WPS7162
Policy Research Working Paper 7162
OECS Ports
An Efficiency and Performance Assessment
Diana Cubas
Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia
Heinrich C. Bofinger
Transport and ICT Global Practice Group
January 2015
Policy Research Working Paper 7162
Abstract
Handling charges in Caribbean ports are two to three distinct policy dimensions: (i) traffic development, (ii) the
times higher than in similar ports in other regions of the institutional and regulatory framework, (iii) infrastructure
world. In some cases, it costs significantly less to ship a development, and (iv) performance, including pricing and
container to Hong Kong SAR, China, or Europe than it finance issues. The report concludes by benchmarking the
does to ship to a neighboring island no more than 100 efficiency of Organization of Eastern Caribbean States ports
miles away. The reasons for high port-handling costs are against other Latin American ports using a stochastic fron-
linked to procedural inefficiencies along the logistics chain, tier approach, and providing a list of next steps for further
high freight rates that shipping lines attribute to empty research and policy prioritization. To make the current anal-
backhauls, and the poor performance of port management ysis possible, a rigorous exercise in the collection of primary
and operations. The Organization of Eastern Caribbean data was conducted, using standardized templates adapted
States shares the larger Caribbean region’s advantages, chal- specifically to the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
lenges, and concerns related to the performance of port context. The collection of data proved to be particularly
management and operations. Yet performance assessments difficult on financial and performance metrics, since many
have been difficult to make because of data constraints. of the ports lack strong statistical systems and institutions.
This report seeks to provide such an assessment along four
This paper is a product of the Transport and ICT Global Practice Group. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to
provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at
cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those
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Produced by the Research Support Team
OECS Ports
An Efficiency and Performance Assessment
Diana Cubas, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, and
Heinrich C. Bofinger
JEL Classification Numbers: L14, L51, L91, R40, R42, R48.
Keywords: Port Performance, Efficiency, Maritime Traffic, Port Capacity, Stochastic Frontiers,
Benchmarking, Island States, Small Economies
This work has been done in partnership with the International Finance Corporation (IFC). Funding was
provided in full by the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID) and the Canadian
International Development Agency (CIDA). The team acknowledges comments by peer reviewers Gylfi
Palsson and William John Gain, and contributions by Harry Moroz. Valuable comments were provided by
Pedro Andres Amo, Arsala Deane, Ankur Huria, Alvaro Quijandria, Frank Sader, Alicia Maude Stephens
and Nelissa Moreen. The team also wants to acknowledge the generous support of the port and transport
authorities and shipping line associations of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS)
countries.
Comments should be addressed to Cecilia Briceno-Garmendia, Transport and ICT Global Practice Group,
The World Bank, E-Mail: cbricenogarmendi@worldbank.org.
OECS Ports: An Efficiency and Performance Assessment
Diana Cubas, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, and Heinrich C. Bofinger
Contents
Acronyms ...................................................................................................................................................... 3
Introduction .................................................................................................................................................. 4
1. Context .................................................................................................................................................. 7
2. An Analysis of Traffic Patterns .............................................................................................................. 8
a. Overall Activity ................................................................................................................................. 8
b. Container Traffic ............................................................................................................................ 12
c. General Cargo ................................................................................................................................ 15
d. Dry Bulk .......................................................................................................................................... 17
e. Liquid Cargo ................................................................................................................................... 18
f. Passenger Traffic ............................................................................................................................ 19
3. Institutional and Regulatory Framework ............................................................................................ 21
4. Infrastructure Development ............................................................................................................... 25
a. Port Infrastructure ......................................................................................................................... 25
b. Capacity and Demand .................................................................................................................... 29
c. Master Plans and Investment Plans............................................................................................... 29
5. Performance, Costs, and Financial Efficiency ..................................................................................... 31
a. Container-handling Systems .......................................................................................................... 31
b. Performance .................................................................................................................................. 33
c. Customs ......................................................................................................................................... 34
d. Pricing ............................................................................................................................................ 38
6. Benchmarking the Efficiency of OECS Ports against Latin America .................................................... 40
References .................................................................................................................................................. 43
Annex 1. Stochastic Frontier Analysis—Methodological Details ................................................................ 44
The Model ............................................................................................................................................... 44
Data ......................................................................................................................................................... 45
Model Results ......................................................................................................................................... 46
Annex 2. OECS Ports at a Glance................................................................................................................. 49
Annex 3. Summary of Emerging Issues ....................................................................................................... 59
2
Acronyms
AAGR average annual growth rate
ASYCUDA automated system for customs data
AW ASYCUDA World
AUSAID Australian Agency for International Development
CATT Customs Assessment Trade Toolkit
CIDA Canadian International Development Agency
CARTAC Caribbean Regional Technical Assistance Center
FAS free along side
GDP gross domestic product
IFC International Finance Corporation
IMF International Monetary Fund
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LCR Latin America and the Caribbean Region
LIAT Leeward Islands Air Transport
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OECS Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
PPP public-private partnership
RMF risk management framework
SEMCAR Supporting Economic Management for the Caribbean
SCASPA St. Christopher Air and Sea Ports Authority
SLASPA St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority
SLMTL St. Lucia Maritime Terminals Ltd.
SMF strategic management framework
SOP standard operating procedure
STS ship to shore
TEU twenty-foot equivalent unit
WCO World Customs Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
3
OECS Ports: An Efficiency
and Performance Assessment
Introduction
There is no apparent cargo capacity problem in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) ports. Though estimates of available capacity and demand are imprecise, self-reported figures
indicate that the ports are operating below their maximum capacity. One possible exception, as repeatedly
reported by operators and shipping lines, may be the terminal of Kingstown in St. Vincent. Overall,
expansion does not seem to be a pressing problem for the OECS ports.
Inadequate maintenance of existing facilities and equipment is drastically curtailing the efficiency
and operational capacity of the OECS ports. While the nominal installed capacity appears sufficient for
the cargo traffic being handled, in practice, the actual throughput of ports is much lower than it could be,
in large part because equipment maintenance is inadequate. Fast-eroding assets exacerbate other
inefficiencies, including those related to the ports’ layout.
The connectivity of the OECS ports is limited by internal issues, not by the capacity of shipping liners
or current route design. Port calls are limited by the quality and operational capacity of the existing ports
and their aging and inefficiently operated equipment. Labor inefficiencies, too, have a significant impact
on the functioning and competitiveness of the OECS ports.
Revamping ports to enable the efficient handling of containers—and to move past outdated break-
bulk practices—is clearly overdue. Many OECS ports have failed to keep pace with the technological
and practical innovations necessary to efficiently handle containerized goods and have failed to invest in
requisite physical infrastructure. A significant amount of space along the piers of several ports is occupied
by warehouses, which present a physical obstacle to the efficient movement of containers. Underdeveloped
infrastructure and equipment constrains these ports from attracting potential business opportunities.
Refurbishment investments need to be planned, taking into consideration the small size of these ports’
markets. Caribbean ports overall have seen vessel traffic decline but cargo and container volumes recover
since the global economic crisis in 2008. These developments may have implications for the efficiency of
OECS ports. As fewer shipping lines are prepared to handle the container traffic of ports not properly
configured for containers, costs and efficiency will be affected. Finally, given the low volumes of cargo at
most OECS ports and the large investment required to operate shore cranes (including the need for a spare
crane in case of a breakdown), the viability of such cranes is questionable in the context.
The OECS ports have not fully developed their infrastructure to satisfy the current and potential
demand of cruise ships, forcing them to use cargo terminals for passenger traffic. One reason why the
OECS ports are unable to respond adequately to increased cargo demand is the improper management of
port facilities. Congestion is due not only to ports’ layout—many OECS ports are designed for break-bulk
and not containerized cargo—but also because priority is given to cruise ships. The efficiency of cargo
handling in ports is largely defined by the behavior of the cruise ship passenger market. Although most
ports have dedicated cruise terminals, due to high demand they have to use cargo terminals to receive
passengers, forcing container ships to berth only after cruise ships have left and delaying the handling of
cargo to overnight hours (when workers are paid overtime) or until the next day. In St. Vincent, for example,
4
the Kingstown cruise terminal has two berths for cruise ships, but the port is not fully equipped to
accommodate a third vessel; additional vessels must dock at the Campden Park container terminal nearby.
In Grenada, although the port has a separate terminal dedicated to cruises, the main cargo berth is used to
dock cruise vessels during the high tourist seasons of April–May and October–November. Governments
should focus on policies and regulations that separate cruise ship and cargo operations, to ensure that cruise
ships’ schedules do not hinder cargo trade.
Institutions, legislation, and regulations are dated and, except in St. Kitts and perhaps Grenada, little
progress has been made to modernize them. Outdated regulations allow uncertainty and a lack of
transparency around the determination of fees and tariffs. With the exception of St. Lucia (Vieux Fort), all
ports are operated and regulated by the government directly and not via a corporatized agency, with no
regulatory guidance on how to implement internationally recognized accounting practices. One resulting
problem is the de facto integration of port finances and government finances. In this context, even if there
are no limits set on private participation, partners may be rebuffed by a perceived lack of transparency. The
lack of modernized regulations and practices makes management less flexible and likely erratic when traffic
suddenly spikes alongside seasonal changes or other events (such as construction booms due to the building
of a new hotel, and so on).
Systematic, performance-based monitoring is for the most part nonexistent, making any operational
and investment gaps difficult to identify, track, and prioritize. Data on port performance, finances, and
other metrics are often absent or structured in such a manner as to make systematic analysis difficult or
impossible. Ports’ financial reports are often mixed with those on extraneous infrastructure installations,
such as airports, making any analysis of ports’ true costs and revenues virtually impossible. Other measures,
such as the TEU 1 per hour of container loading and unloading, berth waiting time, and other metrics are not
collected in a systematic way, depriving port management of valuable tools.
Emerging Policy Implications and Next Steps
1. The OECS ports could benefit from looking at alternative means of financing and managing
infrastructure. A key element of port management is the creation of mechanisms to protect the public
interest. In creating such mechanisms, it is important to keep public statutory and regulatory oversight
responsibilities separate from commercial activities. The OECS service ports might benefit from
introducing public-private partnership (PPP) arrangements to provide access to alternative means of
financing and management, and to break the vicious circle of low productivity and high costs. There
are good worldwide examples of ports that have benefited from various types of PPPs.
2. The OECS ports face the challenge of finding a fiscally responsible way to upgrade port
infrastructure and improve maintenance practices. This issue relates to alternative sources of
financing, such as through PPPs, but certainly merits further analysis on its own. Upgrading physical
layouts that, as a legacy of the break-bulk era, have become an obstacle to ports’ basic container-
handling needs must be reconciled with the very small traffic volumes and markets the ports serve.
There are few international examples of small ports serving small economic areas that have made
investments in such a low level of infrastructure profitable. It would be worth exploring institutional
and port-sharing arrangements that invite innovation and private capital.
1
Twenty-foot equivalent unit.
5
3. Governments would do well to consider innovative ways to revamp the institutions, regulations,
and legislation relevant to port operations. The need for the reform of port institutions is evident. In
this study we have identified four possible steps forward. First, the OECS governments need to
carefully consider regulations and policies that would separate or establish sharing agreements for
cruise ship and cargo operations, so that cruise ship schedules do not hinder cargo trade. Second, ports
need to modernize institutional practices and procedures to allow them to deal with seasonal demand
and one-off events in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Third, the OECS ports might benefit from
the inception of independent regulatory bodies. Fourth, the introduction of the landlord model,
concessions, or outsourcing for port management might boost productivity and draw new technologies
and innovation.
4. Labor reform is necessary to lower costs and improve efficiency. When, how, and to what extent
such reforms might be implemented merits further understanding of the local political and social
environments and institutional constraints. The topic of labor reforms and unions is difficult in any
context, and in the case of the OECS ports, also reflects the legacy of port practices during the break-
bulk era.
5. Achieving regional coordination could bring rapid benefits at a low financial cost. There are many
examples of possible benefits. First, in terms of market development, if OECS countries joined together
to negotiate with international cruise liners, they might develop some market power. Nowadays,
negotiations are done on a bilateral basis, which gives the upper hand to the cruise lines. Similar benefits
may be gained around freight routes and tariff setting. Second, achieving reasonable returns on port
investments in small markets is always a challenge. The OECS could, however, benefit from
coordinated investments and port-sharing agreements that might help reduce investment costs, creating
the basis for a subregional hub-and-spoke system, and making maintenance of valuable assets
financially manageable. Port-sharing agreements would also improve regional resilience to climate-
related events. Third, if the OECS were to pursue PPP alternatives, it would need to create conditions
for successful PPPs. To do that, the OECS could benefit from fostering technical capacity for PPP
management and transaction design at the regional level, perhaps through developing a pool of experts
that would serve the emerging PPP transactions.
6. The sector’s capacity to collect, store, and process data must be improved—and soon. The problem
of unreliable statistics is not exclusive to ports, but everywhere it is encountered, it poses an obstacle
to the monitoring and improvement of performance and cost-efficiency. Statistical capacity has been
recognized as chronically deficient across all the OECS countries and sectors, and was experienced as
a hurdle in the compilation of this study.
7. Further analysis is needed to understand how market dynamics and infrastructure gaps are
linked to performance and efficiency indicators. This study provides a detailed description of traffic
patterns in the OECS region in the years 2008–12 and provides the tools to engage in a deeper analysis
of the impact of traffic development on efficiency and infrastructure gaps. Can regional ports develop
transshipment capacities? What do they need to do to increase their market share—and is this an
important step? Should they focus on attaining increased market shares? Can ports do more to increase
their efficiency? These are just a few of the questions that require further research, now that a
performance baseline has been made available.
6
1. Context
The island nations and territories of the Caribbean have long suffered high costs for moving goods both
within and outside the region. Such costs are due to poor connectivity, a direct result of island geography—
regional markets are effectively “locked in” by the sea—and individual economies too small to efficiently
develop the capital-intensive infrastructure needed to overcome this constraint.
Meanwhile, the Caribbean constitutes a major crossroads for international maritime trade. Located near the
Panama Canal, at a focal point of North and South Atlantic trade routes as well as trade up and down the
east and northern coasts of South America, maritime transport and related logistics services are of vital
importance to the region’s economy.
Despite their strategic location, it is striking that handling charges in Caribbean ports are two to three times
higher than in similar ports in other regions of the world. The overall cost of transport and insurance in the
Caribbean is approximately 30 percent higher than the world average. In some cases, it costs significantly
less to ship a container to Hong Kong SAR, China, or Europe than it does to ship to a neighboring island
no more than 100 miles away.
The reasons for high port-handling costs are linked to procedural inefficiencies along the logistics chain
(for example, customs and trade facilitation), the poor performance of port management and operations,
and also high freight rates that shipping lines attribute to one-way traffic (empty containers must be
repatriated at the carrier’s expense).
The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) 2 shares the larger Caribbean region’s advantages,
challenges, and concerns related to potential trade flows and connectivity, and the performance of port
management and operations. There is much potential to create conditions to foster much-needed economic
growth in the region, including through investment and public-private partnership (PPP) interventions. Yet
any projections or estimates are difficult to make because of data constraints: little has been systematically
documented of the development, stock, and technical performance of the OECS ports and relevant maritime
flows.
The continuing recovery of global trade since 2009, along with the growth of containerized traffic and a
renewed push for investment in physical infrastructure around the world, make an assessment of OECS
port performance timely.
This report seeks to provide such an assessment along four distinct policy dimensions: (i) traffic
development, (ii) the institutional and regulatory framework, (iii) infrastructure development, and (iv)
performance, including pricing and finance issues. The report concludes by benchmarking the efficiency of
OECS ports against other Latin American ports using a stochastic frontier approach.
As a benchmarking exercise, this study identifies general areas in which a specific port outperforms or
underperforms ports with similar characteristics or that are competing for similar markets. The findings
open further opportunities for the exploration of each area, including assigning it priority in relation to other
issues and considering interventions (such as engagement in a multi-stakeholder dialogue). The
2The Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) is comprised of nine nations, of which six are independent and three are
British overseas territories. The independent member countries are Anguilla, Antigua & Barbuda, the British Virgin Islands, the
Commonwealth of Dominica, Grenada, Montserrat, St. Lucia, St. Kitts & Nevis, and St. Vincent & the Grenadines.
7
benchmarking exercise concludes with a list of next steps for further research. The scope of the current
study is six OECS countries and up to eight OECS ports (figure 1.1). These ports were selected since they
are the main ports for international trade in the countries studied.
To make the current analysis possible, a rigorous exercise in the collection of primary data was conducted,
using standardized templates adapted specifically to the OECS context. 3 To our knowledge this is the first
time that a dataset of this type has been put together for the OECS ports. The collection of data proved to
be particularly difficult on financial and performance metrics, since many of the ports lack strong statistical
systems and institutions. The research process that underlies this study itself highlights the need for OECS
ports to invest in statistical capacity.
Figure 1.1 OECS Countries and Ports Covered in the Study
Country City Port Name
Antigua St. John’s St. John’s Harbor
Dominica Roseau Port of Roseau
Grenada St. George’s Port of St. George’s
Basseterre Port of Basseterre
St. Kitts & Nevis
Charlestown Long Point Port
Castries Port Castries
St. Lucia
Vieux-Fort Port of Vieux Fort
Port of Kingstown
St. Vincent & the Grenadines Kingstown
Campden Park
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: OECS members in red. OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
2. An Analysis of Traffic Patterns
a. Overall Activity
Patterns of freight and passenger traffic reveal two distinct and even competing dynamics. OECS
ports act as the most important gateways for much of the region’s trade, which consists primarily of imports.
They are also a cornerstone for tourism, the islands’ main economic activity. To put things in perspective,
the overall contribution of tourism to the economy ranges from 24 percent of gross domestic product (GDP)
in Grenada to 74 percent in Antigua and Barbuda. Moreover, two-thirds of the OECS islands’ tourism can
be traced to cruise activity—a share that is significantly higher than the 14–16 percent seen in leading
Caribbean destinations such as the Bahamas, the Dominican Republic, or Jamaica (WTTC 2012). This
makes ports pivotal to the economy, because of their function in both trade and tourism, and simultaneously
creates tension: in the face of an apparent infrastructure gap, port authorities and operators tend to give
priority to calls by cruise ships over cargo vessels.
The significant majority of OECS cargo calls is concentrated in three islands and involves
containerized cargo. There is very little general cargo, and liquid cargo is mostly processed in private,
enclave-like facilities. Dominica (Woodbridge Bay), Grenada (St. George’s), and St. Vincent (Campden
Park) together get two-thirds of the OECS cargo vessel traffic. Aside from container and liquid cargo, most
of the bulk and general cargo calls are due to interisland traffic. Grenada has the highest number of vessel
calls for general cargo, at 1,016 on average per year. Long Point has the lowest number of calls for general
cargo, at four calls per year. Dominica, St. Lucia, and St. Vincent move dry bulk in very small quantities,
3 Original templates by Foster and Briceño-Garmendia (2009).
8
usually construction materials such as sand and cement imports. In Dominica the number of calls for dry
bulk has been steady in recent years, while in St. Lucia and St. Vincent, it has decreased alongside a slump
in construction investment (in, for example, hotels). Bulk cargo tends to be conducted in small vessels.
Grenada has the highest number of vessel calls for liquid cargo.
The region’s overall cargo vessel traffic is showing a declining trend: total vessel traffic contracted
by 17 percent in 2008–12. This drop contrasts with a rising trend in cargo volume (table 2.4). The decline
in cargo vessel traffic is most likely due to shipping liners using higher load factors on their vessels. It is
also an indication that the OECS ports are slowly moving from break-bulk to containerized practices. Aside
from Woodbridge Bay (which experienced 1 percent growth over the period) and Campden Park (11 percent
growth), OECS ports’ cargo traffic decreased over the period (table 2.1). Antigua’s cargo calls dropped by
half over the period, and the transshipment activities of Vieux Fort also fell significantly.
Table 2.1 Total Cargo Vessel Calls, 2008–12
Change
AAGR
Port 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Growth
(%)
(%)
St. John’s 711 613 506 470 378 -47 -15
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 1,043 1,011 1,041 992 1,056 +1 0
St. George’s 1,235 1,196 1,173 1,162 1,018 -18 -5
Basseterre 711 625 432 569 529 -26 -5
Long Point 403 464 437 344 295 -27 -7
Castries 323 316 350 308 288 -11 -3
Vieux Fort 599 549 560 521 447 -25 -7
Campden Park/Kingstown 646 777 896 753 720 +11 +4
Total 5,671 5,551 5,395 5,119 4,731 -17 -4
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate.
Freight traffic is dominated by containerized cargo, which in recent decades has been handled by five
main shipping lines. Tropical, King Ocean, CMA CGM, Sea Freight, and Geest Line together dominate
the Caribbean market. 4 Most of the routes covered by these shipping lines are “feeder routes” that use
Miami as their main hub and Trinidad and Tobago and Vieux Fort as regional transfer hubs between vessels.
In practice, there is very little interplay between the north and the south of the region. This dynamic is not
unique to the OECS and extends to the entire Caribbean, in which cargo routes are clearly divided between
northern and southern islands. In practical terms, this creates a hub-and-spoke system.
Most of the shipping lines that carry cargo to the OECS are considered “liner” services, and adhere
to a predictable schedule.5 The typical schedule shows the same vessel plowing exactly the same routes
over and over again each year. For example, King Ocean has two vessels that, on a 14-day rotation, 6 travel
the following route:
4
With the exception of Geest Line, which takes general cargo, other shipping lines carry containerized cargo. In addition, Crowley
serves some islands (for example, Antigua and Grenada), mainly doing Ro-Ro (Roll on/Roll off), a method of ocean cargo service
using a vessel with ramps that allow wheeled vehicles to be loaded and discharged without cranes (World Bank, 2007).
5 The term “liner services” is used here in contrast to “tramper services.” Liner services refer to shipping lines that take on fixed
route schedules with their fleet and/or in partnership with other liners. Tramper services are by demand.
6 The route has a bigger vessel capacity of 550 TEU nominal (330 TEU actual) and a smaller vessel capacity of 500 TEU nominal
(275 TEU actual).
9
Port Everglades (Miami), Philipsburg (St. Maarten), Basseterre (St. Kitts), Road Bay
(Anguilla), Gustavia (St. Barths), Charlestown (Nevis), Roseau (Dominica),
Bridgetown (Barbados), Castries and Vieux Fort (St. Lucia), Campden Park (St.
Vincent), St. George’s (Grenada), Plymouth (Montserrat), Paramaribo (Suriname),
Georgetown (Guyana), and back up to Port Everglades
Contrary to cargo shipping lines, which have only a few specific routes and schedules, the cruise ship
industry has multiple routes that vary widely depending on port availability. Around 30 cruise lines
serve the OECS; each has several ships traveling to each island and serving different routes. Ship sizes and
routes vary depending on the length of the trip, which can vary from 3 to 15 days. Schedules are planned
and sent to each port two years ahead of scheduled arrival. St. Kitts (Basseterre), St. Lucia (Castries), and
Antigua (St. John’s) get calls from most cruise liners serving the Caribbean, while Dominica and St. Vincent
are served by less than half of the cruise lines (table 2.2). The number of cruise lines serving each port,
however, does not necessarily reflect the total annual number of cruise ships serving the port, since a cruise
line can have more than one ship calling the same port.
The demand of cruise lines is exerting pressure on existing OECS port infrastructure, which seems
increasingly insufficient in the face of demand. The cruise ship industry fosters a spontaneous economy
around cruise terminal areas, usually located downtown from the main city. But in terms of infrastructure,
the OECS ports—and even regional cities—are not developed to satisfy the capacity and the potential
demand of cruise ships. In Basseterre (St. Kitts) another pier is being built in the cruise terminal, since the
current pier can receive only two cruise ships at a time. In Antigua a separate cruise terminal (Heritage)
holds four cruise ships at a time and, during periods of high demand, up to five. If a sixth cruise vessel
arrives, it is sent to the cargo terminal. 7 The Kingstown cruise terminal in St. Vincent is located next to the
cargo terminal and has two berths for two cruise ships, but the port is not fully equipped to accommodate a
third vessel. If a third approaches the island, it needs to dock in the container terminal. In Grenada, although
the port has a separate terminal dedicated to cruises, the main cargo berth is also used to dock cruise vessels
during the high season in April–May and October–November. Since Long Point Port (Nevis) is a relatively
new port, the demand for cruises has not fully developed.
7 This happens more rarely, about once or twice a year.
10
Table 1.2 Cruise Lines Serving the OECS Ports
St. John’s St. George’s Roseau Basseterre Long Point Castries Kingstown
Aida Cruises X X X X
Azamara Club Cruises X X X
Carnival Cruise Line X X X X X
Costa Cruises X X X X
Celebrity Cruise Lines X X X X X
Compagnie de Ponant X X X
Club Med Marine X X
Crystal Cruises X
Cunard Line X X
Disney Cruise Line X X
Fred Olsen Cruise Line X X X X
Holland America Line X X X X X X
Island Cruises X
Mediterranean Shipping X
MSC Cruises X X
Norwegian Cruise Lines X X X
Oceania Cruises Inc. X X X X
Ocean Village X
P&O Cruises X X X X X X
Passat Ship Management
Princess Cruises X X X X X
Regent Seven Seas Cruises X X X
Royal Caribbean Cruise Line X X X X
Saga Cruises X X X X X
Seabourn Cruise Line X X X X X X
Silversea Cruises X X X X X X
Star Clippers Cruises X X X X X
SeaDream Cruise X X X
Thomson Cruises X X X X X
TUI Cruises X X X X X
Windstar Cruises X X X X X
Source: Authors’ compilation of data provided by port authorities and cruise agents.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
With the exception of St. George’s (Grenada), which seems to be exemplary among OECS ports for
protecting the cargo ship berthing window, ports give cruise ships precedence over cargo. This implies
that, in practice, the efficiency of cargo handling in ports is largely defined by the behavior of the cruise
ship passenger market. Although most OECS ports have dedicated cruise terminals, they are forced to use
cargo terminals to receive cruises due to high demand; container ships must wait to berth until the cruise
ship is gone. For example, in St. Lucia, Castries has a dedicated terminal for cruise ships (Pointe Seraphine)
with two berths, but it is very common for cruise vessels to be sent to the cargo terminal during the peak
tourist season. Cruise operations are between 6 a.m. and 6 p.m. (sometimes until 8 p.m.) and cargo
operations can start only after the cruise ship leaves, delaying the cargo handling to overnight hours (when
workers will be paid overtime) or until the next day.
In terms of cruise vessel calls, the ports of St. John’s (Antigua), Basseterre (St. Kitts), and Castries
(St. Lucia) together receive about 60 percent of OECS passenger traffic. Antigua has the highest
11
number of passenger calls, at 333 per year. This is most likely due to its position as the northernmost island
in the OECS, which puts it closer to most cruise ships’ original ports of embarkation, such as Miami,
Florida. Also, Antigua’s dedicated cruise terminal holds the highest number of vessels within the OECS,
and has the most advanced cruise ship infrastructure. Although Grenada and St. Vincent together receive
an important share of passenger vessel traffic, due to their location farther south, this share is still smaller.
The Port of Long Point in Nevis receives the smallest number of vessel calls, perhaps because it is a
relatively new port, established only in 1998. The port is still developing its infrastructure to attract more
cruise tourism. Additionally, most of the cruise ships in St. Kitts and Nevis berth in the Port of Basseterre.
The Port of Vieux Fort is dedicated to container transshipment and only gets the overflow of cruise ships
calling Castries, which explains the smaller number of cruise calls (table 2.3).
The Port of Woodbridge Bay in Dominica is the only OECS port to be experiencing a visible decline
in passenger vessel calls—21 percent between 2008 and 2012. This might be due to its underdeveloped
dedicated cruise infrastructure. Dominica has a small dedicated pier for cruise ships in downtown Roseau,
and also uses the Woodbridge Bay container port. Both piers, however, can hold only one ship at a time,
and the cruise terminal does not have the same facilities as most other cruise terminals in the OECS.
Combined, these factors may make these ports less attractive to cruise lines. Long Point in Nevis, on the
other hand, has seen an increase in cruise traffic, but from a very low call level. Across the OECS as a
whole, meanwhile, the flow of cruise ships has been stable despite regional economic difficulties and the
global crisis.
Table 2.2 Total Passenger Vessel Calls, 2008–12
Change
AAGR
Port 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Growth
(%)
(%)
St. John’s 317 367 304 328 333 +5 +2
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 213 241 250 194 168 -21 -5
St. George’s 232 251 209 207 227 -2 0
Basseterre 204 234 172 305 267 +31 +13
Long Point 27 19 25 34 31 +15 +7
Castries 132 385 334 286 266 +102 +39
Vieux Fort 0 0 4 4 2 -50 -25
Campden Park/Kingstown 172 164 132 139 173 +1 +1
Total 1,297 1,661 1,430 1,497 1,467 +13 +4
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate.
b. Container Traffic
OECS ports have finally recovered the level of container volume traffic that they had before the
global economic crisis. This has occurred despite a notable reduction in vessel calls. Shipping liners are
using higher load factors on their vessels. Container traffic is a good indication of trade intensity and, as
such, is a sign of recovery. Nowadays, nearly 95 percent of finished consumer goods are transported in
containers. OECS members, like most islands in the Caribbean, are net importers. Imports include nearly
every consumable, including most foodstuffs, and supplies for the resort and hotel industries. 8 The islands’
8Beyond the regular consumables imported via the ports of the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), container traffic
also reflects ongoing construction and recovery projects. Traffic can rise over 20 percent during years of resort construction, or
during hurricane recovery efforts.
12
dependence on such imports underscores the relevance of having efficient ports to make sure supplies reach
their destinations. The larger hotels and resorts use their corporate purchasing power to source nearly all of
their ingredients from cost-effective sources abroad.
During 2008–12, that is, the period following the economic crisis, aggregate container volumes
increased by 8 percent (table 2.4). The main ports driving this increase were Woodbridge Bay in Dominica
and Vieux Fort in St. Lucia. Both Castries and Vieux Fort in St. Lucia received more than half of total
OECS container traffic, with the transshipment Port of Vieux Fort alone handling 46,000 TEU per year,
equivalent to 30 percent of the total OECS traffic. Both ports also seemed to recover from the economic
crisis. 9 Dominica’s Woodbridge Bay port has also recovered: traffic increased by 58 percent between 2008
and 2012. Antigua, on the other hand, has seen a slump, mainly because of the economic impact of the
collapse of Stanford’s businesses in a banking scandal in 2007. Stanford’s enterprises were the top
employers in Antigua next to the airline LIAT and the Government of Antigua.
Table 2.3 Container Traffic, 2008 and 2012
Port TEU Growth
2008 2012 Change (%) AAGR (%)
St. John’s 20,052 13,485 -33 -9
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 12,611 19,905 +58 +13
St. George’s 17,799 13,920 -22 -6
Basseterre 7,100 7,801 +10 +2
Long Point 2,453 2,665 +9 +3
Castries 35,977 37,672 +5 +2
Vieux Fort 34,226 45,668 +33 +13
Campden Park/Kingstown 16,569 16,827 +2 0
Total 146,787 157,943 +8 +3
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate; TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit.
Many OECS container traffic patterns are linked to construction projects, mostly in the tourism
sector. In St. Vincent, Campden Park’s volume has been relatively consistent. It has been reported that
much of the equipment and materials for the construction of Argyle International Airport is routed through
the port (figure 2.1). Throughput in the Port of Long Point (Nevis) dropped after hurricane Omar’s
significant damage to the Four Seasons Hotel in 2008. The hotel reopened two years later, in 2010, and
with that traffic went back to its usual levels. 10 Dominica, too, has seen new hotel construction; Secret Bay
was ranked among the top new hotels in the Caribbean in 2012 by Travel & Leisure Magazine. 11 Ports must
modernize institutional practices and procedures to allow them to deal with unexpected or occasional events
in an efficient and cost-effective manner.
9 Though not reflected in table 2.4, Vieux Fort’s traffic experienced a significant drop in 2013 due to the breakdown of the port’s
only crane and its spreader.
10 In addition, anecdotally it has been reported that the financial difficulties of the Port of Basseterre were in part caused by the
waiving of all port-handling fees for the significant amount of cargo related to the construction of the Marriott St. Kitts Resort.
11 http://dominicanewsonline.com/news/homepage/news/economy-development/secret-bay-among-top-50-new-hotels-in-2012/.
13
Figure 2.1 Container Traffic, 2008–12
50,000
40,000
30,000
20,000
10,000
0
Vieux Fort Castries Woodbridge Campden Saint Saint Basseterre Long Point
Bay/Roseau Park George's John's
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
Container Trade Imbalance
A major issue relevant to container traffic is the balance of trade; a large number of containers are
shipped back out of OECS ports empty. With the exception of St. Lucia, full containers leaving the
islands make up only 5–13 percent of total container traffic (figure 2.2). St. Lucia’s numbers reflect the
transshipment operations of Vieux Fort, where full containers are deposited and then picked up later by
another vessel; such containers compose over 66 percent of all containers shipped from that port. Antigua’s
data, meanwhile, may be skewed: shipping lines stored empty containers for free at the port until 2014, and
a large number of empty boxes accumulated in the container yard. Overall, the disproportionate outflow of
empty containers is seen as a key contributor to the high costs of shipping in the Caribbean.
Figure 2.2 Percentage of Full versus Empty Containers in Total Flow, 2012
100%
90%
Percent of total Throughput (TEU)
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Antigua and Dominica Grenada St. Kitts and St. Lucia St. Vincent and
Barbuda Nevis the Grenadines
Shipped Empty Shipped Full Landed
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit.
14
Container Transshipment Activity
Vieux Fort in St. Lucia is the only port in the OECS dedicated to transshipment and one of the few
designed to be a container terminal. The rest are dedicated to trade, mainly imports. These ports host
occasional transshipment activities, but these are small and yield very little revenue. Transshipment ports
require that space for storing and shifting containers be designed and used in a highly effective manner,
without obstructing warehouses in either the yard or the pier. Vieux Fort, the only true dedicated
transshipment port in the OECS, is also the only one whose operations are set up to facilitate private
participation (through a subsidiary of the St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority that has yet to be privatized).
c. General Cargo
The tonnage of overall general cargo traffic in the region decreased by 24 percent in 2008–12. This
indicates that the OECS ports are slowly moving from the break-bulk era into the containerization era.
Except for Long Point (which experienced a 24 percent increase) and Woodbridge Bay (a 1 percent
increase), the OECS ports showed a decline during this period (table 2.5). The Port of Vieux Fort
experienced the largest decline, at 48 percent, during the period. General cargo in Vieux Fort, mainly
imports, represented only 20 percent of the business of this dedicated transshipment port. Out of ten
shipments, only two are bulk (and this includes dry and liquid bulk). Another reason why general cargo has
declined in the region is that interisland transportation costs are very high, and maritime logistics are
inadequate.
Most general cargo is for interisland trade within the Caribbean, moved by operators on small vessels
called schooners. 12 As is the case with container traffic, the OECS countries are also net importers of
general cargo. Imports are predominantly produce from Trinidad and Tobago; internal agricultural
production is limited. Additionally, hotels generally import the majority of the goods for their operations,
including food.
St. George is host to 45 percent of total general cargo traffic in the region (table 2.5). Imports to the
region account for 90 percent of such traffic. Most imports into Grenada are from Trinidad and Tobago.
Grenada’s main agricultural exports include nutmeg and cocoa; the country has been trying to recover its
market share since these crops were destroyed by Hurricane Ivan in 2004.
Table 2.5 General Cargo Traffic, 2008 and 2012
Port Tonnes Growth
2008 2012 Change (%) AAGR (%)
St. John’s 445,234 288,986 -35 -10
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 26,962 27,142 +1 0
St. George’s 503,887 461,479 -8 -2
Basseterre 151,917 105,313 -31 -8
Long Point 2,947 3,661 +24 +31
Castries 123,721 82,627 -33 -9
Vieux Fort 55,868 28,787 -48 -14
Campden Park/Kingstown 56,649 34,272 -40 -11
Total 1,367,185 1,032,267 -24 -7
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
12 Schooners are typically sailing vessels converted into small cargo vessels.
15
With the exceptions of Antigua and Dominica, general cargo in OECS ports declined after 2008
(figure 2.3). The Port of St. John’s, with the second-largest volume of general cargo in the region,
experienced a sharp decrease in traffic from 445,000 in 2008 to 282,000 tonnes in 2010. Since 2011 the
port has started to slowly recover its general cargo volumes. On the other hand, general cargo movements
in Woodbridge Bay, Dominica, remained relatively steady even after the economic crisis.
Figure 2.3 General Cargo Traffic, 2008–12
600
500
400
Thousands of Tonnes
300
200
100
0
Saint Saint Basseterre Castries Campden Vieux Woodbridge Long
George's John's Park/Kingstown Fort Bay/Roseau Point
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
The biggest general cargo imbalance is seen in Antigua (figure 2.4). Imports represent 93 percent of this
island nation’s general cargo traffic. Land in Antigua is arid, making it a marginal producer of agriculture
highly dependent on imports, mainly from St. Maarten and Dominica. Besides produce, 7 percent of the
traffic is composed of miscellaneous items such as soft drinks, bottled water, rum, and furniture.
St. Vincent exports the highest volume of general cargo in the OECS, composing 37 percent of total
exports. Much of this traffic is headed to the Grenadine islands, including Canouan, Union Island, and
Mustique. St. Vincent exports produce (such as bananas, taro root, sweet potatoes and yams, coconut,
ginger, and plums) to Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, and the United Kingdom. Exports also include
breadfruit to the United States and Canada. Aside from primary goods the country has also started to export
processed goods to Venezuela. Exports destined for Antigua and Grenada represent less than 10 percent of
St. Vincent’s total general cargo traffic.
16
Figure 2.4 General Cargo Trade Imbalance, 2012
100%
90%
80%
Percent of total Cargo 70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Antigua and Dominica Grenada St. Kitts and St. Lucia St. Vincent
Barbuda Nevis and the
Grenadines
Exports Imports
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
d. Dry Bulk
The main driver of dry-bulk traffic in the OECS is construction projects. In this category, sand and
cement are the products most often imported and exported. Most construction projects on the islands are
related to the tourism industry, mainly hotel development. For this reason, dry-bulk traffic fluctuates from
year to year, depending on construction needs and other industry factors. Road construction projects also
increase dry-bulk traffic, mainly for the import of raw materials.
The OECS experienced an overall decrease of 22 percent in dry-bulk traffic in 2008–12; the Port of
St. John’s experienced a particularly sharp decrease of 67 percent in these years (table 2.6). As for
the rest of the economy in Antigua, dry-bulk traffic was severely affected by the Stanford crisis. Dry-bulk
volumes decreased by more than half. On the other hand the Port of St. George’s, with the highest volume
of dry bulk in the OECS, remained relatively steady with only a 1 percent decrease during this period.
Table 2.4 Dry-Bulk Traffic, 2008 and 2012
Port Tonnes Growth
2008 2012 Change (%) AAGR (%)
St. John’s 91,809 30,700 -67 -23
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 249,444 211,679 -15 5
St. George’s 253,279 251,266 -1 0
Basseterre 109,852 104,926 -4 3
Long Point 25,314 29,049 15 10
Castries 5,424 3,859 -29 36
Vieux Fort 174,243 93,682 -46 2
Campden Park/Kingstown 76,256 46,796 -39 -11
Total 985,621 768,098 -22 -5
Source: Authors’ own elaboration based on primary collection.
Note: * Data for Castries from 2011. AAGR = average annual growth rate; OECS = Organization of
Eastern Caribbean States.
17
With the exception of Woodbridge Bay and Vieux Fort, dry-bulk traffic in OECS ports is gradually
changing. Woodbridge Bay in Dominica experienced a sharp increase of 71 percent in 2011 (figure 2.5),
mainly due to a major construction project—the building of a new road to connect to Melville International
Airport. In the case of Vieux Fort, a high volume of dry-bulk traffic was linked to the construction of a
resort in 2007, but the project failed due to financial reasons. The Port of Castries experienced the lowest
volume of dry bulk: 4,000 tonnes a year, on average, interrupted by a sharp increase of 16,000–20,000
tonnes per year in 2009 and 2010.
Figure 2.5 Dry-Bulk Traffic, 2008–12
500
400
Thousands of Tonnes
300
200
100
0
Saint Woodbridge Basseterre Vieux Campden Saint Long Castries
George's Bay/Roseau Fort Park/Kingstown John's Point
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
The traffic imbalance for dry bulk is very high; most of the islands import at least 95 percent of their
dry bulk traffic. St. Lucia is the exception; here, 65 percent of the dry-bulk traffic are exports of lumber,
sand, and cement to other islands in the Caribbean. One reason some members of the OECS are importing
sand from other countries is because the local sand quality is not adequate for construction.
e. Liquid Cargo
The mainstay of liquid-bulk traffic is fuel for power stations and automobiles. Across the OECS liquid
bulk is handled outside ports, though the port authority has regulatory oversight power. Typically a jetty or
a buoy, operated by a private company, is used to move liquid-bulk cargo; in some cases the port also
provides facilities. Most liquid-cargo traffic is imports.
Liquid-bulk traffic increased by 8 percent overall in the OECS in 2008–12. Grenada had the highest
volume of liquid-bulk traffic, mainly in imports, but experienced a 5 percent decrease during this period
(table 2.7). Long Point also experienced a significant decrease, of 18 percent, in liquid-bulk traffic. In the
case of Castries in St. Lucia, the port handles very little liquid bulk, around 4,000 tonnes, but traffic
increased by 83 percent during this period.
18
Table 2.7 Liquid-Bulk Traffic, 2008 and 2012
Port Tonnes Growth
2008 2012 Change (%) AAGR (%)
St. John’s — — — —
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 43,967 48,536 +10 +3
St. George’s 85,076 81,061 -5 -1
Basseterre 68,161 81,296 +19 +18
Long Point 17,869 14,599 -18 -5
Castries 2,218 4,060 +83 +34
Vieux Fort 35,310 38,291 +8 +2
Campden Park/Kingstown 53,393 63,453 +19 +5
Total 305,994 331,296 +8 +5
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
— Not available.
Liquid-bulk traffic patterns remained relatively steady in the OECS in 2008–12. The Port of Basseterre
(St. Kitts) was the only port that experienced a significant decrease in liquid-bulk imports in 2010 and a
sharp increase in 2011 of more than 50 percent, from 41,000 tonnes to 90,000 tonnes (figure 2.6). Liquid-
bulk imports to the Port of Castries doubled between 2008 and 2012, from 2,000 to 4,000 tonnes.
Figure 2.6 Liquid-Bulk Traffic, 2008–12
100
90
80
Total Imports (Thousands of tones)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Basseterre Saint Campden Woodbridge Vieux Long Castries
George's Park/Kingstown Bay/Roseau Fort Point
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
f. Passenger Traffic
Passenger traffic across the OECS declined by 6 percent in 2008–12. The OECS ports have not yet fully
developed their infrastructure to satisfy current and potential capacity needs, forcing ports to use their cargo
19
terminals for passenger traffic. 13 The passenger experience at a cargo terminal does not live up to that at a
dedicated cruise terminal, which may prompt cruise passengers to choose different destinations. In addition,
in contrast to hotel-based tourism, the cruise ship segment of the tourist industry brings a large number of
visitors who spend no more than a day on the destination island, and spend relatively little. Therefore,
OECS countries are trying to attract increased investments in hotel properties. For example, prior to the
economic crisis, St. Lucia was anticipating a 40 percent increase in hotel capacity by 2008, to be spurred
by the investments of large chains (Bofinger and Millan-Placci 2012). Similarly, St. Vincent expect its
completion of a new airport to increase investments in larger hotels.
The ports of St. John’s, Basseterre, and Castries together host 74 percent of total OECS passenger
traffic. Basseterre and Long Point are the only two ports where passenger traffic increased during the study
period; Basseterre’s increased the most, at 35 percent (table 2.8). Long Point’s traffic increased by only 4
percent (this port has the lowest volume of passenger traffic in the OECS, receiving 4,000 passengers
annually, or only 0.2 percent of the OECS total). Although Nevis is a relatively new port, more cruise ships
are docking there as the cruise industry grows.
Dominica and St. Vincent experienced the largest decline in cruise passenger traffic during 2008–12.
Traffic in Dominica decreased by 31 percent, possibly because of insufficient space for cruise ships. St.
Vincent receives less traffic due to its location far south of the other islands, but the port is trying to increase
traffic by attracting South American tourists.
Table 2.5 Passenger Traffic, 2008 and 2012
Port Passengers Growth
2008 2012 Change (%) AAGR (%)
St. John’s 597,124 567,707 -5 0
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 378,963 262,814 -31 -5
St. George’s 296,181 247,884 -16 -3
Basseterre 397,507 535,290 +35 +9
Long Point 3,857 4,020 +4 +4
Castries 610,343 571,894 -6 -1
Campden Park/Kingstown 116,709 77,179 -34 -8
Total 2,400,684 2,266,788 -6 -1
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: AAGR = average annual growth rate; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
In 2009 all of the islands experienced an increase in passenger traffic, most notable in Antigua. With
700,000 cruise passengers, Antigua far surpassed the rest of region during the period 2008–12 (figure 2.7).
This is perhaps because it is the first point of call for most cruise ships coming from Europe; it is also the
northernmost island among OECS members.
With the exception of Castries, all members of the OECS experienced a decrease in passenger traffic
in 2010. Antigua experienced the largest decline, or 22 percent of total traffic, mainly due the impact of the
Stanford crisis on the country’s economy. In 2012 Castries had the highest volume of passenger traffic,
with 572,000 passengers. The Port of Woodbridge Bay/Roseau experienced a significant decrease in 2012,
from 416,000 to 263,000 passengers.
13 No metrics were available on the frequency of cruise ships occupying cargo berths.
20
Figure 2.7 Passenger Traffic, 2008–12
800
700
Number of Passengers (Thousands)
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Castries St. John's Basseterre Woodbridge/ St. George's Kingstown Long
Roseau Point
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
3. Institutional and Regulatory Framework
A key element of port management is the creation of mechanisms to protect the public interest. In
creating such mechanisms, it is important to keep public statutory and regulatory oversight responsibilities
separate from commercial activities (World Bank 2007). In this context, governments provide economic
and technical oversight without getting involved in commercial operations. Increasing private sector
participation in the delivery of port services may be seen as an instrument to achieve well-defined public
interest objectives.
One “best practice” for the management of smaller ports in developing countries is the landlord port
model. In this model the port authority may still own the port, but infrastructure is leased out to private
operators. Most, if not all, port functions remain in the private sector, including cargo handling. Contrary
to this practice, the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) islands operate on the service port
model, in which a public authority (or public entity) provides most, if not all, port services, and owns the
port outright.
The OECS ports are government-run service ports; all basic infrastructure and major
superstructure is owned by the government. Governments have statutory responsibility for the
management, development, and maintenance of the sea ports (table 3.1). Not surprisingly, the port
authorities, which in most cases are also the operators, act as the regulatory agencies. There is no
operational, independent regulatory agency governing the port sector. In Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, and
St. Lucia the port authority also serves as the operator and regulator for airports.
St. Lucia’s port at Vieux Fort was a first attempt to move toward the landlord model. 14 In 1995 the St. Lucia
Air and Sea Ports Authority (SLASPA) created a subsidiary company called the St. Lucia Maritime
14
The other exception is the handling of liquid bulk, which is done privately in an enclave.
21
Terminals Ltd. (SLMTL) to run the Port of Vieux Fort. While the SLMTL was expected to have private
management, it is still 100 percent owned by the SLASPA.
Table 3.1 List of Select OECS Port Authorities
Country Port Port Authority/Regulator/Operator
Antigua St. John’s Antigua and Barbuda Port Authority
Dominica Woodbridge Bay/Roseau Dominica Air and Sea Ports Authority
Grenada St. George’s Grenada Ports Authority
Basseterre St. Christopher Air and Sea Ports Authority
St. Kitts and Nevis
Long Point Nevis Air and Sea Ports Authority
Castries St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority
St. Lucia
Vieux Fort St. Lucia Marine Terminals Ltd.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Campden Park/Kingstown St. Vincent and the Grenadines Port Authority
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
Because of a lack of independent regulatory bodies, adjustments to tariffs and fees are generally made
on an ad hoc basis. With the exception of St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent, all ports base fixed criteria
for adjusting handling charges on periodic reviews, often separated by more than three years. Adjustments
to handling charges in St. Kitts and Nevis are done freely, based on market conditions. In St. Vincent
handling charges are adjusted upon petition from the regulatory board. In general, the process of tariff
adjustments is not very clear. Authorities at St. Vincent report making adjustments by petition and, at St.
Kitts, on a market basis; Dominica uses the free along side (FAS) system. With the exception of Antigua,
all criteria for adjusting port fees are set by the port authority (table 3.2). In many cases, fees are contained
in the law providing the port its authority, and changes by the port authority must be approved by parliament
or another higher government level before being applied.
Table 3.2 Select Regulatory and Institutional Frameworks at a Glance
St. Vincent
Antigua & St. Kitts &
Dominica Grenada St. Lucia & the
Barbuda Nevis
Grenadines
Corporatization of
No Partial –
service provision
Sector reform year No reform 2007 No reform
Legislation year 1973 2006 1978 1993 1983 1975
Decentralization No
Foreign owner
No Yes
restrictions
Port terminal
No
concession
Independent
No
regulatory agency
Criteria for tariff At petition to the Freely based on market At petition to the
Other Other
adjustment regulatory board conditions regulatory board
Freely based Fixed periodic
Criteria for handling At petition to the
Fixed periodic review of more than 3 years on market review of more
charges adjustment regulatory board
conditions than 3 years
Criteria for port fees
Other Set by port authority
adjustment
Source: Authors’ compilation.
22
With the exception of Dominica, which undertook a sector reform in 2007, all ports have legal and
regulatory frameworks that are over 20 years old. In 2007 Dominica introduced the so-called FAS
system and proceeded with drastic workforce reforms to increase port performance. The FAS principle
establishes a flat box rate per container; the shipping lines only incur charges related to ship handling, and
the consignees assume all charges related to cargo handling. In addition, the management reduced the gang
size serving vessels from 32 to 20 members, and also reduced wages by 30 percent by raising the required
gang tonnage per hour from 12 to 16. In St. Kitts new port legislation and regulations are awaiting approval
of the St. Christopher Air and Sea Ports Authority (SCASPA) prior to tabling in parliament.
Select private involvement has spurred incipient competition in ancillary services. For ancillary
services—container, general cargo, bulk, and even passenger facilities—private sector participation is
allowed, though with restrictions, in a limited number of port operations. In St. Kitts and Nevis, container-
handling operations are conducted by private shipping agents. In St. Vincent stevedoring is also conducted
by the shipping agents. In St. Lucia private participation is allowed in tug- and line-handling services. Also,
Castries and Vieux Fort have lease contracts for line handling and towage. Antigua has lease contracts for
dredging and line handling, while St. Vincent has lease contracts for towage.
Labor disputes are another issue relevant to port management and notable in the OECS. Most of the
ports still operate under labor assumptions originating from the break bulk era prior to the onset of
containerization in the 1950s and 1960s. While break bulk operations where highly labor intensive,
requiring warehousing and expert loading and unloading of goods from ships, the containerization process
moved the warehousing and packaging process out of the port. Unions then resisted the onset of the new
technology, and where laws were protective enough, though the technology changed, the staffing has
remained the same. 15
The ports of Castries, St. George’s, and St. John’s face strong unions that challenge efficiency and
productivity. In the OECS much legislation and regulation still reflects a protectionist view. The ports of
Castries, St. George’s, and St. John’s have a large and expensive stevedoring and longshoring workforce.
Newer ports—built after containerization became mainstream—such as Vieux Fort in St. Lucia and Long
Point in Nevis, face considerably fewer challenges from unions.
The impact of workforce costs is evident in St. Lucia’s Port of Castries. Stevedoring was once done
privately, but both longshoring and stevedoring are now accomplished by labor paid directly by the port
authority, with workers represented by four different unions. There is a minimum 4-hour work rule,
requiring gangs to be paid for at least 4 hours even if a task takes only 30 minutes. While the number of
workers needed per gang has fallen steadily from 16 to 2 as container technology has improved, for political
reasons the required membership has been kept at 4. Reportedly, onshore crane breakdowns that require a
15
Overstaffing, in particular, has been a pervasive feature of most port organizations in both the developing and developed world.
Achieving more cost-efficient operations will generally require significant reductions in the workforce. Therefore, reducing the
workforce in a socially acceptable way must be a prominent concern of public authorities and an integral part of the reform process.
Addressing the overstaffing issue as one of the first steps in the reform process, before involving the private sector in operations,
will usually facilitate the overall reform process. Since overstaffing in ports is often the result of government policies that view
port organizations as instruments of social policy and natural shelters for the unemployed, governments should take the lead
responsibility in resolving this issue. Often this means creating programs to ease the transition of port labor into other sectors.
Doing this, in turn, requires the application of significant financial and management resources early in the reform process World
Bank, 2007).
23
shift to ship’s gear slow the workflow; intentional delays of container throughput result in overtime pay for
the gangs. 16 In a similar manner, morning work is reportedly slowed to take advantage of double pay during
lunchtime. Changes in port productivity have been difficult to implement: wages have to be increased on a
regular basis to keep ports operational.
Because of labor disputes in Grenada, shipping lines transferred the responsibility of contracting and
managing stevedoring and longshoring to the Grenada Port Authority in 2000. The same four-hour
minimum work rule found in St. Lucia is extended to a minimum of eight hours in Grenada, with high
wages. Gang sizes are kept artificially high at 22 members per gang and, since the port does not have a
crane and therefore uses ship’s gear, the gangs are used for every vessel. The labor laws supporting these
distortions were established when containers where introduced, to keep longshoremen’s pay at the same
level as when they were destuffing break bulk. These arrangements constrain Grenada from acquiring any
sort of shore-based crane. In addition, though longshoremen and stevedores do not officially work for the
port—and the port is reportedly open 24 hours, 7 days a week, for quayside operations—Tropical Shipping
reports that when one of its ships arrives the line still has to negotiate with labor unions regarding the actual
hours to be worked.
Labor considerations similarly affect the operations of customs departments. In St. Lucia roughly 4
percent of all commercial consignments are physically inspected; many of these inspections, however,
occur after-hours or on weekends, often at a site designated by the receiver of the goods. The inspector thus
is able to charge overtime for the inspection. An x-ray machine purchased for EC$1 million was sitting
unused for three years in the main cargo shed in the Port of Castries, even though Federal Express offered
to pay a rental fee for its use. Another example from St. Lucia is the lax enforcement of manifest arrivals:
St. Lucian law requires that manifests arrive before actual cargo, yet in 60 percent of cases the manifests
arrive late, with no fine or other enforcement levied, since the delayed manifest results in overtime labor
for customs agents.
Efforts have been made to improve port efficiency and productivity, and lower costs, through very
incipient labor reforms. In Antigua there has been an attempt to reduce the number of employees. The
port offered “redundancy packages” to 70 employees, but was able to pay only 20 due to the port’s financial
situation. Infrastructure has not yet been restructured in any of the ports. The formation of a newer, more
aggressive union in St. Kitts prompted immediate intervention by the agents of major shipping lines, which
hired Ports Services Limited to provide stevedoring services using its own selection of workers. Unlike
most of the OECS, the Port of Basseterre has undertaken some reforms in labor management and staffing.
The SCASPA in St. Kitts found itself in severe financial troubles in 2009 and initiated reforms, among
them a retrenchment in port staffing. This was accomplished by offering voluntary severance packages that
were generous enough to reduce the workforce from 500 to 253. In Dominica a court ruling in response to
a strike gave management the upper hand in renegotiating terms of employment, gang size, and performance
standards.
The OECS service ports might benefit from introducing private-public partnership (PPP)
arrangements as an alternative means of financing and management, to break the vicious cycle of
low productivity and high costs. In fact, many ports in the world have benefited from introducing various
types of PPPs. One example is the Port of Cartagena in Colombia. After port labor practices were liberalized
16 The mobile crane does not require stevedores, while stevedores are needed for the ship’s gear operations.
24
and most port services transferred to the private sector, large and rapid improvements in productivity were
observed between 1993 and 2003. These included a shift from 7 moves per ship hour to 52 moves per ship
hour; and lower fees per port user, from $984 per container move to $222; alongside very attractive returns
for the concessionaires. Similarly, in Argentina, improvements following the concessioning of terminal
operations in the Port of Buenos Aires have been dramatic. Port charges and shipping tariffs declined
sharply, labor productivity increased from 400 to 1,000 tonnes per worker per year, and cargo volumes
increased from 4,000,000 to 6,000,000 tonnes in a three-year period (1993–96) (World Bank 2007).
4. Infrastructure Development
a. Port Infrastructure
Most OECS ports were designed during the break-bulk era, and no major renovations have been
made to properly handle containers. Such ports include the older ports of St. John’s, Roseau, St.
George’s, Basseterre, and Castries. Here, a significant amount of space along the piers is occupied by
warehouses, presenting a physical obstacle to the efficient movement of containers and limiting the space
allocated to container manipulation. In Antigua, for example, the Port of St. John’s has a large warehouse
occupying 125 meters of the main quay, impeding proper container operations (table 4.3). The port in
Dominica was built in 1976, with a concrete pier resting on deteriorated pylons. Dated port infrastructure
and cost structures also raise operational costs.
Except for Long Point in Nevis, the OECS ports have multiple berths over several terminals, often
used for multiple purposes. In many cases there are (often large) specialized cruise ship facilities, but
some islands get so many cruise ships at the same time that the main berth used for container shipping
doubles as a cruise berth. All ports have relatively acceptable road access, but only Long Point Port in Nevis
has access to rail. Computer-based systems for truck appointments, vessel traffic management, and vessel
windows are conspicuously absent.
Table 4.1 Physical Characteristics of Select OECS Ports
Maximum Crane Capacity,
Terminal Berth Maximum Maximum
Berth Length Mobile Harbor >40
Country Port Area* Length** Berth Ship
(#) of Vessel Maximum Lifting
(m^2) (m) Depth (m) Draft (m)
(m) Capacity (tonnes)
Antigua and
St. John’s
Barbuda 61,715 3 366 15 10 160 104
Woodbridge
Dominica
Bay/Roseau 43,000 2 244 11 8 200 No cranes
Grenada St. George’s 42,492 2 335 9 8 168 No cranes
St. Kitts and Basseterre 101,171 2 133 12 11 120 No cranes
Nevis Long Point 40,469 1 355 7 6 160 No cranes
St. Lucia Castries 117,360 8 482 10 9 200 52
Vieux Fort 50,000 3 373 11 10 200 80
St. Vincent and Campden
the Grenadines Park/Kingstown 63,749 2 495 15 11 167 110
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: *Authors’ estimates for St. Vincent based on Google Earth; ** Berth length includes all terminals. St. Vincent’s berth length
includes Campden Park and Kingstown terminal. m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
25
The OECS ports are very small when compared with most ports in Latin America and the
Caribbean. On average, OECS ports are about 65,000 square meters, one-third the average across the
Caribbean countries and between six and seven times smaller than the area of an average port in South
America. Similarly, the average berth area of an OECS port is smaller than ports in any other region of
the continent (table 4.1). The maximum lifting capacity is also very low, significantly limited by the
available cranes that, when available, are all mobile.
Box 4.1 The Use of Spreaders versus Cables
In modern port management, the use of spreaders for loading and unloading containers is typical.
Automatic spreaders quickly adjust to the container size, and safely lock on to the container before
lifting.
Cables are considerably less expensive than spreaders, but require an entire crew to attach, with one
worker at each corner of the container. Because workers have to climb on top of the container to attach
the cables, their use is inherently more hazardous, and also more labor intensive. Spreaders require
only one operator—the crane operator. The worst danger of cables is the spreading of tension within a
loaded container, especially with longer, 40-foot containers. Heavily loaded containers have split open
while being lifted with cables in the OECS, resulting in the loss of cargo.
While one shipping line serving the OECS insists that spreaders are the only viable option, another
operator expressed the opinion that in some circumstances, in tight areas with little space, cables may
be more appropriate. But cables should be used only on smaller containers (no more than 20 feet) if
loaded.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Ports in St. Kitts and Nevis, Dominica, and Grenada do not feature onshore cranes, and only ships
with their own cranes (“geared” vessels) can call on these ports. Ship owners prefer using shore cranes
over vessel cranes, since the number of containers that can be loaded and unloaded per hour is much higher
using onshore cranes, and fewer crew gang members are needed. A fully functional mobile crane with an
automatic spreader would require only a gang of two to four (box 4.1). In the OECS, TEUs per hour are
higher with onshore cranes, as seen at Vieux Fort Port in St. Lucia, and at Campden Park in St. Vincent.
But since the ports in St. Kitts and Nevis, Grenada, and Dominica do not have cranes, and the OECS islands
are generally serviced as a set on the same route, geared vessels are generally needed. In ports where an
onshore crane exists, the ship’s gear is usually not used.
Except for Woodbridge Bay and St. George’s, expanding port capacity to accommodate more and
bigger ships is not constrained by geography or location across the OECS (table 4.2). The maximum
length of ships has in many cases been expanded through the use of dolphins (concrete pillars rising out of
the water beyond the pier, used to hold vessel lines) to dock cruise ships. Dolphins can be found along
virtually all cruise piers (recently installed in the cargo Port of Basseterre, and as part of the main port
structure in Campden Park), but they are not used for cargo ships. Deepening the channel and berths does
not seem to be a problem except at Castries, Long Point, and St. John’s. The port in St. Vincent is a natural
deep-water port and requires no maintenance dredging.
26
Table 4.2 Characteristics of Select Port Channels
Entrance Entrance Impediments
Channel Channel Impediments to Port
Country Port Depth (m) Length (m) to Deepening Expansion
Antigua and Barbuda St. John’s 11 5,557 Yes Yes
Dominica Woodbridge Bay/Roseau — — No No
Grenada St. George’s 9 1,300 No No
Basseterre — — No Yes
St. Kitts and Nevis
Long Point — — Yes Yes
St. Lucia Castries 13 1,100 Yes Yes
Vieux Fort 9 — No Yes
St. Vincent and the Campden Park/
Grenadines Kingstown — 1,112 No Yes
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: m = meters.
— Not available.
Because of inadequate maintenance and refurbishment, the infrastructure and equipment in most
ports—including the newer ports of Campden Park, Nevis, and Vieux Fort—are aging very quickly.
This problem may be observed both among mobile equipment and permanent structures. In Antigua the
port has decaying surfaces. The pavement in the container storage yard has completely disappeared; it is
now a dust surface that is becoming a health hazard for port employees and users. The ports of Long Point
and St. John’s have silting problems that will require dredging. Long Point has experienced silting to the
point that the depth is now critical, and container vessels that have not been able to first unload cargo in
Antigua can no longer dock in the port. Basseterre needs to make substantive investments in the surface of
its pier and in cranes. Reach stackers and straddle carriers are aging in Vieux Fort and St. George’s.
Dominica’s Port of Roseau also requires heavy reinvestment in infrastructure. The main pier,
constructed in 1976, is supported over water using iron tube pilings that now show advanced rust and other
damage from wear and tear, and hurricanes. The condition of the pier cannot support the weight of a mobile
crane. Between 150 meters and 240 meters of essential pier length are in need of urgent repair to prevent
collapse. Recent estimates put the repair costs at $12 million.
Disruptions in both St. Lucia ports, due to aging mobile cranes, are taking a toll on trade. A 2012
breakdown of the ports’ sole mobile crane (dating back from 1993 and now a discontinued model) resulted
in a one-year outage. The shipping line CMA CGM transferred operations to Trinidad, while the volumes
of Bernuth Lines (now King Ocean) dropped to one-fourth of previous levels. The port has had to absorb
50 percent of the extra labor costs incurred by the outage, along with 50 percent of the increased labor costs
caused by a breakdown of the spreader used to lift containers with the crane. Before the breakdown of the
crane, the port was experiencing the highest annual volume of throughput since 1996.
27
Table 4.3 Qualitative Description of Six OECS Members’ Port Infrastructure
Antigua
• Port of St. John’s is located northwest of the center of St. John’s city within a protected harbor area.
• Facilities: main cargo in St. John’s; cruise ships and ferries in Heritage Quay and Redcliff Quay.
• Antigua and Barbuda Port Authority oversees all port facilities.
• Layout from the break-bulk era, with a large warehouse occupying 125 meters of the main quay.
• Land footprint large relative to throughput.
• Warehouse is one of the largest in operation in the OECS.
• Warehouse operations do not recover costs.
• Main vessel lines calling include Tropical Shipping, CMA-CGM, and Seabourne, with Geest Line playing a smaller and declining role.
Dominica
• Port of Roseau located 1.4 miles from the center of Roseau, the capital city.
• The Port of Woodbridge Bay is generally unprotected and has been damaged several times by hurricanes.
• Facilities: cargo in Woodbridge Bay; cruise terminal and ferries in the center of Roseau.
• Dominican Air and Sea Port Authority oversees all ports and airport facilities.
• Layout from the break-bulk era, built in 1976 over a concrete pier resting on pylons.
• The port has no cranes, and operates with two reach stackers.
• The port is in danger of losing 150 meters or up to the entire length of the pier due to deteriorated pylons.
• Main vessel lines calling include Tropical Shipping, CMA CGM, King Ocean, and Geest Line.
Grenada
• Port of St. George’s located in the center of the town of St. George’s.
• Layout from the break-bulk era, with a cargo shed on the pier close to the quayside.
• Operations (except for car imports) are lo-lo (lift on/lift off containers); there is very little break bulk.
• Ro-ro operations (cargo rolling in and out from vessels) are constrained by limited space and problems related to storage.
• Main vessel lines calling include Tropical Shipping and Sea Freight (bringing in ZIM containers), with Geest Line also present.
• Considered the most-expensive and challenged port in the OECS.
St. Kitts and Nevis
• Port of Basseterre on St. Kitts island; Port of Long Point on Nevis island.
• St. Christopher Air and Sea Ports Authority oversees port activities in St. Kitts.
• Nevis Air and Sea Ports Authority oversees port activities in Nevis.
• Basseterre handles mostly container traffic. Cruise facilities are able to hold up to two cruise ships, and ferry facilities also present.
• Long Point handles container ro-ro traffic and ferry traffic.
• Layout and functioning processes from the break-bulk era; warehouse/shed occupy a good portion of the main berth space.
• Basseterre pier stems from 1982, and the surface has now deteriorated to the point that some large reinvestments are needed.
• There are no cranes. Therefore the port is entirely reliant on geared vessels and container ro-ro operations.
• Basseterre port uses two reach stackers for management of containers, and reports using spreaders, rather than cables, for lo-lo operations.
• Stevedores hired directly by the shipping line’s agents—Long Point one of the few OECS ports with no labor unions.
• Cruise infrastructure insufficient to handle traffic. Cargo port used as a third berth, creating scheduling conflicts with cargo-passenger traffic.
• Main vessel lines calling include Tropical Shipping, King Ocean, CMA-CGM, and Geest Line, with the frequency of Geest declining.
St. Lucia
• Two main ports: Castries in capital city, and Vieux Fort in the south.
• St. Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority oversees all port facilities.
• Castries is a multipurpose facility with six berths (with the cruise and ferry terminal Point Seraphine).
• Harbor of Castries naturally protected.
• Castries’ layout from the break-bulk era, with main shed/warehouse occupying valuable space along the pier.
• Castries River deposits silt in the port, creating need for periodic dredging.
• Vieux Fort layout modern and adjusted to container activity. Only transshipment OECS port: 85 percent of throughput due to transshipment.
• Vieux Fort has an old and unreliable crane. Crane broke down in 2012 creating important loss of business for Trinidad and Tobago.
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
• Kingstown/Campden area with two big terminals: original Port of Kingstown (break-bulk facility) and Campden Park (container port).
• Port is a natural deep-water port, requiring no maintenance dredging.
• Kingstown facilities are 50 years old, with a design life of 30 years.
• Kingstown facilities showing structural issues; an unfinished portion of the pier is in danger of collapsing.
• Campden Park Container Terminal built in 1992, but became operational in 2007.
• Container terminal features a high-capacity crane (100+ tonne-capacity Gottwald HMK 6406 mobile crane) and 20 reefer points.
• Campden Park has only one berth and services one ship at a time. Cannot operate as a substitute for Kingstown due to lack of berth space.
• Congestion in Kingstown a concern. There are potential plans to relocate the port. It could be shut down if Campden Park had more capacity.
• Geest Line is the regular carrier bringing both containers and break bulk to the port.
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
28
In Grenada the new power configuration of cruise ships has altered the water flow around the pylons
of the main pier, causing pylon degeneration and the need for extensive repairs. In addition, the two reach
stackers 17 have worn out. Instead of replacing them with new stackers and incurring the high costs of
disposing the old ones, they were refurbished. Though port authorities seem satisfied with the refurbished
units, local stakeholders and shipping lines report reliability problems that affect the length of a ship’s stay
in the port.
b. Capacity and Demand
There is no apparent cargo capacity problem in the OECS ports. But estimates of available capacity
and demand are imprecise. Self-reported figures indicate that there is no capacity problem in OECS ports
(table 4.4). Gridlock occurs when demand exceeds 80 percent of capacity. St. George’s (Grenada) and Long
Point (Nevis) seems to have inadequate capacity for bulk cargo. The break-bulk terminal of Kingstown in
St. Vincent is also reported to be congested. But bulk and general cargo are a minority of the cargo traffic
in the OECS, and involve mostly interisland trade.
The inadequate maintenance of existing facilities and equipment drastically curtails the efficiency
and operational capacity of OECS ports. While the nominal installed capacity for cargo handling seems
sufficient for the cargo traffic handled, in practice, the actual throughput of ports is much lower than it
could be, as is performance. Maintenance is indeed one of the main concerns of OECS port authorities.
This concern is paired with the need for more efficient port layouts that align with modernized practices.
c. Master Plans and Investment Plans
The OECS governments are considering new investment and planning measures, some in
partnership with the private sector, to address aging infrastructure and operational gaps. Yet such
initiatives are isolated and lack a long-term planning framework. In fact, most OECS members do not even
have port master plans or structured expansion plans, which also explains why reliable statistics on installed
capacity are difficult to obtain. Castries (St. Lucia) has a master plan, but it is considered more political
than strategic. Plans under consideration include the following.
• In Antigua, a new administration is promoting the first true private sector participation in commercial
port operations in the OECS
• St. Lucia:
o For the operation of warehouses in Castries, the government is considering having shippers and
agents lease their own space out of the warehouse, and perform their own freight movements.
o There are several investment plans for the long-range development and rebuilding of the older
general cargo pier of Vieux Fort.
• St. Vincent:
o Recent studies consider port development options, including closing Kingstown and expanding
Campden Park. It is evident that Campden has no capacity to take cargo overflown from
Kingstown. A study completed on St. Vincent in 2013 has a master plan component
17 Reach stackers are mobile trucks capable of lifting containers on and off container stacks and bringing them shipside.
29
o The southern end of the break-bulk terminal of Kingstown was refurbished, but the funds to rebuild
the rest of the pier, reportedly in the range of EC$35 million ($13.5 million), were reappropriated
to construct the Argyle International Airport. There is the danger that eventually the unfinished
portion of the pier will collapse.
• Dominica:
o The Port of Roseau is in danger of losing 150 meters or up to the entire length of the pier due to
deteriorated pylons. Reinvestment is urgently needed and—according to the latest estimates—
amounts to $12 million.
• St. Kitts:
o The government of St. Kitts is advancing a sophisticated PPP for another cruise ship terminal.
Table 6.4 Capacity and Demand of Select Ports, 2012
Country Port Capacity Demand (as of 2012)
40,000 TEU/yr 13,485 TEU/yr
St. John’s
Barbuda
Antigua
500,000 tonnes/yr (general cargo) 288,986 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
and
200,000 tonnes/yr (dry bulk) 30,700 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
Not reported tonnes/yr (liquid bulk) 890,677* tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
19,905 TEU/yr
Woodbridge
Dominica
27,142 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
Roseau
Not reported
Bay/
211,679 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
48,536 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
13,920 TEU/yr 13,920 TEU/yr
George’s
Grenada
421,568 tonnes/yr (general cargo) 461,479 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
St.
Not reported tonnes/yr (dry bulk) 251,266 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
81,061 tonnes/yr (liquid) 81,061 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
7,801 TEU/yr
Vieux Fort Castries Long Point Basseterre
St. Kitts and Nevis
Not reported 105,313 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
104926 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
81,296 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
30,454 TEU/yr 2,665 TEU/yr
Not reported tonnes/yr (general cargo) 3,661 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
26,506 tonnes/yr (dry bulk) 29,049 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
14,599 tonnes/yr (liquid) 14,599 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
146,000 TEU/yr 37,672 TEU/yr
Not reported tonnes/yr (general cargo) 82,627 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
Not reported tonnes/yr (dry bulk) 3,859 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
St. Lucia
Not reported tonnes/yr (liquid bulk) 4,060 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
493,000 TEU/yr 45,668 TEU/yr
Not reported tonnes/yr (general cargo) 28,787 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
Not reported tonnes/yr (dry bulk) 93,682 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
Not reported tonnes/yr (liquid bulk) 38,291 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
16,827 TEU/yr
Grenadines
St. Vincent
Kingstown
Campden
and the
Not reported 34,272 tonnes/yr (general cargo)
Park/
46,796 tonnes/yr (dry bulk)
63,453 tonnes/yr (liquid bulk)
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: * Numbers for liquid bulk from Antigua need further review and validation. OECS = Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States; TEU/yr = twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
30
5. Performance, Costs, and Financial Efficiency
a. Container-handling Systems
Compared with other Caribbean ports and Latin American ports in general, the OECS ports have
very low throughputs. The average annual OECS throughput, at 18,000 TEU per year, significantly trails
the 300,000–350,000 TEU/year found in the other regions of Latin America. Clearly, overall throughput
levels depend on the size and capacity of the port, and OECS berth lengths and port areas are also smaller.
Notably, there are no ship-to-shore (STS) gantry cranes at the OECS ports, a fact that has significant
implications for the productivity of these ports, since STS gantry cranes are much more productive than
mobile cranes. This contrasts with the Caribbean region as a whole, where the average country has two STS
gantry cranes (table 5.1).
Table 7.1 Aggregate Benchmark of OECS Ports in the Latin American Context, 2010
Mobile STS
Annual Berth
Area Cranes with Gantry
Region Ports Statistic Throughput Length
(m^2) Capacity>14t Cranes
(TEU) (m)
(units) (units)
Average 519,856 844 199,400 1.5 2.9
Central America 21 Minimum 2,229 67 15,000 0.0 0.0
Maximum 2,758,506 2,205 564,000 12.0 16.0
Average 246,816 604 134,495 1.6 1.6
Caribbean 16 Minimum 2,852 133 15,740 0.0 0.0
Maximum 1,525,532 1,688 477,428 7.0 10.0
Average 15,018 333 64,995 0.5 0.0
OECS 8 Minimum 2,852 133 40,469 0.0 0.0
Maximum 27,526 495 117,360 1.0 0.0
Average 560,986 1,270 336,332 2.7 2.2
South America 32 Minimum 36,080 238 15,000 0.0 0.0
Maximum 2,722,225 4,728 1,270,500 10.0 17.0
Average 475,617 986 247,855 2.1 2.3
Total 69 Minimum 2,229 67 15,000 0.0 0.0
Maximum 2,758,506 4,728 1,270,500 12.0 17.0
Source: Adapted from Sarriera and others (2013), based on authors’ primary data collection.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States; STS = ship to shore; t = tonnes.
Caribbean ports—and the OECS ports are no exception—post consistently poor growth and
significant variations in cargo traffic. The throughput of Caribbean and OECS ports increased between
1999 and 2010, while remaining significantly less than ports in Latin America as a whole. But this figure
is deceptive for the OECS, because throughput data are available for only two of the eight ports included
in the sample in 1999 (table 5.2). 18 During the 2008–10 period, when data for all eight OECS ports included
in the sample are available and reflect the global economic slowdown, the OECS ports did slightly better
(that is, they contracted less) than the non-OECS Caribbean ports. Still, their performance was below the
Latin American average.
18 For the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) ports, data are available for Castries and Vieux Fort from 1999; for
Roseau from 2000; and for Campden Park/Kingstown, Long Point, St. George’s, and St. John’s from 2007.
31
Table 5.2 Growth of Annual Throughput, by Region
Compound
Compound
Growth Annual Growth
Annual Growth
Region 1999–2010 Growth Rate 2007–10
Rate 2007–10
(%) 1999–2010 (%)
(%)
(%)
Central America 302 12 -1 0
Caribbean 53 4 -24 -9
OECS 166 8 -18 -6
South America 542 17 4 1
Total 306 12 -2 -1
Source: Adapted from Sarriera and others (2013), based on authors’ primary data collection.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
The OECS’s average throughput of 10.6 TEU/hour in 2013 compares relatively well with the overall
Caribbean average of 11.4, considering that, on average, Caribbean ports are much larger and have more
capacity than the OECS ports. This average, however, hides a wide range of variability across countries.
Grenada has the lowest average throughput per hour when compared with the other OECS ports, with a
maximum TEU per hour that is half that observed in Vieux Fort (figure 5.1). Such averages also hide
fluctuations in hourly throughput.
Throughput (as measured in TEU per hour) is highly volatile, not just in the OECS but in the region
in general, making averages difficult. The reasons for this are not quite clear. In some cases, such as
Vieux Fort, throughput variations can be attributed to crane and spreader outages; the delays in St. Lucia
are attributable to unions. Throughput performance also points to other incongruences: the top two
performers with the highest average TEU per hour are equipped with mobile cranes, but so is the one with
the third-lowest average.
What such averages do not capture is the inefficiency embedded in these ports. Efficiency in the OECS
is admittedly very low; for example, a typical container ship operated by ZIM will arrive at 6 a.m. and not
leave until ten hours later, at 4 p.m. Because of variability, one measure of port performance may be the
maximum monthly average container output achieved during the year. This would put Vieux Fort, a
transshipment port, in the same league as other transshipment ports in the Caribbean (the Bahamas and
Jamaica), but Castries, Kingstown, and St. George’s would clearly fall into the slow category, with just
over 10 TEU/hour maximum throughput.
32
Figure 5.1 Average and Maximum Throughput in OECS and Other Caribbean Countries
(TEU per hour)
Castries, St. Lucia
Kingstown, St. Vincent
St. Georges, Grenada
Basseterre, St. Kitts
Roseau, Dominica
St. Johns, Antigua
Vieux Fort, St. Lucia
Road Town, Tortola
Turks and Caicos, Grand Turk
The Valley, Anguilla
Providenciales, Turks & Caicos
Port
Port of Spain, Trinidad
Montego Bay, Jamaica
Bridgetown, Barbados
Georgetown, Guyana
Paramaribo, Suriname
Port Au Prince, Haiti
Kingston Wharf, Jamaica
Point Lisas, Trinidad
Freeport, Bahamas
Cayman Islands
Kingston, Jamaica
Nassau, Bahamas
- 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0
TEU per Hour
Min Max Average
Source: Authors’ elaboration on data provided by the Florida Shipping Association.
Note: TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit.
b. Performance
Among the most salient performance issues in OECS are high labor costs and a work philosophy that
stems from the break-bulk era. The size of the gangs in the break-bulk era ports (St. John’s, Roseau, and
Long Point) is between two and three times larger than for those newer ports that are structured physically
and institutionally to handle containerized ports (Vieux Fort and Campden), despite their shockingly low
berth utilization (table 5.3). Another important source of delays and inefficiencies is the practice of
inspecting all—that is, 100 percent of—import and export containers rather than drawing a sample to
33
inspect. In the OECS, Antigua and St. Kitts have a practice of inspecting all containers; Grenada, Nevis,
and St. Lucia are slowly moving to more selective and efficient inspection processes.
Table 5.3 Performance Indicators, 2012
Turnaround Time Average Berth
Dwell Time (days) (hours) Workers per Utilization,
Port
Container Cruise Gang Container
Container Transshipment Vessel Vessel (number) (hours)
Antigua and
St. John’s
Barbuda 5 1 6 12 11 6
Woodbridge
Dominica
Bay/Roseau 5 — 6 7 20 6
Grenada St. George’s 14 — — 11 22 —
St. Kitts and Basseterre 7 — 8 10 — —
Nevis Long Point 5 — — — 16
St. Lucia Castries 2 3 8 12 4 6
Vieux Fort 3 1 5 — 6 5
St. Vincent and Campden
the Grenadines Park/Kingstown — — — — 4 —
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
— Not available.
c. Customs
The OECS governments, as in the case of many other governments around the world, tend to have
different objectives for port operations than would private owners and operations. Port tariffs and
other charges are important in countries that have difficulties raising revenues through standard taxes. To
compensate for revenues that would normally be derived through traditional streams, the governments see
the ports, with their unique role as sole gateways, as an alternative source, both through customs tariffs as
well as through port operational charges themselves.
Moreover, it is not uncommon that port operations subsidize other infrastructure sectors. Both in
Grenada and Dominica the ports end up cross-subsiding other infrastructure. In Grenada the main bus
terminal in St. George’s falls under the port authority, while in Dominica the Port of Woodbridge Bay
subsidizes the airport, which loses EC$1 million annually. 19 In addition, the Dominican Air and Sea Port
Authority is inducing losses at its ferry terminal: revenues consist of a docking fee of EC$230 per vessel
per trip (twice a day), and the Government of Dominica collects all passenger fees. By the same token, all
passenger fee revenues collected from visiting cruise ships go directly to the Government of Dominica,
though the port had originally been promised 30 percent of these revenues. Before the global recession
Grenada’s port was profitable and paid its government a dividend of roughly EC$1 million annually. Some
stakeholders report that the Government of Grenada sees the port as a main source of revenue.
The OECS customs authorities lack proper risk-management systems and have only partially
implemented integrated information systems. Information systems are capable of receiving the
electronic manifest before the cargo arrives, but are unable to assess risk in advance, implement facilitation
measures, or formally share information with tax administrators to update the risk profiles of authorized
operators. The control mechanisms of the OECS customs authorities are based primarily on physical
19
The revenues of Canefield International Airport barely cover security costs.
34
examinations of almost 100 percent of the entries, and efforts to promote voluntary compliance have not
met with success.
Overtime payments for customs procedures are applied across the OECS. Typically the customs
brokers pay customs compensation on behalf of importers/exporters to a customs officer who performs
physical examinations on the importer’s/exporter’s premises. The broker will request the service by 3 p.m.
of a supervisor officer, who allocates the overtime service to available inspectors. Once the working hours
are finished at 4:30 p.m., the assigned inspector will go to the importer’s premises to carry out the
inspection. The transport costs are covered and the overtime compensation is based on an hourly rate. Once
the examination is completed, the broker fills out a form for the customs inspector to sign. Upon completion
of the paperwork, the overall compensation amount is deposited in a specific customs account. At the end
of the month, the overtime compensation is paid (by a private party) along with the salary due (by the
government) after the government deducts corresponding taxes. These mechanisms result in less work
being done during regular hours, higher costs of trade, and greater time needed to complete the import
process.
35
Box 5.1 OECS Customs: More than an Administrative Transaction
What are the key characteristics of customs best practices?
The concept of modern customs encompasses effective, efficient, transparent, and predictable
operations consistent with broad strategies and goals to meet current needs (WCO 2007). Customs
offices around the world are currently confronting a challenging environment featuring increased and
more complex international trade, just-in-time distributions models, increased security threats and
organized crime, higher expectations from the public as well as private sector, and trade facilitation
negotiations. To face this changing and challenging environment, international organizations such as
the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the WCO are promoting customs best practices. In this
regard, the Revised Kyoto Convention provides a set of best practices whereby the role of the customs
office is simultaneously defined as that of a:
Policy advisor: to provide trade statistics for macroeconomic purposes and trade negotiations
Policy implementer: to help to regulate trade agreements
Trade facilitator: to facilitate doing business in the country
Security provider: to contribute to national security at the borders
Where are the OECS countries in relation to customs best practices?
According to the Customs Assessment Trade Toolkit (CATT), the assessed processes of the OECS
customs offices are far from best practices. The OECS customs performance was ranked low to medium
for “in progress” performance, with average scores between 30 percent and 36 percent out of a
maximum of 100 percent (World Bank 2010).
The CATT analysis showed a lack of effective feedback mechanisms between the trading community
and the customs office to promote continual performance improvement. The latter is aggravated by the
absence of formal standard operating procedures (SOPs). Overall, the transition costs of dealing with
the OECS customs are high, especially in terms of time. The average amount of time it takes to release
goods can reach more than ten times the international standard of eight hours in some cases.
Why have the OECS countries not embraced best practices?
While the Caribbean economies are highly integrated with the global economy, their customs
performance is lagging behind. One clear pattern is that the OECS customs offices physically examine
almost all entries—a practice far removed from trade facilitation best practices. This is likely the
response to a widely accepted practice of overtime pay that sets out a distorting incentive structure.
Overtime compensation is very attractive and pursued by customs officers to top up their salaries, and
taken as part of the aggregate income for all financial transactions, including mortgage applications.
Other elements that are far from trade facilitation best practices have been identified by the CATT
diagnostics in the OECS. Those elements include incomplete harmonization and dissemination of the
valuation and classification rules, lack of SOPs, nonsystematic updates on customs regulations and
procedures, lack of electronic payment options, and absence of operational benchmarks.
What has been done to improve OECS customs practices?
Most Caribbean countries, including those in the OECS, have implemented an integrated information
system solution: the ASYCUDA World (AW) system, which has become the regional standard due to
its functionality and reasonable implementation cost. The rollout of an integrated information system
36
is undoubtedly a positive move to support customs operations. The AW system facilitates information
lodging, minimizes input mistakes, and makes information more consistent.
With the help of international players, the OECS customs offices have been working to improve their
performance. Notably, the region has benefited from initiatives such as the Caribbean Regional
Technical Assistance Center (CARTAC) for more than eight years, and recently the Supporting
Economic Management for the Caribbean (SEMCAR) program launched by the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The program aims to streamline tax, customs, and public financial
management in the region.
The work of the CARTAC and SEMCAR customs offices points to two priority areas: strategic thinking
and the adoption of risk management systems.
In the area of strategic thinking, the SEMCAR program has produced a Strategic Management
Framework (SMF). At the core of this framework are efforts to help modern customs offices play the
role of trade facilitator. The SMF allows for a participatory process, whereby customs offices interact
with key players to deal effectively with issues as complex and politically sensitive as overtime
practices, thus making it possible to find solutions supported by political will and resources.
On the side of risk management, the SEMCAR program has produced a Risk Management Framework
(RMF). This framework promotes the adoption of risk management practices based on risk profiling of
authorized operators and agile trade facilitation. One OECS country has piloted the RMF by setting up
an information solution that enables data exchanges between the revenue agency and the customs office,
to build up and update risk profiles of authorized operators. This approach to RMF is compatible with
the existing core customs information system.
What else can be done to streamline OECS customs?
The implementation of integrated systems and the initial adoption of the SMF and RMF are positive
steps toward building modern customs in the OECS, but these steps are only the beginning. Changing
the idea that customs processes are means for fee collection is a difficult challenge to overcome. Dealing
with distorting incentives that perpetuate and deepen inefficiencies in trade facilitation is another big
challenge. For the OECS, critical next steps include:
a) Removing the practice of overtime. This implies that the basic salary is the only compensation for
customs inspectors. But this might give rise to corruption to compensate for the loss of overtime
compensation.
b) Introducing a fee for customs services to be paid by the private sector. To be effective this fee must
not be linked to physical examinations and should contribute to an overall compensation fund. Since
the private sector is already paying the cost of overtime, this should not be a problem for them.
c) Revising salary scales and incentives for customs officers. This action might have important fiscal
implications and should be implemented with a reform program oriented toward converting customs
offices in the Caribbean into performance-oriented entities.
Source: Prepared by José Eduardo Gutierrez Ossio, based on Gutierrez Ossio and others (2013) and on Briceño-Garmendia
and others (2013).
37
d. Pricing
With the exception of St. Vincent, the OECS ports are expensive. The Doing Business indicators contain
a measure of costs for importing a container for nearly every country in the world, broken down by costs
for document preparation, customs, port handling and terminal charges, and inland transport charges. On
average the port and terminal charges alone in the OECS are 86 percent higher than in the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries, and 34 percent higher than in Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC) (figure 5.2). Removing St. Vincent, an outlier, from the sample, the average price
for the remaining five islands jumps to $574 per container—more than double the OECD average and 50
percent higher than the LAC average.
Figure 5.2 Port and Handling Charges, 2013
1,000
800
600
US $
400
200
0
Antigua Dominica Grenada St. Kitts St. Lucia St. Vincent
Ports and terminal handling OECS Avg OECD Avg LAC Avg
Source: Doing Business Indicators 2014, World Bank.
Note: Port charges have been collected on-site in the OECS by the authors, and they are reasonably close to those found in the
Doing Business indicators. The Doing Business indicators are presented here because they allow for regional comparisons.
Avg = average; OECD = Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development; OECS = Organization of Eastern
Caribbean States; LAC= Latin America and the Caribbean.
Grenada’s handling charges (reported at $745 per 20’ container and $1,192 per 40’ container) are
among the highest in the region (table 5.4). With the introduction of the free along side (FAS) port
charging scheme in 2001, Dominica reduced tariffs by 20 percent. Methods of setting container-handling
charges vary across the OECS. St. Lucia does not charge per container, for example, but per tonne (the
number per container presented in table 5.4 is an industry-estimated average). In addition, at many ports
other charges, spread over each container (such as the usage of cranes, by hour), place the overall per
container charge higher than the handling charges. In general, transshipment containers are charged at a
significantly lower rate than imports and exports, with the exception of St. Vincent. General cargo and bulk
dry cargo fees, charged by the tonne, also vary widely.
38
Table 5.4 Handling Charges by Type of Freight, 2012
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Dry
Cruise
Country Port Container Container Container Cargo Bulk
($/container) ($/TEU) ($/tonne) ($/passenger)
Antigua and
St. John’s 237 474 141 12 12 —
Barbuda
Woodbridge
Dominica 415 933 69 89 7 5
Bay/Roseau
Grenada St. George’s 745 1,192 — 4 4 5
St. Kitts and Basseterre 452 904 20 33 33 5
Nevis Long Point 322 642 — 36 5 13
Castries 480 960 6 4 7 7
St. Lucia
Vieux Fort 480 960 30 4 4 —
St. Vincent and Campden
167 333 267 9 9 15
the Grenadines Park/Kingstown
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: TEU = twenty-foot equivalent unit.
— Not available.
Per vessel fees, levied on each call, also vary widely across ports (table 5.5). This may have to do with
the spread of costs being levied on each container, versus a one-time charge per vessel. In Dominica, for
example, the higher call cost per vessel may be due to lower overall charges per container. Shipping lines
are not complaining, however, since the vessel-related charges are all they are responsible for, whereas at
other ports the shipping lines are also responsible for per-container handling charges. Overall, the wide
variance of charges, per call and per container, and other charges is not unusual in the ports sector, where
each port in effect becomes its own market with its own priorities.
Table 5.5 Port Fees, 2012
Cost per Vessel ($) Excess Storage Charges ($/tonne/day)
Country Port
Cargo Cruise Dry Bulk General Cargo
Antigua and
St. John’s 741 333 8 8
Barbuda
Woodbridge
Dominica 1,317 892 2 2
Bay/Roseau
Grenada St. George’s 413 833 0 2
St. Kitts and Basseterre 516 837 2 2
Nevis Long Point 100 — 4 4
St. Lucia Castries 89 111 1 1
Vieux Fort 89 — 1 1
St. Vincent and Campden
— — 3 3
the Grenadines Park/Kingstown
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
— Not available.
39
6. Benchmarking the Efficiency of OECS Ports against Latin America
“Technical efficiency” is a measure of how well a port translates a set of inputs into an output,
compared with what is optimal (“the frontier”). This type of analysis 20 is particularly useful because it
quantifies port performance while permitting a comparison of this performance across regions and
subregions and over time. The result is a comprehensive assessment of port performance in Latin America
and the Caribbean (LAC) and in the OECS. Annex 1 describes how technical efficiency is computed.
South America has the best-performing ports in Latin America in terms of technical efficiency, while
the OECS ports are among the worst performers. In Latin America as a whole, technical efficiency
averaged 49 percent of the optimal frontier between 1999 and 2010. South America performed best, with
52 percent technical efficiency, followed by Central America (50 percent) and the Caribbean (44 percent).21
As a group, the eight OECS ports included in the sample performed worse than those in the Caribbean and
South and Central America, with an average technical efficiency of 43 percent over these years. South
America led the way with 11 ports in the top quintile of technical efficiency, followed by Central America
with 6 and the Caribbean with 2. The OECS did not have any ports in the top quintile (table 6.1).
Technical efficiency improved slightly in LAC between 1999 and 2010, but the performance of the
OECS ports declined. The average technical efficiency of the LAC ports rose from 46 percent in 1999 to
50 percent in 2010. While the OECS ports outperformed their Caribbean counterparts on throughput growth
in recent years, the OECS ports performed slightly worse than the rest of the Caribbean and worse than the
other LAC subregions in recent years in terms of technical efficiency. But the sparseness of the OECS data
at the beginning of this period makes any analysis of trends in technical efficiency between 1999 and 2010
difficult.
The best-performing port during this period was Manzanillo in Mexico, with an average technical
efficiency of 83 percent (table 6.1). In 2010 Manzanillo’s throughput was 1,509,378 TEUs, and the port
had 8 gantry cranes and no mobile or quay cranes. The worst-performing port during the period was
Santarem in Brazil.
The performance of individual OECS ports was various but generally poor. Two OECS ports —
Castries (St. Lucia) and St. John’s (Antigua and Barbuda)—appear in the third quintile with technical
efficiencies of 56 percent and 54 percent, respectively. Roseau (Dominica), Vieux Fort (St. Lucia), and
Campden Park/Kingstown (St. Vincent and the Grenadines) appear in the second quintile, with scores of
48 percent, 41 percent, and 35 percent, respectively. St. George’s (Grenada), Basseterre, and Long Point
(St. Kitts and Nevis) fall into the first quintile with technical efficiencies of only 18 percent, 8 percent, and
3 percent, respectively. Notably, the three worst performers in the OECS lack a mobile or quay crane, which
all of their OECS counterparts (except Roseau) have.
The technical efficiency of the OECS ports also varied in the 1999 to 2010 period, with very poor
performance in 2002 and 2003 and again in 2007 (figure 6.2). This variability is due, in part, to the lack
20 The benchmarking of port efficiency included in this section is an extension of Sarriera and others (2013) to include the
Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) ports. The revised estimates are also based on an expanded data set to add a
year of throughput data for all countries, and to revise throughput figures as final rather than preliminary estimates for previous
years.
21 Results reported are based on the second specification of the model as in annex 1(c).
40
of data on OECS ports at the beginning of the sample period. For instance, data are available only for St.
George’s and Long Point, the OECS’s worst performers, beginning in 2007 (when the subregion’s most
recent decline in technical performance occurred). With this note of caution in mind, while the OECS
countries were performing better than the rest of LAC in 1999 and the early 2000s and again after a 2002–
03 dip in performance, the region has not yet managed to recover from its 2007 performance decline. The
OECS ports had an average technical efficiency in 2010 that was 13 percentage points less than that of the
LAC average. OECS ports’ technical efficiency has remained about the same since 2008, and lags well
behind that of Central and South America (figure 6.1). The OECS, however, performed almost on par with
the Caribbean as a whole in 2010 after falling behind in 2007.
Table 6.1 Technical Efficiency of Ports in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1999–2010
Tech. Efficiency Tech. Efficiency
Ranking Port Ranking Port
(%) (%)
1 Manzanillo 83 41 Freeport 50
2 Itajai 81 42 Paita 49
3 Montevideo 80 43 Acajutla 49
4 San Juan 78 44 Balboa 48
5 Santos 78 45 Rio Haina 48
6 Callao 77 46 Roseau* 48
7 Lirquen 76 47 Puerto Cabello 47
8 Puerto Limón 76 48 Progreso 43
9 Belize City 75 49 Belem 42
Quintile 4
Quintile 2
10 Salvador 74 50 Boca Chica 42
11 Guayaquil 74 51 Vieux Fort* 41
12 Sao Francisco do Sul 73 52 Valparaiso 37
13 Puerto Barrios 72 53 Oranjestad 36
14 San Antonio 72 54 Cartagena 36
15 La Guaira 71 55 Campden Park/Kingstown* 35
16 Puerto Cortés 70 56 Suape 35
17 Puerto Quetzal 68 57 Barranquilla 34
18 Port of Spain 65 58 Talcahuano 33
19 Antofagasta 65 59 Buenos Aires 31
20 Veracruz 64 60 Puerto Manzanillo 29
21 Vitoria 63 61 Corinto 28
22 Puerto Caldera 62 62 Maracaibo 24
23 Puerto Castilla 61 63 Ensenada 23
24 Point Lisas 61 64 Santo Tomás de Castilla 22
25 Rio de Janeiro 59 65 Caucedo 22
26 Fortaleza 59 66 Santa Marta 21
27 Buenaventura 59 67 Arica 21
28 Rio Grande 58 68 Lazaro Cardenas 19
29 Havana 57 69 St. George’s* 18
Quintile 3
Quintile 1
30 Altamira 57 70 Mazatlan 17
31 Iquique 57 71 Zarate 16
32 Castries* 56 72 Sepetiba 15
33 Bridgetown 54 73 Kingston 12
34 Manaus 54 74 Rosario 10
35 St. John’s* 54 75 Basseterre* 8
36 Ushuaia 53 76 Tampico 5
37 Pecem 53 77 Long Point* 3
38 San Vicente 51 78 Salina Cruz 3
39 Paranagua 51 79 Santana 1
40 Coco Solo 51 80 Tuxpan 1
81 Santarem 0
Source: Adapted from Sarriera and others (2013) based on authors’ primary data collection.
Note: * Denotes OECS ports. OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
41
Figure 6.1 Technical Efficiency in LAC and the OECS, 2008–10
60%
50%
40%
Technical Efficiency
30%
20%
10%
South America Central America LAC Caribbean OECS
2008 2009 2010
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
Roseau’s technical efficiency improved the most among OECS ports between 2008 and 2010, gaining
9 percentage points. Campden Park/Kingstown and Basseterre also made some progress, both increasing
4 percentage points; Vieux Fort and Castries, in contrast, lost 14 percentage points and 9 percentage points
in technical efficiency, respectively, in this period (figure 6.2). Long Point gained 2 percentage points,
while St. George’s and St. John’s lost 2 percentage points.
Figure 6.2 Technical Efficiency of OECS ports, 2008–10
70%
60%
50%
Technical Efficiency
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Woodbridge Castries Saint Campden Vieux Saint Basseterre Long
Bay/Roseau John's Park/Kingstown Fort George's Point
2008 2009 2010
Source: Authors’ own elaboration on primary data.
Note: OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
42
References
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for the OECS Countries: The Initial Step for an Assessment of the Caribbean Connectivity.”
Paper Presented in the Regional Workshop of the Caribbean Growth Forum in the Bahamas,
World Bank, Washington, DC, June 2013.
Coelli, Timothy J., D. S. Prasada Rao, Christopher J. O’Donnell, and George E. Battese. 2005. An
Introduction to Efficiency and Productivity Analysis. United States: Springer.
Bofinger, H.C. and Millan, Ma. Florencia. 2012. Stocktaking and Project Inception Report Air Transport
in the OECS: Subsidies and Connectivity. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Foster, Vivien and Cecelia Briceño-Garmendia. 2009. Handbook of Infrastructure Indicators.
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Gutierrez Ossio, J. E., M. Alessandro, and J. J. Neyra. 2013. Trade Facilitation in the Caribbean: The
Case of Customs Performance. Caribbean Knowledge series no. 3. Washington, DC: World
Bank.
Sarriera, Morales Javier, Tomás Serebrisky, Gonzalo Araya, Cecilia Briceño-Garmendia, and Jordan
Schwartz. 2013. “Benchmarking Container Port Technical Efficiency in Latin America and the
Caribbean.” Working Paper 474, Inter-American Development Bank, Washington, DC. (Orginal
paper and results published in the Policy Research Working Paper 6680, World Bank,
Washington, DC, October 2013.)
WCO (World Customs Organization). 2007. WCO Trends and Patterns Report. WCO. Brussels,
Belgium, 2007. http://www.mcmullinpublishers.com/downloads/TrendsPatternsEN1.pdf.
World Bank. 2007. Port Reform Tool Kit, 2nd Edition, Module 1.Washington, DC: World Bank.
http://www.ppiaf.org/sites/ppiaf.org/files/documents/toolkits/Portoolkit/Toolkit/module1/roadma
p.html#settingreform.
———. 2010. Customs Assessment Trade Toolkit (CATT).Washington, DC: World Bank.
www.customscatt.org.
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Jobs and the Economy. London, United Kingdom: WTTC.
43
Annex 1. Stochastic Frontier Analysis—Methodological Details
The Model
The study uses stochastic frontier analysis to measure the technical efficiency of ports. 22 This econometric
technique models a production function for ports that consists of throughput as an output and terminal area,
berth length, and cranes as the primary inputs. The residual term of the production function is modeled in
two parts: a nonnegative term representing technical inefficiency and a random error representing statistical
noise. The basic production function is:
ln(������������������������������������ ) = ������������ + ������������1 ln(������������������������������������ ) + ������������2 ������������������������(������������������������������������ ) + ������������3 ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������4 ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������5 (������������������������ ) + ������������6 (������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ )
+ ������������7 (������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������8 (������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������������������������������ + ������������������������������������
where ln(������������������������������������ ) is the log of throughput (TEUs), ln(������������������������������������ ) is the log of terminal area (m2), ������������������������(������������������������������������ ) is the log
of berth length (m), ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) is the log of the number of small and large mobile cranes, ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) is the log
of the number of ship-to-shore gantry cranes, ������������������������ is a time trend, ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ is a dummy variable for the
economic crisis year of 2009, and ������������������������������������������������������������ and ������������������������������������������������������������ are dummies for the absence of mobile and gantry
cranes, respectively. These final two dummies are included to ensure that ports without mobile and quay
cranes are not dropped from the estimation because the log of zero is not defined; 23 ������������������������������������ is a random variable
with a truncated normal distribution representing technical inefficiency and ������������������������������������ is a random error.
The final specification of the model incorporates three additional dummy variables that are likely to
significantly affect port productivity. The first indicates that a port uses ships’ cranes intensively—an
important factor in a port’s ability to load and unload that is not captured by the mobile and gantry crane
variables. 24 The second dummy indicates that a port specializes in transshipment, which could increase
productivity because of the less-intensive use of port resources required by transshipment. 25 The final
dummy variable indicates that a port specializes in container trade.26 Finally, gross domestic product (GDP)
(constant 2005 $), a measure of connectivity (the liner shipping connectivity index), and a country’s
openness to trade (trade as a percentage of GDP) were included to control for exogenous factors that impact
throughput. The final specification is: 27
ln(������������������������������������ ) = ������������ + ������������1 ln(������������������������������������ ) + ������������2 ������������������������(������������������������������������ ) + ������������3 ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������4 ������������������������(������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������5 (������������������������ ) + ������������6 (������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ )
+ ������������7 (������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������8 (������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������1 ������������ℎ������������������������������������ ′ ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ + ������������2 ������������������������������������������������������������������������ℎ������������������������������������
+ ������������3 ������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ + ������������4 ln(������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������5 ln(������������������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������5 ln(������������������������������������������������������������������������������������ ) + ������������������������������������ + ������������������������������������
22 See chapter 9 of Coelli and others (2005) for an introduction.
23 See Sarriera and others (2013) for more details on the inclusion of these dummies.
24 Ports using ships’ cranes intensively were identified using Sarriera and others (2013). St. George’s and Long Point, which were
not included in Sarriera and others (2013), were categorized as using ships’ cranes intensively according to the criteria provided in
Sarriera and others (2013). Campden Park/Kingstown, again not included in Sarriera and others (2013), was categorized as not
using ships’ cranes intensively.
25 Transshipment ports were identified using Sarriera and others (2013). St. George’s, Long Point, and Campden Park/Kingstown
were categorized as not specializing in transshipment.
26 Terminal type was identified using Sarriera and others (2013). St. George’s, Long Point, and Campden Park/Kingstown were
categorized as not specializing in container trade.
27 The preferred specification of Sarriera and others (2013) includes a conditional mean model to explain the inefficiency term.
Because the corruption index used in Sarriera and others (2013) is available for only three Organization of Eastern Caribbean States
(OECS) countries (and four OECS ports), we have chosen a simpler specification. But as long as the production function is well
specified, the addition of the conditional mean model is unnecessary to measure technical efficiency.
44
Data
Data are derived from Sarriera and others (2013), from surveys sent to managers of ports in the Organization
of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) countries, from the Containerization International Yearbook, and from
the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. The sample ranges from 1999 to 2012 and comprises
100 ports with 27 from Central America, 46 from South America, and 27 from the Caribbean, including 8
from the OECS countries. Data are incomplete in many cases: several ports are observed in some years but
not others, and data are unavailable for certain characteristics. Data are particularly sparse after 2010, with
throughput available for only 15 ports in 2011 and 7 ports in 2012. Thus, the final sample used in the
preferred specification range, from 1999 to 2010, comprises 80 ports: 23 from Central America, 39 from
South America, and 18 from the Caribbean, including 8 from the OECS countries (table A1.1).
Table A1.1 Ports Included in the Final Sample
Region Country Port
Antigua and Barbuda St. John’s*
Aruba Oranjestad
Bahamas, The Freeport
Barbados Bridgetown
Cuba Havana
Dominica Roseau*
Dominican Republic Boca Chica, Caucedo, Rio Haina
Caribbean
Grenada St. George’s*
Jamaica Kingston
Puerto Rico San Juan
St. Kitts and Nevis Basseterre*, Long Point*
St. Lucia Castries*, Vieux Fort*
St. Vincent and the Grenadines Campden Park/Kingstown*
Trinidad and Tobago Point Lisas, Port of Spain
Belize Belize City
Costa Rica Puerto Caldera, Puerto Limón
El Salvador Acajutla
Guatemala Puerto Barrios, Puerto Quetzal, Santo Tomás de Castilla
Central America Honduras Puerto Castilla, Puerto Cortés
Altamira, Ensenada, Lazaro Cardenas, Manzanillo, Mazatlan,
Mexico
Progreso, Salina Cruz, Tampico, Tuxpan, Veracruz
Nicaragua Corinto
Panama Balboa, Coco Solo, Puerto Manzanillo
Argentina Buenos Aires, Rosario, Ushuaia, Zarate
Belem, Fortaleza, Itajai, Manaus, Paranagua, Pecem, Rio de
Brazil Janeiro, Rio Grande, Salvador, Santana, Santarem, Santos,
Sao Francisco do Sul, Sepetiba, Suape, Vitoria
Antofagasta, Arica, Iquique, Lirquen, San Antonio, San
Chile
South America Vicente, Talcahuano, Valparaiso
Colombia Barranquilla, Buenaventura, Cartagena, Santa Marta
Ecuador Guayaquil
Peru Callao, Paita
Uruguay Montevideo
Venezuela, RB La Guaira, Maracaibo, Puerto Cabello
Source: Authors’ compilation.
Note: * Indicates an OECS port. OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States.
45
Model Results
The results of the first and second specifications are similar: throughput increases with port area, berth length,
and number of cranes (table A1.2). The basic model suggests that throughput increases more with the number
of STS gantry cranes than with the number of mobile and quay cranes, though the difference between the two
is no longer statistically significant in the second specification. Similarly, the coefficient on the dummy for
the absence of a gantry crane is larger (in absolute value) than that on the dummy for the absence of a mobile
crane, a difference that is statistically significant in both specifications. This suggests that ports get more
throughput “bang for the buck” from gantry cranes than from mobile and quay cranes. As expected, the use
of ships’ cranes, transshipment ports, and container terminals all positively impact throughput. Finally,
throughput also increases with connectivity, though somewhat surprisingly it declines with GDP and
openness to trade.
Table A1.2 Results of Maximum Likelihood Estimation of the Stochastic
Frontier
Variables (1) (2)
ln area 0.161*** 0.309***
[0.034] [0.027]
ln berth length 0.549*** 0.293***
[0.047] [0.035]
ln large and small mobile and quay cranes+1 0.167*** 0.373***
[0.058] [0.053]
ln ship-to-shore gantry cranes+1 0.428*** 0.402***
[0.065] [0.056]
Linear trend 0.033*** 0.008
[0.011] [0.009]
Uses ships’ cranes 1.032***
[0.078]
Transshipment port 0.658***
[0.082]
Dummy for exclusively container terminals 0.663***
[0.060]
ln GDP -0.102***
[0.035]
ln liner shipping connectivity 0.664***
[0.098]
ln trade openness -0.103
[0.074]
Dummy for year 2009 -0.094 -0.097
[0.123] [0.090]
Mobile/quay crane dummy -0.038 -0.116
[0.091] [0.076]
STS gantry crane dummy -0.526*** -0.442***
[0.100] [0.078]
Mu -247.532 -192.399*
[341.959] [112.280]
Constant 7.100*** 7.625***
[0.427] [0.907]
Observations 796 752
Number of _puerto 85 81
lambda 28.27** 40.01***
sigma_u 16.32 14.08***
sigma_v 0.577*** 0.352***
Source: Authors’ own elaboration.
Note: Standard errors in brackets. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. GDP = gross domestic product;
STS = ship to shore.
46
Table A1.3 Characteristics of LAC Ports by Country, 1999–2010
Average Average
Average Annual Average Berth Average Area
Mobile and STS Gantry
Throughput (TEU) Length (m) (m^2)
Quay Cranes Cranes
Antigua and Barbuda
St. John's 18,361 366 61,715 1.0 0.0
Argentina
Buenos Aires 1,234,465 4,450 1,148,656 7.9 15.8
Rosario 28,538 1,000 66,000 0.0 0.0
Ushuaia 37,907 1,194 12,000 0.0 0.0
Zarate 28,574 250 500,000 0.0 1.2
Aruba
Oranjestad 60,425 250 130,000 0.5 1.0
The Bahamas
Freeport 1,190,080 903 303,396 2.2 7.5
Barbados
Bridgetown 77,984 476 73,333 1.1 1.0
Belize
Belize City 32,118 66 175,000 2.7 0.0
Brazil
Belem 49,625 1,610 19,620 2.0 0.0
Fortaleza 59,779 984 24,000 1.4 0.0
Itajai 504,143 833 86,000 3.0 0.0
Manaus 168,839 620 30,000 1.3 0.0
Paranagua 485,980 635 273,422 1.8 3.4
Pecem 142,561 700 380,000 0.0 1.0
Rio de Janeiro 354,508 1,078 322,500 0.1 6.2
Rio Grande 545,278 2,415 564,375 3.3 2.3
Salvador 181,941 269 40,000 3.5 1.3
Santana 500 200 16,182 0.0 0.0
Santarem 570 520 500,000 0.0 0.0
Santos 2,039,737 2,152 800,700 2.6 10.9
Sao Francisco do Sul 234,518 484 800,000 1.5 0.0
Sepetiba 149,373 761 400,000 1.6 1.6
Suape 164,371 783 230,750 0.0 2.2
Vitoria 184,090 692 110,500 1.5 1.5
Chile
Antofagasta 61,274 1,230 15,000 2.0 0.0
Arica 74,745 1,050 193,000 1.0 0.0
Iquique 184,922 1,105 85,350 5.0 0.0
Lirquen 195,680 400 424,000 3.0 0.0
San Antonio 693,599 1,155 468,701 3.9 4.0
San Vicente 282,434 603 405,709 1.6 0.0
Talcahuano 14,787 155 61,270 0.0 0.0
Valparaiso 512,747 2,317 295,651 5.0 3.3
Colombia
Barranquilla 82,610 1,058 933,000 0.9 0.0
Buenaventura 686,915 785 508,642 1.0 2.0
Cartagena 804,853 1,599 424,000 2.0 2.0
Santa Marta 88,467 1,085 133,000 1.0 0.0
Costa Rica
Puerto Caldera 110,548 490 30,000 0.0 0.0
Puerto Limón 692,351 504 95,417 1.0 1.0
Cuba
Havana 257,331 376 185,851 0.7 2.2
Dominica
Roseau 10,785 249 43,000 0.0 0.0
Dominican Republic
Boca Chica 18,600 300 15,740 1.0 0.0
Caucedo 375,875 600 500,000 0.0 5.0
Rio Haina 322,022 1,216 307,067 0.8 2.0
47
Average Average
Average Annual Average Berth Average Area
Mobile and STS Gantry
Throughput (TEU) Length (m) (m^2)
Quay Cranes Cranes
Ecuador
Guayaquil 582,511 1,334 225,750 1.7 1.8
El Salvador
Acajutla 86,854 557 105,000 0.0 0.0
Grenada
St. George's 16,419 335 42,492 0.0 0.0
Guatemala
Puerto Barrios 256,496 610 15,000 1.0 0.0
Puerto Quetzal 226,793 450 90,256 2.0 0.0
Santo Tomás de Castilla 309,399 915 283,000 5.0 0.0
Honduras
Puerto Castilla 76,019 150 80,000 0.0 0.0
Puerto Cortés 457,891 997 144,300 1.0 2.0
Jamaica
Kingston 1,671,820 3,277 1,080,000 5.0 14.0
Mexico
Altamira 310,181 992 406,272 0.9 4.2
Ensenada 73,546 300 70,000 0.8 2.3
Lazaro Cardenas 229,649 478 267,980 0.5 4.6
Manzanillo 1,199,443 2,205 316,571 0.9 7.1
Mazatlan 20,874 1,138 130,000 0.0 0.0
Progreso 63,084 306 84,417 0.3 0.7
Salina Cruz 3,364 275 74,000 0.3 1.0
Tampico 18,361 2,013 252,208 11.6 0.0
Tuxpan 206 300 4,000 1.0 0.0
Veracruz 608,624 468 403,833 0.8 5.5
Nicaragua
Corinto 34,812 240 20,000 0.0 1.0
Panama
Balboa 1,297,942 1,167 181,556 0.0 5.7
Coco Solo 577,939 612 25,000 0.0 4.8
Puerto Manzanillo 1,266,187 1,483 439,167 0.0 11.7
Peru
Callao 795,058 4,000 441,080 0.0 0.0
Paita 94,497 730 37,123 0.0 0.0
Puerto Rico
San Juan 1,716,646 1,688 286,667 0.0 6.0
St. Kitts and Nevis
Basseterre 7,217 133 101,171 0.0 0.0
Long Point 3,159 355 40,469 0.0 0.0
St. Lucia 26,111 339 50,531 1.1 0.0
Castries 22,136 317 50,916 1.2 0.0
Vieux Fort 31,577 370 50,000 1.0 0.0
St. Vincent and the Grenadines
Campden Park/Kingstown 16,608 495 63,749 1.0 0.0
Trinidad and Tobago
Point Lisas 126,512 387 36,909 2.6 0.5
Port of Spain 330,152 783 171,333 5.1 2.7
Uruguay
Montevideo 449,592 580 193,333 2.3 1.8
Venezuela, RB
La Guaira 287,754 1,104 24,000 7.0 0.0
Maracaibo 31,120 774 24,000 6.0 0.0
Puerto Cabello 650,982 4,485 161,491 37.4 0.0
Source: Author’s own elaboration on primary data.
48
Annex 2. OECS Ports at a Glance
49
Table A2.1 Summary of OECS Ports in Study
Antigua Dominica Grenada St. Kitts St. Kitts St. Lucia St. Lucia St. Vincent St. Vincent
St. John’s Woodbridge Bay St. George’s Basseterre Nevis Castries Vieux Fort Kingstown Campden Park
Lo-Lo Lo-Lo/Ro-Ro
Lo-Lo container Lo-Lo container Ro-Ro container Lo-Lo container Lo-Lo container Break bulk Lo-Lo container
Type of Port container container
imports imports imports imports transshipment imports imports
imports imports
TEU, annual 13,485 19,905 13,920 7,801 2,665 37,672 45,668 2,000 15,000
Large mobile: Large mobile:
Small mobile Large mobile:
Crane Liebherr HLM No crane No crane No crane No crane Liebherr HLM No crane
crane Gottwald HMK 6406
320 320
Managed by
Somewhat Difficult to Managed by Difficult to Somewhat Determined by Determined by
Labor costs Difficult to adjust shipping
adjustable adjust shipping agents adjust adjustable shipping agents shipping agents
agents
Port layout Break bulk Break bulk Break bulk Break bulk Container Break bulk Container Break bulk Container
Container 2 reach 2 reach 5 wheel &
th
2 reach stackers 2 reach stackers 2 reach stackers Straddle Carrier 1 reach stacker 2 reach stackers
transport stackers stackers chassis
Cruise ship
scheduling No Yes No Yes No Yes No No No
conflicts?
20’ container
landing charge 237 415 745 452 164 480 480 167 167
(US$)
Abandoned
Pier Pier at risk of
building taking Pier at risk of Full
Infrastructure: foundation Depth of port – collapsing due to
valuable space on collapsing due to resurfacing No issues No issues No Issues
pier condition recently needs dredging deteriorated
pier cannot be torn deteriorated pylons needed
serviced pylons
down
Poor coordination
between port and Problem with
Efficiency
customs, but Moving Model moving Model moving overtime: Don’t On site, mainly Efficiency issues,
In beginning issues, may be
Customs customs towards one- towards trade towards trade want to use X- transshipment may be understaffed,
stages of reform understaffed, lots
themselves stop shop facilitation facilitation Ray equipment, port lots of overtime
of overtime
considered though there
efficient.
Port subsidizes Port subsidizes
Port subsidizes
two airports, ferry Port subsidizes Port subsidizes Port subsidizes Port subsidizes international
Cross-subsidies None None international airport
terminal, cruise bus terminal one airport one airport two airports. airport
construction
terminal construction
New management
Staffing
considering None yet, new
None yet, reduced 2011,
Institutional introducing PPPs Labor and charges legislation Separate
legislation new legislation None None None
reform and other reformed 2007 waiting to be corporation
under review waiting to be
institutional passed
passed
reforms
Employees 255 385 201 227 60 416 125 279
Table A2.2 Port of Saint John’s (Antigua) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Antigua Port Authority • Limited transshipment
• Service port • No competition
• Port authority established in 1973 • Strong unionized labor
• Break bulk layout
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 61,715 m2 • 1 mobile crane
• 3 berths • Crane capacity: 104 tonnes
• Berth length: 366 m • Entrance channel depth: 11 m
• Maximum berth depth: 15 m • Entrance channel length: 5,557 m
• Maximum ship draft: 10 m • Impediments to deepening
• Maximum length of vessels: 160 m • Impediments to port expansion
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 5 5 5 5 5 5
• Passenger 22 22 22 22 22 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 711 613 506 470 378 591
• Passenger 317 367 304 328 333 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 20,052 17,365 14,878 14,006 13,485 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 445,234 367,856 281,507 282,873 288,986 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 91,809 64,489 40,827 32,882 30,700 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) … … … … … 47,328
• Passengers (number) 597,124 709,795 557,030 604,506 567,707 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 8.2 9.0 5.0 4.3 4.1 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) Only Imports 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Mostly Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Saint John’s 237 474 141 12 12 ...
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Saint John’s 50 38 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
Caribbean Average 37 … -
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
51
Table A2.3 Port of Woodbridge Bay/Roseau (Dominica) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Dominica Air and Sea Ports Authority • No transshipment
• Service port • No private sector participation
• Port authority established in 2006 • No competition
• Break bulk layout • Progress with labor reform
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 43,000 m2 • Maximum length of vessels: 200 m
• 2 berths • No crane
• Berth length: 244 m • No entrance channel
• Maximum berth depth: 11 m • No impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 8 m • No impediments to port expansion
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 4 4 4 4 4 5
• Passenger 12 12 12 12 12 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 1,043 1,011 1,041 992 1,056 591
• Passenger 213 241 250 194 168 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 12,611 13,320 13,868 14,055 19,905 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 26,962 26,194 26,706 26,933 27,142 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 249,444 248,052 238,675 407,798 211,679 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 43,967 44,414 52,768 48,985 48,536 47,328
• Passengers (number) 378,963 527,840 504,574 416,191 262,814 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 0.6 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 0 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) 4.2 5.9 8.9 15.9 6.2 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) 1.9 2.7 3.8 4.7 4.2 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 415 933 69 89 7 5
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Woodbridge Bay/Roseau 64 22 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
52
Table A2.4 Port of Saint George’s (Grenada) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Grenada Ports Authority • No transshipment
• Service port • No private sector participation
• Port authority established in 1978 • No competition
• Break bulk layout • Highly unionized labor
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 42,492 m2 • No crane
• 2 berths • Entrance channel depth: 9 m
• Berth length: 335 m • Entrance channel length: 1,300 m
• Maximum berth depth: 9 m • No impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 8 m • No impediments to port expansion
• Maximum length of vessels: 168 m
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 5 5 5 5 5 5
• Passenger 18 18 18 18 18 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 1,235 1,196 1,173 1,162 1,018 591
• Passenger 232 251 209 207 227 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 17,799 14,904 15,008 14,365 13,920 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 503,887 480,600 504,832 477,387 461,479 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 253,279 272,477 284,904 263,386 251,266 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 85,076 80,248 86,827 75,742 81,061 47,328
• Passengers (number) 296,181 343,032 331,012 313,206 247,884 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) … … 0.9 0.5 0.3 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 5.4 4.8 7.2 5.8 4.7 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) 85.6 8.9 211.9 121.5 93.9 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Saint George’s 745 1,192 … 4 4 5
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Saint George’s 16 60 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
53
Table A2.5 Port of Basseterre (St. Kitts and Nevis) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Antigua Port Authority • Limited transshipment
• Service port • Private sector participation in stevedoring
• Port authority established in 1993 • No competition
• Break bulk layout • Strong unionized labor
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 101,171 m2 • Maximum length of vessels: 120 m
• 2 berths • No crane
• Berth length: 133 m • No entrance channel
• Maximum berth depth: 12 m • No impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 11 m • Impediments to port expansion
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 7 7 7 6 6 5
• Passenger 19 19 19 19 19 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 711 625 432 569 529 591
• Passenger 204 234 172 305 267 183
II. Traffic
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 7,100 7,511 7,214 7,312 7,801 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 151,917 133,838 97,767 102,279 105,313 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 109,852 102,352 73,588 111,954 104,926 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 68,161 70,250 40,786 89,612 81,296 47,328
• Passengers (number) 397,507 450,752 475,000 600,131 535,290 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 0.7 1.1 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) Mostly Imports 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Basseterre 452 904 20 33 33 5
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 63 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
38
Basseterre 9 66 40
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 15
9
10 3
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
54
Table A2.6 Port of Long Point (St. Kitts and Nevis) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Nevis Air and Sea Ports • No transshipment
Authority
• Service port • Private sector participation in stevedoring
• Port authority established in 1998 • Competition on labor
• Container layout • No labor unions
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 40,469 m2 • Maximum length of vessels: 160 m
• 1 berth • No crane
• Berth length: 355 m • No entrance channel
• Maximum berth depth: 7 m • Impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 6 m • Impediments to port expansion
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 5 5 5 5 5 5
• Passenger 6 6 6 6 6 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 403 464 437 344 295 591
• Passenger 27 19 25 34 31 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 2,453 3,002 2,852 3,046 2,665 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 2,947 8,064 3,861 2,910 3,661 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 25,314 36,940 24,200 36,176 29,049 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 17,869 17,270 18,164 14,952 14,599 47,328
• Passengers (number) 3,857 3,768 3,542 5,277 4,020 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 1.2 2.9 1.9 2.0 2.3 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 0 0 0 0 0 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) Mostly Imports 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Long Point 322 642 … 36 5 13
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency
(out of 69 ports) 50
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Long Point 4 68 40 36
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22 31
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
Caribbean Average 37 … -
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
55
Table A2.7 Port of Castries (Saint Lucia) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Saint Lucia Air and Sea Ports Authority • Limited transshipment
• Service port • Private sector participation in tug and line handling
• Port authority established in 1983 • Competition for warehousing
• Break bulk layout • Strong unionized labor
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 117,360 m2 • 1 mobile crane
• 8 berths • Crane capacity: 52 tonnes
• Berth length: 482 m • Entrance channel depth: 13 m
• Maximum berth depth: 10 m • Entrance channel length: 1,100 m
• Maximum ship draft: 9 m • Impediments to deepening
• Maximum length of vessels: 200 m • Impediments to port expansion
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 5 5 5 5 5 5
• Passenger 24 24 24 24 24 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 323 316 350 308 288 591
• Passenger 132 385 334 286 266 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 35,977 30,186 27,526 29,500 37,672 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 123,721 100,636 93,358 88,325 82,627 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 5,424 16,538 20,068 3,859 3,859 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 2,218 5,799 4,428 3,278 4,060 47,328
• Passengers (number) 610,343 619,680 670,043 630,444 571,894 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 4.4 3.6 2.2 2.2 0.5 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 7.1 6.1 3.3 3.5 4.4 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) Only Imports 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/TEU) (USD/tonne) (USD/passenger)
Castries 480 960 6 4 7 7
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Castries 56 31 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
56
Table A2.8 Port of Vieux Fort (Saint Lucia) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by Saint Lucia Marine Terminals Limited • Mainly transshipment
• Landlord port • Private sector participation in tug and line handling
• Port authority established in 1995 • No competition
• Container layout • No labor union issues
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 50,000 m2 • 1 mobile crane
• 3 berths • Crane capacity: 80 tonnes
• Berth length: 373 m • Entrance channel depth: 9 m
• Maximum berth depth: 11 m • No impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 10 m • Impediments to port expansion
• Maximum length of vessels: 200 m
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 4 4 4 4 4 5
• Passenger … … … … … 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 599 549 560 521 447 591
• Passenger … … … … … 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 34,226 21,756 21,830 33,047 45,668 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 55,868 52,242 42,551 27,317 28,787 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 174,243 45,601 59,042 69,791 93,682 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 35,310 34,715 39,900 37,413 38,291 47,328
• Passengers (number) … … … … … 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 0 0 0 0 0 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) 0 0 0 0 0.1 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/ TEU) (USD/ ton) (USD/passenger)
Vieux Fort 480 960 30 4 4 …
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmark of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Vieux Fort 31 51 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
57
Table A2.9 Port of Campden Park/Kingstown (Saint Vincent) at a Glance
Institutional Characteristics
• Operated by St. Vincent and the Grenadines Port Authority • No transshipment
• Service port • Private sector participation in stevedoring
• Port authority established in 1975 • Competition for labor
• Container layout
Physical Characteristics
• Terminal Area: 63,749 m2 • 1 mobile crane
• 2 berths • Crane capacity: 110 tonnes
• Berth length: 495 m • Entrance channel length: 1,112 m
• Maximum berth depth: 15 m • No impediments to deepening
• Maximum ship draft: 11 m • Impediments to port expansion
• Maximum length of vessels: 167 m
Key Development Indicators
I. Overall Activity 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Lines serving the port (units)
• Cargo 6 6 6 6 6 5
• Passenger 10 10 10 10 10 16
− Calls (units)
• Cargo 646 777 896 753 720 591
• Passenger 172 164 132 139 173 183
II. Traffic 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 OECS (2012)
− Composition
• Container (TEU/year) 16,569 16,238 16,967 16,419 16,827 19,743
• General cargo (tonnes/year) 56,649 43,161 43,564 35,668 34,272 129,033
• Dry bulk (tonnes/year) 76,256 73,806 60,369 61,541 46,796 96,495
• Liquid bulk (tonnes/year) 53,393 60,927 59,113 58,927 63,453 47,328
• Passengers (number) 116,709 149,160 111,230 89,482 77,179 323,827
− Trade Imbalances
• Container (empty/full ratio) 0.6 0.7 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.6
• General cargo (import/export
ratio) 0.1 0 0.1 0.1 0.1 1.8
• Dry bulk (import/export ratio) 0.6 0.7 1.1 2.9 2.5 25.7
• Liquid (import/export ratio) Only Imports 4.2
Handling Charges (2012)
20’ Dry 40’ Dry Transshipment General Bulk
Container Container Container Cargo Dry Cruise
(USD/container) (USD/ TEU) (USD/ ton) (USD/passenger)
Campden Park/Kingstown 167 333 267 9 9 15
OECS Average 412 800 89 24 10 8
A Benchmarking of Port Efficiency (2010)
70 64 OECS
Technical
Ranking 60 56
Efficiency 50
(out of 69 ports)
(%) 50
Efficiency (%)
Campden Park/Kingstown 38 45 40 36
31
Roseau (Dominica) – Best OECS 64 22
30
San Juan (Puerto Rico) – Best Caribbean 79 7
Manzanillo (Mexico) – Best LAC 86 1 20 16
9
10 4
OECS Average 33 …
-
Caribbean Average 37 …
Roseau
Basseterre
Vieux Fort
St. George's
Castries
St. John's
Campden Park
Long Point
LAC Average 50 …
Source: Authors’ elaboration on primary data.
Note: LAC = Latin America and the Caribbean; m = meters; m2 = square meters; OECS = Organization of Eastern Caribbean States; TEU/yr =
twenty-foot equivalent units per year.
58
Annex 3. Summary of Emerging Issues
St. John’s (Antigua)
• Crane capacity is overstated in relation to the volume it handles. It is only being used five hours a day
for three days a week.
• The port is facing severe financial difficulties. These can be traced back to bad investment decisions
regarding the crane,28 and also to the decision by the port to hire workers on a permanent versus
temporary basis during a construction project with large shipping needs but also with a finite end. The
lack of workforce adjustments are a severe obstacle to the functioning of the port.
• The port is currently not matching its expenses with appropriate sources of revenues; that is, it is
providing services to consignees and other parties for which it is not collecting revenues.
• As with most of the ports in the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS), charge rates are
still based on principles stemming from the break-bulk era.
• The port’s infrastructure is mismatched to its purpose. A warehouse stands in the way of what should
be open space for container operations, and the container area is too large for the port’s volume and
purpose. The vast yard area has caused shipping lines to “dump” empty containers into the port, which,
under threat of a $50 charge per empty container per day by new management, are now being removed.
In addition, the surface of most of the container yard has deteriorated severely, to the point that the
dust generated during operations is now considered a health hazard to workers.
• The port cannot unlock vital pier length because of structural issues related to an abandoned
administrative building.
• The port has now installed a reform-minded manager who is introducing some of the region’s first
private sector participation in critical elements of port operation, such as warehouse management. 29
Woodbridge Bay/Rousseau (Dominica)
• The port management reforms in Woodbridge Bay could be seen as a good practice example in the
OECS in terms of modernizing operations with minimal capital investments. 30
• Cargo operations at the port must be charged at a higher rate than optimal because the port subsidizes
several non-cargo-related activities, including airfields (Canefield Airport and Manville Hall
International Airport), the ferry terminal, and the cruise terminal. In terms of the cruise terminal, all
per passenger head tax revenues go directly to the government, even though initially the port had been
promised a 30 percent portion.
• Infrastructure reinvestment needs are large. The repair of the pier will cost $12 million. This is a must-
do investment, because there is a threat of losing perhaps the entire pier. In addition the roofs of at
least three sheds are leaking, with the largest shed needing the most reinvestment.
28 Anecdotally, the crane is reported to have cost $6.9 million (EC$18.6 million), while a crane of the same make and model was
purchased for Castries in St. Lucia for $2 million.
29 New management was appointed in March 2014, and with that the circumstances surrounding the Port of St. Johns seem to be
actively changing; improvements are being actively pursued. Hopefully these efforts will soon be reflected in the port’s
performance.
30 This is based on qualitative interviews with shipping lines. In particular, representatives of Tropical Shipping and King Ocean
consider Woodbridge the best-run port in the OECS. It uses minimal equipment. It uses reach stackers, and has a crumbling pier
and leaky sheds.
59
• The port is generating revenues with its current equipment. While a mobile crane could increase
container throughput, the pier in its current condition cannot support such a weight. In addition,
containers are still being lifted off ships using cables rather than mechanical spreaders, which increases
safety risks for both cargo and personnel.
• The port underwent important labor reforms, enabling management, through a judicial process, to set
performance, gang size, and gang composition targets.
• The cruise terminal can take only one ship at a time, which makes it necessary to make the cargo port
available for cruise ships. Cruise ship berthing has priority over cargo vessel berthing at the port, and
cargo vessels have to wait outside the harbor at anchor until the extra cruise ship departs.
St. George’s (Grenada)
• St. George’s is one of the more expensive and challenged ports in the OECS. The port faces high labor
costs and still operates on break-bulk principles.
• Regardless of the need for a crane, as based on throughput, the purchase and installation of a mobile
crane might be politically challenging because of its impact on the workforce. Though Tropical
Shipping Lines uses its own geared vessels, it requested an onshore crane and was refused by the port
management. Admittedly, a crane would create job losses by reducing the gang size from 20 to 5.
• Gang sizes are large, with 22 members, containing such positions as an individual whose sole job is to
provide drinking water to the other gang members.
• Though the reach stackers have been rebuilt, users of the port find them unreliable.
• There is an eight-hour rule: even if it takes one hour to unload a ship, stevedores and longshoremen get
a full eight hour’s pay.
• The port operates with double labor rates on Sundays and holidays.
• The port is seen as a source of revenue, not as a trade facilitator. Though operations were profitable
before the global economic slowdown, the port is now operating at a loss. In the meantime the port is
also responsible for a local bus terminal in St. George’s; in other words, it is being used to subsidize
other modes of transport.
• Port, maritime, and shipping legislation and regulations are now under review for potential revision.
Basseterre (St. Kitts and Nevis)
• The port has been undergoing a reform in recent years. After significant losses in the years leading up
to 2010, employees were offered generous packages to leave, and debt was restructured. St. Kitts has
new port legislation and regulations that have been drafted and are awaiting approval by St. Christopher
Air and Sea Ports Authority (SCASPA) for tabling in parliament.
• The port has posted net losses for a long time; before restructuring, over 40 percent of revenues went
to debt servicing. In 2013 the port, for the first time in many years, showed a profit; it also stopped
subsidizing the airport.
• Since 2007 stevedoring has been handled by a firm owned by the shipping agents. This step was taken
to prevent the formation of a stronger labor union than the one already in existence.
• The actual infrastructure, in particular the main working surface, has deteriorated, and investments need
to be made in both the substructure (pylons supporting the port) and the surface itself.
• The port is still overstaffed, though staffing has been reduced by one-third.
60
Long Point (St. Kitts and Nevis)
• The depth of the main usable area for larger vessels is inadequate. Since a fully loaded vessel cannot
visit the port, there are scheduling difficulties and an urgent need for dredging
• Volumes are low, and the port seems to be undermarketed. There has been an interest in local
transshipment (Bernuth once approached the port for transshipment) but nothing has materialized; port
authorities might do more to pursue such offers.
• The port is stuck in the break-bulk era: it (i) charges by tonnage and (ii) collects its statistics by tonnage,
and not by TEU. Container numbers from the port had to be obtained from customs, since the port was
still collecting statistics in tonnage. 31
Castries (St. Lucia)
• Laws and regulations stem from the break-bulk era, evident in the high and nontransparent per container
charges and outdated labor arrangements. Similarly, the port’s layout is for the break-bulk era; sheds
and warehouses take up valuable space by the pier.
• There is very little room for reducing gang sizes and costs.
• Customs at the port do not operate in a manner that is cost-effective for traders. Inspection times for
containers often fall into overtime hours, and the x-ray machine (purchased for inspections at the cost
of $370,000) has never been used, ostensibly because this would reduce the amount of billable time for
customs workers.
• The crane, though its lifting capacity exceeds the needs of the port, is also unreliable, and has caused
bottlenecks during breakdowns.
• St. Lucia is a much-favored cruise ship destination. Cruise ships take priority in berth scheduling at the
port, causing conflicts with arriving cargo vessels.
Vieux Fort (St. Lucia)
• The port has faced significant challenges due to the age and reliability of its crane. The port was out of
commission after a crane breakdown for almost a year in 2012. This prompted the loss of CMA CGM’s
transfer business, which was shifted to Trinidad, and the reduction of King Ocean’s volume to one-
fourth of that prior to the breakdown. In addition, the spreader is not working, increasing labor costs.
• As exception among OECS ports, labor costs are not an issue of concern.
Campden Park/Kingstown (St. Vincent and the Grenadines)
1. The break-bulk terminal of Kingstown is insufficient and frequently congested.
2. The general drawback is that the Campden terminal has only one berth, and only one ship can be
serviced at a time. Campden Park, therefore, in its current state, cannot operate as a substitute for the
Kingstown terminal.
31 This appears to be a common issue with smaller, ro-ro only ports.
61