



## 1. Project Data

**Project ID**  
P124045

**Project Name**  
TZ-Productive Social Safety Net

**Country**  
Tanzania

**Practice Area(Lead)**  
Social Protection & Jobs

**L/C/TF Number(s)**  
IDA-50930,IDA-58600

**Closing Date (Original)**  
31-Dec-2017

**Total Project Cost (USD)**  
402,764,570.86

**Bank Approval Date**  
29-Mar-2012

**Closing Date (Actual)**  
31-Dec-2019

	<b>IBRD/IDA (USD)</b>	<b>Grants (USD)</b>
Original Commitment	220,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	420,000,000.00	0.00
Actual	402,764,570.86	0.00

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## 2. Project Objectives and Components

### a. Objectives

As per the Financing Agreement (p.5) the project objective was “to create a comprehensive, efficient, well-targeted productive social safety net system for the poor and vulnerable section of the Recipient's population.”

### b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes



**Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?**

Yes

**Date of Board Approval**

16-Jun-2016

**c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?**

No

**d. Components**

As per the PAD (pp. 7-10) there were two components the first of which was comprised of two sub-components and the second of which was comprised of three sub-components. Some revisions to the design of the components were introduced at the time of the AF.

**Component 1 Consolidation of Integrated Social Safety Net Interventions for Extremely Poor and Food Insecure Households: (Planned: US\$140.0 million; Actual US\$290.8 million).** This component sought to maximize the impact of a social safety net (SSN) in Tanzania for the extreme poor and food insecure groups through coordination of the implementation and scale up of two complementary interventions: labor intensive public works and cash transfers. The approach adopted by the Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) in which multiple interventions are targeted to the same households required a common targeting mechanism to select eligible households and a unified registry of beneficiaries. The targeting system comprised a two-step process of geographical and community targeting to minimize exclusion errors complemented by a Proxy Means Test tool as a verification mechanism to minimize inclusion errors and possible elite capture.

**Sub-component 1A: Conditional Cash Transfers.** As originally designed, the cash transfer program comprised two benefits to include a Basic Transfer (equivalent to US\$5 per month per household to be transferred to all eligible registered households), and a Variable Conditional Transfer (VCT) for households with children younger than 18 and/or a pregnant woman, equivalent to up to US\$5 per households per month. The VCT would be transferred subject to compliance with co-responsibilities by each of the eligible members of the household as follows: a) Education: Annual enrolment of school-age children aged 5-18 in pre-primary, primary and secondary schools (where available) and regular attendance of at least 80 percent of the school days per month; b) Maternal and Infant Health: all pregnant women within beneficiary households to attend a minimum of four prenatal medical examinations; deliver at a health facility or assisted by skilled personnel and attend a post-natal check-up according to the Tanzania's health protocol. For children younger than two years, regular check-ups at health services at least once every month including regular growth monitoring and counselling and distribution of micro-nutrients; all children of the household aged between 24 and 60 months to attend routine health services at least once every six months. For all children younger than five years the health facility would provide full immunization; and c) Workshops to reinforce nutrition practices and investment in human capital: At least one parent or guardian to attend monthly workshops organized by the program in coordination with the education, health and/or social welfare sectors to promote good nutritional practices, child care, home hygiene, water usage, as well as other topics including the importance of starting education at the right age. Subject to meeting the



conditions, bimonthly payments under the PSSN would be authorized. Transfers were to be received by mothers except in cases where this was not feasible, in which case a guardian would receive the benefit. Beneficiary households would register all eligible members in the program (i.e., children younger than 18 and pregnant women).

Based on the assessment of the intervention before the AF, a slightly revised benefit and co-responsibilities structure was developed to (a) increase the incentive to comply with co-responsibilities by linking cash benefits to households' behaviors more closely, (b) provide additional benefits for children attending secondary education to better reflect the higher opportunity costs of attending secondary versus primary school, (c) better align the penalties for noncompliance with co-responsibilities to individual eligible members of each household, and (d) facilitate delivery of payments by rounding cash benefit amounts to Tanzanian shillings rather than U.S. dollars.

**Sub-component 1B: Labor Intensive Public Works Plus.** As originally designed, a Public Works Program (PWP) would offer a guaranteed 15 days of paid work per month for four months (totaling 60 days per year) to each eligible household (one member per household) targeted under the PSSN targeting. Households would be able to access the program over a number of years, as long as they remained listed by the common targeting mechanism with a view to incentivizing planning, saving and possible investing. Households were eligible for the PWP if they were listed by the common targeting system and had at least one adult able-bodied member (between the ages of 18 and 65, not pregnant beyond 4 months or disabled). Participants would work at a daily wage rate of US\$1.35 in the initial phase of the program, which was lower than the average market rate for unskilled labor so that only those participants with no other, more attractive, livelihood alternatives or employment opportunities would be willing to participate in the PWP. The wage component of public works (PW) funding would represent a minimum of 75 percent of the PW budget allocated for each PAA per year in order to maximize the number of households that would be able to benefit from the transfers. The other 25 percent of PW budget allocation would be used towards financing administrative costs including technical supervision and monitoring and capital inputs. The PW technical manual would include technical design, work productivity norms, social and environmental mitigation measures. A Community Savings Promotion (COMSP) would complement the PW program, by mobilizing beneficiaries to save through a group savings methodology. Activities to be financed would include community mobilization for savings, community groups institutional building, record-keeping and technology based innovations (for example, using Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) where possible and provision of well-designed savings messages to communities on a regular basis using mobile technology). It was also envisaged that groups could be linked to legally-constituted financial institutions (FIs) to ensure that the poor operate in a viable and sustainable savings framework. A rigorous impact evaluation was envisaged as an integral part of the sub-component to assess the evidence of impact.

In addition to scaling up the PWP, the AF introduced two new features: (a) PW was to be undertaken when labor demand for agricultural activities was low (and participation in PW would therefore not compete with the need to work on own land) and (b) PW should be timed so that payments would be made during or before the lean season. The AF also strengthened the Community Savings Promotion (COMSP)—originally introduced to complement Subcomponent 1B by supporting beneficiaries in saving—by expanding its scope to support households' income-generating capacity in the medium and long term. Specifically, the subcomponent was adjusted to support (a) the design of a basic awareness and skills training package to promote savings and budget management and facilitate access of TASAF beneficiaries to skills training,



microcredit, and business development support based on location-specific opportunities; (b) the design and implementation of a communication strategy for program officers to support the implementation of the component; (c) the training for TASAF program officers; (d) the financing of a productive grant for a selected number of beneficiaries; and (e) the design of an M&E strategy to capture results and improve the design of the component.

**Component 2: Institutional Strengthening (Planned: US\$93.9 million; Actual: US\$111.2 million).** This component sought to: (i) support the government in the process of institutionalizing the PSSN as part of a national social protection framework; (ii) support the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) to start the implementation of the PSSN under the current structure and gradually move towards permanent institutional arrangements; and (iii) support program management and monitoring and evaluation of the PSSN. The scope of Component 2 was enhanced with AF to support a substantially larger coverage in the following areas: implementation of a URB of social programs (e.g., improvements to the ICT elements in view of the program's scale-up as well as the operational tools used to collect data to populate the URB; periodic updates of the targeting tools, such as the proxy means test (PMT) and community-based (CB) targeting tools, as new data became available and/or based on operational lessons learned; and operationalization of the latest poverty maps and other poverty data for targeting and retargeting); design and development of a new flagship computerized MIS to cater to the scaled-up PSSNP and that would cater to targeting, enrollment, case management, and compliance monitoring; grievance redress and citizen feedback; project tracking; electronic payments processing; and interfacing the URB with the PSSN MIS; funding of information, education, and communication campaigns; project activities for sensitization, training, and retraining; and communication of messages and results; implementation of a cost-effective payment platform to help the PSSNP in paying beneficiaries; supply-side assessments to identify health and education services gaps for the PSSN communities and establish the appropriate co-responsibilities based on the level of services available; and support for a grievance response mechanism (GRM) that was seen as an important part of scaling up and as a crucial element to provide beneficiaries, communities, and supporting institutions a formal mechanism to report, receive, evaluate, and redress program-related grievances as well as key information to improve program performance.

**Sub-component 2A: Strengthening TASAF and Supporting Implementation of the PSSN.** This sub-component sought to support TASAF and other implementing entities such as the Department of Social Welfare in carrying out the required operational reform to effectively implement the PSSN through the provision of financial and technical assistance to implement activities including the following: (i) operational reforms and institutional strengthening that TASAF may require to improve efficiency in the implementation and monitoring of the PSSN; (ii) program management including procurement, financial management, supervision of operations including safeguards and human resource management; (iii) capacity building through training and technical assistance, advisory services, study tours and operational trips; (v) research and development and knowledge generation activities; (vi) use of ICT in support of Component 1A and 1B; (vii) and research and development.

**Sub-component 2B: Development of Systems for Implementation of Social Safety Net Intervention.** This sub-component involved provision of assistance to develop and finance a set of instruments and



systems in support of the following activities: (a) a unified registry of beneficiaries of social programs (URB); (b) management information systems; (c) information education and communication campaigns (IEC); (d) Supply side assessments; and (e) Strengthening operational capacity of TASAF and CMCs.

**Sub-component 2C: Development and Strengthening of the M&E Systems.** The PSSN M&E system would transform data collection, processing and information management into an integrated data system to facilitate the operation of PSSN components through the entire cycle, across all levels of government. To implement the M&E system, the project would finance consultant and non-consultant services, IT equipment, goods and operational costs to carry out a comprehensive impact evaluation and regular process evaluations, beneficiary surveys and qualitative evaluation, design and test grievance mechanism and enhanced program accountability mechanisms, field-based sampling verifications (spot checks), and audits.

#### **e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates**

##### **Project Cost**

Inclusive of non-World Bank financing (see below), the project cost at appraisal was US\$240.90 million. AF – in response to government request to expand the SSN - and adjustments to non-World Bank financing revised the appraised cost to US\$570.00 million. The ICR shows that, ultimately US\$402.76 million were disbursed. However, in conversation IEG, the TTL for the project explained that it was not possible to enter partner contributions into the system. These contributions were set out, in various currency denominations, in Annex 3 of the ICR as detailed below.

##### **Financing**

The PAD (pp. 11-12) stated the project would be supported with a US\$220 million IDA credit – in the form of an Adaptable Program Loan (APL) noting plans at appraisal for a follow-on project supported by a second APL. In addition, it was envisaged that financing for the project would be provided as follows: US\$16 million equivalent from a DFID grant; US\$0.9 million equivalent from a Spanish Cooperation grant; and US\$4 million from the Government counterpart. The DFID and Spanish grants were to be administered by the Bank under a multi-donor trust fund arrangement (PAD p.12). At restructuring (see below) an additional US\$200 million IDA credit was introduced and the planned DFID contribution was increased to US\$150 million. World Bank financing of US\$402.76 million were disbursed. Annex 3 of the ICR also indicates that the following were disbursed noting an increased number of donors from those identified in the PAD: Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation US\$3.726 million; DFID GBP153.262 million; OPEC's Fund for International Development US\$28.350 million; UNICEF's Private Fundraising and Partnerships (PFP) EURO52,595; SIDA KR89.595; UN Agencies US\$2.452 million; USAID US\$5.6 million; and Tanzania's Commission for Aids (TACAIDS) TZS2.954 million

##### **Borrower Contribution**



A planned borrower contribution of US\$4 million materialized (as per Annex 3) as US\$5.167 million (noting the ICR seems to imply (p.31) that the government did not make a cash contribution due to budgetary constraints). However, the ICR (p. 31) also noted that the implementing agency's final report estimated the government's in-kind contribution (salaries for non-TASAF staff, office space etc.) for the PSSNP at the equivalent of US\$90.9 million.

### **Dates**

The project was approved March 29, 2012 and became effective August 13, 2012 with a planned closing date of December 31, 2017. The Mid-term Review was carried out on October 1, 2014. Given an approved extension, the actual closing was December 31, 2019.

### **Restructuring and Additional Finance**

A level 2 restructuring was approved February 23, 2016 that involved reallocation of funds between expenditure categories to cover the short-term costs of the expansion of the cash transfer program as well as some changes to the language and targets of both key performance indicators and intermediate indicators.

The Board approved a restructuring on June 16, 2016 that involved the introduction of AF, extension of the original closing date, change in the Results Framework, change in components and cost, change in loan closing date(s), and change in safeguard policies triggered. The strategic rationale for AF was to respond to a Government request to support a credible and solid strategy to reduce extreme poverty by reaching the poorest; to provide the necessary institutional, technical, and financial support to ensure long-term sustainability of the PSSN and efforts to eliminate extreme poverty; and to mobilize development partners' technical and financial support to the Government strategy. The Results Framework was changed to reflect the new scope and scale-up of the project and track progress toward achieving the objective of the overall original APL series. Some end targets were revised upwards and others were reformulated to better track project progress. Reflecting the significant scale up with AF the PDO target on "Benefits reaching the poorest 20 percent of the population" was revised downward from 100% (PAD, p. 26) to 85%. Some indicators were deleted as they were considered to be too difficult or costly to measure or were irrelevant to track project progress.

## **3. Relevance of Objectives**

### **Rationale**

According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, pp. 2-4) the project responded to the launch of Tanzania's Second National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty (NSGRP II). The strategy included commitments to improving and increasing social protection provision for both the economically active and vulnerable groups. At the time, the government was also finalizing a draft of a National Social Protection Framework (NSPF) that aimed to improve coordination and speed up the implementation of





social protection policies designed to improve the lives of the poor and most vulnerable groups. There were a large number of transfer programs in implementation, many of which were very small. Overall provision was characterized as inefficient with limited beneficiary coverage, delivering intermittent and inconsistent benefits (at times duplicative). As such there was recognition of the need to introduce greater coordination with the aim of increasing consumption and improving the health and nutrition condition of poor households through sustained, year-long transfers; smoothing household consumption during lean seasons and creating community assets; and improving human capital accumulation of poor and vulnerable children. The government's Third Social Action Fund (TASAF III) Program Document (2011) adopted a new approach to providing support to the poor and food insecure in a systematic way that included the development and consolidation of a comprehensive safety net that more effectively addressed the needs of the poor. The overall government program would establish a national safety net incorporating transfers linked to participation in public works and adherence to co-responsibilities; provide support to community driven interventions to enhance livelihoods and increase incomes (through community savings and investments as well as specific livelihood enhancing seed grants to facilitate asset building); provide targeted infrastructure development (education, health, water) to enable service poor communities to realize the objectives of the safety net; and provide capacity building to ensure adequate program implementation by community, local government authorities, regional and national levels. The World Bank, DFID and USAID committed to supporting the safety nets and capacity building components of the program. The ICR (p.17) stated that, as part of the County Partnership Framework (2018-2022) the Bank plans to support the government's efforts to reinforce TASAF by ensuring PSSN expansion and sustainability, ensuring accountability for public services, and improving the effectiveness of service delivery. Better targeting is also seen as a goal, identifying both inclusion and exclusion errors. The CPF also presents social protection interventions as offering a range of coping mechanisms for households and communities confronting disasters and climate change. More broadly, the ICR noted that social inclusion is at the core of many of the CPF objectives e.g., the PSSN provides support for the poorest 15 percent of households (close to 6 million people) through both conditional cash transfers and public works and livelihoods programs.

## Rating

High

## 4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

### OBJECTIVE 1

#### Objective

To create a comprehensive productive social safety net system for the poor and vulnerable section of the Recipient's population (with 'comprehensive' defined, as under Relevance above, as a programmatic combination of supports)

#### Rationale

For the purposes of this validation exercise and in line with the approach taken in the ICR, the project will be assessed with reference to two sub-objectives as follows: "to create a comprehensive productive social safety



net system for the poor and vulnerable section of the Recipient's population; and “to create an efficient, well-targeted productive social safety net system for the poor and vulnerable section of the Recipient's population.”

There is no Theory of Change (ToC) developed in the PAD. The PAD stated (pp. 11-12) that the project (through an APL) would serve to support the first phase of the transition of the Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) towards the consolidation of a SSN system through support for the development of the building blocks (the second phase would support expansion and functioning of the national SSN system). The overall objective of the APL series was to increase income and consumption and improve the ability to cope with shocks among targeted vulnerable population groups, while enhancing and protecting the human capital of their children. The PAD (p.10) noted that the activities under the first APL (the project) would contribute to the achievement the high-level objectives of a broader program, which would also include a set of investments for gap filling in social and other infrastructure services. Taking into account the expansion of the project with AF, the project's rationale was as follows:

Through the provision of financing for basic cash transfers and variable conditional cash transfers, support for employment through public works, and support for the mobilization and training of community savings groups, the project would deliver basic and conditional cash transfers to targeted beneficiaries, employment opportunities and the completion of public works identified as necessary by beneficiary communities, and the establishment of functioning savings groups. This would result in an expanded SSN covering 1.5 million people (60% female), 95% of the eligible poor receiving cash transfers and more than 30% of beneficiaries better fed. Through the provision of support for the effective management of the project / system – financial management, procurement, M&E, ICT – the project would deliver, for example, training, an MIS, a monitoring system, impact and other evaluation reports, and beneficiary assessments that would result in a well targeted, efficient and transparent SSN system that benefitted the target groups (the 20% poorest).

Although the project underwent two restructurings (one with AF) a split assessment will not be conducted. Most PDO targets were unchanged. In the case of one PDO indicator, there was an upward revision of the target. For another, there was a downward target revision, but both original and revised targets were achieved. Given this, a split evaluation would be inconsequential to overall outcome assessment, which is the reason why a split was not applied. Changes to other outcome indicators were made largely with a view to ensuring enhanced clarity and precision without changing the logic of the project. Additional indicators - assessed below - were added.

### **Intermediate Outcomes**

The target (10,000) for the ‘number of villages selected’ was almost met (9,960) off a baseline of 5,000.

The ‘proportion of children in beneficiary households aged 0-24 months old attending health facilities regularly (monthly)’ was 96%, just below a revised target of 98% off a baseline of 0% and a pre-AF target of 50%.

The ‘proportion of children in beneficiary households aged 6-18 years enrolled in primary schools with more than 80% of attendance a month’ was 95%, well above the revised target of 80% off a baseline 50%.

The ‘number of households in the CCT components supported by the program’ was 1.1 million, meeting the revised target off a baseline 0 and a pre-AF target of 250,000.





The 'proportion of households receiving timely and predictable CCT benefits' met the revised target of 100% against a baseline 0% and pre-AF target of 50%.

The 'number of person days provided in PWP' was 4.39 million, which exceeded the revised target of 3.6 million against a baseline 0 and pre-AF target of 2.5 million.

## **Outcomes**

The number of 'direct project beneficiaries' was 5.4 million, which is below the revised target of 6.5 million beneficiaries against a baseline 5,000 beneficiaries and -pre-AF target of 1.5 m direct project beneficiaries.

The 'proportion of female beneficiaries' was 52%, which was less than the targeted 60% female beneficiaries and only modestly above the 50% target. The ICR (p.18) noted that this indicator recorded the general proportion of male/female household members, mirroring the country-level male/female population proportion; however, 83 percent of the direct recipients of the cash benefits on behalf of the households were women.

The 'proportion of eligible households receiving cash transfers' was 100%, exceeding the target of 95% against a baseline 1%.

The 'proportion of eligible households receiving conditional cash transfers' was 100%, exceeding the target of 95% against a baseline 1%.

The 'proportion of households receiving cash transfers through public works' was 89%, exceeding the target of 80% against a baseline 0.

The ICR (p. 20) noted that, according to the measurements of the extent to which the project is reaching the poorest, the PSSN ranked among the best targeted / most efficient interventions in the world. The majority of the PSSN beneficiaries (83 percent) were in the bottom 40 percent of the consumption distribution and almost half (48 percent) were in the lowest decile. The targeting of PSSN was also briefly discussed in the 2019 Poverty Assessment, which found that the PSSN might have had significant poverty reduction impact and that after three years in operation of the PSSN, about 57 percent of the PSSN beneficiaries were in the two poorest consumption quintiles although the poverty assessment also suggests that about 69 percent of the households interviewed that reported benefiting from the PSSN, were above the poverty line although many risked falling back into poverty in the absence of ongoing support.

The ICR (p. 25) also noted other benefits associated with the project. The PSSN helped increase by 5.6 percent the school enrollment of children ages 5 to 19 years, and that of primary school-age children (ages 5 to 13) by 7 percent. Baseline results showed that only 23 percent of children under the age of 5 visited a health provider, and when they did, 90 percent were already sick. With PSSN, however, over 90 percent of the children in the same cohort visited health facilities for prescribed prophylactics. Furthermore, the Tanzania Youth Study showed that PSSN had positive impacts for youth on knowledge of modern contraceptives, aspirations for higher education, social support among males, and certain forms of empowerment among females, including perceived ability to make household decisions and having control over their own life. The ICR also referenced The Productive Social Safety Net (PSSN) Key Indicators Report extracted from the 2017/18 Household Budget Survey that showed the following results, among others: (i) 72.9 percent of PSSN beneficiary households had their houses built with modern roofing materials (iron sheets); (ii) 67.2 percent of



PSSN beneficiary households had their walls built with modern walls (cement bricks, baked bricks, and stones); (iii) 23.2 percent of PSSN beneficiary households had their houses built with modern floors (cement and ceramic tiles); (iv) 12.1 percent of PSSN beneficiaries were food poor; (v) 32.9 percent of PSSN beneficiary households used clean energy for lighting; (vi) 82 percent of PSSN beneficiary households used drinking water from improved sources; (vii) 98.3 percent of PSSN beneficiary households used charcoal and firewood as sources of energy for cooking; and (viii) 90.3 percent of PSSN beneficiary households had some form of toilet facility. Furthermore, results of the assessment on the benefits realized from participation in the PW subprojects in the communities indicated that a majority (97.2 percent) of the households reported realization of consumption-based benefits, smoothening income over the lean seasons. More than 85 percent of the households used the wages for their children's education (clothing and health care).

### **Rating**

Substantial

## **OBJECTIVE 2**

### **Objective**

To create an efficient, well-targeted productive social safety net system for the poor and vulnerable section of the Recipient's population

### **Rationale**

The theory of change set out for Objective 1 above, also applies here.

### **Intermediate Outcomes**

The '% wages over total subproject costs' was 79.4%, exceeding the target of 75% against a baseline 70%.

The 'number of PWP projects delivered at the community' was 7,775, which was above the revised target of 6,750 (original target was 3,500) against a baseline 0.

The 'satisfaction level of the community with the asset created with respect to the expected value of the asset during project selection process' was 92.5%, which exceeded the 80% target against a baseline of 0%.

The 'proportion of households receiving timely and predictable PWP benefits' was 100%, which exceeded the 80% target against a baseline of 0%.

The 'proportion of communities with climate risk assessment incorporated into a multi-year planning' met the 70% target against a baseline of 0%.

The 'proportion of projects identified by the climate risk assessment that include measures for reducing climate risks or increasing climate resilience' met the revised target of 60% (original target 50%) against a baseline 0%.



The 'number of savings groups formed' was 23,618, which exceeded the revised target of 9,058 (original target 2,058) against a baseline 1,1778.

The 'number of people participating in savings groups' was 31,940 which exceeded the target of 25,130 against a baseline 21,712.

The 'average amount of savings' was US\$250,000 which exceeded the target of US\$50,000 against a baseline US\$0.

The 'number of households enrolled in basic skills training' was 72,000 which was below the target of 250,000 against a baseline 0. This indicator was added at the time of the AF. Enrollment of households for basic skills training was done in 8 PAAs only as the development of training modules took longer than expected.

The 'number of staff trained at district level and number of workshops held for training purposes' was, respectively, 6,299 and 161 against respective targets of 2,000 and 162. The respective baselines were 130 staff at 13 workshops.

The M&E system is generating regular, timely and adequate reports and is fully functional in 161 PAAs supported by the MIS and URB.

The 'proportion of registered households with complete information not older than 2 years' is 100%, meeting the target against a baseline 0%.

The GRM system is in place and is operational in all 161 PAAs. The system can record grievances received, attended, escalated, closed and at various stages of implementation.

The 'percentage of beneficiaries satisfied with the program' is 88% which exceeds the 80% target against a baseline 0%.

## **Outcomes**

The 'proportion of beneficiary households with an increase in food consumption' is almost 44% against a 30% target and baseline of 0%.

The 'proportion of eligible households with consumption below the adjusted food poverty line' is 64%, below the target of 75% against a baseline 0%.

Benefits reached the poorest 20 percent of population in all areas which exceeded the revised target of 85% (original target 100%) against a baseline 0%.

The 'proportion of registered households with updated information on compliance with co-responsibilities' was 90% which exceeded the target of 80% against a baseline 50%.

The 'proportion of households enrolled in livelihood enhancing basic skills training completing the modules' was 100% which exceeded the target of 60% against a baseline 0%.



The 'proportion of grievances resolved in a timely matter' was 90% which exceeded the target of 70% against a baseline 0%.

The ICR (p. 20) noted that the project established the main ICT systems needed for the functioning of the safety net. These included financial MIS and human resources management system with biometric features, fleet management, website and emails, PSSN operational systems, PSSN MIS, GRM and URB, car tracking, human resources and payroll, and time and attendance system. All the PSSNP activities, targeting, enrollment, payment, compliance, and grievance were done through ICT systems. The M&E system was supported by ICT systems for timely generation of required information to aid sound decision making and store huge amount of data.

The ICR (pp. 26-27) also noted that the large majority of the direct recipients of cash transfers payments were women who, based on international experience, were more likely than men to spend money for the benefit of the entire household, especially children. In this case, the PSSN enhanced the participation of women in the process of household financial decision making and other community affairs. The PWP impact assessment report showed that the majority of those who actually took part in the implementation of the PWP in the communities were women (84.6 percent). The gender dimensions of livelihoods were also notable - a total of 23,618 savings groups were formed with a total of 319,940 individual savers, of whom the majority of 272,826 (85.3 percent) were women. A gender assessment of the PSSN program was conducted in 2017 and confirmed that in over 80 percent of the cases, the direct recipients of the CCT benefits were female household representatives thereby enhancing women's social status and bargaining power within the family and community.

The ICR (p. 27) also noted that prior to the PSSNP, the main instrument to support poor and rural populations was through interventions based on traditional social funds that involved PW elements that were not labor intensive or focused on the cash transfer aspect as well as an array of other small scale and fragmented assistance programs. The PSSNP moved the system towards a more comprehensive and integrated approach to supporting targeted populations. The PSSNP also managed to establish appropriate institutional structures for program management at the national, regional, PAA, ward, and community levels supported, as above, by the MIS, URB, GRM and so on. The ICR also identified the 2019 reconstitution of TASAF's National Steering Committee (NSC)/Board (established 2012) as a sign of growing ownership of the program within the Tanzanian Government.

The ICR (p. 28) drew on the Tanzania Poverty Assessment (World Bank 2019b) to further demonstrate how the PSSN program has helped strengthen resilience and reduce poverty. The assessment showed that 14 percent of poor households and 9 percent of total households in the country benefitted from the PSSN; the PSSN reached 15 percent of extremely poor households, 14 percent of poor households, and 8 percent of households not classified as poor. In line with the national distribution of the poor, 78 percent of households benefiting were in rural areas (the program reached 11 percent of all rural and 5 percent of all urban households). About 66 percent of beneficiaries reported using the PSSN income support to cover their food needs, 13 percent to cover education and health expenses, and 21 percent to invest in productive assets and improve housing (8 percent).

**Rating**  
Substantial



## **OVERALL EFFICACY**

### **Rationale**

The overall effort succeeded in delivering a comprehensive, well-targeted SSN system, and almost all outcome and intermediate indicators were met or exceeded.

### **Overall Efficacy Rating**

Substantial

## **5. Efficiency**

The PAD (Annex 8, p.109) provided details of a project simulation that was conducted as part of the cost benefit analysis to ascertain which program combination would yield the maximum number of beneficiaries, and whether combinations of cash transfers and public work programs would result in the expected 5 percent decrease in the poverty rate, considering the maximum monthly and annual benefit amount per intervention. The simulation would, in turn, determine the total administrative cost to the government, the total number of beneficiaries actually covered and the overall effect on the targeted households' consumption. The PAD (p.113) warns that findings were to be viewed carefully, given that some external factors (e.g., the literature shows better response in terms of enrollment when transfers are individual and possibly higher for older children that are more likely to drop out because of labor market demand and insufficient supply of close secondary schools) can strongly affect the predictions. In that regard the PAD noted that the PSSN could contribute to poverty reduction and to improved school enrollment, but other complementary actions would also be necessary. Overall the simulations showed that the PSSN represented a move in the right direction as a social protection program for the poorest population in Tanzania, due to its bigger effect on severity of poverty (15 percent) than in poverty headcount (6 percent) by itself (PAD, p.114)

The ICR provided detailed discussion of the efficiency criteria (pp.21-25). Noting that the PDO is assessed on the basis of the efficiency of the productive SSN system, the ICR set out to support the project's efficiency rating with reference to updating the original economic analysis (and to look at the efficiency of the SSN at large); and to review the efficiency of project preparation and implementation. The ICR noted that to inform the decision of scaling up the PSSN with AF, a series of ex ante micro-simulations, using the 2012 nationally representative household survey, was carried out to estimate the possible impact of the CCT program on poverty reduction and school enrollment. Assuming that transfers were perfectly targeted and that cash benefits were accumulated over time, after one year, the estimate was that the PSSN would reduce the headcount measure of extreme poverty by 5.4 percentage points and over 12.0 percentage points after four years, from a baseline of 14.7 percent, which corresponded to lifting about 350,000 households out of extreme poverty after one year and 750,000 households after four years (among the extremely poor households, reducing the poverty gap measure by 1.0 percentage point after one year and 2.3 percentage points after four years from a baseline of 2.8 percent). Similar to the PAD, the AF Project Paper warned that the results should be interpreted with caution given assumptions made, for example, regarding the availability of an adequate number of secondary schools. The ICR also noted that the exercise relied on the assumption that the household's consumption increased each



year by the amount of the transfer, which, according to the ICR, may be an overstatement of the impacts. In that regard the ICR suggested that the results of the simulation should be considered as upper bound estimates of the potential impacts of the overall program.

With reference to implementation efficiency the ICR noted that the actual administrative costs by completion of the project for the implementation of the components of the project, cash transfers and PW, were maintained as planned. For the CCT aspect administrative costs represented 11 percent of the total amount spent for CCT, lower than the planned ratio of 12 percent. For the PWP aspect, the required PWP labor intensity ratio for materials and administrative costs was 25 percent, with 75 percent going to the payment of wages. The actual labor share ended up being 79 percent. However, based on the overall project budget that includes all overheads and administrative costs (rather than ring-fenced elements thereof), the overall administrative costs were somewhat higher, at 17 percent. The ICR referred to a value for money study (Wylde, 2016) that largely confirms the administrative efficiency of the project. The ICR also discussed other aspects including payment and compliance monitoring in the field where there were unaccounted costs associated with manual payment system at local level; targeting, where the use of combined community and PMT approaches was seen as both more effective and more efficient; and the use of the MIS for targeting, enrollment, and payment noting that the cost of the MIS was at the low end of the range of comparisons made in the Wylde study e.g., the cost of the PSSN MIS was US\$1.63 million in 2016 (at the time of the value for money study) which compared favorably with costs in similar type projects in Costa Rica, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Mexico.

### Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
ICR Estimate		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable

\* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

### 6. Outcome

Relevance of the objectives is rated Substantial based on strong alignment with both country and Bank strategies. Overall Efficacy is rated Substantial based on Substantial achievement of both objectives. Efficiency is rated Substantial based on the favorable economic analyses and implementation efficiencies. Overall outcome is rated Satisfactory.





**a. Outcome Rating**

Satisfactory

## **7. Risk to Development Outcome**

Notwithstanding renewed commitment by the government to the program and the ongoing project (PSSN II) that was approved by the World Bank Board of Executive Directors on September 12, 2019, the ICR identified growing risks to development outcome including the following: failure by the government over time to meet its declared financial commitment to the core spending noting periodic renewal of the commitment (including as part of the AF preparation for the current project) but actual spending of close to zero - the new project shows a financing gap of almost US\$250 million that may be difficult to fill; the COVID-19 crisis may further undermine funding of the poverty agenda; the political environment continues to be complex, and sudden policy changes are possible; and, on the technical side, the temporarily reduced staff and capacity constraints in times of reduced funding may be exacerbated and may slow down the implementation of the further reform steps.

## **8. Assessment of Bank Performance**

**a. Quality-at-Entry**

Overall, design was robust and well thought through although, as discussed below under Monitoring and Evaluation, the results framework was weakly constructed. The PAD (pp. 13-14) discussed lessons learned and reflected in project design. This included reference to a 2011 World Bank study endorsed by the Government of Tanzania – Tanzania: Poverty, Growth and Public Transfers: Options for a National Productive Safety Net Program – that emphasized the role that productive SSNs could play in accelerating poverty-reduction by protecting immediate consumption while allowing the poor to participate more actively in the growth process, providing a cushion against shocks, and helping them escape inter-generational poverty traps. The PAD also noted that design was informed by lessons learned in the implementation of TASAF II and the SSN Review in Tanzania (2011) and had been informed by international experience with reference to the Ethiopia Productive Safety Net Program and conditional transfers in the LAC Region. Key lessons included the need to further enhance community based targeting through the incorporation of a proxy means to address elite capture and minimize inclusion errors; the value of sustained (rather than one-off) support to households over time; the value of support for household savings initiatives in helping beneficiaries on the pathway to getting out of food insecurity; awareness of costs and planning for same to support involvement of sector ministries; and the importance of involving and supporting local government leadership. The overall risk rating for the project was substantial (PAD, pg. 18) based on a number of factors, including stakeholder risks associated with pressure for a nationwide roll-out the program, as well as risks of elite capture. These would be mitigated by firm agreements on program roll-out and, for example, enhanced verification measures. Implementing agency risks associated with limited staff capacity in financial management, procurement and safeguards and the risk of disbursement delays at local levels would be mitigated by local level capacity building efforts, through recruitment and on-the-job training. Project risk associated with the innovative nature of



the program (coupled with capacity limitations) would be mitigated by a focus on capacity building, awareness raising, phased roll-out and strong monitoring and evaluation.

**Quality-at-Entry Rating**  
Moderately Satisfactory

**b. Quality of supervision**

The ICR noted that the team remained in close contact with the project over its cycle and was responsive to implementation challenges, especially during the initial period of delayed implementation associated with political changes (2015/16). The team proactively handled issues related to the design of the AF and safeguards issues and questions pertaining to indigenous peoples that took place during the preparation of the AF. The ICR also noted that the World Bank played a role in donor coordination that promoted effective joint monitoring and coordinated policy dialogue. That said, and as noted in the ICR, restructuring for the AF offered the chance to better address shortcomings in measuring and demonstrating impact i.e., to better address the deficiencies in the results framework. That opportunity was not fully availed although we note that impact evaluations and other reports were completed as part of the project.

**Quality of Supervision Rating**  
Moderately Satisfactory

**Overall Bank Performance Rating**  
Moderately Satisfactory

**9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization**

**a. M&E Design**

The PAD (pp. 16-17) noted that the Government had established a single monitoring and evaluation (M&E) system for the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of Poverty II (NSGRP II) for both Tanzania Mainland and Zanzibar and that the PSSN was linked to the national monitoring system. Primary data would be collected by the Village Council and consolidated at the Project Authority Area (PAA) for analysis and sharing with the regional and national level for further aggregation and dissemination. At the PAA level, all data would be captured in an MIS. A village level paper-based system was in place and would be strengthened under the Institutional Support Component of the project. The PAD noted that, given the scale and innovative nature of project, it would be necessary to carry out continuous assessments (quantitative/qualitative surveys and spot checks), process evaluation and household impact evaluations to track project progress, inform further scale up, and adjust in line with feedback. As such, the project would finance an independent impact evaluation of the combined safety net intervention (public works plus and cash transfers), regular process evaluations, beneficiary assessments, transparency and accountability assessments, including Community Score Cards and Citizen Report Cards, social audits and controls, feedback tools, and financial and technical audits (internal audits and independent audits). However, despite robust plans for data collection and analysis, and as noted in the ICR (p.32), the project outcome



indicators (essentially output-type indicators) did not adequately capture the aspiration of the complex project objective. Some measure of desired outcome - for example, related to increased learning outcomes rather than, simply, school enrolment - would have better determined impact.

## **b. M&E Implementation**

The ICR (p.33) stated that the M&E system provided regular information on progress relative to targets and outcomes. As per design, data entry was to be carried out by the Project Area Authorities (PAAs); however, due to connectivity issues, data entry had to be done centrally during targeting and enrollment and was later decentralized to PAAs once connectivity issues were resolved. All 161 PAAs were connected and used MIS for data entry. ICT equipment was provided to facilitate operations at PAAs. The Tanzania Social Action Fund (TASAF) also allocated monitoring officers at each PAA to support M&E. The ICR stated that M&E contributed to timely implementation of the program. Initial geo-targeting data formed the basis for estimating the number of beneficiary households and resources. Further improvement of the targeting and enrollment process was tested, and subsequently rolled out, by deploying Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing for targeting and enrollment in three PAAs using Open Data Kit. Accountability tools, such as community scorecards that were used in six PAAs, were used to empower beneficiaries to know their entitlements and demand more accountability from services providers and to more generally provide valuable system feedback. The Grievance Redress Mechanisms (GRMs) were also linked to the MIS and rolled out in all the local government authorities providing a strong accountability tool. The M&E system also supported PSSNP impact evaluations, impact assessments, and other studies, and the ICR stated that the use of spot checks and other rapid assessments were crucial in getting structured evidence that allowed for course correction e.g., the PSSN scale-up assessment (Rogelio Gómez-Hermosillo 2016) conducted in 2016 recommended the implementation of an independent annual and ad hoc spot checks of payment process over the more than 54,000 payment events conducted every year.

## **c. M&E Utilization**

The ICR (p.34) noted that data on project indicators were regularly collected and reported and used for decision making, adjustments (restructuring), and planning purposes e.g., early experience with data collection for indicators was used to make the adjustments to the results framework at the time of the AF. As noted above, the project supported impact evaluation and other reports that, together with the more basic counting/throughput aspect associated of the indicators, provided a useful platform for forward planning, including planning for the follow-on project.

### **M&E Quality Rating**

Substantial

## **10. Other Issues**

### **a. Safeguards**



No issues related to environmental safeguards arose during the life of the project. The project was rated as environmental Category B - Partial Assessment. To meet its requirements the government updated the Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) for the Tanzania Social Action Fund (2004). The updated ESMF was cleared by the World Bank at appraisal. Environmental guidelines were complied with and impacts, if any, were minimal and localized in nature. The ICR (p.34) noted the project had a number of positive environmental impacts, as the many PW subprojects focused on environmentally smart infrastructure like afforestation, water wells, and road improvements using the watershed management approach for identifying and designing subprojects. With reference to social impacts, the project at appraisal triggered OP/BP 4.10 due to the presence of indigenous peoples in areas where the project was expected to finance labor intensive PW and cash transfers. As required, the government held consultations and disclosed an Indigenous Peoples Planning Framework (IPPF); however, at the time of the AF, the government requested (and was eventually granted by the World Bank) a waiver to the policy which it considered to be inconsistent with the Tanzanian Constitution. As a justification for the waiver, it was noted that while the project documentation had not been altered and the IPPF remained disclosed at the InfoShop, no Indigenous Peoples Plans had been prepared during project implementation until the AF. Instead, and consistent with the requirements of OP/BP 4.10, the project drew on the IPPF requirements and guidance in delivering cash transfers to indigenous peoples by consulting and engaging local communities in a socially appropriate manner, including communities in which indigenous peoples are present; establishing a Grievance Redress Mechanism; and putting in place a monitoring and evaluation system. The government also prepared and carried out consultations for a Vulnerable Groups Planning Framework (VGPF) which, for the AF, was considered consistent with the requirements of OP/BP 4.10. At closing, implementation of the VGPF was considered to be effective and informed the move toward the new ESF in PSSN II.

## **b. Fiduciary Compliance**

The ICR (p.35) noted that there was adequate staffing for financial management (FM) and accounting at the TASAF and PAA levels resulting in annual work plans and budgets being prepared and approved in line with policy and guidelines. The last FM report by the World Bank (from May 2019) rated the project's overall FM arrangements Satisfactory, which has been the case throughout the project duration. The ICR also noted smooth progress with procurement during the project cycle with procurement at the various levels undertaken in accordance with the World Bank's procurement procedures and the community procurement guidelines and, as relevant, on the basis of approved Procurement Plans. The Procurement Capacity Assessment (carried out by the World Bank in May 2018) of the organizational structure, functions, staff skills and experience, and adequacy for implementation of the project at the TMU and a sample of PAAs and regions concluded that all the necessary bodies and processes for managing procurement activities had been established. The ICR noted (p.36) that the procurement audit conducted by the Public Procurement Regulatory Authority of Tanzania ranked TASAF as the best performer countrywide and awarded TASAF a Certificate of Recognition for Compliance with the Public Procurement Act (PPA) and its regulations for FY2013/14. TASAF was also awarded the East African Procuring Entity of the Year Award in Nairobi, Kenya, in November 2014 and a Certificate of Recognition for Compliance with PPA and its regulations for FY2015/16.



**c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)**

The ICR (pp. 28-29) noted that community assets created through PW – afforestation and tree planting, rural access roads, agriculture and irrigation, environmental conservation, soil and water conservation - had important socioeconomic and environmental benefits including: positive impacts on natural resource conservation and mitigation of climate change effects (drawing on a 2019 Alpha and Omega Consulting Group report); improved agricultural productivity through irrigation, improved farming practices, and access roads; improved social services such as water points, construction/rehabilitation of schools, and health centers. The ICR stated that the subprojects also helped create household-level assets for 66.1 percent of the beneficiaries, and supported engagement in income generation activities for 81.5 percent of households. Based on these effects and as well enhanced saving and investment (76.9 percent of participating households) 65.8 percent of beneficiaries reported that the PW subprojects facilitated local economy and trade and 80.5 percent reported improvement of household health and nutrition. The ICR also suggested that the overall program (PSSNP) may have had significant effects in improving climate resilience of the poorest in Tanzania. The DFID PSSN Final Report (2018) found that unconditional cash transfers, livelihoods, and PW helped heads of household, often single women, create stability in the home and a level of economic independence and ability to manage periods of drought; as the foundation from which their children can be made healthy and attend school; and as the basis from which dependent ill, disabled, and orphans can be better cared for. The DFID report also suggested that the program also seemed to lead to behavioral changes with reference to health seeking behavior, and increased value of education.

**d. Other**

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**11. Ratings**

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

**12. Lessons**

The ICR provided lessons at both the strategic and operational levels the most important of which are:

Programs such as PSSN can operate more effectively within an accepted national social protection/social safety net policy or framework to be sustainable. While there were attempts at



developing policy-level strategic documents on social protection in Tanzania, those are still at a review, nonoperational stage. Presently, PSSN continues therefore to operate in a policy vacuum, while it should be a part of a broader social protection policy and set of interventions. The current plan for the PSSN does not extend beyond 2023, and it is not clear what happens beyond that date. The Government should begin thinking actively about the future of the PSSN, which is a much-needed policy tool in the fight against poverty in Tanzania. Institutionalizing PSSN within a clear legal and policy framework would greatly contribute towards ensuring the program's future.

Building systems around safety nets programs takes time. For all the achievement of PSSN, it needs to be acknowledged that the URB is a registry of TASAF programs and not yet a social registry per se. In the context of PSSN II, and as per the project's design, the Government and donor partners should advance their discussions on how to move the URB toward becoming a social registry that, at a minimum, links the PSSN beneficiaries to complementary interventions. This would require some policy actions on the Government's side and is becoming even more relevant in the context of unexpected shocks like the current COVID-19 crisis.

The ongoing COVID-19 global pandemic has all but highlighted the importance of programs such as PSSN in cushioning the impacts of crisis on poorest households throughout the world... The current crisis has also highlighted the importance of emergency response preparedness with respect to social assistance programs, and of having a well-established information system or registry to adapt programs to rapidly changing circumstances.

With respect to targeting, a combination of community targeting and Proxy Means Test promotes the inclusion of genuine beneficiaries as both inculcate transparency in beneficiary identification. Community targeting uses CB facilitators who are trained to use locally developed poverty criteria to identify poor households and conduct surveys using the PMT questionnaire. This increases communities' confidence on the program. More generally, a participatory approach to targeting increases ownership of project and process. The accuracy in targeting was far better compared with other countries as it minimized inclusion and exclusion errors. This could, at least in part, be because of the program's reliance on local staff who better understand the local environment and culture which, in turn, increases accountability and supervision of the respective local government authorities. This approach is critical for building long-term sustainability.

### 13. Assessment Recommended?

No

### 14. Comments on Quality of ICR





The report was comprehensive and followed the guidelines. The theory of change was clear and well-presented and the ICR presented many well-articulated lessons under various headings. In supporting the achievements of the project, the ICR drew on M&E data as well as beneficiary surveys and impact evaluation carried out under the project. The ICR also provided significant contextualized detail in support of both the efficacy and efficiency criteria. Despite the success of the project, the ICR referenced relative shortcomings in Bank performance. On the other hand, there were some minor inaccuracies in the ICR. For example, the original cost of the project seemed to be misstated (p.2) and, on p. 15, the ICR stated that the project underwent two restructurings, which did not modify the original PDO, and that the first restructuring was part of an AF package; however, it seems it was the second restructuring that dealt with the AF. Finally, the ICR did not discuss the Bank's interaction with other Development Partners (DPs) and did not explain why original planned financing from DPs failed to materialize as part of the final project account.

**a. Quality of ICR Rating**

Substantial