Document of The World Bank Report No: 27540 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (SCL-40830) ON A LOAN IN THE AMOUNT OF US$28.4 MILLION TO JAMAICA FOR A PUBLIC SECTOR MODERNIZATION PROJECT December 4, 2003 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit Caribbean Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective ) Currency Unit = Jamaican Dollars, JMD 60.5 = US$ 1 US$ 1 = JMD 1.01 FISCAL YEAR April 1 March 1 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGD Administrator General's Department CDA Child Development Agency CEO Chief Operating Officer EA Executive Agency FMIS Financial Management Information System GOj Government of Jamaica GIS Geographic Information System GDP Gross Domestic Product HRMIS Human Resources Management Information System IAD Internal Auditing Directorate IAU Internal Auditing Units IAS International Auditing Standards IMCAR Inter-Ministerial Committee on Administrative Reform JAMPRO Jamaica Promotions JIS Jamaica Information Service LDUC Land Development Utilisation Commission MCST Ministry of Commerce, Science, and Technology MIND Management Institute for National Development MIS Management Information System MEH Ministry of Environment and Housing MLE Ministry of Land and Environment MTW Ministry of Transport and Works MoA Ministry of Agriculture MoFP Ministry of Finance and Planning MoH Ministry of Health MoJ Ministry of Justice MoEYC Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture MNS Ministry of National Security NEPA National Environment and Planning Agency NEPS National Environment and Planning Strategy NLA National Land Agency NRCA Natural Resources Conservation Authority NWA National Works Agency MH Ministry of Health OPM Office of the Prime Minister ORC Office of the Registrar of Companies OSC Office of the Services Commission PIOJ Planning Institute of Jamaica PSMP Public Sector Modernization Project RGD Registrar General's Department SMP Staff Monitored Program TPD Town Planning Department VFM Value for Money Vice President: David de Ferranti Country Director: Caroline D. Anstey Sector Manager: Ronald E. Myers Task Team Leader/Task Manager: Mario F. Sangines JAMAICA JM PUB SCTR MODERNIZ CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 3 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 15 6. Sustainability 17 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 18 8. Lessons Learned 19 9. Partner Comments 22 10. Additional Information 30 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 31 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 34 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 36 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 37 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 39 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 40 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 41 Project ID: P007490 Project Name: JM PUB SCTR MODERNIZ Team Leader: Mario Francisco Sangines TL Unit: LCSPS ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 22, 2003 1. Project Data Name: JM PUB SCTR MODERNIZ L/C/TF Number: SCL-40830 Country/Department: JAMAICA Region: Latin America and the Caribbean Region Sector/subsector: Central government administration (96%); Banking (4%) Theme: Administrative and civil service reform (P); Public expenditure, financial management and procurement (P); State enterprise/bank restructuring and privatization (P) KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 08/23/1993 Effective: 01/06/1997 04/07/1997 Appraisal: 09/15/1995 MTR: 06/30/1999 06/29/1999 Approval: 09/03/1996 Closing: 12/31/2001 06/30/2003 Borrower/Implementing Agency: GOV OF JAMAICA/CABINET SECRETARY Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: David de Ferranti Shahid Javed Burki Country Director: Caroline D. Anstey Paul Isenman Sector Manager: Ronald E. Myers Krishna Challa Team Leader at ICR: Mario F. Sangines Jit B. Gill ICR Primary Author: Albert Amos; Carmen Machicado; Mario Francisco Sangines 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: SU Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: S QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: Project at Risk at Any Time: No 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The project was intended to support the GoJ's efforts to: (i) bring about major improvements in the quality of service provided by selected public agencies; (ii) improve the ability of selected Ministries to: (a) formulate sound sector policies, technical standards, and operational norms; (b) effectively monitor and evaluate downstream agencies to ensure that desired policy objectives are achieved; and (c) efficiently perform corporate management functions; (iii) continue the rationalization of the public sector through (a) private participation in the water supply and sewerage sector; and (b) privatization or contracting out of other facilities or services where government has no comparative advantage; (iv) improve efficiency, value for money and transparency in government procurement and contracting; (v) enhance public sector accountability by strengthening internal and external controls; (vi) improve the quality of financial and personnel management in the public sector through computerized information; (vii) prepare the next stage of the modernization process to: (a) extend the reforms initiated by the project in the pilot agencies and Ministries to the rest of the public sector; and (b) introduce other systemic improvements in public sector management. 3.2 Revised Objective: By request from the government, the privatization objective was eliminated from the project on June 28, 2000. Therefore, objective (iii) continue the rationalization of the public sector through (a) private participation in the water supply and sewerage sector, and (b) privatization or contracting out of other facilities or services where government has no comparative advantage was eliminated from the project. 3.3 Original Components: Project design at appraisal consisted of the following 5 major components: (1) Modernization of Public Entities, which included subcomponents for Executive Agencies (EAs) and selected Ministries; (2) Privatization; (3) Government Procurement, Contracting, Internal Control, and Auditing; (4) Management Information Systems; and (5) Project Implementation, Communication Campaign, and Development of Stage II. 3.4 Revised Components: As per the Amendment to the Loan Agreement, dated July 2, 1998, the project description was modified to describe a number of government ministries and agencies which were either in the process of being restructured and/or recently changed names. From the pool of thirteen entities described in the amendment, the project undertook the modernization of two as pilot ministries: The Ministry of Transport and Works (MTW) and the Ministry of Land and Environment (MLE). In June 2000, the Bank and the GoJ agreed to eliminate the privatization component because the GoJ decided to pursue its privatization objectives using its own resources and had not at that point drawn on loan funds to a significant extent. Considering the progress achieved in the other components, it was decided that US$ 6.99 million in project funds for the privatization component were to be primarily reallocated to the Modernization of Executive Agencies Component. The revised components of the Project thus became: Component 1. Modernization of Public Sector Entities Component 2. Procurement/Contracting , Internal Control and Auditing Component 3. Management Information Systems Component 4. Project Implementation, Communication Campaign, and Development of Stage II - 2 - 3.5 Quality at Entry: The ICR finds quality of entry to be satisfactory, although the project preparation phase took longer than usual (3 years). Project preparation was lengthy due to shifts in the focus of the operation which required substantial redesign of objectives and components. The scope of the operation shifted from civil service reform initially, to an overly ambitious public sector reform program, to the more realistic program that was eventually approved and implemented. Although this delay increased the Bank's preparation costs, it enabled the Bank and the GoJ to make a more careful design of the operation which led to a very comprehensive staff appraisal report. During this period, experience from the public sector modernization efforts in New Zealand and the UK, as well as previous Bank operations in the country in related areas to the PSMP, was capitalized upon and contributed to the final project design. Unfortunately, one of the areas where the SAR was most complete and thorough, including a large number of output/outcome indicators, was the privatization component, which was eventually removed from the program. The project was highly consistent with one of the key objectives listed in the Government's Medium-Term Strategy Paper as well as in the 1996 Country Assistance Strategy Report: improving governance, efficiency and effectiveness in the public sector. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The achievement of project objectives is considered to be satisfactory, overall. It should be noted that project objectives (i) through (vi) are strongly interlinked, as the achievement of a single objective directly and indirectly supports the other objectives. In this manner, it is extremely difficult to bring about quality of service improvements without improving the internal efficiency and effectiveness of the service providers, supporting the rationalization process, and improving internal controls, financial information systems, and human resource management. Nevertheless, detailed descriptions regarding the outcomes of each objective are listed in the subsequent paragraphs. (i) Bring about major improvements in the quality of service provided by selected public agencies. This objective was fully achieved. The PSMP has directly supported the GoJ's efforts to modernize selected public agencies, including the introduction and application of the Executive Agency (EA) model, which has had a significant impact on improving the quality and quantity of services delivered. The achievement of this objective became the major thrust and concentration of resources by the project utilizing 73% of project funds. Key underlying principles in the program emphasized the separation of ministerial operational activities from policy and regulatory functions as well as the development of an organizational structure and business strategy for each EA or statutory entity that was more closely linked to services offered. As part of the modernization process, the GoJ has granted greater financial and managerial autonomy to the 8 EAs established during the project. The first four EAs--Office of Registrar of Companies (ORC, responsible for the official registry of companies), Registrar General's Department (RGD, responsible for recording life events such as births, marriages and deaths), Administrator's General Department (AGD, responsible for administering estates), and the Management Institute for National Development (MIND, a training institute) were established in 1999. The other four EAs--the National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA, in charge of Management of Natural Environment and Planning to ensure orderly Development and proper land use, National Land Agency (NLA, in charge of land regulation and permits), National Works Agency (NWA, responsible for roads), and the Jamaica Information Service (JIS, government broadcasting service) were created in March 2001. The project has actively supported the modernization process through the provision of technical assistance as well as the - 3 - procurement of information technology hardware and software. Each EA has recruited a Chief Executive Officer (CEO), who is held accountable through performance-based contracts to manage and administer operational activities. Job descriptions and positions were reevaluated and staffs were reassigned accordingly. EA performance is measured and evaluated through benchmarks that have been specifically tailored for each EA, are directly linked to service delivery improvements and are modified annually to support continued improvements in service delivery and efficiency. For example, each EA conducts periodic surveys based on the "Citizens Charter," a commitment by each agency to achieve certain standards with respect to their customer base. In addition, EAs have also been given greater flexibility in imposing and increasing user fees, so that revenue generation can be better linked to the cost of services provided. While the EAs represented only 6% of the public sector service in number of employees at the time of the reform, the government was concerned in decreasing its subsidies to the agencies. Although full cost recovery and the further reduction of operational subsidies still remain a medium-term goal, each EA receives, on average, fewer central government resources each year to deliver better and wider variety of services. The first four Executive Agencies have shown remarkable improvements in three fundamental areas: (i) Sevice Delivery; (ii) Customer Satisfaction; (iii) Revenue Earnings. In the first four EAs, customer satisfaction moved from 83% in the 1999/00 financial year to 95.1% in the 2002/03 financial year. They have shown steady improvements in meeting their Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) moving from 80% in the 1999/00 financial year to just over 90% in the 2002/03 financial year. Earnings from these entities moved from $247.4million in 1999/00 to over $479M in the 2002/03 financial year, an increase of almost 50%. Revenue for the base year, 1998/99 stood at $92.9M. The latest four EAs have achieved on average 75% of their KPIs. Revenue earnings have grown from 479.7M to in 2001/02 financial year to 695.7M for the financial year 2002/03. The eight EAs have contributed $1.2B to the Consolidated Fund from their cumulative earnings of $2.4B. There was a 20% reduction in the staff complement in these EAs with the Public Works Department (PWD) accounting for 45% of staff reduction to form the National Works Agency (NWA). Specific examples include: l AGD has increased operational revenues from J$15 million in 1999/00 financial year to J44.28 million in 2002/03 financial year. In addition, its operating deficit has decreased from J$39.4 million to J$37.2 million during the same period. The AGD has reduced its backlog as well as processing time for new cases. The volume of new cases has been reduced. The Agency has also increased the number of cases closed from 30 in 1998/99 to 841 (including backlog cases) in the 2002/03 financial year. Customer satisfaction has moved from 50% in the base year 1998/99 to 98% in the 2002/03 financial year. l MIND has been able to offer a greater number as well as a wider range of courses, resulting in a 64 percent increase in participation rates all while reducing its personnel by 18% and increasing its revenue by 516%; l ORC is responsible for registering new companies, business names, and industrial & provident societies. It has established a Help Desk to assist small, medium and micro enterprises to become and remain statutorily compliant. Turnaround time for registering companies has been reduced from 10 days to one working day. It offers money-back guarantees on its core registration services. Their - 4 - website is e-commerce ready and some of its registration and search services are available online. l RGD has improved services relating to the registry of vital events such as births, deaths, and marriages as well as its ability to generate aggregate statistics. It has increased daily customer capacity from 300 to 1500 applications, reduced response from months to hours, added staff and locations, and introduced genealogical research and deed poll preparation services. Because of the implementation delays relating mostly to insufficient budgetary resources arising from severe fiscal constraints, the achievements of the other four are relatively more modest, but still significant. These achievements include the following: l JIS has increased the number and timeliness of radio and television news stories, exceeding annual performance targets. It contracts out services as well as provides services to the private sector; l NEPA has been able to among other things, achieve some of its performance targets for improving processing time for Permits and Licences for numerous categories of development including sewage treatment, regulating beach safety, improving its issuing of Beach Licences and for processing planning approvals l NLA developed a land titling system, called eLandjaimaca, designed to provide selected land valuation and location-based information to customers. This is a fee-based service that permits users to search by discrete parameters and provide electronic access to sales transaction records. A system for establishing and recording the basis for property titles was also implemented; l NWA was established from the Public Works Department which was part of the core structure of the Ministry of Transport and Works. It has responsibility for the island's road construction and maintenance programme. The NWA is consistently improving its performance in KPIs from 60% in 2001/02 financial year to 70% in 2002/03. Customer satisfaction moved from 45% in 2001/02 to 85% in 2002/03. Revenues have moved from $227M in 2001/02 to $378M in 2002/03 financial year. The PSMP has also supported the modernization of 2 statutory entities -- Jamaica Promotion (JAMPRO) and Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) -- as well as the Customs Department. In terms of statutory agencies, JAMPRO received greater support under the project, as much of the planned reform activities within PIOJ were financed by the EU. Specifically, JAMPRO's mission was modified to focus on investment and export promotion activities, while devolving its non-core functions. Although not a statutory agency, Customs also received substantial support and carried out an institutional restructuring exercise, increased revenue generation from fees, streamlined cargo processing systems (introducing e-manifests), implemented a comprehensive training plan, and developed new monitoring systems. (ii) Enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the Ministries covered by the reform program and supported by the project This objective was partially achieved. The implementation of the PSMP project has had a strong impact in regard to improving the efficiency and effectiveness of one of the pilot Ministries, MTW, covered under the reform program. General fiscal constraints and the fact that the other pilot Ministry, MLE, did not readily embark on the modernization process led to a greater focus being placed on supporting the reform process within MTW. Key underlying principles emphasized the separation of operational activities from policy - 5 - and regulatory functions as well as the development of an organizational structure and business strategy that was more closely linked to services offered. Specifically, MTW devolved operational activities, including road asset development, maintenance, optimization, and congestion management, road safety, and flooding/sea damage control, to an Executive Agency (NWA). Moreover, job descriptions and positions were reevaluated and staffs were reassigned accordingly. Improvements in efficiency and effectiveness have been monitored through quarterly and annual reports, which have delineated the progress achieved in relation to specific performance indicators. (iii) Improve efficiency, value for money and transparency in government procurement and contracting This objective was partially achieved. Achievements include institutional and legal improvements to the procurement framework such as: (i) the implementation of a Procurement Policy Implementation Unit in MOFP; (ii) and the development of a National Procurement Policy and Handbook on Public Sector Procedures. The GOJ also implemented a training program for government staff on these new policies and procedures. There were difficulties in the design and evaluation of the expected outputs, as a consequence the National Contracts Commission and the Contractor General's Department chose not to request assistance from the project with the understanding that they would use their own resources to strengthen their institutional capacity. It should be noted, however, that the country benefitted from the Bank's Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) prepared in September, 2000. The CPAR provided technical advice and described linkages to the PSMP in various ways, having noted, for example, that "In 1995 the Government of Jamaica (GOJ) embarked on a program of reforms to modernize the public sector specifically to improve its capacity to respond more effectively to social needs. The modernization program focused on improving the way government conducts its business by stressing accountability, transparency, performance, quality, and value for money with respect to delivery of public services. To give evidence of its commitment to the modernization process, the GOJ strengthened the Cabinet Secretariat in the Office of the Prime Minister, which manages the Public Sector Modernization Project (PSMP) in collaboration with an Inter-ministerial Committee on Administrative Reform, the National Investment Bank of Jamaica, the Office of the Services Commission, and the MOFP. Implementation of the PSMP began with the assistance of several international funding agencies, including the World Bank." (iv) Enhance public sector accountability by strengthening internal and external controls This objective has been partially achieved. The project provided technical assistance to strengthen the Internal Audit Directorate (IAD) within the MoFP and the Internal Audit Units (IAUs) within the public entities that were part of the first stage of the modernization program. Regarding external control, the project supported the provision of technical assistance, including the development of a training manual, guidelines, and staff training to improve the Auditor General's Office's ability to carry out Value-for-Money (VFM) audits. In addition, a number of auditors received formal training in the preparation of VFM audits. Nevertheless, the AGO lacks the technical capacity to conduct VFM audits. Institutional capacity of the Auditor's General remains relatively weak due to insufficient budgetary resources, outmoded information technology and facilities, and insufficient number of qualified staff. Similarly, line ministries and EAs also lack sufficient internal auditors that possess all the necessary skills to conduct VFM audits. (v) Improve the quality of financial and personnel management in the public sector through computerized information - 6 - This objective was partially achieved. The Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) has developed the accrual accounting, accounts receivable, and accounts payable modules within the FMIS. The remaining modules are either in development or have not commenced. Financial management has been improved through technical assistance and training in accrual accounting and upgrades in accounting information systems in all 8 EAs, albeit with mixed results. The largest impact has been in the development of reporting requirements, as nearly all of the EAs have prepared audited financial statements on an annual basis. While some EAs currently use a hybrid of cash and accrual based accounting methods, the accounting systems used, in general, are heavily tilted toward cash accounting. Nevertheless, the GoJ has indicated its intention to adopt accrual accounting within all public sector entities within the next ten years. As a part of these efforts, the GoJ will embark on a pilot project, scheduled for FY04/05, for instituting accrual accounting in 2 ministries. Key issues pertaining to the switch toward accrual accounting include the need to convert existing procedures and information systems (including the implementation of the FMIS and its potential successor FinMan) as well as recruiting and hiring qualified staff. Because certification requirements are in the process of being upgraded to International Auditing Standards (IAS) and domestic certification institutions are being strengthened (activities outside the purview of the PSMP), it is difficult to recruit qualified individuals with extensive experience in accrual accounting. Other areas in which the project has strengthened financial management within the public agencies covered by this intervention include: (i) upgrading the methodologies for invoicing, payments, and collections; (ii) reviewing human resources practices in order to establish legitimacy over overtime charges; and (iii) providing technical assistance to evaluate existing procurement, internal controls, and external auditing. In terms of the latter, a possible follow-on project is expected to provide technical assistance to strengthen the activities of the Administrator's General Office. However, the current version of FMIS (developed with the support from an earlier Bank loan-Financial and Program Improvement Loan, 3386-JM) is now largely outmoded due to the rapid change in information management technologies in recent years. As agreed upon during project implementation, the system was handed over from the project on May 22, 2000 to the MOFP to be managed by the Fiscal Services Ltd. (FSL)- a government owned company. Further financing support conditioned to the design of the second stage of the FMIS. The development and implementation of the HRMIS has encountered even greater difficulties due to hardware, inadequate data, and limited staff training. (vi) Prepare the next stage of the modernization process This objective has been fully achieved. As part of the preparation of the next stage of the public modernization process, in September 2002 the GoJ drafted in consultation with the Bank and other donors their 10 year reform program, the Vision and Strategy Paper 2002-2012. The GoJ has begun to implement the recommendations listed in this report. Using the lessons from the PSMP, the GoJ is planning on widening the modernization process to include a larger number of government ministries. A partial list is expected to include: (i) Ministry of Agriculture (MoA); (ii) Ministry of Commerce, Science, and Technology (MCST); (iii) Ministry of Education, Youth, and Culture (MoEYC); (iv) MoFP; (v) Ministry of Health; (vi) Ministry of Justice (MoJ); and (vii) Ministry of National Security (MNS); (viii); Bureau of Standards; and (ix) the Child Development Agency (CDA). In addition, statutory agencies, such as the Child Development Agency (CDA), the Forestry Department the Mines & Geology Division within MLE, the Passports Office and STATIN have been mentioned as possible candidates to be converted into EAs. Key follow-up activities also include additional technical assistance to deepen the reforms that have taken place within the Customs Department, MLE, MTW, NEPA, and NLA, as well as further development of the FMIS and HRMIS systems. A Public Sector Reform Unit to lead the effort was also established within the Cabinet Secretary's Office. - 7 - Although the current fiscal environment places significant obstacles on the continuation of the public sector reform process as envisioned in the PSMP, the project produced all the elements necessary for the full design of a follow-up operation should the Bank and the GoJ decide to embark on a second phase once the fiscal situation stabilizes. 4.2 Outputs by components: Component 1: Modernization of Public Sector Entities. The achievement of the activities under this component is rated as satisfactory. Project activities and related costs were weighted heaviest toward the achievement of the modernization of public entities component. In all, this component comprised nearly 75 percent the total project cost. The project had a substantial impact in transforming selected public sector entities into performance-based and output-oriented institutions by improving strategic planning, technical and administrative capacity, and resource allocation. These efforts have led to the realization of clear efficiency gains for the 8 Executive Agencies, 1 pilot Ministry, the 2 modernized entities supported by the project, and the Customs Department. Moreover, to the extent that through the modernization process agencies were able to set more realistic charges they were able to create savings to the government by becoming more self-financing. While operating costs increased over the period, reflecting the costs of modernization, so did revenues and transfers to the government's budget. Revenues for the first 6 agencies in the modernization program (4 agencies for 4 years and another 2 agencies for 2 years) show an increase in revenues of 167% and increase in transfers to the government's budget of 177%. Several of the public agencies listed in the revised Loan Agreement (Section 3.4) as possible candidates within the PSMP did in fact receive support under the PSMP. Specifically, the Works Division (within MTW), the Natural Resources Conservation Authority and the Land Development and Utilization Commission (both within MEH), and the Land Valuation and Estate Department (within MEH) were transformed into EAs that received direct support under the PSMP (NWA, NEPA, and NLA, respectively). The PSMP helped to establish these EA, which have since made notable progress in improving service delivery and reducing costs. The specific impact that the project has had on each of these EAs is described in greater detail in the subsequent paragraphs. As part of these efforts, the 2 ministries supported under the project, MTW and MLE, have also improved their operations and service delivery, although not at a uniform pace as described below. The GoJ opted to delay the modernization process for the Ministries of Agriculture, Education and Culture, Mining and Energy, Industry and Investment, National Security and Justice, Commerce and Technology, Local Government and Community Development, and Tourism until the second stage of the modernization program. This decision was taken, in part, to give the GoJ time to evaluate the results of the PSMP process as well as refine and fine-tune the modernization process for the above-mentioned ministries. It should be noted, however, that the modernization of the Ministry of Water was directly linked to the water privatization component, which was later eliminated from the project. Executive Agencies. A major outcome of the Public Sector Modernization Project (PSMP) has been the establishment of 8 EAs or semi-autonomous institutions, which now are operated according to corporate principles to oversee the delivery of specific public services. The basic guidelines for establishing the EA included the following: (i) developing a framework for bringing in and hiring qualified Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) to manage and administer each EA; (ii) increasing accountability of management through performance agreements linked to quantifiable results; (iii) enacting of the Executive Agency Act of 2002, which codified the legal and regulatory framework for the EAs; (iv) introducing accrual accounting - 8 - principles and system to better evaluate financial performance of each EA; and (v) reviewing human resource needs and procedures within each EA. Moreover, CEOs are held accountable for achieving pre-established results, including the potential imposition of sanctions for poor or non-performance. General benefits that have resulted from the establishment of the EA include: (i) increased accountability by linking managerial and staff performance to operational benchmarks; (ii) greater transparency; (iii) improved revenue generation through fees; (iv) improved customer service; (v) wider use of information technologies; and (vi) expanded service delivery. A detailed description of the results achieved for each EA is listed in the subsequent paragraphs. 1) Administrator General's Department. The AGD administers estates of individuals who die without a will and are survived by minors and estates with a will that lack an Executor. AGD's duties include the sale, rental, and maintenance of real property, the investment of Estate Funds, and the disposal of personal property, as necessary. In support of its investment obligations, the AGD created a Common Fund in January 2001. The Common Fund pools financial assets that are not required immediately for distribution to beneficiaries, and which are invested in government securities. Prior to being an EA, the AGD was characterized as having an extremely high backlog and insufficiently trained staff, which translated into slow resolution times for its caseload. Since becoming an EA, the AGD has able to improve its operations by improving the screening of new cases as well as implement more streamlined procedures. AGD staff has also received training in paralegal issues, computer software, and accounting. As a result of improved screenings, the total number of annual new cases has been reduced from 1200 to 300. More importantly, the AGD now closes an average of 350 cases per year, up from 50. In addition, the attainment of EA status has enabled AGD to charge user fees. 2) Jamaica Information Service (JIS). The PSMP has supported the modernization of the JIS, so that it can better fulfill its mandate of promoting information on the Government's policies and programs and educating the citizens in regard to all aspects of governance. Through technical assistance provided by the project, the GoJ was able to merge JIS with JAMPRESS (a limited liability news service) and created a management team to direct the operations of the merged entity. In addition, the project supported the following activities: (i) an assessment of employee capacity and skills as well as the development of a human resources manual; (ii) the redeployment of employees and the hiring of additional employees; (iii) staff training; (iv) the development of a new organizational chart and the preparation of an Operations Manual; (v) preparation of a business plan; (vi) the preparation of an expenditure plan; (vii) greater access to accounting information; (viii) the use of new information technology, including the computerization of the accounting system; and (iv) the establishment of monthly, quarterly, and annual performance-related targets. JIS has increased the number of radio and television news stories, exceeding annual performance targets. 3) Management Institute for National Development. Converting MIND into an EA has yielded a number of positive benefits in regard to improved service delivery, increased revenue generation, and reduced the amount of government budgetary support. In terms of customer service, MIND has been able to offer a greater number as well as a wider range of courses, resulting in a 64 percent increase in student participation rates. Since becoming an EA, revenues have increased from J$8 million to $49.3 million in FY01/02, representing an increase over 500 percent. Revenue generation currently represents an estimated 67 percent of MIND's annual expenditures. Cost-recovery through revenue generation was practically non-existent given that MIND did not charge participation fees prior to becoming an EA. In addition, the imposition of fees for training courses has limited adverse selection of participants as well as increased staff utilization rates from 33 to 100 percent. Under the project, additional computers were purchased and library facilities have been expanded. MIND has also realized cost savings through the implementation of - 9 - computerized processes for course registration, finance & accounting, and reporting, which replaced manual systems. An important barometer of these modernization efforts is that MIND has won 4 training bids over private competition. 4) National Environment and Planning Agency. NEPA was formed as the result of the merger between the Land Development Utilization Commission (LDUC), the Natural Resources Conservation Authority (NRCA) and the Town Planning Department (TPD). NEPA was created with the goal of ensuring that the natural and built resources in Jamaica are used in a sustainable manner, while taking into account planning and development issues and community participation. As a result of the merger of the aforementioned public entities, NEPA's core functions include: (i) policy and program development; (ii) application approvals; (iii) compliance and enforcement; (iv) park, beach, and watershed management; (v) public education and information services and; (vi) environmental and land use database and mapping. Since it became an EA, NEPA has shed about a third of its total staff. Initial delays were associated with insufficient budgetary allocations, difficulties in merging LDUC and NRCA within NEPA's corporate structure, the relatively slow transfer of operational responsibilities from MLE, and difficulties relating with recruiting a qualified CEO. The PSMP aided the GoJ efforts to post-merger integration activities by financing the purchase of information technology hardware and by assisting the recruitment of a CEO. In addition, technical assistance provided under the PSMP has assisted the GoJ in strengthening internal controls, including monitoring and enforcement activities, in relation to the land titling process. To date, NEPA has been able to achieve its regulatory targets regarding beach safety, beach licenses, sewage effluent as well as for the Negril Environmental Protection Area. NEPA has completed at this writing a policy gap analysis as well as the National Environment and Planning Policy and Strategy (NEPPS). 5) National Land Agency. The National Land Agency (NLA) was established as a result of the merger of the Land Valuation and Estate Department (LVED), the Surveys Department, and the Office of Titles, all part of the Ministry of Environment and Housing. This merger formally brought together land titling, survey and mapping, land valuation, and land management functions within a single entity. The NLA was formed as EA in April 2001, which led to potential synergies, improved service availability, and increased the types of services offered. Under the PSMP, training was provided to improve the customer service orientation of the institution, increase technological proficiency, and strengthen the operational performance of services provided. The development of a Land Titling System was an important step in the modernization process. The reengineering of land titles and survey processes revealed significant losses of Government revenue as the result of poor quality control, leading to fraudulent duplication of titles and theft of fees collected. To improve service delivery, NLA is developed an Internet-based service, called eLandjaimaca, designed to provide selected land valuation and location-based information to customers. This is a fee-based service that permits users to search by discrete parameters, such as address and valuation number, bring up interactive maps linked through Geographic Information Systems (GIS), and provide electronic access to sales transaction records. The eLandjamaica system will also include a basic property search by an assigned valuation at no cost to users. The merging of land-related services under a single agency has also permitted the centralization of administrative functions, such as human resources, procurement, accounting, etc., leading to the realization of cost savings. In particular, total staff of the combined agencies has decreased from 591 to 450 employees. In effort to provide greater accountability, job descriptions were redefined and linked to specific performance requirements. Computerized payroll and salary payment systems have also been introduced. NLA has started the transition toward accrual accounting, which should improve the tracking of revenues and expenditures. These efforts have also had a positive impact on revenue generation. 6) National Works Agency (NWA). The reform process specific to NWA was delayed until 2001 due to - 10 - lack of funds appropriated for these activities. Once the modernization process commenced, NWA was established as EA and was given a mandate to oversee the following functions: (i) road asset development and maintenance; (ii) road asset optimization and congestion management; (iii) road safety management; and (iv) flooding & sea damage control. These activities had previously been under the purview of MTW. The PSMP specifically supported efforts to reengineer NWA, upgraded computer hardware, software, and network infrastructure, reviewed and modified HR practices, and provided staff training. In an effort to improve cost-recovery, the project supported development of a revised fee structure. The project has also supported the completion of an asset inventory and asset management system. The immediate impact of these reforms has been to contract out road maintenance activities as well as improve management for emergency response to flooding conditions. Nevertheless, NWA has relatively little autonomy regarding the preparation of its investment plans as well as the use of revenues generated from fees. Due to the difficult fiscal situation in Jamaica, NWA is also required to transfer a significant percentage of revenues generated to MoFP. Financial autonomy has also been affected by budget cuts that have occurred after its annual appropriations had been approved. As a relatively new agency, it is still in the process of updating its 10-year master plan. 7) Office of the Registrar of Companies. Because the ORC has the mandate for registering of new companies, trademarks, industry groups, and business names, it has an important role in the overall competitive environment within Jamaica. Like the AGD, the ORC also experienced a very large backlog of close to 4,000 cases prior to becoming an EA. This large backlog was attributed to outmoded information technology, limited staff, and physical constraints, and insufficient allocation of human resources. Moreover, information regarding the registration process and related services were not widely disseminated to the public. The corrective actions that were taken once ORC became an EA include: (i) streamlining procedures, which has expedited the registration of business names, companies, and company documents; (ii) establishing a business name database; (iii) developing an ORC website to facilitate on-line usage and searches as well as to widen the dissemination of registrations, lists, booklets, and brochures; (iv) developing a help-desk for small, medium, and micro-enterprises; (v) the installation of updated equipment and additional computers; (vi) introducing a performance pay-based system, clear performance indicators for each job category, and higher pay grades to attract better qualified staff; and (vii) moving to more modern and more spacious offices, which include a larger customer service area. An internal audit unit (IAU) and external audit committee were established, which have led to the generation of monthly, quarterly, and annual reports that summarize internal activities and financial operations. As a result of these activities, the most recent 3-year corporate plan and budget has demonstrated improved linkages between resource inputs in relation to objectives, targets, and overall performance. Customer backlog was cleared, average processing time shortened from 8 weeks to 5 days and revenues increased nearly 20-fold. The improvement of ORC operations was financed, in part, through an increase in customer fees. 8) Registrar General's Department. The Registrar General's Department (RGD) has a mandate to register vital events such as births, deaths, and marriages as well as generate aggregate statistics. Prior to becoming an EA, the RGD offered poor customer service, which was made evident by the existence of a backlog of over 160,000 bills of sale covering over 18 years. RGD's single office made access inconvenient for some customers and led to long waiting times. This situation was compounded by the fact that RGD only had a single service representative. Customers also had to deal with limited informational support, especially in regard to filling out forms. The limited number of qualified staff and outmoded information systems also led to a high error rate. Finally, RGD's lacked adequate facilities for researchers, and security measures were relatively porous. Through support provided by the PSMP, the RGD, since it became an EA in 1999, has eliminated its backlog, while increasing the number of average daily customers served from 300 to 1,500 and reduced response time from months to hours. At the same time, the error rate has declined significantly. These results were achieved through the following measures: (i) increasing the number - 11 - locations to four and the number of customer service representatives to 20; (ii) providing staff training; (iii) introducing performance targets and incentives; (iv) installing over 80 desktop computers, 8 servers, and 20 printers; and (v) developing an on-line system to register births. In addition, new services, such as genealogical research and deed poll preparation were introduced, and research equipment and facilities were installed. From an administrative perspective, the PSMP also assisted in the RGD in developing a limited accrual accounting system, clearing the backlog associated to the preparation of financial statements, which are now produced on a timely basis, and the computerization of 93 percent of financial information and payroll systems. Modernization of Ministries. During project implementation, the Ministry of Land and Environment (MLE) and the Ministry of Transport and Works (MTW) were designated as the "pilot" ministries within the modernization process. As part of the reform process, MTW and MLE experienced a reduction of 700 and 201 staff members, respectively. The GoJ was responsible for the payment of pensions, accumulated leave, etc. at a cost of roughly J$147.4 million. Ministry of Land & Environment (MLE). Due to insufficient budgetary resources, the modernization of MLE got off to a relatively slow start. Although MLE developed its modernization plan through the PSMP in 2001, it still continued to be actively involved in the operational activities for land and the environment, which created redundancies with NLA and NEPA, respectively. Nevertheless, MLE eventually divested itself of most of its operational activities and was granted a mandate over policy formulation and regulatory oversight over land and environmental protection activities. A critical element of the reform process has involved the development and adoption of performance targets as well as the implementation of a performance evaluation system for its staff. Ministry Transport and Works (MTW). The budgetary difficulties, which slowed efforts to modernization MLE, were even more acute in regard to MTW, and by extension, NWA. Despite these hurdles, MTW approved its modernization plan in 1999, and has devolved many of its operational activities to NWA. In addition, MTW has also completed the following actions: (i) approved and implemented a new organizational structure; (ii) reviewed human resources policies and procedures; (iii) reexamined and updated job classifications and pay scales; (iv) reduced staff by more than half from 900 to 420; and (v) upgraded IT and corporate information systems. The Inter-American Development Bank (IADB), through its National Road Services Improvement Project, is providing additional support to the NWA. Modernized Public Sector Entities. This category includes the Jamaica Promotions (JAMPRO), and the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ), which had been targeted to become EAs, but have remained as statutory corporations at project end. The Customs Department has also retained its status as a department. Legal concerns and budgetary difficulties prevented the transformation these entities into EAs. Nevertheless, the project provided technical assistance and equipment, which has had a significant impact in modernizing these agencies. Jamaica Promotion (JAMPRO). Prior to the project, JAMPRO lacked a clear strategy with excessive staff working in functional "silos" with overlapping responsibilities. JAMPRO also had a high cost structure with several overseas offices and was not particularly IT-driven. Service quality was relatively poor, as JAMPRO's staff placed insufficient attention to customer needs. The PMSP supported the GoJ's efforts to rationalize JAMPRO as well as improve operational performance and service delivery. Through technical assistance provided under the project, JAMPRO mission statement was modified to focus on investment and export promotion activities in support of the government's economic development policies. In this manner, JAMPRO was able to devolve non-core functions, such as the productivity center and - 12 - export certification activities. The change in its strategic direction was combined with the introduction of an output-driven, operational methodology linked to measurable performance targets. Moreover, several of JAMPRO's overseas offices were closed in favor of new technologies, such as video conferencing, a transactional website, and call center. JAMPRO's total staff was also reduced by 50 percent. These actions have led to significant cost savings. To improve its interface with its customer, JAMPRO installed a customer relationships management system that provides a range of tiered services. Finally, JAMPRO's internal financial systems were upgraded to provide unit cost information relating to its promotional services as well as the related impact. Customs Department. The Customs Department within the MoFP has three essential functions: (i) protecting Jamaican citizens from external security threats; (ii) assessing and generating revenues; and (iii) protecting the economy. In addition to improving service provision, specific objectives related to the modernization of the Customs Department involved increased revenue generation from fees as well as capturing lost revenues due to evasion. The modernization program also focused on the following activities: (i) recruitment of a CEO; (ii) contracting of consultants to implement change management activities; (iii) development of an IT strategy, including an "e-payment" system, electronic manifests and audit intelligence software for import controls; (v) development of a electronic link with the tax administration system; (vi) review of human resources policies and procedures as well as the development of a HR manual; and (vii) development of performance appraisal and quality control systems. Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ). Although the Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ) was to have been part of the modernization program, it opted not to receive financial resources from the PSMP. Although its diagnostic phase was finalized in 1999 with EU resources, there have been difficulties in securing consulting services to carry out implementation. Component 2: Procurement, Contracting, Internal Control and Auditing The achievement of the activities under this component is rated as marginally satisfactory. Procurement. The GOJ advanced with institutional and legal improvements to the procurement framework, instituted a Procurement Policy Implementation Unit in MOFP and developed a National Procurement Policy and Handbook on Public Sector Procedures. It counted on the support and advice provided by a Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR) prepared in late 2000. However, during the course of the project, there were numerous difficulties associated with the GOJ's acceptance of the consultant outputs for the preparation of the report evaluating procurement systems. The issue was discussed at length between the GOJ and the firm and finally resolved but ultimately the delays and need to reallocate resources to the EA component precluded the completion of this activity. Value-for-Money Audits. Technical assistance has been provided, which has enabled the GoJ to begin identifying the procedures that need to be modernized to implement Value-for-Money (VFM) audits. During the course of the project, a training manual on VFM audits was developed, which included detailed guidelines for establishing internal controls in public entities. In addition, staff courses were provided on VFM principles. Initial results include the preparation of 3 VFM audits in 2001. To support these efforts, the PSMP financed the procurement of goods related to this component, including the purchase of computers within the Auditors' General Office, MOFP, and the Internal Auditing Units (IAU) departments in selected ministries. Although the Auditor's General Office has introduced VFM auditing practices and has published some of these audits in its annual report, there are a number of issues that have limited the wider implementation of VFM audits. A key difficulty has been the continued institutional weakness of the Auditor's General - 13 - Office, which lacks sufficient technical staff and the necessary information technology infrastructure to fully carry out its mandate of examining and reporting on all government operations at least once per year. Additional issues involve the following: (i) delays in developing and implementing the FMIS, which has limited the availability of the necessary data to conduct VFM audits; (ii) the general lack of solid cost accounting systems within most of the public sector agencies; and (iii) the legal and institutional framework that prevents public sector entities from setting user fees and charges at levels commensurate for achieving cost recovery (including staff costs, O&M, capital costs, depreciation, etc.). In the few EAs that have a rudimentary cost accounting system, there is still the need to upgrade these systems to include fixed assets and all outstanding liabilities. The GoJ has recognized the deficiencies, and has made it an important priority within the second phase of the modernization program. In particular, the Auditor's General Office is scheduled to receive additional technical assistance during this phase. Internal Controls. Considerable progress was achieved in regard to the modernization of internal auditing. Technical assistance was provided under the project to the Internal Audit Directorate (IAD) within the MoFP and to Internal Audit Units (IAUs) within selected ministries, departments and EAs. Specifically, this included staff training courses on value-for-money, audit planning, sampling techniques, report writing and forensic auditing for over 120 auditors both from the IAD and from the IAUs. In addition, technical assistance provided by the project has also assisted the GoJ in standardizing audit work papers and reports. Finally, the PSMP has supported the GoJ efforts to introduce accrual based accounting and upgrade accounting information systems. Component 3: Management Information Systems The achievement of the activities within this component is rated as marginally satisfactory. This component was intended to support the upgrading of FMIS and HRMIS, so it is impossible to separate the achievements of this component from those of the financial management and human resource management component. In regard to the FMIS, progress has been made to improve the tracking and analysis of public financial data, especially compared to pre-project conditions. However, additional work is needed to modernize existing systems and better link the FMIS to the financial systems in place within the Ministries and the EAs. The implementation of the HRMIS remains largely incomplete. There were also strategic considerations and design issues that delayed the decision on moving forward with the two systems. The project status of both systems is described in greater detail in the subsequent paragraphs. FMIS. The Financial and Program Improvement Loan (3386-JM) developed the FMIS I, a system that is based on cash accounting. This system has been implemented in 17 ministries. With support from the PSMP project the MOFP has also developed the accrual accounting, accounts receivable, and accounts payable modules within the FMIS. The project also financed the development of additional modules, updating of UNIX versions, and the modifications necessary to meet Y2K compliance standards. However, the remaining modules that would provide greater functionality, including budget preparation and payroll, are either in development or have not commenced. The lack of standardized data has also been a problem. Due to the way the software was structured, it has also been difficult to make modifications to the system. Finally, most of the FMIS systems are largely outmoded due to the rapid change in financial management technologies and practices. MOFP has recently commenced the process of redesigning the second stage of the FMIS, known as the FinMan, which will use web-based technologies. The delay in development of the second version of the FMIS was due the government's desire to develop this in the context of a wider national Informatics strategy. HRMIS. The HRMIS is a computerized database designed to improve the management of human resources. A prototype version, funded by the project was installed in each of the 26 government sites and - 14 - another prototype version was installed in the first 4 EAs. However, the implementation of the prototype versions ran into difficulties associated with inadequate hardware, insufficient collected data, and limited staff training. A team of consultants who carried out a review of the system early in 2001 concluded that the system needed to be made more robust and functionality added. More importantly, the evaluation also found that the lack of a central focus for human resource management lead to further organizational and procedural problems and confusion. Thus, the development and implementation of an upgraded version was postponed to allow for the further clarification of institutional responsibilities as well as the review of staff levels within public agencies. Additional implementation difficulties were associated with the need to clarify policies and procedures set by the Offices of the Services Commission (OSC). Component 4: Project Implementation, Communication Campaign, and Development of Stage II. This component is rated as satisfactory. The PSMP was implemented through a Project Implementation Unit (PIU) under the direct supervision of the Cabinet Secretary (CS). The CS maintained strong leadership over the PSMP, exercising strategic direction whenever required. The PIU was led by a Project Coordinator and a team of component coordinators and administrative staff. Despite some minor shortcomings on the administrative side, the PIU was by and large managed quite professionally and responded well to the requirements of the institutions involved in the PSMP as well as to the Bank. Regarding the communication campaign, the reform process supported by the project was widely disseminated to the public through the media. Each executive agency published pamphlets on the reform process of the agency and its new service standards; the RGD had its own radio program advertising their services, and JIS prepared a television broadcast describing the overall vision of the reform process. Throughout the implementation period The Office of the Cabinet Secretary published a series of articles on the reform program and its impacts. The PSMP was also designed as a pilot project that would pave the way for further public sector modernization, including the expansion of the EA model to other public agencies. In this regard, the GoJ has demonstrated considerable commitment to this objective by establishing a Permanent Reform Unit to coordinate the design and implementation of the second phase of the public sector modernization program. In addition, the GoJ has drafted a White Paper that charts out the ongoing reform process over the medium-term. Under the next stage of the PSMP, the GOJ would consolidate the reforms achieved within the EAs and ministries covered under the first operation as well as expand the reform process to include additional agencies and ministerial departments. It should be emphasized, however, that although the project delivered the appropriate inputs for a discussion on the design of a follow-up phase, the current macroeconomic situation may make it difficult to move ahead with continued public sector reform under the PSMP principles, which emphasize increased financial and managerial autonomy for agencies. It is to be expected that once fiscal stability is reestablished the recognized benefits accruing from the PSMP will lead to a renewed reform effort. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: N/A 4.4 Financial rate of return: N/A 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project has had a substantial institutional development impact, although challenges in the - 15 - macroeconomic environment may threaten its sustainability. All the agencies and ministries that received support under the project have undergone large-scale transformations through the hiring of CEO, development of corporate plans, restructuring of operations to improve service delivery, the introduction of performance-based indicators, the restructuring of internal operational and hiring procedures, and the introduction and/or increase of user fees. These actions have all streamlined operations and improved service delivery leading to increased client and citizen satisfaction. However, as will be discussed later in this document, their sustainability is facing significant risks, in particular from a difficult macroeconomic outlook that may place the fundamental objectives of the institutional reform (efficiency and quality) as a secondary consideration as the government seeks to reestablish fiscal stability. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: External Macroeconomic Shocks. The macroeconomic position, which had begun to improve somewhat between FY98/99 to FY00/01, began to deteriorate once again in FY00/01 due primarily to the post-September 11, 2001 decline in tourism and the impact of global economic slowdown on exports, which affected government revenues as well as the balance of payments. Further, severe floods in November 2001 led to increased expenditures and worsened the fragile fiscal situation. As described below, the worsened macroeconomic situation affected the implementation of the EA model. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Macroeconomic Performance. A financial crisis was brewing even during the preparation of the project, but its real impact was felt during project implementation, and continues to be felt today. This crisis, which began in 1995, was caused by liberalizing the financial sector without sufficient regulation or bank supervision, and led to large government intervention to rehabilitate financial institutions, and increased public debt by 40 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This financial sector related debt, along with high fiscal deficits, high interest rates and declining growth, led to public sector debt rising sharply from 86 percent of GDP in 1995/96 to 150 percent of GDP in 2002/03. The large and rising stock of public debt contributed, among other factors, to interest costs rising from 33 percent of expenditure of 1995/96 to 42 percent of expenditure in 2002/03. Government expenditures increased from 26 percent of GDP in 1994/95 to 37 percent in 2002/03. The government wage bill also rose, from 7.7 period of GDP in 95/96 to 13 percent in 02/03. In conjunction with a dramatic increase in government expenditures, the fiscal deficit of the central government increased from 5.5 percent of GDP in 2000/01 to 8 percent of GDP in 2002/03. Resistance to change. Restructuring programs typically encounter some form of institutional and/or staff resistance related to vested interests, fear of job loss, and change in performance requirements. During the project, this resistance was manifested in the affected line ministries and agencies and delayed the modernization process in some agencies. The PSMP mitigated these concerns by holding a series of meeting and seminars with affected staff to discuss the changes in the workplace environment as a result of the modernization program. Staff training was also provided to raise employee skill sets, which somewhat ameliorated staff concerns. The GoJ also sought to protect the vested pension rights of employees transferred from the public service to executive agencies as well as develop pension schemes for future EA employees. Based on lessons learned in the first phase, as part of a possible second stage of the modernization program, the GoJ is considering the following actions to minimize possible resistance: (i) having an entity, such as the PSRU within the Cabinet Office serve as a centralized agency for managing the transition - 16 - process; and (ii) the refinement and expansion of a communication strategy to inform public sector employees of the potential benefits and risks inherent in the restructuring process. Counterpart funding delays. Delays in appropriating sufficient funds put reform activities behind schedule within the pilot ministries as well in Customs, JAMPRO, NEPA, NLA, and NWA. Modernization activities were particularly impacted within MTW and NWA, which did not receive significant financial resources until late in the project. In addition to insufficient financial appropriation due to the worsening of the fiscal situation, public entities supported under the PSMP often experienced significant mid-year budget reductions. For example, project budgets were reduced nearly 70 percent during both FY01/02 and FY02/03. These conditions made it more difficult to initiate and implement the first critical steps in the modernization process, including the hiring of CEOs, the development and implementation of strategic plans, and the review of organizational activities. 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: Delays in recruiting qualified staff. Even if budget difficulties are taken into account, there were, nevertheless, long delays in hiring qualified managerial and technical staff. Some EAs took nearly a year to hire and bring on board a CEO. These delays had the largest impact on EAs and statutory bodies that were created as a result of mergers between public agencies (e.g., NEPA and NLA). These entities needed to have a strong management structure at the outset to better integrate operational activities of the merged entities. Once CEO and other management staff were recruited, these entities were able to begin integrating operations, developing strategic management plans, develop performance indicators, and review staffing requirements and recruiting. Delays in implementing the procurement component. This component experienced significant delays as a result of the receipt of a poor quality report. As a result, the consultant report needed to be retendered, which delayed progress in carrying out the modernization of public procurement activities. Limited progress in implementing the HRMIS/FMIS. As previously noted, there were delays related to the development and installation of both the HRMIS and FMIS systems. The delays were associated with inadequate design, inappropriate technologies, and organizational and institutional bottlenecks. The GoJ is attempting to address these concerns under a possible follow-on project. The successor systems to the HRMIS and FMIS are expected to employ both up-to-date and widely used technologies in order to develop the proper informational tools to assist in making more informed human resource and financial decisions, respectively. 5.4 Costs and financing: Total project costs were US$33.04 million. Of this amount, about US$24.12 (about 73 percent of total project costs) were used to finance activities under the Modernization of Public Sector Entities component, which was the central component of the project. An additional US$3.1 million (9 percent) was used to finance the MIS components. The remaining project funds were allocated toward the procurement, contracting, and auditing component. The Bank provided US$ 27.1 million, while the GoJ allocated US$5.9 million to undertake project activities. Parallel financing of approximately US$ 3.0 million was provided by the Department for International Development of the British High Commission (DFID) to finance consulting services for 4 EAs (RGD, AGD, ORC and MIND). The European Union (EU) also provided financing (amounts are not available) for the modernization of the PIOJ. The US$ 7 million initially allocated for the privatization component was in part reallocated to the other components. In addition, US$ 8 million in counterpart funds to be used for civil works were not carried out. - 17 - 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Project sustainability is rated as likely, although subject to risks. Viewed purely from the perspective of institutional reform, the achievements of the program have yielded a significant improvement in the delivery of certain key public services, such as the recording of life events, the registry of companies, the maintenance of roads, and the processing of imports and exports. These improvements have established a new standard in public service delivery which has redefined the expectations of the citizenry regarding its interactions with the public sector. This new paradigm of service standards, although relatively new, has overtaken the traditional one of a customer-unfriendly public sector in certain key areas that have been traditionally inefficient and burdensome. This in itself creates a barrier for slippage in coverage and quality, more so when one factors in the citizen charters enacted by several of the agencies that protect the rights of the consumers. Furthermore, the institutions that have been reformed to deliver this higher standard of services have a solid legal, organizational, and managerial foundation that should endure the test of time. The Executive Agencies Act has engrained into law some of the key principles of the reform; the EAs, Ministries, and other modernized entities have adopted organizational structures that are more client-responsive and establish clear lines of accountability; and finally, the CEOs of the agencies have demonstrated significant leadership and commitment to reform, becoming key drivers for the sustainability of the process. However, these advances could be put at risk if the fiscal situation of the government leads to quick measures to bring the budget under control. The overall public sector budget deficit, which reached 8% of GDP in 2002/03, may place the essential elements of the reform program ­ such as enhanced service delivery and institutional accountability for results ­ in a second level of priority. Fiscal constraints could mean that the government will add distortions to the incentive structure, such as cuts or freezes in CEO salaries and staff and non-observance of the revenue retention model that is the backbone of the incentive structure that encourages improvements in quality and coverage. Therefore, in times of fiscal crisis, the agencies that have worked hard to recover costs and seek organizational efficiency may be milked of their revenues to help cover the deficit. While the adoption of measures to ensure fiscal sustainability is of paramount importance, there is clearly a trade-off between maintaining a management model that is conducive to improved service delivery but which may be fiscally neutral or even expansionary (although it generated substantial fixed savings at one point), with the need to be fiscally conservative in the face of a budget crisis. In this context, an appropriate rating for the sustainability of the achievements under the PSMP would be "uncertain". However, the Bank does not provide for such a category in its rating system. Therefore, after extensive internal debate, a decision has been made to go with the rating of "Likely" for the following reasons: First, while it is possible that the fiscal crisis may freeze the modernization process in the short run, the successful experience of the PSMP in terms of service delivery has planted a "seed" within government and the public that would be a precursor to continued modernization following a return of healthier fiscal accounts. The public popularity of the agencies could also be seen as an incentive to the government to maintain or extend the model. Consequently, even in the most extreme case of financial restraint on the EAs, it is very unlikely that the service standards would slip to pre-PSMP levels. And finally, it should be noted that the PSMP was not exclusively a World Bank-supported program; there is a large group of bilateral donors that have also financed the process so far and who have an explicit interest in supporting further stages of the PSMP, making up a network of external stakeholders committed to protecting the achievements of the program to date. - 18 - 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: N/A 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7.1 Lending: Bank performance during project preparation is rated as being satisfactory, overall. Project design was comprehensive to enable the implementation of a complex and wide-ranging reform program, yet flexible enough to enable the GoJ to include the public entities that would more readily benefit from the PSMP. Moreover, the PSMP proved to be an important linchpin in the overall development strategy for Jamaica. However, there are two areas where project preparation could have been better: First, the inclusion of the water privatization component into the program should have followed a more careful assessment of the water sector. As a sector lacking an explicit political will to privatize, the project's intervention should have been specifically tailored to ensure that the appropriate legal and regulatory framework was in place. Second, project development was very lengthy, generating high preparation costs. This was due, however, to significant strategic choices along the process that in all likelihood increased the project's odds for a successful implementation. The initial design was a conventional civil service reform project with the intent of increasing salaries across the board. This idea was abandoned after it was projected that salary increases for all public servants would imply an unsustainable additional recurrent cost, as well as realizing that low salaries were not necessarily the only cause for poor public sector performance. A more targeted approach that would link inputs, outputs and outcomes was adopted with a view of undertaking the modernization process in two stages, with the PSMP as the initial, "pilot" stage. Moreover, the Executive Agencies concept pioneered in the UK was also adopted mid-way in project preparation, which eventually became the most visible and successful element of the program. 7.2 Supervision: Bank performance during project implementation, is also rated as being satisfactory, overall. The Bank was both highly responsive to client needs and provided sufficient support to ensure the timely implementation of the PSMP. However, the continued deterioration of fiscal performance might have been better incorporated into project design and supervision. Of course, the effects of September 11 and natural disasters could not have been foreseen and government and the Bank as a whole remained hopeful that the fiscal situation would have improved sooner. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Based on the ratings for lending and supervision, Bank performance is rated as being satisfactory, overall. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: Project preparation is rated as satisfactory. The modernization program developed was comprehensive; however, as described above, the delays in project design generated additional preparation costs for the government as well. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Borrower performance during implementation is rated as satisfactory, overall. The GoJ embarked and implemented an ambitious reform program, especially in light of the political resistance and general inertia - 19 - to change. The successful transformation of the public entities into EA has been a critical first step in the reform program. However, the GoJ's overall poor fiscal position led to insufficient allocations and budges cuts, which delayed implementation of the modernization program in some of the project agencies. It should be noted that the implementation in 1996 of elements of New Public Management (such as the EA model) in a developing country was a highly controversial and risky endeavor. It is widely held in certain academic circles that NPM requires a number of elements for success which are present only in highly developed nations, such as performance-oriented oversight by entities such as Congress or the Auditor General, sophisticated financial control and reporting systems, or legal frameworks that enable true managerial discretion in the public sector. Although the scope of the NPM reforms supported by the PSMP is not as broad as what is found in certain developed nations, the GOJ took the challenge and moved forward with determination. 7.6 Implementing Agency: The performance of the implementing agency in preparing and guiding the GoJ during the implementation of an extremely complex reform program is considered to be satisfactory. The PIU was consistently well staffed, maintained high performance standards, was responsive to the needs of the entities that participated in the PIU, and had the direct support and guidance of the Cabinet Secretary. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Borrower performance is considered to be satisfactory, overall. 8. Lessons Learned Macroeconomic stability is critical to the sustainability of the public sector modernization process From 1995/96 to 2002/03, the primary surplus decreased from 10.5 percent of GDP to 7.7 percent and the fiscal balance deteriorated from a surplus of 1.8 percent of GDP to an 8 percent deficit. The decline in the government's macroeconomic position affected project implementation in that it constrained the availability of financial resources for the modernization program. In a few, extreme cases, public agencies were starved for funds. Moreover, the weak fiscal position has altered the incentive structure relating to the classification of EA's and the concomitant revenue transfers to the MoFP. Thus, a more stable macroeconomic framework would permit the setting of revenues and user fees as well as the transfer of revenues at economically sustainable levels. The deterioration of the macroeconomic position has led to higher debt levels, which has crowded out productive public and private investment. As the debt/GDP rose from 79 percent to 149 percent between 1996/97 and 2002/03, interest costs have increased from 8.7 percent to 15.8 percent of GDP. At the present time, the government's high debt levels have constrained its ability to undertake a wider reform program that would cover ministries which were not part of the first stage of the modernization program. Finally, the decline in the macroeconomic position may have also slowed the momentum for increasing financial autonomy for the EAs and modernized entities--an essential element for achieving sustainability over the medium-term. Greater managerial and financial autonomy is essential to realize the full benefits of modernization. One of the key issues that arose during the implementation of the PSMP was the difficulties EAs experienced related to the lack of full managerial and administrative autonomy, once the reform process was undertaken. Although EA CEOs and managerial staff within modernized ministries had the scope to develop and implement corporate strategies for their respective institutions, in many cases, they were not delegated sufficient authority to determine staffing levels and classifications. Moreover, the relevant - 20 - remuneration for technical and managerial staff was centrally negotiated under pre-determined budgets, which limited the ability to hire the qualified staff needed to meet service demands. There have also been difficulties with EAs not receiving sufficient financial resources to carry out the planned reforms that would improve the customer service delivery and organizational efficiency. In addition, EAs have been unable to retain some of the revenues generated from fee-based customer services. This difficulty is largely related to the tight fiscal situation in Jamaica (see above) which has forced the MOFP to appropriate some EA resources. This is also related to both existing classification scheme for revenue generating institutions within the public sector as well as the misclassification of institutions, especially EAs. For example, AGD has been given a "Type B" classification, requiring that its budget pass through the MoFP before being submitted to the legislature. In practice, 70 percent of its expenditure is financed by own generated revenue, making it eligible for "Type C" classification, which in theory, should allow for the greater retention of revenues and greater financial autonomy. A critical tenet of the EA model has been to grant this autonomy, once the entity in question is ready institutionally to determine how it can best utilize its own resources. For the benefits of the modernization program to be fully realized, EAs need to be granted greater autonomy over the allocation of human and financial resources. Aligning of incentives is critical to support long-term sustainability. The aforementioned revenue classification system has also created perverse financial incentives. The financial instructions to EAs require, without clear reason, monthly and (for EAs with A, B and C classifications) variable amount remissions of revenue to the Consolidated Fund. The stated justification is in terms of the Government's return on investment. However, transfer amounts and timing appear to challenge this justification. The primary objective of EAs is to provide services to the public, not to generate revenue for the Government. If EAs face continued uncertainty about the percentage of revenues generated that they are allowed to keep, then over time, they may face fewer incentives to implement improvements in customer service delivery. Financial management and internal controls should also be directly tied with predetermined output levels as well as planned resource Thus, the existing classification scheme should be reevaluated. These issues have been identified and have been discussed within the government There should be discipline to ensure that their fees and charges should be no more than to reflect the full costs of production including whatever allowance is needed for retention to invest in that production. In this manner, customers can determine their level of usage through appropriate pricing signals. Moreover, EAs can work toward increasing the extent that the cost of these services is recovered, thereby reducing reliance on operational subsidies. Adequate pricing, however, needs to be linked to the retention of revenues to have any significant impact on an EA's incentive structure. Moreover, an adequate assessment of cost structures needs to be undertaken to ensure that pricing levels are appropriate. Improve internal accounting systems is essential for informed decision-making Although the EA model has a significant impact in improving the operational performance of selected EAs, it is necessary to improve and install a cost accounting system that fully identifies all administrative and overhead costs associated with service provision of public sector entities. The development of an improved internal accounting system combined with the use of cost-centers would provide the following benefits: (i) ensure that the pricing of services is structured to allow for improved cost-recovery; (ii) enable EA management and public sector officials to make more informed decision regarding service delivery options and channels; (iii) facilitate the use of internal controls; and (iv) allow for the development of multi-year planning modules; and (v) establish the framework for the use of more sophisticated tools, such as - 21 - value-for-money accounting. Improved financial information systems would also allow a more accurate assessment of EA performance in relation to defined output targets as well as the determination of variances between actual and budgeted costs in the delivery of public services. It is expected that the possible next stage of the modernization process will continue to support the upgrading of financial information systems as well as the wider adoption of accrual accounting mechanisms. Avoid delays in recruiting qualified managerial and technical staff Initial delays in recruiting qualified CEOs and other managerial and technical staff slowed some of the momentum for developing and implementing the strategic visions of newly established EAs. In some cases, it took nearly a year to recruit key managerial staff. These delays impacted the ability of these entities in the review and revision of their organizational structure as well as the determination of personnel, funding, and information technology needs. In addition, the absence of CEOs likely hurt these entities in the budget appropriation process. In this manner, future entities that are converted into EAs should ensure that key managerial staffs are hired on a timely basis. An important issue that arose during project implementation related to the question as to how the GoJ would address the outstanding pension liabilities stemming from the public sector modernization process. This issue is particularly relevant given the size of total public wages (roughly 12 to 13 percent of GDP as of mid-2003) as well as the ongoing fiscal difficulties experienced by the GoJ. Public expenditures related to wages and benefits have grown about 1 percent year since 2000/01. In part, the recent increases reflect the policy of raising civil service wages to 80 percent of comparable private sector wages.. Pension obligations are expected to grow at a relatively fast pace given the size of the public sector workforce and the growing number of individuals reaching retirement age in the near-term. Relating to pension obligations, Bank support has historically been limited to indirect technical assistance, such as the review of policy and legal frameworks. To its credit, the PSMP managed a process, which included the consideration of several proposals to establish and manage an EA contributory pension fund. A specific fund manager has been appointed and the structure for the pension fund was in place by project end. In addition the GoJ, enacted the Executive Agencies Act (EAA) in 2002, which enabled the Minister of Finance to outline financing arrangements for awarding pensions, gratuities, and other retirement or disability benefits to EA employees. The EAA established the normative framework for fund management and general benefits levels. Civil service pension arrangements are non-contributory. The EAA also requires a public officer within 12 months of becoming an EA employee to elect to continue under the Government scheme or under the EA contributory scheme. The employee's decision becomes irrevocable. The EAA also specifically provides for the contents and provisions of benefit schemes not related to the award of pensions. While these activities have improved the ability to address pension obligation for EA employees, they have not lowered the overall level of outstanding pension obligations. Given the recent changes in Bank guidelines in regard to financing outstanding pension obligations, a future project might consider this mechanism for reducing this liability. Nevertheless, the government should demonstrate a strong commitment toward the public sector reform process to be eligible for this type of support. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: - 22 - Borrower's Assessment 1. Project Objectives as Conceptualized The public Sector Modernization Project was initially designed, as indicated in the Staff Appraisal Report (SAR 1996), to support the Government of Jamaica's (GOJ's) effort to: (i) bring about major improvements in the quality of service provide by selected Public Agencies; (ii) improve the ability of select Ministries to (a) formulate sound sector polices, technical standards and operational norms, (b) effective monitor and evaluate downstream agencies to ensure that desired policy objectives are achieved, and (c) efficiently perform corporate management functions; (iii) continue the rationalization of the Public Sector through (a) private participation in the water supply and sewerage sector and (b) privatization of, or contracting out, other facilities or services where government has no comparative advantage; (iv) improve efficiency, value for money and transparency in government procurement and contracting; (v) enhance Public Sector accountability by strengthening internal and external controls; (vi) improve the quality of financial and personnel management in the Public Sector through Computerized Information Systems; and (vii) prepare the next stage of the modernization process to (a) extend the reforms initiated by the Project in the Pilot Agencies and Capital Ministries to rest of the Public Sector and (b) introduce other systemic improvements in Public Sector management. Regulatory reform was proposed to address, through two other World Bank initiatives: the Regulatory Reform and Private Investment Finance Facility and Financial Sector Review. Support to the Local Government Reform effort was proposed to be provided by the Parish Infrastructure Project that was appraised in May 1996. complementary efforts to strengthen the Ministry of Local Government and Works at the central level, were also included in the Project. 1.1 Project Concept/Design The Project Concept went through significant changes as the Project evolved. Initially, it was proposed to undertake a comprehensive reform of the public service grading and salary structure, with a view to improving compensation levels vis-ŕ-vis market comparators and enabling the GOJ to attract and retain qualified persons. This idea was given up, subsequently, as an across-the-board salary increase for all public servants implied a significant recurrent cost (estimated at about US$30 million per annum for upgrading salaries of posts, with salary mid-point equal to a greater that US$2,000, to 80% of market comparators) without any guarantee that it would lead to an improvement in Public Sector performance. It was also noted that low salaries were not the only cause of poor Public Sector performance. Inadequate autonomy, lack of accountability, outmoded business processes and insufficient physical resources also affected efficiency and effectiveness of public entities. In addition, systemic weaknesses pertaining to procurement, contracting, internal and external control had a public sector-wide negative impact on performance. It was, therefore, decided to adopt a more targeted approach that would create tighter link between inputs and outcomes. The Project was ultimately designed around two parallel approaches. Firstly, was the "entity-specific reform" that would modernize the functioning of individual government institutions; and secondly, "systemic reforms" that would bring about improvement in Public Sector performance as a whole. - 23 - Limitations in absorptive capacities, dictated that instead of attempting to modernize the Public Sector at one go, it would be instructive to adopt a "phased approach". Phase 1, would focus on a small number of high priority entities that would be modernized on a pilot basis. This approach would allow adaptation of the modernization strategy to the Jamaican reality; reduce risks associated with innovation and facilitate the extension of the reform process through the replication of successes. It was also envisaged that the present Project would finance execution of activities related to Phase 1 of the modernization process and the Preparation of Phase II. 1.2 PHASE 1: Modernization of Public Sector Entities: Executive Agencies and Ministries In Phase I, public entities at two levels would be targeted: (a) Agencies providing services to internal and external clients, which would be converted into "Executive Agencies", and (b) central divisions of Government Ministries that are engaged in policy formulation, monitoring, coordination, and corporate management. The modernization process would aim to empower managers of these entities by granting them considerably enhanced autonomy in managerial, financial, personnel and operational management, in return for strict accountability for predetermined Performance Targets. Legal Framework: The legal framework governing financial and personnel management in the GOJ was examined to determine the feasibility of granting increased autonomy to public entities. It was found that, but for a few minor amendments needed in specific Acts pertaining to some of the targeted Agencies, the Constitution, The Financial Administration and Audit Act, and the Civil Service Establishment Act have enough flexibility to enable the government to grant additional autonomy to Executive Agencies through Administrative Orders. It was proposed to use this flexibility to create the Pilot Executive Agencies. 1.3 Executive Agencies Initially Proposed The GOJ selected the following pilot entities for conversion into Executive Agencies. These were chosen on the basis of the important services they perform for the public and for other governmental institutions, and the urgent need to improve the quality of their services. "Entities marked (*) are also amongst the agencies selected as pilot to implement the Citizen's Charter. l Planning Institute of Jamaica (PIOJ: Ministry of Finance and Planning). l Jamaica Customs Department* (CUSTOMS: Ministry of Finance and Planning). l Office of Titles* (Ministry of Environment and Housing). l Town Planning Department* (Ministry of Environment and Housing). l Survey Department (Ministry of Environment and Housing). l Jamaica Information Service (JIS: Office of the Prime Minister). l JAMPRESS (Office of the Prime Minister). l Registrar General's Department* (RGD: Ministry of Health). l Registrar of Companies* (ORC: Ministry of Industry, Investment and Commerce). l Administrator General (AGD: Ministry of National Security and Justice); and l Management Institute for National Development (MIND: Efficiency and Directorate, Office of the Prime Minister). 1.3.1 Appraisal: - 24 - At Appraisal, provision had been made for the selection of two additional entities for conversion to executive agencies in the course of project implementation. During negotiations, it was indicated by GOJ that it had identified Jamaica Promotions Corporation ­ JAMPRO (Ministry of Industry, Information and Commerce) and the Construction Division now the National Works Agency (NWA) (Ministry of Local Government and Works) for this purpose. The British Overseas Development Agency (ODA) now DFID would provide parallel financing of UK Pounds 2.0 million (about US$ 3.0 million) to finance consulting services for four of the above mentioned agencies, namely Registrar General's Department; Registrar of Companies; Administrator General; and Management Institute for National Development. Goods and training for these Agencies, would however, be financed by the Bank and GOJ. The European Union (EU) was also expected to provide parallel grant financing of US$ 3 million for the Planning Institute of Jamaica and the Construction Division of the Ministry of Local Government and Works. 2. PRINCIPAL PERFORMANCE RATINGS: Three Documents To Guide Modernization Process These three (3) documents are: (i) the Modernization Plan which provided a detailed review of the organization, management and business processes; (ii) the Medium-Term Financing Plan which indicated the financing needs of the Agency for a five (5)-year period; and (iii) the Framework Document which is buttressed on (i) and (ii) and which defines; - the Mission and Objectives of the Agency; - establishes the Agency's rights and obligations; - specific outputs and required resources; - the extent and nature of related autonomy granted to Management; - Performance Indicators and methods of Performance Measurement; - Evaluation to be used; as well as - rewards and sanctions. The Framework Document constitutes the Basic Contract between the Government and the Agency and must be duly signed by the Permanent Secretary on behalf of the Ministry; and the Chief Executive Officer of the Agency. It is within this context that this assessment is written; meaning that the assessment of the Project is buttressed on the degree to which the Project has achieved the objectives and outputs as defined in Sections 1 and 2 above. 2.1 BORROWER'S EVALUATION - ACHIEVEMENT OF DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES Under the Constitution, Executive Agencies (EAs) could be created administratively and Delegations of A uthority for Human Resources, Information Technology and Financial Management could be granted to Executive Agencies' Chief Executive Officers. However, the Government decided to put in place legislation ­ through the Executive Agencies Act that became law in March 2002, to provide a stable basis for Executive Agencies and to reinforce its primary purpose in proceeding with this model ­ i.e., that they should be based on a performance regime. In its early formative stages, the Public Sector Modernization Project convened several working groups with key stakeholder membership to work through the logic and the logistics of the proposed reforms, covering the areas of Organizational, Legislative, Human Resources and Financial Management. The Public Sector Modernization Project also worked with the Ministry of Finance and Planning (MOFP) to develop the original Financial Instructions for Executive Agencies. Consultants were hired to finalize the development of the Executive Agencies Act and the Executive - 25 - Agencies Pension Scheme. 2.2 Outcomes of The PSMP's Reform While still constitutionally Departments of Government, the Executive Agencies Act has now given Executive Agencies a clear performance mandate. The first four Agencies were: The Registrar General's Department (RGD); Administrator General's Department (AGD); Office of the Registrar of Companies (ORC); and the Management Institute for National Development (MIND). The second four, established on April 2001 were the Jamaica Information Service, the National Environment and Planning Agency; The National Land Agency and the National Works Agency. In addition, Customs and JAMPRO were modernized along the lines of Executive Agencies and the Ministries of Land & Environment and Transport and Works were also selected to be modernized as Policy Ministries. All the Agencies were required to sign the Corporate Framework Documents, which describe the performance and accountability requirements for each Executive Agency; and the individual Performance Agreements, describing the individual relationship between the Minister and Chief Executive Officer. Executive Agencies now work to predetermined targets and maintain records, and are audited in accordance with records of Service Performance, as well as with records of Financial Accounts. Executive Agencies are required to keep their Accounts in accordance with generally accepted accounting practice, which signifies that they must operate Accrual Accounting Systems. By interpretation, all Executive Agencies now maintain complete information, including Financial Information that enables them, in the long run, to manage, value and maintain all their resources and assets. It is the job of each portfolio Ministry to advise the Minister on, and to articulate for him, the outcomes his portfolio needs to achieve in order to contribute to Government's Strategic Policies. It is the job of the portfolio Permanent Secretary in each Ministry to advise the Minister on the outputs or results that each Executive Agency needs to deliver to help bring about those outcomes; to monitor and evaluate the Agency's performance against Plans and to recommend to the Minister, any action he should take, be it corrective action, rewards for excellent performance; or sanctions for non-performance. 2.3 Accountability - The Chief Executive Officers/Executive Agencies The Chief Executive Officers of Executive Agencies are employed on "time limited" Contracts and report to their portfolio Ministers in a relationship that intends to maintain appropriate separations between the different roles of the Minister (policy and portfolio outcomes) and the CEO (outputs ­ that is for service delivery results). The juxtaposition of the CEO's Employment Contract and Performance Agreement with each and with the Framework Document, provides a strong basis for accountability; 2.4 Policy Ministries- Limited Progress Limited progress has been made in the strengthening of Ministries. The Ministry of Transport and Works is now in its implementation stage. This will see it transformed into a modern policy Ministry that should provide a suitable benchmark for the full modernization of Ministries. These then are the modernization outcomes to date. The Executive Agencies (EAs) have all made ­ albeit different ­ efficiency gains. The Audit Component, as far as it was able to go, was successful with the institutional strengthening and more modern approaches in the Ministry of Finance, the Auditor General's Department and the Ministries Internal Audit Units. 2.5 Remuneration within the Executive Agencies - 26 - In the creation of the Executive Agencies, stringent performance standards were imposed on staff. Yet most of the public service is not subject to performance disciplines. Some erstwhile public service rights were removed from the Executive Agencies, for example, by reducing annual leave from 6 to 4 or 3 weeks per annum and by placing some staff on limited term performance based contracts. These are also likely to be "bigger" jobs than exist at comparable levels in the core public service, where staff does not work to a performance mandate. Executive Agencies are still, legally Government departments. They are defined by their service delivery functions, by being legally mandated to perform to predetermined plans and indicators and (in comparison to much of the public service) by being rewarded or sanctioned for success or failure. 2.6 Accrual Accounting The Government has signaled its intention to expand the practice of accrual accounting and to identify the full costs of the activities of the public service. This is necessary to identify true costs and to manage resource flows. In turn, this accounting approach will give the Government necessary information about the relative costs of its high and low priorities. Thus it should be better informed about the impact of financing (or not) particular activities and in deciding where to allocate funds and where not to. Future support will be necessary to improve accounting practices and for managers to know how to price public services appropriately. 2.6.1 Strategic Objectives and Desired Outcomes It will also be necessary to develop the methodologies for identifying the Government's strategic objectives ­ its desired `outcomes' ­ and to use these to define Ministry and Agency outputs along with the full costs of implementing them. Indeed, this discipline of "harmonization" will be necessary to develop and implement `one window' or `one stop shop' approaches to delivering related services where multiple agencies are responsible. A related matter, is that of bringing about some level playing fields' in the operations of the Executive Agencies. It would take the Government's National Industrial Policy into the realm of the public sector. Where public bodies provide services and there are alternative private sector providers, they should be fully competitive and not have reserved for them monopoly privileges such as are afforded by statute or regulation. There is a need to re-examine, and probably change aspects of the regulatory framework. 2.7 EXAMPLE OF FINANCIAL GAINS ­ THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT­ A MODERNIZED ENTITY In terms of Efficiency Gains experienced under the Public Sector Modernization Project, which subject is dealt with in great detail in the ICR one example is referenced in this report, the Customs Department, whose modernization experienced a "very rocky start". Crown Agents is the Consulting Firm that was contracted to develop and implement CASE application (Software). CASE is an online application for Customs Brokers to send entries and get responses via computer. This, along with other Software, allows Customs to clear goods more efficiently and with greater accountability and transparency. The software has won acceptance over time, especially from established Brokers who want its efficiencies. Crown Agents, is an international Public Sector/Business Consultancy that partners with clients to transfer skills, ideas and material Resources for development. Crown Agents developed three Software Modules for Customs clearance. - 27 - The First Module employs Risk Analysis and assigns risk to each entry helping to determine if it should be inspected or not. The Second Module gathers intelligence on what is known about all entries, so that particular patterns can be recognized and fed into the Risk Analysis; while the Third Module captures information about entry values and the history of values so that queries can be submitted to a database for verification. Crown Agents works with many inputs, including Information Technology, to streamline the processes of change in countries around the world. CUSTOMS: Financial Gains Realized in One (1) Year In 2001 alone, the Customs Department Revenue was $25 Billion; more than double the 12 Billion it collected in 1998 and all this with fewer requests by Brokers for Customs overtime; and a simplification of procedures. The CASE system also got another boost, following an Agreement between the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Nova Scotia. This Agreement sets up a Facility for importers to use credit cards for payments to Customs online. The success of the system has enabled Customs to make good use of its multiple skills in Software Development and Implementation, Software maintenance, Implementation Facilitation, Systems Infrastructural Development, Computer Operations, Database Management and Client Training. 2.8 LESSONS LEARNED At the Staff Appraisal Report Level legislative issues should always be subject to critical review by the Borrower, even when systems appear to be in place. The Mergers of Statutory Bodies, Change Management in respect to the transfer of Civil Servants together with their respective pensions, presented problems, notwithstanding the legislative systems. It is now recognized that in the long-term, it would be preferable to design and enact a self-contained legal framework, specifically for Executive Agencies, that would put the autonomy granted to them on a much firmer footing thereby reducing the risk of it being drawn in the future through administrative fiat. Apart from the expected differences in the data statements, reports presented at the Stakeholders' Conference highlighted three common themes: I. That the modernization approach is essentially concerned with securing culture change and enhancing overall capacity in the public sector. II. That the experience to date reflects a holistic approach, but with synergistic incompleteness; and III. That certain `principles' should continue to underpin the modernization effort. THEME # 1: Lesson 1 Administrative Culture is Difficult to Change Culture change is a long-term historical process. Minimum change tendencies are usually evident in qualitative transformations in institutional behavior and performance; growth of strong inter and intra-agency synergies; the extend to positive feedback from stakeholders; evidence of a `reform ethos' embodied in popular language, new social demands and the expression of generalized taken-for-granted expectations of standards of public sector excellence. - 28 - THEME # 2: Lesson 2 Commitment to `Synergistic Convergence' at the Macro Level Conference agreed that the critical conceptual building blocks might include alignment-congruence-complementarity of ideas, tools, techniques, methods, and action strategies across the modernization arena, but that in the process `one size does not necessarily fit all'. Mutual learning and lesson drawing (from best practices here and elsewhere) are central approaches to building synergies. Strategizing for problem solving and sustainability also define the search for synergies. The ultimate `test of effective synergistic strategizing is the cultivation of credible, transformative leadership and a culture of implementation. THEME # 3: Lesson 3 Eight Active `Principles'/ `Lessons' in `Operationalizing' the Modernization Agenda (i) Modernization is concerned with bringing about structural, relational-behavioural change, which requires all-round commitments, mission-driven, goal-directed and outcome-focused approaches. (ii) In short, a coherent vision must drive the process. (iii) There are benefits to be secured by taking a holistic approach to the modernization process. The joined-up-government/joined-up-governance approaches are central to that strategy. (iv) However, such approaches always require careful lesson drawing, often proceeding via manageable bite-size engagement. (v) It is worthwhile to recognize the modernization process as being a continuous enterprise, involving reforming the already reformed, requiring mix of short and long-tern outcomes, the successful ones to be celebrated on a timely basis. (vi) Public Sector Modernization endeavors are always risky. Risky, partly because they often disturb the accustomed comfortable state of affairs; they excite opposition; they engender insecurities and the like. They are risky, partly because they are perceived to create `winners' and `losers. They are risky partly also because reform successes are reversible. All these considerations suggest that incentives should be used as a key instrument in the process. (vii) An inescapable challenge facing PSMP actors involves managing `transitional situations'. A peculiarity of such situations is that the change initiatives usually coexist with old/pre-existing arrangements, thereby creating tensions, conflicts, contradictions. These conditions must be interpreted as catalysts for further change, but must also be sensitively managed. Such tasks require a reservoir of management skills, especially credible leadership. (viii) A concern with the public interest is a fundamental lesson of PSMP. This concern necessarily embraces standards of excellence in service provision and delivery; emphasis on public/stakeholder education, as well as affording opportunities for the exercise of voice, participation, accountability and sound communication between reform principals and the citizenry. A balance must be struck between investment and diagnosis and implementation. Experience here cautions against over-investment in the diagnostic at the expense of concerns with implementation and evaluation. Local experience also cautions - 29 - about the risks of over-concentrating on the `profit motive' within the context of `agencification.' (ix) Finally, careful documentation of the reform/modernization experience should be a first principle. The documentation would be useless unless it is read and internalized; shared/disseminated and made to inform action; as well as be reinforced by sates-of-the-art research by the public sector and it specialist partner organizations. 3. EVALUATION OF THE PERFORMANCE OF THE BANK and CO- FINANCIERS 3.1 Appraisal Stage As early as the development of the Staff Appraisal Report and through to the final scooping of the Project, the World Bank demonstrated a very high level of commitment to and support of this development thrust of the Government of Jamaica. The Project Monitoring and review tools used, especially during the formative months of the Project were particularly helpful in guiding the modernization process. This was particularly noticeable especially in terms of the deliberations relating to the actual concept of modernization, during the formative stages of the Project. In addition, the support given by the Bank to Cabinet and the relevant Ministries and Agencies in the actual translation of the technical aspects of the modernization concept and in the interpretation of the approaches to be used in modernizing the public sector was simultaneously timely and extremely and instructive. 3.2 Understanding and Interpreting the Banks Guidelines - Procurement and Accounting This was not always easy. Sometimes our distinctive "mother tongue' was used to both our mutual advantage. However, no problem was circumvented. Most importantly, the Task Manager could always be reached, always remained in touch; always sought to obtain a clear understanding of the issues and frequently went beyond the call of duty to secure the appropriate resolution; which sometimes was not very easy to accommodate. The Supervision Missions were well timed, mutually programmed and served to keep the Bank and the Borrower in line. The individual Supervisors in the Financial, Accounting, Procurement, Contracts, Audit and Operations Units gave the Implementation Unit every support. The only area that sometimes created concern was the tardiness experienced sometimes in communicating changes in long established guidelines. 3.3 Project / Programme Monitoring of Key Indicators and Revision of Major Components Programme monitoring in respect to the actual implementation of the Project was always treated with the priority dictated, hence Quarterly and Annual Reports proved very effective tools. The Bank's Procurement Guidelines do not offer a ready alternative to `Shopping Procedures', especially in terms of the financial requirements for Local Suppliers of Goods. This mitigated against that which could have otherwise been good business opportunities for nationals. 3.4 Co - Financiers and Evolution Partners - DFID and The European Union The support received from both the Department for International Development (DFID) and the European Union (EU) in terms of Grant Funds and Programme Monitoring was timely and extremely beneficial. The support in the establishment of the first four Executive Agencies was excellent and established standards which were very difficult to replicate. However, there could have been a more coordinated approach to the deployment of the resources. - 30 - 3.5 CIDA and the USAID Co - Financiers - Grants Land and Environment Sector The support received from these two Agencies was timely and was dedicated to areas which were of a very high priority. The assistance received in this area was geared to ensuring the sustainability of critical components of the wider modernization/environmental thrust. (b) Cofinanciers: N/A (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): N/A 10. Additional Information - 31 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate Output Indicators: 1 Indicator/Matrix Projected in last PSR Actual/Latest Estimate AGD # of new investigations taken on 168 168 # of enquiry backlog cases closed 1560 1560 Avg. time cases to be ready for 38.5 38.5 Administration (weeks) # of grants of Administration 93 93 Avg. time of Letter of Administration Granted, 73.1 73.1 Supreme Court (weeks) Avg. time of Letter of Administration Granted, 76.9 76.9 R.M. Court (weeks) Avg. time taken per estate for assets to be 39 39 collected from date of grant Administration, Cash Assets (weeks) Avg. time taken per estate for assets to be 4 4 collected from date of grant Aministration, Reality (weeks) Avg. time taken to collect fatal accident "out 199.6 199.6 of court" settlement (weeks) Avg. time taken to collect fatal accident court 156 156 judgment (weeks) # of fatal accidents proceeds collected 11 11 # of estates in administration (current) 2,640 2,640 # of estates in administration (backlog) 7,575 7,575 Avg. tiem for final distribution from date of 79.8 79.8 legal entitlement, Cash Assets (weeks) Avg. tiem for final distribution from date of 106.8 106.8 legal entitlement, Reality (weeks) Avg. tiem to close an estate (years) 11 11 # of estates closed (current) 86 86 # of estated closed (backlog) 287 287 JIS Radio News stories 330 330 Features 191 191 Statements 7 7 Jamaica Magazine Programs 66 66 News Programs 0 0 Television News stories 200 200 Features 80 80 Statements 4 4 Jamaica Magazine Programs 91 91 News Programs 1 1 Editorial News stories 183 183 - 32 - Features 27 27 Captioned Photographs 760 760 Regional Services Dept. News realeases 174 174 Radio stories 88 88 Community Meetings 90 90 TV Features 77 77 Overseas News Departments. 57 57 MIND # of Courses 164 164 Course Hours 7,416 7,416 # of Trainees not including customized 1,552 1,552 courses # of Trainees including customized courses 2,987 2,987 NEPA % Processing of all planning applications 78% 78% within 90 days % Processing of all subdivisions within 90 25% 25% days % of letters to NEPA acknowledge within 5 80% 80% days # of planning applications processed 390 390 # of subdivision applications processed 825 825 # of enquiry applications processed 65 65 # of environmental permits applications 101 101 processed # of environmental license applications 8 8 processed # of beach license applications processed 19 19 # of restrictive covenants processed N/A N/A # of transfer/lease/sale of agricultural lands 23 23 # of CITES applications processed 55 55 # of exemptions under Wildlife Protection Act 2 2 # of research applications processed NLA 15 15 Days to process transactions (e.g. transfer, mortgages) 17 17 # of endorsements % of search certificates processed within 2 23,775 23,775 days 81% 81% Days to process titles with plans Days to process titles w/o plans 35 35 Days to process suervey plans pre-checked 25 25 # of Titles Issues 35 35 Days to process plas prepared for annexing 4,289 4,289 Certificates of Title 3 3 # of Certificates of Titles prepared New Parcels Added 1,342 1,342 Cases Completed 1,230 1,230 NWA 9,711 9,711 # of Km of road maintained under Routine Maintenance Program 5000 5000 # of Km of road maintained under Periodic Maintenance Program 13 13 Area patched under Major Patching Program (sq. meters) 467,748 467,748 Response time to disaster situations (hour) Flood Damage Walls & slope stabilization 24 24 and drainage designs 50 50 # of bridges inspected # of hydraulic investigations 126 126 # of topographic surveys adn alignment 17 17 control 42 42 # of subdivision drainage # of quarries inspected 30 30 ORC 40 40 Customer Services Certified Copies of Documents Uncertified Copies of Company Documents 30,786 30,786 - 33 - Business Registration 11,556 11,556 Business Names Registration New Local Companies 2,891 2,891 Expedited New Companies 1,106 1,106 Annual Returns 625 625 Change of Directors 10,492 10,492 Registered Office Notice 1,271 1,271 Charges Certified 1,360 1,360 Business Names Renewals 489 489 Incoming Documents Converted 487 487 Information Technology N/A N/A Residual Conversion of Co. Files Conversion of Correspondence Files 3,047 3,047 New Incoming Documents 2,095 2,095 Cleansing of Computerized Files 26,067 26,067 RGD 2,074 2,074 Vital Events Registered # of Applications Paid 24,073 24,073 # of Days to Prepare Vital Statistics 61,247 61,247 IRO Bills of Sales Backlog Cleared <90 <90 complete complete 1End of project Last PSR reflects actual indicators. - 34 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Estimate Estimate Appraisal Component US$ million US$ million 1. Modernization of Public Sector Entities 32.53 24.18 0.7433 2. Privatization 7.00 0.01 0.0014 3. Procurement, Contracting Internal & Auditing 2.00 0.96 0.48 4. Management Information Systems 7.30 3.10 0.425 5. Project Implementation, Communication Campaign, and 3.00 4.80 1.6 Development of Stage II Total Baseline Cost 51.83 33.05 Physical Contingencies 2.59 Price Contingencies 2.49 Total Project Costs 56.91 33.05 Total Financing Required 56.91 33.05 Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Appraisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.03 8.03 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 10.56 0.00 1.50 6.33 18.39 (10.56) (0.00) (1.50) (0.00) (12.06) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 14.31 12.06 26.37 (0.00) (0.00) (14.31) (0.00) (14.31) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 2.03 2.06 4.09 (0.00) (0.00) (2.03) (0.00) (2.03) 5. Information Campaign 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 6. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 10.56 0.00 17.84 28.48 56.88 (10.56) (0.00) (17.84) (0.00) (28.40) Project Costs by Procurement Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) 1 Procurement Method Expenditure Category ICB NCB 2 N.B.F. Total Cost Other 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 9.76 0.00 0.00 2.54 12.30 (9.76) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (9.76) - 35 - 3. Services 0.00 0.00 16.62 1.83 18.45 (0.00) (0.00) (16.62) (0.00) (16.62) 4. Training 0.00 0.00 0.54 0.35 0.89 (0.00) (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.54) 5. Information Campaign 0.00 0.00 0.20 0.23 0.43 (0.00) (0.00) (0.20) (0.00) (0.20) 6. Operating Costs 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.97 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) Total 9.76 0.00 17.36 5.92 33.04 (9.76) (0.00) (17.36) (0.00) (27.12) 1/Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the Bank Loan. All costs include contingencies. 2/Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Percentage of Appraisal Component Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. Bank Govt. CoF. 1. Modernization of Public 20.50 21.20 3.00 18.83 2.18 3.00 91.9 10.3 100.0 Sector Entities 2. Privatization 3. Procurement, 1.50 0.50 0.00 0.83 0.75 55.3 150.0 0.0 Contracting Internal & Auditing 4. Management 5.90 1.40 0.00 3.01 0.86 51.0 61.4 0.0 Information Systems 5. Project Implementation, 0.50 2.50 0.00 4.45 2.13 890.0 85.2 0.0 Communication Campaign, and Development of Stage II - 36 - Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits N/A - 37 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation 6/03/1993 2 CONSULTANT; HR CONSULTANT 8/23/1993 3 TASK MANAGER; ESP; CONSULTANT 8/30/1993 4 CONSULTANT; PUBLIC SECTOR MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST; IT SPECIALIST; HR CONSULTANT 11/01/1993 4 TASK MANAGER; CONSULTANT, 1/24/1994 1 HR CONSULTANT 2/13/1994 6 TASK MANAGER (LATPS); HR CONSULTANT; OPERATIONAL ANALYST; FINANCIAL MNGMNT SPECIALIST; IT SPECIALIST; CONSULTANT Appraisal/Negotiation 6/19/1995 2 TASK MANAGER; FINANCIAL MNGMNT SPECIALIST 7/24/1995 5 TASK MANAGER; FINANCIAL SPECIALIST; PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST; FIN. MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST; CONSULTANT 10/05/1995 3 TASK MANAGER; PROGRAM OFFICER; FIN. MNGMT. SPECIALIST. Supervision 04/09/1997 3 TRAINING SPECIALIST (1); S S TASK MANAGER (1); CONSULTANT (1) 11/22/1997 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S CONSULTANT (1) 05/28/1998 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S CONSULTANT (1) 12/10/1999 2 OPERATIONS ANALYST (1); S S TASK MANAGER (1) 06/23/2000 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S OPERATIONS ANALYST (1) 04/12/2001 2 TASK MANAGER (1); S S OPERATIONS ANALYST (1) - 38 - 04/12/2002 3 TASK MANAGER (1); S S OPERATIONS ANALYST (1); FORMER TASK MGR (1) 04/12/2002 2 OPERATIONS ANALYST (1); S S TASK MANAGER (1) 05/23/2003 3 TASK MANAGER (1); S S OPERATIONS ANALYST (1); FIN MGMT SPECIALIST (1) ICR 5/11/2003 2 FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT SPECIALIST; PROCUREMENT SPECIALIST 3/11/2003 1 FINANCIAL SPECIALIST (b) Staff: Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ ('000) Identification/Preparation 182.50 225.30 Appraisal/Negotiation 33.10 47.60 Supervision 56.6 485.4 ICR 4.68 22.57 Total 379.04 675.35 - 39 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating Macro policies H SU M N NA Sector Policies H SU M N NA Physical H SU M N NA Financial H SU M N NA Institutional Development H SU M N NA Environmental H SU M N NA Social Poverty Reduction H SU M N NA Gender H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA Private sector development H SU M N NA Public sector management H SU M N NA Other (Please specify) H SU M N NA - 40 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating Lending HS S U HU Supervision HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU 6.2 Borrower performance Rating Preparation HS S U HU Government implementation performance HS S U HU Implementation agency performance HS S U HU Overall HS S U HU - 41 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents The Administrator-General's Office, "Third Quarterly Performance Report Financial Year 2002-2003", The Administrator-General's Office, 2002. The Cabinet Office, Government at your Service: Public Sector Modernisation Vision and Strategy 2002-2012, Ministry Paper #56, The Cabinet Office, Kingston, Jamaica, September 2002. The Government of Jamaica, Executive Agencies Act, 2002, the Government of Jamaica, Kingston, Jamaica, 2002. Jamaica Information Service, "Refining Goals and Objectives, Third Quarter Report, October to December 2002," Jamaica Information Service, Kingston, Jamaica 2002. Management Institute for National Development, "Executive Agency Performance Report April to December 2002," Management Institute for National Development, 2002. National Environment & Planning Agency, "Third Quarterly Performance Report Financial Year 2002-2003", National Environment & Planning Agency, 2002. National Environment & Planning Agency, "Second Quarterly Performance Report Financial Year 2002-2003", National Environment & Planning Agency, 2002. National Land Agency, "Quarterly Report October to December 2002", National Land Agency, 2002. National Works Agency, "Performance Review" National Works Agency, 2003. Office of the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Land & Environment, Final Modernization Plan for the Ministry of Land and Environment, Ministry of Land & Environment, April 2002. Office of the Registrar of Companies, "Third Quarter Report 1st October 2002 to 31st December, 2002", Office of the Registrar of Companies, 2002. Office of the Registrar of Companies, "Framework Document Public Sector Modernisation Programme, Office of the Registrar of Companies, July 10th 1998. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Action Plan by Components for the Project Management Unit of the Public Sector Modernization Project, July 1st ,2002 to June 30th, 2003" PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Achievements and Impact Under the Modernization of 4 Government Agencies & Departments: Customs Department, National Environment & Planning Agency, National Land Agency, and the National Works Agency" PSMP Project Management Unit. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Third Quarter Reports for the Jamaica Information Service (JIS), National Environment and Planning Agency (NEPA) and the National Land Agency, October to December 2002", PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, First Quarter (April to June 2002), Second Quarter (July to September - 42 - 2002) and Third Quarter (October to December 2002) Report for the Jamaica Information Service, National Environment & Planning Agency and National Land Agency," PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, First Quarter (April to June 2002), Second Quarter (July to September 2002) and Third Quarter (October to December 2002) Report for the Administrator General's Department, Management Institute for National Development, Office of the Registrar of Companies, and the Registrar General's Department," PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "First and Second Quarter Report FY2002-2003, The Public Sector Modernization Project, April 2002 to September 2002," PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "First and Second Quarter Report FY2002-2003, The Public Sector Modernization Project, April 2002 to September 2002" PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Second Quarter Report FY2002-2003, The Public Sector Modernization Project, July 2002 to September 2002" PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "First and Second Quarterly Performance Reports for the Administrator General's Department (AGD) & Management Institute for National Development (MIND) Fiscal Year 2002-2003, April to September 2002" PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Second and Third Quarterly Performance Reports for the National Environment & Planning Agency, National Land Agency, and the Jamaica Information Service, Financial Year 2002-2003, April to September 2002" PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, The Before and After in the Executive Agencies and Modernized Entities , the Public Sector Modernization Project PSMP/OPM, February 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, "Last Quarter Report FY2001-2002, The Public Sector Modernization Project, January 2002 to March 2002," PSMP Project Management Unit, 2002. PSMP Project Management Unit, Review of the Public Sector Modernization Project April 1 to September 30, 2001, The Public Sector Modernization Project, November 2001. PSMP Project Management Unit, Annual Report 2001, The Public Sector Modernization Project, 2001. The World Bank, "Country Assistance Strategy Progress Report of the World Bank Group for Jamaica, September 18, 2002" The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 2002. The World Bank, "Implementation Completion Report on a Loan in the Amount of US$75.0 million to Jamaica for an Emergency Economic Rehabilitation Loan, December 19, 2002". The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 2002. The World Bank, "Country Assistance Strategy of the World Bank Group for Jamaica, November 2, 2000" The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 2000. The World Bank, "Staff Appraisal Report, Jamaica Public Sector Modernization Project, July 29, 1996" The World Bank, Washington, D.C, 1996. - 43 - - 44 -