Adaptive
Social Protection A Case Study
and Disaster Risk of Japan
Management:
G LO BA L FAC I L I T Y F O R DI SA ST E R R E D U C T IO N A N D R E COV E RY
Cover photo: Marumori, Japan—Scene after Typhoon Hagibis that caused widespread destruction across its path, starting from October 6 up until
October 13, 2019. Photo: Moses.Cao/Shutterstock.
Adaptive
Social Protection A Case Study
and Disaster Risk of Japan
Management:
© 2019 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / The World Bank Group
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Table of Contents
Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................... v
Acknowledgements............................................................................................................................................. vi
1. Introduction – Natural Disasters and Social Protection in Japan........................................ 1
2. Legislation, Institutions, and Actors.............................................................................................. 3
Legislation .................................................................................................................................................... 3
Institutional Framework: Key Institutions and Actors Involved in SP and DRM............................................ 6
Inter-Institutional Collaboration................................................................................................................... 8
Capacity Enhancement.................................................................................................................................. 10
3. Mobilizing Financial Resources........................................................................................................ 11
Financing Schemes........................................................................................................................................ 11
Financial Governance.................................................................................................................................... 12
4. Interventions........................................................................................................................................... 13
Social Assistance Program in Normal Circumstances.................................................................................... 13
Post disaster Social Assistance Interventions............................................................................................... 13
Post disaster Social Insurance Interventions................................................................................................ 14
Social Care Services...................................................................................................................................... 15
5. Service Delivery Mechanism.............................................................................................................. 17
Service delivery at the Response Phase........................................................................................................ 17
Service delivery at the Recovery Phase......................................................................................................... 17
Grievance Redress Mechanism...................................................................................................................... 17
Communication and Outreach....................................................................................................................... 17
6. Data and Information System............................................................................................................ 21
Hazard Data................................................................................................................................................... 21
Socioeconomic Data...................................................................................................................................... 21
Damage and Loss Data .................................................................................................................................. 21
MIS (Management Information System)........................................................................................................ 23
iv / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
7. Key Lessons Learned for ASP and DRM Systems in Developing Countries....................... 25
1. Preparedness: Strengthen the ASP system with a comprehensive DRM framework and enhance
the capacity of institutions prior to a disaster....................................................................................... 25
2. Flexibility: Prepare for ad-hoc adaptation (design tweak and new design) of the system responding
to the unique needs of each disaster...................................................................................................... 25
3. Effective and efficient outreach: Provide multiple options for ASP programs, clarify criteria
for eligibility, and identify needs through citizen interfaces................................................................. 26
4. Leadership and collaboration: Ensure strong government leadership, develop well-designed
collaboration mechanisms, and optimize collaboration networks......................................................... 26
5. Continuous learning and improvement: Forge a culture of learning through experience and make
continuous improvements in policies, mechanisms, interventions, and technologies.......................... 27
8. References................................................................................................................................................ 29
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / v
Acronyms
Abbr. Definition
ASP Adaptive Social Protection
CBO Community-Based Organization
CFW Cash for Work
DRM Disaster Risk Management
GIS Geographic Information System
JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency
JNCSW Japan National Council of Social Welfare
KRA Kesennuma Reconstruction Association
MHLW Ministry of Health, Labour, and Welfare
MIS Management Information System
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NPO Nonprofit Organization
SP Social Protection
vi / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Acknowledgements
T
he report was prepared by Yasuhiro Kawasoe, Junior Professional Officer, the Social Protection & Jobs Global Practice
in collaboration with a team at the World Bank Tokyo Disaster Risk Management Hub led by Guillermo A. Siercke,
Disaster Risk Management Specialist, with Yasuko Kusakari, Consultant, World Bank. Inputs were also received
from Yasuhiko Matsuda, Program Leader, and Naho Shibuya, Disaster Risk Management Specialist. The report was
prepared under the overall guidance of Thomas Bowen, Social Protection Specialist, Yuka Makino, Senior Natural Resource
Management Specialist, and Hideki Mori, World Bank Country Manager, Uzbekistan, the Task Team Leaders of the Social Risk
Management and Disaster Risk Management Program.
The team appreciates feedback and advice received from Setsuko Saya, Cabinet Office; Tomoaki Hirai, Ministry of Health,
Labour, and Welfare (MHLW); Yohei Takahashi and Miki Inaoka, Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA); Naoko
Komatsu, Japan Meteorological Agency; and Shouichi Tawaki, Sendai City.
Lastly, the report benefitted from in-depth review and feedback from World Bank colleagues: Jesse Doyle, Young Professional,
Junko Onishi, Senior Social Protection Specialist, Kenichi Nishikawa Chavez, Senior Social Protection Specialist, and Rina
Meutia, Disaster Risk Management Specialist. Editorial services were provided by Patricia M. Carley.
This report could not have been developed without the financial support of the Japan-World Bank Program for Mainstreaming
Disaster Risk Management in Developing Countries, which is financed by the Government of Japan and receives technical
support from the World Bank Tokyo Disaster Risk Management Hub.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 1
1. Introduction—Natural Disasters and Social
Protection in Japan
J
apan has long suffered from intermittent but The general social protection (SP) system in Japan has
devastating natural disasters. Over the years, the been developed in response to people’s needs as they
country has developed a comprehensive disaster risk have changed over time. After World War II, the system’s
management (DRM) system to ensure that disaster main target was protection of the poor. Coupled with
response and recovery are as effective and efficient as Japanese economic growth, the number of the beneficiary
possible. Japan has also created an elaborate system of social assistance (Seikatsu-hogo) has decreased to
to provide social and economic assistance to disaster approx. 0.7% in 1995. At the same time, SP program in
victims, including the most vulnerable. Today, Japan is Japan has been increasingly expanded to target more
a model of how the DRM and Adaptive Social Protection vulnerable groups, including people with disabilities,
(ASP) systems can function in the context of rapid onset children in need, and particularly the elderly, given
disasters, which, though infrequent, often have severe the rapidly aging population and decreasing birthrate.
consequences. After 1995, the rate of Social assistance beneficiaries
Japan is ranked fourth among the 171 countries most increased, where about half of them are elderly (over 65
exposed to natural disasters (Bündnis Entwicklung Hilft years) old as of 2018.
2017). Until the 1950s, such disasters frequently led to As a highly disaster-prone country, Japan has developed
thousands of deaths. Since then, however, the number an elaborate system to provide social and economic
of deaths from these events has decreased markedly assistance to disaster victims. Every time a major disaster
due to the improvement of the country’s DRM system. occurs, effective ways to assist victims are repeatedly
Nevertheless, mega-scale disasters, especially the “Great discussed in the Diet, and laws and institutions are
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster” in 1995 and the continuously being established and revised. Since
“Great East Japan Earthquake” and tsunami in 2011, have experience has demonstrated that vulnerable groups
still resulted in significant damage and loss of life. Given
tend to be more severely affected by natural disasters,
the high probability that a large-scale disaster could
developing post-disaster social assistance for these
occur in the near future, Japan has continuously made
particular households has been an important element of
efforts to further develop disaster risk mitigation and
Japan’s evolving DRM and ASP systems.
preparedness measures, often in response to a specific
disaster for which aspects of the existing systems were While it is considered that disasters likely increase the
found wanting. poverty level, it depends on how well-prepared social
Figure 1 The Record of Natural Disasters in Japan
Source: Cabinet Office. 2015. Disaster Management in Japan
2 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
systems are. Data from the Hanshin and Awaji earthquake and each country or locality has its own unique context;
in 1995 and those from the Great East Japan earthquake an ASP system therefore needs to be adapted to each
and tsunami in 2011 imply a significant difference. The respective situation. Nevertheless, the lessons learned
former shows a continuous increase in the number of from Japan’s response to the disasters that have occurred
beneficiaries of social assistance in Kinki region over there over many decades could be very valuable to other
several years after 1995, while Tohoku region, which are countries, especially those that are similarly disaster-
affected by the Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami, prone. The lessons are summarized here and discussed in
witnessed a stable number of beneficiaries even after the detail in chapter 7.
disaster (see figure 2).
1. Preparedness: Strengthen the ASP system with a com-
While various factors (e.g. economic shock and aging prehensive DRM framework and enhance the capacity
society) would affect the coverage of the program, one of institutions prior to a disaster.
possible reason for the difference in these two disasters
2. Flexibility: Prepare for ad-hoc adaptation (design
in 1995 and 2011 could be the availability and use of
tweak and new design) of the system responding to
social protection systems. In the case of the disaster in
the unique needs of each disaster.
2011, there was a system of emergency (cash and work-
based) assistance as part of regular social protection. In 3. Effective and efficient outreach: Provide multiple
fact, Japan has started developing such social protection options for ASP programs, clarify criteria for eligibility,
systems after the disaster 1995 (See Section 2. Legislation, and identify needs through citizen interfaces.
Institutions, and Actors for more detail). Disaster victims
in 2011 were able to benefit from participation in cash for 4. Leadership and collaboration: Ensure strong govern-
work and other assistance, indicating that well-designed ment leadership, develop well-designed collaboration
assistance shall reduce the impact of shocks and poverty mechanisms, and optimize collaboration networks.
level. 5. Continuous learning and improvement: Forge a culture
Japan’s experiences offer a number of lessons in ways to of learning through experience and make continuous
improvements in policies, mechanisms, interventions,
prepare for and respond to natural disasters using the ASP
and technologies.
system. Clearly, not all disasters are equally devastating,
Figure 2 The Coverage rate (%) of beneficiary-households of the national social assistance program (Seikatsu hogo)
3.0
2.5
2.0
National
1.5
Tohoku region
Kinki region
1.0
0.5
0.0
1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Note: Kinki region includes three prefectures: Osaka, Kyoto, and Hyogo, where Hyogo prefecture is the epicenter and the most-affected area of 1995 Hanshin
and Awaji earthquake. Tohoku region includes six prefectures: Aomiri, Akita, Yamagata, Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima, where the latter three prefectures are
significantly damaged by the 2011 Great East Japan earthquake and tsunami.
Source: National Institute of Population and Social Security Research
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 3
2. Legislation, Institutions, and Actors
A
single comprehensive law with sectoral Health insurance, Pension, Long-term Care Insurance,
regulations is the backbone of the Japanese DRM Employment Insurance, and Compensation insurance.
system. The Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act Social assistance program (Seikatsu-hogo) and social
covers all types of disasters and all phases of the welfare services are required by Livelihood Protection
DRM cycle, with separate regulations for the response and Law and Social Welfare Act summarize, respectively.
recovery phases. This is supported by the Disaster Relief
Act, which structures the institutional arrangements and
defines the triggers for immediate response actions, Constitution of Japan Article 25.
such as in-kind transfers. In addition, several acts, All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum
including those related to financing and interventions standards of wholesome and cultured living.
for the recovery phase, are explicitly dedicated to
In all spheres of life, the State shall use its endeavors
adaptive (emergency) SP programs. Notably, the legal
for the promotion and extension of social welfare and
and regulatory framework for disaster response in Japan
security, and of public health.
has steadily evolved over time through continuous
policy adjustments that reflect specific lessons from past
disasters. A complex and quite comprehensive legal framework
All levels of government, as well as nonprofit organizations provides the policy foundation for Japan’s system of post-
(NPOs) and community-based organizations (CBOs), disaster social protection system (see figure 3). The core
play a critical role in both SP and DRM. Once a disaster of the framework is the Disaster Countermeasures Basic
occurs, the Cabinet Office, which oversees the national Act, which offers the overall structure, including the basic
vision and principle, (for example, the division of roles
DRM program, manages all response activities, including
and responsibilities, including financial responsibilities,
various forms of assistance to disaster victims. All related
across all levels of government and among different
ministries, including the Ministry of Health, Labour,
government bodies), we all as the criteria and
and Welfare (MHLW), which is in charge of regular SP,
procedures for declaring emergencies. Supplementing
work together to assist affected prefectural and local
the Basic Act are roughly 45 separate pieces of additional
governments. Under the Disaster Relief Act (which covers
legislation, each regulating a specific aspect of DRM.
the response phase) and the Act Concerning Support for
These supplementary laws can be grouped according to
Reconstructing the Livelihoods of Disaster Victims (the
the DRM cycle of mitigation, preparedness, response,
recovery phase), prefectural governments are the main
and recovery or by the specific type of disaster, such
implementing entities of emergency social assistance.
as an earthquake, tsunami, volcanic eruption, typhoon,
Local governments collect and manage data on affected landslide, snowstorm, or nuclear accident.
households in order to issue certificates indicating a
claim to further aid. NPOs and CBOs also support the The Disaster Relief Act summarizes the detailed actions
government by utilizing their networks (see box 2). for disaster response. It includes the systems to initiate
search and rescue; in-kind transfers involving shelters,
rugs, food, water, and medical care; and other activities,
Legislation such as debris removal and repair of damaged housing.
The relevant acts for the arrangement of prompt support,
Article 25 of the Constitution of Japan provides the
such as the Fire Service Act, Police Act, and Self-Defense
legal basis of Japanese SP system. On the basis of this
Forces Act, are also utilized for quick and comprehensive
article, the government of Japan identifies four pillars
humanitarian aid activities.
of social protection: 1) Social insurance; 2) Social
assistance; 3) Social welfare; and 4) Public health. There The legislation for the recovery phase relates deeply to
are laws for each Social Insurance programs, including the Adaptive SP system. The Act on Special Financial
4 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Figure 3 Legislative Framework of DRM
Ex ante Ex post
Preparedness/Mitigation Response Recovery/Reconstruction
Framework
Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
Disaster Type Base
Tsunami Countermeasures Act
Volanic Eruption Countermeasures Act
Nuclear Accident Countermeasures Act
Earthquake Countermeasures Act
Support to Victims
River Act
National Financial Arrangement
Acts related to landslides, Flood countermeasures Act Act on Special Financial Support to deal with the
heavy snow, debris flow Designsted Disaster or Extreme Severity
Acts against specific Acts for financial supports for recovery
Response Framework
earhquakes
Disaster Relief Act Instruments for Supporting Victims
Acts for promoting
Acts for instrumental programs (e.g., cash transfers)
countermeasures
Supporting Arrangement
Insurance
Fire Service Act
Acts for insurancess (e.g., earthquake, agriculture)
Police Act
Tax waiver
Self-Defense Forces Act
Acts for tax waivers for victims
Source: Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.
Support to Deal with the Designated Disaster of Extreme with at least 10 specific amendments in the past five
Severity is the trigger for the national government’s years following the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011.
additional subsidized financial support to disaster- For example, amendments in June 2013 authorized
affected local governments. The subsidy rates range from the heads of local governments to use certain private
around 50–90 percent, with the specific rate determined information of residents to prepare a roster of people
by a comparison between the estimated cost of recovery who might require assistance; it also authorized the
and reconstruction and the regular tax revenue for that national and prefectural governments to unilaterally
local government. The respective acts for different
send support materials to affected local governments
types of interventions (for example, those for cash
without their explicit request.
transfers, employment insurance, tax waivers, and so on)
summarize the detail of each instrument, including its The prevailing legal framework and procedure had
trigger, eligibility, and benefit amount. required that affected local governments formally request
In addition to its comprehensiveness, another assistance from higher tiers of government. After the
remarkable feature of Japan’s legal framework for DRM is 2011 earthquake, however, the unprecedented extent
its evolving nature (see figure 4). The Basic Act was first of devastation completely disabled the communication
passed in 1961 after major typhoons caused extensive networks of many local governments, rendering them
damage in the southwestern part of the country in 1959. unable even to send in requests for assistance and thereby
It has been amended several times since then, including slowing the government’s response in some cases.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 5
Figure 4 Evolving Nature of SP- and DRM-Related Legislation in Japan
Background Evolution of Legislation (Summary)
1946 Necessity of swift response, defining the role of 1947
Earthquake national/local governments Disaster Relief Act
1961
Necessity of comprehensive DRM system
(both physical and social) Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
1959
Typhoon
Fire insurance (private) could not cover exceptional 1962
large-scale disasters, necessity of public intervention Act on Special Financial Support to deal with
the Designated Disaster of Extreme Severity
1964 Necessity of a consistent and swift approach
Earthquake to severe disasters 1966
Act on Earthquake Insurance
Discussions: Difficulty in supporting individuals vs 1973
1967
heavier damage to vulnerable people (took 6 years)
Heavy Rains Act on Provision of Disaster Condolence
➞ As condolence grant
Grant (Cash Transfer)
Necessity of institutional arrangements and
1995 Amendment
collaboration after severe disasters
➞ HQs in national and local governments Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
1995
Earthquake Civic movement complaining about the necessity
1999 2004 Amendment
of safety net (first to target by income, but eliminated
by amendment in 2007) Act on Support for Reconstructing
Livelihoods of Disaster Victims
2011 Various lessons, i.e., necessity to support people
Earthquake requiring support for evacuation and a shelter, 2013 Amendment
Tsunami breakdown of local governments Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act
An additional amendment passed in March 2016 the Livelihoods of Disaster Victims, passed in 1999,
augmented the autonomy of local governments, enabling authorized cash transfers to affected households up to a
them to set up their own employment assistance programs maximum of JPY 1 million.1 However, because of concerns
and considerably relaxing the national government’s at the time to the use of public funds to compensate for
regulatory and supervisory authority. These amendments personal property damage, cash transfers for housing
signify Japan’s ability and willingness to continually reconstruction were excluded. The Diet revisited the
adjust and improve its policy framework in response to proposal in 2004 and authorized subsidies of up to JPY
feedback on previous implementation efforts. 2 million2 for housing reconstruction on the grounds that
assistance to ensure that people have stable residences
Before the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, cash to return to after a disaster was essential.
transfers to victims were limited only to condolence grants
for the loss of human lives. After the earthquake, many
victims found themselves ineligible for private insurance
Institutional Framework: Key Institutions
coverage, and funds provided by private donations
and Actors Involved in SP and DRM
proved insufficient. To offer minimum safety nets to Since its establishment in 2001, the Cabinet Office has
affected people, the Act on Support for Reconstructing overseen the formulation of government-wide policies
Approximately US$8,875 at the exchange rate on January 4, 1999 (US$1 = JPY 112.68).
1
Approximately US$18,223 on May 1, 2018 (US$1 = JPY 109.75).
2
6 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
on DRM as well as cross-cutting policy concerns, such Since the passage of the Disaster Countermeasures
as intellectual property, gender equality, and inter- Basic Act, the MHLW has formulated its own Disaster
governmental relations. The Minister of State for Disaster Management Operation Plan that lays out policies on both
Management is mandated to undertake the planning of disaster preparedness and response, including health/
basic disaster management policies on and responses to medical issues and social welfare. The plan suggests that
large-scale disasters and to conduct overall coordination local governments liaise with the Japan National Council
efforts. of Social Welfare (JNCSW), the Japan Red Cross Society,
and other volunteer organizations to support volunteer
As noted, measures specific to SP are the domain of the
activities through the comprehensive registration,
MHLW. The major works of the MHLW include: 1) Setting
training, and coordination of volunteers (MHLW 2017,
a basic framework and standards for the national SP sys-
18). The Japan Pension Service is the main responder for
tem; 2) Financial support to local governments for imple-
social insurance, and the JNCSW is the main source of
menting the programs (the MHLW cover three-quarter of
emergency loans to affected families.
the cost); 3) Audit and advice to the works of prefectures
and municipalities; and 4) support the independence of Although the schemes for DRM and SP are formulated at
beneficiaries (graduation from the program). the national level, local governments (prefectures and
Box 1. Soma City’s Disaster Management Headquarters and Delivery
of Adaptive Social Protection to Affected Households
The Great East Japan Earthquake and consequent devastating tsunami in 2011 took the lives of 458 residents, inundated 40
percent of the farmland with seawater, flattened 1,087 houses, and damaged another approximately 4,500 houses in Soma
City, located in Fukushima Prefecture. Within nine minutes of the earthquake, Mayor Hidekiyo Tachiya had established the
city’s disaster management headquarters and immediately instructed municipal officials to search for and rescue people and
check social welfare facilities to coordinate assistance to vulnerable groups. Within 12 hours of the earthquake, the mayor had
established nine guiding principles for action, including: rescue people as a matter of utmost priority; arrange food and health
care at evacuation sites; confirm the list of survivors and missing people; secure land for temporary housing; arrange for ex
gratia financial support to the affected people; and restore utility services (for example, water and electricity). Within two–three
days of the earthquake, the city had arranged for medical and psychological support from the Japan Medical Assistance Team
and Disaster Medical Assistance Team for evacuees and patients at area hospitals. By two weeks after the disaster, the city had
started construction of inclusive temporary housing for people who lost their homes, with priority for vulnerable groups.
Since the earthquake, Soma City
has developed a disaster victim
database and implemented the
following financial instruments for
the individuals and households
that were affected:
› ex gratia financial assistance
for daily expenses
› financial assistance for
reconstructing livelihoods
› condolence money to
households who had lost family member(s)
› disaster relief loans
› exemptions or extended grace periods for fixed asset tax payments
› partial exemption from the national health insurance payment
› subsidies for temporary housing
› scholarships for children who had become orphaned
Owing to the various legislative frameworks and service delivery infrastructure developed before the earthquake, combined
with the mayor’s excellent leadership and decision making, Soma City effectively responded to the devastating impact of the
earthquake with a focus on saving lives and restoring livelihoods, especially of vulnerable groups.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 7
municipalities) are responsible for acting as a single accordance with the Disaster Relief Act. As this moves to
window to engage in SP as well as disaster planning. the recovery phase, local governments are responsible
In regard to SP, they are required by law to set up a for the management and delivery of SP interventions.
social welfare office, where they implement the SP
Communities also play a key role in both DRM and SP.
programs. As of 2019, such offices are in 207 prefectures
Neighborhood associations, as the traditional community-
and 1,041 municipalities. Prefectural offices audit the
based institutions of Japan, often a play central role in
municipal office, and also implement the program in the
community-based disaster response activities, such as
municipalities without social welfare offices.
management of evacuation sites, facilitation of search
As for Disaster response, prefectural governments (or and rescue, coordination with local governments, and
larger local governments) are tasked with providing preparedness training for these and other activities. In
emergency assistance to victims in the response Japan, many community-level institutions do not operate
phase, once a disaster of a certain magnitude occurs in in isolation but rather form part of a structured network of
Box 2. The Japan National Council of Social Welfare: Nonprofit Sector Supplementing SP Delivery
The Japan National Council of Social Welfare (JNCSW), as well as the affiliated networks of prefectural and municipal councils
that are present in all prefectures and local governments, actively supplement SP delivery by government institutions and
buttress the country’s SP system, both under normal circumstances and in the event of a disaster.
Although the JNCSW receives government subsidies to cover part of its operational costs, it is dependent on those funds for
only 10 percent of its total revenue, most of which comes from the sale of its publications, leasing of space at its headquarters,
and other revenue-generating activities (65 percent). Membership dues and donations make up another 10–20 percent of its
funding.
Disaster response is an area in which the JNCSW’s unique organizational features (its nonprofit status, nationwide reach, and
local presence) become truly potent strengths. The council’s nationwide network can become immediately operational to help
overwhelmed local governments, especially in managing and coordinating an army of volunteers. These people often arrive
spontaneously from outside the affected areas with a strong desire to help but without clear organization and with uneven levels
of experience and skills. The task of managing them technically falls on local governments, but in severe post-disaster situations,
this can be an overwhelming job, which is where the JNCSW steps in. When the response is especially great, the JNCSW may even
be forced to turn away volunteers, though it can also mobilize additional numbers through its network when needed.
For example, with a flood or a landslide, local governments are responsible for clearing debris from such public infrastructure as
roads or public properties but not from private properties. Volunteers can be directed to help local residents clear debris from
their homes and help restore their property. If a sizable disaster leads to the operational disruption of certain welfare facilities,
such as nursing homes, that offer highly complex care, other nearby facilities can be commandeered to provide short-term
accommodations. As these nearby facilities will likely face a temporary staff shortage as a result, the JNCSW is able to dispatch
qualified personnel from elsewhere.
Local residents are sometimes skeptical of outsiders, even those who have come in to help them in a dire disaster situation.
Yet the JNCSW’s regular contacts with local civic and neighborhood associations and volunteers can be useful antidotes to such
local concerns and can help to smooth the relationships between outside volunteers and local groups. For their part, some NPOs,
especially the larger ones, often bristle at being managed by another entity like the JNCSW; here again, the council’s regular
contacts with these groups helps to build relationships and trust that can facilitate effective collaboration in crisis situations.
The JNCSW’s disaster preparedness is not a coincidental byproduct of its regular activities and management, such as regular
contacts and communication with local associations and national NPOs. It is, in fact, a fruit of its conscious efforts and learning
from past experience. Keeping track of vulnerable populations in a given locality through day-to-day contacts is one such effort.
Elderly persons in particular often eschew outside help under normal circumstances but become more open to assistance when
they have been approached beforehand with a “what if” scenario with regard to a possible natural disaster (that is, “yes, we
know you are fine now but what if a disaster were to strike tomorrow?”).
Disaster response also requires the quick mobilization of funds. The JNCSW annually conducts nationwide fundraising through
street donations and allocates 3 percent of its proceeds to a disaster preparation fund in each local council.
8 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
other quasi- or nongovernmental institutions, such as the coordinate response activities among related ministries
JNCSW, which itself plays a critical role in organizing and and organizations (see figure 5).
coordinating these groups. This is a particularly unique
All the information collected, and decisions are coordi-
feature of Japan’s institutional arrangements with regard nated and communicated through these headquarters,
to DRM and SP. which is headed up by the Minister of State for Disaster
Management in the Cabinet Office and obtains staff from
all related ministries. In the event of a particularly cata-
Inter-Institutional Collaboration
strophic disaster, the prime minister can decide to lead
The Japanese government has a coordination mechanism the operations.
among ministries to support prefectural governments
The role of the MHLW is mainly limited to management of
whose areas have been affected by a natural disaster.
the in-kind transfer of goods and the evacuation facilities.
When an extremely large disaster occurs, the capacity Considering the capacity and character of each ministry,
of the prefectural governments is often insufficient for other in-kind assistance, such as water, food, and
robust response interventions. To fulfill this capacity electricity, is managed by the Cabinet Security Affairs
gap, both the national and prefectural governments Office, the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fisheries,
are prepared to establish emergency prefectural (local) and/or the Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry. The
disaster management headquarters with staff from the system and participants are decided according to the
national ministries or other prefectural governments to DRM plan of each government.
Figure 5 Collaboration System for Disaster Response after the Great East Japan Earthquake 2011
Communication
Extreme Disaster Management Headquarters (Cabinet Ministries
Agencies
Staff
Communication
On-Site Headquarters for Extreme Disaster Management
(H): Head
Information
Lifeline (H) Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transport and Tourism
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications
Shelter (H) Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare Prefectural
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology Disaster
Management
In-kind Cabinet Security Affairs Office Headquarters
Water/Food Communication
(H) Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries
Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Fuel Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Others Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare
Rescue Polices, firefighters, self-defense forces
Source: Modified from Cabinet Office (2011, 15) and Cabinet Office (2015, 11–12).
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 9
After the stabilization of the response phase, the role earthquake, in areas where local governments did
of the headquarters is complete, and the government not have an agreement, the existing network among
would establish recovery organizations—the National local governments, called the Japan Association of
Reconstruction Authority at the national level, and City Mayors under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and
recovery units within prefectural governments. The role Communications, facilitated an ex post emergency
of these organizations, however, is not described in agreement (see figure 6).
the DRM plan developed ex-ante. The current National Local governments also have cooperation agreements
Reconstruction Authority was formed after the Great East with private sectors and community-based organizations
Japan Earthquake in 2011 as a temporary organization to to have their supports in case of a disaster. The support
function for 10 years. agreements range from medical relief, a supply of
A mutual support agreement among local governments goods, transportation operations, and information and
communications. For instance, the role of JNCSW is
is the major coordinating mechanism at the local level,
articulated in the Social Welfare Law and a large proportion
as stipulated by the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act.
of its funds derive from the Japanese national government.
Based on these agreements, local governments outside
Building upon advantages of nongovernmental and
the affected area will send staff and goods upon request
governmental institutional arrangements, it contributes
of the governments whose areas have been devastated.
to effectively promoting public-private partnerships.
The Kansai Region Network is one such example of a
mutual support agreement (see box 3). After the 2011
Box 3. Kansai Region Network (The Union of Kansai Governments) and its Disaster Management Plan
The Union of Kansai Governments was established in 2010 to respond to regional administrative issues in the field of DRM,
tourism, culture and sports promotion, industry, medical care, environmental conservation, tests, and licensing. The union
consists of seven prefectures and four local governments in the Kansai region (as of December 2015). Based on lessons learned
from the earthquakes in 1995 and 2011, the Union Disaster Management Plan, which prescribes policy and procedure for large-
scale disasters, was developed. Guidelines for providing and receiving support during disasters were also developed based on
the plan. The guidelines indicate implementation systems and procedures that are to provide and receive support, such as in-
kind assistance and dispatch of support staff.
Figure 6 Collaboration between Local Governments for Supplementing Staff in the Case of Earthquake 2011
<Suportee> Request for
<Suporter>
Ministry of
Claim Suffering local Share claim support
Internal Affairs
governments and
(Prefectural)
Notification Share
Communications
Affected of supporter Apply Local
local governments
governments Coordinate Share Share claim (Municipal)
(Municipal) Apply outside of
devastation
Share claim
Coordinate Major Association Coordinate The Japan
of Suffering Local Association Apply
Governments of City Mayors
Source: Website of the Japan Association of City Mayors, http://www.mayors.or.jp (in Japanese).
10 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Capacity Enhancement natural disaster. Local governments publicize hazard
maps showing risk-sensitive areas and designated
Together with the development of legislative and institu-
evacuation sites. These maps help local governments
tional frameworks, the capacity of each of the relevant
and community members to better visualize the risk
organizations has been broadly and strategically en-
potential, decide on evacuation routes and sites, and
hanced. The laws encourage neighborhood associations
consider a support system for vulnerable people living in
to promote community-level activities by offering some
risk-sensitive areas.
specific examples including emergency drills and disas-
ter management activities. The drills include evacuation The MHLW, which manages the regular social protection
practices with wheelchairs, blindfolds, and so on to help system in Japan, also has its own emergency operations
the participants understand what kind of support SP manual. Representatives of the ministry-level committee
beneficiaries might require in disaster situations. Local for DRM attend the coordinating committee at the
community members and/or staff of the Council of So- Cabinet Office, sharing information within the ministry
cial Welfare know well who from among their community and organizing training programs for staff twice a year.
might require assistance because of their regular com- All of the ministry-level DRM committee members are
munity-based social welfare activities. This contributes required to have cell phones with them at all times and
to the development of successful evacuation plans and to come to the ministry immediately in the event of a
inclusive response activities in the event of a disaster. disaster. Moreover, the manual is to be revised every
The drills for organizations are often implemented fol- year, as necessary, based on feedback from the training
lowing the operation manuals. The Cabinet Office devel- and coordinating meetings.
oped the comprehensive Disaster Recovery Manuals and Even though these manuals have often been developed
suggests that each prefectural and local government de- within each agency or sector individually, they can
velop its own Disaster Recovery Manual to be prepared nevertheless facilitate collaboration among organizations
for quick and smooth response and recovery. Similarly,
in as much as they clarify procedures within each relevant
schools and parts of the private sector also prepare the
agency. Given each agency’s limited capacity to cope with
manual and organize disaster management drills at least
disasters on its own, coordination between national and
once every year. The lessons from such drills and expe-
local governments or networks on plans that were agreed
riences from disaster response activities are utilized to
ex ante ensures that organizations in the devastated areas
update the manuals.
receive the assistance they need. These nationwide and
The manuals often refer the result of disaster risk analysis strategically connected systems enable effective capacity
which summarizes the potential damage from a target development and help to smooth that collaboration.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 11
3. Mobilizing Financial Resources
S
everal types of financing schemes are available reserve fund with municipal bylaws according to the
to enable the Japanese government to respond Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. To prepare for the
to the chronically changing budget needs for long-term recovery, all prefectural governments are
disaster response and recovery. Along with obligated to reserve funds at a public foundation called
common financial programs such as reserve funds, Japan the Prefectural Assembly Hall, as stipulated by the Act
has developed various unique schemes to ensure a cash Concerning Support for Reconstructing the Livelihoods of
flow to damaged areas from the outside. For instance, Disaster Victims.
individuals outside the affected area can support the
pertinent local government by designating a portion There is also an inter-prefectural mutual support
of their taxes to go to the disaster-affected jurisdiction system called ‘Reserve Fund for Cash Transfer’, which
instead of their residential governments. was established after the occurrence of the Hanshin
Awaji Earthquakes in 1995. Since its establishment,
each prefecture has provided funds three times. The
Financing Schemes funding contributions made for each time are as follows:
1) 30 billion yen in 2000; 2) 30 billion yen in 2004; and
Response and recovery often require different needs
3) 88 billion yen in 20113.
of financing, that is, a small amount in the short term
and a comparatively larger amount in the longer term,
respectively. After the 2011 earthquake, the national Reconstruction Bonds and Tax
budget for response and recovery from the disaster was
revised four times in one year, and four new laws were In the event that expenditure for reconstruction cannot be
enacted. The first and second revised budgets focused covered by reserve funds and other budgets, the national
on response, while emergency recovery was covered and/or local government(s) will decide to issue bonds as
through the reserve fund and through reallocations the main revenue for the reconstruction budget. After the
from other budgeted expenditures. At the third revision earthquake in 2011, the national government introduced
of the budget, which was based on a five-year estimate a reconstruction tax an additional percentage to the
of recovery and reconstruction costs, the government existing tax rate of income tax for 25 years, of residential
decided to introduce a reconstruction tax and to issue a tax for 10 years, and of cooperate tax for two years. The
reconstruction bond to supplement the budget until the reconstruction bond by the affected local governments
tax revenue was collected. This combination of financing are common, but has been raised the issue that it may
schemes is now a requirement. The individual schemes have long-term negative impacts on their finance.
used in Japan are outlined below.
Donations (Gienkin) from Individuals
Reserve Funds
A cash relief donation, called Gienkin in Japanese, is
Local governments are responsible for the costs related a common and effective way to raise funds to support
to disaster preparedness and emergency response. For disaster victims. Aid organizations such as the Japan Red
the immediate expenses required for disaster response, Cross Society also assist in the collection of donations.
the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act mandates that People can donate through the Internet, bank deposits,
all prefectural governments reserve the equivalent of and donation boxes at various locations. As of February
0.5 percent of the average amount of annual prefectural 2018, the sum of JPY 381 billion had been donated from
general tax revenues for the past three years as a Disaster across the world to help with recovery efforts for the
Relief Fund. Similarly, local governments must create a 2011 earthquake. The national level Gienkin committee
3 Approximately 1) US$ 278 million, 2) US$278 million, and 3) US 814 million, at the exchange rate on September 15, 2019 (US$1 = JPY 108.09)
12 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
determines the distribution rates to the affected disaster). When the Disaster Relief Act is triggered based,
prefectures, and the prefectural level Gienkin committee the national government covers 50-90% of prefectural
decide to what extent distribute to the affected local government’s expenditure for post-disaster cash transfer
governments. interventions. The rate is determined based on the
number of affected housings at each local government.
Promoting Donations to Local Governments with In the particular case of the Great East Japan Earthquake
Tax Deductions (Furusato Nozei) and tsunami, given the magnitude of the event, some part
of the national government-level budget for response and
Furusato Nozei is a tax deduction given to taxpayers who recovery, including social welfare support for disaster
donate to local governments, and people can donate victims, was managed through the special account
to a local government of their choosing. A part of the for reconstruction, thus assuring the transparency of
donation amount is deducted from their income and expenditures under the country’s Reconstruction Agency.
resident taxes. Generally, once a local government has
received a donation, a certification receipt is generated. Meanwhile, financial governance for the operation of
An online donation system for Furusato Nozei has been the Disaster Relief Act is handled by the prefectural
established by local governments and the private sector. governments. The distribution of food and water to victims
After the more recent Kumamoto earthquake of 2016, can be done by local governments and/or volunteers. In
staff members of approximately 40 local governments this case, the local governments or volunteers can request
across the country outside the affected area used this a reimbursement for these costs, and the prefectural
online system to partially support the administrative government will fulfill these expenditures. In terms of
work that would be needed to process the donations to the expenditure for the supporting staff from outside the
the affected local governments. As a result, in one year, affected areas (see box 3), the affected local governments
donations to the local governments in the areas affect by are basically in charge. Any contribution from the national
the Kumamoto earthquake exceeded JPY 2 billion.4 government is provided based on an application from the
prefectural government.
Financial Governance For emergency cash transfers during the recovery phase,
the Prefectural Assembly Hall manages a fund that has
Before a disaster, the budget for social welfare is mainly been reserved by the prefectural government ex ante (see
spent and managed by both the MHLW and the local Reserve Funds above). When the Act Concerning Support
governments in the general accounts. Once a disaster for Reconstructing the Livelihoods of Disaster Victims is
occurs, each ministry and local government formulates triggered, each affected local and prefectural government
a plan, requests a budget, and executes implementation registers the list of eligible households and reports to
with a lead of Cabinet office (in case of a large disaster) the Prefectural Assembly Hall, which then distributes the
or Prime Minister’s office (in case of an extremely large funds needed.
4 Approximately US$18,313,341 at the exchange rate on April 13, 2017 (one year after the Kumamoto earthquake) (US$1 = JPY 109.21)
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 13
4. Interventions
V
arious types of emergency interventions, Post disaster Social Assistance
including in-kind assistance and cash transfers, interventions
have been developed to ensure smooth
distribution in the event of a disaster. In- In addition to the regular program, Japan has a variety
kind assistance is used together with humanitarian of emergency (separate) social assistance program to
aid immediately after a disaster to assist all victims. support the recovery of the affected households. People
Cash transfers, on the other hand, are mainly used in are still eligible to and can apply for the existing program.
the recovery phase in accordance with the diverse and
specific needs of the victims. Social care services protect
In-kind Assistance <Response>
those who are especially vulnerable, and both public and
private insurance aid in victim recovery. In-kind assistance, including food, drinking water,
clothing, bedding, school supplies, and other basic
necessities, is provided immediately after a disaster.
Social Assistance program in normal With a certificate of damage issued by local governments
circumstances (see chapter 5), the victims can also receive support for
The Social Assistance program (Seikatsu hogo) is housing repair or the right to live in temporary public
designed to guarantee the minimum cost of living in housing. Official assistance is managed and budgeted
Japan. The minimum cost of living is determined by by prefectural and local governments based on the
age, number of household members, and area of living, Disaster Relief Act. At the same time, nongovernmental
calculated by the following eight categories: livelihood; organizations (NGOs) and volunteers work to facilitate all
housing; education; health; long-term health; childbirth; types of in-kind assistance.
employment; and funerals. If the income of the households
is less than this minimum living cost, they can receive Cash Transfers and Fee Waivers <Recovery>
the assistance to fulfill this gap5. The income of the
households is reviewed by the Means Test, where their In addition to the regular eligibility criteria, such as
financial status is checked based on their tax payment poverty, old age, a household with children, and single
record at the local government. If the households have parentage, material loss and damage are taken into con-
an asset to sell or they can receive supports from their sideration when determining government financial assis-
relatives, they cannot be eligible to the program. On the tance after a disaster. To provide support when a family
other hand, the female headed households, those with member has been lost, an official cash benefit is paid to
disability, and those with small child (less than 18 years the surviving family (spouse, children, parents, grand-
old) are eligible to the additional support. children, or grandparents). The injured are also support-
ed. In both cases, the financial amount is doubled if the
Other than Seikatsu hogo, the child allowance (Jido teate) person has dependent family members to take care of.
is also social assistance scheme to support households
with children (until the age of 9 years old – third grade A cash transfer is also paid to assist with housing damage.
of the elementary school). It also requires means test, The amount is decided according to two criteria: the level
but the threshold is higher. Similarly, the female headed of damage (fully or partially damaged); and the method of
households with children under 18 years old can receive recovery (new construction, reconstruction, renovation,
additional allowance called Child Rearing Allowance (Jido and/or renting other housing).
fuyo teate).
In addition to cash transfers, poor households, there are
fee waivers for eligible households. Those with elderly or
5 The amount a household receive is calculated by subtracting the household income from the minimum living cost in the local government
14 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
physically challenged people, and single parent families employs the two-tiered system, where the employee
affected by disasters are also eligible for interest-free of the full-time workers can have additional premiums
loans. For children and students, several cash-based proportional to their salary and year of their employment.
interventions, such as a waiver of tuition fees, assistance Everyone is covered by the public health insurance as
with the purchase of school supplies, and special standardized by law. Some are managed by employee’s
scholarships, are available. Existing beneficiaries of association (private), and others by national agency
welfare programs continue to receive public assistance (public). Co-pay are same (30 percent) regardless of the
after a disaster occurs, and victims who have financial management agency. Long-term Care Insurance covers
difficulties due to disaster damage also gain the right to people aged over 40 years old.
apply for regular public assistance.
All the full-time employees also participate in
Unemployment Insurance. Part-time (informal) workers
Distribution of Donations (Gienkin) to Individuals who work for 20 hours or more per week and expected
<Recovery> to work for over 6 months can also participate in the
program. Its budget is financed through a monthly payroll
Besides official cash transfers, affected local governments deduction from all employees with a supplemental
distribute collected donations (Gienkin) to individual payment from their employers, and the MHLW manages
households. A prefecture-level committee determines, the program. The benefits are paid with the condition that
based on the extent of the damage, how the collected recipients are actively seeking new jobs. It means that
funds will be distributed to each local government, which, they need to file application at the Employment Security
in turn, distributes the monies to individual victims. Local Office (Hello-Work) to receive the benefit. To be eligible
governments can distribute donations only after finishing to the program, the person needs to participate in the
their damage assessments. program at least for 6 months during the past 2years, and
the benefit level is determined based on the income and
duration of their enrollment in the program.
Cash for Work for Those who Lost Jobs <Recovery>
The Cash for Work (CFW) program, developed by the
MHLW in 2008 in response to the global financial crisis, Post disaster Social Insurance interventions
expanded its scope and budget after the Great East Japan The eligible people can continue to receive the support
Earthquake in 2011 to help the roughly 150,000 people through social insurance scheme. For example, the
who lost their jobs. A significant feature of the Japanese people over 65 years old receive the pension as before a
CFW program is the variety of jobs that it provides, such disaster. Yet, Japan does not have a system to drawdown
as management of shelters; assistance to the elderly, on their retirement savings in respond to a disaster.
children, and people with disabilities; and administrative Unemployment Insurance, on the other hand, waive the
support for governments. Many of these are types of eligibility of being totally unemployed, allowing those
work can easily include women and elderly persons. In who cannot work temporarily also becomes eligible after
comparison, CFW programs in many countries often a disaster. Further, affected households can be exempted
target mainly construction work, thus primarily attracting from the fee for social insurance.
working-age men. Prefectural or local governments can
either directly employ eligible victims or entrust private
enterprises and NPOs to hire them. Unemployment Insurance <Recovery>
Unemployment insurance is usually paid to workers who
Social Insurance program in normal lose their jobs. Notably, according to the relevant laws, as
a special case in the event of a disaster,6 people who can-
circumstances
not temporarily work due to the closure of their workplac-
Social Insurance in Japan includes Public Pension, es can also apply for this insurance. The regular terms of
Public Health Insurance, long-term Care Insurance, and the payment of unemployment insurance differ by age
Unemployment Insurance. Japanese Public Pension and time employed and can be between 90 and 360 days.
The Disaster Relief Act and the Act on Special Financial Support to Deal with the Designated Disaster of Extreme Severity.
6
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 15
In addition to this regular term, those affected by natural of private insurance companies, the remainder is borne
disasters can have their payments extended, depending by the national government. The amount of the national
on the scale of the disaster and the status of the economic government’s contribution to earthquake insurance is
recovery. In the case of the Great East Japan Earthquake in determined by the Diet every fiscal year.
2011, the first and second extensions were 60 days each,
and the last extension was 90 days (210 additional days in
total). The government decided to end the unemployment Social Care Services
benefit after confirming that job offers were recovering in Before a disaster occurs, the local Council of Social
the area and shifted its assistance to small and medium
Welfare has a key role in community-level social care
enterprises that had been affected by the earthquake to
services, including the delivery of welfare services
maintain their ability to provide employment, as well as
and support for volunteer activities, counseling, and
to individuals who remained unable to find a job.
issues related to household income. These activities
contribute to the development of social resilience by, for
Exemption from Social Insurance Fees <Recovery> example, protecting the elderly from isolation, providing
networking opportunities, and promoting the inclusion
Fees for other social insurance, such as health insurance and participation of diverse groups in local communities.
and pensions, can be excused for families that have been Moreover, many neighborhood associations have already
affected by disasters.
established a culture of mutual assistance in Japan’s
aging society.
Other Private (Optional) Insurance <Recovery> After an emergency, social care services start at
Private insurance, including life insurance and house/ evacuation sites. Both long-term and newer beneficiaries
property/asset insurance, is basically paid during the of social welfare often must contend with physical and/
recovery phase, after stabilization. This insurance is or psychological issues during their temporary stay at
paid by the private sector to victims, or the relatives of evacuation facilities. The Council of Social Welfare can
victims, who have suffered human and/or asset losses. effectively support vulnerable people by connecting
Earthquake insurance is optional and is managed by persons in need of assistance and related support
the private sector for homeowners, as it is a form of systems with volunteers. For those who cannot come to
reinsurance that is ceded to the national government. their offices due to age and/or disability, the council also
In other words, if the amount of damage caused by a provides home visits. Neighborhood associations can
significant earthquake is greater than the responsibility also assist victims with their community networks.
16 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Box 4. Recovery Support with Regular Social Care Services to Vulnerable Households in Sendai City
After the Great East Japan Earthquake of 2011, Sendai City in Miyagi Prefecture continued to follow up on those who had
been left out of the recovery assistance programs (that is, in-kind and cash transfers, unemployment assistance, and so on),
giving particular attention to vulnerable households. At its peak, more than 12,000 households scattered throughout the city
were living in temporary housing supported by the government. To understand living situations after providing support, city
staff members visited each household. After this initial visit, consultation visits were conducted for continuous follow-up on
households in need.
Based on the field visits, the city decided to continue recovery support in alignment with regular social welfare assistance to
targeted vulnerable households. The survey results showed the necessity of both short- and long-term support. First, residents
in temporary housing needed to rebuild their homes within a limited time frame. At the same time, many households required
day-to-day support, including health- and welfare-related assistance. The city thought it was important to connect the day-to-
day support to regular social welfare from a long-term perspective.
Category-based support promoted the recovery of affected households, which were classified into four categories based on
their capacity for recovery and need for regular assistance (see figure 7). The vertical axis represents the household’s capacity
to rebuild its own home, and the horizontal axis represents the need for regular assistance. The upper right side of the top
diagram, Category 1, shows an independent household, while Category 4, bottom left, are those who found it difficult to rebuild
their homes and needed regular assistance. With this strategy, 96 percent of households were able to fully rebuild their homes.
In looking at the proportion of each category, Category 1, “Households able to rebuild their livelihoods,” rose to 77 percent from
66 percent. Categories 3 and 4 together accounted for 28 percent originally but dropped to 16 percent. The follow-up support
after recovery phase interventions was smoothly combined into regular social assistance.
Figure 7 Category-Based Support After Completion of Emergency Social Assistance
• Individual visits
High
Category 2 Category 1 Support common to all
• Health care support households, including
• Watch-over and day-to- those who are able to
day counseling Households receiving rebuild their livelihoods
Households able to
• Utilization of regional day-to-day support
health care and welfare rebuild their livelihoods
services • Survey and verification
• Information dissemination
• Support for taking
residence in public
Capacity of
housing
• Counseling and support
for home rebuilding
Health care support by
a public health nurse Low Need for regular supports High
home rebuilding
• Individual visits
• Health care support Category 4 Category 3
• Watch-over and day-to-day
counseling Households receiving Households receiving
• Utilization of regional day-to-day support and home rebuilding support
health care and welfare home rebuilding support Individual visits by livelihood
services rehabilitation support staff
• Accompainment support for
taking residence in private • Individual visits
rental housing • Employment support
• Counseling and support • Accompainment support
in collaboration with an Slated for individual Slated for individual for taking residence in
Low
attorney support support private rental housing
Source: Sendai City.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 17
5. Service Delivery Mechanism
W
hile there is no one-fit-all procedure for Service Delivery at the Recovery phase
post-disaster service delivery, most of
the procedures have two timeline—quick By contrast to the response phase, eligibility for major
response phase and mid-term to long-term interventions to recover household income is decided
recovery phase. For post-disaster programs, quickness of based on an assessment of physical damage and economic
response is of paramount importance in the immediate loss. The contracted engineers/architects survey the
aftermath of the disaster. As the nature of the assistance homes according to a standardized manual. With the
shifts toward recovery, accuracy in addressing the specific collected information, along with household and tax
needs of specific segments of the affected population information, the local government will issue a certificate
acquires greater importance. of damage to individuals (see figure 8 and also chapter 6
for more details). There is no automatic enrollment, and
all potential beneficiaries need to apply for various types
Service Delivery at the Response phase of public recovery assistance with this certificate. The
local government, the local Council of Social Welfare, and
Local governments are the primary responders to
CBOs often have a help desk where individuals in need
small-scale disasters, with support from prefectural
can ask about their eligibility. All the cash payments are
governments, while the prefectural government will have
done through a bank transfer.
the primary responsibility when the impact of a disaster
is larger than a certain threshold (for example, 30 houses
are affected in an area of fewer than 5,000 people). Once Grievance Redress Mechanism
these response actions are triggered, the prefectural
governments set up emergency shelters in the affected Households can submit complaints to the official damage
area and distribute in-kind transfers to those shelters certificate. As noted, the damage certificate plays critical
with the assistance of local governments. role on determining eligibility of recovery assistance
programs. Local governments have consultation services
Japan’s experience in managing natural disasters has where households can confer about the results of building
highlighted the importance of controlling supply levels. damage surveys. The local government officials explain
Generally, the needs of each evacuation facility are col- four damage categories and the reason why a category
lected at the local hub and used for controlling the level was applied in each case. When a household cannot
of supplies. However, gaps between demand and supply agree with the explanation, housing owners can ask for
surfaced in many facilities in the aftermath of the 2011 the additional (more detail) damage survey.
earthquake because of inaccurate information and the
time lag in reporting. The government is now developing
a system with a format that can share the needs of evacu- Communication and Outreach
ation facilities with local governments in real time.
Although the government assures communication with
Service delivery in the very early stage of the response affected households through in-person contacts (citizen
phase may take a top-down approach by using a “push service desks), other outlets, such as community radio,
mode7” for large-scale disasters, prioritizing the speed websites, and social media that are managed by citizens
of delivery. In-kind transfers as a form of emergency or NGOs, are increasingly being utilized. Each locality has
assistance are delivered from outside the affected areas improved its means of communication on disaster response
to an affected prefectural hub, a municipal local hub, and efforts to avoid service disruptions while distributing the
finally, evacuation facilities and temporary houses. necessary information to all potential beneficiaries.
7 In
the push-mode support, the government procure and transport supplies without waiting for requests from affected areas. The antonym is “pull-mode”
support where the government provides support only on the basis of requests.
18 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Figure 8 Flow of the Delivery Chain for Post-Disaster Social Assistance in Japan
Official damage certificate
(Risa Shomei)
Resident
registry Cash transfer,
donations
Shelter,
DB temporary
Shock Victim Database
(Hisaisha Daicho) housing
Cloud-based Platform
Management
Property tax of migration
cadastre
Use the database for all
Building Store in Data the post-disaster service Post-disaster
DISASTER damage survey database verification delivery management service delivery
Source: Tokyo Metropolitan Government Earthquake Countermeasures Plan, Japan.
Face-to-Face Communication and Outreach control the number of visitors as well as staff needed and
prioritize the most affected areas. If volunteers become
Direct communication to affected households is critical
available, the team can increase the number of citizens
though not easy for capacity-strained local governments. on that particular day.
The major constraint, in addition to the lack of capacity,
is the inadequate number of access points—typically the The spatial design of the front office is also key to promoting
front office of the local government—for citizen interface. efficient citizen services. After heavy rains in 2012, Uji City
Ideally, the number of access points and government staff in Kyoto Prefecture divided its office entrance space to
should increase in accordance with the coverage level six sections—reception, outside lobby, inside lobby, first
needed. A suitably devised front office will allow citizens desk, second desk, and third desk. First, the receptionists
to efficiently navigate the delivery chain. The following (around two people) determined whether the visitors
paragraphs describe ways in which local governments in had brought the necessary documents and guided them
Japan have handled or continue to handle direct citizen to the appropriate desk or lobby. The staff at the first
interface. desk searched the property damage data on a cloud data
platform against the property ID number written on the
The first idea is to flexibly allocate support staff from other documents. If the citizen confirmed the information, the
local governments as demand changes. Past experience staff issued a certificate of damage. In situations for which
of disasters has shown that the tasks requiring more staff the manual did not include any specific protocol, such as
change gradually from management of shelters and in- cases that require engineering knowledge or where the
kind transfers in the first few weeks, to assessments of visitor was not satisfied with the result at the first desk,
eligibility (housing damage surveys) in the second phase, the citizen was referred to the second and/or third desk.
to the issuance of disaster-affected certificates still later If the visitor did not accept the result there, he or she
in the process. Each local government is able to design a could apply for assistance to be resurveyed. Lobbies were
staff deployment plan with an estimation of the activities the waiting space before the first desk, often with posters
and staff that will be required during each phase. and documents explaining the social assistance services
available, damage assessments, and so forth.
Alternatively, local governments could limit the number
of visitors per day. Without any restrictions, citizens In addition to “identifying and registering affected
would likely visit or call the front office as soon as they households” at the first stage of the delivery chain, the
become aware of the availability of services. To avoid a citizen interface through local communities is useful.
chaotic situation, the local government can assign a date Supplementing the data collected initially through
to households in a certain area on which they can access official channels, local communities can collect and share
the front office. In this way, the citizen service team can information on the victims’ actual situation. In Kesennuma
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 19
Box 5. Understanding Needs of Victims through Semi-Formal Information Flow
Kesennuma Cuty, woman outside destroyed home, hit by the tsunami/earthquake. Photo: krestafer
Kesennuma City, Miyagi Prefecture, was severely damaged during the Great East Japan Earthquake and tsunami, and 90
temporary housing complexes were constructed for victims of the disaster. The assignment of residents to each complex followed
a random drawing, which meant that shelter residents did not know each other. The local government contracted the Kesennuma
Reconstruction Association (KRA), a local NPO, to provide community enhancement activities for the Emergency Job Creation
Program. The KRA conducted communal exchange activities at least twice a month in each temporary housing complex and also
attended weekly coordination meetings with the local government, Council of Social Welfare, and NPOs. At these meetings,
the KRA shared informal information on the residents’ needs that the group had identified through these exchange activities to
ensure that the needs were matched with the social care services provided by the local government or aid organizations.
City, the local government contracted NGOs to manage a victims. Existing official communication networks can be
casual exchange of opinions with affected households used for effective broadcasting to the target population.
and share these as “semi-informal” information with A wireless-activated disaster warning system is the most
support groups, such as social workers, public health common one-way communication tool, used by approxi-
nurses, NPOs, and volunteers who provide assistance in mately 80 percent of local governments. More than half
temporary housing complexes (see box 5). These informal of the local governments and schools in Japan have also
exchanges via social media can be an effective means of introduced e-mail distribution systems to deliver emer-
sharing information within the local community, such as gency information. The website of each local government
first-hand knowledge on disaster risks and the identities/ can update public information as needed. After the 2011
locations of persons in the area who need support during earthquake, however, three major weaknesses in these
a natural disaster. practices became apparent: damage to—and higher traffic
in—the IT infrastructure of local governments obstructed
Remote and Virtual Communication and Outreach the use of websites and e-mail; the communication was
A variety of remote and virtual communication meth- only uni-directional; and there were difficulties in com-
ods are used in combination to reach out to all disaster municating with people outside the area.
20 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Box 6. Emergency Broadcasting by a Community FM Radio Station (AMAMI FM)
On October 20, 2010, Amami City in Kagoshima Prefecture experienced record-breaking rain that caused heavy damage. Traffic
networks, the electricity supply, landline and mobile telephone lines, and the disaster administrative wireless network were
damaged by the resulting floods and landslides, preventing the local government from collecting and disseminating information.
A community FM radio station, “AMAMI FM D! WAVE,” conducted emergency broadcasting throughout the night at the request?
of administrative officials from the start of the disaster—24-hour broadcasting was conducted for five days. The number of
e-mails to the station jumped from fewer than 10 per day to over 120 during those five days
Social media played a key role in overcoming these computers and smartphones limited until electricity is
issues. In Iwate Prefecture, whose information and restored. According to an evaluation of the use of various
communications technology (ICT) was severely damaged kinds of information and communications tools during
after the 2011 earthquake, information was disseminated and immediately after a disaster, radio was ranked first,
through Twitter immediately after the event. The number rated as highly useful by 60 percent of those surveyed.
of followers of the prefecture increased from about 2,500
8
A particular advantage of community broadcasting is its
to over 20,000 within five days of the disaster. In the focus on local information and the fact that the elderly are
recovery phase, volunteers in the temporary shelters more familiar with radio than with social media. During a
shared news about their activities and additional victim disaster, radios can be used for emergency calls to evac-
needs through various social media, and governments uees. Afterwards, it can be used as a communication tool
used this information to help meet those needs. to enhance community recovery activities. AMAMI FM is
one such community broadcasting service that collected
Community radio broadcasting services can also supple- and disseminated information immediately after a heavy
ment information dissemination and communications, rainstorm while the local government could not commu-
especially immediately after a disaster, given that pow- nicate with the affected population due to the damage to
er and Internet connections may be down and the use of its information network (see box 6).
8 Mitsubishi Research Institute (2012).
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 21
6. Data and Information System
R
eliable information on both disaster risks and SP assist with evacuation efforts and help provide safety for
beneficiaries ensures successful DRM and a quick this group of people.
and adequate response after a disaster occurs.
Household information is regularly managed by dif-
ferent units within local governments, whereas risk/hazard Damage and Loss Data
information is mainly collected by a national organization. Data on damage and loss are collected through a
When a disaster is expected, national and local govern- housing damage survey. Local governments develop a
ments make decisions on an emergency response, utilizing list of professional/licensed Architects/Engineers who
disaster mitigation information such as early warning data agree to do voluntary works for assessment of damage
provided by the Japan Meteorological Agency. Once the houses after earthquake disasters in collaboration with
national government (Cabinet Office) officially announc- engineering staff from local governments. Some local
es that a severe disaster has occurred, a management governments adopt a two-step approach: 1) trained non-
information system (MIS) that includes a geographical professionals identify collapsed buildings; 2) trained
information system (GIS) enables each local government engineers conduct surveys on the damages.
to link data from different sectors (that is, household and
cadaster data), add newly collected data (satellite images Advanced ICT technologies with use of electric gadgets
of disaster-affected areas), and check for any data overlaps such as tablet are not common in Japan, partially due to
to gauge households’ eligibility for services. the high average age of licensed architects/ engineers,
and students are not officially allowed to do this kind
of voluntary work in this field. However, some local
Hazard Data governments have increasingly started digitalizing data
Hazard risk information is collected by national or local with use of QR-code on questionnaire surveys (Technical
governments with support from academia or the private Committee on Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures in
sector. For instance, the Tokyo metropolitan government Local Cities, 2010).
has developed a ranking of disaster risk and vulnerability Using the collected damage data with existing data from
for each small local government boundary. This ranking is resident registry and from other data sources, a victim
used to prioritize DRM activities. database (Hisaisha Daicho) (see figure 9) is developed
The Japan Meteorological Agency monitors natural phe- after a disaster at the local government. The information in
nomena that may cause a disaster and provides early the database includes name, birth date, gender, residential
warning information to support national and local gov- address, support needs, and the extent of home damage
ernments in the prompt execution of disaster mitigation according to the official certificate (Risai Shomei). The
activities.9 Risai Shomei is widely utilized as the basis for determining
whether, to what degree, and in what form the certificate
holder is entitled to specific post-disaster assistance.
Socioeconomic Data
The national government, through the Cabinet Office, has
A 2013 amendment to the Disaster Countermeasures set guidelines for the development and management of the
Basic Act requires each local government to develop victim databases of local governments. These guidelines
a list of persons who will likely need extra assistance define how and when the data should be collected, and
in evacuating their residences, such as the elderly, the which information should be disseminated and shared
physically challenged, and infants. With the permission publicly. Training sessions, including simulations on how
of those on the register, the mayor will share the list with to use the database, are also conducted periodically by
stakeholders, such as firefighters and CBO members, who some prefectural and local governments.
9 Information on the JMA can be found at https://www.jma.go.jp/jma/en/Activities/brochure201803.pdf.
22 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Figure 9 Contents of the Victim Database (Hisaisha Daicho)
Basic information Asset Damage information Supporting condition Data sharing status
ID Housing damage Issue of certificate Share within government
Name Housing structure Comment Share with external parties
(requires permission of a person)
Gender Survey times (first/second) Social assistance application
status
Birth date Owner (own or rent) Social assistance payment status
Family members Type (apartment, etc.)
Email and Phone Other damage
Evacuation site Location
Health condition First survey date and result
Support (Need or not) Second survey date and result
Box 7. Sendai City: Targeting Potential Beneficiaries by Damage Assessment
using a Combination of Aerial Photography and Field Surveys
Sendai City took steps to expedite the processing of a damage survey after the devastating 2011 earthquake and tsunami by
utilizing aerial photography and simplifying the survey items. First, the city divided the affected area into three categories
using aerial photography. All the housing in the regions with catastrophic tsunami damage was categorized as collapsed/heavily
damaged (A). In the regions with a mix of earthquake and tsunami damage, the city deployed individual field surveyors to
collect more granular data in addition to the aerial photography (B). The level of tsunami damage was briefly analyzed using the
satellite images, and the housing units that did not look heavily damaged from the satellite images were surveyed by on-site
visits. In the regions with damage sustained (solely) from the earthquake, visual and on-site surveys were conducted (C). This
method allowed the city to respond efficiently to the high demand for certificates of damage (over 10,000 cases per week and
252,000 cases in total) after the mega-scale disaster.
Figure 10 Initial Damage Assessment Using Aerial Photography
A. Most properties completely destroyed <Coastline> Across-the-board 2-D surveys
Survey method
• Overall visual surveys
(overview study)
Regions primarily with
• Using aerial photography
tsunami damage
and GIS
(Regions with catastophic
tsunami damage)
Shiogama-Watari prefectural road Combination of individual
B. Mixture of completely and partially properties destroyed
and regional surveys
Regions with mixture of
Survey method
earthquake and tsunami damage
• Overall visual surveys by district
(Regions with damage other than
• On-site interior surveys of
that from the earthquake, such
individual sites
as flooding)
• Using aerial photography and GIS
Tsunami Line
C. Earthquake damage Sendai Tobu Road Pinpoint survey
Survey method
Regions with damage sustained • Primary: Visual
(solely) from the earthquake) • Secondary: On-site survey
(Disaster information, degree
of immediate danger, Teage
[self-nomination] method)
<Inland urban areas> • Self-diagnostic method
Source: Sendai City.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 23
MIS (Management Information System) A national system known as “My Number,” involving
unique individual IDs, is a strong tool for collating
While there are no uniform MIS for post-disaster data from different ministries and agencies. In normal
service delivery in Japan, there is a general-purpose circumstances, this information is restricted to only
MIS (Hisaisha Shien System) for this purpose developed pre-specified agencies and cannot be accessed by
by one local government. The first MIS for emergency other organizations. Once a disaster occurs, however,
support was developed in Nishinomiya city after the legislation allows other relevant government agencies
earthquake in 1995 (Box-8). After that, the municipality and units to access the necessary information on victims
made the general-purpose version and distributed to through the ID system of the relevant local governments.
other municipalities for free so that they can employ The city government can easily confirm the personal
and adjust to their context. As of 2017, over 1,000 out information, even if the victim who has been evacuated is
of 1741local governments use this general-purpose MIS a citizen of another local government.
to develop their own system—the others may develop by
them own or may not have developed yet. Until 2016, Japan did not have a national ID system.
Instead, basic individual information, including name,
The system includes eight sub-system: 1) post-disaster sex, address, and date of birth, had been used to link
social assistance management system; 2) shelter data from different sources. Also, geo-referenced data
management system; 3) relief aid management system; on household assets (such as land and buildings) have
4) temporary housing management system; 5) bereaved been used to cross-reference with the satellite image to
household management system; 6) damage analysis confirm the victim’s property and household information
and reconstruction management system; 7) damaged and disaster-affected certificate (see figure 11). The
building management system; and 8) vulnerable people combination of the ID and the GIS will help to minimize
(in terms of evacuation) management system. The post- errors.
disaster social assistance management system utilizes
the information from the victim database, and it has the
payment system.
Figure 11 System Interface of the MIS with the GIS
Source: Cabinet Office (2010); Technical Committee on Earthquake Disaster Countermeasures in Local Cities .
24 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
Box 8. Development of a Management Information System in Support of Affected People
Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (HD), CC BY 2.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=48171740. Photo: Masahiko OHKUBO.
In the aftermath of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995, most of the town center of Nishinomiya City, Hyogo Prefecture,
including even city hall’s computers and communications networks, was devastated. In the recovery process, the local
government developed an MIS to manage evacuation shelters, housing damage, the payment of cash transfer, and so on, to
support the victims. “The system demonstrated its value by reducing the time for issuing a certificate of loss to less than one
hour, which would take 7 to 8 hours of work if we do it manually,” said Mr. Minoru Yoshida, the developer of the system. Based
on that experience, the value of developing an MIS to assist victims has been recognized by other local governments in Japan,
and Nishinomiya has offered the general-purpose version of the system for free.
In addition, since 2013, a number of local governments have started to make a list of those who have needed support during and
after disasters, thus following the directive in the Disaster Countermeasures Basic Act. Mailing addresses are also included. The
damage assessments collected in the database can be linked to this list after a disaster occurs.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 25
7. Key Lessons Learned for ASP and DRM
Systems in Developing Countries
J
apan’s deep and wide-ranging experience with nat- in 2007, and an additional 17.4 percent are currently
ural disasters has helped it to develop an exemplary preparing similar guidelines (Cabinet Office 2018c, 7).
ASP system to respond to rapid onset disasters such The MHLW, the ministry primarily responsible for regular
as an earthquake or tsunami. As noted above, since SP, also has its own Disaster Management Operation Plan
not all disasters are of equal magnitude and each coun- that lays out policies on both disaster preparedness and
try or locality has its own unique context, an ASP system response within its domain, including the health/medical
needs to be adapted to each respective situation. For field and social welfare. The plan also indicates how the
example, it would not be easy to mobilize an equivalent MHLW works together with organizations from non-public
amount of tax revenue in the country with a high rate of sectors as detailed in chapter 2.
informal workers. Similarly, a country with more ethnic
Capacity enhancement is another key strategy to
diversity may face difficulty in empowering local govern-
increase the quality of disaster preparedness. In the
ments as Japan did. Nevertheless, in an attempt to pro-
case of Japan, one key effort is the holding of a series of
mote the use of ASPs, policy makers elsewhere may find
disaster management drills that are organized at various
the following recommendations and features of Japan’s
institutions on a regular basis in line with DRM-related
system to be particularly noteworthy.
plans and manuals. Training is effective when it targets key
stakeholders and focuses on relevant topics in line with
1. Preparedness: Strengthen the ASP specific frameworks, such as the respective operations
system with a comprehensive DRM manuals, thus enhancing capacity and preparedness.
framework and enhance the capacity of The publication of hazard maps by local governments
also leads to a more effective understanding of disaster
institutions prior to a disaster.
risks for vulnerable people living in disaster-sensitive
The first key lesson from Japan is that the existence areas. These kinds of strategically connected systems can
of established policies and systems in normal swiftly assist in coordinating support to the devastated
circumstances facilitates smooth decision making in the areas when a disaster occurs. The establishment and
event of a disaster and better implementation of post- availability of a variety of financial schemes increase the
disaster SP interventions. In Japan, a comprehensive level of preparedness and capacity for DRM.
DRM legal framework provides a clear policy foundation
that includes the basic vision, essential principles,
clearly defined regulations, reporting mechanisms, and 2. Flexibility: Prepare for ad-hoc adaptation
operating procedures, specifying the relationships, roles, (design tweak and new design) of the
and responsibilities of the agencies and actors involved system responding to the unique needs
in ASP service delivery. Following the framework, the of each disaster.
separate laws and acts outline the rules for a number of
Countries should acknowledge that preparation cannot
ASP interventions and financing schemes, from which the
be perfect and that each disaster requires different
national and local governments can choose to use in their
design tweaks to respond to the specific needs of affected
response to a disaster.
individuals. Japan’s local government-led assistance has
Relatedly, both public and private sectors are encouraged a number of advantages in ensuring flexibility, including
to develop emergency operations manuals or business its understanding of the real-time local situations,
continuity plans to define a clear division of roles proximity to affected areas, and efficiency in providing
regarding who does what and how in response to a support. Although the national government plays a
disaster. As of 2017, 64 percent of large-scale firms critical leadership role nationwide, local governments
in Japan had such plans compared to only 19 percent are responsible for leading emergency assistance. The
26 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
cases from Soma City (box 1) and Sendai City (see boxes nevertheless eligible to receive unemployment insurance,
4 and 7) illustrate these advantages. In response to a social care services, and/or in-kind assistance from
large-scale, complex earthquake and tsunami disaster, the government and payouts from private insurance, if
Sendai City employed aerial photos to carry out damage applicable. Information systems can link the relevant data
surveys efficiently (see box 7). Communities and NGOs to identify eligible households. In normal circumstances,
also play critical roles, often supplementing the functions community-level social care services contribute to social
of overwhelmed local governments (see box 2). resilience by protecting the elderly from isolation,
providing networking opportunities, and promoting the
The Japan case also shows how some design tweak to
inclusion and participation of diverse groups in local
existing interventions were can ensure flexibilities. “Cash communities. These services can be expanded in the
for Work,” which was originally designed in response to event of a disaster.
the global financial crisis in 2008, relaxed its eligibility
requirements and expanded its budget after the 2011 Victim outreach is pivotal to ensuring that services
earthquake. About 20 percent of the newly employed reach people in need at the right time. In Japan, citizen
persons in the affected area were hired under this program. interfaces, which consist of in-person (citizen service
Unemployment insurance also expand the coverage desks, home/community visits) and remote (community
by accepting those temporary lose jobs. Sendai City’s radio (see box 6], social media) approaches, have been
categorization-based recovery support in combination locally improved to avoid service disorders, ensuring
with regular social care services, which followed up that they can distribute the necessary information to all
emergency cash and in-kind–based intervention, helped potential beneficiaries. By way of example, a story from
the recovery of vulnerable households (see box 4). Kesennuma City pointed to the way that the voices of
citizens, collected by NGOs, are then shared with staff
Further, small design tweaks to financial schemes members of the local government to determine if ongoing
have been shown to be effective and efficient ways to social assistance programs match the needs of victims
respond to post-disaster situations. Furusato Nozei is (see box 5).
a tax deduction given to taxpayers who donate to local
governments in areas that have been affected by a natural
disaster. This tax deduction, originally designed to 4. Leadership and collaboration: Ensure
reduce gaps between urban and rural local governments, strong government leadership, develop
is used after a disaster to financially support affected well-designed collaboration mechanisms,
local governments. and optimize collaboration networks.
Strong leadership at each level of government and
3. Effective and efficient outreach: Provide effective collaboration with nongovernment sectors are
multiple options for ASP programs, both crucial to facilitating multidimensional efforts in ASP.
clarify criteria for eligibility, and At the national level in Japan, the Cabinet Office, headed
identify needs through citizen interfaces. by the prime minister, leads the government response to
natural disasters. At the same time, local, prefectural, and
ASP programs should be designed with multiple options city governments serve as the main entities closest to the
to answer people’s diverse and transitional demands victims. After the Great East Japan Earthquake, the mayor
after a disaster. People who do not normally qualify for of the affected local government of Soma City established
or receive benefits may suddenly need social assistance the city’s disaster management headquarters within
after a disaster. As described here, Japan has developed nine minutes and immediately instructed municipality
various ASP interventions that can support those already officials to search for and rescue people and check social
eligible for regular social assistance, such as the poor, welfare facilities to coordinate a response to the needs of
elderly, and households with children, as well as those vulnerable groups. Within 12 hours after the earthquake,
not usually eligible but currently affected by a natural the mayor had established nine guiding principles for
disaster. All victims can receive in-kind assistance at action (see box 1). This case highlights that clear and
shelters. In addition, several financial assistance schemes timely decision making by local government leaders can
are available based on loss and damage conditions. Those promote an effective response to a disaster, including the
who did not suffer physical damage to their home are protection of vulnerable households.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 27
It should be noted that existing framework may not 5. Continuous learning and improvement:
be always the best mechanism to promote long-term Forge a culture of learning through
recovery. Given the lengthy recovery estimate after experience and make continuous
the Great East Japan Earthquake in 2011, the Japanese improvements in policies, mechanisms,
government decided to establish a subsequent 10-year
interventions, and technologies.
limited-term organization for recovery called the National
Reconstruction Authority at the national level, with Continuous learning and improvements help to expand a
recovery units within prefectural governments. The act to country’s context-specific ASP system. One particularly
establish this agency was passed in December 2011, and remarkable feature of Japan’s SP-DRM framework is
it was finally established at the national level in February its evolving nature. As described above, continuous
2012, almost a year after the disaster. A smooth transition amendments to existing legislation and the approval
from the institutional setting for relief and response to of new policies in response to lessons learned from
that of long-term recovery and development will be key past disasters have built up this robust system. Various
to ensuring a flexible response to the changing needs of concrete interventions have also evolved in the same way,
victims and affected local governments. as Japan is constantly exploring further improvements to
its DRM system. This culture of learning and continuous
Japan is also an example of the value of well-structured
improvement can make the system more feasible, relevant,
collaboration mechanisms on both vertical (from
and sustainable. The culture did not emerge simply from
the national government to subnational/prefectural
the actions of certain people or policy makers, however.
governments and local governments) and horizontal
Its emergence and sustenance have much to do with the
(among various ministries and institutions at the national
underlying institutional foundations that have allowed
level or among local governments) dimensions. The
these constant policy adaptations. Japan is fortunate
national government has a coordination mechanism among
to have experienced a relatively stable government
ministries to support affected prefectural governments,
and bureaucracy over the past several decades, which
which then support affected local governments. A mutual
has helped to create strong institutional memory and
support agreement among local governments is the major
policy continuity. The prominence of natural disasters
coordinating mechanism at the local level (see box 3).
as a national policy (and political) priority has given the
Based on these agreements, local governments outside the
matter the necessary amount of political attention to
affected area can send staff and goods at the request of the
ensure that the government’s ability to mitigate disaster-
governments where the disaster occurred.
related risks is constantly improved.
Private sectors, NGOs and local communities are also piv-
New technologies may improve ASP service delivery
otal to an effective response and can fill the gap between
dramatically. In Japan, the MIS that supports affected
the demands on and capacity of local governments. In
households was developed by one local government after
Japan, the national level law identifies the role of neigh-
the Great Hanshin Earthquake in 1995 and adopted by
borhood association and JNCSW, and local governments
other disaster-affected local governments (see box 8). The
made agreements with these organizations and seek col-
introduction of this new system has dramatically reduced
laboration to ensure prompt assistance. As outlined in
the time needed to verify eligibility. Moreover, the
box 2, the JNCSW, an NGO, has helped overwhelmed local
recently adopted new ID system is expected to strengthen
governments to manage volunteers using its national and
the system further by linking and verifying related data
local networks. An NPO, the Japan Voluntary Organiza-
from different sources more smoothly. At the same time, it
tions Active in Disaster,10 serves as a coordinator of var-
should be noted that the introduction of new technologies
ious NGOs and NPOs ready to support disaster victims.
may also cause new issues, such as a concern about the
This organization, along with the JNCSW and the Cabinet
security of personal information. The government should
Office, work together to coordinate their activities. To
therefore be cautious about any decision to adopt new
understand which organization can and should do what
technologies and consider the expected benefits and
tasks, it is critical to articulate the role of these agencies,
potential problems, and also bear in mind the capacity of
preferably define in an act and local-level agreements,
the people who will be tasked with using them.
promoting regular communication at normal times.
10 Information on the Japan Voluntary Organizations Active in Disaster can be found on its website, http://jvoad.jp/.
28 / Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan
The case of Japan confirms that it is essential that a technologies. Through this continuous process of learning
country forge a culture of learning from its experiences and improvement, an ASP system can be successful and
in DRM and persist in making improvements in policies, a country’s resilience to natural disasters enhanced as a
disaster risk reduction mechanisms, interventions, and result.
Adaptive Social Protection and Disaster Risk Management: A Case Study of Japan / 29
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