WT P26g WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPER NUMBER 268 iI4 h. f' i Surveillance of Agricultural Prices and Trade A Handbook for Colombia Alberto Valdes and Barry Schaeffer in collaboration with Lia Guterman RECENT WORLD BANK TECHNICAL PAPERS No. 193 Braatz, Conservin?g Biological Diversity: A Strategyfor Protected Areas in the Asia-Pacific Region No. 194 Saint, Universities in Africa: Strategiesfor Stabilization and Revitalization No. 195 Ochs and Bishay, Drainage Guidelines No. 196 Mabogunje, Perspective on Urban Land and Land Management Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa No. 197 Zymelman, editor, Assessing Engineering Education in Sub-Sahlaran Africa No. 198 Teerink and Nakashima, Water Allocation, Rights, and Pricing: Examples from Japan and the United States No. 199 Hussi, Murphy, Lindberg, and Brenneman, The Development of Cooperatives and Other Rural Organizations: The Role of the World Bank No. 200 McMillan, Nana, and Savadogo, Settlement and Development in the River Blindness Control Zone: Case Study of Buirkina Faso No. 201 Van Tuijl, Improving Water Use in Agricuilture: Experiences in the Middle East and Nortlh Africa No. 202 Vergara, The Materials Revolutioni: What Does It Mean for Developing Asia? 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Copyright i) 1995 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/THE WORLD BANK 1818 H Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A. All rights reserved Manufactured in the United States of Arnerica First printing August 1995 Technical Papers are published to communicate the results of the Bank's work to the development com- munity with the least possible delay. The typescript of this paper therefore has not been prepared in accor- dance with the procedures appropriate to formal printed texts, and the World Bank accepts no responsibili- ty for errors. Some sources cited in this paper may be informal documents that are not readily available. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author(s) and should not be attributed in any manner to the World Bank, to its affiliated organizations, or to members of its Board of Executive Directors or the countries they represent. 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The complete backlist of publications from the World Bank is shown in the annual Index of Publications, which contains an alphabetical title list (with full ordering information) and indexes of sub- jects, authors, and countries and regions. The latest edition is available free of charge from the Distribution Unit, Office of the Publisher, The World Bank, 1818 H Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20433, U.S.A., or from Publications, The World Bank, 66, avenue d'Ina, 75116 Paris, France. ISSN: 0253-7494 Both authors work in the Latin America Technical Department of the World Bank. Alberto Vald6s is an agricultural adviser and Barry Schaeffer is an agricultural economist. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Vald6s, Alberto. Surveillance of agricultural prices and trade: a handbook for Colombia / Alberto Vald6s, Barry Schaeffer. p. cm. - (World Bank technical paper, ISSN 0253-7494; no. 268) ISBN 0-8213-3117-5 1. Agricultural prices-Government policy-Colombia-Statistics. 2. Farm produce-Colombia-Statistics. 3. Produce trade-Colombia- Statistics. I. Schaeffer, Barry, 1957- . II. Title. III. Series. HD1882.75.V35 1995 338.1'8861-dc2O 95-2099 CIP Contents Foreword ...... v Abstract ................................................................................................................ vii Acknowledgments ................................................................................................ix Preface..........i Introduction .................................................................................... Chapter 1 Protection Indicators Defined .........................3 Chapter 2 Presentation and Discussion of Results ......................... 19 Appendix A Commodity Charts and Protection Indicator Calculation Tables .45 Appendix B Description of Colombia's Commodity Markets .85 iii I FOREWORD Latin America and Caribbean countries are at different stages of a policy reform process involving their overall economies and their agriculture sector. Agricultural trade and price policy reform are emerging as particularly complex and controversial topics. The Surveillance project, for which this Handbook was prepared, was undertaken by the Advisory Group of the Technical Department in the Latin America and Caribbean Region to offer a framework for the analysis and monitoring of agricultural price and trade policy reforms. Each Handbook presents a quantitative analysis of the structure of incentives for agricultural activities and measures income transfers as a result of government policies for the country concerned. Quantification, and the resulting transparency, can be an effective deterrent against discriminatory treatment regarding agricultural pricing and trade. Sri-ram Aiyer Director Technical Department Latin America and the Caribbean Region v ABSTRACT This is one of a series of handbooks that have arisen from a Surveillance project to evaluate agricultural price and trade interventions in eight Latin American countries for seven commodities for the period 1986 to 1993. The countries included in this Surveillance project are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. The aim of the project is to make transparent the effects of agricultural trade and price policies. To achieve this goal a common methodology was applied to each country to calculate four policy indicators: Nominal Protection Rate (NPR), Effective Protection Rate (EPR), Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA), and Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE). This Handbook presents and discusses the results and methodology for Colombia on beef, cotton, maize, milk, rice, sorghum, soybeans, and wheat for 1985-1993. vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS We would like to thank our collaborator Lia Guterman for her substantial contribution to this document. Lia Guterman was responsible for assembling the raw data series used in this document; for providing a number of background computations; for supplying us with information on the market structure of each of the agricultural commodities covered in the study; and, for commenting on our interpretation of the results derived from the study. The authors are particularly grateful to Melanie Meyer for her excellent assistance in the various revisions of this report. Alberto Valdes and Barry Schaeffer Ix PREFACE How level is the playing field for agriculture after the initiation of trade and price reforms? Agricultural price interventions in Latin America were predominantly implemented using restrictions such as discretionary import and export licenses, direct price regulations, burdensome customs clearance procedures, and fixed and variable tariffs. The level and extent of protection and export taxation -- the hidden income transfers -- was largely unknown, due to the use of complex policy instruments. With the maze of overlapping effects it was virtually impossible to ascertain the effect of these impacts across subsectors. An outgrowth of this lack of transparency within the framework of price incentives is insufficient political pressure to attain a fair playing field within the agricultural market. Like most countries in Latin America, Colombia does not have a 'transparency institution' providing greater public awareness of the way in which activities in agriculture and other sectors can sometimes receive preferential treatment. Most countries in Latin America, including Colombia, are beginning to embark on a unilateral process of tariffication with bound tariffs, eliminating quota restrictions and also removing export taxes. This should result in a more transparent trade regime in the future, and make domestic prices more sensitive to changes in border prices. The Surveillance project addresses a major gap in the analysis of trade and price policy for agriculture. To provide transparency, countries require a mechanism which enables vigorous screening and monitoring of price interventions. Once reforms are undertaken what indicators can be used to analyze surveillance of price interventions? For this report a quantitative assessment of trade and price policy interventions has been carried out involving seven commodities for eight Latin American and Caribbean countries during 1984-1994. These countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. Four policy indicators, Nominal and Effective Rates of Protection (NPR and EPR), Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) and the Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA) were used. To achieve comparability across products and countries, a common methodology and formatting of the data was applied to calculate the four policy indicators. Gauged annually, these indicators expose subsidies and taxes in specific commodity markets. It is proposed that such surveillance be institutionalized and undertaken periodically as a monitoring mechanism to assess agricultural trade and price reform. The results for Colombia are presented in Chapter 2. Alberto Valdes Agricultural Adviser Latin American and the Caribbean Advisory Group xi INTRODUCTION The Surveillance Study seeks to provide a consistent framework and yardstick with which to measure the progress of price and trade reforms. As a part of that study, this Handbook has the following goals; to explain each quantitative tool used to assess trade and price policy with respect to a commodity (Chapter 1); and * to present the results in detail along with supporting documentation for the calculation of protection indicators (Chapter 2 and Appendix A). Beginning in 1985 and continuing through 1993, this project's goal is to assess: historical agricultural price policy (i.e., prior to reforms), and current agricultural price policy. Four policy indicator measures of assessment have been applied to several major importable and exportable agricultural commodities; they are: Nominal Protection Rate (NPR); Effective Protection Rate (EPR); Producer Subsidy Equivalent (P SE), and Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA). Chapter 1 explains these policy indicators. Each is subject to limitations and is an approximation. Using the four indicators means that the NPRs and EPRs are complementary to the PSEs and ERAs. The first two are effective in measuring the structure of incentives as affected by price interventions. The latter two are effective in quantifying the combined effect of price and non-price policies on income transfers between producers and the rest of the economy. Combined, the four provide insight to a sector's aims and incentives. A tariff-equivalent approach based on direct border/domestic price comparison was used to estimate the market price support component to these indicators. While we expect that trade and price policy intervention explain most of the observed price wedge, one cannot rule out that domestic market structure in the particular activity will also influence the results. Thus, not all of the price wedge observed is policy induced. The four indicators help readers to see the results in terms of a broad picture. However, depending on how the question is posed different analysts can arrive at very different numbers (for the same product in a given year). Thus, it is necessary to provide detailed information for background computations. The analysis of these indicators allows policymakers to examine various policy issues. For example, which activities help or hinder agricultural price and trade policy? Are transfers price-based, or do they exist as direct income transfers? Are reforms already in place that reduce the level of protection? 1 How much and how accurately do the quantitative indicators reflect exogenous shocks, such as changes in border prices? How uniform is the structure of incentives across various activities? Does the trade regime result in significant anti-export bias? Below are examples, discussions and results directly related to Colombia. For the interested reader, a summary of the protection indicators appears in tables 5 and 6 (at the end of Chapter 2). The main results are shown on pages 20 through 25, figures la and lb, and tables 5, 6 and 8. Figures la and lb illustrate income transfers. For importables (figure lb), income transfers from price and non-price interventions have declined significantly since 1985. By 1992, the impact of price and non-price interventions on income transfers was low (and in some cases negative). For exportables (figure la), rice and beef have largely benefited while coffee was taxed. 2 CHAPTER 1 PROTECTION INDICATORS DEFINED Definition of Indicators In order to measure periodically the structure of incentives for various agricultural activities, and to produce a consistent, quantitative assessment of income transfers between agriculture and the rest of the economy, indicators must be comparable over time, across commodities, and across countries. Further, they must be easy to measure and understand, and must accurately reflect the incentive structure of the underlying policy instrument(s). Data Assembly The first step is to examine and understand the data used to calculate the indicators. A review of the characteristics of the indicators follows a discussion of the process by which the data were assembled. The Surveillance Project's analysis begins with a broad overview of a given commodity's marketing chain in the country concerned, followed by information gathering. Is a commodity exportable or importable? How many steps exist in the chain? Is any significant processing required? A typical chain involves transport to processor - processing - transport to the wholesaler - wholesaler's activity - transport to port facility - lading and shipment. Once the marketing chain has been delineated, each step of the chain can be analyzed with cost and price estimates. The NPR, EPR, PSE and ERA all involve comparison of a domestic price with its border equivalent. This is true for both inputs and outputs. The next logical step in the surveillance process is to focus on pricing instruments using the marketing chain derived above as a sequential series of "price points." Relevant domestic prices of both outputs and inputs need to be obtained before assembling the database to calculate protection rates. It is also necessary, in the case of inputs, to acquire the technological coefficients of converting input into output. Domestic prices should ideally be acquired at the farm level. In reality, however, most prices are based on those at the central market, warehouse or auction (outputs) or at retail (inputs). This information can be obtained from farm budget data. Direct payments through subsidies, and such costs as taxes and payments to marketing boards should be accounted for at the farm level in addition to those prices paid and received directly. After delivery of the commodity to the central market, transportation and marketing costs are important considerations as are any necessary processing costs. 3 Internal transport and related costs can be substantial, and provide for a 'natural' rate of protection to producers of importables and an implicit tax to the producers of exportables. Physical transformation of the raw product, i.e., wheat ground into flour, soybeans crushed into oil and meal, and cotton ginned into seed and fiber, should also be taken into account. Thus, conversion factors must take into consideration such processes. Moreover, price subsidies and taxes may exist in addition to the direct costs. Transportation should also be considered a major cost unless the processing center/central market is close to the port of entry/exit. At the port of entry/exit in the marketing chain all tariffs, taxes, subsidies, port charges and other costs associated with either the importation or exportation of a commodity must be accounted for. This stage in the marketing chain is the most difficult to exarnine because it is here that the government (or other interested party) is most likely to intervene. In addition, border prices of the commodity and its inputs are identified at this stage. For example, the government may charge large user fees that are implicit tariffs if state trading is a factor. Border prices, when converted to domestic currency from world prices, reflect the opportunity cost to the economy of producing the commodity. This focus on the use of opportunity cost as a benchmark against which trade and price policy is assessed is the essence of the economic approach used in this study. Many problems exist in selecting the world price benchmark. If grade and quality differences exist between the internationally traded product and the local commodity, problems arise because one could be comparing dissimilar products. As a result, the estimate of protection may be measuring differences in the two products and not protection. An example would be white vs. paddy rice. In addition, the world price itself can be misleading if the markets are thinly traded (for example, white maize). At this stage in the marketing chain a proper exchange rate should be identified. The criterion for selection in the Surveillance report was the exchange rate farners/processors/exporters receive for their product. In most cases it was the official exchange rate. However, existence of multiple exchange rates or some other form of indirect taxation using the exchange rate complicates the task of defining a valid rate. The Surveillance Project did not include an adjustment for indirect effects of economywide policies in the real exchange rate'. Thus, all calculations of the four indicators, NPRs, PSEs, ERAs, and EPRs, are at the relevant nominal exchange rate. A critical step before the calculation of the indicators is price adjustment. In determining the adjustments three decisive factors are taken into consideration. The first is whether the commodity is an exportable or importable. The second is the place or point of competition between the domestically produced commodity and its overseas l See Maurice Schiff and Alberto Valdes, 'The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing," Economics in Developing Countries, vol. 4 (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992). 4 counterpart. The third is the point in the marketing chain at which the two prices are to be compared. For exportables, the point of competition is normally the port. Using the central farm marketing point as the place of comparison, the costs of the marketing chain must be subtracted from the f.o.b. border price to obtain the farm-level price. The net result is a border equivalent price that can be meaningfully compared to the domestic price. For importables, the point of competition is frequently the processor. Again using the central farm marketing point as the place of comparison, the marketing chain cost must be added to the c.i.f. border price until the point of competition is reached. The costs are then subtracted to the central farm marketing point. These adjustments provide an accurate comparison between the domestic price and its efficiency benchmark. Below, an example of the calculation together with actual illustrations of these adjustments are given along with discussions of each indicator. Nominal Rate of Protection (NPR) In this study the Nominal Protection Rate is defined as the ratio of the prevailing domestic price relative to the appropriate adjusted border price in the absence of intervention. Thus, our NPR is an 'equivalent tariff' measure and does not necessarily coincide with the explicit tariff for the commodity in question. The formula for the NPR for commodity i is the following: NPR, =~-FE P,wEo where pd is the domestic price, pW is the world price of commodity i, and E. is the exchange rate. While this calculation is relatively simple, it is very important to select accurate prices for the ratios, and it is essential to have a thorough understanding of the domestic markets where the prices are formed.2 Once the NPR is calculated, the results can be interpreted. Values can range from positive to negative and each has its own meaning regarding policy. A positive NPR means the producer is receiving a higher price for the commodity than he would without intervention, and the consumer is paying more for the product. Positive protection is frequently associated with importables. 2 See chapters 2, 3 and 4 in Isabelle Tsakok, Agricultural Price Policy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1990) for a useful reference on the NPR, EPR and PSE. 5 A negative NPR signals that the producer is being discriminated against relative to the prevailing border prices. A zero NPR suggests that the structure of protection is neutral, i.e., producers face domestic prices comparable to border prices. The following NPR calculation will illustrate the above. The commodity depicted is the importable wheat. Table 1 is a standardized format designed to approximate the marketing chain of a commodity. Section I in the table determines the correct exchange rate and border price. Using 1992 as an example, the appropriate border price is US$137 per ton CIF. This represents the cost of one ton of wheat purchased in the U.S. plus shipping charges to the port in Colombia. Since this study does not adjust for a possible exchange rate misalignment, the official exchange rate is used.3 For 1992, the exchange rate is 640 Colombian pesos per US dollar. The costs associated with importing the commodity are then examined. These costs are reported in section 2. In the example, one port cost is accounted for in this section. Using 1992 as an example, the port charge is COL$19,175. The next step is to examine costs associated with the marketing chain. Sections 3, 4 and 5 of table 1 account for these costs. Two costs are reported for Colombian wheat: transportation costs from the port to the processor (section 3), and transportation from the processor to the farm level (section 5). For 1992, transportation costs are COL$9,627 in section 3 and COL$13,111 in section 5. Finally, in many cases after accounting for all the costs, a difference still exists between the border equivalent and the domestic price. Market structure is the main cause of the difference between the two prices. Therefore, to account for these differences, an adjustment is made in section 4. In 1992, the adjustment was COL$48,629. It is important to note that with this adjustment the border equivalent price with intervention (section 5) will equal the domestic price reported in section 6. In section 6, appropriate domestic prices are selected. In 1992, the domestic price was COL$165,111. The NPR estimates appear in section 7. To calculate the NPR for 1992, the difference between the domestic and border equivalent price (COL$165,1 11 - COL$116,482 = COL$48,629) is divided by the border equivalent price. The estimate for 1992 is 41.7%. Chapter 2 discusses the results. 3 For a comparison of the NPRs with and without the exchange rate misalignment correction for eighteen developing countries, see Schiff and Valdes, 'The Political Economy of Agricultural Pricing." 6 TABLE 1 Standardized Format Nominal Rate of Protection Courntry: Cor-ds Type: Imporbo Comomodty: Whto, Point of Comp&U9on: Proo..o. 109S l0 a 1 199D7 199 199 199D 1991 1992 1. UNADJUSTED BOROER PRICE E.d.nge R9b Crd P.Doa. 1422 194.1 2435 294.90 22.0 5022 614.0 040.0 Do,orrP=o4 $USOFToT. 173.0 134.0 120.0 131.0 11t.0 127.3 1072 1370 BWd. Pre r .n r 3n..q 24.597 0 24.013.0 29,220.0 39,042 0 63,4100 3,9301 s,o20 a *7,500.0 2. BORDER ADJUSTMENTS T..EABo9oB./AdyP19b __________ Port Chg __ _ _ 3,793.0 5,029.0 6,447.0 S209.0 11.0 0I 15,006.0 18,3790 19.175.0 S1o,epAI..d64 ,1ef__ _ __ __ __ __ Srd.. Prm. Eqd.i (a10, .r.4 26,30.0 1042.0 35JS.670 47,311.0 74,9060 793,90.1 4,194.9 16069.0 ..d.PVi Eq6.dW (s1t1hout n 20,204.0 II 242.0 3,007.0 47,311.0 74,20!.0 f.,930.l 94.1 9.9 1904,15.0 3. COSTS FROM BORDER TO PROCESSINGO(WHOLESALE MARKET) T r.6dB00M.SAdj. Tm'9rnM_ 1,920.0 2,54O.0 2,363.0 4.1 36.0 5,814.0 7,594.0 9,251.0 9.327.0 §t Pr. Equ6,.o.. Pr I (h,nio-on) 30,310.0 33t72 30,920.0 51.496.0 5 0,119.0 4,930.1 93,450.8 11 .40220 Sad. por E5Ied FM. Prom" D (.01,out InW.lhn) 02,210.0o 31,607.0 32,930.0 91.46.0 901119.0 ".630.1 93450.8 116,412.0 4. PROCESSING COST (WHOLESALE MARKET) T.d1149dd*sV.94m (1) 0,498.0 1 1 2990 20,432.0 294640.0 32,9420 o,5.PI9 70,9022 41,629.0 -w m _ _ _ _ Crw-rn 1D 12 I 1D 1D 1D 1.0 1.0 1D _d0 r 94 "Eqdud 4. - P,ow44o O I -1) 321.775.0 44,9062 60,2620 79,1362 113001.0 142,79.0 104,23.0 1t.1111.0 1WIV P.M. Eq*~bsf*vm.ft _IwS,t_ hWdnl 30,310.0 33107.9 32,92D0 M1A4MA r0,11* 9K,220.1 93,480.8 116,462.0 5. COSTS FROM COLLECTION POINT (FARM) TO PROCESSOR T r_r __2,9474 (2,1064 14.1344 1.14.06 (7,306.9 pI,5(." (12,2.34 13.111.0) m.d.PrVM Eq5d at rnC.Nln P*ht (V- IIN 33A,D 41,220D 64.10 7n*27D 105,7tS0 130,731.0 191,000.0 10t,0000 Scd. Pi. leg art Coog6 P Iwor t_ mum""1 27,4l02 0"12 24,40 48,967. 72.o0 76,92.1 94.197A 103.271A 0. DOMESTC PRICE Bwd. _4d.6955 67791, 44,_D61, 0,2902 79,139.0 112,01 O 142,371 10 I4,130 106,1112 cantaii" Pd. 912D 4102DA *4,19 72,2*7.0 106,7r02 132,7212 192,0o0 12.0D 7. NPR Bud. 2131% 33E1A 51.711 41.1% IMA% 78J9 41.71 Ctdl rn P404 OF." 13,9 37,611 9MA% 29. 48.29. 72.19. 67A2% 4729. t. Itgeo letee9 954490,06 poid. d VW1900 ..S, 00q OA 795 p5 W prim at49040606040606 U MO Th 4som0d b 9069. 0iepilee 9445 mqahd by USDAW 405k. Effective Protection Rate (EPR) In most cases, trade policy extends beyond output prices and into the input markets. The Effective Protection Rate (EPR) indicator accounts for these additional interventions. The EPR measures how trade barriers on a product and its tradable inputs jointly affect value-added in a particular activity. This indicator has the advantage of examining the resource allocation effect of a tariff structure. Previous work has shown that the same tariff (or NPR) can imply different Effective Rates of Protection, depending on the level of taxation on the imported inputs and on their importance in the production process. By including inputs, the EPR becomes a more encompassing instrument and, at the same time, more difficult to calculate. Inputs are often subject to both tariffs and quantitative restrictions. Product quality and defining an appropriate border price for a direct price comparison can be a problem. This study considers the principal purchased inputs including fertilizers, chemicals, seed, and the cost of operating farm machinery and equipment (tractors, combines, milking equipment, plows and fuels). Calculation of the EPR is very similar to that of the NPR. Instead of being a ratio of the output prices, as is the NPR, the EPR is a ratio of the value-added at domestic prices (intervention) to value-added at world prices (without intervention). Value-added is defined as the value of output less input costs. The formula for the EPR for commodity i is the following: VAd VA"E EPRi = V. E where VAd and VAW are value-added at domestic and world prices, and E. is the appropriate exchange rate. Interpretation of the EPR is similar to the NPR. For positive EPRs, the returns earned through the activity with intervention are greater than those earned without intervention. For negative EPRs, the reverse is true. Finally, for EPRs equal to zero, the protection factor is neutral and the returns are the same. Since EPRs are, in fact, NPRs which have been extended to include inputs, similar behavior between the two indicators is expected under certain conditions. For example, if the inputs are a small proportion of the value of output, calculating the EPR is of little value. Although the EPR provides more information, it also contains biases because of input substitution possibilities. In practice, however, these biases tend to be ignored because elasticities of substitution are virtually impossible to obtain. 8 TABLE 2 Standardized Format Effective Rate of Protection Country: Colombia Type: Importable Commodity: Wheat Level: Fam 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1. OUTPUT Domestic Pnce Colt Per Ton 36,775.0 44,826.0 59,362.0 79,136.0 113,061.0 142,379.0 164,253.0 165,111.0 Quantity 1 Ton 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Value at Domestic Prices 36,775.0 44,886.0 59,362.0 79,136.0 113,061.0 142,379.0 164,253.0 165,111.0 Border Prce EquivaIlnt Colt Per Ton 30,310.0 33,587.0 38,930.0 51,496.0 80,119.0 86,534.0 93,449.0 116,487.0 Cuanitity 1 Ton 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Value at Brder Price Equivalnt 30,310.0 33,587.0 38,930.0 51,496.0 80,119.0 86,534.0 93,449.0 116,487.0 2. TRADEABLE DIRECT INPUTS Seeds Quanitity (1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Domestic Price Per MT Produced 12012 13980 18828 32179 9606 9671 10525 12461 Domestic Cost 12,012.0 13,990.3 19,927.5 32,179.1 9,605.6 9,670.6 10,524.5 12,461.3 Border Pric Eq. Price Per MT Pmduccd 9846 11008 14825 25335 7623 7992 9073 11868 Border Prce Eq. Cost 9,845.9 11,008.1 14,824.8 25,335.5 7,823.5 7,992.3 9,072.8 11,867.9 Pertilizer Quanitity 11) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Domestic Price Per MT Produced 1930 1994 1308 765 7903 6762 12325 16122 Domestic Cost 1,930.1 1,994.2 1,308.1 764.9 7,903.2 6,761.8 12,324.8 16,121.7 Border Price Eq. Price Per MT Produced 1930 2099 1768 1109 9084 9524 10811 14142 Border Price Eq. Cost 1,930.1 2,099.2 1,767.7 1,108.6 9,084.2 9,523.6 10,811.3 14,141.9 Herbicide Quantity (1l 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Domestic Price Per MT Produced 0 0 9 0 3554 4569 3419 4093 Domestic Cost 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 3,554.4 4,568.6 3,418.9 4,093.1 Border Price Eq. Price Per MT Pmdduced 0 0 0 0 2434 2552 2897 3790 Border Price Eq. Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2,434.0 2,552.3 2,897.4 3,789.9 Insecticide Quanitity (1) 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Domestic Price Per MT Poduced 1030 1098 1170 796 1777 2284 1709 2047 Domestic Cost 1,029.8 1,098.5 1,169.9 796.3 1,777.2 2,284.3 1,709.4 2,046.6 Border Pnce Eq. Price Per MT Produced 990 1077 907 569 1217 1276 1449 1895 Border Price Eq. Cost 990.2 1,076.9 906.9 568.8 1,217.3 1,276.1 1,448.7 1,895.0 Total Direct Inputs (Dome.tic Prices) 14,972.0 17,073.0 21,314.3 33,740.3 22,840.4 23,285.3 27,977.6 34,722.7 Total Direct Inputs (Border Price) 12,766.3 14,184.2 17,499.5 27,012.9 20,358.9 21,344.3 24,230.2 31,694.7 TABLE 2 (cont.) Standardized Format Effective Rate of Protection Country: Colombia Type: Importable Commodity: Wheat Level: Farm 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 3. TRADEABLE INDIRECT INPUTS Other Pre,merngnta Quenitity 1 1 1 Domestic Price Per MT Produced 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Domestic Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Border Price Eq. Price Per MT Produced 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Border Price Eq. Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Mechinery QOunitity j1) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Domestic Pnce Per MT Produced 5306 5638 4740 2953 18419 17777 19311 24122 Domestic Cost 5,305.9 5,636.4 4,746.5 2,953.1 18,418.9 17,777.4 19,311.1 24,122.4 Border Price Eq. Price Per MT Produced 4113 4473 3667 2352 14618 15325 17397 22757 Border Price Eq. Cost 4,113.1 4,473.4 3,667.1 2,362.0 14,818.2 15,325.3 17,397.4 22,756.9 Packing Quanitity 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 Domestic Price Per MT Produced 872 1002 843 529 5837 5599 5580 5704 Domeetic Cost 871.9 1,001.5 843.4 528.9 5,837.5 5,599.0 5,580.0 5,703.9 Border Price Eq. Price Per MT Produced 490 533 449 281 3105 3255 3695 4834 Border Price Eq. Cot 489.8 532.7 448.6 281.3 3,105.0 3,255.2 3,895.4 4,833.8 Quenitity Domestic Price Domestic Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 00 0.0 0.0 Border Price Eq. Price Border Price Eq. Cost 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 Total Indirect Inputs (Domeetic Pricesa 6,177.8 6,637.9 5,589.9 3,482.0 24,256.3 23,37a.4 24,891.1 29.820.2 Total Indirect Inputs (Border PriosI 4,e02.9 5,006.1 4,115.7 2,643.3 17,723.2 18,580.5 21,092.7 27,590.7 4. VALUE ADDED Dirmct Inputs Only At Domestic Prices 21,803.0 27,813.0 38,047.7 45,395.7 90,220.0 119,093.7 136,275.4 130,388.3 At Intemational Prices 17,543.7 19,402.8 21,430.5 24,483.1 59,700.1 65,189.7 69.218,8 84,792.3 Direct & Indirect Inputs At Domestic Prices 15,025.2 21,175.1 32,457.9 41,913.7 65,964.3 95,717.4 111,384.3 100,562.0 At Intemational Prices 12,940.8 14,396.7 17,314.9 21,839.8 42,038.9 46,609.2 48,126.1 57,201.0 5. EPR 20.7% 47.1% 87.5% 91.9% 56.9% 105.4%* 131.4% 75.8% 1. Estiretes of inputs derivwd from cost date. Actual quantities used not evailabi. Again, an actual EPR calculation illustrates the above (see table 2). The commodity depicted is, once again, the importable wheat. Section 1 contains both the domestic and border equivalent price of 1 ton of wheat. The domestic price is COL$165,111 and the border equivalent price is COL$116,487. It is important to note how these two prices are derived. Referring back to table 1, the two prices can be found in section 5. Their ratio minus 1 is the NPR. In effect, the concept of EPR starts where that of the NPR ends (the relationship between the domestic and border output price) and expands the NPR concept to include input prices (both domestic and border). The example incorporates four tradable direct inputs into the calculation (see section 2 of the table). The direct tradable inputs used are seeds, fertilizers, herbicides and insecticides. The domestic and border prices are shown along with a technical coefficient for each input. The technical coefficient is the amount of input needed to produce 1 unit of output. For wheat the unit is 1 ton. Using 1992 as an illustration, only budget data was available so the input/output coefficients are 1. Each of these inputs is valued at both its domestic cost per ton of wheat produced (COL$12,461 for seeds) and border cost (COL$11,868 for seeds). The sum of the direct tradable inputs valued per ton at their domestic price is COL$34,722.7 and at the border price is COL$31,694.7. In section 3, the tradable indirect inputs take into account the cost of machinery, equipment, packing and other preemergents. Section 3 follows the same format as section 2. Combined, section 2 and 3 will add up to the cost of the inputs in producing 1 ton of wheat. Each of these inputs were valued at both its domestic cost (COL$24,122 for machinery) and border cost (COL$22,757 for machinery). The sum of the indirect tradable inputs valued at domestic prices is COL$29,826.2 and at border prices is COL$27,590.7. Section 4 tabulates value-added at both domestic and border equivalent prices. Value-added at domestic prices is the domestic price of output per ton, less the sum of the four directly tradable and four indirectly tradable inputs valued at their domestic price. Value-added at border equivalent prices is the border equivalent price of the output (determined from NPR calculations) less the sum of the same inputs valued at border equivalent prices. For 1992, the value of 1 ton of wheat at domestic prices is COL$165,111 and COL$116,487 at border equivalent prices. The sum of the costs (tradable direct and indirect) valued at domestic prices is COL$64,548.9 (COL$34,722.7 + COL$29,826.2). The same costs valued at border prices is COL$16,162.1 (COL$31,694.7 + COL$27,590.7). Therefore value-added at domestic prices is COL$100,562, and at border prices is COL$57,201.6. Section 5 shows the calculations for the EPR. For 1992, the EPR is the difference between value-added at domestic and border prices (COL$100,562 - COL$57,201.6 = COL$43,360.4), divided by value-added at border prices. The EPR resulting from this calculation is 75.8%. Chapter 2 discusses the results. 11 Producer Subsidy Equivalent (PSE) Governments intervene in a variety of ways in an attempt to assist agricultural producers. Although price interventions represent an important form of assistance, non- price measures could be important as well. The PSE can be defined as compensation to farmers for the loss of income resulting from the removal of domestic agricultural policy measures at a given level of production. Specifically, it is the sum of net output market support, input subsidies, marketing/transport/storage subsidies, deficiency payments, and non-price transfers (research, extension, irrigation)4. Expressed as a sum, the PSE is an absolute aggregate monetary figure and can be calculated both for individual commodities or as an overall sector PSE. However, to make the PSE comparable across commodities and countries, the aggregate PSE should be expressed as a ratio. The PSE is then a ratio of policy transfers compared to the total value of domestic production (valued at domestic prices). The formula for the PSE for commodity i is as follows: pid _ pd pdE )Q)+ ((pd _p,Eo)TC0Q1)+DPj +NPT ipdQi where pd and pw are the domestic and world price of commodity i, pd and pw are the domestic and world prices of input j for commodity i, TC is the technical coefficient of input j for commodity i, Q is the total production of commodity i, DP and NPT are the deficiency payments and non-price transfers payable to producers of commodity i, and E. is the exchange rate. In addition to price interventions, this instrument can capture a variety of non- border types of assistance to producers. Non-border transfers cover a range of expenditures, from agricultural research and extension, public investment in irrigation, and credit subsidies, to broader benefits like tax concessions. The PSE herein covers only those public expenditures allocated to the specific commodities being analyzed.5 As a measure of iso-income rather than a unit subsidy at a given level of output, the PSE is a lump-sum budgetary substitute for both price transfers (as measured by EPR) and non- price transfers. The net income of farmers from transfers through the output and input market remains unchanged. It is important to note that this definition differs from other estimates because non-price transfers have not been included in the denominator. Our decision not to include non-price transfers is based on our opinion that farm income, as 4For a more detailed explanation of the PSE, see GATT, "Quantitative Measurement of Support: The PSE", Tocmical Paper 87-13 15 (Geneva, Switzerland: GATT), September 8, 1987. 5The coverage of the non-price transfers can differ amongst various studies. For a discussion on this see Tim Joling and Stefin Tangennan, "Measuring Levels of Protection in Agriculture: A Survey of Approches and Rwdts" in Agriculture and Govemnments in an Interdenendent World: Proceedings of the 20th Intemational C e of Agncultuml Econonusb, edited by A. Maunders and A. Vald6s (Brookfield, VT: Gower Publishing Co, 1990). 12 TABLE 3 STANDARIZED FORMAT PRODUCER SUBSIDY EQUIVALENT Couny: Coimb. Typo: Impwta Conmodn:; W lw Level: Fwm 1960 161 1962 19o 194 1966 196 1967 1998 1989 1990 1961 1962 Morket Vabuk of Output Output (Tusns of Tons) 48 62 71 78 59 76 82 74 63 80 105 94 75 PriomPerTon iC0L$) 14,115 18,063 21,261 24,814 28,837 38,775 44Sao 59S,362 78,136 113,061 142,379 164,253 165,111 (J.) Total MffbtVdiof Output (MEoOCOLS) 045 1,120 1,503 1,931 1,710 2,799 3,687 4,405 4,884 9,011 14,921 15,423 12,416 Aa.iotnee (MUtons COLOI: Mwk.t Prio. Suppu 138 271 441 584 338 492 923 1,516 1,665 2,825 5,853 6,e48 3,657 kiut Pao). (48) (95) (94) (107) (1421 (241) (291) (346) (548) (858) (888) (600) (339) Cdt A 14 22 29 24 24 32 25 28 32 37 15 10 5 R _.ewd. & Extwon 9 11 17 22 36 42 39 43 45 56 64 98 208 Total A_.htgno. 111 209 393 503 256 325 697 1,240 1,196 1,83 5,066 0,148 3,531 Produo. Subhdy Equkuimnt 17.2% 18.6% 26.1% 26.0% 15.0% 11.0% 19.0% 28.2% 24.5% 20.7% 33.9% 39.9% 28.4% Sdot.: PSE a.(wte. do not g,lod. ozpandim ef the. Mi4ity of Agnculairo. perceived by the agriculture sector and many government census departments, does not include government expenditure on research and extension, and irrigation. Interpretation of the PSE is similar to the other indicators. A positive PSE reflects that the producer is receiving positive income transfers. A negative PSE means the producer is being taxed. Zero PSE implies a neutral policy. Unfortunately, the PSE reflects the costs of providing assistance (non-price interventions), and not the actual benefits received by farmers. Thus, the PSE will be inflated by the difference between cost of the program and actual benefit received by producers (the difference being the costs of administration), and the amount of inflation is determined by the government's efficiency in providing the benefits to the producers. Table 3 illustrates a calculation of the PSE for Colombian wheat. It has two parts. The top section displays a calculation of the total market value at domestic prices. The lower section, titled 'Assistance", lists the cost per year of the various government transfers. For wheat, this includes market support (tax); a tax on inputs, credit assistance, and research and extension. The results are located at the bottom of the table. For a numerical example, refer to the year 1992. Production of wheat was 75,000 tons and the domestic price was COL$ 165,1 11 per ton. Thus, the total market value of wheat in 1992 was COL$ 12,416 million. Transfers included market price support of COL$3,657 million, an input tax of COL$339 million, credit assistance of COL$5 million, and research and extension of COL$208 million. The total of all the transfers divided by the total market value (at domestic prices) of wheat yields a PSE of 28.4%. Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA) The Effective Rate of Assistance (ERA) is conceptually close to the PSE and the EPR. It is similar to the PSE in that it attempts to capture non-price as well as price assistance, but is dissimilar in that the ERA measures effects on value-added. The ERA is the difference in domestically priced aggregate value-added plus non-price transfers from marketing, transport and storage, deficiency payments, and technical assistance (research, extension, irrigation) relative to aggregate international value-added prices. The ERA can be defined as the percentage change in returns per unit of output to an activity's value-adding factors due to the entire assistance structure:6 ERA A-VA E)Qi) + DPi + NPTi VA w Eo Qj where VAd and VAW are value-added per unit of output for commodity i at domestic and world prices, Q is the total production of commodity i, DP and NPT are the deficiency 6 For a reference on the origin and concept of the ERA, see GATT, "Effective Rate of Assistance and Related Methods," Technical Bulletin UR-89-0392 (Geneva, Switzerland: GATT), November 20, 1989. 14 payments and non-price transfers payable to producers of commodity i, and E. is the exchange rate. The ERA represents the broadest indicator of protection used in the study. This means, however, that the data required for calculations are difficult to obtain and manipulate. Interpretation of the ERA is much the same as the other indicators of protection. A positive ERA indicates government intervention in favor of the producer. A negative ERA indicates that the producer is being penalized. A zero ERA implies that government interventions have little effect in either direction. Table 4 uses the importable wheat as an example. Section 1 estimates output assistance. Total assistance for the ERA is measured using a monetary absolute. In this case, total output is multiplied by the domestic price giving the total revenue with all intervention taken into account. Total output is multiplied by the border price equivalent giving the total revenue without taking any intervention into account. Using the year 1992 as an example, total output is 75,200 tons while the domestic and border equivalent prices are COL$165,111 and COL$116,487 respectively. In section 2, input assistance is estimated using the same methodology as output assistance. Cultivated area or output is multiplied by the appropriate technical coefficient; this figure is then multiplied by the domestic price and the international price of the input to obtain an estimate of total output cost. In the case of Colombia seven inputs were used in the calculation: seeds, fertilizers, herbicides, insecticides, the tradable component of machinery, packing, and other preemergents. Fourteen estimates of total individual input cost were calculated; seven at domestic prices and seven at border equivalent prices. Since only budget data are available, no input/output coefficients are used. Thus, its value is 1.0. The total value of seeds at domestic and border prices is then calculated. The domestic cost per ton of wheat produced is COL$12,461 and the border price per ton is COL$11,868. Multiplying these costs per ton of wheat by the amount of wheat produced the total value of seeds valued at the domestic price (COL$937,327 million) and at the border price (COL$892,693 million) is calculated. Each of the above steps is carried out for all seven of the inputs. Section 3 illustrates non-price assistance. Data for this frequently comes from government budget data and are aggregate totals allocated to a specific commodity. As a result, money absolutes are used in many cases. In Colombia, two programs representing transfers to producers existed. The first is a transfer based on research and extension. The second is a credit subsidy. In 1992, COL$207,500 million is transferred through research and extension, and COL$500 million is transferred through a program to subsidize credit. 15 The composite value-added calculation at both domestic and border equivalent prices is shown in section 4. In 1992, aggregate value-added at domestic prices was COL$7,772,174 million and at border prices was is COL$4,302,645 million. Section 5 shows the calculated ERA. In the above example, dividing COL$7,772,174 million by COL$4,302,645 million, and subtracting 1 yields an ERA for wheat of 80.6% in 1992. 16 TABLE 4 Standardized Format Effective Rate of Assistance Country: Ct - Type: hte Commodty: Whet Loyal: Fa.m 1985 1980 1987 1988 1999 1990 1991 1992 1. OUTPUT ASSISTANCE Tdl OA"t ODD To 78 82 74 t3 80 105 94 75 Dom ' Pntn COLUPttTon 38775 44988 69382 78138 113081 142379 134263 186111 Tota lOtA V. at GD-muaP 2,798,578 3,887,188 4,404,880 4,883,500 9,010,882 14,*21,319 16.423,357 12,419,484 httlMa~Price 00 COLlPat Tm 30310 33687 38930 1148 80119 88534 93449 118487 Tot O.fAt Val. ahtlnttiorl P-ce 2,308,561 2,744,018 2.888,808 3.218,500 8,385,484 8.098,783 8,774,881 8,782,030 2. INFPUT ASSISTANCE To.ta O Au ODO Torr 78 82 74 83 80 106 94 75 S.e d *a.a h UtLl_ P. 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 khpo'. ToWt U-c 76 82 74 83 sO IOS 94 75 Don_ticPnn Coat To- of Outwit 12012 13860 18828 32178 9608 W871 10525 12481 hpM. Tota Value I omotio Pooat 914,118 1,142,188 1,397,002 2.011.004 786,695 1.013,483 988,251 937,327 Sttur8iorl Pdto Coot oa Too of Outi 884 11006S 14825 25335 7623 7992 5073 11888w Z. Total VaS @ ki-tP,aruiorl Noaa 749.275 889,380 1,100,002 1,953,488 507.591 837,589 851,940 892,853 Fofrlizrw qp.d' U_ Par I 0 10 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 hp,ta.' Tor.l UL 76 92 74 83 80 10 94 75 Dom-atioPt- Coot P, Togo outtan 1930.1 1,904.2 1,308.1 7849 7903.2 6d7d1.8 12,324.9 18.121.7 hot.' Total V..t e Dorooatio Prioao 148,883 182,928 97,083 47,909 829,888 708,934 1,157,302 1,212,981 ktmdrnlPtit tt Coat - T-o o Outout 1.830.1 2,099.2 1,797 7 1,108.f 9,084.2 9.523 8 109811.3 14,141.9 b"A'. Towt alVoSt P bhto-nona l Poco- 148,983 171,503 131,188 f9.289 724,009 998,078 1,015,177 1.0f3.738 Poatioidoo kh,t'. Uaa Pr 1.0 1.0 1 0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 Ipitaa Total UW 78 82 74 93 80 105 94 75 Dotnoit Price Cot - Too ol Outiot 1,030 1,098 1.170 798 5,332 8,853 5.128 d.140 kpo'. Total V.k. 9 Oo-tl,c PNi- 78,370 89,748 8f6,807 40,788 424,927 1H1,179 481.548 481,.22 hbtanftioI Pnctt Coa o Tcn of Outot 9802 1 ,079 90d.9 Sd8.9 38651. 3928.4 4,348.0 5884.9 houta Totl Va1o 9 HWortona Pr,cao 75,356 87,9ff d7,292 35,547 291,045 401,217 408.092 427,613 Machney huta' Pa IJ_ P. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1.0 1 0 1 0 1.0 1.0 ,opta' Total Li 7d 62 74 63 60 10 94 75 omat-cPricp Co-, -rTootOutoot 5.305.9 6,6364 4,7485 2,9531 104109 17.77/4 190311.1 24.1224 Sputa' Total Vabu @ (h 1-tc Prrca 403,780 4d0,4'96 3521t9 184,566 1,467,964 1,863,067 1,813,3(Xi 1,614,464 66o.ootionttl Prio CooC p Ton ol Optput 41131 4473 4 3.767 1 2,362 5 14,618 2 15,326 3 1739 64 22,758.8 Sputa' Total Valu e Star-tooIal Pricaa 313,. 386,473 278,615 147,854 1,165.0d7 1.608.082 1.833,811 1,711,764 Otlu P-ommgota 4 Pockioo puta I Ue Par 10 1.0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1.0 1.0 1 0 hutaa Total Lao 76 82 74 63 60 106 94 75 Ooroo-tic P-ice Coot -a Tof Qoltut 671 9 1,0(1 5 5.4 528.9 5.837.5 5,599.0 5.580 0 5.703.9 h=orta Total V.bua 9 Dotic Puica- 86,340 61,823 62,579 33,057 465,246 566,777 523.962 429,040 Int P.at,al Pcu C-t p