1 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY STANDARD DISCL A I M E R This volume is a product of the staff of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The World Bank. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the views of the Executive Di- rectors of The World Bank or the governments they represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this work. The boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information shown on any map in this work do not imply any judgment on the part of The World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance of such boundaries. COPY RIG H T STAT E M E N T The material in this publication is copyrighted. Copying and/or transmitting portions or all of this work without permission may be a violation of applicable law. 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Cover Photo: © Share Zone Design: Sergio Andres Moreno | World Bank Group 2  ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS ACRWC African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child CBS Central Bureau of Statistics CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women FAO Food and Agriculture Organization (of the United Nations) FDI Foreign Direct Investment FGD Focus Group Discussion GDP Gross Domestic Product ICT Information and Communication Technology IDP Internally Displaced Person IFAD International Fund for Agricultural Development IFC International Finance Corporation ILO International Labour Organization I-PRSP Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper ITU International Telecommunications Union KII Key Informant Interview MENA Middle East and North Africa MICS Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey MPSL Muslim Personal Status Law NBHS National Baseline Household Survey NGO Nongovernmental Organization NHBPS National Household Budget and Poverty Survey SDGs Sustainable Development Goals STEM Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics UN United Nations UNDP United Nations Development Programme UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund WBL Women, Business and the Law WDI World Development Indicators WFP World Food Programme 3 ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This report was prepared by Alvin Etang (Senior Economist, World Bank), Jonna Lundwall (Senior Social Scientist, World Bank), Eiman Osman (Extended Term Consultant, World Bank), and Jennifer Wistrand (Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University). The report benefited from inputs and comments by David Newhouse (Senior Economist, World Bank) and Racheal Pierotti (Social Development Specialist, World Bank). The study was conducted as part of the Sudan Programmatic Poverty Assessment (P164694) and under the general guid- ance of Pierella Paci (Practice Manager, Poverty and Equity Global Practice, World Bank). Consulsat, a local consulting firm, conducted fieldwork for the qualitative research. Sara Amin provided research assistance during fieldwork. The team organized a technical workshop on December 10, 2020 to discuss the main findings of the report and potential areas for policy and programmatic ac- tion. Workshop participants represented the Ministry of Social Development; Ministry of Youth; International Labour Organization; Sudanese Women in Science Organization; nongovernmental organizations (including Challenge Fund for Youth Employment, Leaders of Change Consultancy, Open Society Initiative for Eastern Africa, The Palladium Group); and the academia (Oxford University China-Africa Network, Economic Consultant for the Governor of Khartoum State, Purdue University, University of Massachusetts Boston). Feedback from the workshop has been incorporated in this report. 4 Table of Contents Acknowledgments....................................................................................................................................................................................................... 2 Abbreviations and Acronyms..................................................................................................................................................................................3 Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................................................................................................6 Potential policy actions........................................................................................................................................................... 7 Introduction ...................................................................................................................................................................................................................8 Analytical Framing and Methodology................................................................................................................................................................. 10 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan..................................................................................................... 14 A country of many transitions.............................................................................................................................................15 Characteristics of the labor market in the last decade.......................................................................................................17 Formal Institutions: Setting the Tone for Labor Force Participation..................................................................................................... 28 A legal and institutional framework with direct implications for women’s economic participation............................29 Informal Institutions: The Role of Norms and Networks............................................................................................................................. 34 Customs and norms affect women’s roles in society.........................................................................................................35 Importance of wasta for access to economic opportunities..............................................................................................36 Markets and Their Impacts on Economic Activity.......................................................................................................................................40 Privatization and the rise of the oil industry: a labor market transformation...............................................................41 Private sector engagement preferred over public sector employment.............................................................................42 Low access to banking and finance limits entrepreneurial activity..................................................................................42 Women in agriculture tend to earn less than men and face similar challenges as female entrepreneurs....................44 Informality is high, linked to poverty, migration, and low education .............................................................................45 Digital technology also transforms interactions in the economic sphere.......................................................................46 Household Decisions Shape Development Outcomes............................................................................................................................... 48 Stifled personal and professional aspirations ....................................................................................................................49 The gender-based division of roles and labor starts at home............................................................................................50 Additional constraints: Low wages and lack of adequate transportation........................................................................53 Concluding Remarks ............................................................................................................................................................................................... 54 Potential areas for policy and programmatic action..........................................................................................................56 References................................................................................................................................................................................................................... 62 5 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Executive Summary Sudan has been, and continues to be, undergoing enormous employment in Sudan, and employment in agriculture is social, political, and economic change. Nationwide protests more common among women. Women who do work earn that started in December 2018 over rapidly increasing less than men and do not seem to advance to leadership inflation, removal of subsidies for wheat and fuel, macro- positions within firms. Sudan’s young population, with 60 economic instability, widespread shortages of cash, and the percent below the age of 25, is struggling with increased un- perception of an economy that was skewed in favor of the employment, especially in urban areas. Young women face elite led to the ousting of former President Omar al-Bashir even higher levels of unemployment as a result of structural in April 2019. Sudan is now at a crucial moment in its his- factors that include, but are not limited to, the legal frame- tory, transitioning from a military to a civilian government. work, patriarchal customs, land and property rights, and The new Sudanese government has faced an economic crisis access to finance. from the outset. Since 2019, domestic inflation has stayed Thus, by and large, males, irrespective of their geographic above 60 percent a year and the currency has depreciated location or level of education, have an easier time finding at a similar pace. Poverty is rampant across the country employment than females. Women may have difficulty find- and varies substantially across states. The greater share of ing jobs with hours that enable them to fulfill their (unpaid) Sudan’s working-age population—male and female, older care and household responsibilities while not requiring and younger, urban and rural, non-IDP1 and IDP—is un- them to spend most or all of their wages on transportation. able to economically support itself in a predictable, reliable At the same time, women who desire to pursue more en- manner. The provision and access to quality employment trepreneurial forms of income-generating activity may have opportunities, especially for women and youth, is instru- difficulty getting credit from a bank because of their lack of mental in achieving inclusive growth and more effective assets as well as their lack of personal connections—was- development outcomes. However, women and youth are ta—within the male-dominated banking system. Focus particularly disadvantaged in the Sudanese labor market. group discussions (FGDs) revealed that wasta is an import- Understanding gender- and youth-specific issues can help ant informal institution that affects women’s and youth’s identify entry points for greater employment opportu- ability to access the labor market in Sudan. Whereas patriar- nities for women and youth in Sudan. They can also help chal customs appear to constrain the acquisition of human shape actions for enhanced growth and sustainability. The capital, wasta appears to constrain the acquisition of social objective of this report, which builds on mixed methods capital and, by extension, individuals’ ability to access net- research, is to contribute to a better understanding of the works for economic and other gain. current situation, challenges, and constraints that women Sudanese customs and norms affect women’s roles in so- and youth face in accessing employment opportunities. ciety. For example, the male breadwinner-female caregiver To identify and examine these challenges and constraints, model is based on the belief that women are first and fore- the study applies a conceptual framework derived from most wives and mothers whose duty is to care for their the World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality husbands, and their husbands’ family members, while and Development analytical framework. More specifically, bearing and raising children. By contrast, men are seen as the study examines the role of informal institutions, formal economic providers. For a woman in Sudan, two events are institutions, and markets as they relate to employment-re- particularly important in shaping her future: getting mar- lated outcomes for women and youth in Sudan. The study ried and having children. Given the strongly held beliefs and analyzes how these aspects influence intra-household de- expectations among the greater share of Sudanese society cision-making processes, especially as they relate to the about women’s primary role—if not sole role—as caregiv- participation of women and youth in the economic sphere. ers, it is not surprising to hear from focus groups that one These decisions directly affect individual-level endowments of the factors motivating recently married women to drop and agency, including access to economic opportunities. out of the labor force is the burden of household chores. According to data from the last household survey (National Patriarchal customs and norms, combined with a legal Household Budget and Poverty Survey - NHBPS 2014/15), framework that reinforces discriminatory practices, restrict three-quarters of men are in the labor force compared to women’s access to economic opportunities. a third of women. Few women work, as the overall un- Young people are less likely to participate in the labor employment rate for women is more than twice that of force and be employed compared to adults. Key informant men. Agriculture and services are the main sources of 1 Internally displaced person. 6  interviews (KIIs) and FGDs show that youth face many of and sometimes when you need money you don’t find loan the same challenges as women. For example, a male youth in the suitable time for you.” The FGDs also revealed that it from Nyala who had a university degree and was the own- was common for a combination of financial constraints and er of a medium-size agricultural business said, “Sometimes patriarchal customs to affect daughters’ ability to study as you don’t have possibilities, you can take loans from banks well as work outside the home after they were married. Potential policy actions The findings from this study point to several areas in which the labor market. Multipronged actions could be taken to targeted policies and programs might serve to help Sudan’s improve human development outcomes while at the same more vulnerable populations, specifically women and youth, time increasing the likelihood of adolescent girls engaging improve their economic circumstances. Five main areas are in income-generating activities. identified and summarized as follows. Identify and develop marketable skills that in- Boost access to finance for women. Women working crease opportunities for service sector employment in agriculture face similar constraints as women entrepre- and for entrepreneurial activities. The service sector neurs in the private sector. This includes access to credit, employs 46 percent of the labor force, but its growth is which requires the support of a male guardian. It is there- deterred by poor infrastructure conditions, such as lack of fore important to have lending opportunities that are marketing services, access to credit, and knowledge of man- designed to meet women’s needs. The study also finds that agement practices. Women and youth can be instrumental women are less likely to have land titles compared to male in contributing to the growth of this sector. For example, counterparts. Because land titles can be used as collateral many women and youth who migrate to cities from rural security for loans, promoting land titles for women would areas only have agricultural skills and lack relevant wasta. also mean promoting their access to credit. Vocational training can play an important role in developing and harnessing marketable skills for the service sector as Improve the access to and quality of agricultural well as for more entrepreneurial activities. jobs. Sustained agriculture is a main driver of employment and job creation. Achieving sustained agricultural growth Create an enabling environment that lifts gen- is vital for job creation and poverty reduction. Programs der-specific constraints. Lifting regulatory constraints should not only benefit women but also harness their to women’s economic participation is key. There are several capacity and include them from program design to imple- restrictions in Sudan’s current legal framework that are di- mentation. It will also be critical to develop and implement rectly related to economic opportunities. For example, the labor market policies that aim to build a skilled labor force, law prohibits women from working the same hours as men; consistent with the demands of the labor market, focused performing jobs deemed hazardous, arduous, or morally in- on women and youth. It would also be useful to design and appropriate; and performing the same tasks or work in the implement interventions specifically aimed at increasing same industries as men. Young persons’ employment con- the quality of jobs and targeting the working poor. ditions are also restricted by the law. According to Sudanese labor code, young persons are those under the age of 16. Combine efforts to build human capital with ac- While it is forbidden to employ those under the age of 12, tivities aimed at strengthening agency. It will be except in cases of training or work under family supervi- important to promote gender equality, track disparities sion, the rest are not allowed to work night shifts (8 p.m. in human capital accumulation, and ensure that girls and to 6 a.m.) or to work in hazardous, arduous, or morally in- young women complete their educations. Given that so- appropriate jobs. The working hours for young persons are cial norms related to the caregiving versus provider role seven hours with paid rest of one hour. Other legal mea- seem to be strongly internalized, it will be important to sures could be enacted to address related issues that affect identify ways to address girls’ low agency in determining girls’ and women’s human capital accumulation and well-be- their future—education and marriage—and to strengthen ing. Easing regulations to start a business would benefit their bargaining power within households and the greater both male and female entrepreneurs, but maybe even more community. Behavioral science-informed community-level so women, as they tend to have less capital. interventions to address social norms that restrict women’s economic activity can be explored, with activities targeting Taking these actions would not only help improve the ac- husbands, parents, and/or other community members. It cess of women and youth to employment opportunities, would also be important to close gender gaps in human cap- but it would also allow these groups to contribute toward ital accumulation and ensure women are better prepared for economic growth and poverty reduction in Sudan. 7 INTRODUCTION © Sari Omer / Photography The provision and access to quality employment opportunities, especially for women and youth, is instrumental in achieving inclusive growth and more effective develop- ment outcomes. Research shows that increasing female labor force participation to the levels of men could boost annual global gross domestic product (GDP) by 26 per- cent in 2025 compared with a business-as-usual scenario and that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 40–45 percent of the potential increase in output could come from shifting women into higher productivity sectors (McKinsey Global Institute 2015). In societ- ies where women and men are relatively equal, the economies tend to grow faster, the poor move more quickly out of poverty, and the well-being of all—men, women and children—is enhanced. However, in Sudan, women face a range of constraints to join and stay in the labor market and to benefit fully from economic opportunities. At the same time, youth are an asset and instrumental in achieving a large share of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), but they need to be equipped with the skills and opportunities required to reach their potential, support development, and con- tribute to peace and security. Young people today face significant challenges across the globe regarding economic inclusion. Youth unemployment is a global develop- ment challenge, especially in countries such as Sudan where around 60 percent of the population is below the age of 25 (CBS, 2020). In Sudan the labor market is characterized by low overall The focus is on women, with age-related data and infor- labor force participation, in which women and youth are mation provided wherever possible. The study reflects the particularly disadvantaged. Unemployment seems to be types of barriers that may prevent women and youth from a major cause of poverty in Sudan and addressing it is at capitalizing on existing economic opportunities. The study the core of the Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper also contributes to enhancing knowledge on women- and (I-PRSP). Building on the various national plans of the youth-related issues in Sudan, areas in which analytical Government of Sudan, the I-PRSP identifies promotion work is scarce. The findings from this study are expected to of economic growth and employment creation as one of be a tool for dialogue: they are expected to inform policy its four pillars. Labor force participation as a share of the decisions and programs aimed at creating more and bet- working-age population (15–64 years) increased from 48.3 ter-quality jobs. percent in 2009 to about 53.5 percent in 2014, while the The report is organized as follows. After a brief description unemployment rate decreased slightly to 11.3 percent of the analytical framing and methodology in Section 2, in 2014 from 12.5 percent in 2009 (World Bank 2019c). Section 3 presents the history and demographics of the labor The labor force participation rate is 76 percent among market in Sudan, focusing on indicators by gender and age men, compared to 33 percent among women (World Bank across the three main sectors of employment: services, agri- 2019b). Agriculture and services are the main sources of culture, and industry. Section 4 examines formal institutions: employment in Sudan, and employment in agriculture is the institutional setting, service delivery, and laws and reg- more common among women.2 The overall unemployment ulations as they relate to economic opportunities. Section rate for women is more than twice that of men (19 percent 5 examines informal institutions, where the social norms and 8 percent, respectively), and being a young woman is and networks can be a barrier to women’s and youth’s full even more detrimental: 27 percent of young women are un- economic participation. Section 6 analyzes how the market employed, compared to 20 percent of young men. is supporting or constraining economic activity, which in- Understanding gender- and youth-specific issues can help cludes a closer look at the labor market itself and access to identify entry points for greater employment opportunities assets. Section 7 discusses how all of these aspects are con- for women and youth in Sudan and shape actions for en- sidered when it comes to the household- and individual-level hanced growth and sustainability. The objective of this mixed decision-making that directly affects women’s and youth’s methods study is to contribute to a better understanding of accumulation of human capital, overall agency, and—ulti- the current situation, challenges, and constraints that wom- mately—their economic opportunities. Section 8 concludes en and youth face in accessing employment opportunities. with considerations for policy and action. 2 Agriculture accounts for 60 percent of all employment among women (and almost all employment in rural areas), compared to 39 percent among men. Women are mostly engaged in subsistence farming and their agricultural activities are key for both income generation and food security for the family. ANALYTICAL FRAMING AND METHODOLOGY © Sari Omer / Photography To identify and examine the constraints that women and youth face in accessing employment opportunities, including employment, the study applies a conceptual framework derived from the World Development Report 2012: Gender Equality and Development analytical framework. While the framework was developed for gender equality, it is also applicable to, and highly relevant for, better understanding the soci- etal conditions and individual-level outcomes of youth. The focus is on the economic opportunities dimension, particularly on employment, but relevant variables related to the interconnected dimensions of endowments and agency are also considered (Figure 1). The study examines the role of informal institutions (norms, stereotypes, trust, sense of security/safety, and so on); formal institutions (legal restrictions, em- ployer policies, and so on); and markets (access to finance, transport, day care, and so on) as they affect employment-related outcomes for women and youth in Sudan. The study analyzes how these aspects influence intra-household decision-making processes, especially as they relate to the participation of women and youth in the economic sphere. These decisions directly affect individual-level endowments and agency as well as access to economic opportunities. FIGURE 1. Conceptual framework Economic Opportunities Policies Informal Institutions Markets Endowments Agency Households Formal Growth Institutions Equal Opportunities CONDITIONS AT INDIVIDUAL LEVEL SOCIETAL LEVEL OUTCOMES Source: Authors’ adaptation of the 2012 World Development Report framework. TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY This study applies a mixed methods research methodology, Additional information has been drawn from existing em- combining existing evidence with new data to document pirical literature and country-specific resources, including a disparities in relevant development outcomes according review of the current legal and policy framework. The litera- to sex and age. This study also identifies segments of the ture review focuses on the perspectives of anthropological, population that are especially affected by limited access to sociological, and gender studies. Given the limited literature employment opportunities and areas in which continuing specifically focusing on women and youth in Sudan, before knowledge gaps are critical to understanding and address- conducting the literature review, the team reached out to ing persistent inequalities. Drawing on information from a number of leading scholars of Sudan, including Balghis household and perception surveys, new qualitative data, Badri, Nafisa Bedri, Janice Boddy, Ellen Gruenbaum, and an extensive literature review, this study investigates the Sondra Hale, Shadia Mohammed, Nada Mustafa Ali, and determinants of women’s and youth’s labor force participa- Harry Verhoeven, who recommended particular scholars’ tion and employment while also reviewing ongoing policies work. The literature review includes academic monographs, and general cultural norms that can limit women and youth peer reviewed journal articles, and reports from the World from capitalizing on existing economic opportunities. Bank and UN organizations, in combination with descrip- tive survey data from the World Bank, the Arab Barometer, In this report, ‘women’ refers to all females while ‘female and others. Selected online news sites, such as Dabanga, youth’ refers to females aged between 15 and 24 years. were also referenced. There is currently no universally agreed international defi- nition of the ‘youth’ age group. Sudan’s Ministry of Youth The qualitative research element of the study provides a and Sports defines youth as persons between the ages of deeper and more nuanced understanding of the binding 18 and 35 years. For this study, youth is defined as persons constraints on women and youth from both the supply between the ages of 15 and 24 years. This definition is used and demand side of jobs by conducting focus group discus- for several reasons. First, the United Nations (UN) defines sions (FGDs) and key informant interviews (KIIs) in three ‘youth’ as those persons between the ages of 15 and 24 different states of Sudan. A survey firm (Consulsat) was years.3 Second, a number of SDGs are based upon the 15–24 hired to develop and implement qualitative research in- age range. To compare between Sudan and other countries, struments to improve the understanding of the constraints it makes sense to adopt the UN definition. Moreover, while both women and youth face in joining and staying in the the percentage of Sudan’s population that would be classi- labor force, finding a job, and accessing self-employment. fied as youth would be greater (than the current 60 percent) A total of 33 FGDs with different segments of youth and if the age range of 18–35 was used, an analysis of the quan- women (urban/rural, employed/unemployed, and so on) titative data indicates that the outcome, or overall message were carried out regarding issues such as access to informa- from this report, would be the same: youth are still differ- tion, decision-making power and processes, and challenges entially disadvantaged compared to other segments of the to enter and stay in the workforce. The FGDs, 12 each in population. Khartoum and Madani and 9 in Nyala, were conducted sep- arately with men, women, male youth, and female youth. The main sources of quantitative data for this study are the The focus group participants had varying levels of edu- Sudan 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) cation—primary school to post-secondary education. and the 2014/15 National Household Budget and Poverty In-depth interviews with employers (28) include employers’ Survey (NHBPS). Both surveys, conducted by Sudan’s concerns, policies, and experiences related to hiring and re- Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS), employed a two-stage taining young people and women. The KIIs and FGDs were stratified cluster design in which the enumeration areas conducted in Arabic and then translated into English. The were selected in the first stage based on the 2008 Census, data were coded and then compiled, according to themes, in and individual households were randomly selected in the Excel spreadsheets. In addition to shedding light on urban/ second stage following household listing exercises in the rural divides, the qualitative work highlights regional differ- selected enumeration areas. The sample was designed to ences in three different states where services, agriculture, be representative both at the national and state levels, ac- and industries are the predominant employment sectors: counting for 8,000 and 11,953 households in 2009 and Khartoum (Khartoum State), Madani (Al-Gezira State), and 2014, respectively. These sources are complemented by ad- Nyala (South Darfur State) (see Box 1). Due to security is- ditional data sources such as the Multiple Indicator Cluster sues on the ground and some technical issues faced by the Survey (MICS 2014); World Development Indicators (WDI) survey firm, the fieldwork was conducted in two parts, with database; Doing Business (2019); the Women, Business the main work carried out between April and June 2019, and the Law (WBL) database (2021); the Enterprise Survey complemented by additional data collection in February (2014); Global Financial Inclusion (Global Findex 2011– 2020. Annex 1 provides a detailed description of the meth- 2014); the Afrobarometer (2018); and the Arab Barometer odology followed for the qualitative data collection. (2018). Econometric analysis was used to examine the de- terminants of some outcome variables relevant for women and youth. 3 https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-depth/youth-0/#:~:text=There%20is%20no%20universally%20agreed,of%2015% 20and%2024%20years. 12 Analytical Framing and Methodology TABLE 1. Brief description of sample characteristics and references used in the report Location Type of Population Population Poverty rate Labor force Nature of economic activity community projections (women (US$3.20 per participation rate 2020 and youth, capita per (male/femaleb) (millionsa) % of totala) day PPPb) Khartoum, Urban 7.3 W: 47% 40.2% M: 70.3% Has the highest concentration of Khartoum (state) Y: 16% (state) F: 25.1% industries and is the headquarters State (state) (state) of most of the major business establishments in Sudan. Based on industrial growth, the thriving service industry is also established in the city. Services include building and construction, trade, hotel and restaurants, transport and communications, finance, insurance and real estate, and government services. Also, Khartoum is a key transit point for those migrating through Sudan, mainly to Europe. Madani, Rural 4.7 W: 51% 39.7% M: 75.7% Has the second largest industrial sector Al-Gezira (state) Y: 20% (state) F: 22.6% after Khartoum, which accommodates State (state) (state) several factories including oil, textile, and cigarettes. Nyala, Rural 3.7 W: 48% 62.8% M: 79.2% Agriculture is the main source of South Darfur (state) Y: 24% (state) F: 66.5% income for most households. Most State (state) (state) common type is small-scale rainfed crop production. Sorghum and millet are the main crops grown here. Note: a. Central Bureau of Statistics Report on Population Projections 2009–2020; b. World Bank (2020b), based on NHBPS 2014/15. References. Throughout this report, male and female respondents from the FGDs are identified as ‘having a job’ or ‘working’ if they reported being engaged in any income-generating activity at the time of the research. For more detailed information, see Annex 1. 13 HISTORICAL AND DEMOGRAPHIC CONTEXT OF THE LABOR MARKET IN SUDAN © Sari Omer / Photography This section begins with a brief historical snapshot of the social, political, and eco- nomic transformations Sudan has undergone since achieving independence from Anglo-Egyptian co-rule in 1956, including how those transformations have influenced the present-day situation for women and young people in Sudan. This section then examines the characteristics of key development indicators related to current labor market and economic opportunities. A country of many transitions Since achieving independence from Anglo-Egyptian co- in April 2019. Inflation increased significantly from 35.1 rule in 1956, Sudan has experienced recurrent social, percent in September 2017 to 68 percent in September political, and economic instability. The First Sudanese Civil 2018 and has continued to trend upward, reaching 98.8 War (1955–1972) claimed half a million lives. The Second percent in April 2020. The rising inflation trend is driven by Sudanese Civil War (1983-2005) claimed an additional 2 exchange rate depreciation and monetary expansion to fi- million lives while displacing upward of 4 million people. nance the budget deficit. Protests that started in December The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) between the 2018 in Damazeen and Atbara quickly spread to Khartoum, north and the south brought decades of fighting to a close Port Sudan, Dongola, and other major cities of Sudan, de- by granting the south a six-year period of semi-autonomy, manding a regime change. The protests were prompted by following which it was mandated to hold a referendum on economic distress through shortages of bread, fuel, essen- whether to remain a part of Sudan. In 2011 the south voted tial medicines, and cash that have sharply increased the overwhelmingly for independence, and South Sudan be- cost of living in Sudan and affected basic livelihoods and came the world’s newest country (World Bank 2020b). food security. The protests resulted in the removal of former President Omar al-Bashir from power. A joint military-civil- Sudan is rich in water, and agriculture was the backbone of ian transitional government was set up to lead the country Sudan’s economy before the government’s decision in the for three years with the goal of transitioning to civilian rule 1990s to focus on the development of its oil industry, to through elections in 2022. the detriment of its other industries. Sudan’s economy grew from US$12 billion in 1999 to US$65 billion in 2011, repre- Sudanese women had already been suffering from the senting an average annual growth rate of 5.8 percent (World consequences of the country’s overdependence on its oil Bank 2019c) compared to an average annual growth rate of industry for decades. Employment in agriculture has con- 2.9 percent between 1980 and 1998 (Patey 2010). Since sistently been more common among Sudan’s women than the secession of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011, men, especially after the privatization that took place in however, Sudan has lost three-quarters of its oil reserves. the 1990s and the shift to a resource-based economy that Production levels are no longer sufficient to support domes- followed shortly thereafter (Khalfalla and Ahmed 2015). As tic consumption. In 2013, then President Omar al-Bashir of 2014, the agricultural sector accounted for 47 percent announced an end to fuel and other subsidies, which result- of Sudan’s total employment, which included 60 percent ed in protests across the country. The precipitous drop in oil of Sudan’s employed women and 80 percent of Sudan’s prices by 2015 (US$115 a barrel in mid-2014 and less than employed rural women (World Bank 2019c). Sudanese US$50 a barrel by the end of 2014) led to the devaluation of households whose primary source of income is derived Sudan’s currency. Inflation ensued shortly thereafter. from agriculture, rather than from other segments of the economy, are generally poorer, more vulnerable, and less re- The rising cost of living aggravated by a shortage of bread, silient (World Bank 2019c). fuel, and cash led to protests in December 2018 that cul- minated in the ousting of former President Omar al-Bashir TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Before the drop in oil prices, Sudan’s economy was already are employed than female non-IDPs because of more fe- crippled by the economic sanctions the United States had male-headed households among the IDP population (World imposed on the country in 1997, when it was added to the Bank 2018b). Poor wages in the agricultural sector have in- State Sponsors of Terrorism list. Comprehensive US sanc- duced some Sudanese, especially youth, to migrate to the tions on Sudan, levied in 1997 and expanded in 2006, were capital, Khartoum, in search of work. The lack of education, lifted in October 2017. This generated initial optimism, but skills, financial capital, and social networks has relegated foreign investors and commercial banks remained reluc- most of the youth to jobs in the informal sector, where tant to reengage. Trade and financial transactions between wages can be as poor as in the agricultural sector (Daoud, Sudan and the world economy continued to be limited, Eldeen, and Bello 2017). most likely because Sudan continued to be designated The size, growth, distribution, and structure of the Sudanese by the US as a state sponsor of terrorism until December population directly affect its labor force. Sudan faces rapid 2020, when it was officially removed from the list. While population growth compared to many neighboring coun- the change in designation is expected to herald Sudan’s tries, and its total population in 2019 was estimated at 42.5 re-entry to the world economy, the cumulative effect of two million persons according to the WDI. Sudan’s population decades of limited interaction, including both foreign direct is mostly young as a result of relatively high fertility (4.4 investment (FDI) and development assistance, puts it in a in 2018) and lower-than-expected life expectancy (less than highly precarious economic position. In 2014, 46 percent 62 years). More than two in five (43 percent) Sudanese of Sudan’s population was classified as poor when poverty are below the age of 15 and only 4 percent are older than is defined as living on less than US$3.20 per day (the in- 64 (CBS 2017; World Bank 2020b). While fertility is ex- ternational poverty line for lower-middle-income countries) pected to slow down from 5.3 in 2005 to 3.4 in 2030, the (World Bank 2020b). population is still anticipated to double during this period. Forced displacement and internal migration have also af- Importantly, this growth will be accompanied by profound fected Sudanese women’s and youth’s socioeconomic status. age structure change. Children below age 15 will increase Sudan is host to one of the larger populations of internal- to about 21.4 million in 2035 compared to 13.8 million in ly displaced persons (IDPs) in the world. The vast majority 2005. The workforce aged 20 to 64 is expected to reach 32 of Sudan’s 1.9 million IDPs is concentrated in the Darfur million in 2035 in contrast to 13.9 million in 2005; one half region (UNHCR 2020). In addition, the country hosts 1.1 of the workforce will be youth (Republic of Sudan: National million refugees and asylum seekers, mostly from South Population Council 2018). There are roughly equal numbers Sudan (UNHCR 2020), though large numbers of Ethiopians of males and females in the country’s urban and rural areas. from the Tigray Region of Ethiopia have begun moving into However, there are a larger share of men above 50 years of Sudan as the fighting that began in that region in November age, whereas in the population aged 25–49, there are more 2020 has intensified. Sudan’s IDPs in Darfur are employed women (Figure 2). at rates similar to its non-IDPs, though more female IDPs FIGURE 2. Sudan’s population pyramid 2014 90-94 80-84 70-74 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4 -0.2 -0.15 -0.1 -0.05 0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 Women/girls Boys/men Source: World Bank 2019b. 16 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan Characteristics of the labor market in the last decade Despite a significant increase in the number of jobs in workforce is a key driver behind the overall increase in the Sudan, the labor force participation rate, at 53 percent of labor force participation rate in Sudan. The country’s in- the working-age population, remains the lowest among crease in the labor force participation rate between 2009 the average rate of Sub-Saharan Africa, low-income and and 2014 (from 48 to 53 percent) was mainly due to the lower-middle-income countries.4 The Sudanese econo- substantial increase in female participation rate from 24 my added 2.5 million jobs between 2009 and 2014 while percent in 2009 to 33 percent in 2014. This positive change the working-age population increased by around 2.8 mil- took place in both urban and rural areas. However, while lion and the active population by 2.6 million. As a result, the female labor force participation rate increased by nearly there were measurable improvements for the working-age 10 percentage points (compared to only 2 percentage points population between 2009 and 2014 with a more than 5 among men), it remains less than half the male rate: the percentage point increase in the labor force participation, labor force participation rate is 76 percent among men com- from 48 to 53 percent, and a decrease in the unemploy- pared to 33 percent among women (World Bank 2019b). In ment rate from 13 to 11 percent (Figure 3).5 Despite these addition, among the third of women who are economically improvements, Sudan’s labor force participation rate lags active, few women actually work: they are more than twice behind many neighboring and post-conflict African coun- as likely as men to be unemployed (19 percent and 8 per- tries such as Chad (71 percent), Eritrea (81 percent), and cent, respectively). Ethiopia (82 percent). The employment-to-population ratio Despite the increase in all regions, female labor force par- in Sudan is the lowest (41 percent) among the average share ticipation rates were below 20 percent in the Northern, of Sub-Saharan Africa and low-income countries (63 and 68 Eastern, and Central regions. In contrast, more than half percent, respectively) (WDI 2020, data for 2019). of all working-age women in Darfur and Kordufan were economically active in 2014. Compared to those living in Labor market indicators by gender and age Khartoum, women who live in Kordufan and Darfur are Women’s economic activity lags substantially behind that more likely than men to participate in the labor force. of men, even though their increased participation in the Living in rural areas increases the odds for women to be in the labor market and to be employed by 42 percent and 87 FIGURE 3. Labor force participation rates and unemployment rate by sex, quintile, locality, and year A LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATE B UNEMPLOYMENT RATE 80% 30% 60% 20% 40% 10% 20% 0% 0% All Women Men B20% B40% T20% Rural Urban All Women Men B20% B40% T20% Rural Urban BY GENDER BY QUINTILE BY LOCALITY BY GENDER BY QUINTILE BY LOCALITY 2009 2014 2009 2014 Source: World Bank 2019c. 4 Labor force participation rate is the proportion of the population aged 15–64 that is economically active: all people who supply labor for the production of goods and services during a specified period. 5 There are differences in the design of the labor modules between the two surveys: the recall period changed from 7 days in 2009 to 10 days in 2014, and the order in which questions were asked changed, with implications for skipping patterns. 17 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY percent, respectively.6 Yet despite the much lower participa- odds to be employed and to be in the labor force increased tion rates, working-age women were about as likely as men by nearly 80 percent and by 32 percent, respectively. The to be unemployed. Conversely, youth labor force participa- labor force participation rate increased by 12 percentage tion rates increased by varying degrees in all regions and points in the Northern region and only by 1.3 percentage in both urban and rural areas. For youth in rural areas, the points in Kordufan (Figure 4). FIGURE 4. Labor force participation rate by locality and region A YOUTH LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION B WOMEN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION 60% 70% 60% 50% 50% 40% 40% 30% 30% 20% 20% 10% 10% 0% 0% Sudan Rural Urban Northern Eastern Khartoum Central Kordofan Darfur Sudan Rural Urban Northern Eastern Khartoum Central Kordofan Darfur BY BY RURAL/URBAN BY REGION RURAL/URBAN BY REGION 2009 2014 2009 2014 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. FIGURE 5. Population out of the labor force, by gender, age, and locality 100% 80% 60% 40% 20% 0% Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Overall 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 SHARE IN LF POPULATION Sudan Urban Rural Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. Note: LF means “Labor Force” 6 The pattern is the same for other categories (men and adults); compared to urban areas, living in rural areas increases the chances for men and adults to be employed by 35 percent and 41 percent, respectively. Data based on logistic regression model using the NHBPS 2014/15. 18 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan Many women do not even enter the labor force: women gen- (17 percent in 2014). The unemployment rate decreased by erally, and female youth in particular, represent the highest 4 percentage points for women but only by 1 percentage share of the population out of the labor force. For men it is point among men between 2009 and 2014. more common to be out of the labor force before the age of There is considerable variation in unemployment among the 24, while women are likely to be out of the labor force across states, with higher unemployment among women in bet- all age cohorts. Three in every four young women (75 per- ter-off states. Compared to 2009, unemployment increased cent) are not in the labor market, compared to just over half primarily in Sudan’s Northern, Khartoum, and Central (54 percent) of young men. The percentage out of the labor regions and decreased markedly in Kordufan and Darfur force varies significantly across working-age men and wom- regions. Unemployment is above the national average for en: only 3 to 13 percent for men aged 25 to 64 compared to almost all states with the lowest poverty incidence in 2014: 58 to 66 percent for women (Figure 5). Al-Gezira (23 percent), River Nile (17 percent), Khartoum Being a housewife and full-time student are the main rea- (17 percent), and Northern (15 percent). The states with sons why women and youth are out of the labor force, the lowest unemployment rates were Blue Nile (5 percent); respectively. More than two-thirds (70 percent) of women South Kordufan, Sennar, and Kassala (6 percent each); and reported being out of the labor force because they were North Kordufan (7 percent). Women were more likely to be either a housewife or homemaker, compared to only 2 per- unemployed in the richest states: Al-Gezira (58 percent), cent for men. Among youth, 64 percent reported the reason River Nile (45 percent), Northern (40 percent), Khartoum as being full-time students. Nearly half of the household (30 percent), Kassala (19 percent), and Sinnar (17 percent). heads were in the labor force, but only 52 percent were em- In those states, adult female unemployment rates were two ployed (Figure 6). to five times the unemployment rates of males (Figure 7). The fact that unemployment is less prevalent among wom- The overall unemployment rate declined from 13 percent in en in poorer states, that are also mainly rural, reflects that 2009 to 11 percent in 2014, with variation by gender and most of the women in those states are engaged in agri- location. The decrease in unemployment among the poor- culture. It is relatively easy to find work in the agriculture est quintile and rural areas contributed substantially to the sector compared to other sectors. Overall, people in the overall decline in the unemployment rate. Among the bot- poorer states are more likely to be working compared to tom 20 percent of the population, unemployment fell from those in the richer states, which are mainly concentrated in 18 percent in 2009 to only 10 percent in 2014. In rural ar- the urban areas, where there are limited opportunities to eas, the unemployment rate decreased from 14 percent in engage in agricultural activities. 2009 to 8 percent in 2014, which is lower than urban areas FIGURE 6. Reasons for being out of the labor force 100% Income recipient Pensioner/retired 80% Disabled/too sick 24% 2% 36.6% Too old 70% No hope to find job 60% Full time 79% 93% homemaker/housewife 89% 40% 73% 64% 60% 48.5% 20% 21% 9% 0% Male Female 15-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 OVERALL GENDER AGE GROUP Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. 19 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY FIGURE 7. Unemployment rate by state and gender 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% Al-Gezira River Nile Khartoum Northern East Darfur West Kordufan West Darfur White Nile Red Sea South Darfur North Darfur Central Darfur North Kordufan Kassala Sinnar South Kordufan Blue Nile Al-Gadarif Total Male Female Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. FIGURE 8. Youth unemployment rate by gender, quintile, locality, and year 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% All youth Women Men B20% B40% T20% Rural Urban BY GENDER BY QUINTILE BY LOCALITY 2009 2014 Source: World Bank 2019b. Youth unemployment increased between 2009 and 2014, 2 percentage points during the same period but remained especially in urban areas. Unemployment among the pop- higher than male youth unemployment (Figure 8). The gen- ulation between 15 and 24 years increased by 2 percentage der gap is also pronounced across many states with lower points from 20 percent in 2009 to 22 percent in 2014, with poverty incidence, a pattern similar to all working-age a sharp increase in urban areas reaching nearly 40 per- adults, as explained earlier. cent in 2014. Female youth unemployment decreased by 20 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan Employment sectors and type of work employers (Figure 9). Unpaid work within the family is the most common type of employment for women, particularly Women are overrepresented in non-paid jobs, while men for younger women in rural areas. constitute most of the employers, paid workers, and own account workers. Employment types are categorized as Before the separation from South Sudan in July 2011, paid employee, employer, own account worker, unpaid Sudan was the largest country in Africa in terms of land family worker, and unpaid working for others. This catego- mass. Sudan is now the third largest country in Africa be- rization is important as it sheds light on why there may be hind Algeria and the Democratic Republic of Congo. Since differences in incomes and access to social benefits across the late 1990s, Sudan’s economy has been driven by oil. different groups. For example, non-paid jobs correlate with That said, the mainstay for the greater share of the popula- low incomes and less likelihood of having health insurance tion has always been agriculture. According to a UN World coverage—benefits that are relatively common among Food Programme (WFP) study that was conducted in 2006, paid employees. Among the non-paid workers, 64 percent Sudan was estimated to have 84 million ha of arable land. are women. Only one-fifth (21 percent) of paid employ- However, only 17 million ha, or 20 percent, of that land ees are women, and even less are employers (18 percent). was being cultivated (Karrar, Abbadi, and Adam 2006). Youth represent only 20 percent of the working population, Some of Sudan’s agricultural land is irrigated. However, the yet constitute more than 40 percent of the unpaid work- vast majority of it—upward of 90 percent according to a ers, and only represent 18 percent of the paid employees, 2003 governmental study—is dependent solely on rainfall 13 percent of own account workers, and 10 percent of (Ibnouf 2011).7 FIGURE 9. Work category by gender and by age cohort Unpaid Worker 36% 64% Unpaid Worker 41% 59% Own Account Worker 76% 24% Own Account Worker 13% 87% Employer 82% 18% Employer 10% 90% Paid Employee 79% 21% Paid Employee 18% 82% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% Male Female Youth Adults Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. 7 The effect of climate change on agriculture is relevant to Sudan, as Sudan is highly dependent on agriculture, and climate change can lead to increased drought and desert- ification, which can lead to decreased agricultural output. For this study, however, the effect of climate change on agriculture is not discussed, because the objective of this study is not to address climate change but to address the inequity in economic opportunities for women and youth. 21 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Employment in agriculture is more common among wom- heavily male dominated, while employment among women en, among the poor, and in rural areas. Nearly 70 percent is largely restricted to the agricultural sector in rural areas of Sudanese occupations are focused on elementary occupa- and to the service sector in urban areas. Less than 4 per- tions and skilled agriculture. Both elementary occupations8 cent of women are service or market sales workers and even and skilled agriculture represent more than one-third of the fewer are technicians or senior officials—job categories that working-age population, which is consistent with the trend require certain level of higher education. Young people rep- in the sector in which they are mainly involved. In fact, out resent nearly 45 percent of the workers in skilled agriculture of the 2.5 million additional jobs created between 2009 and and fishing, with female youth representing 60 percent. 2014, 1.9 million, more than three-quarters, were added in Male youth are more likely to be in elementary occupations. agriculture.9 As a result, the share of agricultural workers in- An employer interviewed as a part of the qualitative re- creased by more than 10 percentage points. About 8 percent search for this report suggests that agricultural workers are of all employment in Sudan is in industries while 47 and essential: a manager of a medium-size private agricultural 44 percent of employment is in agriculture and services, re- operation in Nyala said, “In the last period, it is the opposite spectively (Figure 10). Agriculture accounts for 60 percent there is a lot of problems because of the war that was during of employment among women but only 39 percent among the past thirteen years, so the agriculture you can say that men. It is also more common among the poor, with a share the half of the farmers aren’t farmers anymore. Yes, it has of 58 percent among the bottom 40 percent and a share of deteriorated too much because of the conditions.” 27 percent among the top 20 percent. Jobs in industries are FIGURE 10. Employment shares by sector, gender, quintile, and locality, 2014 100% 19% 31% 32% 80% 38% 35% 1% 37% 47% 51% 63% 5% 6% 60% 2% 7% 79% 76% 86% 7% 8% 10% 80% 40% 60% 63% 10% 62% 58% 56% 20% 44% 39% 27% 13% 15% 5% 8% 9% 8% 0% All Women Men B20% B40% T20% Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Women Women Men Men BY GENDER BY QUINTILE BY LOCALITY BY LOCALITY AND GENDER Services Industries Agriculture Source: World Bank 2019b. 8 Elementary occupations consist of simple and routine tasks that mainly require the use of hand-held tools and often some physical effort. Tasks performed by workers in elementary occupations usually include selling goods in streets and public places or from door to door; providing various street services; cleaning, washing, pressing; taking care of apartment houses. 9 Wholesale and retail trade and education accounted for significant shares—about 730,000 and 475,000 jobs, respectively. All other categories account for fewer than 500,000 jobs each, with construction (425,000), transport and storage (372,000), and public administration and defense (344,000) the most important. Only around 140,000 Sudanese are employed in manufacturing, a sector that is often seen as having ample potential for growth in labor productivity. 22 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan Education and economic opportunities school, respectively) (Figure 11). The primary enrollment increase was mainly driven by an increase in girls’ atten- Low educational attainment has far-reaching impacts dance in the poorest quintiles in urban areas. The difference across domains, including on people’s earnings and stan- in enrollment between the poorest and richest quintiles dards of living (Wodon et al. 2018). A recent study confirms was 9 percentage points at the primary level and 11 per- that educational gaps between boys and girls in Sudan are centage points at the secondary level. Although enrollment still striking, and they perpetuate gender inequality, with rates have increased, Sudan is still below the average of child labor also contributing to keeping future genera- Sub-Saharan Africa countries at the primary and secondary tions uneducated (Berenger and Verdier-Chouchane 2015). levels. Sudanese boys have 7.9 expected years of schooling Enrollment rates in Sudan have increased across the board and girls 7.3 (WDI 2020, data for 2015). Access to school is in the last few decades, but especially noticeable is the 20 affected by multiple factors, and the intersection of poverty, percentage point increase in girls’ enrollment in prima- rurality, and gender decreases the likelihood of children at- ry school and 16 percentage point increase in secondary tending school: a poor girl living in a rural area is 25 percent school between 2001 and 2017 (compared to 15 and 8 per- less likely to attend school than a boy living in an urban area centage point increases for boys in primary and secondary (World Bank 2012a). FIGURE 11. School enrollment rates, %, gross 79.2 77.9 80.0 74.4 67.6 64.7 60.0 54.7 46.3 47.0 40.3 38.1 36.2 40.0 31.0 16.8 17.1 20.0 15.9 14.6 9.0 7.8 0.0 Female Male Female Male Female Male PRIMARY SECONDARY TERTIARY 2001 2008 Latest available Source: WDI data retrieved May 2020. Note: Latest available year is 2017 for primary and secondary enrollment and 2015 for tertiary enrollment rates. 23 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Early marriage is one of the main reasons girls (4–24 years) with a change in cultural norms, a topic that is discussed in drop out of school. According to MICS 2014, early marriage subsequent sections of this report. was the third most common reason for girls’ dropout but While educational attainment is generally low in Sudan, was not a factor for boys, echoing broader analysis from the young women and men who reach the level of tertiary ed- region showing that child marriage is one of the main rea- ucation choose different areas of study. As noted below, sons that girls leave school early (Wodon et al. 2017). MICS occupational segregation has direct implications for the 2014 data indicate that 21 percent of girls in Sudan were gender wage gap, and for skilled labor this is correlated with married by the age of 15, but this rate rises to 26 percent the areas of study. In Sudan, there are no significant gen- if only girls in rural areas are considered. Though national der disparities in the graduate programs across the different child protection legislation was introduced in 2010, it does fields of study (Figure 12). However, a couple of things stand not cover protection for girls against early or forced mar- out. Women are not only disproportionately represented riage.10 Early marriage has negative effects on educational in the agricultural sector in the labor force, but they also attainment for girls and is strongly correlated with poverty represent the majority of tertiary education graduates from and low education of the mother (World Bank 2018a). Early agriculture programs. This suggests that women’s role in the marriage can also have cyclical effects, as it often leads to sector can go far beyond low-skilled labor and they could early pregnancies that prevent a girl from going to school. play an important role in developing the sector. At the same In line with this trend, MICS 2014 data show that fertility time, while less than a third (28 percent) of the graduates rates are nearly twice as high for adolescent girls who live from Science, Technology, Engineering, and Mathematics in rural areas than for those in urban areas, where marriage (STEM) programs are female, women dominate the share of rates are lower (World Bank 2018a). It should be noted that graduates in information and communication technology the Government of Sudan’s decision in November 2020 to (ICT). However, several focus group participants from the fully adopt the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of qualitative work for this report indicated that certain areas the Child (ACRWC), including the prohibition against child of studies are seen as more—or less—appropriate for wom- marriage, has the potential to have a positive impact on en. A female youth from Khartoum who was not working girls’ educational attainment moving forward. However, the outside the home said, “I am a girl and I want to study art implementation of the legislation would need to be coupled FIGURE 12. Graduates in tertiary education fields of study, by gender, % Agriculture 55.1 44.9 Information and Communication Technologies 53.8 46.2 Humanities and Arts 50.2 49.8 Health and Welfare 49.9 50.1 Education 49.0 51.0 Social Science, Business and Law 48.0 52.0 Science 47.7 52.3 Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction 46.3 53.7 Business, Administration and Law 44.9 55.1 Science, Technology, Engineering and Math 27.8 72.2 0.0 10.0 20.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 70.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 Female Male Source: WDI data retrieved May 2020. All data for 2015, except ‘Engineering, Manufacturing and Construction’ and ‘Education’, both datapoints for 2012. 10 More about the legal framework and the reasons behind early marriage can be found in the sections related to informal and formal institutions below (specifically in ‘Customs and norms impact women’s roles in society’ and ‘A legal and institutional framework with direct implications for women’s economic participation’). 24 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan and theater, but my family is fanatical so they don’t accept The labor market seems to demand low-skilled labor as that a girl study something like that, and they don’t accept there is a general pattern where there are better job oppor- to have a girl who can perform anything on the TV.” A work- tunities for people without education than those with any ing woman, also from Khartoum, said, “Civil engineering is education. Women and youth with some or completed pri- hard on girls, a boy can be better at this specialty.” mary education have 38 and 65 percent lower chances to be in the labor force and employed, respectively, compared This educational context translates into the current to those with no education (Annex 2). Men with some or Sudanese labor force in which close to half (45 percent) completed primary education have a 58 and 52 percent of those out of the labor force are individuals with no ed- lower probability to be a labor force participant and em- ucation. This group represents the majority (52 percent) ployed, respectively, compared to men with no education. of the employed group. This probably explains why most On the other hand, women and adults with higher educa- of those engaged in agriculture have no education. Given tion attainment (post-secondary and above) are better-off that individuals with secondary and above secondary edu- than those with no education, with greater chances of being cation represent only 26 percent of the labor force, of which employed and participating in the labor force. A plausible 45 percent are unemployed while only 23 are percent em- explanation for this observed pattern is that people with no ployed, it suggests that the market demand is focused on education are more likely to be employed in the agriculture low-skilled and low-paid work (Figure 13). There are stark sector in rural areas. On the other hand, educated persons gender differences: most women who are out of the labor are more likely to be living in urban areas and looking for force also appear to have no education (41 percent). The better-paid jobs. If they do not find high-skilled jobs, they corresponding number for males is only 4 percent. But for will remain unemployed, with little opportunity to fall back all levels of educational attainment, the share of women on agriculture-related work, which is relatively hard to find out of the labor force is consistently higher than for men, in urban settings. although the gender gap is smallest for those with post-sec- ondary education. Conversely, for any level of educational Among the working-age population, only 3 percent at- attainment, the share of women who are employed is always tended vocational training with women and youth being lower than that for men. This may be explained in part by particularly disadvantaged (CBS 2017). In the context of an the fact that some women leave the labor force to be a full- educational system that has weakened over the last few de- time housewife. cades, there is often a mismatch between the skills acquired in school and those required by employers. For example, from KIIs that were conducted for this report, a human FIGURE 13. Labor force indicators by sex and educational attainment 80% 5% 70% 12% 8% 60% 10% 22% 50% 20% 16% 11% 40% 9% 10% 30% 4% 2% 15% 2% 20% 4% 12% 41% 34% 4% 10% 18% 10% 13% 14% 4% 0% Male Female Male Female Male Female EMPLOYED UNEMPLOYED OUT OF LABOR FORCE No qualification Some/Completed Primary Secondary Post-Secondary and above Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBPS 2014/15. 25 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY resources manager of a large pharmaceutical services com- in 2014) and average daily wages (from 8.4 in 2009 to 6.1 pany in Khartoum said, “Actually, in Sudan in general, I in 2014). While men’s average wages declined by 11 per- think there is a problem in service state, I mean as a sector cent, women’s wages declined by more than one-third. […] the service concept in Sudan doesn’t work, even in the This is expected as the increase in labor force participation private sector, you find that there is a governmental part and employment among women has been concentrated in so you don’t feel that it’s working in the professional way.” low-productivity activities such as agriculture (Figure 14). A human resources manager of a medium-size industry in Differences in characteristics between male and female Madani said, “No, it needs more, it’s advanced but slow, it wage workers in terms of education, employment sector, lo- needs more concentration, more training for the employee cation, and age explain about 96 percent of the gender gap and more experience.” In this case, vocational training could in monthly earnings. The Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition fill some of the skills gaps that might improve employment splits the wage gap between men and women into three ef- possibilities. At present, only 36 percent of the attendees fects: (a) endowment effect (reflecting the mean increase in are women (compared to 64 percent men) and 27 percent women’s wages if they had the same characteristics as men), are youth (compared to 73 percent adults). The low atten- (b) coefficient effect (reflecting the change in women’s wag- dance of women and youth is in part due to their limited es when applying the men’s coefficients to the women’s access to training centers, which eventually results in a mis- characteristics), and (c) interaction effect (measures the match between the areas of employment in which women simultaneous effect of differences in endowments and co- and youth are interested and the skilled labor demanded efficients). Determinants of monthly earnings used in the by the labor market. Case in point, a 2018 International analysis are education, sector of employment, location, and Labour Organization (ILO) study conducted in White Nile age. The results show that the mean log wage is 6.75 for State found that women and youth were highly interested men and 6.20 for women, yielding a wage gap of 0.55. The in taking part in vocational and/or skills training oppor- endowment effect explains about 5.4 percent of this dif- tunities that might improve their chances of getting a job. ference, while 95.5 percent is explained by the coefficient However, the lack of training centers in their communities effect and negative 0.9 percent by the interaction effect. The forced them to travel more than two hours to find one, large coefficient effect is mainly captured in the regression which was costly, timewise and monetary-wise, and many intercept, indicating possible gender-based discrimination could not afford (ILO 2018, 18). in the labor market. In other words, men generally benefit from more favorable return to characteristics. In addition, Gender wage gap male wage workers are more advantaged due to their over- Globally, the more education women have, the higher the representation in industries which are linked with higher economic return on education. While women with some wage premiums (that is, endowment effect). Women’s over- primary education earn 14 to 19 percent more than those representation in agriculture and other low productivity with no education at all, women with secondary education jobs contributes to the gender wage gap. Annex 2 provides make almost twice as much and women with tertiary edu- detailed results of the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition. cation earn almost three times as much as women with no These findings are consistent with the FGDs where wages education (Wodon et al. 2018). Women who have secondary were a frequent topic of conversation, especially among and tertiary education tend to have higher labor force par- women. A female youth from Khartoum who was working ticipation and more often full-time work. Studies point to said, “My friend dropped out her work because her salary several factors contributing to women’s lower earnings than was too low in return of the efforts she was making.” A fe- men, including the fact that fewer women are economically male youth from Madani who was not working concurred, active than men and often work fewer hours (for example, “The salary maybe not enough. They prefer to exert effort in Wodon et al. 2020). However, there is also a tendency for house rather than exerting efforts at work in return of low women to be paid less than men when working. In addition, salary.” Some of the focus group participants took the con- social norms affect the occupational segregation across sec- versation to the next level, noting that some managers used tors and types of employment as well as between the paid women’s wages as a bargaining chip to get them to do what and unpaid work as household and care responsibilities are they wanted. A male youth from Madani who did not have a considered women’s work, while men are considered pro- job said, “Yes sometimes the owners or managers use wom- viders. (This is discussed in greater detail in the section on en needs against them they make them work extra hours informal institutions). for instance if their working hours are for eight hours they In Sudan, earnings have gone down, and the decrease in make them work for ten hours, or they might cut their pay real wages has been more pronounced among women and because they think that their work don’t require so much the better-off. More people in urban areas earned less than money. And sometimes they cut out their income because US$1.90 a day in 2014, compared to 2009, a pattern fol- they are late.” A man from Nyala who had a job added, “They lowed by a decline in the median (from 6.1 in 2009 to 3.8 can delay her salary.” 26 Historical and Demographic Context of the Labor Market in Sudan FIGURE 14. Daily average and median wages among the employed and share of employed earning wages be- low the US$1.90-poverty line by gender, quintile, locality, and year A AVERAGE AND MEDIAN DAILY WAGES OF B SHARE OF EMPLOYED EARNING EMPLOYED POPULATION DAILY WAGES BELOW US$1.90 RATIO OF US$1.90 POVERTY LINE 10 15% 8 6 10% 4 5% 2 0 0% All employed Women Men Bottom 20% Bottom 40% Top 20% Rural Urban All employed Women Men Bottom 20% Bottom 40% Top 20% Rural Urban 2009 2014 Median 2009 2014 Source: World Bank 2019b. 27 FORMAL INSTITUTIONS: SETTING THE TONE FOR LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION © Atif Saad / Photography The preceding section of this report presented a brief overview of the historical and demographic context, and the key labor market characteristics, of Sudan, especial- ly for women and youth. In this section, Sudan’s legal and institutional framework is discussed. Particular attention is paid to formal institutions and the mechanisms that encourage, or discourage, women and youth from accumulating human capital and participating equally in the economy of Sudan. The section begins with a discussion of three laws that have been passed over the past 20 years that have had a lasting impact on women’s, and to a lesser extent youth’s, agency: the 1991 Muslim Personal Status Law (MPSL), the 1997 Labor Code, and the 2008 National Elections Act. Next, there is a discussion about land and property rights, as access to these types of assets can have a direct impact on the ability to access financing. Finally, there is a discussion about national machineries and strategies to improve women’s and youth’s economic opportunities as well as grassroots initiatives that women and youth have pursued on their own. A legal and institutional framework with direct implications for women’s economic participation Sudan is one of the few countries that is not party to the from 190 countries are examined going back nearly 50 years. United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Each country is provided an overall score that is an average Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW). The of their individual score for each dimension, ranging from convention, known as the international bill of rights for 0 to 100, with 100 representing the highest score (that is, women, provides the basis for realizing equality between there are no legal differences in men’s and women’s access to women and men through ensuring women’s equal access to, economic opportunities in the indicators measured). Sudan for example, education, health care, and employment.11 The has an overall score of 29.4, and the only three countries country has also not developed a National Action Plan for that score lower than Sudan are Kuwait, with an overall implementing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 which score of 28.8; Yemen, with an overall score of 26.9, and the calls for the greater involvement of women in all peace and West Bank and Gaza, with an overall score of 26.3 (World security efforts. Bank 2020d; World Bank 2021). Women in Sudan enjoy less than a third of the rights men Over the last decade, Sudan has not seen any improve- do related to their economic opportunities, according to ments in the dimensions measured, and it scores 0 on the the World Bank’s WBL 2021 report. The report explores the dimensions of mobility, workplace, pay, and marriage. For legal differences in men’s and women’s access to econom- example, the legal restrictions the 1997 Labor Code differ- ic opportunities, measured through a series of indicators entially imposes on men and women affect the score of the across eight dimensions: mobility, workplace, pay, marriage, pay dimension in particular, which measures laws and regu- parenthood, entrepreneurship, assets, and pension. Data lations concerning job restrictions and the gender wage gap. 11 The other countries that have not signed are the Holy See, the Islamic Republic of Iran, Somalia, and Tonga. The United States and Palau have signed but not ratified the treaty. Recent media coverage in Sudan suggests that Sudan may change its position with respect to the treaty. TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY BOX 1. Sudan’s legal system and Constitution English common law, Islamic law, and Sudanese cus- shall be made; however, the legislation shall be guid- tomary law form the basis of Sudan’s legal system. ed by the nation’s public opinion, the learned opinion Sudan was subject to Anglo-Egyptian co-rule from 1899 of scholars and thinkers, and then by the decision of until 1956. During the 1960s and early 1970s, there were those in charge of public affairs.” Following the conclu- several attempts by interim Sudanese governments sion of the Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005), to replace British legal precedents with, for example, the 1998 Constitution was superseded by the 2005 Egyptian legal precedents that were based on the Interim Constitution. ‘Sources of legislation’ are dis- French civil code. However, these changes did not take cussed in Article 5 of the 2005 Interim Constitution hold. Beginning in the late 1970s, Sudan’s leaders be- which addresses north and south separately. Article gan drafting legislation to bring Sudan’s legal system 5 begins: “Nationally enacted legislation having effect in line with Islamic law. In 1983, Islamic law, specifically only in respect of the Northern states of the Sudan shall Sharia law, was adopted, a change that was not em- have as its sources of legislation Islamic Sharia and the braced by everyone, especially those in the south. consensus of the people.” Sharia law was reaffirmed following the 1989 coup that The 2005 Interim Constitution was amended in 2017. brought Omar al-Bashir to power. Article 65 of the 1998 Then, in April 2019, President Omar al-Bashir, who had Constitution, which replaced the 1973 Constitution, been in power for 30 years, was deposed in a coup. independent Sudan’s first Constitution, stated that: In August 2019, the transitional government drafted a “Sources of legislation [are] Islamic law and the con- ‘constitutional declaration’ which is intended to guide sensus of the nation, by referendum, Constitution and the country through a three-year transition period custom shall be the sources of legislation; and no during which a new Constitution, and various pieces of legislation in contravention with these fundamentals legislation, are intended to be produced. Sources: An-Na'im 2017; Metz 1991; 1998 Sudan Constitution; 2005 Sudan Interim Constitution; UNDP 2018. Married women are required by law to obey their husbands, matters of guardianship, marriage, including polygamy and but they can still obtain a national ID card in the same way divorce, custody, and inheritance. According to the 1991 as married men. There is no legal provision that prohibits MPSL, a wife is obliged to obey her husband, which means or invalidates child or early marriage nor are married wom- that a husband can, among other things, deny his wife the en legally protected from domestic violence or marital rape. opportunity to seek employment outside the home. If a Annex 3 provides an overview of how Sudan fairs across all wife disobeys her husband by seeking employment outside indicators measured. the home, the husband can cease fulfilling his marital obli- gation to provide for his wife (Biro 1994). This could leave There is a mutually reinforcing nature between a society’s the wife destitute if she has no other means to support her- formal legal framework and its norms and customs. Two self. Sudanese women may, and in many if not most cases pieces of legislation passed in the 1990s that have argu- do, receive inheritance from their fathers. That said, a study ably had a greater impact on Sudanese women’s, and to a by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lesser extent Sudanese youth’s, economic potential than confirms that, in practice, daughters generally receive half any other pieces of legislation are the 1991 MPSL and the as much as sons (UNDP 2018). Public perception seems 1997 Labor Code. In addition, the 2008 National Elections to be in favor of gender-differentiated inheritance rights. Act introduced a quota for women’s representation in the According to the Arab Barometer (2018), the vast majori- Parliament. ty of respondents, 87 percent, do not believe that women should have the right to the same share of inheritance as Family roles defined in the Muslim Personal Status men.12 However, when it comes to divorce, a considerably Law larger share of women (54 percent) than men (37 percent) Islamic family law governs Muslims’ behaviors in different believe that women should have the same right to decide to family roles, for example, husband, wife, father, mother. divorce as men (Arab Barometer 2018). Muslim personal status laws stipulate how family members The 1991 MPSL was significant—and remains significant— are supposed to act in, for example, matters of marriage and not just for the abovementioned reasons but because it divorce. Sudan’s 1991 MPSL is primarily concerned with transferred authority over family matters from Islamic 12 While women and younger cohorts seem to be slightly more open to equal inheritance rights, there is not a large difference between men’s and women’s attitudes toward this, with 90 and 85 percent, respectively, disagreeing with equal inheritance rights. Similarly, both younger and older respondents (87 percent of people between 18 and 29 years old and 92 percent of respondents 50 years or older, respectively) were largely in disagreement with equal inheritance rights (Arab Barometer 2018). 30 Formal Institutions: Setting the Tone for Labor Force Participation religious leaders to the country’s political leaders. Nada employment of women in occupations that are deemed to Mustafa Ali, a leading academic authority on Sudan, notes be “hazardous, arduous or harmful to their health.” Women how, in the wake of the passage of the 1991 MPSL, the are specifically prohibited from working “underground or country’s political leaders took advantage of the opportuni- under water or [in] jobs which may expose them to poison- ty to interpret the 1991 MPSL in a way that allowed them ous material or to temperatures exceeding the normal limits to easily dismiss women from their professional positions. borne by women.” Paragraph 20 limits women’s working “In accordance with this legal discourse, the early days of hours from 6 a.m. until 10 p.m., unless they are performing the regime saw systematic dismissal of women from public an administrative job, or a technical job, or a job in health service. This was not government policy, but was concealed care or social services that necessitates them working other during mass purges, or representing it as part of the coun- hours. Women who are working at night “for purposes relat- try’s economic measures in the attorney general’s office, out ed to the public interest” are also exempted. of 60 employees dismissed almost 60 percent were women, The KIIs and FGDs shed some light on the impact that the a number of whom had been in senior positions for sever- restrictions on women’s working hours have on women’s al years. The justification put forward for that act was that ability to find jobs, especially in regions where shift work ‘married women were often absent from work’.” (Ali 2016, is common. According to an employer of a large industry in 12). Ali goes on to say that it was not just women in the Madani, “Yes for sure, I always ask women if they are mar- formal economy who were targeted but women in the infor- ried or not as you know sometimes a woman work without mal economy too, many of whom had been displaced to the telling her husband and he may cause problems also I ask capital, Khartoum, because of war or drought. about the place where they live because they shouldn’t be Based on the KIIs and FGDs that were conducted in far away from the factory as they need to come early at 6:30 Khartoum, Madani (Al-Gezira State), and Nyala (South am unlike men that doesn’t matter.” According to a woman Darfur State), the way women’s employment opportu- from Khartoum who did not have a job, “[Men] don’t care nities are shaped is aligned with these legal provisions. A about the working hours. They don’t care about working at woman from Madani who was not working reported that, night or at morning. It is hard for females to work at night.” “My brother’s wife is an engineer. She is graduated from The overwhelming focus of the 1997 Labor Code Chapter Khartoum University and they offer her many jobs and she IV titled ‘Employment of Women and Young Persons’ is on succeeded in all interviews, but my brother refuses to [let] youth and on protecting them. For example, Paragraph 21 her work. He believes that her job is to take care of her home.” prohibits youth from “carrying heavy loads” or doing work According to a human resources manager of a medium-size that puts them in direct contact with, for example, “lead or commercial services operation in Khartoum, “Overall when lead compounds” or “x-rays and other harmful radiation.” I hire a female I check if she have kids and if she could work Paragraph 21 also limits youth’s working hours from 6 a.m. and leave their kids and her house because it’s hard for any until 8 p.m. Children 15 to 16 years old may be exempted female to leave her kids alone, and I ask them specific ques- from these limits under certain circumstances. There are tions when I make any interview, for example I have two several provisions for youth that are focused specifically candidates male and female, and the female have kids so I on preserving their health, broadly defined. Paragraph 22 ask her what will you do in some situations, and if she have states that all youth must undergo a “full medical examina- solution for these cases she could be hired.” tion” that is administered by “government hospital doctors” before the start of their employment and at regular inter- Protections and restrictions in the Labor Code vals throughout their employment. Paragraph 21 prohibits Overall, the 1997 Labor Code includes more restrictions the employment of youth in occupations that are “harmful on women’s ability to work than it does protections. That to their morals.” said, the 1997 Labor Code does include a few provisions In general, youth under the age of 12 are not allowed to that serve to protect women. For example, it protects preg- work. However, there is a clause in Paragraph 21 that out- nant women from being dismissed from their positions (for lines several exceptions which include employment in “(a) being pregnant). Part Two of Paragraph 46, which is titled the State’s training schools; (b) non-profitable training ‘Maternity Leave’, includes the clause, “it shall be forbidden workshops; (c) jobs supervised by his [sic] family members to rescind the contract of employment of a female worker in establishments which do not employ other persons; (e) during her pregnancy or confinement period.” Part One of [sic] jobs performed under apprenticeship contracts.” One Paragraph 46 stipulates the amount of paid maternity leave could interpret these exceptions to be opportunities that a woman is due. It is based on the number of years a woman serve to strengthen youth’s position in the labor market has worked and whether or not she has received any special down the road. However, one could also interpret these ex- written instructions from her doctor. As mentioned above, ceptions in a more negative light based on globally adopted however, the 1997 Labor Code includes more restrictions UN and ILO conventions on child labor. In 1990, Sudan than protections. For example, Paragraph 19 prohibits the ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. In 31 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY 2003, it ratified the ILO 1973 Minimum Age Convention movement’s platform is synonymous with Western human (No. 138) as well as the ILO 1999 Worst Forms of Child rights platforms that oppose gender differentiation and Labour Convention (No. 182). the gender subordination that the 1991 MPSL condones (Tonnessen and El Nagar 2013). In a recent article about the The quota system introduced in the National role that international law might play in removing gender Elections Act disparities in Sudanese law, Halim (2019, 41) suggests that, “The state may give token recognition to gender equality by The 2008 National Elections Act mandated that 25 per- placing some women in governmental offices and appoint- cent of the seats in both State and National Parliamentary ing some to the legislative body. Lip service may be paid to Assemblies should be held by women. This act follows ar- the important role of women in the development of the ticle 32.2 of the Constitution which reads: “The State shall country, but women are only permitted to perform the role promote women rights through positive discrimination ac- designed for them by the ruling patriarch.” tions” (UNDP 2018, 11). One of the rationales for setting various quotas for Parliaments is that the inclusion of a Land and property rights diversity of groups, for example, gender, ethnic, religious, will not only benefit the members of those groups but will Despite Sudan’s significant landmass, communal access to also benefit society as a whole. In Sudan, this quota system and legal ownership of land have become sources of conflict led to changes in the share of women in Parliament: while in recent decades, as customary rights have clashed with the in 1980, only 5 percent of the seats in Parliament were held state’s rights over, among other things, foreign companies’ by women, by 2010, that figure rose to 28 percent (UNDP rights to drill and mine (Calkins et al. 2015). According to a 2018). At present, 133 of the 426 seats in Sudan’s National UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) Gender and Assembly, or 31 percent, are held by women (International Land Rights Database, there are two different systems of IDEA, International Parliamentary Union, and Stockholm property rights in Sudan: one based on a statutory legal University 2020). system and one based on a customary system. People who own land under the statutory legal system generally have However, there is an ongoing discussion about the quota title to their land, while people who hold land under the cus- system and whether it really paved the way for increased fe- tomary system generally do not. If a woman is married to a male participation in decision-making positions. According man who has title to his land, and if her husband dies, it is to the 2018 Arab Barometer, while 79 percent of respon- difficult for the widow to acquire title to her late husband’s dents are supportive of quotas to increase women’s political land in her own name. This has been especially difficult for representation, 83 percent believe that men make better many female IDP heads of households. Conversely, land political leaders than women. The Afrobarometer (2018) that is communal under the customary system is no easier provides additional telling insights related to the rights to for women to access. It is generally managed by a high-sta- be elected: 61 percent of female respondents agree that tus adult male member of the community, and women women should have the same chance as men to be elected can generally only obtain access through a male relative.13 to political office, compared to 36 percent of men. Despite As mentioned earlier in this report, data from the Arab the comparatively high percentage of women in Sudan’s Barometer (2018) show that there is not a lot of support National Assembly (as a comparator, only 23 percent of for equal inheritance rights. The overwhelming majority of the seats in the US House of Representatives are held by respondents, 87 percent, disagree with the statement that women), there has been little discussion on reforming the “Women’s share of inheritance should be equal to that of aspects of the 1991 MPSL that subordinate women to men. men” (Arab Barometer 2018). Having a land title has sev- Tonnessen and El Nagar (2013) posit several reasons for eral advantages, including the ability to use it as collateral this. Namely, the 2008 National Elections Act was passed to access financing. Limiting women’s ability to obtain land because women who represented a diversity of geographic titles limits their ability to access financing opportunities regions, socioeconomic strata, and political leanings came that may help them start a business or finance other pro- together to form one broad coalition. Since the passing of ductive activities that have the potential to benefit not only the 2008 National Elections Act, however, the great majori- their families but also the economy in general. Women and ty of the seats in the National Assembly have been filled by agriculture are discussed in greater detail in Section 6. women who represent a narrow spectrum of that coalition. Tonnessen and El Nagar classify these women as the ‘gen- der equity’ bloc. This bloc supports the existing 1991 MPSL. National strategies and grassroots initiatives Disagreeing with these women are women who are not in There are currently two Sudanese ministries that specifically the government but in civil society who Tonnessen and address women’s and youth’s affairs: the Ministry of Social El Nagar classify as the ‘gender equality’ movement. This Development and the Ministry of Youth and Sports. Under 13 FAO Country Profiles retrieved from database May 25, 2020. 32 Formal Institutions: Setting the Tone for Labor Force Participation the transitional government, each ministry is headed by a and youth pressuring the government through their work woman. As mentioned earlier, the transitional government on behalf of local and international nongovernmental or- is planning to draft a new Constitution, as well as various ganizations (NGOs). Some women and youth have worked pieces of legislation, which may inform the development with these NGOs for ‘watchdog’ reasons while others have of new or revised national strategies. For example, short- worked with them for social service-oriented reasons, for ly after the passage of the 2005 Interim Constitution, example, the ability to provide social welfare services that the then Ministry of Social Welfare for Women and Child the government does not provide. Regardless of individu- Affairs prepared a 2007 Women Empowerment Policy doc- als’ motivations, Kadoda’s and Hale’s post-2011 research on ument which identified six ‘areas of concern’ followed by this subject shows that “women-oriented NGOs” in Sudan “institutional mechanisms to operationalize the policy for are “very active and make up the bulk of civil society” (2015, women empowerment” (Republic of Sudan: Ministry of 221). Accurate numbers of active NGOs are notoriously dif- Social Welfare for Women and Child Affairs 2007). The latter ficult to obtain. Kadoda and Hale report familiarity with included institutions ranging from the General Directorate ‘dozens’ of NGOs that are formally registered with the gov- for Women and Family, at the national level, to the General ernment and that are actively working in and around the Union of Sudanese Women, the largest grassroots organiza- capital, Khartoum. The leader of a prominent NGO whom tion in Sudan focusing on women’s issues. Kadoda and Hale interviewed believes the numbers are much higher: there are “thousands of NGOs in Sudan and While the direction that the transitional government’s laws hundreds in Greater Khartoum” (Kadoda and Hale 2015). and policies will take with respect to women and youth is Youth, especially female youth, were active in the protests— not yet known, there has been a growing movement in ur- both live and on social media—that led to the toppling of ban Sudanese society of educated and motivated women former President Omar al-Bashir in April 2019. 33 INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS: THE ROLE OF NORMS AND NETWORKS © Atif Saad / Photography Sudan’s formal institutions do not operate independently of its informal institutions, which include, but are not limited to, beliefs about gender roles and relations, social norms, and social networks. This section begins with an examination of the impact of Sudan’s patriarchal customs on female youth’s and women’s ability to pursue educa- tion and employment outside the home. It then goes on to discuss the role that wasta plays in enabling or inhibiting Sudanese women’s and youth’s access to the labor mar- ket, especially in the context of low levels of social capital and trust throughout society. Customs and norms affect women’s roles in society Sudanese women are subordinated to men by patriarchal for. Paradoxically, in the 2018 Afrobarometer, more female customs and prevailing norms, in addition to existing le- respondents (48 percent) than male respondents (32 per- gal provisions. The 1991 MPSL includes several provisions cent) thought that when jobs are scarce men should have that subordinate women to men, paramount among them more right to a job than women. In various societies, the provisions regarding male guardianship. However, academ- male breadwinner-female caregiver model may be support- ic experts on Sudan are generally in agreement that Sharia ed either by custom or by law. In Sudan, it is upheld by both. law is not the sole source of women’s subordination or re- For example, while not necessarily applied de facto, accord- stricted agency. Citing a report by a governmental task force ing to the 1991 MPSL, women who wish to work outside composed of Sudanese women’s studies scholars, academic the home must first seek permission from their husbands. Sondra Hale writes: “[The members of the task force] make The Arab Barometer’s 2018 survey sheds light on the way a clear attempt to exempt religion as a cause of women’s different countries’ populations conceive of gender roles subordination: ‘the emphasis on the reproductive capacity and relations at both an individual and a societal level. For of women in Sudan is largely a by-product of multidimen- example, 74 percent of Sudanese agree with the statement sional constraints created by customs and traditions – more “husbands should have final say in all decisions concerning than by religion – on women’” (Hale 1997, 123) (italics in the family,” placing Sudan ahead of every other country in original). Writing 20 years later, academic Liv Tonnessen the region. In response to the statement “women and men (2019) reaffirms the role that ‘customs and traditions’ play should have equal rights in making the decision to divorce,” in subordinating Sudanese women to men. Specifically, 45 percent of Sudanese agree, placing Sudan behind every she discusses how the ‘male breadwinner-female caregiver’ other country in the region. Building on the earlier Arab model, and by extension the belief that the public sphere Barometer data shared with respect to opinions regarding is the male domain while the private sphere is the female inheritance rights and leadership opportunities, Sudan’s domain, are used to uphold three areas of Sudanese law, the population appears to be the least willing, among the popu- first two of which were discussed in the preceding section: lations of the 12 countries surveyed, to accept the idea that Muslim family law (or the 1991 MPSL), labor law, and pub- women’s rights and roles in society should be equal to that lic order laws. of men’s. The male breadwinner-female caregiver model is based on Sudan’s patriarchal customs tend to be stronger in the coun- the belief that women are first and foremost wives and try’s poorer rural areas. Consequently, they tend to start mothers whose duty is to care for their husbands, and their shaping the life courses of the females living in these areas at husbands’ family members, while bearing and raising chil- a younger age. Early marriage is an important determinant dren. By contrast, men are seen as economic providers. They of women’s role in society. In patriarchal societies, once a are responsible for ensuring that their wives and children girl is married, she moves to live with her husband and, fre- are properly housed, fed, clothed, and otherwise provided quently, his family members. At that point, the girl (who is TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY now deemed to be a woman) ceases to be the economic re- parts of Red Sea State, an estimated 70 percent of girls sponsibility of her parents, primarily her father, and instead stopped going to school by the sixth grade (Tonnessen and becomes the economic responsibility of her husband—in El Nagar 2018). exchange for the domestic labor she provides. Poor families The stigmas of being unmarried and not being able to with large numbers of unmarried daughters will often see have children, perhaps because one waited too long to get early marriage as the only viable economic option for the married, also motivate the choice of early marriage over ed- family. As of 2014, 38 percent of Sudanese women aged 15 ucation. That said, the Algadaref State study revealed that to 49 had been married before the age of 18, and 12 percent this patriarchal custom appears to be weakening. When had been married before the age of 15.14 In some rural ar- respondents were asked, “What are the consequences to eas, the numbers are even higher; 45 percent of the girls in families of delaying the marriage of their daughters?” 57 Kassala State are estimated to be married before the age of percent of the female respondents said, “There is no stigma, 15 (Tonnessen and El Nagar 2018). as their daughters are educated and can work to support the Child marriage occurs for a number of reasons, and while family.” That view was shared by 50 percent of the male re- poverty is often cited as one of the principal reasons driv- spondents (El Nagar, Eljack, and Tonnessen 2017, 31). ing early marriage, the role of customs seems to be a more Both Sudanese women and men have internalized Sudan’s important driver behind this practice in Sudan. According patriarchal customs and norms. Kathleen Fincham, who has to a study on the relationship between cultural norms and conducted research on youth, gender, and school dropout child marriage in Algadaref State, poverty was one of the across several states in Sudan, notes that, “Particularly im- five reasons cited for child marriage, but it was not the most portant in determining whether girls would continue their common response and in a similar study in neighboring Red education were family attitudes relating to gender roles and Sea State, poverty was not mentioned at all.15 Four of the responsibilities. For example, parents (both mothers and five reasons respondents in the Algadaref State study cited fathers) who believed in girls’ intellectual ability to achieve had to do with patriarchal customs: control of girls, fertility, academically tended to support their daughters’ continued protection of girls from immorality, and protection of girls attendance in school. Moreover, parents who believed in from the stigma of being unmarried. Protection from im- the possibility of women working outside of the home tend- morality, which was the most common response, can mean ed to support their daughters’ education” (Fincham 2017, any number of things. In a review of the three related stud- 369). If education is needed to acquire the knowledge and ies conducted in Red Sea State, Kassala State, and Algadaref skills to access the labor market, and if higher education is State, protection from immorality included discouraging, if needed to climb within the labor market, Sudan’s patriar- not outright forbidding, girls from attending school since chal customs are inhibiting many girls and women, though school uniforms, public transportation, and mixed-gender by no means all, from both accessing and rising within the classrooms challenge patriarchal customs regarding female labor market, irrespective of, for example, the number and modesty—the subject of the public order laws—and the quality of the schools and universities in their areas. idea that the public sphere is the male domain. In some Importance of wasta for access to economic opportunities An important informal institution that affects women’s and countries’ bureaucracies. “[W]asta is not perceived as cor- youth’s ability to access the labor market in Sudan is wasta. ruption across MENA [Middle Eastern and North African] Wasta is an Arabic term that means having a connection to societies and is not criminalized in the same way as in someone who can ‘get things done’. Whereas patriarchal Western countries” (Buttorff and Welborne 2015, 1). That customs appear to exert more constraints on the acquisi- said, there seems to be some gender differences in the use tion of human capital, wasta appears to exert more of wasta depending on the country context. In a study com- constraints on the acquisition of social capital and, by ex- paring several Arab countries, men and women appeared to tension, individuals’ ability to access networks for economic use roughly comparable amounts of wasta in Algeria, and other gain. According to academic Laura Mann, “[Wasta] Morocco, and Lebanon, while men were using considerably signifies both the possession of ties (a person can ‘have more wasta than women in Jordan, Palestine, and Yemen wasta’) and the person who intermediates on behalf of (Buttorff and Welborne 2015). someone (a person can be ‘one’s wasta’.)” Simply put, wasta is, “loyalty plus access to power” (Mann 2014, 563) (italics “You need to take care of your kids. in original). Wasta is widely acknowledged to play a role in Sometimes after you get married, the functioning of many Middle Eastern and North African your husband tells you to quit.” Female youth, Khartoum, not working outside the home 14 United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) database on child marriage. 15 UNICEF database on child marriage; El Nagar, Eljack, and Tonnessen 2017. 36 Informal Institutions: The Role of Norms and Networks BOX 2. A context of low levels of social capital and trust in Sudan Social capital is a term that political theorists, so- Trust and networks uphold institutions and formal ciologists, and social workers, among others, have economies in many liberal democracies. They have been using for over a century to describe the nature, been similarly demonstrated to uphold informal econ- strength, and utility of the bonds that members of a omies in many African countries. According to the Arab society form. According to Francis Fukuyama, “[S]ocial Barometer (2018), interpersonal trust is low in Sudan; capital is an instantiated informal norm that promotes only 14 percent of the Sudanese surveyed believe “most co-operation between two or more individuals. The people can be trusted.” About 84 percent felt “I must norms that constitute social capital can range from a be very careful in dealing with people.” The Sudanese norm of reciprocity between two friends all the way up who were surveyed were equally wary of their coun- to complex and elaborately articulated doctrines like try’s institutions. For example, when asked about their Christianity or Confucianism. They must be instantiated trust in the Parliament, 68 percent reported “not very in an actual human relationship: the norm of reciproci- much trust” or “no trust at all,” and for civil service, this ty exists in potentia in my dealings with all people, but figure was 64 percent. The trust in local governments is actualised only in my dealings with my friends. By is equally low with 63 percent reporting not much or no this definition, trust, networks, civil society, and the like, trust at all. When it comes to the private sector, the situ- which have been associated with social capital, are all ation is similar with 65 percent of respondents claiming epiphenomenal, arising as a result of social capital but to have not much or no trust at all in domestic business not constituting social capital itself.” The last sentence people and 61 percent for private banks. Of the 16 in- of Fukuyama’s definition is especially important, be- stitutions that the Sudanese who were surveyed were cause it underscores the relationship between social asked to assess, people had by far the greatest trust capital, on the one hand, and trust, networks, and civil in the army: 31 percent reported “a great deal of trust,” society, on the other. while 33 percent reported “quite a lot of trust.” Sources: Fukuyama 2001, 7; Odera 2013. In Sudan, the use of wasta to shape current institutions can ages of 20 and 24 learned about their current jobs through be traced back to colonial times. Mann explains how the ‘personal contacts’ (as opposed to ‘direct application’, ‘news- British colonial administration used the wasta of Sudan’s paper/internet’, or ‘combination’). For respondents aged 30 sectarian and tribal leaders to develop Sudanese institu- to 34, the figure was 50 percent; for respondents aged 40 to tions modelled after British institutions. For example, 44, it was close to 60 percent; and for respondents aged 50 following independence, Gordon Memorial College became and older, it was less than 30 percent (Mann 2014). The KIIs the University of Khartoum, and the children of the sectari- and FGDs conducted for this report confirmed the above- an and tribal leaders, and their trusted circles, had an easier mentioned studies’ findings. Indeed, one of the focus group time securing positions in Gordon Memorial College and participants, a woman from Madani who was not working, then posts in the government. Similarly, Sudan’s post-1983 made a comment identical to that of one of the participants leaders used the wasta of regional leaders in Islamic banking in Mann’s study: “Young people call it [wasta] vitamin ‘W’.” to Islamize Sudan’s banking system. Those whose personal The usefulness of wasta appears to be region specific. For connections brought them into the fold of these banks, like those who were raised in the capital, Khartoum, and its en- the youth of the Colonial era who were educated in Gordon virons, wasta is about useful ties to those who are in power Memorial College, became the country’s future leaders in in the government and/or the private sector, for example, business and politics. the oil industry. Mann’s research offers several examples of Wasta continues to play an important role in both ac- Khartoum youth who became involved in clubs that were cessing and rising within the Sudanese labor market. organized and funded by prominent politicians or business More than half, 56 percent, of the Arab Barometer leaders. Through their affiliations with these clubs—rather (2018) respondents believe that it is often impossi- than through school or university—these youth were able ble to get a job without wasta. According to Mann’s to make connections that led to jobs. This is such a well-es- fieldwork in Sudan, wasta plays a greater role among the tablished practice that a fifth of the respondents in the current generation than it did among previous generations. Arab Barometer survey (2018) do not consider it corrup- Mann writes, “[Wasta] has become so important in secur- tion when government officials provide wasta for relatives. ing livelihoods that young people refer to it as ‘Vitamin Mann’s study shows that for those who are from outside Waw’” (Mann 2014, 21). For example, more than 80 per- Khartoum, however, wasta is more about geographic or trib- cent of Mann’s survey respondents who were between the al ties. These ties will serve people well if they stay within 37 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY their geographic region or tribal group and they are not obstacle found while searching for a job are common except otherwise marginalized. For example, single women who if you have a high recommendation acquaintance. The first are heads of households in poorer rural areas have limited one to be hired is the one who has recommendation letter, social capital because of the stigma their conationals ascribe whether to be hired in governmental or non-governmental to their social status (Daoud, Gindeel, and Ahmed 2020). sectors. And if you don’t have you may not move a step for- Geographic and tribal ties may also help people if they move ward.” A female youth from Khartoum who had a university to greater Khartoum and settle in a neighborhood where in- degree but was not working said, “Here in Sudan everything dividuals from their geographic region or tribe live. More works through intermediaries like if you have a strong in- specifically, these ties may help people find jobs in the in- termediary then you can go anyplace you want even if I have formal sector or lower-wage jobs in the formal sector (Bello a higher certificate than you but what distinguishes you is and Daoud 2014). However, these ties are unlikely to help your intermediary even if I deserve the job better than you someone ‘break into’ Khartoum’s labor market, specifically and I have the requirements they ask for. Yes, even if my higher wage jobs in the formal sector, because, in these cas- qualifications are better the person who has the intermedi- es, a person does not have the ‘right’ wasta. This observation ary would get the job.” was confirmed by the qualitative work that was conducted There are some similarities and some differences across gen- for this report. Although Sudanese seeking employment in der divides, and wasta may be more important for women to Nyala and Madani need wasta as much as Sudanese seek- obtain employment. Both male and female focus group dis- ing employment in Khartoum, the FGDs underscored the cussants concurred that both males and females need wasta fact that wasta from one region was not equivalent to wasta to get a job. According to a man from Nyala who had a job, from another—in other words, one’s ‘Nyala wasta’ does not “Wasta is number one in work.” According to a woman from have the same currency in Khartoum. For example, a work- Madani who was working, “If you are illiterate and have ing woman from Madani said, “I applied for a job and I had wasta, you’ll get a job.” However, some of the focus group wasta, but they only accepted three people. Our wasta wasn’t participants believed that wasta was either more often in- useful.” A man from Nyala who had a job said, “According to voked by, or more critical for, females than males in seeking wasta nepotism they bring their relatives only. For example, and obtaining employment. For example, a woman from if I read in Nyala newspaper, someone else will read it in Khartoum who did not have a job said, “For example, I can Khartoum. When we both apply our papers, they will prefer easily ask one of my friends to find work for me, and if she men from Khartoum. It is a big city. If I am an employee recommended a job, I can easily negotiate to have this job, and I have a brother or a graduated son, they will hire him. but for men they have an ego to ask anybody to get them While there are other people who have graduated from uni- a job. As the male even if has certificate or not, he doesn’t versity and they can’t find any job or work in other fields.” accept to ask anyone for getting him a job. But it is common While wasta may be ‘worth more’ in the region where a per- between females, as she may find a good job in a shop, she son is from, it plays as important a role in the professional will recommend it for her friend if it is with suitable work- lives of individuals from Nyala and Madani as it does in the ing hours and she knows the owner of the job. But it is not professional lives of individuals from Khartoum. According the same among males, as they don’t accept something like to a woman from Nyala who had a university degree but did that.” According to a female youth from Khartoum who was not have a job, “Yes, also itinerant work, I can work anything not working, “No, it’s not the same, it helps girls more, for and mostly wasta plays an effective role here, also to work in example if a girl doesn’t have a certificate she can work nor- nursery if I have no wasta I can’t get this job even who doesn’t mally in a bank.” According to a female youth from Nyala have a degree and we are too many.” A woman from Madani who did have a job, “Wasta is more important. It helps wom- who had a university degree and was a general supervisor of en more.” a large cigarette manufacturer said, “These challenges and 38 39 MARKETS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON ECONOMIC ACTIVITY © Atif Saad / Photography The preceding two sections of this report examined the extent to which Sudan’s for- mal and informal institutions enable women and youth to access the labor market. This section breaks down the labor market into several sectors to better understand how changes at both the macro and the micro levels have been both positively and negatively affecting women’s and youth’s economic opportunities. The goal is to offer a more in-depth look at the characteristics of the labor market that were present- ed earlier. After a brief discussion about privatization and the oil industry, this section discusses women’s and youth’s efforts to seek, obtain, and maintain employment in the public sector and engage in the private sector. The role of access to banking and finance for entrepreneurial activity is also discussed. The agricultural and the informal sectors are then examined, before concluding with a brief discussion about gen- der-differentiated access to, and use of, digital technologies. Privatization and the rise of the oil industry: a labor market transformation The characteristics of Sudanese women’s employment employment in the informal sector, even though it mag- changed with the transformation of the labor market. nified their vulnerabilities. As discussed in the remainder During the 1990s, for reasons that were part economic and of this section, many of these characteristics of Sudanese part political, Sudan pursued a policy of rapid privatization women’s employment continue to hold to the present day. (Verhoeven 2015). Between 1992 and 1998, Sudan halved Indirectly, the rise of the oil industry played an import- its public spending as a share of its GDP (UNDP 2006). ant role in economically marginalizing Sudanese women Many Sudanese women who worked in the public sector (Khalfalla and Ahmed 2015). Ross (2008) accepts the data lost their jobs (Ali 2016; Khalfalla and Ahmed 2015). The that show that there are comparatively fewer women in the 1991 MPSL, discussed in earlier sections of this report, workforce in the Middle East than in other world regions contributed to women’s redundancy. As a consequence of but disagrees with the widely held conception that the dis- the neoliberal policies that were pursued, and the laws that crepancy is due to Islam. Instead, he believes it is due to were passed codifying women’s subservience to men, aca- ‘oil’, an industry where the greater share of the positions are demics Khalfalla and Ahmed (2015, 119–120) contend that dominated by men. Moghadam (2004, 30) agrees with Ross, Sudanese women’s employment assumed four key charac- though she takes his argument a step further. She believes teristics: (a) women became more likely to be employed in that it is not just the gendered nature of the oil industry’s rural areas, especially in the agricultural sector; (b) women positions but the higher wages that accompany them which became more likely to be concentrated in gender-specific, “[keep] women locked into a patriarchal family structure” that is, women’s, jobs; (c) women became more likely to because of the “male breadwinner-female caregiver” model be concentrated in lower-skilled and lower-paying jobs; that was discussed in the preceding sections of this report. and (d) vulnerable women became more likely to pursue TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Private sector engagement preferred over public sector employment Public sector jobs used to be preferred by women. As men- said that between public and private sector employment she tioned above, as well as earlier in this report, many women would prefer the private sector, “Because they give their em- who had been working in the public sector in the early 1990s ployees their complete rights. If I was able to work in the had lost their jobs by the late 1990s. While public sector private sector, they will deal with me in a good way, they will jobs were lower paying than private sector jobs, with women offer me a good salary and even the benefits they will pro- generally earning less than men, women tended to prefer vide will be comfortable. They provide benefits, money and public sector jobs to private sector jobs for their hours and even the moral and psychological way of dealing is better in their benefits. The KIIs and FGDs revealed that women still private sectors.” A male youth from Khartoum who had a primarily seek jobs in the public sector. However, when giv- university degree but did not have a job said, “Private sector en the choice of a public sector or a private sector job, many for sure. Private sectors are definitely better financially that women—and youth—would prefer a private sector job and is the first thing, plus you can transfer and move from one a major reason for this is the higher wages. Public sector company to another more easily than in public sectors.” A salaries in Sudan have been decreasing for years. Between woman from Madani who had a university degree but did 2009 and 2014, wages in administrative and support ser- not have a job said, “Because the private sector is somehow vice activities as well as in education declined 10 percent affording you the specifications you are seeking nowadays. per year; in human health and social activities, the decline If you are seeking promotions and retirement pension and was 9 percent per year; and in public administration and so- so on, you may find it at a governmental job. Yet the private cial services and defense, the decline was 7 percent per year sector nowadays provides you what you wish for. Most of (World Bank 2019c). This, coupled with rising inflation, has the people are aiming at travelling abroad … So, the private really eroded the value of salaries. Note that the transitional sector is more comforting in that regard if I’d say so.” While government increased civil servants’ salaries in May 2020. a female youth from Madani who had a university degree but was not working said, “I prefer the private sector. First Higher wages is not the only motivating factor in seeking of all, because of the salary, it’s better. Also, in the private a job in the private sector. Workers’ rights, opportunities you can increase your relations but the government the field for professional advancement, travel, and networking op- is kind of limited.” portunities also play a role. For example, a woman from Khartoum who had a university degree but was not working Low access to banking and finance limits entrepreneurial activity One of the main obstacles to improving Sudanese wom- Sudan’s banking system does not legally preclude women’s en’s economic empowerment is that assets and credit are participation. Rather, as Kevane and Stiansen (2006) note, difficult for Sudanese women to obtain. This was noted in “The mechanisms of exclusion are subtle or implied since the 2007 Women Empowerment Policy document, which they are not the result of specific legislation. Examples of identified six “areas of concern,” one of which was “econom- cultural practices that prevent women from gaining access ic empowerment,” and where it was specifically noted that to formal financial institutions are the predominant role of investment policies favor large-scale projects over medium- males in the household, inheritance rules that favor male and small-scale projects in which women are more likely to family members, and the gendering of economic spheres.” become engaged. A 2016 study based on a cross-section- This is reflected in the data. al survey of 250 women from Sinnar State reaffirms this While the share of women and youth with bank accounts observation, showing that 79 percent of the women who increased from 2011 to 2014, men are still twice as likely did not possess any assets were classified as poor (Elsheikh to have an account compared to women. A lower share of and Elamin 2016, 198). The study concludes by suggesting the Sudanese population has an account at a financial in- that, “In order to enable women to develop their full eco- stitution, compared to the average for Sub-Saharan Africa nomic potential there is a need to improving women access (15 and 34 percent, respectively) (Global Findex 2014). to private business, and access to and control over financial Both women and youth shares for having an account at a services including banking, and business development. It is bank or a financial institution or for using a mobile mon- very important to establish small and medium enterpris- ey service increased by 6 percentage points from 2011 to es and moving into product development” (Elsheikh and 2014. Men, adults, individuals in the labor force, and the Elamin 2016). better-off shares have increased significantly compared to Unlike Sudan’s two different systems of property rights, other categories. Nearly half of those who reported having each of which legally precludes women’s participation, an account borrowed to start, operate, or expand a farm or 42 Markets and Their Impacts on Economic Activity business. Only one in three women who reported having an women entrepreneurs in urban Sudan, there are a variety of account borrowed to start a business, compared to half of institutions that offer microfinance. the men. About 40 percent of the young people who have The lack of access to finance contributes to low levels of accounts borrowed to expand or start a business, compared entrepreneurial activity among women. Data from the to 47 percent for adults (Figure 15). Enterprise Survey conducted in Sudan in 2014 show that Women rely to a larger extent than men on informal in- only 3 percent of firms have a woman as the top manag- stitutions for access to money and finance. For example, er, compared to the average of 15 percent in Sub-Saharan women have a harder time coming up with emergency Africa. Female participation in firm ownership in Sudan funds according to Global Findex 2014 data. While almost is 8 percent, which is substantially lower than the Sub- half of the women surveyed (48 percent) reported not Saharan Africa average of 36 percent. Access to finance is being able to come up with emergency funds, only 39 cited as the biggest obstacle to firm growth for 10 percent percent of the men reported the same. There is also a no- of female-led firms compared to 6 percent of male-led firms. ticeable difference in the source of these emergency funds, A study of 142 female business owners in Sudan, who rep- with 64 percent of women relying on family and friends, resent a diversity of geographic locations, industries, and compared to 42 percent of men. There are a number of sizes, confirms that one of the greater obstacles to starting informal financial institutions in Sudan, and Kevane or expanding their businesses was their inability to rely on and Stiansen highlight three: sandug, dayn, and shayl. banks for credit (Musa 2012). Many of the businesswomen Of these, sandug are the only viable credit option for most were asked to provide guarantees in the form of real es- women. Sandug are monthly gatherings of small groups tate or other assets which they did not have, and the cost of women at which each woman contributes something of loans was often greater than 10 percent of the amount from her savings to the group’s pool of savings enabling loaned. As mentioned earlier, having a land title might help one woman—based on a rotating system—to borrow one access credit from a bank, as the land title could serve as from the group’s savings for consumption or investment. collateral, but women face difficulties obtaining land titles. Microfinance is another option for some Sudanese women, Some of the businesswomen also reported that the banks and according to a study of microfinance’s role in supporting were reluctant to lend to those with whom they did not have personal connections, or wasta, which was discussed FIGURE 15. Individuals with an account at a bank or other financial institution, % 30% 28% 26% 20% 20% 20% 17% 16% 15% 13% 13% 11% 10% 10% 10% 9% 10% 9% 9% 9% 8% 8% 8% 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4% 3% 3% 2% 0% All (15+) Rural Male Female In Labor Force Out of Labor Force Young Adults Older Adults (25+) Primary Education or Less Secondary Education or More Poorest 40% Richest 60% BY GENDER PARTICIPATION BY AGE BY EDUCATION BY QUINTILE BY LF Account 2011 Account 2014 Borrowed to start, operate, or expand a farm or business 2014 Source: Global Findex Data 2011, 2014. 43 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY in the preceding sections of this report. Consequently, 66 achieving greater success in starting and managing their percent of the businesswomen used their own savings to businesses. In general, the women were younger when start their businesses and 17 percent borrowed from fam- they started their businesses (50 percent were between the ily or friends, while only 17 percent sought financing from ages of 36 and 45), 62 percent came from families who had a bank. Similarly, 63 percent used their own savings or experience of owning and managing businesses, the wom- earnings for working capital, and only 37 percent sought en were highly educated (62 percent had a university or a financing from a bank for such purposes. It is noteworthy post-graduate degree), and 67 percent had professional ex- that the businesses these women started were impressive perience in the formal sector (Musa 2012). Also of interest on multiple fronts, not least of which was the fact that 84 is the fact that, in contrast to a number of the larger busi- percent reported positive net profit margins (Musa 2012). nesses in Sudan that are owned and managed by men, none of the businesses these women had started relied on foreign Access to finance is not the only hurdle that women en- investors for start-up capital. counter when starting and growing a business. Campos et al. (2019) identify a number of constraints that female The challenges that aspiring and successful businesswom- entrepreneurs in Sub-Saharan Africa face in the realm of en encounter are further illustrated by the qualitative work endowments as well as at the household level. These include that was undertaken for this report. A female youth from differences in skills, capital, networks, occupational oppor- Khartoum who had a university degree and was the own- tunities, and safety. These underlying constraints shape er of a small pastry shop said, “Because my capital wasn’t women’s strategic decisions, resulting in them being more enough, so I took things from home and my mother helped likely than men to end up with smaller firms in lower pro- me … because I have no experience in this field my big ductivity sectors. Regulatory constraints are among some brother did everything related to taxes and rent fees and of the more prominent contextual-level hurdles that wom- everything, he is responsible about the legal papers … they en face. For example, the 2020 Doing Business assessment were supporting me, my mother, brother and my father shows that additional steps are often required for women were very supporting, and my father supported me finan- to start a business compared to men and that it takes on cially too, thanks God for having them and their support.” average 35 days for a woman to start a business compared The KIIs and FGDs revealed that youth face many of the to 34 days for men. This is considerably longer than the 22- same struggles as women. For example, a male youth from day average for the Sub-Saharan Africa region (World Bank Nyala who had a university degree and was the owner of 2020c). The previously referenced study highlights the per- a medium-size agricultural business said, “Sometimes you sonal characteristics of the businesswomen that appear to don’t have possibilities, you can take loans from banks and have helped them succeed as well as some of the structural sometimes when you need money you don’t find loan in the factors that, according to them, have inhibited them from suitable time for you.” Women in agriculture tend to earn less than men and face similar challenges as female entrepreneurs Sudan is rich in arable land and water, with two-thirds of working in agriculture increased between 2011 and 2014, the population living in rural areas and a large share of the with almost half of the labor force employed in agriculture population engaged in agricultural activities. Before the in 2014. The data also show a significant gender dimension, separation of South Sudan from Sudan in July 2011, Sudan with 60 percent of female labor force participation being had “7% of [Africa’s] cropland, 13% of its pastureland and in agriculture, compared to 39 percent of male labor force 10% of its livestock” (Ibnouf 2011, 216). The idea of turn- participation. This is even more pronounced in rural areas ing Sudan into the Middle East’s or Africa’s ‘breadbasket’ where four out of every five women working outside the has been repeatedly proposed by Sudanese leaders, region- home are engaged in agriculture (World Bank 2019c). al leaders, and development organizations for the last 50 Despite the large share of women in Sudan’s agricultural years. However, since Sudan experienced rapid nationaliza- labor force, female farmers generally earn less than male tion followed by rapid privatization and has been subject farmers for a number of reasons including, but not limit- to repeated droughts, desertification, famines, and conflict, ed to, the smaller size of their plots. A multicountry study the dream of turning Sudan into the region’s breadbas- in Africa found that women farmers not only face indi- ket has yet to be achieved (Calkins et al. 2015; Verhoeven vidual-level obstacles that limit their access to inputs and 2015). In contrast to many of its African neighbors which impede their productivity, but they also face a complex set have transitioned, to one degree or another, from agricul- of restrictive social norms, market failures, and regulatory ture to industry and services, much of Sudan’s labor force or institutional constraints that affect policies and pro- continues to be engaged in agriculture. As mentioned ear- grams intended to support women farmers (O’Sullivan et al. lier in this report, the share of the employed population 2014). In 1992, the Government of Sudan launched a Ten 44 Markets and Their Impacts on Economic Activity Year Comprehensive National Strategy that aimed, among by paid employee (35 percent), then unpaid worker (15 per- other things, to increase the country’s agricultural output, cent) and then employer (9 percent). particularly the agricultural sector’s share of GDP. The Ten Many of the constraints that female farmers face are Year Comprehensive National Strategy (1992–2002) and similar to the constraints faced by Sudanese women en- the initiatives that followed, such as the Economic Salvation trepreneurs. A study of the role that female farmers in Program and the National Five-Year Strategic Development the western Sudan region play in food security highlights Plan (2007–2011), focused on supporting “large-scale this: “[Female farmers] have limited access to credit and mechanized agriculture projects” over “smallholder rain- inputs because of gender discrimination and lack [of] fed traditional agriculture” (Ibnouf 2011, 219). This was collateral. Formal regulations prohibit married women to the detriment of female farmers who generally farmed to access credit without the signature of their husband” smaller, rain-fed plots. At the same time, females engaged (Ibnouf 2011, 222–223). Agricultural land that is owned in agricultural activities tend to be overrepresented in un- by potential borrowers can be used as collateral for cred- paid jobs. According to NHBPS 2014/15, more than half of it. As mentioned earlier in this report, however, Sudan the women working in agriculture were doing this as unpaid has two different systems of property rights—one based workers (53 percent). Only 28 percent worked as own ac- on a statutory legal system and one based on a custom- count workers, 16 percent as paid employees, and 3 percent ary system not regulated by the legal system—both of as employers. Male farmers are more likely to be engaged in which include discriminatory measures against women. agriculture as an own account worker (42 percent), followed Informality is high, linked to poverty, migration, and low education Those who work in the agricultural sector are more likely a consequence, 60 percent of the respondents in the study to be poor than those who work in other sectors. In 2014, ended up working as ‘mobile sellers’ and 24 percent as ‘food 47 percent of those employed in agriculture were deemed vendors’, 68 percent frequently changed jobs, and 50 per- to be moderately poor (using a poverty line of US$3.20 per cent worked for more than 15 hours per day. When asked day) compared to 36 percent employed in industry and 34 what challenges they faced trying to secure more predict- percent employed in services (World Bank 2019c). Given able, reliable employment, 96 percent said “lack of capital” the ongoing economic uncertainty with which many rural and “low access to credit” (Daoud, Eldeen, and Bello 2017). Sudanese live, some choose to migrate to Khartoum in the IDPs represent another population that has migrated to hopes of finding more stable employment there. However, Khartoum in the hopes of escaping poverty and finding these individuals’ education levels and skill sets are gener- work. There are estimated to be between 1.2 and 1.5 mil- ally a poor match for Khartoum’s labor market. About 37 lion IDPs living in and around Khartoum (Bello, Daoud, and percent of Sudan’s population has no formal education, 41 Baig 2014, 169). Like many of the youth who migrate to percent has at most a primary school education, 15 percent Khartoum, however, it is not uncommon for the IDPs who has at most a secondary school education, and 7 percent do so to lack educations and skills and to only be able to has some post-secondary education (World Bank 2019c). find work in the informal sector. For example, a study of Among those engaged in agriculture, two out of three have no female IDPs living on the outskirts of Khartoum found that formal education while only one in fifty has some post-sec- 71 percent had no formal education, 71 percent had only ondary education (World Bank 2019c). As a consequence, agricultural skills, and 26 percent could only secure work as many of the rural Sudanese who migrate to Khartoum, ‘street vendors’ (Bello, Daoud, and Baig 2014, 171). often for the sole purpose of finding income-generating op- portunities, end up working in Khartoum’s informal sector. Despite the many challenges, some Sudanese are able to improve their socioeconomic circumstances through Sudan’s population is young and many of the individuals mi- employment in Sudan’s informal sector. Among business- grating to Khartoum are youth who fit the above-described women in Khartoum State who prepared and sold food either profile—that is, they are poor, have little to no education, in a market or out of their homes, 74 percent had no formal and have few skills that are marketable in an urban area. For education and “90% of them lack[ed] the basic knowledge example, a study of youth who migrated to Khartoum from for managing a business properly” (El Zein et al. 2008, 42). Al-Gezira State (44 percent), White Nile State (40 percent), That said, most of these women’s businesses had lasted for and the Darfur region (16 percent) found that 46 percent at least five years, if not more, and most of these women’s of their sample were motivated to migrate to find work and businesses made a profit during that time. As a result, they escape poverty, 58 percent had no formal education, and 58 were able to “meet expenses of children’s education, health percent were previously engaged in agriculture, that is, only and medical care” and “[enhance] their ability to save” (El had agricultural skills (Daoud, Eldeen, and Bello 2017). As Zein et al. 2008, 54). 45 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY The informal sector has been a mainstay of not just Sudan’s not working said, “It would be good if there is [support].” economy but also Africa’s economy for decades. As of the A male youth from Khartoum who did not have a job said, mid-1990s, the informal sector was estimated to be employ- “Yes, they need. They need to accompany people working ing 60–70 percent of Africa’s workforce, accounting for over this job and learn skills from them till they became able 20 percent of its GDP (Odera 2013). Based on the above-cit- to do the job alone.” A working woman from Madani said, ed studies, the informal sector is a large and growing sector “There is only crafts schools. It is for young people, but old in Sudan, particularly among the country’s more vulnerable people don’t have any trainings.” A male youth from Madani populations. According to the FGDs, however, there is little who did not have a job said, “No, I think he gets the job meaningful support for those who are employed in this sec- training only by practicing the work.” tor. For example, a female youth from Khartoum who was Digital technology also transforms interactions in the economic sphere Access to digital technologies and social media has trans- 77 percent, respectively, while phone availability is linked formed the way youth interact and exercise their agency to a 34 percent better chance of employment for youth. in social, political, and other arenas. In late 2013, demon- Based on the FGDs, a number of Sudanese are already rely- strations took place in greater Khartoum following then ing on social media—in some cases exclusively so—to help President Omar al-Bashir’s decision to end fuel and oth- them learn about job opportunities. For example, when er subsidies. Many of the leaders of these protests, like asked about sources of job information, a female youth from many of the leaders of the earlier post-Arab Spring pro- Khartoum who was not working said, “Facebook.” A male tests, were youth who had access to smartphones and youth from Madani who did not have a job said, “Through social media. Kadoda and Hale (2015, 223) argue that some social networking applications, such as Facebook, for “social media not only facilitated civil society’s mobili- example.” While a working female youth from Nyala said, zation and greater visibility, but they (the media) raised “Via social media for example.” consciousness and drew in greater numbers.” Their research There is a gender digital divide in Sudan with respect to the demonstrates that the youth activism that took place in access and use of digital technologies. The International 2013 on social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Telecommunications Union (2016) reports that 17 percent and YouTube succeeded in cross-cutting socioeconom- of men and 11 percent of women use the internet. That ic and other divides in ways that the ‘traditional’ protest said, the penetration of the internet as a tool for econom- movements in the mid-1960s and mid-1980s could not. ic transactions is low in Sudan, with only 1.3 percent of Building on that, access to social media in 2013 allowed men and 0.7 percent of women having used the internet to many women who might not otherwise have been able to pay bills or buy something online in the past year (Global participate—due to the patriarchal norms discussed earli- Findex 2014). In addition, men are twice as likely as women er—to actually participate, because social media enabled to make or receive digital payments; 16 percent of men and them to mask their identities. As mentioned earlier in 8 percent of women made or received a digital payment in this report, youth, including female youth, were active in the past year (Global Findex 2014). Some focus group dis- the protests that led to the toppling of President Omar al- cussants raised the issue of not having the same access to Bashir mid-2019, and they typically relied on social media technology and social media as others. For example, a fe- to organize their protests. male youth from Madani who was not working said, “Some The expansion of digital technologies and social media has people don’t know about job opportunities because they the potential to contribute to expanding women’s and youth’s can’t use the internet.” A man from Nyala who had a job economic opportunities. Household possession of assets said, “For example, the one who called us, and asked us to such as a computer and a phone has been shown to have a pos- come, if he didn’t call us, we wouldn’t know about this. But itive influence on labor force participation. Women living in if he announced through [social] media, we may not know households with access to a computer improve their chances about it, even if there are people with experience for the job of being in the labor force and employed by 33 percent and offered.” 46 Markets and Their Impacts on Economic Activity 47 HOUSEHOLD DECISIONS SHAPE DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES While Sudan’s formal institutions, informal institutions, and markets exert a great deal of influence over women’s and youth’s ability to accumulate human capital endowments and seek, obtain, and maintain employment, individuals’ positions in their households, for example, wife versus husband, their relations with their immediate and extended family members, and, critically, their ‘perceptions’ of these positions and relations may be equally important in shaping their economic opportunities. In this section, women’s and youth’s voices and bargaining power are discussed in the context of their ability or inability to engage in income-generating activities. This section draws heavily on the qualitative research that was conducted in Sudan between May 2019 and March 2020 employing KIIs and FGDs in Khartoum, Madani, and Nyala (details are provided in Annex 1). Stifled personal and professional aspirations Decisions made at the household level are informed by the working said, “Yes, but something related to women, like external context and household-level needs and preferences, beauty center for example, this is my dream.” A man from and they have an impact on individual-level human capital Khartoum who had a job said, “I wished to be an engineer.” accumulation, agency, and economic opportunities (World Another working man from Khartoum said, “Yes of course Bank 2012b). While the latest data show that a similar share it was everybody’s wish to go to military school in a certain of young women and young men enroll in tertiary educa- period of time. All the Sudanese guys wished to be officers.” tion, the prevailing norm is that this is more important for Even though most focus group participants had profession- men: more than a third (36 percent) of male Arab Barometer al aspirations, whether now or in the past, it was clear that respondents believe that university education is more im- most of them had not been able to realize them. Two sets of portant for males than females, compared to almost a fourth reasons were primarily mentioned for this: (a) country-lev- (24 percent) of female respondents (Arab Barometer 2018). el reasons, that is, Sudan’s interwoven political crises and The decision as to whether a girl or a boy should drop out of economic crises, and (b) family or household reasons. With school is generally decided at the household level. In other respect to country-level reasons, a working woman from words, it is not just rural Sudanese girls and boys who are Khartoum said, “Yes, it is good to have dreams, and each one making decisions about their futures, but their families, es- wants to be better in the future, but the conditions of the pecially their fathers. It is not just rural Sudanese girls whose country are not helping any to achieve their dreams.” A male personal and professional aspirations may go unrealized but youth from Nyala who did not have a job said, “I have many those of many Sudanese youth as well. ambitions and great, but hands are limited, because here we When asked what they wanted to achieve in their adult will not be able to achieve your dream easily because the lives (in the case of youth) or had wanted to achieve (in the conditions here and the problems that have eliminated all case of adults), focus group participants spent more time our dreams in the recent period, the conditions of our coun- mentioning professional rather than personal goals. For ex- try have changed dramatically.” A male youth from Madani ample, a female youth from Khartoum who had a job said, who did not have a job said, “I will tell you why, because of “I want to complete my studies and work by the certificate/ the circumstances that we’re facing nowadays in addition degree I will take, in a good company, and to achieve good to that, our parents force us in certain directions and the position in this company, like to be a manager for exam- second thing is that everyone wants their children to follow ple.” Another female youth from Khartoum who was also their lead and work in the same field for example the doctor TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY wants his son to be a doctor as well.” The last example partly The FGDs also revealed it was common for a combination addresses country-level reasons and partly addresses family of financial constraints and patriarchal customs to af- or household reasons. fect daughters’ ability to study as well as work outside the home after they were married. As mentioned in preceding Many of the focus group participants, irrespective of their sections of this report, poor families with large numbers circumstances, said that their families played a leading of unmarried daughters will often choose to discontinue role in determining their life courses. For example, a fe- their daughters’ educations so that they can get married, male youth from Khartoum who was not working said, since marriage transfers the economic responsibility for the “Sometimes the parents take the decision for you.” Another daughters to their husbands’ families while also generating woman from Khartoum who was working said, “My father some wealth for the daughters’ families in the form of ‘bride made me leave school, he told me now that you know how price’ and other gifts from the husband (Papps et al. 1983). A to write and read so you shouldn’t go to school anyway.” A female youth from Madani who was not working said, “Girls male youth from Khartoum who did not have a job said, stop their education depending on their families’ decisions, “Yes, the majority affected by the choice of their family.” At but it is different for boys. If boys want to continue their the same time, many of the decisions that families make education, no one will influence them.” This comment was with respect to their daughters and sons are gendered. followed by a direct comment from another female youth While poverty was not reported to play a pronounced role from Madani who was not working either: “For girls, it is in studies concerning early marriage and school dropout, their family’s decision.” Once married, it can be difficult for families’ financial situations does appear to affect daugh- women to join the labor force. A woman from Khartoum who ters’—and sons’—ability to study. For example, a male was not working said, “For me I left school, to work to help unemployed youth from Madani said, “I [know] a man my family, then I got married and left the work.” A female who has five daughters at the beginning who made them working youth from Khartoum said, “I stopped my studies learn, but after a while he brought them all out of education because of its expenses, and then I got married and I didn’t because of his financial circumstances.” A female working have the chance to return back and complete my studies.” youth from Khartoum said, “Maybe because she sees her family suffering in paying the education expenses, so she Boys and men face pressures to be the provider, which feels it is better to stop education in order to help her fami- may lead to them dropping out of school to engage in in- ly.” A male youth from Madani who had a job said, “I know a come-generating activities to a larger extent than girls. person who was the only man in the house and he had like According to some of the focus group participants who were five sisters, so he left school for financial reasons.” Another male, life was not without its obstacles for them. Indeed, male youth from Madani who did not work said, “…I drop poor families with sons may choose to discontinue their out my study because of substantial reasons because of my sons’ educations so that they can seek employment that of- situation, I entered the university but I dropped [out] be- fers needed income. A male youth from Madani who had a cause the expenses to register were 1500. And this amount job said, “Sometimes it does not happen because there are wasn’t available, I have elder sisters who go to the college circumstances that control you.” A male youth from Nyala and there are younger sisters who go to the school, so I drop who did not work said, “Sometimes you have to give up this out my study and I help my father so the rest of my sisters in exchange for work at a young age to provide additional can continue their study.” income for your home.” The gender-based division of roles and labor starts at home For a woman in Sudan, two events are particularly im- (World Bank 2018a). On the other hand, women, youth, portant in shaping her future: getting married and having and adults are less likely to be active when married, com- children. Some Sudanese girls will complete their second- pared to those who have never been married. Results of ary level education, or beyond, either before or after getting the determinants of labor force participation show that married. Some will also get jobs. However, the challenges the odds ratio of married women and men being in the of marriage followed by childbearing and child-rearing will labor force is 0.609 and 2.077, respectively, meaning that lead many to drop out of the labor market. Since women married women are about 40 percent less likely and mar- often have limited bargaining power within the household, ried men are over 100 percent more likely to be in the this affects their access to different types of economic labor force compared to their unmarried counterparts. opportunities, including financial capital and other re- In 2014, one in five girls in Sudan aged 15–19 was already sources that could facilitate entrepreneurial activities. married, and thus they are more likely to be poor, unedu- In sum, marital status contributes to defining the decision cated, and nonusers of contraception (World Bank 2018a). to enter the labor market. Compared to individuals who About 60 percent of the married adolescents in 2014 were have never been married, married, divorced, and widowed pregnant or had at least one child. High rates of early mar- men are more likely to be in the labor force and employed riage and childbearing lead to unnecessary health risks for 50 Household Decisions Shape Development Outcomes mothers and babies, higher rates of secondary school drops was conducted for this report. When asked if it would be outs, and associated lower educational and labor opportuni- possible for a woman to ask for help with her household ties for young women. chores so that she could pursue employment outside the home—or because she had already assumed employment The likelihood of women being in the labor force is higher outside the home—the response from the focus group when they are the household heads as well as when they live participants, irrespective of their gender, age, geographic in households with fewer dependents. locale, or employment status (working versus not working), The average household size in Sudan is six, and the larger was an overwhelming “no.” There was slightly more recep- the household, the less chances of individuals being active tivity to the idea among the focus group participants in in general. However, in households with many dependents, Khartoum, though most of their statements were couched women are less likely and men are more likely to be em- in the conditional. ployed and participate in the labor force. Overall, the share of households that are headed by women in Sudan rep- There are few exceptions that would make it possible and resents less than 15 percent of all households. Women and acceptable for a man to help a woman with household youth living in female-headed households are less likely to chores. For example, one woman from Khartoum who was be involved in employment and the labor force: the odds of not working said, “Yes, it depends on your conditions, he such women being in the labor force are 42 percent lower may help you in feeding the children. If you are busy.” The compared to women living in male-headed households. For one exception to the overwhelmingly negative response was household heads, having children increases the odds by 91 if the woman was ill. Then, it was acceptable for her hus- percent for male household heads and 145 percent for fe- band to help her with “spreading bed sheets” or “bathing male household heads to be part of the labor force. kids.” That said, one woman from Madani who did not have a job said, “If I told him that I am sick, he will tell me that Household chores I am pretending.” The reasons the focus group participants gave as to why men could not, or should not, be asked to In patriarchal societies that subscribe to the male breadwin- help women with household chores fell, for the most part, ner-female caregiver model, women are first and foremost into one of two categories: (a) that is not done here, that is, wives and mothers (or, until they come of age, daughters in Sudan, and (b) he would not agree to this arrangement. and sisters) whose duty is to care for their male relatives. These are conditioned responses that stem from Sudan’s This means assuming responsibility for all household patriarchal customs that are discussed in Section 5. For ex- chores. As discussed in preceding sections of this report, ample, with respect to the first category, a male youth from in patriarchal societies, marriage results in women moving Khartoum who did not have a job said, “I don’t think you from their homes to their husbands’ homes. In Sudan, both do this. No one do this in our country.” A male youth from women (67 percent) and men (81 percent) think the hus- Madani who did not work said, “Yes, here in Sudan we have band should have the final say in all decisions concerning beliefs that do not allow men to work at home.” However, a the family (Afrobarometer 2019). In addition, 57 percent female youth from Nyala who was working said, “Yes, there of both women and men agree that “in general, it is bet- are women who ask their men to help them in household ter for a family if a woman has the main responsibility for responsibilities. But it’s rare.” With respect to the second taking care of the home and children rather than a man” category, that is, the husband would not agree to this ar- (Afrobarometer 2019). This was strongly confirmed by the rangement, a woman from Khartoum who was not working focus group discussants from the qualitative research that said, “He will never accept, impossible.” A man from Madani BOX 3. Additional illustrations of men’s roles and responsibilities related to household chores “My brother lives with us, he, his wife and his children, from the job and he said that he says that he is a man, he doesn’t stay with his family the whole week, he only he shouldn’t do anything.” - Woman, Khartoum, working stays on Friday even though he doesn’t stand staying outside the home with his children. So, I don’t think there is a man could “I will not help [her] because of the social vision for such stay at home and share with us the house chores.” - thing is not good.” - Male youth, Madani, not working Female youth, Khartoum, working outside the home “I help her by going to my work, but I can’t help her at “No, it depends on his mood, if he does the thing when home.” - Male youth, Madani, working he isn’t in the mood, so he ruins it, he said he is [tired] Source: Qualitative work conducted for this report. See Annex 1 for methodology. 51 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY who had a job said, “No, she doesn’t dare to ask for some- According to the focus group participants, childcare op- thing like this.” Overall, the most extreme responses, tions are not readily available, which greatly limits women’s meaning those that offered the least flexibility with respect ability to work outside the home. Given the fact that most to household chores, were offered not by adult men, as one employers who were interviewed said that maternity leave might expect, but by young males who had jobs. For exam- policies and childcare facilities exist, it is not clear what, ex- ple, a male youth from Madani who had a job said, “If my actly, the impediment is. It could be that some employers wife said that she can’t do the households, I’ll tell her that I have policies on paper, but not in practice, or not fully in am going to marry to bring another woman to help her. If practice. It could also be that there are direct and indirect she is impolite, I’ll send her to her family.” costs for childcare that families either choose not to assume or are unable to afford. It is also possible that the childcare Given the strongly held beliefs and expectations among available is not up to parents’ expectations regarding afford- the greater share of Sudanese society with respect to wom- ability, accessibility, and quality or that there is a mistrust en’s primary roles—if not sole role—as caregivers, it is of childcare, that is, the idea of placing one’s child in the not surprising that one of the factors motivating recently care of a nonrelative. Based on the focus group participants’ married women to drop out of the labor force is the burden responses, it seems clear that one issue is a lack of people of household chores. According to a woman from Madani who can offer childcare, whether those people are provid- who worked outside the home, “She has a lot of duties ed by an employer or are relatives. For example, a woman and responsibilities so she can’t make a balance between from Madani who was not working said, “She [must] leave them, so she decides to leave her job for the sake of her her job because she doesn’t have someone to look after her home.” According to a female youth from Khartoum who kids.” While a man from Nyala who had a job said, “I think worked outside the home, “Yes, the same example I know they don’t find someone to take care of the kids. Her hus- a girl dropped out her work because she got married and band may be outside Sudan. Kids need attention and care. she couldn’t stand working and handling her house and So, their husbands ask them to leave their jobs. Women in her children needs.” The weight of the ‘double burden’ that this case prefer to stay at home and take care of their kids.” Sudanese women who pursue income-generating opportu- nities face was raised by female youth and women in each of Mothers are supposed to provide childcare, and families the FGDs (Khartoum, Madani, and Nyala), irrespective of have the right to expect them to provide it. This is one of the whether or not they currently had a job. foundational beliefs upon which the male breadwinner-fe- male caregiver model is based and the most frequently cited Childcare impediment facing women who wish to work outside the home. As mentioned in Section 4 and Section 5, aspects of It is not just household chores that impede women from this cultural model are codified in Muslim family law, which working outside the home, but women’s responsibilities as gives husbands the right to limit their wives’ ability to work the primary caregiver, combined with the lack of alternative outside the home. A number of the focus group participants’ childcare options, also pose an obstacle. Once a Sudanese responses addressed this issue, from a husband not wanting woman is married, she is expected to start having children. his wife to work, to a husband telling his wife she could not Sudan’s fertility rate (births per woman) was estimated to work, to the family, for example, the mother-in-law, saying be 4.4 in 2018 (World Bank 2020a), and large families are the woman should not work. For example, a female youth the norm, especially in the country’s rural areas. When em- from Nyala who had a job said, “Because of household re- ployers across a range of industries were asked about their sponsibilities, for example her husband doesn’t want her to companies’ maternity leave policies and childcare facilities, work and he wants her to take care of the kids and he will most said they had one or the other if not both. For exam- provide everything for her.” While a woman from Khartoum ple, according to the director of a large agricultural business who was working said, “Maybe their family forces them to in Nyala, “Actually we do provide childcare related to the do so, their marriage for example, the kids, the family, tak- ministry and there is one hour for breastfeeding, so we give ing care of kids and sometimes their family get sick so they women all their rights.” Only one employer of a large compa- stay to take care of same, responsibility at home.” In sum, ny in Madani indirectly acknowledged that his business did at present, Sudanese women’s domestic duties, which are not offer any childcare options. He said, “[T]he problem is the simultaneously defined and upheld by cultural norms and le- baby as she can’t work if she brought him with her, usually gal codes, pose a significant obstacle to working outside the after marriage responsibilities increase especially if children home for a great many Sudanese women, irrespective of the are ill or at hospital, we can be tolerant for simple things but childcare options that government or industry might offer. we won’t accept ten days’ vacation without excuse.” 52 Household Decisions Shape Development Outcomes Additional constraints: Low wages and lack of adequate transportation Wages are another factor that are assessed in household One of the things that stood out from the FGDs was the decision-making. Low wages affect Sudanese women’s lack of adequate transportation, the need to spend one’s and youth’s ability to pursue income-generating activities. wages on transportation, and, in some cases, one’s wages Paradoxically, while employers who were interviewed for not being high enough to justify one’s transportation costs. this study reported adequately compensating all of their According to the NHBPS 2014/15, the average transpor- employees, that is, they do not engage in gender, age, or tation cost per person per year is SDG 71 and increases wage discrimination, employees who were interviewed re- with household income. For example, a female youth from ported unhappiness with their wages. Both the former and Khartoum who was working said, “The working time is relat- the latter are widespread phenomena. For example, a male ed to the transportation, as if I finished my work late, I will youth from Madani who was not working said, “I think the not find any transportation to get back home.” A woman salary is the first thing anyone who wants to find a job can from Khartoum who did not have a job said, “Yes, exactly, think of.” A male youth from Nyala who did not have a job because of the transportation. The transportation is hard said, “I can work anywhere, but there are basic things that I and costly.” A working woman from Khartoum said, “Yes, look to at work anywhere the salary first, then experience.” maybe, you can finish your working hours at 5 p.m. and A working woman from Madani said, “My sister works in you can’t find a transportation or you can find a means of Khartoum and she lives in stay-in house for girls. Her salary transport but it will cost you a fortune and at the end of the wasn’t enough.” month you wouldn’t have any salary left.” 53 CONCLUDING REMARKS © Atif Saad / Photography This section summarizes the main findings of the study. Areas that are believed to be critical to improving women’s and youth’s economic opportunities in both the nearer and the longer term are highlighted. It is recommended that these areas be discussed with a broad range of stakeholders to further identify and prioritize specific policy and programmatic actions. When examining the determinants of labor market out- who succeed in getting jobs, fulfilling their (unpaid) care and comes for women and youth across geographic regions, household responsibilities while working often presents an educational levels, and socioeconomic strata, a few factors insurmountable challenge, leading many to drop out of the stand out as discussed in the following paragraphs. labor force before they rise within it. Women who work face many constraints including, but not Young people are less likely to participate in the labor force limited to, the legal framework, patriarchal customs, land and be employed, compared to adults. Sudan’s population is and property rights, and access to finance. Three-quarters young with 60 percent below the age of 25. Male youth have of men are in the labor force compared to a third of wom- 77 and 73 percent odds of participating in the labor force en. Unemployment is twice as high for women as it is for and being employed, respectively, compared to male adults. men. Female youth are 55 percent less likely to be employed Youth are struggling with high unemployment, especially in compared to female adults. Women who work earn less urban areas, where it increased from 20 percent in 2009 to than men, and they have been disproportionally affected by 40 percent in 2014. This trend seems to be associated with the decline in real daily wages. Women who want to pursue increased migration to urban centers, such as Khartoum, more entrepreneurial forms of income-generating activ- where rural youth who were engaged in agriculture and ity, whether in the private sector, the agricultural sector, rural IDPs are competing with urban youth—and their was- or the informal sector, are likely to face challenges getting ta—for income-generating opportunities. credit from a bank because of their lack of assets and per- Agriculture and services are the main sources of em- sonal connections, or wasta, the latter of which are essential ployment in Sudan, with the agricultural sector largely for accessing and navigating the male-dominated banking dominated by women, according to some measures. In system. Few women hold decision-making positions. Only 2014, the agricultural sector accounted for almost half of 3 percent of firms are led by women. Women are gaining Sudan’s total employment, which included 60 percent of ground in various social and political arenas as demon- Sudan’s employed women and 80 percent of Sudan’s em- strated by, for example, their increased representation in ployed rural women. Sudanese households whose primary Parliament. At present, however, these advances do not source of income is derived from agriculture, rather than appear to be having a meaningful impact on the above-de- from other segments of the economy, are generally poorer, scribed labor market outcomes. more vulnerable, and less resilient. Patriarchal customs and norms, combined with a legal Having wasta—a connection to someone who can “get framework that reinforces discriminatory practices, restrict things done”—plays a key role in enabling, or inhibiting, women’s access to economic opportunities. According to Sudanese women’s and youth’s access to the labor market. prevailing cultural beliefs and practices, men are supposed Wasta helps members of all demographic groups access em- to be providers, while women are supposed to be caregiv- ployment opportunities so long as they stay within their ers. These, and other, customs and norms are reflected and geographic, socioeconomic, and so on context. If, however, reinforced in the 1991 MPSL and other legal instruments’ as implied earlier, a male youth from Nyala tries to “use” his regulations that explicitly discriminate against women, “Nyala wasta” in Khartoum, he is probably not going to be placing Sudan near the bottom of the global WBL index. For successful, unless he is solely interested in seeking employ- example, many women need to ask their husbands for per- ment in a “Nyala enclave.” mission to seek employment outside of the home. For those TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY Potential areas for policy and programmatic action This study has brought to light several areas in which target- but the sandug model would not be appropriate for women ed policies and programs have the potential to help Sudan’s in central Khartoum who desire to grow their small-to-me- women and youth improve their economic circumstances. dium-size businesses—these women need to be able to The following five areas are briefly explored with the idea take out loans, and possibly more than one, from tradition- that discussions with a broad range of stakeholders will al banks. This is aligned with international evidence which serve to further refine them: shows that to improve the supply side behind the gender gap in access to finance, offering different services (includ- • Expand the opportunities for women to access finance. ing microfinance) and introducing operational changes such • Improve the access to and quality of agricultural jobs. as the following have proven successful: (a) account open- • Combine efforts to build human capital with activities ing without a minimum deposit requirement; (b) flexible aimed at strengthening agency. loan terms, such as smaller amounts with longer-terms and • Identify and develop marketable skills that increase lower-interest rates; (c) banking hours outside of normal opportunities for service sector employment and for business hours; (d) women staff available to assist wom- entrepreneurial activities. en borrowers; and (e) services available at closer locations • Create an enabling environment that lifts gender-spe- (IFC/GPFI 2011). Encouraging the use of movable collat- cific constraints. eral can benefit women in particular, empowering them to overcome their lack of titled land, or the limitations on their The five areas are intentionally broad though by no means power to transfer property, enabling them to use the assets arbitrary. They draw on international best practices from they have to gain access to formal credit markets.16 Ensuring the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa and from a variety that women have government-issued identification docu- of sectoral initiatives (World Bank, 2008, 2017). The goal ments is also critical to being able to access formal finance. is to appeal to as wide an array of potential stakeholders as To address challenges related to the demand side, a study possible. The policy actions include short-, medium-, and from four North African countries indicates that female long-term options. The analysis in this report suggests that firm managers tend to underestimate their creditworthi- the greater share of the policies and programs that will serve ness based primarily on perceived discriminatory lending to improve Sudanese women’s and youth’s economic circum- practices by banks which ultimately deters them from ap- stances for the better will necessitate outlooks that focus on plying for credit (Morsy, El-Shal, and Woldemichael 2019). the longer term. However, there are some low-hanging fruits While this would not be the only challenge that would need that can be achieved in the short term and have the poten- to be addressed on the demand side—other issues include tial to make significant impact. The reason the actions are the willingness to take risks and other preferences—invest- not separated into these three groups is to avoid possible ing in women’s financial literacy knowledge and skills would misinterpretation that medium- and long-term goals can be be an effective step toward women’s financial inclusion. set aside for now. Rather, work on achieving some medium- and long-term goals also needs to start now while working Second, women are much less likely than men to have land to achieve short-term objectives. The policy action areas are titles due to a property rights system that formally excludes summarized in a matrix (Table 2). them. Female farmers who do not have title to the land they farm are not likely to be able to expand beyond the smaller, rain-fed plots which, as this report has shown, are not near- Expand the opportunities for women to access ly as lucrative as the larger agricultural firms. Formalizing finance land ownership with stronger land rights have shown the Women working in agriculture face similar constraints as potential to increase productivity (World Bank 2020g). At women entrepreneurs in both the private sector and the the same time, and as mentioned above, since land titles informal sector. First, access to credit often requires the can be used as collateral for loans, enabling women to ac- support of a male guardian. Offering a range of lending op- quire land titles would simultaneously make it easier for portunities that include, but are not limited to, traditional them to access credit. Where women may not have access banks, nonprofit organizations that support microfinance, to their own titles, small nudges have proven effective in and informal lending institutions would serve to meet dif- encouraging joint land titling (World Bank 2020g). In sum, ferent women’s different needs. For example, the sandug different finance models need to be explored to identify model (an informal lending institution) that, in some re- what works well—and what does not work well—in differ- gions, has become affiliated with the Agricultural Bank of ent contexts. Rigorous evidence from more than one study Sudan’s microfinance program works well for women in in Africa shows the positive effects of savings mechanisms more rural areas who aspire to start one-person businesses, on business investment and performance of female-owned 16 See, for example, World Bank (2019d) for specific, actionable suggestions on expanding the use of moveable assets and its benefits for women. 56 Concluding Remarks firms (Campos et al. 2019). There is no reason to believe that women and youth are aware of the economic oppor- that the same would not hold in the Sudanese context. tunities provided along the agricultural value chain, the Interventions simply need to be tailored to ensure that they overall improvement of the legal framework (nondiscrimi- are embraced and adopted by the relevant target groups nation in hiring and promotion), introduction of workplace such as female farmers in the Darfur region or female entre- flexibilities and support that cater to women’s household preneurs in the private sector in Khartoum. and care responsibilities, and the organization of women agriculturists in professional associations that advocate for Improve the access to and quality of women in agriculture (Karl 1997; World Bank 2009). In ad- agricultural jobs dition, ‘feeder programs’ for youth, especially female youth, graduating from universities’ agricultural programs could In contrast to some of its neighbors in Africa, agriculture has be considered. These individuals should be placed in agricul- been and is likely to continue to be one of the main sources tural firms immediately upon graduation so that they can of employment for women and youth in Sudan. Therefore, hone the skills they acquired, and share the ideas they devel- focusing on sustained agriculture growth is vital for job oped, in their university programs, as well as begin to learn creation and poverty reduction. Between 2011 and 2014, the management skills and continuous in-service training the share of the employed population working in agricul- necessary to advance to leadership positions. In sum, a ture increased, with almost half of the labor force employed whole-of-sector approach is needed to make sure that adults in agriculture in 2014. In rural areas, four out of every five and youth, males and females, the tertiary educated, and women working outside of the home are engaged in agri- the vocationally trained are able to collectively engage in, culture. In addition to the women working as agricultural and productively contribute to, one of Sudan’s leading in- laborers, there are female youth graduating from universi- dustries. Focusing on improving the quality of and access ties with the training to develop the sector. Indeed, female to agricultural jobs in Sudan’s rural areas should also reduce youth presently represent the majority of tertiary educa- the strain on Sudan’s urban labor markets, which have not tion graduates from agriculture programs. However, as the been able to absorb the influx of rural women and youth KIIs and FGDs showed, few women are rising to positions seeking employment, resulting in an increase in urban pov- of management in the larger, more profitable agricultural erty. In addition to creating jobs and reducing poverty, the firms. Programs should not only benefit women but also above-described approach would also provide a productive harness their capacity and include them from program de- link between social protection and women’s and youth’s sign to implementation in capacities beyond consultations. economic empowerment. Ample evidence shows that increasing women’s control over productive resources by providing inputs directly to women Combine efforts to build human capital with or lowering costs for obtaining these resources, facilitating activities aimed at strengthening agency access to credit and information, sometimes in combination with technical training and support, will help women shift It is important to promote gender equality from a young into higher-value activities and increase overall agricultural age, tracking disparities in human capital accumulation by productivity (Anderson et al. 2020; World Bank 2020f). ensuring that, among other things, girls and young women complete their education. As presented in this report, en- It will be critical to develop and implement labor market rollment rates have increased in Sudan for both boys and policies that aim to build a skilled agricultural labor force girls and, in fact, reached gender parity in primary and sec- consistent with the demands of the labor market. This will ondary education in 2017 (World Bank Gender Statistics). necessitate a multipronged approach. On the one hand, However, these are still below the average of Sub-Saharan there is a need to develop vocational training programs for Africa countries at the primary and secondary levels and male and female adults and youth who desire to work as girls in rural areas are less likely to be enrolled especially in agricultural laborers. These individuals may not necessari- primary school. ly aspire to rise to positions of management in agricultural firms, but they nonetheless want to be trained—and if nec- This report has identified early marriage as an important essary retrained—as the agricultural labor market changes reason that girls drop out of school and there are various due to, for example, natural disasters or economic crises. interventions that could be considered to delay marriage Targeting extension services to women by, for example, and support girls who marry early. Based on a review of having more female extension agents and better trained what works to end child marriage, such interventions could agents overall related to gender mainstreaming, or targeting include (a) empowering girls with information, skills, and the training to both spouses, will increase female farmers’ support networks; (b) educating and mobilizing parents and knowledge and help improve their outcomes (World Bank community members; (c) enhancing the accessibility and 2014a, 2020g). At the same time, there is a need to ensure quality of formal schooling for girls; (d) offering economic that higher educated women in agriculture are able to ben- support and incentives for girls and their families; and (e) efit from this training. Potential measures include ensuring fostering an enabling legal and policy framework (Wodon et 57 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY al. 2017). Programs to educate girls and their parents about country’s urban areas. Few working-age Sudanese attend the negative impacts of this would be useful. Curbing early vocational training programs (3 percent). Of those who do, marriage and pregnancy will also help reduce the fertility about a third are women, and about a third are youth. The rate, and subsequently the dependency ratio, with a positive KIIs with employers and employees revealed an education impact on poverty. and skills mismatch in the labor market. Vocational training programs, coupled with basic business programs, should be Given that social norms related to the caregiver versus established and/or strengthened based on the specific de- provider role seem to be strongly internalized, it will be im- mands of the labor market in the areas in which they are portant to identify ways to address girls’ limited agency in being offered, as well as the interests of the youth and the determining their future—education and marriage—and to women who live there, with access to funding available to strengthen their bargaining power within their households encourage an entrepreneurial spirit. Additionally, vocation- and the larger community. Behavioral science-informed al training programs tailored to specific geographic regions community-level interventions to address social norms that should not only help people obtain the skills necessary to restrict women’s agency related to education and economic become employed in needed vocations but also emphasize activity can be explored, with activities that target hus- job search skills, so that those who do not have access to bands, parents, and/or other community members (World the internet or to wasta can still succeed.17 In a related vein, Bank 2018a). For example, this report noted that, while research has shown that, to increase women’s economic ac- recent data suggest that roughly comparable numbers of tivity, rather than focusing on general managerial training, young women and young men are enrolling in tertiary edu- programs are more effective in numerous contexts in Africa cation, the prevailing perception is that higher education is when addressing socio-emotional skills and gender-specific more important for men. Until this perception is changed, content (Campos et al. 2019). Sudan is unlikely to see the ‘return on investment’ of its fe- male university graduates, which negatively affects not only The service sector employs 46 percent of the labor force and those graduates but also the country’s GDP. In the nearer is a key sector for the employment of women and youth. term, actions could be taken to (a) reduce school dropouts for However, a number of factors are deterring service sector girls at all levels, and provide dropouts with opportunities growth. These include, but are not limited to, weak econom- to complete their educations to some degree of certification ic growth, flagging infrastructure, poor management, and through alternative mechanisms such as traditional corre- the inability to attract and retain a strong workforce, both spondence programs or contemporary online programs; skilled and unskilled. Similar to the above-described recom- (b) improve girls’ enrollment at the secondary level; and mendation with respect to the agricultural sector, women (c) target young women for school-to-work transition pro- and youth can be instrumental in supporting the growth grams that take into account their individual realities such of the service sector. To ensure that women and youth can as rural versus urban, married versus unmarried, some pri- both contribute to this growth and benefit from a growing mary school education versus higher education, and so on. sector, vocational programs should be designed and offered Evidence shows that a multipronged approach related to to those with less education and training and ‘young pro- life-skills and livelihood training may be most effective in fessional programs’ to those who have recently graduated increasing adolescent girls’ human development outcomes from higher education programs. To facilitate women’s ac- and likelihood to engage in income-generating activities cess to these kinds of programs, evidence suggests that it is (World Bank 2013). important to improve outreach and introduce flexibility in hours; create a safe, gender-sensitive training environment Identify and develop marketable skills that increase and transport to and from training opportunities; and use opportunities for service sector employment and mentoring and ensure equal participation in training and in for entrepreneurial activities management of skills development institutions (ILO 2014; World Bank 2020e). There is a need to identify and develop marketable skills, especially for women and youth who migrate to cities from There is an opportunity to close the remaining gender dig- rural areas, since many of them only have agricultural skills. ital divide and harness the skills developed by women and As long as Sudan continues to experience droughts and de- youth to develop the ICT sector. While comparatively few sertification and have large numbers of IDPs, people will Sudanese have access to the internet at present (17 percent continue to migrate out of those circumstances (primarily, men and 11 percent women), this is likely to change with though not exclusively, from the Darfur region) to urban time. While less than a third of the graduates from STEM areas that are believed to offer a diversity of employment op- programs are female youth, female youth dominate the portunities. Despite the large number of working-age youth share of graduates in ICT—they are thus well placed to help in Sudan, however, many are unemployed, especially in the Sudan’s service sector industry develop its IT services and 17 World Bank (2020e) identifies among the top lessons learned for increasing employment particularly among young women the need to not only empower adolescent girls and develop marketable skills but also stress the importance of increasing efficiency in job searches. 58 Concluding Remarks its marketing services. These female and male youth should force and with higher incomes and improved development be employed in a variety of sectors with the objective of get- outcomes. Of the 190 countries that are covered in this ting these sectors’ IT services up to speed. At the same time, report, Sudan is fourth from the bottom, with Sudanese women whose domestic responsibilities inhibit them from women having less than a third of the rights that Sudanese seeking employment outside of the home, and who none- men have in the measured areas. theless desire to engage in some form of income-generating Amending aspects of the 1997 Labor Code would be a activity, should be taught—as connectively increases—how significant first step in improving women’s economic op- to use the internet to make basic economic transactions so portunities. For example, the 1997 Labor Code prohibits that they can more easily complete those transactions from women from having the ability to work the same hours as their homes. In sum, it has been found that “lower earnings men. This limits the number of jobs for which women can for women in adulthood due to low educational attainment apply. It also limits their ability to seek promotions, since lead to losses in human capital wealth defined as the pres- promotions are generally awarded to those who demon- ent value of the future earnings of the labor force” (Wodon strate a desire and a willingness to work longer hours. The et al. 2018). 1997 Labor Code prohibits women from performing jobs Recognition by the Government of Sudan, particularly local deemed “hazardous, arduous, or harmful to their health” authorities, of the important role entrepreneurial activities without explaining what “hazardous”, “arduous”, or “harm- play is essential and—if done right—should benefit work- ful” means. In other words, these terms are open to the ers by providing additional opportunities and protections. interpretation of employers. Their interpretations could As mentioned in different places throughout this report, be as broad or as narrow as they choose without giving many women find it difficult to work after they get married women—or, for that matter, anyone—the legal recourse due to the caregiver role, and the accompanying house- to challenge them. There are no legal provisions on equal hold responsibilities, they are expected to assume. At the remuneration for women and men for work of equal val- same time, this report cited several studies that showed ue or for nondiscrimination based on gender in hiring. that women with no more than modest formal educations Furthermore, pregnant women are not protected; mothers and/or vocational trainings could, under the right circum- are not guaranteed an equivalent position after maternity stances, open and operate successful small businesses out leave. In sum, Sudanese women are legally restricted in a of their homes while still fulfilling their caregiver roles. The way that circumscribes their economic mobility and their FGDs with male and female adults and youth in all three economic decision-making. regions noted a desire for increased vocational trainings and Easing regulations to start businesses would benefit both basic business trainings so that more people could operate male and female entrepreneurs, but maybe even more so small businesses like the women mentioned above. The for women, since they tend to have less capital for reasons Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, which the government that were highlighted throughout this report. Business is is currently preparing, offers an opportunity to address the clearly a viable economic option for some Sudanese women. constraints to employment in the agricultural sector, the At present, however, it appears to be limited to the small service sector, and the informal sector. minority who have high levels of human capital, financial capital, and social capital and social networks, which enable Create an enabling environment that lifts gender- them to circumvent the structural factors that are imped- specific constraints ing, rather than facilitating, their success. The main obstacle to improving women’s, and to a lesser ex- Other legal measures could be enacted to address some of tent youth’s, economic opportunities, irrespective of their the societal issues that affect girls’ and women’s human geographic locale, their educational level, or their socioeco- capital accumulation and overall well-being. Mandating nomic circumstances, is a combination of certain laws and and enforcing an increase in the minimum age for marriage certain cultural norms. Since laws are more tangible than is one example. Child marriage and early childbearing are cultural norms, it is recommended that attempts to amend common in certain parts of Sudan, and studies show that aspects of the law be tackled first. girls who marry during their adolescent years are more like- Lifting regulatory constraints to women’s economic partici- ly to be—and to remain—poor and uneducated. Given the pation is key. Discriminatory laws limit equal opportunities recent (April 2020) landmark decision outlawing female and constitute a threat to women’s economic security, posi- genital mutilation in Sudan, now may be an opportune time tion in society, and overall well-being. The WBL 2021 report for the public and the elected representatives to address finds that better performance in the areas measured by the a number of other societal issues that differentially affect index presented is associated with more women in the labor girls’ and women’s personal and professional potential. 59 TOWARDS A MORE INCLUSIVE ECONOMY TABLE 2. Summary of potential areas for policy and programmatic action Barriers/obstacles General policy recommendations • Opening bank accounts • Obtaining land titles and other Expand opportunities for assets that can be used as collateral 1 women to access finance • Accessing credit • Obtaining land titles • Controlling productive resources 2 Improve access to and • Benefiting from vocational training, extension services quality of agricultural jobs • Leveraging higher education • Completing education (rural) • Early marriage • Having a voice, exercising agency 3 Build human capital & • Working outside the home strengthen agency • Balancing paid work and unpaid household responsibilities • Obtaining relevant vocational training; acquiring basic business knowledge and skills Identify and develop • Networking, job searching 4 marketable skills • Leveraging higher education, ICT • Unfriendly work environment • Having a voice, exercising agency • Working outside the home, pursuing entrepreneurial activities 5 Create enabling environment that • Balancing paid work and unpaid lifts gender-specific constraints household responsibilities 60 Concluding Remarks Policy and programmatic action Individual level outcomes FORMAL Enable women to obtain own or joint land title; create an enabling Enhanced uptake of financial INSTITUTIONS environment for a range of lending opportunities services among women; more entrepreneurial activity INFORMAL Expand and learn from informal lending institutions; include risk INSTITUTIONS management in financial literacy training for women MARKETS Offer different types of lending opportunities; introduce operational changes in banking services to address women’s needs FORMAL Enable women to obtain land titles, and to access and make Women’s increased ownership INSTITUTIONS decisions on productive resources; support organization of female and control over assets; agriculture workers increased productivity for women and youth in rural areas INFORMAL INSTITUTIONS Facilitate access to information MARKETS Target extension services; develop placement programs for female youth graduating from university agricultural programs; diversify market entry points FORMAL Enable school drop-outs to complete education via alternative Women and girls have more human INSTITUTIONS mechanism; provide economic incentives to families for school capital and bargaining power within completion; target school-to-work programs; address obedience household and in society provisions in Personal Status Law INFORMAL Support behavioral science-informed community-level INSTITUTIONS interventions to address patriarchal customs; ensure that vocational training programs combine life-skills and livelihood training; facilitate access to information and networking FORMAL Bolster the ICT sector and ensure women and youth participation; For women and youth, increased INSTITUTIONS support geographically targeted vocational training; employment and entrepreneurship; school-to-work programs; introduce flexible work policies higher return-on- INFORMAL Socio-emotional skills, gender-specific content in trainings education/skills-investment INSTITUTIONS MARKETS Develop placement programs for university ICT graduates; facilitate digital networking and job searching; establish targeted mentoring programs FORMAL Lift gender-specific restrictions in Labor Code (sector, hour Women have increased voice INSTITUTIONS restrictions, etc.); introduce childcare, safe transport measures; and agency. 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Washington, Agriculture. Gender Innovation Lab. Washington, DC: DC: World Bank. World Bank. World Bank. 2020d. Women, Business and the Law 2020. World Bank. 2020g. Top Policy Lessons in Women’s Property Washington, DC: World Bank. Rights. Gender Innovation Lab. Washington, DC: World Bank. World Bank. 2020e. GIL Top Policy Lessons on Increasing Women’s Youth Employment. Gender Innovation World Bank. 2021. Women, Business and the Law 2021. Lab. Washington, DC: World Bank. Washington, DC: World Bank. 65 ANNEX 1. Methodological Note Qualitative Data Collection and Analysis This section describes the methods used for data collection, developed with customized sections for each target group data cleaning, and analysis.  (for example, perceptions about life, education, getting a job, self-employment, and dropping out). Similarly, cus- Research approach tomized semi-structured in-depth interview guides were developed. To meet the research objectives, a qualitative study was car- ried out to better understand the constraints women and Sampling youth face in accessing economic opportunities. The fol- lowing research methods were used to collect data from the Purposive sampling was employed since there was clarity on areas/people related to the subject under the study: the respondent profiles who fit the research. While homog- enous sampling (a type of purposive sampling) was used • FGDs  were chosen for in-depth discussions about for the FGDs to look at the unemployment issues in depth, unemployment, to explore collective views and the maximum variation sampling (a type of purposive sampling underlying meanings. They targeted the affected com- that ensures diversity as well)—covering a broader range munity within a limited time frame. of samples (for example, employers in various industries, • In-depth interviews:  These use a KII methodolo- range of employer size)—was used for KIIs to discover cen- gy to gather more information from a limited set of tral themes, core elements, and/or shared dimensions.  knowledgeable employers/experts about a particular subject (for example, policies, hiring of women and • Focus group sampling.  A total of 33 FGDs were youth). conducted in three states: 12 FGDs each in Khartoum and Al-Gezira, and 9 FGDs in South Darfur (of which 3 groups had to be canceled due to COVID-19). The Research geographical areas respondents (women-men-youth) were selected to The study was carried out in three different states covering represent both employed and unemployed communi- three main income-generating activities to develop a broad- ty with different levels of education. The Khartoum er understanding of the different conditions and drivers of and Al-Gezira groups were from urban areas, while employment for Sudanese women and youth. The selected the South Darfur group represented a rural area. Each states are Khartoum (services), South Darfur (agriculture), FGD had six participants. and Al-Gezira (industries).  • KII.  A total of 28 KIIs were conducted: 18 were con- ducted with employees representing working, not Research instruments working, self-employed participants, while 10 KIIs were conducted with employers representing the three First, key research questions about the research objective sectors (services, agriculture, industries). were broadly identified. Based on these, FGD guides were 66 Focus group sample. A total of 15 FGDs were conducted. Sl. No. Region Locality Respondents Description Education* Age 1 Urban Women Not working Completed university and above 25–45 Urban Completed secondary or vocational training 2 Female youth Not working 18–24 and completed university and above Urban Completed secondary or vocational training 3 Male youth Not working 18–24 Khartoum and completed university and above 4 Urban Men Working Completed university and above 25–45 Urban Completed secondary or vocational training 5 Female youth Working 18–24 and completed university and above 6 Urban Women Working Completed university and above 25–45 7 Rural Women Working Completed university and above 25–45 8 South Darfur Rural Female youth Working Completed university and above 18–24 9 Rural Male youth Working Completed university and above 18–24 13 Urban Men Working Completed university and above 25–45 14 Urban Female youth Not working Completed university and above 18–24 15 Urban Male youth Not working Completed university and above 18–24 Al-Gezira 16 Urban Women Not working Completed university and above 25–45 17 Urban Female youth Not working Completed university and above 18–24 18 Urban Male youth Not working Completed university and above 18–24 Additional FGDs were conducted in all the three regions to cover a range of uneducated (never attended schools or completed only primary education) and less educated (not graduated but completed secondary or vocational education) backgrounds. The sample size is 15. Sl. No. Region Locality Respondents Description Education* Age 1 Urban Women Not working Never attended school/Khalwa and 25–45 completed primary education 2 Urban Female youth Not working Completed primary education and 18–24 completed secondary or vocational training 3 Urban Male youth Not working Completed primary education and 18–24 completed secondary or vocational training Khartoum 4 Urban Men Working Completed primary education and 25–45 completed secondary or vocational training 5 Urban Female youth Working Never attended school/Khalwa and 18–24 completed primary education 6 Urban Women Working Completed primary education and 25–45 completed secondary or vocational training 7 Rural Female youth Working Completed primary education and 18–24 completed secondary or vocational training 8 Rural Men Working Never attended school/Khalwa and 25–45 South Darfur completed primary education 9 Rural Male youth Not working Never attended school/Khalwa and 18–24 completed primary education 67 Sl. No. Region Locality Respondents Description Education* Age 13 Urban Female Not working Never attended school/Khalwa and 25–45 completed primary education 14 Urban Female youth Not working Completed primary education and 18–24 completed secondary or vocational training 15 Urban Male youth Not working Completed primary education and 18–24 completed secondary or vocational training Al-Gezira 16 Urban Men Working Never attended school/Khalwa and 25–45 completed primary education 17 Urban Male youth Working Never attended school/Khalwa and 18–24 completed primary education 18 Urban Women Working Never attended school/Khalwa and 25–45 completed primary education A total of 28 KIIs were conducted. Category: Individual employees and persons not working Organization type Sl. No. Region Locality Respondents Description Education (and size) Completed secondary or 1 Urban Woman Not working — vocational training Completed university and 2 Urban Female youth Self-employed Pastry shop (small) above Completed university and Administrative 3 Urban Male youth Working Khartoum above employee (small) Completed university and Marketing and sales 4 Urban Women Working above manager (large) 5 Urban Female youth Not working Completed primary education — Completed secondary or 6 Urban Male youth Not working — vocational training Completed university and Flower plantation 7 Rural Woman Self-employed above (small) Completed secondary or 8 Rural Female youth Not working — vocational training Completed secondary or 9 Rural Male youth Not working — vocational training South Darfur Completed secondary or 10 Rural Woman Not working — vocational training Completed university and Employer/owner 11 Rural Female youth Working above (small) Completed university and Employer/owner 12 Rural Male youth Self-employed above (medium) 13 Urban Woman Working Never attended school/Khalwa Supervisor (large) 14 Urban Female youth Not working Completed primary education — Completed university and Employer/owner 15 Urban Male youth Self-employed above (medium) Al-Gezira Completed secondary or 16 Urban Woman Not working — vocational training Completed university and Employer/owner 17 Urban Female youth Self-employed above (small) Completed secondary or General supervisor 18 Urban Male youth Working vocational training (large) 68 Category: Employers Gender of Size of the Sl. No Region Locality Designation Sector Respondent organization 1 Urban Female HR manager Commercial services Medium 2 Khartoum Urban Female HR manager Pharmaceutical services Large 3 Urban Female Director of administration Government service Large 4 Rural Male Owner Private agriculture Small Rural Male Director of agriculture 5 South Darfur Large department Government service 6 Rural Male Owner Private agriculture Medium 7 Urban Male HR manager Industry Medium 8 Urban Male Owner Industry Large Al-Gezira 9 Urban Female Project manager Industry Small 10 Urban Female Executive director Industry Medium Data collection Data analysis • Facilitator training.  A three-day intensive class- Based on the research questions, analysis matrices were room and field training was conducted before the developed for all interviews (including KII employees, KII commencement of the fieldwork. Female moderators employers, and all FGDs), and the data were coded and handled focus groups and KIIs with women respon- summarized into various themes using these matrices. The dents while male moderators handled focus groups data are analyzed inductively to ensure no misconceptions and KIIs with male respondents. The field team which are formed before the analysis. When reporting findings consisted of 12 experienced field women recruiters from the inductive analysis, the summary or top-level cat- responsible for recruiting the FGD respondents were egories were used as main headings in the findings, with briefed on the screener questionnaire as well. specific categories as subheadings. Necessary quotes were • Pilot phase.  The pilot had one focus group and one provided as well.  KII employee. It was conducted in Khartoum with the ‘not working young male’ category to check the validity Shortcomings of the qualitative research of the discussion duration, discussion guide, and the number of respondents for FGD which seemed to be The objective of the qualitative research was to produce appropriate between 6 and 8.  in-depth and illustrative information to understand the var- ious dimensions of the problem under analysis (Almeida, • Field work.  A screener questionnaire was developed Faria, and Queirós 2017). While the qualitative work does and used to identify suitable respondents for the not aim for full representativeness nor does it allow for FGDs. A mix of the door-to-door approach and snow- broad generalizations, the FGDs allowed to collect detailed balling was used to recruit the respondents. All the information about individual participants and the group, interviews with the study participants were conducted providing a deeper understanding of the dynamics of the only after obtaining free informed consent from them. issues being discussed. However, qualitative studies have They were conducted in the local language (Arabic). their own limitations. This study is not an exception. First, The qualitative interviews were digitally recorded on a it covered only 3 out of Sudan’s 18 states. Second, fieldwork portable audio recorder only after obtaining informed was entirely dependent on the moderator’s and notetakers’ consent from the study participants. The focus group impartiality, particularly given that documenting observa- duration was around 2 hours and the KII lasted for 45 tions is a challenging process. The World Bank team held minutes to 1 hour. discussions with the consulting firm to discuss how to min- • Transcripts, data entry, and data organiza- imize potential bias from the moderator and notetakers. tion.  All discussions were transcribed verbatim in The World Bank team was unable to observe some of the Arabic from the audio recordings and translated into fieldwork because of travel restrictions for World Bank staff English. due to security concerns. The World Bank team compared transcripts and recorded audio files as part of data quality checks. Some mistakes were identified and later rectified by the consulting firm. 69 ANNEX 2 Methodological Note Quantitative Data Analysis Logistic regression model explained The logistic regression model is estimated to explore the determinants of an individual’s labor force participation and em- ployment while controlling for some individual and household characteristics. The analysis aims to understand and identify the most effective factors for participation in labor force or for being employed. The regression will be separated by gender (male versus female) and by age (youth versus adults). The logistic regression model can be written as where yi is a binary variable represents labor force participation and employment. 70 TABLE A.1. Determinants of labor market participation among working-age population (odd ratios results from logistic regression model)   Male Female Youth Older   Male Female Youth Older Married/ 2.077*** 0.609*** 0.371*** 0.189*** Rural 1.186* 1.420*** 1.315*** 1.297*** married (0.30) (0.05) (0.03) (0.01) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) before Northern 1.542*** 0.652*** 1.456** 0.782** Female 1.01 0.584*** 0.873 2.668*** (0.19) (0.06) (0.17) (0.07) headed (0.11) (0.05) (0.08) (0.27) Eastern 1.545*** 0.762** 1.233 0.979 Log 0.553*** 0.911 0.781** 0.629*** (0.17) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) household (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) size Central 1.711*** 0.819* 1.325** 0.998 Dependency 1.235*** 0.949     (0.18) (0.07) (0.14) (0.08) ratio (0.08) (0.03)     Kordufan 2.076*** 4.545*** 3.060*** 3.201*** Have children 1.917*** 2.449*** 14.81*** 28.06*** (0.25) (0.41) (0.34) (0.29) =1 (0.31) (0.32) (4.99) (1.72) Darfur 1.822*** 8.274*** 3.340*** 6.797*** Poor 1.01 1.273*** 1.01 1.344*** (0.21) (0.74) (0.37) (0.63) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) Youth 0.232*** 0.487***     Phone 1.505*** 0.998 1.280** 1.078 (0.02) (0.03)     availability (0.14) (0.06) (0.10) (0.07) Some/ 0.422*** 0.730*** 0.350*** 1.300*** completed Computer 0.818 1.332* 0.774 1.172 (0.03) (0.05) (0.02) (0.08) availability primary (0.12) (0.18) (0.13) (0.15) Secondary 0.495*** 1.137 0.456*** 1.639*** Access to 1.028 1.073 0.829 1.259* (0.05) (0.11) (0.04) (0.13) finance (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) Post- 0.873 4.744*** 1.357* 3.326*** Observations 13,571 14,740 8,598 19,713 secondary (0.12) (0.48) (0.18) (0.33) and above Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBS 2009 and NHBPS 2014/15. Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Exponentiated coefficients are reported in parentheses. 71 TABLE A.2. Determinants of employment among working-age population (odd ratios results from logistic regression model)   Male Female Youth Older   Male Female Youth Older Married/married 2.593*** 0.782** 0.386*** 0.290*** Rural 1.347*** 1.874*** 1.779*** 1.410*** before (0.32) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.12) (0.13) (0.07) Female headed 1.002 0.565*** 0.877 2.733*** Northern 1.193 0.456*** 1.149 0.740*** (0.10) (0.05) (0.08) (0.27) (0.13) (0.06) (0.16) (0.06) Log household 0.607*** 0.835* 0.805* 0.598*** Eastern 1.587*** 0.779* 1.518** 0.997 size (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.16) (0.08) (0.19) (0.08) Dependency 1.303*** 0.983 Central 1.363** 0.559*** 1.229 0.847* ratio (0.07) (0.03) (0.13) (0.06) (0.15) (0.06) Have children 1.944*** 2.472*** 15.59*** 25.21*** Kordufan 1.948*** 4.594*** 3.436*** 2.945*** =1 (0.27) (0.33) (4.75) (1.46) (0.21) (0.44) (0.43) (0.25) Poor 0.98 1.310*** 1.046 1.299*** Darfur 1.664*** 7.592*** 3.881*** 5.027*** (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.18) (0.71) (0.47) (0.44) Phone 1.430*** 1.101 1.337*** 1.136* Youth 0.275*** 0.453*** availability (0.12) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.02) (0.03) Computer 0.882 1.766*** 0.823 1.257 Some/ 0.483*** 0.624*** 0.347*** 1.097 availability completed (0.12) (0.25) (0.17) (0.16) primary (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.06) Access to 1.076 1.113 0.775 1.287** Secondary 0.559*** 0.88 0.427*** 1.398*** finance (0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11) (0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11) Observations 13,571 14,740 8,598 19,713 Post-secondary 0.548*** 2.430*** 0.515*** 1.789*** and above (0.06) (0.26) (0.07) (0.16) Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBS 2009 and NHBPS 2014/15. Note: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level. Exponentiated coefficients are reported in parentheses. 72 TABLE A.3. Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of gender gaps in monthly earnings Linearized Differential Coefficient standard t P>t (95% confidence interval) error % of total difference Prediction_1 6.750818   0.010065 670.70 0.000 6.731089 6.770547 Prediction_2 6.200205   0.01934 320.59 0.000 6.162296 6.238114 Difference 0.5506126   0.021803 25.25 0.000 0.5078774 0.5933479 Endowments 0.0296419 5.4 0.009777 3.03 0.002 0.0104774 0.0488064 Coefficients 0.5257046 95.5 0.020489 25.66 0.000 0.4855451 0.5658641 Interaction −0.0047339 −0.9 0.005818 −0.81 0.416 −0.0161384 0.0066706 % of total endowments effect ENDOWMENTS   Education 0.0014214 5 0.005497 0.26 0.796 −0.0093525 0.0121952 Industry 0.0146243 49 0.004038 3.62 0.000 0.0067096 0.022539 Location −0.0045575 −15 0.002374 −1.92 0.055 −0.0092115 0.0000965 Age 0.0181538 61 0.004134 4.39 0.000 0.0100516 0.026256 % of total coefficients effect COEFFICIENTS   Education −0.1370417 −26 0.038552 −3.55 0.000 −0.2126074 −0.061476 Industry −0.0498547 −9 0.053389 −0.93 0.35 −0.1545024 0.054793 Location 0.0634583 12 0.076606 0.83 0.407 −0.0866975 0.2136141 Age −0.0373285 −7 0.066865 −0.56 0.577 −0.1683902 0.0937331 Constant 0.6864713 131 0.136454 5.03 0.000 0.419009 0.9539336 % of total interaction effect INTERACTION   Education −0.0005567 12 0.002158 −0.26 0.796 −0.004786 0.0036727 Industry −0.0032839 69 0.003563 −0.92 0.357 −0.0102677 0.0036999 Location 0.0010529 −22 0.00136 0.77 0.439 −0.0016134 0.0037192 Age −0.0019462 41 0.003498 −0.56 0.578 −0.0088035 0.004911 Source: World Bank staff calculations based on NHBS 2009 and NHBPS 2014/15. 73 ANNEX 3 Sudan’s Performance in the 2021 WBL Index The WBL 2021 report explores the legal differences in men’s and women’s access to economic opportunities, measured through indicators across eight dimensions. The overall score is an average of their individual score for each dimension, rang- ing from 0 to 100 with 100 representing the highest score. Sudan has an overall score of 29.4, and the table below shows the breakdown across dimensions and indicators. MOBILITY 0 Can a woman apply for a passport in the same way as a man? No Can a woman travel outside the country in the same way as a man? No Can a woman travel outside her home in the same way as a man? No Can a woman choose where to live in the same way as a man? No WORKPLACE 0 Can a woman get a job in the same way as a man? No Does the law prohibit discrimination in employment based on gender? No Is there legislation on sexual harassment in employment? No Are there criminal penalties or civil remedies for sexual harassment in employment? No PAY 0 Does the law mandates equal remuneration for work of equal value? No Can women work the same night hours as men? No Can women work in jobs deemed dangerous in the same way as men? No Are women able to work in the same industries as men? No MARRIAGE 0 Is there no legal provision that requires a married woman to obey her husband? No Can a woman be ‘head of household’ or ‘head of family’ in the same way as a man? No Is there legislation specifically addressing domestic violence? No Can a woman obtain a judgment of divorce in the same way as a man? No Does a woman have the same rights to remarry as a man? No PARENTHOOD 20 Is paid leave of at least 14 weeks available to mothers? No Does the government administer 100% of maternity leave benefits? No Is paid leave available to fathers? No Is there paid parental leave? No Is dismissal of pregnant workers prohibited? Yes ENTREPRENEURSHIP 75 Can a woman sign a contract in the same way as a man? Yes Can a woman register a business in the same way as a man? Yes Can a woman open a bank account in the same way as a man? Yes Does the law prohibit discrimination in access to credit based on gender? No ASSETS 40 Do men and women have equal ownership rights to immovable property? Yes Do sons and daughters have equal rights to inherit assets from their parents? No Do female and male surviving spouses have equal rights to inherit assets? No Does the law grant spouses equal administrative authority over assets during marriage? Yes Does the law provide for the valuation of nonmonetary contributions? No PENSION 100 Are the ages at which men and women can retire with full pension benefits equal? Yes Are the ages at which men and women can retire with partial pension benefits equal? Yes Is the mandatory retirement age for men and women equal? Yes Are periods of absence from work due to childcare accounted for in pension benefits? Yes 74