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the World Bank**

**Report No: ICR0001085**

**IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT  
(IDA-3837-CD)**

**ON A**

**CREDIT  
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.2 MILLION  
(US\$20 MILLION EQUIVALENT)**

**TO THE**

**REPUBLIC OF CHAD**

**FOR A**

**AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS  
PROJECT**

**June 25, 2009**

Agriculture and Rural Development Unit (AFTAR)  
Sustainable Development Department  
Country Department AFCC1  
Africa Region

## CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 30, 2009)

Currency Unit = FCFA

US\$1.00 = FCFA 465

US\$ 1.00 = SDR 0.65

FISCAL YEAR

January 1 – December 31

## ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
AFD	<i>Agence Française de Développement</i> (French Development Agency)
APL	Adaptable Program Loan
ASP	Agricultural Services Program
ASPOP	Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy (of the World Bank)
CBO	Community Based Organization
CDD	Community-Driven Development
CDP	Community Development Plan
CNCPRT	<i>Conseil National de Concertation des Producteurs Ruraux du Tchad</i> (National Federation of Rural Producers of Chad)
CTRC	<i>Comité Technique de Réforme du Sous-secteur Coton</i> (Technical Support Unit for Cotton Reform)
DP	Development partners
FCFA	<i>Franc des Colonies Françaises d'Afrique</i> (Franc of the French colonies of Africa)
GEF	Global Environmental Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HIV/AIDS	Human Immuno-Deficiency Virus/Acquired Immuno-Deficiency Syndrome
IBRD	International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
IDA	International Development Association
IFAD	International Fund for Agricultural Development
IRDP	Integrated Rural Development Program
IRPMCU	Inter-Regional Project Coordination and Management Unit
IRR	Internal Rate of Return
ISR	Implementation Support Mission Reports
LDP	Local Development Plan
MA	Ministry of Agriculture
MEW	Ministry of Environment and Water
ML	Ministry of Livestock
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization

NPCMU	National Project Coordination and Management Unit
NPV	Net Present Value
NRM	Natural Resource Management
ODP	<i>Opérateurs de Proximité</i> (Technical Service Providers)
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PAPRONAT	<i>Projet d'Appui au Programme des Transports</i> (National Transport Program Support Project)
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PIDR	<i>Programme Intégré de Développement Rural</i> (Integrated Rural Development Program)
PIM	Project Implementation Manuel
PMP	Pest Management Plan
PPF	Project Preparation Facility
PROADEL	<i>Projet d'Appui au Développement Local</i> (Local Development Program Support Program)
PRSP	Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper
PS	Proposed Subprojects
PSMCs	Producer Services and Management Centers
PSO	Private sector organization
SDR	Standard Drawing Right
TOR	Terms of Reference
UNEP	United National Environment Program
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
UDP	Urban Development Project
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USD	United States Dollars

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Sector Manager:	Karen Mcconnell Brooks
Project Team Leader:	Ousmane Seck
ICR Team Leader:	Michael Morris

**CHAD**  
**AGRICULTURAL SERVICES AND PRODUCER ORGANIZATIONS PROJECT**  
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MAP IBRD 33385

<b>A. Basic Information</b>			
Country:	Chad	Project Name:	Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project
Project ID:	P074266	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-38370
ICR Date:	06/26/2009	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF CHAD
Original Total Commitment:	XDR 14.2M	Disbursed Amount:	XDR 14.0M
<b>Environmental Category: B</b>			
<b>Implementing Agencies:</b> Ministry of Agriculture			
<b>Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:</b>			

<b>B. Key Dates</b>				
Process	Date	Process	Original Date	Revised / Actual Date(s)
Concept Review:	11/08/2001	Effectiveness:		06/29/2004
Appraisal:	11/25/2002	Restructuring(s):		
Approval:	12/11/2003	Mid-term Review:	05/30/2006	10/17/2006
		Closing:	09/30/2008	09/30/2008

<b>C. Ratings Summary</b>			
<b>C.1 Performance Rating by ICR</b>			
Outcomes:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		
Risk to Development Outcome:	High		
Bank Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Unsatisfactory		
<b>C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)</b>			
Bank	Ratings	Borrower	Ratings
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Satisfactory	Government:	Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
<b>Overall Bank Performance:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory	<b>Overall Borrower Performance:</b>	Moderately Unsatisfactory

<b>C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators</b>			
<b>Implementation Performance</b>	<b>Indicators</b>	<b>QAG Assessments (if any)</b>	<b>Rating</b>
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	Yes	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

<b>D. Sector and Theme Codes</b>		
	<b>Original</b>	<b>Actual</b>
<b>Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Agricultural extension and research	60	20
Agricultural marketing and trade	10	30
Crops	10	30
Irrigation and drainage	20	20
<b>Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)</b>		
Rural non-farm income generation	20	20
Rural policies and institutions	20	20
Rural services and infrastructure	40	40
Technology diffusion	20	20

<b>E. Bank Staff</b>		
<b>Positions</b>	<b>At ICR</b>	<b>At Approval</b>
Vice President:	Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili	Callisto E. Madavo
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Project Team Leader:	Ousmane Seck	Ousmane Seck
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ICR Primary Author:	Turto Asseri Turtiainen	

## **F. Results Framework Analysis**

### **Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)**

The objective of the Project is to assist the Borrower to increase agricultural productivity and rural income while preserving the natural resource base.

**Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)**

**(a) PDO Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	Increase in yields for beneficiaries of subprojects in the Project's area.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	(i) millet/sorghum (600 kg/ha); (ii) irrigated rice (4.0 tons/ha); (iii) maize (700 kg/ha); (iv) groundnut (800 kg/ha); (v) mortality rate of chickens (70%).	(i) 700kg/ha; (ii) 5.0 ton/ha; (iii) 800kg/ha; (iv) NA; (v) mortality rate of imported chickens (50%).		(i) millet/sorghum (960kg/ha); (ii) irrigated rice (7.1 tons/ha); (iii) maize (NA); (iv) groundnut (759 kg/ha); (v) mortality rate of imported chickens (43%).
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Change in yields measured on sample of microprojects.			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	Increase in revenues for beneficiaries of subprojects.			
Value quantitative or Qualitative)	Total net profit of about XAF 200.00 millions for 3900 beneficiary households.	36,000 beneficiary families, with 25% increase of income		20,578 families averaging six persons each; incremental income is about FCFA 1.4 billion annually
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)				

**(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)**

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
<b>Indicator 1 :</b>	No. of productive investment subprojects approved and being implemented.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a	1250 approved and successfully implemented		1,173 subprojects approved (of which 412 for women); 639 implemented



				and 457 under implementation (90 suspended)
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Due to unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar, FCFA-denominated funds available for the project decreased by more than 30 percent compared to the amount estimated at appraisal, so the targets were not achieved.			
<b>Indicator 2 :</b>	No. of subprojects on adaptive research technology approved in a competitive basis and being implemented satisfactorily, as evidenced by the technical sheet produced and disseminated.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	35 technical sheets produced and disseminated.	16	4
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008	09/30/2008	09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Due to unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar, funds covered only 16 adaptive research subprojects, and of these 13 were successfully implemented. Because of poor links between research and extension, only four technical sheets were disseminated.			
<b>Indicator 3 :</b>	No. of producer services and management centers being implemented.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	6	15		11
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Due to unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar and underestimation of the average cost of subprojects, only 11 PSMCs have been implemented (not all are functional).			
<b>Indicator 4 :</b>	No. of rural radios managed by producer organizations being implemented			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	3		1
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Due to unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar, FCFA-denominated funds available for the project decreased by more than 30 percent compared to the amount estimated at appraisal, and two rural radio stations have not been completed.			
<b>Indicator 5 :</b>	Institutional and legal framework for cotton producers improved through cooperatives to be established, prior to the liberalization of the subsector.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	90 persons have been trained in cooperative principles, benefits, difficulties, and implementation conditions, representing 39,343 producers, of which 4,559 women		45 cooperative trainers educated in central courses, 540 sessions organized in the field, resulting in making 19,585 cotton farmers ready start cooperatives

Date achieved	04/22/2005	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Due to unanticipated devaluation of the US dollar, this activity was not fully completed, and no cooperatives have yet been established.			
<b>Indicator 6 :</b>	An M&E system for the rural sector is in place and is effective.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	The institutional set up is completed (1 national unit and 16 regional units have been put in place and are effective); a GIS database has been established and is functional		The structures have been put in place. The Geographic Information System center has been completed
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The M&E system and procedures were slow to develop. They were moderately satisfactory by the end of the project.			
<b>Indicator 7 :</b>	The organizational and technical capacities of the private veterinarian's association are strengthened			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	The veterinarian network is revived and is operational.		Capacity of the veterinarian's network only moderately strengthened.
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	The private veterinarian's association is likely to remain weak until institutional issues can be addressed to clarify the role of public and private veterinarians.			
<b>Indicator 8 :</b>	An agricultural and livestock census is carried out and its findings are disseminated.			
Value (quantitative or Qualitative)	n.a.	The census is successfully completed.		A network of private veterinary services has been invigorated
Date achieved	04/22/2004	09/30/2008		09/30/2008
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Diagnostic work and field cartography work have been carried out; legal documents on ethical codes have been approved.			

### G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs


No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (USD millions)
1	06/21/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	12/15/2004	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.39

3	04/25/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.46
4	06/17/2005	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	3.93
5	12/22/2005	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	7.68
6	06/09/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	9.63
7	11/30/2006	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	11.79
8	06/29/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	17.41
9	12/21/2007	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	20.15
10	06/01/2008	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	20.93

## H. Restructuring (if any)

Not Applicable

## I. Disbursement Profile



# Project Context, Development and Global Environment Objectives Design

## 1.1. Context at Appraisal

1. The country context and the main rural sector issues at the time of appraisal in 2003 were described in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD), which drew on information from various sources, including the government's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) and the Bank's Country Assistance Strategy (CAS). The following summary description based on the PRSP and the CAS remains valid today (the statistics have been updated).

2. **Poverty in Chad.** With an average annual income per capita under US\$250, Chad is among the 10 poorest countries in the world. Poverty is severe all over the country, but it is most pronounced in rural areas, where about 80 percent of the population resides. There is a marked disparity in incomes between rural areas (US\$133) and urban areas (US\$328).

3. **The agricultural sector.** Three out of four Chadians depend on agriculture for their livelihood. The agricultural sector contributes about 40 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), accounts for about 50 percent of exports, and employs about 80 percent of the active workforce. Women play a critical role in the sector, particularly in collecting fruit, catching fish, raising cattle, and processing and marketing farm produce. Crop production activities make up 50 to 65 percent of all agricultural activities. Cotton is the main cash crop, followed by groundnuts and gum arabic. Livestock production activities account for 30 to 40 percent of agricultural income, fisheries 12 percent, and forestry 7 percent. The sector grew about 4 percent annually between 1996 and 2001.

4. **Lagging rural growth.** Despite the positive record of production growth, 55 percent of Chad's population remains below the poverty line (World Bank, 2009). The persistence of widespread rural poverty illustrates the difficulty of bringing about a rural development process that leads to widely shared growth. Agricultural production activities are characterized by low land and labor productivity. Yields of most crops are as much as 30 percent lower than those in countries with comparable agro-climatic conditions. Year-to-year growth rates continue to be strongly affected by such exogenous factors as world market prices and rainfall. The heavy reliance of Chadian agriculture on highly uncertain rainfall underscores the importance of natural resource management policies, especially those relating to management of soil and water resources.

5. **Challenges to be overcome.** Chad's agricultural sector could, if adequately developed, contribute significantly to growth and poverty reduction. Of the country's three main ecological zones, the northernmost Saharan oasis zone and the centrally located Sahelian zone are subject to large climatic constraints that limit their potential as engines of growth. The southernmost Sudanian zone has the best potential for production

of food and cash crops. But if agriculture is to contribute significantly to growth, a number of problems will have to be addressed:

- low productivity at the farm level;
- inefficient agricultural marketing systems;
- weak producer organizations;
- poor delivery of agricultural research and extension services;
- an underdeveloped financial sector with limited penetration into rural areas;
- inadequate rural infrastructure
- weak capacity of public-sector institutions; and
- severely degraded fragile ecosystems.

### **The Government's strategy and the rationale for Bank assistance**

6. *Poverty reduction strategy.* The PRSP, adopted in June 2003, sets out five strategic priorities: (i) improving the social, judicial, political, and economic environment; (ii) ensuring rapid and sustained economic growth; (iii) building human capital; (iv) improving living conditions for vulnerable groups; and (v) safeguarding and restoring ecosystems.

7. *Government strategy to address sector-specific issues.* The objective of the government's rural development strategy prevailing at the time of appraisal was to increase production in a sustainable way and preserving the environment while reinforcing institutional and human capacities. The key elements of the strategy included:

- (i) increasing agricultural productivity and improving agricultural marketing;
- (ii) providing support to rural organizations;
- (iii) promoting sustainable management of natural resources and restoring production potential;
- (iv) improving the effectiveness of the public sector; and
- (v) improving the provision of basic services.

8. To accelerate implementation of the country's rural development strategy, the government created an Integrated Rural Development Program (IRDP). Within the IRDP framework, and as stated in the CAS, the Bank supported the rural development strategy and the cotton reform strategy with two projects: the Agricultural Services and Producer Organizations Project (ASPOP) and the Local Development Program Support Project (PROADEL). ASPOP and PROADEL were conceived as synergistic companion projects, and they were prepared in parallel and implemented by the same agencies.

### **Sector-related Country Assistance Strategy**

9. The CAS, which was presented at the same time as ASPOP, aimed to help Chad use its oil resources to reduce poverty by improving governance and providing opportunities for more people to earn money outside of oil-related enterprises. The

second pillar of the strategy focused on developing the non-oil sector. Rural development and increased agricultural productivity were core priorities identified in the CAS. ASPOP was to be the main instrument of the CAS for enhancing agricultural services and helping producer organizations raise agricultural productivity and rural incomes.

10. ASPOP was conceived as part of a broader rural development strategy involving several other Bank-financed operations that were to be implemented in parallel. To complement the activities being supported under ASPOP, the national road network was to be improved through the National Transport Program Support Project (PAPRONAT), rural roads were to be constructed and maintained through PROADEL, and market infrastructure was to be developed through the Urban Development Project (UDP).

## 1.2. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators

11. **The Project Development Objective (PDO)** was to increase agricultural productivity and rural incomes while preserving the natural resource base. The project was to pursue this objective by financing activities to raise productivity and by strengthening the institutional and technical capacities of producer organizations, government institutions, and private support services.

12. **Key Performance Indicators (Outcome and Impact Indicators)** were specified in the PAD for the component of the PDO relating to increasing agricultural productivity: “Project beneficiaries increase productivity of major crops and livestock by 10 percent by the end of the project and reduce cereal crop losses from about 30 percent to less than 20 percent by project end.” No Key Performance Indicator was specified in the PAD for the component of the PDO relating to increasing rural incomes.

13. Baselines and targets for the agricultural productivity-related Outcome and Impact Indicators appear in Section A.2 of the PAD.

**Table 1. Baselines and targets for Outcome and Impact Indicators**

Commodity	Baseline	By midterm	By end-project
Millet/sorghum (kg/ha)	600	650	700
Maize (kg/ha)	700	800	900
Cotton (kg/ha)	700	850	900
Groundnuts (kg/ha)	800	850	900
Irrigated rice (t/ha)	4.0	4.5	5.0
Milk productivity (l/cow/day):			
- Dry season	0.4	1.0	2.0
- Rainy season	3.0	4.5	5.0
Mortality rate of chickens (%)	70	60	50
Cereal crop losses	30	> 25	> 20

Source: PAD, p.2 (Note: There are some slight discrepancies between several of these target values and the target values presented on p.4 of the PAD.)

14. **Output Indicators and Process Indicators** were also specified in the PAD, in Section A.2 and in the logical framework (Annex 1). Some of the Output Indicators and some of the Process Indicators had multiple parts.

15. The most relevant **Output Indicators** included:

- *Beneficiaries*: By the end of the project, at least 60,000 families are benefiting directly from the project.
- *Subprojects*: By the end of the project, at least 3,000 subprojects on productive investments have been approved, at least 90 percent of which have been implemented satisfactorily, and at least 40 percent of which have been successfully implemented by women.
- *Extension services*: By the end of the project, at least 30 percent of all contracts for extension services under subprojects on productive investments have been awarded to the private sector.
- *Adaptive research*: By the end of the project, at least 50 subprojects on short-term research activities have been satisfactorily implemented, and 35 technical sheets have been submitted to beneficiaries for implementation.
- *Producer Service Management Centers*: By the end of the project, 47 Producer Service Management Centers have been established, of which at least 90 percent are functioning satisfactorily.
- *Rural radio stations*: By the end of the project, three rural radios networks managed by producer organizations have been established and are functioning satisfactorily.

16. The most relevant **Process Indicators** included:

- *Environmental and social safeguards*: By the mid-term review, at least five training programs on environmental management have been carried out for staff of the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), the Ministry of Livestock (ML), and the Ministry of Environment and Water (MEW). An environmental and social impact assessment has been carried out and approved for all subprojects.
- *Cotton sector reforms*: By the mid-term review, the texts regarding the legal status of cotton producer organizations have been substantially improved.
- *Monitoring and evaluation*: By the end of the first project year, a monitoring and evaluation system for rural sector activities has been established and is operating in a satisfactory manner.
- *Project audits*: By the end of each project year, all audit reports have been prepared and submitted on time.

### 1.3. Revised PDO and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification

17. The PDO and Key Performance Indicators were not formally revised. During implementation, the Bank supervision team recognized that an important component of the PDO—income gains realized by project beneficiaries—was not being systematically tracked. Therefore, a new indicator was added to the set of PDO Indicators recorded in the Implementation Supervision and Results (ISR) reports: “Increase in revenues for beneficiaries of subprojects.” Since addition of this indicator simply facilitated tracking of progress achieved against the existing PDO, Board approval was not sought.

### 1.4. Main Beneficiaries

18. The main beneficiaries (and the avenues through which they were to be assisted) included: (i) *rural households* in the project areas (through improved farming and off-farm activities, higher productivity and ultimately higher incomes for further productivity investments); (ii) *private entrepreneurs* (directly through technical and financial support and indirectly through induced demand due to higher incomes in the agricultural sector); (iii) *consumers* (through lower food prices); (iv) *local communities* (through improvements in local infrastructure and indirectly, through the diversification of the local economy and employment); and (v) *targeted institutions*, including research and extension institutions, local and central administrations (through technical support and capacity building activities).

### 1.5. Original Components (as approved)

19. The project included three components, each of which had numerous subcomponents and activities: (1) Promotion of sustainable growth in agricultural production, (2) Capacity building for agricultural services, and (3) Support to project management.

#### Component 1: Promotion of sustainable growth in agricultural production

20. Two sub-components were financed under this component.

**(a) Productive investments.** This sub-component financed demand driven productive investments (subprojects) proposed by producer organizations, along with the technical assistance required for proper implementation. Financing was to be provided through a matching grant system under which beneficiaries were required to make an up-front contribution representing at least 20 percent of the costs of subproject. Productive investments included among other things:

- ***Productive infrastructure:*** The project financed the identification, planning, and implementation of subprojects that supported the construction of small-scale rural infrastructure, including for example drainage and irrigation infrastructure for improved soil and water management; fish ponds and fish processing facilities; grain storage facilities; agro-processing machinery; and rural veterinary facilities.
- ***Agricultural development:*** The project financed the identification, planning, and implementation of subprojects that promoted agricultural diversification,



including for example improvement of existing farming systems (e.g., cotton); development of conservation farming techniques; provision of demand-driven extension and training activities; and affording better access to high-quality seeds and planting material.

- ***Nonfarm productive activities in rural areas:*** The project financed the identification, planning, and implementation of subprojects that promoted nonfarm income-generating activities, including for example handicraft production; women's weaving rings; building materials manufacturing; small machinery repair; and local blacksmithing.

**(b) Competitive research grant program subprojects.** This sub-component financed two- to three-year applied research projects that were designed to relieve constraints encountered during the productive investment subprojects, both cotton-related and non-cotton-related. ASPOP funds complemented funds provided by the French Development Agency (*Agence Française de Développement – AFD*) and the African Development Bank (AfDB).

## **Component 2. Capacity building for agricultural services**

21. Four sub-components were financed under this component:

**(a) Capacity strengthening of producer organizations:** Activities to be financed under this subcomponent included the following:

- ***Technical advisory services provided by a variety of rural service providers*** to help identify, prepare, and support implementation of productive investment subprojects and manage Producer Services and Management Centers (PSMCs).
- ***Training, workshops, and study tours*** to enhance the ability of producer organizations to promote participatory approaches, develop basic accounting and procurement methods, and participate in state and regional steering committees.
- ***Dissemination of technical and economic information to producer organizations***, with the help of rural radio networks, United Nations Development Program (UNDP), and AFD.

**(b) Support to cotton sector reforms:** This subcomponent was designed to support selected activities of the Technical Support Unit for Cotton Reform (CTRC), such as the following:

- ***Review of the legal status of cotton producer organizations***, with the objective of realigning the organizations so as to better meet their socioeconomic objectives.
- ***Promotion of cotton farmers' access to farm inputs***, not by financing farm inputs directly, but rather by helping to reduce transaction costs for the supply of farm inputs through consolidation of orders, providing of training, and other means.

**(c) Private-sector development.** This subcomponent was expected to foster privatization by supporting the following activities:

- *Promotion of private veterinary services* through training of veterinarians in the legal and regulatory framework for the practice of veterinary medicine and through building veterinarians' knowledge about the financial aspects of the practice of veterinary medicine.
- *Strengthening of Producer Service Management Centers* to improve access to services by small-scale producers and rural entrepreneurs and to help producer organizations gradually take over the operating costs of their PSMC.

**(d) Public-service development.** This subcomponent was designed to support the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), the Ministry of Livestock (ML), and the Ministry of Environment and Water (MEW) through:

- *Training and capacity building* designed to (i) improve the ability of MA and ML to prepare and implement rural investment programs, and (ii) strengthen the ability of MEW to monitor measures introduced to mitigate negative environmental impacts.
- *Institutional reforms* designed to strengthen the technical and institutional capacities of research units in MA and ML to implement agreed-upon thematic research activities.

### **Component 3. Support to project management**

22. Two sub-components were financed under this component:

- (a) Project administration and management** was ensured through the establishment of a National Project Coordination and Management Unit (NPCMU) and six Inter-Regional Coordination and Management Units (IRPCMUs) within MA.
- (b) Monitoring and evaluation** of project activities, and carrying out periodic studies to assess the impacts of project-supported activities.

### **Relationship of the Project Components to the PDO**

23. The project design was based on the assumption that agricultural development is a complex, multi-faceted process that cannot be accomplished via one-dimensional approaches; many constraints need to be attacked simultaneously to achieve a successful overall outcome. The project components therefore were designed to support the overall PDO by supporting activities intended to improve productivity and increase incomes while at the same time strengthening the capacity of selected producer organizations, government institutions, and private service providers. Component 1 was designed to raise productivity and increase income at the farm household level, while Component 2 was aimed at strengthening capacity at the local and national levels to support primary production activities.

## **1.6. Revised Components**

24. The project components were not revised.

## **1.7. Other Significant Changes**

### **Changes in project design and restructuring**

25. No changes were made to the project design.

### **Reallocation of funds**

26. Actual expenses for project management and for vehicle purchases and operations exceeded the appraisal estimates by 47 percent and 15 percent, respectively. Funds were reallocated to cover the additional expenses from the “Civil Works” and the “Unallocated” disbursement categories.

## **Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes**

27. In assessing the implementation and outcomes of ASPOP, it is necessary to take into account the unusually challenging circumstances that prevailed throughout most of the project implementation period. Two factors in the external environment are particularly noteworthy:

28. *Civil conflict:* The project implementation period coincided with a period of great turbulence in Chad. The government was (and continues to be) engaged in what amounts to a low-level civil war, with opposition groups based inside and outside the country mounting regular armed attacks designed to destabilize the economy and overthrow the existing regime. The lack of security in many parts of the country, especially rural areas including many of those targeted by the project, often made it unsafe for project staff to travel to project sites and/or perform their activities in a normal way. The frequent disruptions slowed implementation of many project activities and forced the abandonment of some subprojects before they had been completed.

29. *Breakdown in relations between the Bank and the government:* During project implementation, the relationship between the Bank and the Government of Chad was severely strained, mainly over matters relating to the financing, construction, and management of the controversial Chad-Cameroon oil pipeline. Three times during the implementation period, the Bank suspended its program in Chad, which led to the temporary freezing of disbursements to all projects including ASPOP. On each occasion, project activities slowed or stopped altogether before eventually resuming when the suspension was lifted. These disruptions slowed implementation of project activities and required many subprojects to stop and then re-start again from scratch.

30. These two factors in the external environment, which were beyond the control of the project implementing agencies and the Bank’s task team, delayed and/or disrupted the implementation of many project-supported activities and complicated supervision efforts. In this context, it must be appreciated that the outcomes achieved by the project

(described below) were achieved in the face of an extremely difficult environment that posed severe challenges both for the project implementing agencies as well as for the Bank's task team.

### **Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry**

31. Project preparation, design, and quality at entry were in general adequate.

32. The team that prepared the project commissioned a number of background studies to inform the project design. These studies allowed the team to benefit from: (i) lessons learned under the earlier Bank-supported Agricultural Services Program (ASP), which had successfully engaged producers in the design and implementation of subprojects (similar to community-driven development programs); (ii) experience gained through other Bank-supported rural development projects in neighboring countries; and (iii) the recent OED evaluation of World Bank-supported agricultural research projects.

33. A number of lessons learned from other Bank-financed rural development projects in Africa were specifically mentioned in the PAD as having been taken on board during project preparation:

- (i) Projects must be designed by communities based on needs their populations have identified and implemented using partly their own resources;
- (ii) Project implementation arrangements must take into account local social structures;
- (iii) Local development efforts must have strong political commitment from the center;
- (iv) The capacity of local NGOs and consulting firms must be strengthened, especially with regard to supporting producer organizations;
- (v) Effective representation must be ensured with respect to women and women's groups in community associations and other local organizations;
- (vi) Resources and responsibilities must be transferred to local government bodies; and
- (vii) Local accountability and ownership of projects must be assured.

34. The predecessor project, ASP, had shown that strong producer organizations are essential for improving productivity, because they can leverage the power of individual farmers in seeking improved access to agricultural support services, production inputs, and market outlets.

35. In addition, the ASP experience had reflected the broader lesson emerging at the time from the OED evaluation of Bank-funded agricultural research projects that if research-extension linkages are to be effective, institutional reforms must be implemented that create incentives for different actors to collaborate. Moreover, good

agricultural research requires careful selection of research activities, the introduction of procedures into the national agricultural research system to enhance the relevance of research, ensure scientific rigor (including scientific networking, adequate external reviews and linkages), and provide competitive funding.

36. The project design was based on the paradigm, already widely accepted within the Bank at the time, that rural development is a complex, multi-faceted process that cannot be accomplished via one-dimensional approaches (e.g., stand-alone projects focusing on research or extension or rural finance). Many constraints need to be attacked at once to achieve a successful overall outcome. The project design reflected this holistic view.

37. The project objectives and the approach selected to achieve those objectives, while avowedly ambitious, were appropriate. In seeking to increase agricultural productivity and raise rural incomes while preserving the natural resource base, the project was designed to: (i) cover multiple sectors; (ii) ensure active participation of all groups within the targeted communities; (iii) provide financial mechanisms to satisfy priority development needs at the local level while promoting activities to ensure long-term viability of ecosystems and natural resources; (iv) make the principal cash crop of the country, cotton, more profitable over the longer term while at the same time promoting diversification of agricultural production; (v) make agricultural research more responsive to the needs of end users; and (vi) introduce measures to privatize certain activities related to rural development, such as provision of veterinary services.

38. The project concept was fully endorsed by the government, which established a working group to support preparation comprising members drawn from central ministries, NGOs, and related donor-funded initiatives. Responsibility for supervision was assigned to the existing Steering Committee for Rural Development, which included representatives from the government, civil society, and producer organizations. In addition to the Ministry of Planning (MP), the key ministries involved were the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), the Ministry of Livestock ML), and the Ministry of Environment and Water (MEW).

39. Risks were reasonably identified, and mitigating measures were appropriately conceived. Many of the risks identified in the PAD eventually materialized, but they were successfully mitigated with the help of measures proposed by the project. The only risk that was overestimated (it was rated moderate) was the risk that “the producer organizations may have difficulty preparing subproject proposals.” As it turned out, producer organizations (working with project-supported service providers) proved very capable of preparing subproject proposals.

40. One risk that was not foreseen—and it is perhaps not surprising, because there was no historical precedent—was the risk posed by a dramatic appreciation of the FCFA relative to the dollar. At appraisal, the exchange rate was US\$ 1 = FCFA 700. During project implementation, the rate fell as low as US\$ 1 = FCFA 450. At project closing, it stood at US\$ 1 = FCFA 480. The steep rise in the value of the FCFA relative to the dollar (which is an important component of SDRs) eroded the amount of FCFA-denominated

funding and adversely affected the ability of project management to fully implement all planned activities.

## **Implementation**

41. Project implementation was mixed. The various implementing agencies performed reasonably well, but they had to confront significant challenges that were beyond their control and that were not adequately anticipated during preparation (e.g., lack of security in rural areas, multiple suspensions of the Bank's programs in Chad, reduced amount of FCFA-denominated funding). Even though implementation fell behind schedule, the project was never judged to be at risk, and the project design was not changed through restructuring. When eventually it became evident that the available funds would not be sufficient to allow full implementation of the planned activities, restructuring was ruled out, on the grounds that all components of the project were considered essential to achieve the PDO. The Mid-Term Review made recommendations for addressing the funding shortfall, but the Mid-Term review was delayed by more than a year due to a suspension in the Bank's programs in Chad (it was originally scheduled for May 2006 but not carried out until June 2007). As a result, these recommendations came very late in the day, and they were not fully implemented by the government.

42. Project implementation was *positively impacted* by the following factors:

- Project implementation agencies were established and staffed quickly, allowing project activities to get underway almost immediately after project effectiveness.
- Community-based organizations responded quickly and enthusiastically to calls for subproject proposals.
- The line ministries involved with the project provided strong technical support throughout the life of the project.
- Supervision missions were carried out regularly by the Bank, the government, and project staff working in collaboration, and supervision teams included appropriate mixes of staff with project implementation skills and technical expertise.

43. Project implementation was *negatively impacted* by the following factors:

- During project implementation, lack of security in rural areas prevented timely implementation of some project-supported activities and disrupted supervision.
- During project implementation, the Bank three times temporarily suspended disbursements to all projects in Chad; after each suspension, time and effort were required to re-start project-supported activities that had been stopped.
- During project implementation, the FCFA appreciated significantly in relation to the dollar which effectively reduced the value of FCFA-denominated project funds by 35 percent.

- During project implementation, an unanticipated sharp escalation in the cost of many materials rendered obsolete many of the unit costings that had been used during the preparation of the project cost tables.
- Payment of counterpart funds was often delayed, and the full amount of counterpart funds was not always provided.
- Because of the complexity of the project design, the attention of project management was drawn in many directions, reducing its ability to focus on emerging problems.
- Throughout much of the project, the M&E system failed to generate the information needed to effectively gauge implementation progress.

### **Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization**

44. Funds for the establishment and implementation of the project M&E system were provided under Component 3.

#### **M&E design.**

45. The project M&E system complied with Bank guidelines prevailing at the time of project appraisal. The logical framework laid out the objectives of the project, described the causal relationships between project-supported activities and expected outputs, and described how program actions were expected to lead to the intended outcomes. Appropriate numbers of staff were assigned to M&E functions, and the budget allocation to support their work was adequate.

46. Even though it complied with Bank guidelines prevailing at the time, the project M&E system suffered from three serious design weaknesses.

- (i) No Key Performance Indicator was specified in the PAD for the component of the PDO relating to increasing rural incomes.
- (ii) The logical framework, which is supposed to serve as a management tool, contained a large number of indicators. In the end it proved very challenging to track all of these indicators, making timely monitoring of project-supported activities very difficult.
- (iii) The project M&E system was not linked to the project financial management system, so information recorded in the M&E system about subproject commitments was not transmitted to the financial management unit.

#### **M&E implementation.**

47. Implementation of the project M&E system got off to a slow start. Initially, information was collected mainly on the number of subprojects approved, plus several other measures of implementation progress. The Aides Memoire for the supervision missions conducted up until the time of the Mid-Term Review commented on the weakness of the M&E system and signaled the inadequacy of the information being

produced. M&E data were supposed to be collected at the village level, forwarded to interregional project units, and then passed on to the National Project Coordination and Management Unit, but the process was long and time-consuming and involved many actors whose commitment was not always strong. Recognizing the futility of tracking the large number of indicators appearing in the results framework, the Bank supervision team reduced the number of indicators reported on in ISRs, but data were not always available even for the reduced set of indicators. Despite the streamlining of the reporting framework, some important aspects of project performance proved difficult to monitor on a continuous basis, such as participation rates of women and youth, and environmental impacts of project-supported activities. To compensate for the weakness of the M&E system, the decision was taken to undertake periodic sample surveys, which facilitated preparation of a relatively satisfactory end-of-project M&E report.

### **M&E utilization.**

48. Because the project M&E system proved incapable of tracking all of the performance indicators specified in the logical framework, it was not able to provide accurate and timely information for use by project management. This not only prevented project management from knowing the progress that had been realized toward achievement of key project objectives, but it also contributed indirectly to a significant overcommitment of project funds. In the absence of updated data on the numbers of new subproject approvals and the projected costs of approved subprojects, management was unaware that commitments for new subprojects were outpacing the available amount of funding. As a result, far more subprojects were approved that could be funded by the project. By the time it became known that too many subprojects had been approved, there were not even enough funds remaining to complete all the subprojects that had already been initiated. The weaknesses of the project M&E system were repeatedly flagged during supervision missions, but only during the latter stages of implementation were these weaknesses addressed.

### **Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance**

Safeguard policies. Five World Bank safeguard policies were triggered at the time of project appraisal: OP 4.01 (Environmental Assessment), OP 4.09 (Pest Management), OP 4.12 (Involuntary Resettlement), OP 4.37 (Safety of Dams), and OP 7.50 (Projects on International Waters). An Environmental Assessment (EA) and an Environmental Management Plan (EMP) were prepared by the time of appraisal. Similarly, a Pest Management Plan (PMP), a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and documents for dam safety analyses were prepared by the time of appraisal. The notification process required under OP 7.50 (Projects on International Waters) took place in accordance with the policy.

49. The Mid-Term Review carried out 15 months before project closing revealed several shortcomings in the implementation of safeguard policies: (i) environmental evaluation of subprojects was often insufficient, (ii) the unit charged with verifying the security of dams was in place but non-operational, and (iii) farmers were not always effectively implementing the PMP. Corrective measures were taken by project



management in response to these findings, resulting in substantial improvement in the implementation of safeguards policies. The final ISRs rated the safeguards compliance aspects of the project as moderately satisfactory (MS) to satisfactory (S).

50. Fiduciary compliance. Project accounts, including the special accounts maintained by the national coordination unit and the regional sub-accounts managed by the regional coordination units, were audited regularly up to 2007. Completion of the 2008 audit is experiencing delays due to (i) non-settlement of prior bills submitted by the auditor, and (ii) lack of assurances by project management that future auditing fees will be settled. A new deadline of July 31, 2009 has been communicated to project management for submission of the final 2008 audit report to the Bank. The 2007 audit report was qualified on (i) financial statements, and (ii) project bank accounts. The qualification on the Special Account centered on an overdraft of approximately FCFA 31 million, reflecting an outstanding liability that must be reimbursed by the project. During project implementation, a number of problems arose stemming from a lack of budget control. Because commitments for new subprojects were being made without any reference to the amount of funding left in the project accounts, subproject-related commitments were able to grow to the point where they significantly exceeded the amount of available funding. The financial management function also exhibited shortcomings, although these were relatively minor. For example, when funds had to be reallocated because of higher than projected project management costs (inflated in part by unanticipated vehicle purchases), project staff complained that the reallocation took an excessively long time because of heavy Bank administrative procedures.

51. Procurement. Procurement activities were routinely monitored during supervision missions. A stand-alone procurement review was not carried out. No problems were reported affecting the central procurement function, but several supervision missions and the Mid-Term Review flagged issues relating to procurement activities being carried out in regional offices. For example, it was reported that staff in regional offices and subproject approval committees often failed to follow the proper procedures; that bidding for technical service provision contracts was not sufficiently competitive; that procurement documents were poorly organized; and that producer organizations lacked training in procurement. These shortcomings may have stemmed from the fact that the project employed a full-time Procurement Specialist for only two years, and this person did not have time to provide the extensive training and follow-up support needed to manage the large volume of procurement work generated by the project.

### **Post-completion Operation / Next Phase**

Note: This section is not required for a core ICR. It is however included because a number of activities initiated under the project have not been completed, so the overall impacts of the project will depend on what happens in the months and years to come.

52. The Country Management Unit (CMU) has expressed interest in financing a follow-on operation. The case for a follow-on operation rests on three main arguments.

53. First, ASPOP has been instrumental in introducing the participatory, community-led approach to rural development into the country. The approach has gained many adherents and is now being promoted in government programs and projects, as well as in donor-financed programs and projects. Several development partners followed the progress of ASPOP and have taken up project-generated guidelines and manuals when these have been relevant to their own programs. The positive achievements of ASPOP have generated enthusiasm for participatory community-led approaches and have encouraged increased investment in rural development activities.

54. Second, rural development is a long-term endeavor requiring a sustained commitment of funding. Many developing countries facing challenges similar to those faced by Chad have chosen to implement decentralized rural development programs based on multi-year, multi-phase Adaptable Program Loans (APLs). By the same logic, the activities initiated under ASPOP will need to be sustained if they are to have their intended effect of stimulating sustainable rural development.

55. Third, because of the many challenges that arose during implementation, a number of activities initiated under ASPOP could not be completed. In this context, additional funds will be needed to allow Chad to benefit from the investments that have already been made.

56. These arguments in favor of a follow-on operation are somewhat counterbalanced by several aspects of the ASPOP implementation experience that can only be described as a negative legacy: the failure to implement fully the planned work program; the inability of the project M&E system to document clearly the achievements of the project; the failure of the government to honor fully its commitments to provide counterpart funding; and delays in payments made to service providers that have left many service providers reluctant to continue working with the project. These lessons will have to be reflected in the design of any follow-on operation, whether supported by the Bank or by other development partners.

## **Assessment of Outcomes**

### **Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation**

57. The objectives of ASPOP remain highly relevant. The project's core focus on reducing rural poverty by raising agricultural productivity and increasing incomes while preserving the natural resource base is a major priority today, as was the case at appraisal.

58. The main elements of the government's national rural development strategy at the time of appraisal were as follows: (i) increase agricultural productivity and improve agricultural marketing; (ii) provide support to rural organizations; (iii) promote sustainable management of natural resources and restoration of production potential; and (iv) improve the effectiveness of public agencies serving rural development. The government's overall development strategy has evolved in recent years as oil revenues have increased, along with employment in the oil sector, but the current strategy for rural development and poverty reduction still rests on the same pillars that prevailed at the time

of appraisal. These fundamental pillars include four that the project has supported: (i) diversifying sources of growth; (ii) promoting agriculture and livestock production, and preserving the ecosystems on which agriculture and livestock production depend; and (iii) promoting cooperation between the public and private sectors, including civil society organizations; and (iv) integrating formal and informal markets.

59. The current CAS acknowledges that rural poverty poses a key development challenge for Chad. World Bank assistance to Chad during the period 2008-12 will support the pillars of the national development strategy. The CAS emphasizes the importance of pursuing good governance and enhancing non-oil opportunities (including rural development) while reducing sources of vulnerability, notably for the poor.

60. Implementation modalities for the project were generally appropriate. The roles of the implementing bodies were clearly defined, and responsibilities were appropriately distributed among the project implementation agencies, other public organizations and agencies, private and NGO service providers, and community-based organizations. This is not to say that implementation was always smooth; as discussed earlier, because the lack of security often made it unsafe for project staff to travel to rural areas, implementation of many project activities was delayed, and some subprojects had to be abandoned before they had been completed.

### **Achievement of Project Development Objective**

61. Achievement of the PDO is evaluated in terms of two quantifiable indicators: (i) *increased productivity of key commodities*, and (ii) *increased incomes of project beneficiaries*. The third component of the PDO—preservation of the natural resource base—is not considered to be a measurable objective in and of itself, but rather refers to the process through which the first two indicators are to be achieved.<sup>1</sup>

62. With regard to *productivity increases* in key commodities realized by project beneficiaries, and taking into account those commodities for which data are available, the project largely achieved its development objective. The paucity of data, however, reduces the confidence associated with this conclusion. Productivity increases realized during the life of the project varied by commodity, but target values were met or exceeded for most of the commodities for which data are available (for details, see Annex 2). Productivity in sorghum and millet, the main food crops in Chad, increased markedly (160 percent compared to the baseline), as did productivity in irrigated rice (150 percent compared to the baseline). Mortality rates in poultry decreased by more than the targeted amount, for both local and imported birds. Not all of the productivity targets were achieved, however; for example, productivity in groundnuts actually declined slightly (-5 percent compared to the baseline), mainly because of inclement weather occurring in the final year of project implementation. It is not possible to report on productivity changes in maize,

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<sup>1</sup> With regard to the environmental objective mentioned in the PDO, it is important to recall that ASPOP was prepared in parallel with a companion project, PROADEL, that was designed to focus more directly on large-scale issues relating to environmental stewardship and natural resource management (e.g., management of watersheds, forests, and pastoral areas; preservation of biodiversity).

cotton, and milk, because few or no subprojects involving these commodities appeared in the sample of subprojects selected by the project to collect productivity data.

63. With regard to *income gains* realized by project beneficiaries, no Key Performance Indicators were specified in the PAD relating to income generation. For purposes of the ICR, achievement of the income-generation objective was evaluated based on financial analysis of selected subprojects—the same approach used by project management to estimate income gains during the life of the project (for details, see Annex 2). Based on this approach, the project can be considered to have partially achieved its development objective. Using net profitability figures generated through an in-depth analysis of eight representative sub-projects, the 1,173 completed subprojects are estimated to have generated net revenues totaling nearly FCFA 1.4 billion (US\$ 2.7 million), or slightly more than FCFA 66,780 (US\$ 132) per year for each of 20,578 rural households. This suggests that subprojects financed under the project were on average very successful in generating income for beneficiary households. However, the number of beneficiary households fell considerably short of the target of 60,000 households specified in the PAD, because fewer subprojects were financed than had been projected. The fact that fewer subprojects were financed than had been projected is explained by two factors: (i) the reduction in local currency-denominated funding that resulted from the appreciation of the FCFA, and (ii) the higher-than projected average unit cost of individual subprojects.

#### **Additional achievements measured against output indicators**

64. In assessing the achievement of the PDO, it must be recognized that the outcomes of many project-supported activities are not directly captured in the PDO indicators. For this reason, as described in the ICR Guidelines, it is reasonable to evaluate also the progress achieved against the intermediate indicators specified in the PAD. These can be grouped into four broad categories: (i) building local capacity to prepare and implement subprojects; (ii) strengthening producer organizations; (iii) funding agricultural research through competitive grants; and (iv) promoting private agricultural extension services.

65. With regard to these four categories, the project achieved significant results (for details, see Table A2.4 in Annex 2):

(i) Building local capacity to identify, prepare, and implement subprojects

66. One important achievement of the project was to build local capacity to identify, prepare, and implement subprojects. During the life of the project, community-based groups (supported by locally hired service providers) identified, prepared, and processed 2,500 subprojects.<sup>2</sup> This was a remarkable achievement in a country in which CDD approaches had rarely been used and in which rural development initiatives have traditionally been conceived, designed, and implemented from the center, using top-down

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<sup>2</sup> Not all of these sub-projects were eventually funded, however.

approaches. Local capacity-building efforts extended also to environmental dimensions of subprojects; local government bodies, service providers, and community groups were trained in environmental protection practices, and environmental assessments were carried out for a large number of subprojects.

(ii) Strengthening producer organizations

67. A second important achievement of the project was to strengthen a large number of producer organizations. The PAD did not set specific targets with regard to this objective, but the project financed many activities in this area, with tangible results. For example, the project helped establish a national federation of rural producers (Conseil National de Concertation des Producteurs Ruraux du Tchad—CNCPR), as well as a series of regional associations. The national federation engages in activities such as product promotion, training and capacity building, and representation of the membership in discussions with the government. The federation enjoyed considerable success as long as it was being supported by ASPOP, but management has expressed fears that its activities will be curtailed unless a sustainable funding mechanism can be identified.

68. Similarly, the project provided funds for promoting the development of producer cooperatives around the cotton ginneries. This initiative was implemented through a subcontract with CTRC and proceeded in stages. First, 90 trainers were trained in the principles and practices of cooperative management. These 90 trainers then trained 39,343 cotton growers in 5,935 villages; these growers are members of farmer associations that represent a population of 240,000 growers. Thanks to these efforts, a solid basis was established for launching cotton producer cooperatives throughout the country, but because the initiative was not completed prior to the project closing date, actual formation of cooperatives has not yet taken place.

(iii) Funding agricultural research through competitive grants

69. A third important achievement of the project was to put in place an innovative program to finance demand-driven, competitively funded agricultural research. Under the program, a rigorous selection process implemented with the help of independent evaluators was used to identify 31 priority subproject proposals. Of these, 16 were funded, and the 13 that were successfully completed produced 25 technical notes destined for use in the formulation of extension messages. The remaining 3 research subprojects did not receive all three tranches of funding and could still meet their objectives, if additional funds can be identified.

(iv) Promotion of private agricultural extension services

70. Only with regard to this fourth category of intermediate indicators did the progress achieved fall short of expectations. Not all of the planned Producer Service Management Centers (PSMCs) were constructed, and many of those that were constructed still are not fully operational. As a result, the nation's private extension

network remains underdeveloped, and many of the extension messages developed by the research system have not been delivered effectively to farmers.

71. Any evaluation of the achievement of the PDO must also recognize some shortcomings. As detailed in Annex 2, approximately 45 percent of the subprojects that were financed under Component 1 received only one or two tranches of financing (out of three projected tranches), meaning that these subprojects have not been completed. In addition, limited progress has been achieved with regard to the objectives set for some activities financed under Component 2. For example, cotton sector institutional reforms have stalled; several agricultural research projects have not been completed; and efforts to strengthen private veterinary services have lagged.

### **Efficiency**

(Not applicable for a core ICR)

### **Justification of Overall Outcome Rating**

**Rating:** *Moderately unsatisfactory*

72. According to the ICR Guidelines, the overall outcome of a project should be rated based on the extent to which the major objectives were achieved or are expected to be achieved, efficiently. Although the project achieved many positive results, since the outcome targets listed in the PAD have not all been met, the PDO cannot be considered to have been fully achieved. The overall outcome is therefore rated as *moderately unsatisfactory*.

73. Factors considered in rating the overall outcome of ASPOP include the following:

- *Relevance of project objectives, design, and implementation:* The PDO remains highly relevant given the development priorities and circumstances prevailing today. Agricultural development and diversification of the rural economy remain vitally important for the vast majority of Chadians. The project design was generally appropriate, even though it contained too many activities, some of which were only indirectly linked to the PDO. Implementation was moderately satisfactory in spite of an ineffective M&E system, especially in view of the severe challenges that arose during the life of the project.
- *Achievement of the development objectives:* Based on the available evidence, achievement of the PDO is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. Productivity increases in key commodities for the most part met or exceeded targets specified in the PAD, and although no clear target was established for income gains, the subprojects that were completed generated significant revenues for project beneficiaries. Evaluated at a higher program impact level, there can be no doubt that substantial progress was achieved in a number of areas important to agricultural and rural development in Chad, for example, building local capacity identify, prepare, and process subproject proposals; strengthening producer organizations; and successfully managing competitively-financed agricultural research. The

empirical foundation for evaluating changes in yields is, however, weak, and many of the income generating projects remained unfinished.

- *Likelihood of completing the project activities started:* Mainly because of the shortfall in funding, a significant proportion of the subprojects that were started remained incomplete at the time of project closing. For this reason, the risk to the development outcome is rated as high unless additional funds can be mobilized quickly. In view of continuing uncertainties about continued external financing, the most likely source of additional funding is the public treasury, since long-awaited oil revenues are now finally flowing.

## **Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts**

### **(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development**

74. Analysis of a sample of subprojects suggests that many of the subprojects financed by ASPOP have increased the income (and presumably improved the welfare) of more than 20,000 rural households, nearly all of which can be assumed to be poor.

75. However the overall impact of the project on rural poverty in Chad has not been evaluated. Rural poverty in Chad is determined by many factors lying outside the project's sphere of influence, so isolating the contribution of the project would be technically challenging.

76. The project empowered many women and enhanced confidence in their abilities, as reflected in the 339 subprojects that were formulated by women's groups and the 146 completed subprojects that were managed by women (see Table A2.4 in Annex 2).

### **(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening**

77. The project has been an important instrument used by the government to build up decentralized administrative capacity, specifically through the setting up of local participatory networks to identify, prepare, and implement subprojects. This capacity remains in place, and it is available to be used in future to implement participatory rural development activities. In addition, the project facilitated the establishment of demand-driven rural advisory services, which, if they can be fully operationalized and sustained, could become a central force in advancing the agricultural and rural development agenda in the country. Finally, the project improved the capacity of several government ministries and agencies.

### **(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative)**

78. An unintended positive impact, not anticipated at the time of project preparation, was the identification, preparation, and implementation by project-supported organizations of many subprojects that did more than simply address the productive needs of rural communities. For example, organizations established under ASPOP were able to identify, prepare, and implement 86 environmental subprojects financed by the

Global Environmental Fund (GEF). These GEF-financed subprojects were accomplished with the help of a memorandum of understanding negotiated between ASPOP and the IDA-financed companion project, PROADEL.

### **Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops**

79. *Stakeholder workshops.* The ICR mission participated in meetings and individual interviews involving government officials, private sector representatives, development partners, and NGOs. The results of the consultation process are summarized in Annex 6.

80. *Positive lessons learned* under the project as articulated by stakeholders included the following:

- Almost all of the stakeholders expressed appreciation for the achievements of the project “on the ground.” They strongly endorsed the general approach of the project—i.e., bringing development finance to the local level and allowing rural communities to decide their priorities in a participatory manner. They also recognized that to be effective, the participatory approach needs to be accompanied by supporting actions and activities, for example, provision of information, training, and technical support.
- The project sparked enthusiasm and generated self-confidence among local communities, encouraged people to organize for their own development, strengthened institutional capacity at the local level, allowed new leaders to emerge, and provided resources (money and know-how) that previously were not widely available in rural areas of Chad. The project also helped bridge the gap that had existed between development initiatives launched in the capital, N’djamená, and implemented in rural communities.
- The competitive grant mechanism introduced under the project for funding agricultural research resulted in better proposals for more relevant research oriented toward the needs of producers. The competitive funding approach opened researchers’ eyes to the demands of the marketplace and its priorities, as well to means of identifying sources of funds for research.

81. *Negative lessons learned* under the project as articulated by stakeholders included the following:

- The steep appreciation of the FCFA against the US dollar significantly reduced the amount of FCFA-denominated funds available to implement planned activities. Many stakeholders felt that the Bank has a role to play in insulating borrowers from external shocks.
- The reduction in the real value of IDA funding was exacerbated by payment delays and shortfalls in the government-provided counterpart funding.
- Political and social instability caused suspensions in payments, disrupted field activities, complicated the timely completion of supervision missions, and



precluded full implementation of some project activities. Many project activities were subjected to several lengthy suspensions, after which they had to start again almost from scratch.

- The lack of funding needed for subprojects created frustration among potential beneficiaries, many of whom made required bank deposits and continue to pay fees on their accounts. More than one-half of the subprojects that were prepared did not receive funding, and many subprojects that did receive funding received less than the amount originally promised.

82. *Beneficiary survey.* No beneficiary survey was carried out. This was a shortcoming, given the weakness of the project M&E system. In the absence of a beneficiary survey, information about the benefits attributable to the project was generated through an extensive review exercise carried out with stakeholders during the ICR mission, as well as a financial profitability analysis of a sample of subprojects (for details, see Annexes 3 and 6).

## **Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome**

**Rating:** *High*

83. The high risk rating reflects an assessment of potential sources of risks and the mitigating effects of existing arrangements and arrangements likely to be implemented.

84. *Lack of financing needed to complete unfinished subprojects.* Achievement of the PDO will be threatened unless additional financing can be mobilized to allow successful completion of the many subprojects that are still in progress. At the end of 2008 (three months after the IDA grant closed), 36 subprojects had received only one tranche of financing (out of three scheduled tranches), and 421 subprojects had received only two tranches of financing. In addition, the project owes substantial sums to service providers who have provided services and who have not yet been paid. The final Bank supervision mission estimated that approximately US\$4.1 million equivalent will be needed to meet these outstanding commitments, as well as other projected expenses (such as payment of project staff salaries and operating costs). This figure could rise, as it may not include all commitments already made to service providers.

85. *Failure of government to honor fully its commitment to provide additional financing.* During the final supervision missions, the financing of uncompleted subprojects and the clearing of outstanding commitments was discussed with project management and government officials. The Ministry of Planning promised to include funds in the 2008 budget to complete unfinished subprojects and to clear all other outstanding commitments. However, the allocation to ASPOP in the 2008 budget came to only FCFA 1.6 billion (US\$3.4 million equivalent), and of that amount only FCFA 550 million was actually disbursed (US\$1.1 million). The risk that the financing gap will not be covered would appear to be mitigated by the fact that the government remains supportive of rural development and has promised to make good on the needed funds.

Evidence of the government's commitment to the project can be seen in that it has continued paying some of the arrears in the counterpart funds to keep the project going. Still, in view of the government's earlier failures to finance its share of the project costs, considerable uncertainty remains as to whether it will make good on these promises.

86. *Uncertain prospects for continued external funding.* While some have suggested that the remaining subprojects could potentially be completed using IDA funds that would become available under an eventual follow-on operation, considering the long period that has already elapsed since many of these projects were initiated (more than two years in some cases), it seems unlikely that funds from an eventual follow-on operation would become available in time.

87. *Loss of experienced project staff.* Because of the tight funding situation, many trained project staff have not been retained. Some staff based in the project head office and almost all staff based in the project interregional offices have been laid off (only two persons have been retained in each of the interregional offices—the regional coordinator and a maintenance worker). The erosion in implementation capacity will be difficult to reverse quickly. Even if funds become available to allow the remaining subprojects to be completed, it may be difficult to rehire the laid-off staff, in which case there would likely be a substantial delay in restarting the project activities.

## **Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance**

### **Bank Performance**

#### **(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry**

**Rating:** *Moderately satisfactory.*

88. The project design was based on the assumption that getting agriculture going in one of the poorest countries in the world would not be possible through a narrowly focused project. Convinced that many constraints would need to be attacked simultaneously to achieve a successful overall outcome, the team that prepared the project opted for a multi-component, multi-agency approach. This strategy, while demanding, was nonetheless reasonable.

89. Project preparation was adequately supported by the Bank. A Project Preparation Facility (PPF) was approved, and experienced Bank staff were mobilized to carry out background analytical work. During preparation, Bank staff interacted closely with the government and also reached out to potential development partners (although in the end none of the development partners who were approached joined as co-financiers).

90. At the time of preparation, the objectives of the project were extremely relevant with regard to the country's development needs and fully consistent with the government's poverty-reduction strategy. The weaknesses of the country's institutions at the time dictated the need to promote development of human capacity at the national,

regional, and local levels. The lack of understanding in the capital city of the problems being experienced in rural areas justified the use of a community-driven development approach, and the vulnerability of fragile ecosystems on which rural livelihoods depend warranted the emphasis placed on protecting the environment.

91. The risk assessment was generally appropriate. The team that prepared the project cannot have been expected to anticipate the dramatic decline in the value of the US dollar that later played such a determining role in influencing the performance of the project. Nor could it have been expected to anticipate the sharp escalation in the cost of many materials that soon rendered obsolete many of the unit costings used for the preparation of the project cost tables.

92. As with all projects, with the benefit of hindsight one can say there are things that should have been done differently. The project design was very complex, and it could be argued that the preparation team should have known that implementation was likely to overwhelm the government's limited capacity. Similarly, the provisions made for M&E were inadequate, especially with regard to more challenging tasks such as quantifying income gains among project beneficiaries and tracking environmental aspects of project-supported activities. That these shortcomings were not addressed during preparation can be attributed in part to the fact that there was no formal quality-at-entry review. The only review of the project design and implementation arrangements occurred during standard project review meetings and decision meetings.

### **(b) Quality of Supervision**

**Rating:** *Moderately unsatisfactory*

93. Bank supervision of the project was moderately unsatisfactory. Supervision missions were carried out regularly (except during periods when Bank staff were prohibited from traveling to the country), and most supervision missions involved extensive interaction with project management and staff, responsible government agencies, stakeholders, development partners, and beneficiaries. The teams carrying out the supervision missions generally included an appropriate mix of seasoned operational staff and technical specialists. Team members included mainly Bank staff based in the region, which helped to keep the costs of the missions manageable. The Aides Memoire prepared by the supervision missions were comprehensive and provided detailed updates on project accomplishments, diagnosis of emerging problems, and guidance to project management about how to advance implementation.

94. Although supervision of the project was generally sound, especially in light of the challenging circumstances, there were shortcomings in several areas:

- Implementation performance ratings recorded in ISRs were overly generous in some respects. The ratings for most indicators were lowered to MS (moderately satisfactory) toward the end of the project when it became apparent that a shortfall in funding would prevent timely completion of the project as originally planned, but ratings for some indicators should have been lowered sooner, and in some cases

they should have been lowered further based on lagging performance. To the extent that some of the ratings appear to have been lenient, this may have been because the supervision team received assurances from the Borrower that problems would be addressed, but then the Borrower failed to follow up.

- The weaknesses of some project management functions, especially including the M&E system, were flagged repeatedly during supervision missions, but they were never resolved. This had dire consequences: in large part because of the weak management functions, the supervision team was slow to recognize the severity of the funding gap that emerged during implementation. The severity of the funding gap was recognized only at the time of the Mid-Term Review, which due to disruptions in the implementation schedule took place only 15 months before the project closing date. By that time, more than 2,500 subprojects had been approved, far more than could be financed with the remaining project funds.

95. In considering the performance of the supervision team, it is reasonable to ask why, once the funding gap was recognized and it became evident that achievement of some targets was jeopardized, the team did not seek to restructure the project or request additional financing. The team did explore these options with the Country Management Unit (CMU) and the Sector Management Unit (SMU). The decision at the time was that the government should be expected to make up the funding shortfall from oil revenues. Since the government did not do so, the project was left with no recourse.

### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance**

**Rating:** *Moderately unsatisfactory*

96. Overall Bank Performance is rated as moderately unsatisfactory. This rating reflects (a) moderately satisfactory performance in ensuring quality at entry and (b) moderately unsatisfactory quality of supervision. The Bank can be credited for having prepared an innovative and relevant project, one that nevertheless had some weaknesses in design. The Bank can also be credited for having managed to ensure that the project was continuously supervised during a period of great turmoil when working in Chad was very challenging, particularly in rural areas. However the supervision team was overly lenient in assigning performance ratings, and it was slow to recognize the severe funding shortfall that developed during implementation. Moreover, once the funding shortfall was recognized, the team could have given greater weight to the risk that the government would not make good on its promises to make up the longstanding arrears in counterpart funding.

## **Borrower Performance**

### **(a) Government Performance**

**Rating:** *Moderately unsatisfactory*

97. Government performance was mixed. The government made important contributions both during preparation and during implementation. However it also failed to live up to some of its obligations, particularly with regard to timely provision of counterpart funds.

98. During project identification, the government helped build momentum for the endorsement of the project concept when it prepared its national poverty reduction strategy and identified ASPOP as important instrument needed for the implementation of the strategy.

99. During project preparation and throughout implementation, the government provided tangible support by:

- Requiring ministries that were stakeholders or recipients of project funds to support the project's field activities and participate in the multiagency teams that supervised the project.
- Encouraging development partners that were active in Chad at the time to participate in the design and supervision of the project, and encouraging the uptake of the project's implementation practices in other rural development projects.
- Providing operational support to Bank supervision missions.
- Introducing incentives to ensure that project staff remained in place throughout project implementation.
- Providing counterpart funds throughout the life of the project (although not at the agreed level) and continuing to support selected activities following the formal closing of the project.

100. Despite these positive actions, however, the government's performance in supporting the project was lacking in three important respects:

- The amount of counterpart funding provided was less than the amount to which the government had committed, and disbursement of counterpart funding was often late.
- The government was slow to acknowledge the financing gap that emerged following the appreciation of the FCFA, and when it did acknowledge the gap, it failed to mobilize the additional funding needed to implement fully all project activities.
- The government failed to mobilize the funding needed to initiate timely preparation of a follow-on operation.

## **(b) Implementing Agencies Performance**

**Rating:** *Moderately satisfactory.*

101. Implementing agencies performance was mixed as well. The various implementing agencies, which included the project coordination and management unit (PCMU), the Ministry of Agriculture (MA), and various organizations and agencies responsible for implementing key activities—made important contributions both during preparation and during implementation. However they also failed to live up to some of their obligations.

102. Positive aspects of the performance of the implementing agencies included the following:

- The PCMU was staffed quickly, and it moved aggressively to recruit service providers in timely fashion to implement project-supported activities in all regions.<sup>3</sup>
- The Ministry of Agriculture consistently provided active support for project management.
- Up until the time that funding constraints set in, a large number of subprojects was identified, prepared, and successfully implemented. The implementing agencies working on financing competitive research, strengthening cotton cooperatives, and building regional and national producer organizations performed particularly well for as long as funds were available.
- All of the implementing agencies conscientiously adhered to a major tenet of the project's strategy by systematically encouraging popular participation and by regularly consulting with stakeholders and donors.
- Toward the end of the project, the PCMU did not shirk from the unpleasant task of warning stakeholders about the shortage of funds.
- After the severity of the funding gap became apparent, the PCMU worked hard (although ultimately without success) to mobilize additional financing to complete project activities.

103. Despite these positive actions, the performance of the implementing agencies was lacking in three important respects:

- The project's M&E unit was unable to generate all of the information needed for management purposes, and even after this was recognized, the PCMU was slow to take remedial measures.
- The project's financial management unit did not exercise sufficient budget control, in the sense that it failed to track subproject applications and ensure that commitments

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<sup>3</sup> With regard to both of these tasks, ASPOP benefited from the predecessor project.

could be met using available funds; as a result, many more subprojects were prepared and approved than could be financed.

- Project management did not always ensure service providers were paid on time (or in some cases, paid at all).

### **(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance**

**Rating:** *Moderately unsatisfactory*

104. Overall Borrower performance is rated moderately unsatisfactory. This rating is based on the moderately unsatisfactory rating assigned to the performance of the government and the moderately satisfactory rating assigned to the performance of the implementing agencies. The choice of the moderately unsatisfactory rating for overall Borrower performance (the more unfavorable of the two constituent sub-ratings) is based on the contribution of the borrower's actions to the overall outcome of the project. One can nonetheless note that: (i) the national project implementing agency moved aggressively to recruit service providers in timely fashion to implement project-supported activities in all regions, and (ii) the national project implementing agency and all of the regional project implementing agencies conscientiously adhered to a major tenet of the project's strategy by systematically encouraging participation of project beneficiaries and by regularly consulting with stakeholders and donors. This represented a major departure from previous practice and remains one of the enduring positive legacies of the project.

## **Lessons Learned**

105. A review of the ASPOP experience yields a number of lessons learned, both positive and negative.

106. *Participatory community-driven development can be successful.* ASPOP demonstrated that participatory community-driven development can produce substantial results, even though it is challenging to organize the extended network of actors needed at the provincial, district, and community levels. Factors that contributed to the success of the approach pioneered by ASPOP included (i) the existence of a conducive legal and regulatory environment allowing decentralized government decision-making; (ii) the presence of competent service providers; (iii) the ability of the project to implement effective training and capacity-building programs throughout the network of actors; and (iv) the formulation of sound development plans characterized by realistic implementation schedules.

107. *Certain types of subprojects were more successful than others.* Economic analysis of a sample of 200 subprojects financed under ASPOP revealed considerable variability in the profitability of different types of activities. Consistently more profitable activities included poultry production, rice production, vegetable production, establishment of banana gardens, and grain milling. Consistently less profitable activities included production of basic cereals (sorghum, millet, beans, maize), small ruminant production, and establishment of plant nurseries. The knowledge generated through

ASPOP about the profitability of different types of subprojects will be extremely valuable in informing the design of an eventual follow-on operation.

108. ***Competitive research funding mechanisms can work even in poor countries.*** ASPOP showed that the introduction of competitive funding mechanisms to support agricultural research can work even in a poor country such as Chad. The competitive funding mechanisms introduced under the project produced better research proposals and led to more careful screening of proposals for eventual financing based on broadly approved criteria that took into account the actual and current needs of the producers. The approach opened researchers' eyes to the demands of the marketplace and its priorities, as well as to means of identifying sources of funds for research. Researchers and research institutions came together to prepare joint proposals, engage in collaborative research, and participate in training programs and workshops. The collaborative review and monitoring process led to better results and papers, some of which were published. In a few cases, educational degrees were upgraded.

109. ***Rural development projects must maintain a tight focus on a manageable agenda.*** While there is no question that successful rural development requires a multi-pronged approach, ASPOP showed that project effectiveness is diluted when there are too many components, subcomponents, and activities. Thus there is a need to maintain a tight focus on an agenda that is manageable given the constraints on implementation capacity. Many of ASPOP's so-called "complementary sub-components" were relatively easy to implement, but they siphoned attention and energy from the main focus of the project, which was promoting local development through productivity increases. Examples of complementary activities include construction of veterinary laboratories, promotion of private veterinary services, establishment of the "*Cellule de coton*," and financing regulatory development efforts in the cotton sector.

110. ***Monitoring and evaluation activities must be linked to project financial management systems.*** In the absence of an effective M&E system linked to the project financial management system, project management and the Bank's supervision team remained unaware that many more subprojects were being prepared and approved than could be funded with the available resources. As a result, the project vastly overcommitted itself, and a large funding gap emerged that was not detected until late in the project life cycle. The lesson that emerges is that it is critical to have in place an M&E system that is linked to the financial management system, so that spending (actual and commitments) can be tracked in real time. This allows management to be aware of the balance of remaining funds and reduces the risk of commitments being made for which funding is no longer available.

111. ***Privatization of agricultural extension is fraught with difficulties.*** Attempts were made under the project to replace the failed public extension system that had been based on the Training and Visit (T&V) system with a semi-privatized extension system under which technology transfer functions were to be entrusted to producers associations, cooperatives, and project-financed Agricultural Service Centers. However the private service providers proved incapable of transferring the recommended technology packages



to farmers. As a result, the impact achieved by the project's innovative agricultural research financing mechanism was undermined.

112. *There is a danger in overpromising and underdelivering.* Early efforts to publicize the project were very successful. Hundreds of rural communities were informed about the potential economic, social, and environmental benefits of the project and were led to believe that they stood a good chance of securing financing to implement subprojects. Later when it proved impossible to fund all of the subprojects that had been approved, frustration erupted among those who had prepared subprojects, especially when beneficiaries had already mobilized their own contribution and deposited it into a specially created bank account. This created a negative legacy that an eventual follow-on operation will have to overcome.

## **Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners**

### **(a) Borrower/implementing agencies**

No comments received.

### **(b) Cofinanciers**

N/A

### **(c) Other partners and stakeholders**

N/A

## Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

### (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)

Components	Appraisal Estimate (USD million)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD million) <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of Appraisal
<b>1. Promotion of sustainable growth in agricultural production</b>	11.61	9.00	77
<b>2. Capacity building for agricultural services</b>	7.49	5.00	66
<b>3. Support to project management</b>	2.97	6.81	228
<b>4. PPF</b>	1.00	1.00	100
<b>Total Baseline Cost</b>	<b>23.08</b>		
Physical Contingencies	0.81		
Price Contingencies	0.73		
<b>Total Project Costs</b>	<b>24.62 21.</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>84</b>
PPF (included in above)			
Front-end fee IBRD			

### (b) Financing

Source of Funds	Type of Financing	Appraisal Estimate (USD million)	Actual/Latest Estimate (USD million) <sup>a</sup>	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower		2.81	1.48	52
Local Communities		1.81	1.15	64
IDA Grant		20.00	21.02	105
Total		24.62	21.65	88

<sup>a</sup> Data on total project costs, denominated in FCFA, were provided by project management. During project implementation, large fluctuations occurred in the FCFA:USD exchange rate, making it problematic to convert the FCFA-denominated total amounts into USD-denominated total amounts. In these tables, the FCFA-denominated amounts provided by project management have been converted into USD-denominated amounts using an FCFA:USD exchange rate of 588 for the IDA contribution (estimated as a notional “average” exchange rate that prevailed during project implementation) and an FCFA:USD exchange rate of 755 for the Borrower and Local Communities contributions (the exchange rate prevailing at the time of project approval, when the Borrower and Local Community contributions were paid).

## Annex 2. Outputs by Component

1. Over the life of the project, approximately 1,173 productive investment subprojects received financing through Component 1 (Table A2.1). This number fell far short of the appraisal estimate of 3,000, but the appraisal estimate was always somewhat notional, because the average cost of each subproject could not be known with certainty at the time of appraisal. The average cost of each subproject ended up being considerably higher than anticipated, partly because of unanticipated increases in the cost of materials, and partly because many of the subprojects that were approved were more elaborate than the model subprojects that had been costed out prior to appraisal. In summary, the project ended up financing fewer productive investment subprojects than anticipated, but those that it did finance were more elaborate and yielded greater benefits.

**Table A2.1 Productive investment subprojects financed under Component 1**

Category	Number financed	Average cost (FCFA)	Total Cost (FCFA)
Productive infrastructure	483	4,473,738	2,160,815,374
Agricultural development	614	2,383,681	1,463,580,389
Off-farm activities	76	1,822,945	138,543,830
Total	1,173	-----	3,762,939,593

2. Table A.2.2 provides information about the types of productive investment subprojects that were financed. The principal types included crop production (mainly rice, groundnuts and sorghum), vegetable production, livestock production (small ruminants, pigs, and poultry), grain milling, grain storage, and diverse non-agricultural activities (sewing, ironworking, petty trading).

**Table A2.2 Types of productive investment subprojects financed under Component 1**

Type of subproject	Number financed
Irrigated rice production, monocrop	27
Irrigated rice production, double crop	16
Groundnut production	20
Sorghum production	10
Other crops production (beans, maize, sesame)	5
Grain milling	173
Grain storage	78
Vegetable production	211
Banana gardens	6
Plant nurseries	34
Small ruminant production	285
Pork production	47
Poultry production	28
Non-agricultural activities	76
Other (feed, vaccines, well construction, etc)	151
Total	1,173

3. As previously noted, not all subprojects financed by the project were completed. Because of the funding gap that emerged, a significant number of subprojects received only one tranche or two tranches of the planned three tranches of financing. Of the 1,186 subprojects<sup>4</sup> that were financed and for which funding data are available, 652 subprojects (55 percent) received all three tranches of funding and were completed. Of the remaining subprojects, 290 subprojects (24 percent) received two tranches of financing, and 244 subprojects (21 percent) received only one tranche of financing. Generally speaking, the rate of subproject completion rate was higher in the three regions in which project activities were launched in Year 1 (Bongor, Mongo, and N'Djamena).

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<sup>4</sup> This number includes the 1,173 productive investment subprojects referred to earlier, as well as 13 private sector and capacity building subprojects.

**Table A2.3 Funding status of subprojects financed under Component 1**

	Phase 1 regions			Phase 2 regions			All regions
	Bongor	Mongo	N'Djamena	Abéché	Doba	Faya	
One tranche	1	-	87	53	90	13	244
Two tranches	99	-	70	32	60	29	290
Three tranches	198	284	132	-	33	5	652
Total	298	284	289	85	183	47	1,186

4. These data on the numbers and types of subprojects funded by the project provide important insights that help to understand the project achievements. The picture that emerges is mixed. Clearly the project ended up financing fewer subprojects than was projected at appraisal (and although cost data are presented here, the average cost of each subproject that was funded ended up being significantly higher than projected). This was not necessarily a problem, however. In view of the demand-driven nature of the project, the fact that the appraisal estimates of subproject numbers and costs turned out to be wide of the mark is not entirely surprising, since there was no way to predict with certainty what types of subprojects would be proposed, and since the average cost of different types of subprojects varied considerably.

5. What was a problem, however, is that many subprojects did not receive the full three tranches of funding and consequently were not completed during the life of the project. Without question, had these subprojects been completed, the impact of the project would have been greater.

6. Table A2.4 summarizes progress achieved against the key performance indicators. What is impressive is that despite the lower-than-projected number of subprojects (and the even lower number of completed subprojects), the PDO indicators were largely achieved for the microprojects assessed. This speaks to the significant productivity increases and income gains generated by the subprojects that were completed, as well as to the robustness of the overall project design, as evidenced by the fact that the projected benefits were substantially achieved even in the face of unanticipated implementation problems.

**Table A2.4 Progress achieved against key performance indicators**

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
<b>A. Promotion of sustainable agricultural production</b>								
	<b>A.1. Productive investments</b>							
	At the end of the project, at least 3,000 subprojects for productive investments have been approved; in addition, 90% of subprojects have been implemented satisfactorily and at least 40% are for women	No. of subprojects prepared	0	3,000	3,156	105 %	Output	
		No. of subprojects financed	0	3,000	1,173	39 %	Output	
		No. of subprojects implemented satisfactorily	0	2,700	424	16 %	Impact	
		No. of subprojects implemented by women's groups	0	1,080	156	14 %	Impact	
		No. of jobs generated by subprojects	0	3,000	5,930	198 %	Impact	
	At the end of the project, productivity has increased in major crops grown by project beneficiaries	Millet/sorghum (kg/ha)	600	700	960	160 %	Impact	
		Maize (kg/ha)	700	800	NA		Impact	No subprojects among the 100 subprojects that were randomly sampled had applied for financing for maize production
		Cotton (kg/ha)	700	NA	NA		Impact	No subprojects among the 100 subprojects that were randomly sampled had applied for financing for cotton production
		Groundnut (kg/ha)	800	850	759	95 %	Impact	
		Irrigated rice - two harvests (t/ha)	4	5	7.1	178 %	Impact	
		Irrigated rice - rainy season (t/ha)	NA	NA	3.6		Impact	
		No. of beneficiaries		30,000	102,890	343 %	Impact	
		Milk production - dry season (l/cow/day)	0.4	1.0	NA		Impact	No subprojects among the 100 subprojects that were randomly sampled had applied for financing for milk production

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
		Milk production - rainy season (l/cow/day)	3.0	4.0	NA		Impact	No subprojects among the 100 subprojects that were randomly sampled had applied for financing for milk production
	Mortality rate (%)	Local chicken - mortality rate (%)	70	60	26	5 %	Impact	
		Imported chicken - mortality rate (%)	25	15	10	N/A	Impact	
	By the end of the project, at least 30% of all contracts for provision of extension services under productive investment subprojects have been awarded to the private sector.	No. of total contracts for provision of agricultural extension services	0	900	508	56 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of service providers
		No. of total contracts for provision of agricultural extension services awarded to public service providers	0	720	465	65 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of public service providers
		No. of total contracts for provision of agricultural extension services awarded to private service providers	0	180	43	24 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of private service providers
		No. of total contracts for provision of agricultural extension services awarded to local service providers ( <i>Opérateurs de Proximité</i> )		18	16	89 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of local service providers
		No. of contracts for provision of agricultural extension services awarded to public local service providers		14	3	21 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of public local service providers
		No. of contracts for provision of agricultural extension services awarded to private local service providers		4	13	361 %	Output	Beneficiaries were not always satisfied with the performance of private local service providers

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
<b>A.2. Competitive research</b>								
	By the end of the project, at least 50 subprojects financing short-term research activities have been implemented in a satisfactory manner, and at least 30% of these have been implemented by private service providers.	No. of research subprojects approved		50	31	62 %	Output	
		No. of research subprojects that received financing		25	16	64 %	Output	The funds earmarked for this activity (FCFA 300 million) were exhausted
		No. of research subprojects implemented satisfactorily		15	13	81 %	Impact	No subproject has been fully completed
		No. of research subprojects awarded to private service providers / research groups		4	0	0 %	Output	No subproject has been fully completed
		No. of research subprojects awarded to public institutions		8	15	188 %	Output	No subproject has been fully completed
		No. of research subprojects awarded to NGOs		4	0	0 %	Output	No subproject has been fully completed
		No. of technical extension messages transferred to farmer organizations and adopted		15	4	27 %	Impact	No subproject has been fully completed
<b>B. Capacity building for agricultural services</b>								
<b>B.1. Capacity building for farmer organizations</b>								
		A national union for farmer organizations has been established, and one national workshop and 18 regional workshops have been held			1	100%	Output	The national union has been organized, and regional workshops have been held. However, the regional unions are not active
<b>B2. Specific support to the cotton sector reform</b>								
	By the Mid-Term Review, the laws and decrees regarding the legal status of the cotton producer organizations have been substantially improved.	A roadmap for privatization of the cotton sector has been developed and discussed several times with the Government			99		Output	Implementation of the roadmap has been delayed for economic and political reasons. However implementation was not a project objective.



Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
	Promote organization of cooperatives around cotton ginneries	90 persons have been trained in cooperative principles, benefits, difficulties, and implementation conditions. These 90 persons are from cooperatives representing 39,343 producers, of which 4,559 are women.					Output	Organization of cooperatives was not listed as objective in the PAD. This objective (and the related ones that follow) are apparently internal targets established by project management
		No. of EPCV trainers receiving classroom training		46	45	98%	Output	
		No. of EPCV trainers receiving field training		572	540	94%	Output	
		No. of persons trained in the field		1,444	1,045	72%	Output	
		No. of forms provided to EPCVs for enrollment of cotton growers as members of cooperatives		200,000	195,855	98%	Output	
		No. of villages to be covered by cooperative promotion		5,935	5,613	95%	Output	
<b>B3. Public service development</b>								
	By the end of the project, a rural-sector oriented agency ( <i>Cellule Permanente</i> ) charged with collecting and diffusing economic and technical data has been formed and is operating satisfactorily	Establishment of the <i>Cellule Permanente</i>		1	1	100%	Impact	The Statistics Division in the Ministry of Agriculture has been supported and is operational; documents have been collected, staff have been recruited and trained; a geographic information systems center has been completed; establishment of CRA and CDA not completed

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
	By the Mid-Term Review, at least five (5) environmental training programs have been carried out for MA, MEE, and ME; and environmental and social impacts assessments have been carried out for all subprojects approved before the Mid-Term Review that involve use of water, fertilizer, or pesticides	Environmental training for staff in the ministries charged with rural development		5	5	100%	Output	Training carried out in 2006
	By the end of the project, at least 70% of priority thematic research activities supported under the project have been completed in a satisfactory manner.	Substantial improvement in the legal and regulatory set-up regarding producer organizations in the cotton sector		1	1	100%	Impact	Action plan for establishing an apex organization for cooperatives has been adopted; training of cooperatives is underway; National Union for Producer Organization has been created
		<b>LRVZ (veterinary)</b>						
		No. of extension themes approved		12	9	75 %		
		No. of extension themes disseminated		9	5	56 %		
		No. of extension themes introduced satisfactorily		5	3	60 %		
		<b>ITRAD (agricultural)</b>						
		No. of extension themes approved		7	7	100 %		
		No. of extension themes disseminated		7	3	43 %		
		No. of extension themes introduced satisfactorily		3	2	67 %		
		<b>COMPETITIVE RESEARCH</b>						Summarizing the LRVZ and ITRAT research above
		No. of extension themes approved		19	16	84 %		
		No. of extension themes disseminated		16	8	50 %		

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
		No. of extension themes introduced satisfactorily		8	5	63 %		
<b>B4. Private sector development</b>								
	By the end of the project, 47 Producer Service Management Centers (CSG) have been established, and at least 90% of these are functioning in a satisfactory manner.	Number of CSGs created		15	11	73 %	Output	Subprojects with completed facilities: 2 in N'Djamena and 3 in Bongor. Subprojects with facilities under construction: 6 in various regions
		Number of CSGs functioning satisfactorily		14	1	7 %	Impact	
	By the end of the project, three rural radios networks managed by producer organizations have been established and are functioning satisfactorily.	Number of rural radio networks established		3	1	33 %	Output	Three rural radio networks have been completed in Kélo; construction is underway and equipment is being procured in Gounou and Gaya; equipment is being procured in Amtimane
		Number of rural radio stations functioning satisfactorily		3	0	0 %	Impact	
	By the Mid-Term Review, a network for private provision of veterinary services has been established and is functioning satisfactorily	A network of private veterinary services has been revitalized		1	N/A	N/A	Output/Impact	Diagnostic exercises have been carried out; legal documents on ethical codes have been approved
<b>C. Support for project management</b>								
<b>C.1. Administration and management</b>								
		Six Inter-regional coordination units are fully staffed and equipped with furniture, equipment and vehicles. (1=all IRCMUs and staff)		1	1	100 %	Output	
		Equipment available for departmental selection committees		51	24	47 %	Output	The Departmental Selection Committees in two Inter-regional units have not been equipped
		Rehabilitation of laboratories		2	2	100 %	Output	

Component	Subcomponent/Activity	Indicators	Baseline	Projection	Actual achievement (12/31/08)	Implementation level relative to projection	Indicator type	Observations (12/31/2008)
		Recruitment and training of Local Service Providers ( <i>Operateurs de Proximité</i> )		21	21	100 %	Output	
		Project staff have been trained in IDA procedures		1	1	100 %	Output	
		The Special Account and Second Generation Special Accounts have been replenished in a satisfactory manner		1	1	100 %	Output	
		Annual audit reports have been prepared and filed on time.		8	8	100 %	Output	
<b>C.2. Monitoring and Evaluation</b>								
		By the end Year 1, a monitoring and evaluation system has been established and is operating in a satisfactory manner.		1	1	100 %	Output	By the end of the project, the M&E Unit was functioning satisfactorily

7. To provide a more complete picture of the project outcomes, additional information is provided below concerning the achievement of the two PDO indicators: (i) productivity increases in key commodities produced by project beneficiaries, and (ii) income gains realized by project beneficiaries.

**Productivity increases in key commodities**

8. Information about productivity increases resulting from project-supported subprojects was generated through an evaluation of a sample of subprojects carried out in 2008 by the project M&E unit. Data were collected from a sample of 200 randomly selected subprojects, representing 16 percent of all subprojects that were financed (fully or partly) by ASPOP. The sampled subprojects can be considered representative of the subprojects supported under the project. However because a random sampling procedure was used, the sample included few examples or no examples of several types of subprojects that were present in the overall population in very small numbers (e.g., cotton production, milk production, maize production). In retrospect, it would have been better to have used some sort of purposive sampling strategy to ensure that the evaluation sample included a minimum number of all major types of subprojects.

9. Most of the producer organizations that implemented subprojects financed by the project achieved substantial increases in agricultural productivity. Table A2.5 presents productivity increases in the commodities listed in PAD as performance indicators, as well as for several other commodities noted as important during project implementation.

**Table A2.5 Productivity increases achieved in a sample of 200 ASPOP-financed subprojects**

Commodity	Baseline value	End-of-project target	Actual achievement
Millet/sorghum (kg/ha)	600	700	1,640
Maize (kg/ha)	700	900	533 <sup>a</sup>
Cotton (kg/ha)	700	850	N/A <sup>b</sup>
Groundnut (kg/ha)	800	900	1,317
Sesame (kg/ha)	N/A	N/A	500
Beans (kg/ha)	N/A	N/A	437
Irrigated rice - two crops (t/ha)	4.0	5	7.1
Irrigated rice - rainy season (t/ha)	N/A	N/A	3.6
Irrigated vegetables, generally onion and garlic (kg/ha)	N/A	N/A	13,119
Milk production - dry season (l/cow/day)	0.4	2.0	N/A <sup>c</sup>
Milk production - rainy season (l/cow/day)	3.0	5.0	N/A <sup>c</sup>
Mortality rate of poultry	70 %	50 %	5 %

<sup>a</sup> The sample included only one maize subproject

<sup>b</sup> The sample included no cotton subprojects

<sup>c</sup> The sample include no milk production subprojects

## Income gains realized by project beneficiaries

10. The same survey of a sample of 200 subprojects carried out in 2008 by the project M&E unit to estimate agricultural production increases also evaluated the income generated by subprojects for beneficiaries. The results are given in Table A2.6.

**Table A2.6 Average income generation, by the type of the subproject**

Type of subproject	Number funded	Number sampled	Average revenue (FCFA 1,000)	Average number of beneficiaries	Estimated total number of beneficiary-families	Estimated annual revenue (FCFA million)
Irrigated rice, single	36	27	5,994	63	2,268	215.8
Irrigated rice, double	16	8	6,770	70	1,120	108.3
Groundnut	20	6	612	14	280	12.3
Sorghum	10	2	370	19	190	3.7
Bean	2	2	595	24	48	1.2
Maize	2	1	560	19	38	1.1
Sesame	1	1	580	9	9	0.6
Grain milling	173	63	1,036	25	4,325	179.3
Grain storage	78	9	834	15	1,120	65.1
Vegetables	211	39	1,676	16	3,376	353.6
Banana gardens	6	1	3,228	24	144	19.4
Plant nurseries	34	2	219	12	408	7.4
Small ruminants	285	15	363	15	4,275	103.5
Pork production	47	6	967	27	1,269	45.4
Poultry	28	1	7,784	12	336	217.9
Non-agricultural	76	17	514	16	1,232	39.6
Other	151					
<b>Total</b>	<b>1,173</b>	<b>200</b>			<b>20,578</b>	<b>1,374.2</b>

Source: Borrower's ICR.

11. Based on the data in Table A2.6, completed subprojects funded under Component 1 are estimated to have benefited 20,578 rural households. Assuming an average of six family members per household, the total number of beneficiaries is estimated to have exceeded 123,000 individuals.

12. The average annual net revenue generated by subprojects financed under Component 1 is estimated to have totaled FCFA 66,780 (US\$132.5) per household, or FCFA 11,130 (US\$22.08) per person. With average annual per capita income in Chad estimated at US\$133, this represents a 16.6 percent increase in annual income.

## Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

1. Economic and financial analysis is not required for Core ICRs, and no overall financial and economic analyses were prepared at project closing. However, because the profitability of subproject investments will be an important factor taken into account when the time comes to consider a potential follow-on operation, information about the profitability of subprojects is presented below.

### Profitability of project-financed subprojects

2. Information about the profitability of project supported subprojects was generated through an impact assessment carried out for the government by an independent consultant after the project was completed. The impact assessment was carried out by an international consultant recruited by the government to prepare the government's own evaluation of the project.
3. Because of time constraints, as well as security restrictions that prevented the consultant from visiting all regions of the country, the sample of eight subprojects selected for the in-depth impact assessment was not representative for the entire population of subprojects. The eight subprojects selected for in-depth analysis came from only three provinces—Bongor, Mongo, and N'Djamena. However since these three provinces were those in which the first three ASPOP Interregional Coordination Units were established, the eight subprojects that were selected were representative of mature subprojects. No partly financed, incomplete subprojects were included in the sample.
4. The consultant visited the eight subprojects in the sample and collected detailed information about costs (investment costs and operational costs) and revenues (calculated based on production and sales). The profitability calculations assumed an active life of 10 years for each subproject. The analysis was carried out using real prices, i.e., no inflation was factored in.
5. Internal rates of return (IRR) calculated for the eight subprojects under a range of assumptions are presented in Table A3.1. Under the baseline scenario (Row 1), the highest IRR (95%) was generated by a dressmaking workshop (this workshop is operated by a group of 12 women). The other seven subprojects in the sample generated baseline IRRs ranging from 25 percent to 63 percent. These IRRs are significantly higher than the IRRs that were projected at appraisal.
6. Sensitivity analysis was carried out to determine whether the IRRs are sensitive to changes in subproject costs and revenues. The results presented in Rows 2-9 show that all of the IRRs remain positive even if costs increase by 5 percent, 10 percent, or 15 percent. The same is true if revenues decline by the same proportions. Even if costs increase and revenues decline simultaneously by 10 percent, the IRR for only one subproject (irrigated rice) turns negative.

**Table A3.1 Economic rates of return for selected ASPOP subprojects (%)**

IRR/ Sensitivities	Grain milling, Bongor	Grain milling, Faya	Onions 1, Bongor	Onion 2, Bongor	Irrigated rice, Bongor	Forge, Bongor	Dress- making, Bongor	Pig production, N'Djamena
Base scenario	26.70	26.00	57.00	63.00	56.60	25.00	95.20	32.20
Costs + 5%	23.40	22.00	51.80	57.20	49.20	22.90	82.60	10.60
Costs + 10%	20.00	17.90	47.00	51.90	42.60	20.60	70.70	7.50
Costs + 15%	16.20	13.60	42.20	46.80	36.40	18.60	59.50	4.40
Revenue - 5%	21.90	20.50	51.50	56.90	48.80	21.50	79.30	10.50
Revenue - 10%	16.80	14.60	45.90	50.70	41.20	17.70	64.00	6.80
Revenue - 15%	11.40	8.10	40.10	44.30	33.20	13.70	49.00	2.90
Costs + 5% Revenue - 5%	17.30	15.20	36.30	40.00	27.90	18.10	65.40	7.10
Costs + 10% Revenue -10%	7.60	3.50	15.00	16.60	- 5.10	11.00	39.50	ND
Investment recovery (yrs)	3.69	3.71	1.81	1.66	1.97	4.16	1.65	4.00

7. *Summary of key findings.* The impact assessment concluded that most subprojects financed under the project were successful. Since financing of subprojects was the single largest activity funded under the project (accounting for 45 percent of total project costs), the fact that most subprojects were successful suggests that a major component of the project generated the expected results. To give a better idea of size of the economic benefits, the impacts assessment study estimated that about 120,000 persons benefited from the subprojects (roughly 20,600 households averaging six persons each), about 2,900 seasonal jobs were created, and about FCFA 1,4 billion (about US\$2.8 million) of value-added was generated.
8. *The impacts assessment* concluded that project-supported subprojects contributed directly or indirectly to improvements in the welfare of thousands of rural households. A significant proportion of the beneficiaries were women, who benefited especially from the many subprojects that were managed and operated by women (e.g., dressmaking and cereal processing). Women benefited also from the many so-called “mixed” subprojects (e.g., rice production, irrigated vegetable production, small-scale livestock production, machinery workshops).



## Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

### (a) Task Team members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility / Specialty
<b>Lending</b>			
Ousmane Seck	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Soulemame Fofana	Operations Officer	AFTAR	Project budgeting
Alassane Sow	Lead Operations Officer	AFTAR	Cotton sector reforms
Amadou Tidiane Toure	Lead Procurement Specialist	SARPS	Procurement review
Ningayo Charles Donang	Sr. Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Procurement review
Marie Louise Ah-Kee	Procurement Analyst	AFTAR	Procurement review
Fridolin Ondobo	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Procurement review
Amadou Alassane	Sr. Agriculture Specialist	AFTAR	Agricultural research
Marie-Helene Collion	Lead Agriculturist	LCSAR	Peer Reviewer
Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt	Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Environmental safeguards
Virginie Vaselopoulos	Language Program Assistant	AFTEN	Administrative support
Desiré Coquillat	Consultant		Project costing
Guy-Joseph Malembeti	Consultant		Procurement review
Remileku Rakiatu Cole	Consultant		Monitoring and evaluation
James Orehmie Monday	Consultant		EIA
Anthony Youdeowei	Consultant		EIA (Pest management)
<b>Supervision</b>			
Ousmane Seck	Sr. Rural Development Specialist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Fridolin Ondobo	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Financial management
Emmanuel Tchoukou	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Financial management
Etienne Nkoa	Financial Management Specialist	AFTFM	Financial management
Ningayo Charles Donang	Sr. Procurement Specialist	AFTPC	Procurement review
Marie Louise Ah-Kee	Procurement Analyst	AFTAR	Procurement review
Amadou Alassane	Sr. Agricultural Specialist	AFTAR	Agricultural research
Lucienne M' Baipor	Social Development Specialist	AFTCS	Social safeguards
Mohamed Arbi Ben-Achour	Lead Social Development Specialist	AFTSD	Social safeguards
Edeltraut Gilgan-Hunt	Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Environmental safeguards
Korotimi Sylvie Traore	Program Assistant	MNSED	Administrative support
Germaine Mafougong	Program Assistant	AFTAR	Administrative support
Francois Honoré Mkouonga	Consultant		Technical support
<b>ICR</b>			
Michael Morris	Lead Agricultural Economist	AFTAR	Task Team Leader
Turto Turtiainen	Consultant		ICR preparation
Marie-Claudine Fundi	Sr. Language Program Assistant	AFTAR	Administrative support

**(b) Staff Time and Cost**

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of staff weeks	USD Thousands (including travel and consultant costs)
<b>Lending</b>		
FY02	27	162.54
FY03	35	197.15
FY04	17	68.24
<b>Total:</b>	79	427.93
<b>Supervision/ICR</b>		
FY04	3	16.96
FY05	20	83.29
FY06	31	124.62
FY07	38	123.26
FY08	22	81.16
FY09	6	47.48
<b>Total:</b>	120	429.29

## **Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results**

No Beneficiary Survey was carried out during the project period.

## Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

### 1. Stakeholder workshops

The ICR mission met with key stakeholder representatives in individual or small group sessions. Stakeholders met included the following:

- (a) the Director General and other senior officials of the Ministry of Agriculture, which is the supervising ministry for the project and which chairs the Steering Committee,
- (b) the Directors General and other senior officials of the line ministries that were directly involved with the project (e.g., the Ministries of Planning, Livestock, and Environment);
- (c) the Coordinator of the *Cellule Permanente* that is in charge of monitoring of all externally financed projects;
- (d) officials of semi-public agencies and parastatals, including the CTRC (the center charged with monitoring cotton sector reforms) and several agricultural research centers;
- (e) ASPOP management and senior staff;
- (f) staff of ASPOP Interregional Coordination Units;
- (g) private sector operators (*Opérateurs de Proximité* and *prestataires de service*);
- (h) producer associations and their national apex organizations; and
- (i) the development partners that are most active in rural development in Chad (EU, SCAC, World Bank).

### 2. Methodology

Stakeholders were asked the following key questions:

- What was the relationship of your ministry/agency/organization vis-à-vis the project? In other words, how did your ministry/agency/organization engage with the project?
- What were the most significant results/achievements of the project?
- What were the main problems encountered that negatively affected implementation of the project?
- What are the most important lessons learned from the project and its implementation that can help to inform the design of a follow-on project in Chad, or similar projects in other countries?

### 3. Main achievements

Almost all of the stakeholders interviewed expressed appreciation for the achievements of the project. They strongly endorsed the general approach of the project—i.e., bringing development finance to the local level and helping rural communities to decide priorities in a participatory manner. They also recognized that in order to be effective, the participatory approach needs to be accompanied by supporting actions and activities, for example, provision of information, training, and technical support. Public agencies, private firms, and NGOs all have roles to play in providing these supporting actions and activities.

The stakeholders reported that the project had generated benefits in a number of areas:

- The project brought a new approach to the fight against the poverty in Chad, one that has been successfully integrated into the government's strategic planning and decentralization effort (PS; DP). It mobilized donors that are active in the rural development field to coordinate better around a common set of decentralized, participatory approaches (DP).
- The project stimulated an entirely new level of enthusiasm and self-esteem in rural communities. It facilitated the establishment of many local community organizations and mobilized these organizations to participate in their own development. It built up local capacity and allowed new leaders to emerge. It provided resources (financing and know-how) that previously had been unavailable to most rural communities in the country (NPMCU; IRPCU; PSO; PS).
- The project instilled confidence in rural communities to take the initiative to act in their own interest. Previously rural communities had been used to waiting for government or donor-led projects to come to them (the top-down approach). ASPOP was the first large-scale project to stimulate rural development efforts at the grass-roots level. The project serves as an example for the government and donors on how to foster community-led local development (IRCMU; DP).
- The project built capacity at the local level for long-term development (DP). It organized and trained a large number of people in participatory democratic approaches (more than 2,500 groups were trained to draw up prioritized lists of development needs and to prepare subproject proposals for the leading priorities) (IRCMU; PO; PS). It trained *Operateurs de Proximité*, staff of IRCMUs, and members of coordination bodies and subproject approval committees (NPCMU; PS; PSO).
- The project organized a large number of workshops, seminars, and conferences on rural development-related topics at all levels, from the national level to the village level to the organization level (NPCMU, IRCMU; PSO).

- The project improved the effectiveness of the Government's technical ministries by bringing in the appropriate technical resources to support the local subprojects and facilitate supervision (PS, NPCMU).
- The project facilitated the acquisition by government agencies, service providers, and beneficiaries of information technology and materials. It financed the creation of policies, manuals, and documents of good quality (including a new version of the Strategy for Reducing Poverty) that were widely used in training and implementing the project activities (NPCMU; IRCMU; PS; SPA).
- The project financed the establishment of the country's first competitive agricultural research program. It funded 16 research proposals and monitored their implementation (SPA; NPCMU). The program has generated 25 technical messages (*fiches techniques*). Trained a large number of researchers in preparing competitive funding proposals (SP).
- The project introduced new income-generating activities into the country's Sahelian zones, including aquaculture and poultry production (IRCMU; PSO). All of the subprojects that were fully funded generated significant income gains for the beneficiaries (PS, PSO).
- The project facilitated establishment at the regional and national levels of organizations that could lobby effectively for producer organizations and other community groups. It financed the launching of agricultural service centers and paid for the revision of national by-laws to govern the activities of these organizations (PO).
- The project facilitated the establishment of local radio stations dedicated to disseminating rural development-oriented information and other content of interest to rural audiences (PO, NPCMU).
- The project successfully identified potential members of producer cooperatives (originally the idea was to concentrate on cooperatives for cotton producers only, but the focus later expanded to include other crops). It provided training in basic principles of cooperative organization and management (unfortunately these activities failed to lead to the establishment of any new cooperatives) (SPA, PS).
- The project funded many environmental protection and improvement activities, including introduction of environmentally friendly crops and trees (such as gum arabic), reforestation schemes, enforcement of environmental standards relating to irrigation infrastructure, mosquito eradication programs, and integrated pest management schemes for agriculture (PS).
- The project financed training for project environmental staff and built capacity to carry out systematic environmental assessments of proposed subprojects (PS).
- The project strengthened the government's capacity to plan and implement effective M&E activities, especially at the field level (PS, PSO).

#### **4. Problem areas and difficulties**

Stakeholders also recognized that a number of problems had arisen during implementation that would best be avoided in any eventual follow-operation.

- Delays in the disbursement of government counterpart funding resulted in frequent disruptions to the project implementation schedule, delaying the timely implementation many field activities and causing the eventual abandonment of others. Many subprojects that were forced to endure long months of suspension due to lack of funding later had start again almost from scratch (NPCMU; IRCMU; SPA; PS).
- The fact that the government did not provide the full amount of counterpart funding added to the shortfall that had resulted from the unanticipated devaluation of the dollar against the FCFA. Because of the funding, many approved subprojects did not receive the full amount of financing, and many other approved subprojects did not receive any financing at all.
- The dramatic weakening of the US dollar reduced the amount of FCFA-denominated funds available for project activities by approximately 35 percent compared to the amount estimated at appraisal (PS, SPA; NPCMU; PO).
- Several shareholders expressed the view that World Bank exacerbated the problems caused by the government's unpredictable disbursement schedule by suspending disbursements during periods when its relations with the government had soured.
- The quantity and sometimes the quality of technical assistance provided to the project by the line ministries was sometimes inadequate, especially the technical assistance relating to management of water resources (PS).
- Excellent extension packages came out of the competitive research programs, but often the extension service proved incapable of transferring the packages to significant numbers of farmers. Efforts to replace the earlier Training and Visit System with a system of private service providers have not worked (PS, SPA).
- The cost projections during project preparation and reviewed at appraisal were unrealistic. The parameters used to develop the cost tables were too conservative, resulting in consistent underestimation of subproject costs. As a result, the projected numbers of subprojects to be financed was too large, and more subprojects were planned than could eventually be financed.
- Because the projected numbers of subprojects to be financed was too large, the targets for key project performance indicators were set too high. Thus, there was no possibility to attain the target numbers in subprojects and some other indicators (NPCMU).
- Project management and World Bank supervision teams were slow to address the disconnect between the number of planned subprojects and the amount of available financing. The total estimated cost of the project at pre-appraisal was nearly double the amount of the approved IDA credit, but the performance targets were not changed. The widening gap between subproject commitments and the

amount of available financing would have warranted a restructuring of the project or at least an adjustment of some of the performance targets, but the possibility of restructuring was raised only at the time of the Mid-Term Review, which came very late in the project cycle, only 15 months before the closing date (SPA; IRCMU).

- The lack of funding generated a lot of frustration among potential beneficiaries, many of whom had mobilized their own required contributions and deposited the funds into bank accounts, where they were accumulating fees (PO; PS; IRCMU; PSO).
- Implementation of many subprojects was delayed by late payments to *Operateurs de Proximité* (ODP) and other service providers. Many ODP and service providers have not yet been paid for their services.
- The funding shortfall experienced by the project has still not been resolved. Currently the project is still in arrears on payments to ODPs to the tune of FCFA700 million.
- The project paid for the establishment of the *Cellule Permanente* and supported its operational costs during an agreed two-year start-up period. Since that time, however, the government has failed to provide adequate operational funds for the agency. The government-provided annual allocation is only FCFA50 million (US\$100,000 equivalent), well less than required (SPA).
- The performance of the bodies that have been created to provide support services to producer organizations remains unknown. Regional Coordinators (and supervision missions) have visited many of these bodies, but no systematic audit of their performance has been carried out at the national level (NPCMU).
- The flow of funds was slow at all levels. Replenishment requests addressed to the World Bank took a long time to be honored (the average processing time exceeded six weeks), even though the Financial Monitoring System was supposed to speed up disbursements. Transactions between the central NPCMU and the regional IRCMUs and subprojects also frequently took weeks or even months, usually because the needed supporting documents had not been provided (PSO, NPCMU).

## 5. Lessons learned

Based on the positive achievements of the project but also in recognition of the problem areas and difficulties, stakeholder identified a lessons learned in a number of areas.

### *Improved donor coordination and harmonization*

- ASPOP has played an extremely influential role in Chad in introducing a new approach to the fight against the poverty, one that has been successfully integrated into the government's strategic planning and decentralization effort (PS; DP). It has mobilized donors that are active in the rural development field to coordinate



better around a common set of decentralized, participatory approaches (DP; SPA; PS).

- PNDP has provided a platform for extensive discussions among international and national development partners and therefore has facilitated a certain degree of harmonization of external assistance in the rural development field. Development partners have actively reviewed and commented on project-generated documents, and they have adapted many guidelines and policies for use in their own programs.
- Collaboration with others in the field generally has been satisfactory. For example, FAO has provided technical expertise in the irrigation subsector. However, not all donor-funded projects and programs have been able to collaborate seamlessly with ASPOP. The effectiveness of ASPOP would have been enhanced through better collaboration with other donor-funded projects and programs, especially in zones where both were active.
- Thanks in part to strong leadership exhibited by PNDP, an impressive level of collaboration has been achieved among the implementing agencies. The teamwork between partners and the information flows that PNDP have fostered have been substantial and have allowed different development partners to feel that they are working toward a common goal and essentially using the same approach (DP).

#### *Project design*

- The project design was exceedingly complex, to the extent that it seriously challenged the government's limited implementation capacity. The project should have focused on a smaller geographical area and restricted itself to a sub-set of core activities. The "Christmas tree" nature of the project design drew attention away from the main focus (IRCMU).

#### *Project financial management*

- Suspensions of disbursements by the World Bank slow down implementation progress, increase costs (because activities must be repeated), and compress the implementation time line. Therefore with projects such as ASPOP, the World Bank should be favorably disposed to grant extension requests, possibly along with approval of supplemental funding (PS; NPCMU). Alternatively, the World Bank should be favorably disposed to approve follow-on operations (all respondents).
- Late payment and non-payment of service providers was a chronic problem. Measures must be found to ensure that in future contractual conditions will be respected by the project and especially by project beneficiaries in charge of implementing subprojects. *Operateurs de Proximité* and other service providers must be paid and paid in timely fashion. One option would be to allow payments to be made by the project directly to the service providers (PSO).
- With the objective of ensuring equitable treatment for all service providers, ASPOP introduced a standardized country-wide payment schedule for the

preparation and implementation of subproject costs. This turned out to be unfair, because the cost structure differed significantly in different parts of the country.

- Shocks stemming from global economic downturns, dramatic and unanticipated changes in the exchange rate, suspensions of World Bank lending programs for political or other reasons, and other external factors pose a heavy burden when they must be borne should by the Borrower alone. In the case of ASPOP, such shocks reduced the amount of FCFA-denominated project funds by nearly 33 percent. Some stakeholders expressed the view that if the World Bank is a real partner in development, it should be willing to do more to help Borrowers in finding solutions (SPA).

#### *Local capacity building*

- Local communities benefited tremendously from the training and capacity building provided by the project. This empowered them to become organized, identify development priorities in their own communities, prepare development plans, and prepare and implement subprojects identified in the development plans
- Many local organizations that were awarded project-supported subprojects were initially unfamiliar with competitive bidding procedures such as those required for selection of service providers. Although introduction of the competitive bidding procedures in some cases delayed the initiation of field work, use of the procedures has enabled the organizations to choose the best and least expensive NGOs to carry out the field activities (NPCMU; PSO).

#### *Competitive funding for agricultural research*

- The competitive grant mechanism introduced under the project for funding agricultural research resulted in better proposals for more relevant research oriented toward the needs of producers. This approach also opened researchers' eyes to the demands of the marketplace and its priorities, as well to means of identifying sources of funds for research. Researchers and research institutions often were brought together to prepare joint proposals, engage in collaborative research, and participate in training programs and workshops (PS; SPO).
- Adaptive research, no matter how good, will have limited impact if the research results are not widely adopted. In Chad, the recommended technical packages coming out of the research program have not yet been taken by significant numbers of farmers. Efforts to replace the earlier Training and Visit System with a system of private service providers have not worked (PS, SPA).

## **Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR**

Le Projet d'Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations de Producteurs (PSAOP) a démarré ses activités le 1er décembre 2003, suite au recrutement du personnel clé de l'Unité Nationale. C'est un projet d'envergure nationale avec six (6) Unités Inter Régionales installées à N'Djaména, Bongor, Mongo, Doba, Abéché et Faya. L'objectif de développement du projet est d'accroître la productivité agricole et le revenu en milieu rural, tout en préservant les ressources naturelles de base.

Ce document a pour objectif de dégager les principales réalisations physiques et financières, les résultats enregistrés et les niveaux de performance atteints et de tirer les leçons.

### **I. NIVEAU D'EXECUTION ET D'ATTEINTE DES OBJECTIFS DU PSAOP**

#### **1.1 Investissements productifs**

Le projet a financé 1,186 microprojets dont 1,173 sous projets, 10 Centres de Services et de Gestion (CSG), et 3 radios communautaires sur une prévision de 3,000 sous projets, 47 CSG, et 3 radios communautaires.

Les 1,186 sous-projets financés sont repartis comme suit: Bongor (298), Mongo (284), N'Djaména (289), Doba (183), Faya-Largeau (47) et Abéché (85).

244 SPP attendent la deuxième et la troisième tranche de financement alors que 290 attendent la troisième tranche. Ce qui fait qu'il reste à déboursier la deuxième tranche pour 244 SPP et la troisième tranche pour 534 SPP.

*Le processus est très pertinent au regard de l'intérêt porté par les communautés; en terme d'efficacité, les couts unitaires des sous-projets ont été sous-évalués, et la répartition géographique de sous projets est défavorable aux UIRCGP de la deuxième année. La participation des femmes a été satisfaisante, de même que le développement des relations fonctionnelles entre les OPs et les IMF.*

*Ces projets sont très rentables d'après l'étude, et l'analyse de sensibilité montre l'absence de risques potentiels*

*Une pertinence évidente, une efficacité et une efficience moyenne, une rentabilité très intéressante et une durabilité assurée pour des sous-projets qui répondent aux préoccupations urgentes des populations bénéficiaires.*

#### **1.2 Programme de Recherche sur Base Compétitive**

Les sous projets PRBC ont été mis en œuvre sur la base de contrat de services avec des institutions publiques et privées en équipes de recherche; les producteurs ont été impliqués à l'identification, l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre des sous projets.

Sur les 31 sous projets sélectionnés 16 sont effectivement financés dont 13 exécutés de manière satisfaisante, et 3 réorientés. Les 13 sous projets mis en œuvre ont permis de générer 25 fiches techniques.

Le dispositif mis en place a développé un esprit de compétition chez les chercheurs avec pour conséquence le développement de la culture de l'excellence scientifique.

*Le processus qui rapproche la recherche et les producteurs est très pertinent, et son efficacité est prouvée au regard des résultats obtenus.*

***Une pertinence garantie, une efficacité incontestable mais une efficacité très moyenne et un impact et une durabilité qui laissent des doutes.***

### **1.3 Assistance Technique aux OPs**

- Un réseau privé d'opérateurs de proximité et de prestataires de service opérationnel;
- Une faïtière des producteurs mise en place et participant aux processus de prise de décision.
- Un outil d'information et de communication pour les communautés en cours d'opérationnalisation, avec 02 Radios communautaires opérationnelles à Kélo et Gounou-Gaya, et une en phase d'installation à Amtiman (bâtiment construit, marché des équipements non achevé).

***Des activités d'une pertinence indiscutable, d'une efficacité incontestable pour le CNCPR et les radios communautaires appuyées, une efficacité qui reste bonne mais une durabilité qui reste fragile.***

***Les performances des ODP et des prestataires sont faibles, en dépit de leurs rôles stratégiques.***

### **1.4 Appui à la Réforme de la filière Coton**

- L'adjudication du marché de l'audit technique et financier de la Coton Tchad est effective.
- Installation des coopératives de producteurs dans 5,935 villages de la zone coton au cours du premier semestre 2007. Ces coopératives sont en cours de formalisation pour accueillir la réforme.

***Une activité des plus pertinentes, mais une efficacité des plus nuancée.***

### **1.5 Renforcement des Capacités du Secteur Public**

Au niveau du secteur public, l'appui du projet a permis la publication régulière de statistiques sur le secteur agricole et la mise en place d'une Centrale d'information sur le Secteur Rural (Cellule Permanente).

Le Projet appuie l'ITRAD et le LRVZ dans l'exécution des thèmes prioritaires de recherche thématique, lesquels thèmes n'ont pas été correctement achevés; les résultats de leur mise en œuvre sont faiblement satisfaisants.

Au niveau des Ministères Techniques l'appui a permis la mise en le renforcement des capacités des agents pour l'élaboration des plans et budgets et d'une base de données documentaire; le suivi des programme et projets de développement; et le recueil des données statistiques; la production d'annuaires statistiques et d'annuaires SIM (Système d'Information sur les Marchés); la mise en œuvre du Recensement Général de l'Elevage et de l'Agriculture et la préparation d'un Plan National pour le Développement de l'Elevage.

Ces services ont, par ailleurs, contribué à la définition des stratégies sectorielles de lutte contre la pauvreté, et à l'opérationnalisation de la Centrale d'information sur le Secteur Rural.

*Un outil de suivi du secteur très pertinent, mais non encore opérationnel sur le terrain. Les activités de recherche thématique, bien que très réduits, n'ont pas été concluants: manque d'efficacité, absence d'efficience et de durabilité.*

## **1.6 Développement du Secteur Privé**

Au premier janvier 2008, 10 CSG sur 15 prévus sont en cours de financement, mais non encore opérationnels compte tenu des ruptures de financement.

*Une pertinence incontestable, une efficacité encore douteuse, une efficience qui aurait pu être démontrée moyennant un allongement du temps et des ressources additionnelles, la durabilité du CSG opérationnel incontestable.*

Les activités de renforcement des capacités des vétérinaires privés n'ont finalement pas été initiées en raison de l'achèvement tardif des activités préparatoires et de difficultés financières du Projet.

*Une pertinence certaine des objectifs mais une efficacité et une efficience très moyenne et un impact très mineur.*

## **1.7 Appui à la Gestion du Projet**

Le dispositif institutionnel est parfaitement adapté et d'une grande pertinence, d'une efficacité réelle avec des nuances d'une UIRCGP à l'autre; mais l'efficience qui aurait pu être bien meilleure, si les ressources supplémentaires avaient été dégagées et si une meilleure affectation des ressources disponibles avait été envisagée à temps, la succession

des suspensions, la tenue tardive de l'évaluation mi-parcours, la sous-évaluation initiale des activités, le déblocage tardif de la contre partie nationale et la décision précipitée de remettre en cause l'option de financements complémentaires en est une cause suffisante.

### *Suivi-évaluation: Des résultats assez décevants*

Un système peu efficace et peu efficient de remontée et d'analyse des données. Sur un plan général, on constate: (i) Une certaine incohérence au niveau de pilotage du système de suivi évaluation dans son ensemble; (ii) Une insuffisance au niveau de l'analyse des indicateurs et données collectées pour créer des conditions favorables à un pilotage efficace du Projet; (iii) Une grande déficience dans la maîtrise des logiciels de suivi évaluation rendant difficile la production des tableaux de bord.

## **1.8 Conclusion**

L'étude d'évaluation indépendante des résultats et impacts du Projet comanditée en mars 2009 a tiré les conclusions suivantes:

1. Une nouvelle approche qui responsabilise des bénéficiaires. L'approche utilisée dans le cadre du PSAOP permet de responsabiliser les populations des communautés et collectivités rurales dans le choix de leur développement en les impliquant dès l'identification des idées de sous-projets et leur permettant d'en assurer la gestion en s'appuyant sur des instruments d'appui et de conseils qu'ils ont eux-mêmes sélectionnés et contractualisés. Cette approche nouvelle de promotion du développement accompagne de manière efficace le processus de décentralisation.
2. Des acquis incontestables. Sur un plan général la mission a constaté que les acquis du PSAOP sont nombreux et méritent d'être renforcés et poursuivis dans le cadre d'une intervention ultérieure qui ciblerait essentiellement les OP dans une démarche similaire de réponse à la demande avec un accompagnement professionnel d'OdP préalablement formées.
3. La réalisation des Sous-projets Productifs: Une réussite. L'étude entreprise, même si elle a recherché à analyser toutes les activités s'est essentiellement concentrée sur la réalisation des sous-projets qui constituait la partie prédominante et essentielle de ce "Projet PSAOP." Les sous-projets ont de manière directe ou indirecte contribué à l'amélioration des conditions de vie des populations. Qu'il s'agisse des sous-projets de couture, de coiffure, de moulin à céréales ... qui ont surtout été pris en charge et gérés par les femmes seules, ou de ceux de forges, aménagements rizicoles, maraichages, élevage porcins, qui ont été entrepris par des OP mixtes, ils ont tous eu un impact significatif en matière de lutte contre la pauvreté rurale.
4. Des Sous-Projets productifs dégageant une rentabilité économique inattendue. Les travaux d'analyse de la rentabilité économique de ces sous-projets, a montré que

- les choix et dimensionnements des investissements étaient en général adéquats et que l'utilisation des fonds disponibles tendait à être optimale, les taux rencontrés allaient bien au delà des prévisions. On pourrait reprocher un excès de sélection de sous-projets dans certaines UIRCGP qui ont abouti à des suspensions à l'issue de la 1<sup>ère</sup> ou de la 2<sup>ème</sup> tranche, limitant ainsi certes les dérapages ultérieurs mais compromettant une utilisation rationnelle des ressources dont disposait le Projet.
5. Un rôle stratégique des CDS à pérenniser. L'importance du rôle joué par les Comité Départementaux de Sélection (CDS), dont les membres doivent pouvoir se retrouver au sein des nouveaux Comités Département de Développement, peut certainement être accrue et professionnalisée par le recours systématique à des commissions techniques ad-hoc performantes.
  6. Un dispositif d'appui-conseil original, adapté et que se sont appropriés les OP: les CSG. Le dispositif de mise en place de CSG a montré qu'il était porteur, pour autant qu'il puisse s'adresser à des OP structurées et déjà bénéficiaires de sous-projets productifs. L'intensification de ce dispositif dans le cadre d'un autre Projet doit être envisagé sérieusement.
  7. LE PRBC: un mécanisme à pérenniser en adoptant des mesures prudentielles. en s'assurant au préalable que les destinataires finaux des travaux de recherche sont bien les OP et que l'aboutissement ne peut être que cette appropriation par les OP qui doit être la partie fondamentale et indispensable du processus. Le budget alloué à l'accompagnement et au suivi des chercheurs ne doit pas atteindre des proportions démesurées au risque de compromettre de manière définitive cette approche pourtant porteuse de résultats. Le rattachement du PRBC au dispositif institutionnel de recherche agricole est indispensable et sa pérennité ne peut être assurée qu'à travers la constitution d'un "Fonds National de Recherche Compétitive Multi-bailleurs" qui fait encore défaut.
  8. La Cellule Permanente: un outil au service des décideurs non suffisamment valorisé. Il est regrettable que les dispositions adéquates n'aient pas été prises par le Gouvernement pour assurer la pérennité des actions structurantes qui s'inscrivent dans la durée telle que la Cellule Permanente qui devrait devenir à terme le pôle de réflexion et d'orientation et de pilotage du secteur.
  9. Un appui aux Services publics peu performant. L'appui et les actions de renforcement de capacité apportés aux services de l'administration ont montré l'absence d'impact réel du fait d'un saupoudrage inefficace. Il conviendrait de porter une attention particulière à ce renforcement des capacités de l'administration à travers d'un Projet spécifique qui ne mélange pas le productif et l'administration.
  10. La nécessité d'une diversification des activités en zone cotonnière. La pérennité des filières coton semble compromise, tant au Tchad qu'ailleurs en Afrique et s'orienter vers une diversification des productions dans une zone ou d'autres

cultures annuelles peuvent avoir leur place doit constituer ne priorité. L'action de la CTRC aurait pu avoir tout son effet si cette faitière avait pu être créée qui aurait donné beaucoup plus de poids et un fond structuré aux producteurs de la région qu'ils soient producteurs de coton, d'arachide ou d'autres spéculations.

11. Un dispositif de suivi évaluation à soigner pour l'avenir. Il est enfin dommage que par manque d'informations concernant l'exploitation courante, tous les avantages économiques des sous-projets n'aient pu être estimés au fur et à mesure de leur mise en exploitation ou l'ont été très approximativement. La conception d'outils simplifiés de suivi de l'exploitation des aménagements riziocoles, des aménagements maraichers, des unités de transformation, des forges etc. auraient du donner de tels résultats exploitables et transposables au bénéfice du Projet. Les quelques analyses faites au cours de la mission sur des échantillons le prouvent de manière incontestable.
12. Une durée minimale de 6 années nécessaire: la contrainte d'un tel type de Projet. Enfin la poursuite d'un tel Projet ou de tout autre Projet similaire qui pourrait suivre, ne peut, au risque de déstabiliser les populations en place, s'inscrire sur une période inférieure à six années pour autant que celle-ci ne soit pas entrecoupée de plusieurs périodes de suspension intérimaires. Il devra par ailleurs s'équiper d'un instrument et de moyens adaptés de suivi évaluation tant au niveau national que régional qui permettront de piloter les activités, de prendre les décisions opportunes et de capitaliser pour l'avenir, ce que n'a malheureusement pas fait le Projet qui s'achève.

## II. PROMOTION D'UNE CROISSANCE SOUTENUE ET DURABLE DE LA PRODUCTION AGRICOLE

### (a) Principales réalisations physiques et financières

#### 1. Réalisations physiques

##### Investissements productifs

Le PSAOP a financé 1,186 sous-projets, repartis comme suit: Bongor (298), Mongo (284), N'Djaména (289), Doba (183), Faya-Largeau (47) et Abéché (85).

**Tableau A.7.1 Sous-projets financés par UIRCGP, par tranche**

	Abéché	Bongor	Doba	Faya	Mongo	N'djamena	Total général
1	53	1	90	13	-	87	244
2	32	99	60	29	-	70	290
3	-	198	33	5	284	132	652
Total general	85	298	183	47	284	289	1,186



**Tableau A.7.2 Sous-projets financés par domaines et par tranche**

Tranche	ANA	ASPA	ASPV	CPSE	CSG	FAD	IFPA	IFPV	IFTC	Total général
1	16	95	51	6	1	2	21	25	27	244
2	9	97	62	7	-	-	14	34	67	290
3	51	146	116	20	9	15	54	66	175	652
Total general	76	338	229	33	10	17	89	125	269	1,186

**ANA:** Activité Non Agricole **ASPA:** Amélioration du Système de Production Animale **ASPV:** Amélioration du Système de Production Végétale **CPSE:** Conservation et Protection des Sols et de l'Environnement **CSG:** Centre de Services et de Gestion **FAD:** Formation à la Demande **IFPA:** Infrastructure de Production Animale **IFPV:** Infrastructure de Production Végétale **IFTC:** Infrastructure de Transformation et de Commercialisation

### Recherche sur Base Compétitive

#### *Niveau d'exécution du Programme*

Indicateurs de Résultats	Prévisions	Réalisations	Pourcentage
SP approuvés	50	31	62
SP ayant obtenu un financement	25	16	64
SP alloués aux prestataires privés	4	0	0
SP alloués aux institutions publiques	8	15	187
SP alloués aux ONG	4	0	0
Fiches transférées aux OP et adoptees	15	4	27

Les sous projets PRBC ont été mis en œuvre sur la base de contrat de services avec des institutions publiques et privées en équipes de recherche ; les producteurs ont été impliqués à l'identification, l'élaboration et la mise en œuvre des sous projets.

Sur les 31 sous projets sélectionnés 16 sont effectivement financés. Parmi les 16 sous-projets financés, 13 sont ont été exécutés de manière satisfaisante, et les 3 autres sont réorientés. Les 13 sous projets mis en œuvre ont permis de générer 25 fiches techniques transférables aux producteurs.

#### *Impact institutionnel*

Le dispositif compétitif mis en place par le PRBC a développé un esprit de compétition chez les chercheurs avec pour conséquence le développement de la culture de l'excellence scientifique perçue dans la qualité des sous projets sélectionnés (31) et la qualité de la mise en œuvre des sous projets.

En outre, le PRBC a permis de décloisonner les institutions de recherche et de vulgarisation du Tchad, avec 13 équipes de recherche pluridisciplinaires opérationnelles mis en place. Ceci a eu pour conséquence la mise en place d'un réseau dense de partenariat constitué des acteurs de la recherche (chercheurs, ONGs, privés et producteurs). Ce partenariat a brisé la rigidité thématique et les organisations par discipline, généralement moins efficaces.

Enfin le PRBC a contribué à renforcer les capacités opérationnelles des chercheurs en élaboration des projets (31 sous projets sélectionnés sur 63), en rédaction scientifique (2 publications, 25 fiches technico-économiques), en traitement des données (publications et fiches techniques).

En plus, les résultats des sous projets de recherche ont fait l'objet de 2 thèses dont une soutenue et l'autre en instance. 2 mémoires de DEA ont été également soutenues dans le même cadre.

## 2. Réalisations financières

Les subventions au titre des investissements productifs aux organisations de producteurs s'élèvent à 3.667.977.985 FCFA; à cela s'ajoutent la contre-partie des bénéficiaires de 20%. Cet investissement a généré des recettes supplémentaires annuelles évaluées à 1.374.242.868 FCFA.

Pour les SP PRBC les décaissements s'élèvent à 483.778.546 FCFA.

Des ressources supplémentaires, sollicitées à la revue à mi-parcours, n'ont pu être dégagées comme prévu; ces ressources auraient eu pour effet de doubler ces réalisations, au regard de la demande en instance (environ 1.800 requêtes de financement de sous projets non traitées).

### (b) Situation des produits livrés aux bénéficiaires

Le Projet a été très bien accepté par les producteurs. Outre les résultats directs sur la productivité et les revenus des populations bénéficiaires, la mise en œuvre des sous-projets a contribué à la création d'environ 2600 emplois temporaires et /ou saisonniers.

De plus en plus de producteurs font appel à l'appui conseil des prestataires de services dont l'émergence a été dans une large mesure, facilitée par l'avènement du Projet. Les infrastructures construites avec l'aide du projet répondent en général aux préoccupations des bénéficiaires.

La situation des investissements peut être regroupée par grands types:

- Les petits périmètres irrigués sont aménagés pour la riziculture et le maraîchage.
- Le petit élevage: C'est l'activité la plus pratiquée aussi bien par les hommes que par les femmes. L'engouement est réel et cela se traduit par le nombre élevé des sous - projets financés.
- Infrastructures de stockage (magasins) dont la plupart appartiennent aux organisations féminines.

- Unités de transformation: En général, il s'agit des moulins à céréales, la presse à huile, les unités de transformation des fruits et légumes et de fabrication des aliments pour les animaux.
- Protection de l'environnement: Les organisations des producteurs s'intéressent plus souvent aux activités qui génèrent un gain immédiat. C'est pourquoi, le nombre des sous - projets de ce type est faible, comparativement à ceux d'autres domaines.
- Activités non agricoles: ce sont les activités génératrices de revenus en dehors des activités traditionnelles issues de l'agriculture, de l'élevage et de l'environnement. Généralement ces activités intéressent les femmes la demande est restée faible.

En ce qui concerne la Recherche sur Base Compétitive, 25 fiches technico-économiques ont été produites, mais 4 seulement ont été diffusées auprès des utilisateurs, en raison de l'arrivée tardive des résultats.

(c) Résultats enregistrés et niveau de performance

**Tableau A.7.3 Indicateurs clefs du PAD**

Spécifications	Situation de référence	Situation en fin de Projet	Situation Projet
Mil/sorgho (kg/ha)	600	700	1,640
Maïs (kg/ha)	700	900	533
Coton (kg/ha)	700	900	NA
Arachide (kg/ha)	800	900	1,317
Sésame (kg/ha)	NA	NA	500
Haricot (kg/ha)	NA	NA	437
Riz irrigué double campagne (t/ha)	4.0	5	7,069
Riz irrigué en saison de pluies (t/ha)	NA	NA	3,637
Maraîchage (kg/ha) [en général oignon et ails]	NA	NA	13,119
Productivité laitière des vaches (l/vache/jour) - Saison sèche	0.4	2.0	NA
Productivité laitière des vaches (l/vache/jour) - Saison des pluies	3.0	5.0	NA
Taux de mortalité chez les poules (%)	70	50	5%

- Riz irrigué en double campagne: 75 % d'augmentation des rendements (de 4 tonnes/ha à 7 T/ha Pour le riz irrigué, les rendements de 7 T/ha sont une agrégation des résultats des deux campagnes dans l'année (Contre Saison et Saison des pluies). Les résultats de la situation de référence sont ceux obtenus par les producteurs en conditions pluviales et sans production de contre-saison.
- Riz irrigué en saison de pluies: plus de 45% d'augmentation des rendements (de 2 T/ha à 3,637 T/ha); Pour le riz irrigué en saison des pluies sur les périmètres en cours d'aménagement, les appuis préliminaires du projet (planage, construction de digues et

canaux, acquisition d'équipements, formation, etc.) ont permis d'accroître substantiellement le rendement par rapport celui obtenu avant la réalisation de ces travaux.

- Mil/sorgho: Plus de 100% d'augmentation (de 600 kg/ha à 1640 kg/ha) Les rendements élevés s'expliquent par le fait que ces rendements concernent la culture du bérébéré dans l'UIRCGP de Mongo (zone soudanienne) dont les rendements sont plus importants que ceux du mil/sorgho au niveau national (différentes zones agro écologiques).
- L'appui aux OP coton en matière d'investissements productifs n'a pas été réalisé car leurs besoins (à savoir le financement des intrants agricoles) n'est pas pris en compte par le PSAOP; il en est de même pour la productivité de lait de vache, suite à une limitation des sous projets d'élevage aux petits animaux.

La mise en œuvre des sous-projets ont permis aux OP d'améliorer le niveau de leurs revenus.

Le Projet a aussi produit des effets induits tels que:

- Investissement dans la construction des écoles et scolarisation des enfants membres des groupements (cas de groupement Cedra Homme, VSDE et Lagapka)
- Stockage et commercialisation de céréales (ODA2, Tingzou falissou)
- Diversification des activités de certains groupements (Tonaye et Avenir)
- Recours aux services des micro- crédits (épargnes et crédits)

Le PSAOP a apporté son assistance à d'autres Projets:

- Le Volet GCE du projet PROADEL dans le montage et le suivi des micro-projets environnementaux au sein des UIRCGP de Bongor et de Abéché (86 sous projets financés);
- Le Projet AELP dans le montage des sous-projets productifs dans les UIRCGP de N'djaména et de Abéché (14 sous projets financés grâce au partenariat avec le PSAOP).

(d) Leçons retenues en terme de points forts et points faibles

Le sous-projet constitue un outil générateur de revenus pour les producteurs organisés; par ailleurs les résultats et la valeur ajoutée augmentent avec la taille du sous projet, par conséquent avec son montant.

Les points forts:

- les sous projets sont initiés à la demande des communautés qui y participent de diverses manières; l'adhésion des communautés à l'approche CDD s'est avérée très forte;
- le sous projets productifs étant conçue de manière intégrée, la plupart des problèmes potentiels sont anticipés;
- les formations réalisées permettent une maîtrise de la conduite des activités sur le plan technique et d'assurer la gestion des ressources générées; ces deux aspects contribuent à la durabilité du sous projet;
- La Recherche sur Base Compétitive a laissé de nombreux aspects positifs, dont la coopération, la communication entre différents partenaires, et la démarche axée sur les résultats transférables.

Les points faibles:

- un nombre important de sous projet n'a pas atteint le stade d'achèvement;
- le système de suivi-évaluation n'a pas contribué à un pilotage efficace du Projet;
- les retards de paiement des fonds de contrepartie;
- les factures impayées des fournisseurs et des ODPs;
- beaucoup de producteurs étant peu instruits, un suivi régulier permet la consolidation des acquis;
- la durée du Projet étant relativement courte (exacerbée par les suspensions), l'organisation des producteurs à grande échelle (filière, fédération et unions de producteurs) n'a pas été réalisée.

### **III. RENFORCEMENT DES CAPACITES DES SERVICES AGRICOLES**

(a) Résultats enregistrés et niveau de performance

1. Réalizations physiques et niveau de performance

#### **Assistance Technique aux OPs**

- Disponibilité des opérateurs de proximité formés dans toutes les régions du pays;
- Fonctionnalité de la Cellule Permanente en terme de banque de données sur le secteur rural
- Existence des locaux pour 10 centres de services et de gestion;
- Deux radios communautaires à Kélo et Gounou-Gaya émettent sur un rayon d'environ 60 Km ;
- faîtières des OP opérationnelle sur l'ensemble du territoire national;

## **Appui à la Réforme de la filière Coton**

- La mise en œuvre de l'audit technique et financier de la Coton Tchad en cours;
- Les activités menées par la CTRC faciliteront l'émergence des coopératives des cotonculteurs en vue de leur participation à la privatisation de la Coton Tchad.

Au niveau des Ministères Techniques:

- Ministère de l'Agriculture: les agents de la DEPP sont capables d'élaborer des plans et budgets du Ministère et il existe une base de données documentaire utile sur le développement rural et des annuaires (statistiques et SIM);
- Ministère de l'environnement: existence de la base de données environnementales et renforcement des capacités des agents dans l'élaboration des plans et budgets du Ministère ;
- Ministère de l'Elevage: existence d'une base de données; capacité des structures de suivi-évaluation des délégations régionales renforcées; et participation à la mise en œuvre du RGEA et du PNDE.

### 2. Réalisations financières

Au niveau de cette composante, il a été décaissé au total y compris la contribution de l'Etat d'un montant de 2.6669.641.919 FCFA.

#### (b) Leçons retenues

L'appui du Projet d'appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations des Producteurs (PSAOP en terme de renforcement des capacités des OP et autres partenaires a été fortement apprécié. Cet appui a permis non seulement de rendre opérationnels certaines structures, mais également d'assurer leur visibilité sur le territoire national. Cependant, le PSAOP a dispersé ses faibles ressources compte tenu de la multiplicité des appuis prévus.

## **IV. APPUI A LA GESTION DU PROJET**

### (a) Principales réalisations

#### 1. Réalisations physiques

Cette composante comprend deux volets: (i) l'administration et (ii) le suivi-évaluation.

Les réalisations concernent: (i) la réhabilitation des locaux des Unités du Projet et de ses composantes; (ii) leur équipement en moyens roulants, matériels informatiques et mobiliers de bureau; (iii) la réalisation d'études, des services de consultants et d'audits; (iv) la formation des personnels et des partenaires; (v) les prestations diverses et le fonctionnement des structures et des partenaires.

La mise en œuvre du suivi-évaluation du PSAOP est organisée dans un cadre général constitué de:

- au niveau national, de la cellule de suivi-évaluation est dirigée par un Responsable national de suivi-évaluation (RNSE) appuyé par une responsable du Volet Genre;
- au niveau inter-régional, des responsables inter-régionaux de suivi-évaluation;
- les Opérateurs de Proximités assurent la collecte des informations sur les sous- projets en production;
- au niveau départemental, des Comités Départementaux de Sélection (CDS), constituent le niveau de collecte des données primaires pour alimenter les bases de données inter-régionales et nationales.

Ce dispositif a été réduit suite aux recommandations de la revue à mi-parcours.

Les Comptes Spéciaux A et B ont été reconstitués d'une manière satisfaisante (au moins 1 DRF/CS/mois).

Indicateurs intermédiaires	Situation Projet au 31/03/09
Durée de la période (mois)	55
Nb total de DRF correspondant	101
Moyenne mensuelle correspondante	1,85

Les rapports d'audit ont été préparés dans les délais prescrits.

Indicateurs intermédiaires	Date limite prévisionnelle	Date de dépôt effectif du rapport	Situation cumulée au 31/03/09
Exercice 2004	30/06/05	20/06/05	6 rapports disponibles, Un rapport attendu
1 <sup>er</sup> semestre 2005	31/12/05	30/12/05	
2 <sup>ème</sup> semestre 2005	30/06/06	30/06/06	
1 <sup>er</sup> semestre 2006	31/12/06	16/11/06	
2 <sup>ème</sup> semestre 2006	30/06/07	04/06/07	
1 <sup>er</sup> et 2 <sup>ème</sup> semestre 2007	30/06/08	31/12/08	
1 <sup>er</sup> et 2 <sup>ème</sup> semestre 2008	30/06/09	-----	

## 2. Réalisations financières

Au niveau de la composante 3, les décaissements y compris ceux de l'Etat s'élèvent à 6.042.464.320 FCFA; ceci s'explique par la sous estimation des appuis divers et des frais de fonctionnement de nombreux partenaires, et à l'assistance technique aux organisations de producteurs dans toutes les régions (CDS, comités adhoc, APD en aménagement, etc).

### (a) Leçons retenues

Le déroulement des activités du Projet, entrecoupé de trois périodes de suspension entre 2005 et 2007 présente de nombreux aspects positifs.

Le Projet a fonctionné avec des équipes légères, mais la multiplicité des appuis prévus ont sérieusement alourdi le dispositif, et créé des tensions permanentes de trésorerie.

La présence de spécialistes dans certains domaines (aménagement hydro-agricole, aviculture, etc) faciliterait l'élaboration de référentiels techniques et la vulgarisation de normes techniques adaptées.

## **V. PERFORMANCE DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE ET DU GOUVERNEMENT DU TCHAD**

### **Banque Mondiale**

Les missions d'appui et les revues ont été régulièrement tenues; toutefois les effets négatifs liées aux suspensions (perte de 13 mois sur la durée d'exécution), aux ajustements financiers sur à la dépréciation du dollar, et aux problèmes de trésorerie du Projet n'ont pas trouvé des solutions à temps.

### **Gouvernement**

L'Accord de Crédit stipule qu'une avance initiale de 90 millions de FCFA sur la contrepartie est déposée, et relevée à ce seuil dès que le montant descend à 45 millions FCFA; cette disposition n'a pas été respectée; il y a eu de surcroit de longs mois d'arriérés de salaires du personnel fonctionnaire détaché au Projet.



## **Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders**

(none)

## Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents

Project Appraisal Document, November 11, 2003 (Report Number 24104-CD)

Development Credit Agreement; December 22, 2003 (Credit Number 3837-CD)

Mid-Term Report (aide-mémoire), September 2007

Project Implementation Support Reports (8 reports 2003-2008)

ISR mission aide-mémoires 2005-2008

Audit reports and auditors' management letters 2004-2007

Government of Chad: Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper 2003-2007

Gouvernement du Tchad: *Document de Stratégie de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté: SNRP II: 2008-2011, Avril 2008*

Gouvernement du Tchad: *Etude d'Evaluation des Resultats et Impacts du Projet d'Appui aux Services Agricoles et aux Organisations de Producteurs, May 2009.*  
(Government ICR Report)

Country Assistance Strategy, World Bank reports for 2003-2007 and 2008-2011

PSAOP Manuals:

- *Manuel d'Execution, Octobre 2003;*
- *Gestion de sous-projets de recherche sur base competitive, Octobre 2003;*
- *Manuel de suivi du secteur rural, Juin 2003;*
- *Gestion des sous-projets productifs, Octobre 2003*
- *Manuel de suivi-evaluation du projet PSAOP, Juin 2003.*

Study reports:

- Evaluation du Mécanisme de Suivi de la Réunion Sectorielle sur le Développement Rural (Government de Tchad/ Cellule Permanante)

## **Annex 10: Summary of Training, Workshops, and Meetings Organized by PSAOP**


The main capacity building efforts of ASPOP focused on: (i) strengthening communication capacity of producer organizations; (ii) supporting identification and formulation of subprojects by local service providers; (iii) supporting the review and selection of subprojects by approval committees in the regions; and (d) training members of producer organizations and their contracting partners.

According to the records of the project M&E unit, training, workshops, and meetings organized by the project included the following:

- Gestion Administrative, financière et comptable des sous – projets aux OP qui ont bénéficiées des SPP ;
- Capture des oiseaux granivores par l'utilisation du filet Hadjaraye ;
- 51 CDS (3 personnes par CDS) formés sur l'élaboration et l'approbation des sous - projets;
- Formation de 20 membres d'OP en techniques apicoles dans l'UIRCGP de N'djaména ;
- Formation de 23 membres des OP féminine en techniques de transformation de conservation des légumes et fruits dans l'UIRCGP de N'djaména ;
- Formation de 23 membres des OP féminine en techniques de transformation de poisson séché salé dans l'UIRCGP de N'djaména ;
- Formation de 63 femmes en technique de transformation des produits locaux en farine enrichie pour la préparation de la bouillie dans l'UIRCGP de N'djaména ;
- 51 CDS et 21 ODP ont été Formées sur l'évaluation de l'impact environnemental d'un sous- projet et sur l'approche genre en raison de 3 personnes par CDS et une personne par ODP ;
- 11 animateurs radio dont deux femmes sont formés en techniques d'animation ;
- 2 techniciens radios sont formés sur l'utilisation des équipements de radio ;
- 51 ateliers de mise en place des CDS ont été organisées ;
- 8 sessions d'approbation et de sélection des SPP par CDS ont été organisées ;
- Un atelier de formation des chercheurs sur l'analyse, le traitement des données a été organisé ;
- Un atelier sur la publication scientifique organisée au niveau du PRBC à l'intention des chercheurs ;
- Un atelier des Evaluateurs anonyme du PRBC a été organisé ;

- 5 ateliers pour l’approbation des programmes techniques et budgets annuels du Comité Directeur PRBC tenus ;
- Un atelier de présentation de l’état d’avancement des sous projets de recherche organisé ;
- Un atelier national des vétérinaires et autre partenaires du secteur pour l’amélioration et le développement de l’élevage au Tchad organisé ;
- Le document stratégique du plan national d’élevage est élaboré et validé;
- 5 Réunion du Comité Technique de Suivi (CTS) organisées pour l’approbation des Programmes Techniques et Budgets annuels du Projet ;
- Une réunion du Comité ad hoc s’est tenue dans chaque UIRCGP pour examiner les SPP transmis par les ODP ;
- Un atelier de validation des guides d’analyse, d’approbation et de montage des SPP organisé ;
- Un atelier de formation des ODP sur le montage et l’analyse des SPP réalisé dans chaque UIRCGP ;
- Un atelier de formation des CDS sur l’analyse, l’approbation des SPP organisé dans chaque UIRCGP ;
- Un atelier de mise en place d’une faîtière des OP organisé ;
- 18 ateliers régionaux pour la mise en place des représentants des OP au niveau régional organisés ;
- Une formation en suivi évaluation et en informatique a été organisée au profit des agents de la Direction des Etudes, des Programmes et des Projets du Ministère de l’Agriculture ;
- Une étude documentaire sur le Développement rural réalisée ;
- Une étude sur la situation de référence du projet réalisée ;
- Une étude sur l’évaluation des compétences des opérateurs de proximité réalisée ;
- Une étude sur la petite irrigation a été organisée dans les UIRCGP de N’djaména, Bongor et Doba ;
- Une étude de faisabilité pour la mise en place des Centres de Services et de Gestion réalisée.

# MAP



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# CHAD

- SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
- ⊙ PREFECTURE CAPITALS
- ⊛ NATIONAL CAPITAL
- RIVERS
- MAIN ROADS
- RAILROADS
- PREFECTURE BOUNDARIES
- - - INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES