RESTRICTED FILE COPY Report No. AE-27 This report is for official use only by the Bank Group and specifically authorized organizations or persons. It may not be published, quoted or cited without Bank Group authorization. The Bank Group does not accept responsibility for the accuracy or completeness of the report. INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS OF THE SUDAN (in four volumes) VOLUME III ANNEX 2: THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR June 9, 1972 Eastern Africa Department EQUIVALENTS Cu rrencz 100 Sudanese Piasters = 1 L Sudan 1 Is Sudan (is or Ls) U.S. $2.872 1 U.S. $ 34.8 Piasters Area 1 Feddanr 1.038 acres 1 Bale = 420 lbs. (app-ox) 1 large Kantar 315 lbs. Tons are short tons of 2,000 lbs., unless otherwise stated. THE MISSION This report is based on the findings of a mission which visited the Sudan during November and December, 1971e The mission consisted of the following: Kudlapur G.V Krishna Chief of Mission Shawki Farag General Economist Shankar Acharya Eaonomist - Public Enterprises M. Altaf Hussain Agricultural Economist Donald He Bickers Transportation Economist Robert W. MacDonald Financial Analyst FeD.T. Reid Highway Engineer James M. Kesson (Consultant) Railway Engineer Messrs. Stanley Please (Economic Program Department), A. Sani El Darwish (Industrial Projects Department) and Khalil E. Nougaim (Dsvelopment Finance Companies Department) also joined the mission for brief periods in an advisory capacity. This volume was prepared by Mr. M. Altaf Hussain. THE ECONOMIC DEVELnPMENT AND PROSPECTS OF TRE SUDAN VOLUME III - ANNEX 2 THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR TABLE OF CONTENTS Page No. MAPS I. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMY ..................... 1 II. REVIEW OF PAST PERFORMANCE ................................. 6 III. SECTORAL PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES ........................ 11 IV. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ............................ 22 APPFNDIX - STATISTICAL TABLES ARAB REPUBLIC . SU A OF EGYPT _ / SUDAN I****--- .-*HolNJ.-J 5 -* -International boundaries _-~. River service - j Railway r P. S"on + Airport F N O R T H E R N -Bituminous surfaced roads N j Oongoln - Roads and tracks, all season J Krnnt ./ Roads and trocks, dry season T Roads under construction DARFUIR Provinces ...... Provincial boundaries .................................... O National capitol i *. ® Provincial capitol *d -J On,dr/ O& . * Towns ond villoges 3 RM *- ih Wd Med.n, Ged , D T The h.aa jrie fid,ae -vanp d- -1 - . Jyol Bohr D.A,pl W, > , ,, h, s e,ptar M h \&hARRA/.-\ ,,_ ~lf_ Glol itei'Or,eerdrtJ Aenyheer Voo. D \ A! R F U R N *- ' f 5 R>Dt ,,, ; k , \ J N;n j % ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Ed do'E in , '0 I r > < | ( Kodug z / q . f ut . nJ ~~~~~~Kd.9 CENTRAL . . 1: / AFRICAN ........ REPUBLIC 0 100 200 300 400 R N Kilometers 7_ B A H R E L AZAL P P E R AFRI CAN I L E . /d \ g : .........u-bo.. 5 t A F R I C A jJ< t To\kX ' *. } . 7\> .... . ............................ ....................... .. .... = w ... vJ> \ ~~~~~~~~~~~~K E N Y A JIJNE 1972 IBRD 3933R 25 30~~~~~~~~~~~~~2 35* S U D A N -MILES 25' VEGETATION 1 o 90 2u0 390 4sO 's Desert Semi desert - Low rainfoll savnrnah woodlond - High rainfall suavnnah woodland _ Floodorgino n ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT Montane vegetction i -J Railways - ----- Province. bound.,ies Mif < ; i; E -- International bouJndaries ! . I : . :. .t' a r / @ /~~~~~~\ aria - !RN ers1\ -- - - . 9 a ! ~~~~I / _R,>,,bWS, C HA D j - J II \ t,( < LIBYA ------------- / "XHA,RFOU8-''--,- - IRi I I t 11 Omdur0 pn, I H/ POWd rs~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~K- S S A _ H .AHA ,,> Geneinn a Fahe ° ' - . -F-! 0 Fenr A N / 7- ? \ .' / R os~~~~~~~~~~~~~"edref XEN /~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ nen 0 1\ 1 Sena "'. raclalsb'/ . iZS Foshe r lJhenl ARl/s/wj/ * N: MARCH~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-. 1972,~ IBD 8I ,CS 'V 8 Y~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A' 'I ~~ A ~ A - ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ '1/~1/ - -'-AF .' <~<. // A . &i///'/p~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~7// ~~~~~~~ ~\IAKE N_ REPUBLIC OF ZAIRE N- TI, .......,If.... III,rt4,'IUGANDAKENYA MARCH 1972 lORD 3889 2b- 5' 0'\ -21 3S U D A N20 0 o 20 30 25 AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTS ° 0 2K0LO MFIERS g0 5 0 X Long stople cotton (; Cassava r . r 1i-1 , TO - Co Coffee D Dotes Short stople cotton E Eleucine ARAB REPUBLIC OF EGYPT * Ginning factories Mixed fru M Ntongoes A Oil mills Dom nuts ||||||| sesGround nuts Or P) Pulses W. DiH. ses ame R? Rice > Duro or dukhn S Melon seeds _ tD Cm o T Native tobacco \/ Vegetablest2e` Sugar cone W Wheat 20- Zm3 Camels Somboo X 7 cattle Charcoal jG-j Goats CD Dom fiber WD E Horses F Firewood D Sheep ( T Timber Railways At Rivers Z International boundaries C , W tX N N v~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~v / te Mulukll e .. ,,1<. o l j . ETHIOPIA } [G3 [C3 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~KHARTOUM _ h-sC K,s > G , ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~a Ed D *- D t :..El Obeid A o 5 u ( 20 \.~~~~ C H A D A T T So, N N y r / ,Jno *mdfm[iail11111111 X A R ~ ~ ~ ~ R PULI OF ZAR B L IC , wlf\ 25- -. E T I PI JIJNE 1 972 Bets s eeC E ae11lil Ililyl D E CNTAL AFRICAN/_ -' N ry\ t {t^ (REPURPUBLI OT ZAIE -I\ __~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ _ . 25 ao- 3 JUNE 1972 IBRD 3888R~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~191 I. THE ROLE OF AGRICULTURE IN THE ECONOMY 1. Agriculture dominates the Sudanese economy. The commercial sector is modern, highly organized and well capitalized - particularly in the case of cotton - while traditional farming has changed little with the passage of time. In recent years agriculture's contribution to the gross domestic product has averaged about 40% of the total. About 98% of annual exports, which have averaged Ls 82 million in recent years, originate from the agri- culture sector. In terms of employment, about three-fourths of the country's 15.7 million population are engaged in agriculture; many are farmers while others are nomads living on pastoral or allied agricultural activities. Agriculture also provides raw material for 90% of the local industrial plants. 2. Crops form the bulk of production and there are sizeable livestock and forestry subsectors. Fisheries and poultry are relativelv unimportant. The change in area and production of major crops over the past decade is shown in Table 1. Table 1: AREA AND PRODUCTION OF MAJOR CROPS /1 Crop 1960/61 1965/66 1970/71 1960/61 1965/66 1970/71 -----('000 Feddans) /2 ---- … ('000 M. Tons) ----- Cotton 902 1,050 1,198 124 164 252 Oil Seeds /3 2,070 2,951 3,909 564 784 19122 Cereals 4,131 4,825 6,809 1,334 1,429 2,146 Others 81 62 146 _ Total 6,282 7,838 10,864 2,022 2,377 3,520 /1 For detailed breakdown see Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 72 1 feddan - 1.038 acre. /3 Area of cotton repeated for cotton seed. Cotton, oil seeds, and cereals are the major crops. Gum trees, which mostly grow wild, are also important. The principal exports are cotton, oil seeds, vegetable oils, gum, oil cakes, livestock, hides and skins and, in the years of good harvest, sorghum. Cotton accounts for about 60% of exports and is the government's major source of revenue. Livestock, which contributes about 25% of GDP, provides about 7% of exports, and gum accounts for about 10%. The country is self-sufficient in sorghum, its staple food grain. Wheat, second in importance to sorghum, now accounts for a fifth of food requirements and its consumption is increasing; despite a steady increase in local produc- tion, some imports are required. The other main food imports are sugar, tea, coffee and canned food. Inputs such as fertilizer, pesticides and machinery are also imported. Together, food and inputs account for about one-fifth of total imports. Resource Base 3. The Sudan is a vast country, covering about 2.6 million square km. The country has vast qua,.n!tie! of unused nc,ent:±.aljy irrigable land, sub- stantial areas with a.-'.eqnate ratnfall., a large population of livestock, and some fisher,.es. Of the .:ot:'. area (625 millio-a feddans) about 200 million feddans are suitable for cop and oastorai farmning.. At present, about 80 million feddans are used, vnsy'te7ia.ihally5 as i:ange land. Only about 16 million feddans are cultivat.:ed of xfhich 1I Aul:li:on are sown to crops, and of these nearly four mIl.li-Do fcddane are irrigated. Acditional large areLis hav,e been identified for acreage nxpansion uinde- rainfed cond:itions and i-- rigation. 4. Rainfall. var:Les from about 20 ram annually in the arid northernmost parts of the country to 1,300 ma i.n the hamid south. The total area receivi.ng an average annual raiLnfall be^tween 400 and 800 mm, most of it suitable for rainfed farming, anount:s ':o 60 million feddans; only one-tenth of this area is present i7 cropped and less than one million .eddans of rainfed land bene- fit from a measure of moderTn technology, 5. The Nile system uasses through the Siidan, and provides the source of irrigation and public utility water. The avarilable supply is governed bv the 1959 Water Agreement with the Arab Republic of: Egypt. According to th agreement, the Sudan is ent!tlea to 18.5 nilliard .m 1/ (measured -t Aswan about 22 milliard m3 at Sen2ar, as comparedl with only 4 milliard m before, of the 64 milliard n13 average annual flovy of the N.il.e. The agreemenE alsc prov- ides that Sudan would rece:1v one-hal.f ot any additional availability, such as by reducing the large lo.sses to evaporatior b.c- channelling the southerr. swamlps or baiaking the Yohat. Onlr r 1 7 mi .liard m-b (as measured at Sennar), or about one-half of the 7)reqe'\t enlt:itlement, i.s currenl.:Iy being used. Even the storage capacity oi the eo .iris dam, hui!.t in h066, is only partly utilized, 6. TThe liyestock wealt1t 0 t he Suda.. is esti.mated at 12.3 million cattle, 10A3 millien shseo, 7.2 mi.lliior goats, 2.5 million camels and 0.2 million donke-ys, and about 20 "tillion po'ut ry.tn Herd rnumbers have been largely regulazed by thc avrihabilty of grazing and water. There has been no systematic develo?pmen.: ot i.vest4cV . 7. There are about '3 raillIon feddans of fresh water which have an estimated production 0oteniaY o2 more than 100,)f00 tons of fish annually. Only about one-fifth of this i s currently produced. T'he resource base con- sists of tle rivers themsel.ves, but mainly the darn reservoirs. One-third of the Aswan Dam pond, knc;-,oTn as lake Nub.La1 'provtdes the Sudan with a 2.5 mil- lion feddan fresh water ressurce. 8. In sTn,i the Sudan con be conveniently classified into three agri-- cultural zones. The northe-n one-third of the country is an arid desert where agriculture is only possibl2t on a nArrow strip of irrigated land along 1/ Billion cubic me-trs. - 3 - the Nile and its tributaries. The more humid climate of the southern one- third is suitable for a wide range of tropical crops but poor communications and, in recent years, political unrest have limited agricultural development. The central one-third, lying 10°-15° north of the equator, has been the main area for traditional farming and the center for modern developments in irri- gation and in rainfed mechanized agriculture. 9. This area, where the greatest near-term development potential exists, consists mostly of a vast plain which slopes gently downwards from the south to the north and west. It consists largely of sediments of the Blue Nile and its tributaries, mostly derived from the basic rocks of the Ethiopian High- lands. There is a pronounced swelling and shrinking of the clays during wet- ting and drying. The soils are poor in nutrients, but are physically well suited for irrigation. The fallowing requirement varies, from every few years on the older schemes to none in some of the newer irrigated areas. 10. From the agricultural point of view, transportation is crucial. Port Sudan, the country's only seaport, is 1100 km from the Nile, across country inhabited mostly by nomads. The present network of 4,500 km of rail- way serves primarily the center and eastern areas. Nile river steamers, navigating 3,500 km, are still the most important north-south link. Road transport has so far remained virtually undeveloped. Two grain silos have recently been completed; one at Gedaref has a capacity of 100,000 tons, and the other at Port Sudan has a capacity of 50,000 tons. 11. The manpower resource can be viewed from numerous angles, but two key elements have been seasonal shortages of agricultural labor, which have been met by importing migratory labor, and severe shortfalls in the supply of some categories of trained manpower. A survey of manpower requirements and resources published in 1967 gave the following projection for 1971: an overall shortage of 1,100 degree-level personnel (25% of requirements) and of 4,800 sub-professional personnel (62% of requirements). The shortages are concentrated in technical and scientific professions, including agrioul- turists, engineers, and science teachers. To overcome this shortage, enroll- ment has recently been increased both in the University and below-degree tech- nical institutions. The Pattern of Production 12. Almost all organized economic activity in the Sudan is in the north, with Malakal being a convenient dividing point. The south is largely a subsistence area with substantial (but as yet undeveloped) potential. The Blue Nile Province and the southern portion of Kassala Province--to the south and southeast of Khartoum--form the most highly developed region of the country. Most of the commercial crop production comes from this region. Livestock is relatively more important in the arid western provinces of Kordofan and Darfur, where about half the national herd is found under tra- ditional systems of nomadic or seminomadic management. Acacia trees, the source of gum arabic, grow wild over large areas of semi-desert. 13. The Giezira Scheme -.n its exrensions form the largest single irrig- ation complex. Deve.lopment of the scheme Jegan following completion of the Sennar Dam on the Bluie Nile in 1925. The Scheire now covers nearly 2 million feddans, providing the live:'ihoods of over 77,000 tenant farmers and producing more than 60% of the extral-Ion'-staple cotton., 4% of the wheat, 20% of the groundnuts and 10% of tile sorghum grown in the Sudan. The Gezira Scheme was managed by a cotmmercial com,;,a.ny until 1950, when management and the provisior. of services was taken over ':ry the nationalized Sudan Gezira Board. 14. The second largest irrigation sclheme, at Khashm el Girba, was completed in the 1960s. it draws its water from a dam on the Atbara River. financed by compensation from the UAR for land flooded by the Aswan High ,emn Medium staple cottoln, sugarcane, and g--oundnuts are the principal rotation crops. The scheme now covers about 450,000 feddans, and includes some 30,000 tenants. The suppn:r of water would be a constraint on the further development of the scheme. 15. There are also a number of smaller putmp and gravity schemes which grow long and medium stanle cotton and foodstuffs. All gravity and pumnp schemes where cotton is grown are serviced and managed by government corpora-- tions on a partnership basis. The area under 4rrigation in the Sudan has been expanding at ar average rate of nearly 5% a year. Further expansion and further intensification of cropping on existing schemes has been made posslble by the completion of Stage i of the Roseires Dam. 16. Mechanized rainfec' fanning centers in the Gedaref area of Kassala Province. Development began ir the '1940s with state farms, but private entrepreneurs have been the ;nair. source of expansion since the middle '1950s. The a.rea under mechanized farming has averaged ahout 2 million feddans, of which about one-half -s eronned. 17. Mechanized farming in thu Sudan I.s generally migratory in clharac- ter. The farmer arnd h-is workers lve in tovfnis or tvillages and only camp over- night. on the farm during! the peak c.ultivat-ing ana harvest periods. Low cost extensive farmina methods are used. Farimers rely on cultivating and planting the maximum acreage at minimum cost with modern, tractor-drawn equipment. The official farm size is 1,000- '',500 feddans. The main crop grown on the mech- anized farnms is sorghum cogethe,- with sonme whort-stanle cotton, and sesame. Fewq, if any, farms other than. t1hose in the mechanized farming project follow a rotation and sorghum morocvAltare is a common practice. 18. In aggregate acreage terns, the pattern of crop production can be seen in Table 2. 'rhe nicst marked change In recent years has been expansion of cotton, especially of medium staple, wheat, sugarcane, and certain oilseeds. Despite this, sorghum alone occupias more thAn 4i 0 of the cultivated area com- pared with 13% for cotton, which accoutnts for more than one-fourth of the total. value of agricultural output. Table 2: ACREAGE UNDER CROPS ('000 feddans) Average Five Year Five Year Annual Average Average Rate of Crop Year 1960/61-1964/65 1964/65-1969/70 Growth Cotton (1,044) (1,154) 2.0 Extra Long and Long Staple 726 782 1.4 Medium Staple 57 121 16.2 Short Staple 261 251 -0.8 Cereals Sorghum (Dura) 3,307 3,650 2.0 Millet (Dukhn) 1,118 1,426 5.0 Wheat 65 215 27.0 Maize 73 70 -0.9 Oil Seeds Cotton Seed 1,04101 1,1542 2.0 Groundnuts 652 902 6.7 Sesame 950 1,157 4.0 Castor Seed 14 30 16.5 Sugarcane 20 36 12.5 Others 57 108 13.6 GRAND TOTAL 7,300 8X748 3.7 4.=== 71 Acreage under cotton is repeated. Source: Appendix Table 1. -6- IT. RFVIET; OF 'AST PERFORKANCE 19. There have been subttantial interyear fluctiiationls in production of crops and livestock, clearly infIlienced by weather. In order to take account of changes in output: resuJlt-F-Lg frcom xeather, fni.e vear average data have been usecd to measure output growth. The v.lue of a,,,ricultural producc, at constant 1969 prices, increased by 4.3% per year between 1960/64 and 1965/69. Crops perfonned 1%at-.:er thana livestock, as t:hese 3itbsectors recordefd growths of 4.6% and 3.6%, respectively. l-hi. growth has been influenlced by several factors which are CLs' csussed briei:ly becow. Specific factor3 are discussed in later sections, 20. Phvsical "onstraints. Agricultural labor. transport and upcountry storage have been major constraintls on 5udanese agrirulture. The underlying factor is that output is highl-y seasonal duLe to climate. The main crops in the rainfed and irrigated a:eas are sown and harvested within a short span of time. This peaks demand for labor tihichl is unemployed for several months. Furthermore, the transport o:f produce 'biiat be ceonpleted in a relatively s'hort period before the ensuing rc.:Lnv f.eason, and long haulages from the areas of production, especially ilrboce o:0. rainfed crols, are involved. In such a situation anl efficient transport system and sizeable upcountry storage are needed, but Sudan Railways, which have a virtua.L monopoly of the main tranE- port system, are increasingly becoming .a bottleneck, and upcountry storage is grossly inadequate in most productng areas (see also Volume IV - Annex 3). 21. 0rganlzax.iori Tha organization of aRriclultur^al activity needs to be streamlined. Too many institutions are involved in th-e sector-, and their functions are not clearly drfifne6. Three mini.stries - Agriculture, irrigation, and Livestock Resources - have been directlv res-Pons!ble for this sector, in addition to some others which were indirectly involvred, To these imust bh added the public corporatioxes fno. the administrations and servicing of agri- cult ure. The extent of pulflc participation In thoe sector ;.as increased dur- ing a period when these institutions -Itemsel4zes needed upgrading and consoft- dation. 22. Prior to recent c.hanges, more then a fourtzh of the production schemes, mainly irrigated, -.ere maneag,led Oy public corporations and all land was state-owned. In 196%93 240 privnacc pumn schemes. involving 250,000 feddans and accounting for one-fifth of clhe total ciotton nroduction, were added to the public domain. All irrIfga9_ad cottor. product:Lon was thus placed in public hands. Aiso the bulk of local aind export traee TTas nati.onalized. To meet consequent requirements, agrulest_urai t-ztltions were hurri.edly reorganized so tnat the number of mninistries. instead of being reduced as recommended by an FAO study in 1968, iwas inci:eased to four rby acldIng the Ministry of Coop- eratives and Rural Develooment. 'Some departments rithiin the ministries and six corporations T!ere newly et1-&b1shed -wth inadequate financial backing. 23. Questions relatinr; to re-ponsibi:l9ity, autho-city and coordination are yet to be resolved. Tl,Ž work of the lrnistries concerned -,as, to some extent, suffered owing to changes in executive and technical personnel, espe- cially at senior levels. The recent establishment of coordinating committees at ministerial and technical levels should help in identifying the principal constraints facing the agricultural sector as a whole and in working out sat- isfactory solutions. 24. Investment Policy and Priorities. The major proportion of the in- vestment was directed to projects which were not production oriented or those which, at any rate, were not completed on schedule, such as rural water deve- lopment and the Roseires Dam projects. Moreover, development strategy cen- tered on increasing acreage. During the 1960s, cropped area increased an- nually by 260,000 feddans, of which one-third was irrigated, but the conso- lidation of existing schemes was neglected. In the Khashm El Girba scheme, for example, groundnuts, a third of the rotation, were not planted because not only was the extension service inadequate, but credit and marketing facilities were poor. Similarly, in the Gezira scheme about 0.3 million feddans receive uneven irrigation and therefore register low yields, although these could be readily improved by light land smoothing. A half million acres of irrigated land were sown to sorghum instead of higher value groundnuts. Ginning capacity is also inadequate in this important cotton scheme. 25. The Es Suki project was implemented with inadequate preparation, and the Gamoya scheme was constructed with hardly any preparation; the result in both cases was an avoidable waste of resources. The rural water develop- ment program could have been integrated with other efforts to increase pro- duction of crops, livestock and forestry. Some good projects could have been implemented in the livestock and fisheries subsector, for example, but not enough effort was put into their preparation. 26. Prices. The policy concerning prices of agricultural products has not provided incentives to producers. Under the present cost-sharing arrange- ment, payment for cotton follows a rigid formula, while, at the same time, tenants are free to grow and sell other crops without consideration of charges for land, water and other services. The support scheme for groundnut prices has not worked as was intended, and price relationships for groundnuts and other oilseed have been distorted. The livestock producer's share of whole- sale prices is low, and appears to have further decreased in recent years. The production of short-staple cotton, which could be used by local industry, has been hampered by low prices, leading to the domestic utilization of higher-grade, exportable medium-staple cotton. Price policy in general has been set less by market forces than by official dicta of the Ministries of Supply, Economy and Treasury. 27. Services. The extension organization for all subsectors needs to be strengthened in numbers, skills and mobility. For the crop subsectors, for example, there are only 146 extension agents to help about one million farmers. This is clearly insufficient. Formal extension services for the large livestock subsector do not exist. There are very few positions for forestry, and even those have not all been filled. Agricultural machinery, - 8 - according to official estimates, has only one-fifth of the needed extension staff, due to lack of staff and necessary funds. Services in general, in- cluding the supplv of inputs, have been concentrated on cotton production. 28. Government Expenditures, During the period 1965-69, actual invest- ment in agriculture fell considerably short of the target; only Ls 48 milllort were actually invested as compared wJith the planned figuire of Ls 74 millioT.. This represented an implementation. rate of 64%r which was even lower than the rate of 66% for- the plan as a whol.e. About 40% of the Ls 48 mi.llion was in- vested in projects wyhich were not production oriented or were not completed on schedule, inicluding those mentioned in vara. 24 I.e. rural water develop- ment and the Roseires Dam projects, which absorbed about Ls 20 million. 29. The financial squeeze on public agencies is particularly evident in the current budgets of the Central Government. Eetween 1965/66 and 1970/71, for example, current funds available for agricultural ministries increased very slightly, from Ls 8.6 million to Ls 9.4 willion, while the total budget almost doubled; the relative share of agricultura'. ministries therefore was reduced from 11.67% in 1965/66 to 6.4%' in 1970/71 as shown in Table 3. Table 3: CENTRAIl GOVERNMENT ORDINARY EXPENDITURES (Ls million) 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 19:0/o Total Expenditure 74.3 82.3 86.4 103.7 143.9 146.4 Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 4.4 5.3 6.4 3.9 5.2 4e6 Ministry of Irrigation & Hydro Power 2,8 3.0 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.3 Ministry of Livestock Resources 1.4 1.6 1.2 1.4 1.8 1.5 Total of 3 Ministries 8.6 9.9 8.6 8.8 8.7 9.4 Percentage of Agriculture Ministries to Total Expenditure 11.5 12.0 9.9 8.5 6.0 6.4 Source: Ministry of Treasury and mission calculations. The Current Plan: Priorities and Targets 30. The current Development Plan covers the five years from July 1, 197C' to June 30, 1975. it succeeds the len Year Plan which ended June 30, 1970, and supercedes the recommendations for a Five Year Development Program (1969/ 1973) which had been prepared prior to the change of government in May 1969. The planned public sector investment and share of agriculture sector during the latter five years (1965/1969) of the T'en Year Plan, the Draft Plan (1969/ 1973), and the current Plan (1970/1974) are as fo:.lows: - 9 - Table 4: PUJBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT PROGRAMS (Ls million) 1965/69 1970/74 /1 (Actual) (Current) Total Investment 138 256 Of which Agriculture 48 98 Share of Agriculture (%) 34.7 38.4 71 According to latest revisions up to December 1971. The original figure was Ls 215 million for the public sector and Ls 80 for agriculture. Source: Five-Year Plan, 1970/71-1974/75. 31. Priorities. The Plan's objectives are basically consistent with the resource potential of the country, but the priorities are not well-defined. The extension of irrigation, promotion of mechanized rainfed farming, and exploitation of animal wealth, together with needed supporting services, cons- titute the central theme of development. But the overall investment target is high, and the program is large in relation to both available financial and human resources and to the transport and market capacity for products which can be economically produced in the Sudan. There is a general need to review project priorities and revise financial allocations in order to ensure effi- cient implementation and management through improved formulation and phasing. 32. Targets. The Plan targets for the major crops are not realistic by comparison with past performance. That the growth realized in the last decade was far less than the Plan targets is shown in Table 5. Five-Year averages are used for comparative purposes, and on this basis the difference is quite striking. Table 5: PLAN TARGETS AND PAST PERFORMANCES ('000 tons) Actual Actual Target Percentage Increase 1960/64 1965/69 1974/75 A B C A to B B to C Cotton 148 203 420 37 106 Cereals 1,594 1,676 3,157 5 88 Oilseeds 405 477 901 17 88 Cotton Seed 284 385 730 35 89 Gum 45 48 62 6 29 - 10 - 33. Allocations. The planned investment in agriculture, in particular, is overly optimistic, whether judged in relation to allocations under previous plans or actual investment during its first 18 months of operation. While the proposed total expenditure is 85% higher than the Ls 137 million actually invested in the period 1965-69, the agricultural allocation is even larger, requiring a 104% increase over the previous level. The actual investment in agriculture in 1970/71 is not known yet, but is believed to be much less than projected. Taking all relevant factors into account, the mission esti- mates that investment in agriculture during the Plan could amount to Ls 65 million or about two-thirds of the Plan figure. 34. Prolects. The project portfolio of the Plan is large. Out of a total of 268 items listed in the Plan, 105 are in the agriculture sector. About one-third of the listed items involve an expenditure of Ls 1 million or more. Most of the projects have yet to be prepared in sufficient economic and technical detail as to demonstrate their viability. Progress in certain cases is disappointing. For example, the Es Suki project which encompasses 90,000 feddans is the largest, but not the only, project which, in the open- ing years of the plan, ran into avoidable problems. On the other hand, where project formulation and preparation for its management were carefully made, the results are encouraging. For example, the First Mechanized Farming proj- ect, financed by the IBRD, was successfully completed a year ahead of schedu7e with substantial cost savings and yields close to estimates. This emphasize:- the importance of good project preparation and management. The focus of at-- tention at the present time is the Second Mechanized Farming Project recently approved for IDA financing, and the Rahad Irrigation Project, which would utilize a substantial portion of unallocated Roseires Dam storage capacity. III. SECTORAL PROBLEMS AND POLICY ISSUES 35. Irrigation. To assist in improving the utilization of available irrigation water, the Sudan government organized detailed soil surveys of 3.5 million feddans and reconnaissance surveys of another 3.7 million feddans during the mid-1960s. Four million feddans of potentially irrigable land were identified and detailed proposals were framed for an aggregate two million feddans, at an estimated cost of some US$465 million. About a fifth of these feddans have been brought under irrigation either on the fringes of existing schemes or as new projects, such as Guneid (45,000 feddans), Gamoya (10,000 feddans) and Es Suki (90,000 feddans). The Rahad project is the next irrigation project, to be implemented in two stages. With an area of 300,000 feddans, Phase I would cost some US$80 million (including a foreign exchange component of Ls 55 million), and enable settlement of 15-20,000 families to produce cotton and groundnuts. It is a priority project and has been re- appraised for Bank Group lending. On completion, it will consume approxi- mately 1.5 milliard m3 of water and yet leave between five and six milliard m3 unused for the Sudan's future use. This will suffice to irrigate more than one million feddans at a cost of some US$250 million. A second phase for Rahad has been identified, and there are other possibilities for future projects. 36. The intensity of cropping in irrigated areas represents, to some extent, an alternative claim against the unallocated water resources, but this also involves the entire cultural regime. In the Sudan, irrigation "intensity" is based on the following requirement i.e. 50% intensity means fallow every other year. 37. Intensity has increased from 50% to above 60% over the past decade, hut is still low compared with the possible 80% under the existing climate, soils and crops. It should be noted that the 80% figure represents an average, composed of about 75% for the Gezira (on the basis of present know- ledge of the soils) and 100% on some of the new schemes. 38. The Es Suki project exemplifies the implementation difficulties that have been experienced in the Sudan. When irrigation for the 90,000 feddan area was completed, planting was hurriedly carried out - in certain cases, even before tenants were chosen to look after crops. The supervisory and extension staff were less than half the required number, and they lacked adecuate transportation. Only one-half the cropped area was irrigated due to poor coordination between the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation and the Electricity Corporation. Several canals breached, as they had not been properly tested. Contour studies proved to be inadequate. Administrative decisions on the choice between the conventional crop sharing system and of supposedly more appropriate land and/or water charge systems were not made until the crops were being harvested. The whole effort became an embarrass- ment rather than an achievement. 39. In sum, while a valuable resource of irrigated land has been created with a large public and private investment, it is not being fully utilized. Among the reasons for the poor utilization are: - 12 - a) thie nature of the crop sharing system between government and tenants; b) the low priority given to noncotton crops; and c) the failure to perform agricultural operations on schedule, resulting in wasteful use of water, low cropping intensity, and peaking of demand for labor. 40. Mechanized Farming. The shortage of agricultural labor makes it necessary for the Sudan to go in for some mechanized fanning. Encourage(d by the success of its first project whiclh, on comnletion, will cover 2i5,000 feddans, the government has prepared a second project which involver an area of 420,000 feddans and an investment of $18 million. Essentially a continuation of the first, it will allow a larger farm size, a changed crop rotation, and a higher proportion of fallow. The princiual cron will still be sorghum, with some sesame. Further expansion, however, will depend on the success of efforts to improve thŽ marketing of sorghum and other crops. 41. Marketing and Transport. Marketing constraints impede the expan-- sion of several products, although cotton has been relatively less affected because of public participation in its production, ginning, transport, and export. Before July 1970, &ezira and Khasm el Girba cotton was auctioned by Gezira sales office to 14 private exporting firms. 1/ Until they were nationalized in 1968, private schemes sold their cotton through the Agricultural Bank of Sudan which financed their production. Subsequently, their administration was transferred to the Agrarian Reform Corporatiorn, and cotton marketirng became the responsibility of Gezira. In 1970, a State Cotton Marketing Corporation (SCMC) was established to act as a nonprofit marketing agent for all cotton export. It was recommended by the 1966 IBRD Cezira Review Mission that such an organization should undertake purclhase and ginning of cotton, besides establishing an income stabilization fund. If the SCMC undertakes these functions, as it apparently plans to, it would represent a major reform. 42. The marketing of crops and livestock produced and sold privately is adversely affected by limited holding and bargaining capacity on the part of the producers. Producers in general sell their produce in advance at low prices to secure credit. Cooperative marketing tried in respect of wheat and groundnuts by some of the 53 cooperatives in the Gezira scheme has proved unsuccessful, owing to financial and administrative problems. As there are no organized marketing channels, quality products are not rewarded, and fraudulent practices are all too common. The quality of crops and live- stock sold is, therefore, low. 43. The state of transport is an even more serious constraint. 2/ The capacity and efficiency of railways has fallen behind the growth of freight. All weather roads are few and, because of distances involved, are expensi.v2 1/ For details, see Volume II - Annex 1. 2/ A detailed discussion is included in Volume IV - Annex 3. - 13 - to build and maintain. Seasonal tracks, usable for several months, are hard on vehicles. The type of traffic to be catered for is also less suited to road transport than to railways. W4hile cotton enjoys first claim on railway capacity, movement of other crops and livestock suffers from being assigned lower priority. The record 1967/68 sorghum harvest, for example, should have led to sizeable exports, but only 10% of the surplus was actually ex- ported owing to transportation difficulties. Therefore, foreign exchange earnings amounting to about La 2 million were lost. The irregular and slow railway transportation is a particularly limiting factor for the movement of livestock. Herdsmen, therefore, are obliged to walk their animals to the market, thus slowing movement and causing loss of weight and quality. 44. Lack of upcounty storage for crops in most producing areas, and of holding facilities for livestock, together with seasonality, accentuates the transport and marketing problems. Cotton ginneries have steel sheds for storing the bulk of the normal harvests but other crops have little storage, with the exception of sorghum in the Gedaref region. There is only one silo of 100,000 tons, but even that is not fully used. Locally processed products are stored in factory premises, but those domestically consumed are mainly stored in groundholes. Storage for export crops is also unsatisfactory. To improve this situation, the government ordered in 1971 that all government corporations should build their own storage, but financing was not provided. The Government also established a fattening center for livestock at Soba near Khartoum to regulate the livestock market, but it is not yet known if this center, which caters to more than 25% of Khartoum's requirements, is financially viable. 45. In general, there is a dearth of information on storage and holding requirements for both crops and livestock but it seems clear that transport and market constraints will continue to impede agricultural expansion under the present plan. Except for wheat and sugar, additional production of other major agricultural commodities is intended for export. Sizeable increases are expected for goundnuts, livestock, oil seed cake and sorghum. The railway system is unable to handle efficiently the present agricultural freight of about 800,000 tons and the problem could be even more severe by 1975, when the tonnage is expected to increase to about 1.25 million tons. 46. Pricing and Incentives. The net sale proceeds of cotton, which is the main crop on irrigation schemes and is marketed by the management, are divided among tenants, the government and the corporations according to a formula which gives tenants 48% (compared to 42% before 1966), the government 36% and the corporations 10% with miscellaneous items accounting for the rest. This arrangement is counter-productive because the incentive aspects of returns versus costs are not apparent to the tenant. The tenants are also allowed to grow crops like groundnuts, wheat, sorghum and legumes, whose sales are handled by themselves. These crops are not shared, nor subjected to any charges for land, water and services. The effect of the current arrangement is that: (a) farmers do not always crop all available areas; (b) planting of each crop is not done at the optimum time which, apart from giving poor yields, - 14 - does not optimize labor and water use and reduces the area that can be cropped; and (c) no central product'on and marketing services are availahle for crops other than cotton. Consequently, the production of both cotton and other crops in these areas remains below their potential. For some other products notably groundnuts and livestock, the absence of a price policy has failecd to, provide adequate incentives to producers. 47. Farmers in the Gezira receive only one-fourth or one-fifth of the FOB price of groundnuts compared with a minimum of one-third reparded as desirable by Government and reflected in official price policy. In August, 1970, a minimum price of Ls 19.2 per ton was fixed, but this was later revised after farmers had sold their crops. For 1971, the minimum price was Ls 21 f per ton, but again it was announced after most of the groundnuts had been harvested and partly sold; this procedure also applied to sesame. Table 6: GROUNDNIJT PRICES FOR GFZIRA PPODUlCT (Ls per ton) Producers Price FOB Price Share of in Gezira Port Sudan Farmers (%) 1967/68 16.0 44.6 26.2 1969/70 16,0 84.2 19.0 1971/72 21.0 64.5 32.5 Source: Sudan Gezira Board, Barakat. 48. The minimum price of groundnuts is intended to be a floor price, but in practice it has often turned out to be the ceiling price. The price of cotton seed is fixed at a low level and quantity is rationed to spread it over the excessive local capacity, since the crushing mills are operating at about two-thirds of capacity. Moreover, since cottonseed oil price is also fixed - but those of other oils are not - groundnuts and sesame are crushed for domestic consumption in preference to cottonseed. As a result, exports of groundnuts and sesame were 25,000 tons less in 1970 than in 1969, even though production was 244,000 tons higher. Groundnut acreage declined in 1971 according to preliminary figures, and it is important to examine thoroughly the extent to which this was in response to low prices. On the other hand the area under sesame did not decrease because of good rainfall and the fact that price has a lower influence on the output of sesame, since some of it is locally consumed. 49. There are no minimum prices for livestock and the producers' prices are low, as indicated in Table 7. In particular, producers' share of sheep wholesale prices were markedly lower in 1970 than in the middle of the 1960s. Retail prices are fixed for meat but are not related to quality nor strictlv policed. The animals offered for meat are therefore of low quality and generally small in numbers. - 15 - Table 7: LIVESTOCK PRICES (Ls per head) A. Sheep Prices Producers' Prices Wholesale Price Producers' at Nyala at Omdurman Share 1962 2.7 5.2 51 1966 3.5 4.9 71 1969 2.2 5.3 41 1970 1.8 5.2 34 Average 2.5 5.1 49 B. Cattle Prices 1962 9.0 17.9 50 1966 9.8 19.4 50 1969 12.0 23.2 51 1970 12.1 26.4 45 Average 10.7 21.7 49 Source: Unpublished Dissertation, University of Khartoum. 50. In the past, the Government fixed low prices for short staple cotton, inhibiting its production and forcing the local textile industry to use exportable mfdium staple. In 1971, therefore, the Government increased the price of short staple cotton from Ls 44 to Ls 48 per ton, which stimulated large increases in planting and harvesting. This increase, besides providing short staple cotton for domestic consumption, will also release more valuable medium staple cotton for export. 51. Livestock. The nature of the livestock resource makes it suscep- tible to "vicious cycles" caused by the interaction of pricing and natural conditions. Available pasture and fodder cannot support more than a certain number of stock, and if animals are withheld from the market, the result is overgrazing and the disappearance of certain grasses. Malnutrition and reduced productivity follow leading to more migration in search of food, but also increasing exposure to pests and diseases. Controlled breeding becomes impossible and application of improved technology difficult. 52. Successive governments have explored various methods of developing the livestock industry, and several studies have been commissioned. Two separate but related preinvestment studies were undertaken of the livestock sector -- the first under Yugoslav technical assistance in 1964, and the second financed by USAID in 1965. Both studies recommended the establishment - 16 - of an export-oriented meat industry. A private U.S. export firm offered to develop a beef export industry and an FAO study, made at the Government's request in 1967, also confirmed the feasibility of establishing a dairv and meat industry. The African Development Bank (ADB) and the British Overseas Development Ministry (ODM) were also active in the livestock field during the late 1960s. The ADB supported a small but essential aninal health improvement project, and the ODM made certain "practical suggestions" but no financial assistance was provided. A meat export study sponsored by the Kuwait Development Fund has recently been completed by consultants. It envisages the export of meat and live animals initially to Middle East countries and later to European and other markets. Although feasible live- stock projects have been identified many times, no significant development has taken place owing to the lack of a prompt follow-up. 53. Fisheries. Fresh water fish has strong local demand which is re- flected by prices two to three times higher than those of beef. The demand has not been met to date, for want of a suitable organization to undertake production, transportation and distribution. A project with FAO assistance is now being prepared to increase production initially for the local market from Lake Nubia (the one-third of the Aswan dam pond which lies in the Sudan). A similar project in Lake Nasser, (the portion of the dam pond which is located in Egypt), aimed at producing 25,000 tons of fish annually, is being implemented. The importance of this resource can also be judged from the very low fish consumption in the Sudan, which is about 1.3 kg. per head annually as compared with the world average of more than 10 kg. 54. Public Sector Organization. The number of institutions which are responsible for overseeing agriculture is too great to permit the optimum use of the limited technical skills, especially at the middle and lower levels where these are particularly deficient. Some of the present arrange- ments result in duplication of effort and tend to cause departmental fric- tions. In particular, the agricultural functions of the Ministry of Coopera- tion and Rural Development conflict with those of the Ministry of Agriculture. The responsibilities of the Public Agricultural Production Corporation and the Agrarian Reforms Corporation also overlap to a considerable extent. The result of the lack of clearly defined responsibility among the agencies con- cerned was illustrated by the Es Suki project (paragraph 38). 55. The key agricultural institutions do not have the financial and administrative autonomy they need. At present all corporations are, in theory, autonomous but, in practice, with the exception of Gezira scheme, they have neither the financial resources (and the freedom to use it if they did) nor even the choice of their staff. In most cases, the staff is seconded by the Ministries and the corporations do not enjoy the freedor to recruit their own staff and to pursue personnel policies which will maximize incentives. In order to improve overall coordination between the Ministries and corporations - particularly with regard to new investment decisions - the mission recommends that a project committee headed by the Ministry of Planning be established with strong representation from the institutions concerned. - 17 - 56. The present staff shortage could be alleviated by flexible policies concerning appointments and reappointment. The decision to reemploy some senior personnel who were retired after the present government came into power has proved useful and should be extended. If the agricultural sector is to develop rapidly, it should get a fair share of qualified Sudanese, and this should be followed by a policy to appoint the right men for the right jobs. In some cases it may be useful to reduce staff. The Ministry of Irrigation, for example, retains a 4,000-man labor force but, with reduced levels of investment, it has not been possible to utilize them in high prior- ity activities. Hence, at times, low priority works have been executed just to keep the force occupied. Some of the problems of the Gamoya and the Es Suki schemes might be attributed to this. 57. Education and Research. It was noted earlier that the organization of extension services for all subsectors is weak in numbers, skills and mobility. This situation has resulted from unavailability of trained manpower and the needed funds. Furthermore, not all of the present staff are profes- sionally qualified. Of the extension staff, the majority have not completed high school. Only a fourth of them have either a university degree in agriculture or any post-high school training. Extension work for livestock has been entrusted to graduates in veterinary science as an additional duty. Only a score of agricultural engineers are professionally qualified. 58. Most of the graduates in agriculture, veterinary science and engineering are produced by the University of Khartoum. Those of a lower level are produced by the Shambat Agricultural Institute. The training of the latter has been adequate, but their number is small in relation to re- quirements. Degree graduates spend 12 years in primary and secondary school, five year in the university of which four years in the Faculty of Agricul- ture. The final year is spent in specialization in one of the eight dis- ciplines including extension, engineering, entomology, and animal production. Sub-professional training (Shambat) used to take two years after high school, but has now been extended to three years. There were no facilities for sub- professional training in veterinary work until 1971, when an institute was established with Dutch technical assistance. Its first 60 trainees should be available by the end of 1974. 59. Measures are now being taken to improve the availability of staff at different levels. The University of Khartoum, for example, has increased its enrollment to produce more than 200 graduates annually by 1975 compared with 47 in 1969 and 70 in 1972. Similarly, the output of sub-professionals from the Shambat Institute should increase from 47 graduates in 1972 to 120 in 1973 and, when two additional IBRD financed institutes become fully oper- ational, to 360 by 1977. The dormant provision of the university charter for trainin,g agricultural engineers jointly in the faculties of agriculture and engineering has also been activated. To stimulate interest in the sub- ject, agriculture has been introduced in the high school syllabus. Experi- ence has shown, however, that many candidates do not consider extension work attractive partly because living conditions in rural Sudan are unattractive and also because working conditions are not good; besides a low salary, - 18 - housing and transport are also of a poor quality. For example in the Kashm El Girba project, a large number of field staff are without houses and some live 70 miles away from their place of work. Some transport and eqninment was obtained under USAID assistance in the early sixties, but is inadequate for present needs. 60. Agricultural research both for crops and livestock is well orgac- ized and well staffed, but it is strongly biased towards cotton. There are 130 scientists working at eight different stations but there is too much concentration of staff at headquarters. There would be a clear advantage in devoting greater efforts to crops other than cotton. At present, there are 40 scientists who are engaged in research on livestock. The impact (.f their effort has not been very significant because of the lack of a clear focus. Research should also be decentralized, to some extent. 61. Physical Inputs. The arrangements for the supply of improved seed made by the government corporations are satisfactory only for cotton. Farmers are obliged to make their own arrangements for seeds of other crops, including sorghum, which occupies half the cropped area, and for groundnuts and sesame which, after cotton, are most important in terms of product value and exports. The Gezira scheme management distributed sorghum seed for 200,000 feddans for the first time in 1971. While this program succeeded and is to be expandee. organized production and supply of seed is essential for all areas and for crops. A seed propagation department, created in 1970, is not yet fully operational, but FAO technical assistance has been requested to help strengthen it. 62. The use of fertilizer is far below the required level. No chemical fertilizer is produced in the Sudan and even organic fertilizers produced lo- cally are not used. Chemical fertilizers, mainly urea, have been imported at a level which averaged about 63,500 tons per year, equivalent to 25,500 tons of nitrogen. This is about half of the estimated reauirements. At 2 N (80 lb. of nitrogen) against the recently established optimum 3 N per feddan for cotton, it would cover 700,000 feddans or 60% of cotton area. In theory, all sugarcane, vegetables and most wheat and irrigated sorghum were considered fertilized, but large areas in fact remain unfertilized. 63. The fertilizer distribution system in Government schemes for cotton is satisfactory, but elsewhere it is not. Even in public schemes, noncotton crops are not equally well treated. Corporations handle supply of the fertil- izer in all Government schemes. The Ministry of Agriculture and the Agricul- tural Bank of Sudan (ABS) handle fertilizer in some but not all the non-gov- ernment scheme areas. Prices charged by the ABS, despite the inclusion of supervision costs, appear unnecessarily high. Quantities sold are related to acreage and recommended dose, but not to soil needs which vary greatly. Fertilizer for noncotton crops is often unavailable because of small imports, monopoly handling, and inconvenient access. 64. Plant Protection. The plant protection service has not been fully utilized because it tends to be concentrated on cotton, and is inadequately staffed and financed for extending it to other crops. The organization has - 19 - an adequate number of skilled staff, including some expatriates. Besides a central department in the Ministry of Agriculture, there are technical cells in the major public corporations. Coordination between the department and cells and the Agricultural Research Corporation (ARC) is achieved through a technical committee headed by the director of the ARC and appears to be good. The organization has some equipment and transport including 11 planes and 16 Unimog vehicles. Cotton spraying is performed by contractors who use their own planes and transport. Such contract operations cost about Ls one million in foreign exchange, or nearly one-fourth of the organization's total expend- iture. Since the cost would increase if coverage is extended to other crops, the possible cost economies and foreign exchange savings accruing from pur- chasing or hiring the plane fleet instead of contracting for it should be investigated. 65. For crops other than cotton, funds have been a constraint for the purchase of certain equipment and chemicals. While about Ls 5 per feddan were available for cotton, only Ls 0.05 per feddan was budgeted, on the averape, for other crops. This amount is too small to control locusts, grasshoppers, migratory birds, water h'acinth, and numberous other pests and disease. The importance of cotton to the economy certainly desernes priority treatment, but this should not be at the expense of other crops. With regard to cotton, since it is assmred that it will be protected at anv cost, the sanitary measures, preventive in essence, tend not to be applied stringentlv: for example, field clean-up campaigns become sluggish, cotton stalks are pilfered for domestic use, and cotton seed is allowed to be crushed locally despite poor fumigation coverage. The ginning season of cotton may sometimes be prolonged owing to insufficient ginning capacity. All these factors have increased the incidence of pests, and cotton protection has become more expensive, partly because the price of chemicals and supporting needs has risen (more expensive chemicals are needed) and partly because the number of sprayings has had to be increased, from less than one in 1951 to two in 1961 and more than five in 1971. Insufficient coverage of crops other than cotton has in the past not only caused loss in production of up to 10% of the crops, but has also pertetuated pests and diseases. There would be some advantages in adopting a more balanced approach in the plant protection program through the provision of equipment and funds to enable it to cover all the important crops. 66. Mechanization. Some degree of mechanization of the Sudan's agricul- ture is justified to improve agricultural operations, especially In clay soils which are otherwise difficult to work, and to reduce seasonal labor shortages. The supply of labor is inadequate for harvest needs if the crop is above normal, even though as many as half a million pickers annually migrate to the schemes for cotton harvesting, and many others come for the sorghum harvest Cotton is not mechanically harvested, but is helped by labor released by mechanization of concurrent operations of other crops. Seasonality and in- teryear fluctuations in farm output can be better handled by machines than by human labor, and field haulage by tractor trailers also reduces the con- straint posed by the absence of feeder roads. - 20 - 67. On the other hand, there are limits to the use of machinery in low rainfall areas. Tractor plowing should be controlled to preserve soil texture and reduce erosion. There is also a danger of under-utilization of machinery at present, with a consequent increase in costs. Recent purchases of tractors under bilateral arrangements were on a non-competitive basis. Consequently, the price paid was about a third higher than for similar machinery on the open market. The number of makes and models of tractors has also increased; there are now some 12 different makes and these are mixed and spread in various schemes, making operations difficult and main- tenance expensive. 68. Available machinery is under-utilized partly owing to the season- ality of operations, and also to inadequate servicing and technical support. There is a shortage of agricultural engineers, supervisors, mechanics and operators. The number of agricultural engineers is twelve, but this could be increased if, as provided in the University of Khartoum charter, joint courses by the faculties of agriculture and engineering were initiated. Training of supervisors is possible in the existing facilities in the Uni- versity of Khartoum and Agricultural Institutes. Mechanics could be trained in the national ILO-sponsored vocational, training program which is operation- al in the Sudan, but the program excludes training in agricu'Ltural skills, Operator training schools such as the one in Tozi - expansion of which is being financed by IDA - offer a means of improving the number of operators and the level of their training. These and servicing facilities should be geared to the pace of mechanization. 69. As noted above, the growing use of machinery Is tending to imDrove agricultural operations, overcome labor shortage and help field haulage. About 3,600 tractors and ancillary machinery, including combine harvesters, were procured during 1966-1970. The tractor fleet numbered about 6,000 in late 1971, when an additional 1,000 tractors were ordered for delivery early in 1972. Plowing and ridging of all crops and stalk pulling for most cotton is mechanized in the modern sector. The sowing of cotton and groundnuts is done with machines in the Es Suki scheme, as also for all wheat and half the groundnuts in the Khashm el Girba scheme. The sowing of a part of both these crops is mechanized in the Gezira scheme. Harvesting is mechanized for all wheat and groundnuts in Gezira. Fuller mechanization of various operations is to be pursued, as is being done in respect of sorghum in the Mechanized Farming Project for which IDA has recently made a credit. Mechanical har- vesting of cotton and sesame has not, however, been practical so far. 70. Agricultural Credit. Facilities for credit are poor for livestock and all crops except for cotton in the Government schemes and the Bank Group financed Mechanized Farming project. There are two main sources of credit: individual merchants and the Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS). Merchants lend against advance crop sales at depressed (sheil) prices. Although no in- terest is charged explicitlv, prices paid are low and requirements for early deliveries of crops necessitate early harvestLng, resulting in poor yields and quality. Groundnuts, harvested in West Sudan while still immature, lose up to one-fourth in gross output and 10% in oil content. Quality also suf- fers because farmers tend to deliver an unclean crop. This in turn, serves as a disincentive for production and quality improvement. - 21 - 71. The ABS was established in 1959 and has 11 branches. Its capital amounts to Ls 5 million paid by the Central Bank and Government of Sudan, which was interest free for the first six years and is now 3% a year. In addition, ABS has overdraft facilities up to Ls 2.5 million at 3% a year, without a time limit, from the Ministry of Finance. It can also borrow short-term up to Ls 2 million at 6% against discount bills, and more against crop pledges, from the Bank of Sudan. Nevertheless, owing to financial strin- gency in the above agencies, the funds actually available to ABS are limited. 72. Interest charged by ABS on short-term loans is 7% and for medium- term loans it is 9%. Cooperatives borrow at 7% per year, irrespective of the repayment period. The ABS has concentrated on medium and short-term credits, and long-term lending has been negligible. About 60% of loans have been made to private pump schemes and the rest to cooperatives and individ- uals. Because recoveries have been only about 60%, ABS resources are contin- uously being depleted. Some loans have been written off and some postponed on Government instructions. Further, loans totalling Ls 4 million to private pump schemes were frozen when the schemes were nationalized. Consequently, not only was ABS' capital dissipated but its biggest customers i.e. the pump schemes have been lost; the public sector is ineligible to borrow, according to present regulations. 73. The scale of credit operations has therefore been declining. In 1967/68, there were 956 customers who borrowed Ls 680,000 in short-term loans. During 1969/70, the number fell to 714 and the loan amount to Ls 320,000. While the ABS previously made a modest profit, it has lately incurred losses. It is difficult to see how recoveries can be improved and operations commercialized without a major reorganization. Since most irriga- tion schemes have been nationalized, their management should be required to guarantee repayments of loans to ABS for non cotton crops, as was done in 1971 for groundnut loans in the Gezira scheme. - 22 - IV. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 74. Projects for the future development of the Sudan's agriculture will depend primarily on the availability of financial and staff resources and on improvements in transport and marketing. The financial situation is expected to improve in the wake of standby agreements with the ITE and ex- pected activation of Bank Group operations, and it is reasonable to expect increased support from bilateral sources as well. More finance will not, however, accelerate development unless it is matched by an increase in the implementation capacity of the public sector. A streamlined organization, armed with authority, responsibility and skilled personnel is equally im- portant. Some short-term improvements can be made by employing a few ex- patriates, but real progress can only be achieved by raising the number and capability of Sudanese personnel. A larger intake into the existing educa- tional institutions and the establishment of new ones are therefore needed to increase the availability of trained staff. In the short-term, the public sector capacity could be improved by increased employment of some of the staff who were prematurely retired a few years ago, since they have valua- ble professional background and experience. 75. The labor constraints can be alleviated through a combination of increased mechanization, crop diversification, and a deliberate effort to spread the cropping season. That is, the peak can be reduced to some ex- tent by early p]anting and harvesting of medium staple cotton, sorghum and groundnuts. This is both possible and agronomically desirable. It is en- couraging to note that some of the government agencies are pursuing this and that some progress has already been made. 76. The efficiency of the transport system - particularly the railway - is vital for the success of investments in the agricultural sector. Hence the inability of the Sudan Railways to cope with the growing traffic must be viewed with some concern. The mission has recommended that some steps be taken as soon as possible with a view to improving the railway's operating efficiency (for details see Volume IV - Annex 3). Some improvement will also be achieved with a US$3 million loan recently made to the railways by the African Development Bank. West Germany is also financing the purchase of some diesel locomotives and equipment for railways. The Gedaref-Medani road, the construction of which is to be undertaken by Mainland China, would be a further useful addition. The revised targets of production assume these im- provements in transport capacity. Temporal reallocation of traffic through upcotutry storage would somewhat relieve the transport bottleneck, provided this is in line with demand patterns. This issue is discussed further in Volume IV - Annex 3. 77. Problems of marketing, both domestic and foreign, will need contin- uous attention if they are to be resolved. A more pragmatic price policy needs to be formulated and more systematically applied, and its coverage ex- tended to all important products. The state marketing corporations should be given well defined responsibility, authority and facilities, and should only handle trade in the main products, with others remaining in the private sector. - 23 - 78. The utilization of Roseires dam's storage is of high priority as the large sun1h investment suggests that the returns to incremental investment to utilize stor'd water should be good. The advent of another large new ir- rigation proect will reenphatize the urgent need for the creation of appro- priate institutions. 79. The foregoing considerations indicate that a feasible level of public sector investment in agriculture would be about Ls 65 million, against Ls 98 million nrojected in the Plan. Investment should be directed primarily to conso]idation of developed schemes. New acreage should be developed only where sunk costs are high, e.g. in the Rahad Project; where project prepara- tion is thorouglh, such as in the field of livestock; or where it is justified by demonstrated results, e.g. the Mechanized Farming Project. Input use can be expected to increase, but only slowly owing to constraints in extension services and in distribution. 80. Based on such a level and distribution of investment, the growth of output over the f've years 1970-74 is more likely to be around 6% than the 10.6% planned (this compared with 4.3% realized during the five years to 1970). The livestock subsector could grow at about 5.0-5.5% annually compared with the past level of 3.6%. Assuming that a Ls 65 million public sector investment would be matched with Ls 47 million in private investment, the implied incremental capital:output ratio would be about 2.0, against the optimistic Plan figure of 1.5 and the 3.0 achieved during the 1961-68 period. Better performance would depend on an investment policy, which aims at consolidation of existing schemes, and better project preparation and management. Estimates of realistic growth targets for acreage, output and value of the principal agricultural commodities are presented in Appendix Tables 1, 2 and 3. 81. An increased cropped acreage can be achieved through intensified cultivation of existing schemes and expansion of mechanized farming projects. The Rahad project, which would ultimately add to cropped acreage, will not contribute to an expansion of cultivation before the end of the Plan period in 1975. Guided by past experience in the Sudan, improvement in crop yields is likel.y to he modest, resulting from greater use of inputs in irrigated areas and greater concentration of rainfed agriculture in high rainfall areas. Mechanization should also help improve cultural practices and ease labor constraints. 82. Consequent upon increased production, exports can be expected to rise somewhat from Ls 104 million in 1970 to about Ls 119 million by 1975. This presupposes that transport and marketing problems will be overcome. Growth in output should not only improve foreign exchange earnings, but should help in achieving substantial substitution of wheat and sugar imports, as well as minor savings on imports of rice, canned food and dairy products. Imports of agricultural commodities are likely to be about Ls 17.4 million per annum by 1975 compared with the average Ls 16 million during 1966/70 and the unusually high Ls 21.3 million during 1970. Input imports may increase from Ls 8 million during 1966/70 to more than Ls 10 million in 1975, as their use increases overall. Threfore, the country could have a slightly improved agricultural trade balance at the end of Plan period. - 24 - 83. Critical, to the achievement of a satisfactory growth rate is an improvement in the extension service. This will require the following measures: (a) the introduction of a retraining program for existing, staff; (b) increased erphasis on agricultural engineering in extension training courses; (c) expansion of the newly established institute for suh-professional. training in livestock extension; (d) greater coordination between extension and research, and the creation of specialists to convert research results and other knowledge into an appropriate form for mass distribution; and (e) provision of adequate housing and transtort facilities for all field staff. 84. The mission also recommends the following measures for organiza- tional improvements: (a) The agricultural functions of the Ministry of Cooperation and Rural Development should be transferred back to the Ministry of Agriculture. The Public Agricultural Production Cooperation and Agrarian Reforms Corporation should be merged; (b) all corporations should have their own Boards of Directors; and (c) to improve coordination between ministeries and corporations, a project committee headed by Ministry of Planning with members from interested institutions should be established. 85. The project pipeline appears adequate. The Es Suki project has been financed partly with an Austrian supplier credit. The Northwest Sennar sugar plantation is being developed with public resources; a sugar factory is expected to be financed from suppliers' credit. The execution of the Northern Pump schemes began in 1972 with British aid. IDA has recently ap- proved a credit of $11.2 million for a second Mechanized Farming Project. A livestock development project has been prepared by consultants, and the Government expects that the Kuwait Fund may finance the project. A fisheries project is being prepared with FAO help and will probably be financed bi- laterally. 86. UNDP is active in preinvestment work. Investigations have been in progress for several years into development of about 80,000 feddans of piedmont slopes and lower valleys in the Jabel Marra area with surface and/ or underground irrigation. The focal point is to determine ecologicallv suitable high value crops. This study will be completed by April 1974 and - 25 - may lead to investment requirements. Another project is likely to emerge from studies now in progress on Savannah Belt development with rainfed crops and livestock. This study embraces 40,000 square miles and will be completed by mid-1973. 87. The following additional projects are of high priority and their preparation should be initiated as soon as possible, and, if necessary, with external technical assistance: (a) a project for combined grain and livestock production near Roseires Dam. The growing of feedgrain and grazing of livestock would be under rainfed conditions, and the Roseires Darn would provide irrigation for off-season fodder and water for drinking; (b) the need for upcountry storage is increasingly important in order to reduce waste, regulate freight flow and improve farm gate prices. Both transport and storage capacity are major constraints at present. The need for a study is indicated on the size, location, type and suitability of storage (especially for oilseeds which develop free fattv acids under humid and hot conditions). Arrangements for such a study have been completed. (c) the IBPD Review Mission (1967) had made a recommendation that land smoothing should be undertaken in Gezira. The present Gezira administration is interested in this operation, and a study should be initiated to determine the extent of area involved, type and quality of machinery needed, and the number and skills of staff required; (d) inadequate cotton ginning capacity is detrimental to agricul- tural growth which heavily depends on cotton. Cotton is currently being diversified so that new areas are being planted to medium staple cottons instead of conventional long staple cottons. While the medium staple cotton can be either roller ginned or saw ginned, the long staple cotton is better suited to roller ginning. A study is needed to assess not only capacity but also the type of ginning facil- ities and their most suitable locations; (e) the Sudan spends large sums of foreign exchange on contract- ing aerial spraying of cotton. This expenditure will increase if and when the coverage of sprays is extended to all crops. A study is needed to evaluate the costs and benefits of nurchasing or renting of aeroplanes for spraying instead of contracting these services. APPENDIX STATISTICAL TABLES INDEX Table No. 1 Acreage under Crops 2 Production of Crops 3 Production of Livestock Sub-Sector 4 Value of Agricultural Production at 1969 Prices 5 Main Agricultural Exports: Past and Projected 6 Main Agricultural Imports 7 Utilization of Irrigation Water 8 Mission Assessment of Feasible Investment in Agriculture, 1970/71 - 1974/75 TABLE 1: ACREAGE UNDER CROPS Five Year Five Year Average Average Rate of Rate of Up to And Up to And Annual Annual Including Includirg Irncrease 1970/71 1974/75 4/ Increase Crop Year 1964/65 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 1969/70 in 5 Years (Tentative) (Projected) in 5 Years --------------_______----Thousand Feddans-- -( -----Thousand Feddans------ (%) Cotton 1/ 1,044 1,050 1,158 1,149 1,155 1,258 1,154 2.0 1,198 1,345 3.2 Extra Long and Long Staple 726 748 776 784 775 825 782 1.4 818 875 2.3 Medium Staple 57 56 83 187 139 138 121 16.2 179 190 9.5 Short Staple 261 246 299 178 241 295 251 -0.8 201 280 2.2 Cereals Sorghum (Dura) 3,307 3,200 3,182 4,700 2,823 4,345 3,650 2.0 4,698 4,700 5.2 Millet (Dukhn) 1,118 1,447 1,297 1,452 1,h36 1,499 1,426 5.0 1,731 1,630 2.7 Wheat 65 137 173 213 262 290 215 27.0 294 360 10.8 Maize 73 41 h1 85 67 119 70 -0.9 86 120 11.5 Oil Seeds Cotton Seed 1,044 1,050 1,158 1,149 1,155 1,258 1,154 2.0 1,198 1,345 3.2 Groundnuts 652 935 926 847 719 1,082 902 6.7 903 1,102 4.1 Sesame 950 948 925 1,236 1,320 1,356 1,157 4.0 1,773 1,253 2.4 Castor Seed 14 18 32 33 25 45 30 16.5 35 45 8.5 Sugarcane 20 3/ 30 37 37 37 37 36 12.5 31 50 6.8 Others 2/ 57 32 33 248 98 130 108 13.6 115 205 13.6 GRAND TOTAL 7,300 7,838 7,803 10,000 7,942 10,161 8.71,8 3.7 10,864 10,810 4.3 1/ Extra long staple is poduced in Gezira-Managil, White and Blue Nile pump schemes and Malut Scheme; medium staple is produced in Khashm el Girba, Gunied, Toker, Gash and Zaidab schemes; short staple is produced in Gederef, Nuba and A/Habel areas. 2/ Includes finger millet, rice, pulses and onions, but excludes area unier fruits estimated at 75,000 feddan and a s-imilar area under vegetables. Position of fedder acreage is not clear. 3/ Average for less than five years for harvested area only. Ei Projections assume that full Es Suki and Northern province projects will be cropped. Mechanized farming will add o.8 million acres and subsistenoe areas will grow at 3% a year. Khasm el Girba scheme for groundnuts will be fully used and, in consequence of Sennar Dam modifications, Gezira scheme will add 150,000 feddan of cotton ard groundnuts, partly through intensification and partly replacement of sorghum. Gash Delta will grow castor seeds. Sugar cane areas will be enlarged to meet full requirements of the existing two sugar factories and about 5,000 feddan for a lunning trial of the third sugar factory at Sennar. Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Mission estimates. Table 2: FROLICTTON OF CROPS Five Year Average up to and Rate of 2/ Rate of Including Five Year Increase in 1970/71 Yield- 1974/75 Increase in crop/Year 1964/65 1965/66 1966/61 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 Average Five Years (Tentative) Present Projected (Projected) Five Years -----------------------------------------'000 Tons--------------7--------- 7%) ('000 Tons)- kg/fd--------- ('0 Tons) (% Cotton 148 164 193 195 228 239 203 6.5 252 - - 262 5.3 Extra Long Staples 131 148 167 162 190 197 172 5.6 212 221 230 201 3.1 Medium 5 7 14 27 29 31 22 34.0 35 213 250 48 16.9 Short 12 9 12 6 9 11 9 -6.0 5 40 45 13 7.6 Cereals Sorghum 1,247 1,095 850 1,980 870 1,498 1,258 0.2 1,529 340 360 1,692 6.1 Millet 290 253 252 369 268 384 305 1.0 460 210 210 342 2.3 Wheat 36 69 78 88 128 115 95 21.0 134 450 550 198 15.8 Maize 21 12 11 18 16 36 18 -3.1 23 250 300 36 14.9 Oil Seed Cottonseed Blackl 250 283 319 309 363 376 329 5.6 405 - - 384 3.1 Cottonseed White 34 31 49 57 66 74 55 10.1 67 - - 106 13.6 TOTAL 284 309 361 362 424 443 385 6.3 472 490 5.0 Groundnuts 228 305 314 297 164 408 298 5.5 351 380 430 474 9.7 Sesame 172 160 134 187 151Z 175 162 -1.2 282 150 175 219 6.2 Castor Seed 5 10 19 21 11 23 17 28.0 17 538 680 31 12.8 Others Sugarcane (Stripped) 170 250 710 930 830 750 690 32.0 800 2,000 3,000 1,500 16.8 Gum 145 50 l45 62 46 39 48 1.3 45 - - 50 0.9 Others 32 300 300 62 1/ Assamed seed ratio is 65% for extra long staple, 61% for medium and 68% for short. 1% is loss and the balance is lint. Factors used are 1.91, 1.61 and 2.19 respectively for calculating the quantity of cot tonseed. 2/ Present yields urc derived from recent trends and nct five year averages. Projected cotton yield improved for extra long staple after recent trend. Medium cotton yield increased because relatively more area will be irrigated and less flooded. Moreover, it has a better potential for high yields. For sorghum, groundnuts and sesame the yield levels will remain unchanged for different types of farning; the increase is mainly on account of larger areas to be under irrigatimn or mechanized farming. No change in yield is anticipated for millet. Wheat, maize, and sugarcane are assumed to benefit mainly from technology. Yield of castor seed is in line with recent trends. Source: Ministry of Agriculture and Missicn estimates. TABLE 3: PRODUCTION OF LIVESTOCK SUB-SECTOR Increase in 1/ Population Population Breeding Calving Offtake Production 1965 1970 1975 1965/70 1970/75 Stock Rate Rate 1970 1975 Ti-illion headT Tpecen) (ppercent) t'OOO head) Cattle 9.4 12.3 15.0 5.5 4.0 35.0 45.0 6.o 738 1,050 Sheep 8.9 10.3 11.9 3.0 3.0 30.0 55.0 12.0 1,236 1,428 Goats 6.9 7.2 8.3 1.0 3.0 30.0 55.0 10.0 720 830 Camels 2.0 2.0 2.3 - 3.0 40.0 30.0 5.0 100 115 1/ Offtake is net of additions to population and deaths which were taken as 6% for cattle in 1970 increasing to 7% in 1975; 2% for sheep; 4% for goats and 2% for camels. Calving rate taken as 45% for cows and 55% for sheep and goats. Source: Ministry of Planning, and Mission estimates. TABLE 4: VALUE OF AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AT 1969 PRICES ------------Production------____ Rate of Rate of Average Estimated Increase in Increase in 1960/64 1965/69 1974/75 1969 Prices 1960/64 1965/69 Five Years 1974/75 Five Years ----------Thousand Tons---------- ---L Ton--- i Million (e/) Mi lion Cotton Extra Long Staple 131 172 201 296 38.8 50.9 59.5 Medium 5 22 48 224 1.1 4.9 10.8 Short 12 9 13 202 2.4 1.8 2.6 Sorghum 1,247 1,258 1,692 14 17.5 17.6 23.7 Millet 290 305 342 14 4.1 4.3 4.8 Wheat 36 95 198 35 1.3 3.3 6.9 Maize 21 18 36 16 0.3 0.3 0.6 Cottonseed Black 250 329 384 22 5.5 7.2 8.4 Cottonseed White 34 55 106 20 0.5 1.1 2.1 Groundnuts (in shell) 228 298 474 35 8.0 10.4 16.6 Sesame 172 162 219 65 11.2 10.5 14.2 Castor Seed 5 17 31 60 0.3 1.0 1.9 Sugarcane (at factory) 170 690 1,500 3 0.5 2.1 4.5 Gum 45 48 50 160 7.2 7.7 8.0 Others 17 32 62 30 0.5 1.0 1.9 TOTAL - - - - 99.4 124.4 4.6 166.5 6.o --- Thousand Head--- -L Per Head- Cattle 564 738 1,050 23 13.0 17.0 24.2 Sheep 1,068 1,236 1,428 5 5.3 6.2 7.1 Goats 690 720 830 4 2.8 2.9 3.3 Camels 100 100 115 50 5.0 5.0 5.7 TOTAL - - - 26.1 31.1 3.6 40.3 5.3 All Others 12.5 15.5 4.4 20.7 6.o GRAND TOTAL 138.0 170.0 4.3 227.5 6.o Includes forestry except gum, fisheries and other unspecified goods which is taken at 10% of the total value. This percentage is derived from the 1968 National Accounts of Sudan. FOB for export commodities and wholesale at main markets for others. Source: Mission estimates based on Appendix Table 2. Table 5: MAIN AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS: PAST AND PROJECTED 1975 1966 Projected9/ 1/ 1/ 1967 1968 1969 1970 Unit Value/Ton QuantityL Value - Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity $ I: Value Commodities Cotton All Types 141 34.8 172 440.9 183 51.3 182 51.8 215 63.7 228 - - 58.5 of which ELS 131 32.7 158 38.5 173 48.7 166 48.2 - - 201 760 265 53.3 Medium (Acala) 10 2.1 114 2.4 10 2.6 16 3.6 - - 27 558 192 5.2 Cottonseed Black - - - - - - 21 o.6 17 0.5 27 - - - Cottonseed White 2/ 47 1.3 32 1.0 36 0.9 91 1.7 65 1.6 70 63 22 1.5 Cottonseed Oil 3F 10 1.1 8 o.8 3 0.4 11 0.7 18 1.8 30 230 80 2.4 Groundnuts 4/ 108 7.3 109 6.5 89 5.7 70 5.o 69 5.5 220 184 64 14.1 Groundnut 0il - - - - - - 2 0.1 4 0.1 10 230 80 o.8 Sesame Seed 75 5.6 75 6.5 85 6.6 107 7.2 84 6.5 100 210 73 7.3 Oil Cakes and Meal i/ 160 3.8 163 3.7 137 2.7 126 3.0 250 5.6 310 60 21 6.5 Melon Seed 6 0.2 5 0.1 11 0.2 6 0.3 7 o.4 8 172 60 o.5 Castor Seed 8 o.4 10 0.5 6 0.3 4 0.2 15 0.7 30 170 59 1.8 Gum 55 7.2 51 8.3 50 7.8 49 8.6 47 8.6 50 459 160 8.0 Sorghum (Dura) 79 1.9 -2 - 55 1.1 6 0.1 -2 - 200 60 21 4.2 Cattle ('000 Head) 17 0.5 12 0.3 7 0.2 10 0.3 19 0.7 50 6/ 72* 25* 1.3 Sheep and Iamb ('000 Head) 163 1.3 213 1.7 293 2.3 235 1.8 169 1.6 250 - 23* 8* 2.0 Camels ('000 Head) 7/ 60 48 - 53 - 35 - 30 - 40 158 55 2.2 Hides and Skins 6 1.6 4 1.4 5 1.5 5 1.9 4 1.4 7 860 300 2.1 Minor Agricultural 8/ - 2.0 - 1.5 - 2.1 - 1.5 - 1.9 22 258 90 2.0 Total Agricultural 69.0 73.2 83.1 84.8 100.6 115.2 Non-Agricultural 1.7 1.0 2.5 1.5 3.1 3.5 GRAND TOTAL 70.7 74.2 85.6 8603 103.7 118.7 1/ Quantity in thousand tons unless differently shown and value in Ls million. 2/ Includes white cottonseed of short staple cotton. 3/ Including small quantities of sesame oil up to 1970 and 5,000 tons in 1975. 4/ Including unshelled groundnuts which canprise roughly 10% of total exports. / Cottonseed, groundnuts and sesame. Including live animals and meat. * j __ic -e re i: 7/ Rough estimates and volume included under minor agricultural commodities up to 1970. / Camels, millets, karkaden, pulses, minor forest products. 9/ Main assumptions are: About 314,000 tons of medium and short varieties of cotton will be locally consumed. All black cottonseed and a part of white cottonseed will be crushed and mainly eaten domestically. Local consumption of sorghum, groundnut and sesare will increase by about 3% of the present consumption and thebalance will be exported. Source: Bank of Sudan. 1970 data are preliminary. 1975 figures are mission projections. TABLE 6: MAIN AGRICULTURAL IMPOR TS (Quantity = '000 metric tons: Value = Ls million) Average of 1975 1966 1967 1960 1969 1970 Five Years Projected Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value Agricultural Commodities Tea 12.0 4.1 9.8 3.0 13.3 4.0 10.0 2.2 19.4 4.9 12.9 3.6 14.8 .1 Coffee 1L.0 1.9 11.4 l.-c 15.0 2.1 3.9 0.4 14.4 1.9 11.7 1.6 13.4 1.8 Tobacco 0.4 O.9 0.4 0.7 0.6 0.3 0.4 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.5 0.9 o.6 1.0 Sugar 33.7 2.d 75.6 1.6 160.0 4.2 30.1 2.7 125.3 5.1 105.0 3.3 103.0 4.1 Wheat 27.4 0.3 49.0 1.3 65.6, l.a 32.1 0.7 194.7 4.6 73.8 1.5 144.0 3.6 Wheat Flour .39.4 2.3 123.0 3.5 78.7 2.1 50.6 1.1 24.6 0.7 73.1 2.0 - - Rice 4.7 0.9 6.9 0.5 6.) 0.5 10.0 0.7 11.0 0.6 7.9 0.6 9.5 0.3 Lentils 4.2 0.3 3.4 0.2 2.5 0.2 6.1 0.4 6.5 0.5 4.5 0.3 5.2 0.3 Canned Fruit and Vegetables 11.2 1.3 11.4 1.1 12.2 1.4 14.4 1.3 6.9 1.1 11.2 1.2 12.9 1.4 Dairy Products 1.3 0.3 2.5 0.7 2.0 0.5 3.7 1.0 3.5 0.o 2.7 0.7 3.1 0.8 Sub-total 9 17.2 11 21.3 16.0 17.4 Agricultural Inputs Fertilizers 74.2 2.1 66.4 2.0 39.0 1.0 60.2 1.3 7t.8 1.6 63.5 1.6 79.1 2.0 Insecticides 4.2 1.6 4-.4 1. 6.6 2.0 4.9 1.9 10.2 2.5 6.1 2.0 7.6 2.5 Tractors (number) 657 0.7 633 0.6 2i5 0.3 234 0.3 1,763 1.8 724 0.7 960 0.9 Other Machinery 2.9 1.5 2.1 1.0 2.3 1.2 2.i 1.1 3.1 1.6 2.5 1.3 3.3 1.7 Jute & Sacks - 2.3 - 1.5 17.9! 1.7 20.0 2.6 28.0 3.3 21.9 2.4 29.3 3.2 Sub-total FT 79 7.2 lC7 h 10.3 Total Agricultural 24.6 21.3 23.4 18.6 32.1 24.0 P'.7 1/ The assumptions are that quantity imports of agricultural commodities, except sugar and wheat, will increase by 2.8%/year, same as population. For sugar and wheat, the increase assumed is 5.6% on present consumpticn (imports and domestic production) to allow for increase in per capita consumpticn. However, their increased domestic production will offset imports by 66,000 tons of sugar and 103,000 tons of wheat by 1975. About 4,500 tons of rice will also be substituted. Domestic production of canned food and dairy products will also increase and meet demand arising from per capita consumption. Agricultural inputs are assumed to increase by 4.5% for fertilizer and pesticides - slightly higher rate than that of acreage expansion; and machinery and jute goods by 6% to match with increase in production. For 1975 projection, the prices used for sugar and wheat are Ls 40/ton and Ls 25/ton, respectively. For all others, the prices are derived from "Average of Five Years" column. Source: Department of Statistics, Economic Survey 1969. TABLE 7: UTILIZATION OF IRRIGATION WATER Quantity -------------------------------------Area of Crops Irrigated------------------------------------ / ------Type of Irrigation----- Year Consumed Cotton Wheat Sorghum Groundnuts Pulses Sugarcane Others Total - Gravity Pumps Total- milliardl- -----ou-------------------------------Thosand Feddans--------------------------------------- -----Million Feddan-------- 1966/67 9.83 836 170 419 177 31 30 9 1.172 1.166 470 1.636 i967/68 10.09 873 210 4+19 113 33 34 10 1.692 1.146 506 1.652 1968/69 9.67 833 260 440 93 28 33 12 1.699 1.195 463 1.658 1969/70 11.32 949 290 526 217 26 28 15 2.051 1.462 562 2.024 1970/71 11.65 959 294 652 187 37 29 9 2.167 1.588 539 2.127 / Million cubic meters. Flooded areas excluded. 3 Minor difierences in the totals attributable to incomplete data. Source: Ministry of Irrigation. TABLE 8: MISSION ASSESSMENT OF FEASIBLE INVESTMENT IN AGRICULTURE, 1970/71 - 1974/75 Ls million Rahad Project 17.5 Es-Suki Project 5.0 Mechanized Farming 8.o Gezira Scheme 5.5 Khashm El Girba 0.7 Plant Protection 1.0 Northern Pump Schemes 4.5 Agricultural Extension and Education 2.0 Co-ops Development o.6 Agricultural Credit and Marketing 2.0 Agricultural Research 0.8 Animal Resources 3.0 Rural Water 6.5 Northwest Sennar 1.0 All Others 6.9 TOTAL 65.0 a/ a/ This compares with the revised Plan target of Ls 99.5 million