79052 v2 DIVISION OF THE HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES CALIFORNIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOlOGY PASADENA, CALIFORNIA 91125 A CONVERSATION WITH ANDREW KAMARCK, II NEW YORK CITY November 2, 1985 © Robert W. Oliver . --~<:~·.:;·"> .· ·,. · .·'}f!(j,"{\ ~r,1\1UT£ OF . . 'V.'-:::"~ \ ~ 'll ... ,..., \ J~ 'If.;; ) , -~v- Go: ~ ~ ~o/ ~ <:: - 0 ~ ~ i -:;.~ .# i 't SlfALL lA".,_\. CONVERSATIONS ABOUT GEORGE WOODS AND THE WORLD BANK 2 A OONVER.SATION WITH ANDREW KAMARQC. II were knowledgeable both inside and outside of the government. In the New York City case of Australia. for esample. there were about ten people outside of Noveaber 2. 1985 the governaent whose judgement as to what was going on in the country I Robert W. Oliver valued -- as a aatter of fact. the Australian government valued. You could sit down with those people. and it was possible aost of the time to CLIVER: Let m.e begin the second of our taped conversations by asking reach agreement on what the probleas of the country were -- problems you to comaent in general upon the probleas of an outside organization. that were holding up development. that something ought to be done whether it be the Bank or the Fund or any other international about. It was usually possible also below the political level. and organization. trying in detail to suggest proper fiscal and monetary soaetimes even at the political level. to agree as to what was feasible policies for ita member goverttments. that could be done within a certain period of time if they were given KAMARCIC: Well. first of all. it depends a great deal on wbOID you are help. dealing with. In the early years of the Bank's history (maybe this is You would sit down with. say. the Secretary of Treasury in the explanation for the change in the way the Bank did things) when we Australia (the Secretary of Treasury is a top civil servant). and you'd were dealing with countries like Finland. Iceland. Norway. Italy. agree with him as to what it is that should be done in the next period. Australia. New Zealand and Greece. you had a quite different situation There might be some things that you would disagree with. (In fact. we frOil what you have when you are dealing with a country like Mali today had a basic. fundaaental agreement with the Secretary. but a continuing or Ethiopia or SOD&lia. the difference being that there you bad an disagreement about one particular aspect of policy.) On most things you administration: you not only had able people at the top (in less could reach agreement as to what needed to be done. Then. you would developed countries you may have very able people at the top). but they say. ·~ell what are the obstaclesM1 bad somebody below them: they bad a middle management; they bad skilled One of the things we used to do before we left the country was to people in the agencies. so that it was possible for them to have a have a final chat with the Prime Minister and the Minister of Finance policy. or the Secretary of the Treasury. We had found what we were going to In those early years. what one did very frequently. (certainly in report back to the Bank and where we thought Australia was going and the countries I was working with at that time) was that when we were the sort of things we thought Australia ought to do: and then we'd say. there on a mission. we would sit down with the people. and the people ·~e would like to recommend to the Bank that we lend for this. or that. 3 4 bu~. in order to be able to persuade the Bank and our Board, we have to series of issues. Very often reaching an agreement isn't worth a great be able. to tell them what you're going to do. We're not putting any deal. conditions on tbia, but what .!!! you going to do'l" Meanwhile, of What the Bank people in the field found as time went on (this course. their civil servants had inforaed thea what the thinking of the probably affected me unconsciously and affected the economic advisors Bank was and what the Bank would like to bear: and they were going to in the different departments) was that if we were to get anything try to come up with something feasible they could do with the help of accomplished. what we ought to do was to work sector by sector. An the Bank or could blame the Bank for. That's the case of a governaent outstanding example that I did not work on but which you would get from in a country where you h.ve an able, functioning administration which Bernie Bell is what we were trying to do in India. A lot of the works. success in India came about that way. just working sector by sector. When it comes to many of the countries in Africa, you don't Look at agriculture: O.K •• in agriculture there is a certain amount of really have an adai.niatration. You may have a ve:ry able guy who is an irrigation that needed to be done. O.K., these are the irrigation administrator; you aay have a very able civil servant, but he doesn't projects we are trying to finance. You ought to have this policy for have anybody below him.. Sometimes he cannot get his papers typed, very tube wells. and so on. A whole series of concrete things, where the often the telephones don 1 t work. he can't get his information to the Bank resources or other resources could come in where you could get on field. Sa.etilles he doesn't know what's out there. I remeaber in top of this sector. Then look at another key sector. In a sense, you Uganda when the ainistry of agriculture said there were half-a-million could get much more progress that way than by sitting down with the acres under cotton. and the statistical officer said there were a central administration and reaching broad agreements about the macro million-and-a-half acres under cotton. The figures were coapletely economy which they couldn't implement any way and which were usually irreconcilable, and cotton was one of Uganda's major exports. You based on information that was useless in any case. What I think I am needed to have some idea of what was happening there. saying, although this is probably outside your book. is that I have a In those countries, even if you sit down with the minister on feeling that an awful lot of so-called Structural Adjustment Loans some kind of macro economics, it is aore than just the question of what nowadays are just fakes. Basically, what they are is an excuse. a way they are going to do with fiscal and aonetary policy. Sometimes it's of giving a lot of resources to a country in a hurry. pricing policy. Sometimes it is How are you are going to build a road OLIVER: Ia there anything else we need to say about the Supplementary or the amount you are going to give for investment. There are a whole Finance Proposal of the '60s? 5 6 KAMARCK.: Yes. conclusion that came out. Then the question came, Would governments OLIVER: Why did this not catch on in the Bank aore than it did? put up additional resources? We said. -No.u and that killed it. It KAMARCK: First of all. there was this aajor problem that I have been didn t get killed actually until McNamara came into the Bank. 1 After talking about. What is the most effective way of operating in these McNamara was in the Bank. however. this became more and more clear. countriea1 It never was posed the way I just put it. at least not to OLIVER: There was trouble enough in the late sixties siaply getting 'IllY knowledge. I think I senaed this. but I never put it into words countries to agree to an IDA replenishment as large as George Woods and before. I never heard anybody else put it into words. others had hoped for without worrying about whether or not additional OLIVER: 1 1 • slad we got it into words today. funds beyond that could be made available for suppleaentary finance. KAMAR.ac:: But I think that there was also this era of confrontation. That must have entered into it. Let us again come back • • • The top people in the Bank were not going to support anything that was KAMARCK: Incidentally. you might also add to this, the Fund was on the labeled a Priedaan project. Irving Friedman aade a very bad tactical side lines. sniping all the time. error in that be wanted it very clear that if this thing went through. OLIVER: Yes. I heard a marvelous story of a conversation between Frank it would be regarded as his success and only E!! success. The result Southard and Irving Friedman. in which Frank Southard was strongly was that there was nobody else in the Bank willing to carry the ball on criticizing Friedaan for trying to get the Bank to take over what it or give it much support. He bad no support froa other people in the traditionally had been Fund territory, and Friedman replying that he staff whatsoever. and, to soae extent, this fed out to the governments. thought there was roam for both of them since. in this era of scarce I have forgotten exactly where this was discussed, in what forum. funds for total development, there was need for more funds on both OLIVER: It started in UNCrAD. sides. IWIARCK: Yes, well it aay have COlle out of UNClAD, but it was being IWIARCK: One of the important aspects of the papers on supplementary discussed at a cODDittee of DAC in Paris, and the conclusion that came finance was to try to define the role of supplementary finance in such out basically was that there is no point in going ahead with s way that it would clearly not be Fund business. It could be done and supplementary finance. except if there would be additional resources actually was done, but. still as far as the Fund was concerned, that available; if suppleaentary finance meant a diversion of the resources wasn't enough. I will make a gratuitous remark here. One of the that were already available for helping the developing countries, then problems in the Bank's dealing with the Fund is that the Fund has got a it wasn't worth setting up a new mechanism. This was more or less the certain inferiority complex. Strangely enough it does. It copies the 7 8 Bank. When the Bank set up the Economic Development Institute, the about the •coamodity problea" and the Bank was doing quite a lot of proposal was actually that the Fund should participate in it, but the work on it. the Fund was scared to death that the Bank was going to get Pund set up its own Institute. In the Economics Departaent. we wanted into this field. so they rushed in quickly to provide finance. They to start a progr. . of publication with the lund. I had good relations made it clear that they would be willing to help finance commodity with the Pund because I bad a lot of old-tiae friends there with whoa I stabilization schemes. So supplementary finance may not have come to could talk quite freely u to what we were trying to do. The Fund caae fruition in the Bank. but it certainly helped the LDC 1 s through the back with a proposal that their~ Papers become a jointly funded Fund. Bank-Pund !!!!!. Papers. I said sure, P d be glad to do that. The OLIVER: Yes. but as a final footnote to all of this: the proposals of editor of the Fund~ Papers. Keith Horsefield, thought it vas a the United States Treasury Department at the Annual Meetings of the aaart idea. I thought it was a saart idea. Here you bad a publication Bank and the Fund only two weeks ago nOll suggest that we are going to going. you bad an able editor that I trusted and that we could work bring private banks into the whole scheme and add to the financing with. It would ll8ke a hell of a lot of sense to just join in. So be requirements of the World Bank. at least. if not of the International caae up with this proposal. I agreed with it. He pushed it up in the Monetary Fund. NOll put at the door of the Bank is the general staff in the Fund. and aanageaent said. •In no circumstances.• So we administration of. in effect. compensatory finance to help deal with started our 011n Occasional Paper Series. The Fund got its 011n probleas of over borrowing. So. in a way. we have come full circle it occasional paper series. quite a few years later. but still. • It seems to ae. bas been this way all along. It 1 s remarkable. and I think the KAMARCK: Well. I'm glad the u. S. Treasury is finally trying to do Supplementary Finance Proposal bad a great deal to do with loosening up something. but my feeling is that they haven't thought this thing funds and with the Fund 1 s caaing up with the so called Caaple.entary through -- asking the commercial banks to provide $20 billion of Financing Scheme. additional loans to these countries. Supposing the commercial banks go OLIVER: Compensatory financing'l ahead and do provide $20 billion. and you are a banker. You already KAKARQC.: Coapensatory, or is it • • • 1 think yourself overlent in these countries. but the u. S. Treasury asks OLIVER: There is a Compensatory Financing Scheme. There may be a you to lend more. So you lend. let's say. $3 or 4 billion more to complementary one also. Argentina. and then next year Argentina defaults. At that point. what KAMARa<: I may have the tera wrong. Later on. when people got worried is the responsibility of the U. S. Treasury? Is the U. S. Treasury 9 10 going to bail out the bank, or are the stockholders of the bank longer there. He committed suicide -- not because he got the papers. supposed to go down the tubes because U. S. Treasury asked them to do OLIVER: Was he the Archivist1 it? Clearly they haven't begun to think through what they are doing. KAHARCK: No. he wasn't. but he was in the files. There was no I'm glad they are trying to do ac.ething. bu't I don't think they have Archivist at that time. All we had was operation files and research thought through what they are doing. files. It probably would have been in the research files. I sent them OLIVER: This take us a bit afield. but I suppose the Federal Resene a note and said. This is a selection of the history of the Economics System would become involved at that point too. Let us come back to Department. Do you want them1 or Should I keep them1 or something where we were a half an hour ago when you were about to become Cbai%m&n like that. and he said. he wanted them. So there is a selection. about of the Econaaica Department of the World Bank. a foot of papers I guess. KAMAR.CK.: Director. OLIVER: I will look for them next week. OLIVER: Director, ezcuae me. Let me ask the circumstances of your KAHARCK: All the key documents at that time. There probably is being invited to be Director, what things you hoped to accomplish. and another copy. not of all the papers, but of that memorandum. at the what things you feel were accoaplished during that period. Is that too University of Wyoming. much all at once1 OLIVER: How would it get there? KAKARCK: The question is, I'• trying to remember. I was in Loa KAHARCK: The librarian of the University of Wyoming. about 10 - 12 Angeles. at UCLA. and Irving called me and then George Woods called me years ago, decided to build a collection of papers of people who had and asked me if I would take the job. I agreed I would. When I got been involved in international finance in Washington. He got a number back to the Bank. I aet down in a aeaorandua the things I wanted to of people to turn their papers over. For example, Ralph Young. who had accomplish in the nezt five years. The problem is if I can reaember been the economic advisor to the Federal Reserve Board. did that. He what those were. wrote to ae, and I sent him a batch of my papers at one point. When I OLIVER: Where is the aemorandum.1 left EDI, I sent him another batch of my papers. I don't have any KAMARQC: Actually. there are two places where it is. When I aoved chronological files for the time that I was in the Bank. All of those over to the EDI and while I was at the EDI. I bad a complete selection are in Wyoming. I can give you the address. of papers made on the history of the Economics Department in the years bOLIVER: Well, from your memory. what can you say about these subjects? I was Director. I sent them to the files, to Harold Dyer. He is no KAHARCK: This is going to be difficult. Let me think. 11 12 OLIVER: As you are thinking. let me ask a general question. Did you this guy's naae? He had been in the Bank and OECD. Phil and Irving work closely together so that you and he would be planning OLIVER: Let's leave it blank in the tape. and we'll put it in later. the work of the Economics Departaent. or was he off doing his thing KAHARCK: We did not go through all of this aodel- building. about suppleaentary finance while you were running the Economics gap-estimating exercise. The way we did it in the Bank was. we asked Department. the area people. the people who knew the countries. the people who knew ICAMARQ(: The way i't worked was: Irving spent a lot of time with the projects. to come up with an estimate for each of their countries Woods and on the issues of the President's council. He had things that of what could be done in the country if the money was available. How be wished to push. like auppleaentary finance. He had other things. much more could the countries absorb? Forgetting about the CLIVER: He bad lots of responsibilities dealing with IDA repleniahaent creditworthiness limitation. just on the basis of if money were too. for ezaaple. available. how much could each country use. That is how we came up KAHARCK: He got involved in IDA replenishment off and on. He did get with the estimate. It was a judgment estimate. It didn't have a neat involved with this study which vas a very Ulportant study. but never model showing you that assumed this rate of saving. this rate of properly finished. It had a aajor iapact. The Bank was terribly investment. this capital-output ratio. and so on. That was criticized. criticized for it, but. at the same time. it really changed people's but actually. as I say. it did succeed. It changed people's thinking. thinking. Tbis was a stu~ which attempted to make an estimate of bow Irving was involved in that. much additional resources the less developed countries could absorb. OLIVER: I take it you were too. OLIVER: This was in order to provide some background for the IDA KAMARCK: I was too. Then Irving bad this peculiar set up with replenishment. Dragoalsv Abramovic for quite a while. Drag had been acting director KAHARCK: For a much larger IDA. Up until that time the official line of this nucleus Economic Department. as I mentioned earlier. I had in the Bank. the U. S. Govern.ent and all the donor countries was that been put in as Director. and Woods liked Drag. so be wanted to protect we were doing as much as the countries could absorb. We were financing Drag from having to work for me. So he gave Drag a separate little all the good projects. This study turned it around and came up with an staff for special projects or something like that. It's complicated as estimate that the less-developed countries could use from $3 to 5 hell. billion more a year. This study was criticized by people like Hollis This gives you an example of how the Bank operates: nobody else Chenery and • • • • (I'm not sure that Hollis actually • • • • ) What's in the Bank wanted to give Drag any staff. particularly the personnel 13 14 people. The adainistration people didn't want to give hi• any staff; we didn't think much of its policies. Algeria had just joined the they did not trust Drag as an administrator. so the set up was one that Bank. If the Bank showed up with a mission of 36 or 40 people. an •DUY was bound to cause a terrific . .aunt of trouble. In essence. they of people. covering every god damn sector. the Algerians were going to said. 11 Drag. you have a staff. but not a permanent staff; the Econcmica have to put in a hell of a lot of work and they were going to expect a Deparcaent will furnish you people.• Well. Econaaica did furnish some aajor lending prograa. My question was. What are we expecting1 What people. but we always bad this problaa: aside from one person. Flora is it we are really planning to do1 White. eveJ:Ybody else that we gave to Drag to work for bia would coae It becaae quite clear that as far as Burke Knapp and John Williams back in a abort period of ti.a coaplaining and wanting to be pulled were concerned. what they wanted was a preliminary reconnaissance to out. Flora White was different. She loved working for Drag. So we find out more about Algeria. to find out just enough to decide whether had this constant problea all this time. In addition. Drag wanted to we were going to be able to work with Algeria in a big way. Are they work on caaaodities. and we had a caaaoditiea division that was working going to be receptive to us1 Get some ideas about whether we were on commodities. so it waa conflict. conflict. conflict all the time. going to have a small lending prograa or a large lending program. What When Drag was given the job of heading a aission to Algeria -- you basically need is two or three people. If you have 40 people. the the first mission. a very sensitive mission. he was in one of his aanic expectations were going to be very high. and we were going to phases. and. before he got through. he had a mission of about 30 disappoint their ezpectations. The result would be that they would people. Host of the were non-bank people. He bad UNcrAD. PAO. and say. MThe bell with the Banko we can't work with the Bank. •• Everyone UNDP people. I got worried about this. Basically. it was none of my clearly understood. With this army. what we ezpected to happen did business. but I knew sooner or later it would be dwaped in 111 lap. All happen. It came back with a voluminous report. I'm not sure whether these things periodically would be. So I arranged a aeeting with John they finished it or dumped it on us to finish. The Algerians were as Williaas. John wasn•t the head of the Africa Department. be was the mad as hell because we didn't do any lending in Algeria. because we deputy director. but for some reason. John William's job was sitting on didn't like their economic policies and they weren't about to change top of Drag. I arranged for a 11.eeting between John Williams. Drag. their economic policies. It was just a mess. Burke Knapp and myself. Basically what I wanted to do is talk about Of course. Irving was involved in these things. It was really what was supposed to come out of this mission. This was the first John Williams who should have been holding the thing down. because once mission to Algeria. Algeria was highly auspicious. From what we knew. Drag was going off on s mission to Algeria. he was working with the 15 16 Africa Department. but Irving got the blaae just the same. Irving had called the World Tables. The ~ Development Report and the ~ to try to clean the thing up. It landed in our lap in the Economics !!!!! were an outgrowth of that. The ~ ~ came about when Woods Department. &811 that all this data and thought it ought to be made available to the OLIVER: What tiae vas this1 Was this in the early part of the rest of the world. McNaaara years? OLIVER: The idea for the Atlas. I think you mentioned at lunch. was KAMAR.CK: No. this vas the Woods period. AsJ a result of this. a crazy essentially Woods' idea. administrative circular caae out which limited the size of economic KAKARCK: Yes. He called me up one day and said we ought to be doing missions. There vas a central control set up by the Adainistration something like this. Department or some place like that. If a aiasion was going to have OLIVER: It was his response to seeing the data which you were aore tban 6 or 8 people. the area departaent had to apply to the gathering? Administration Depar~nt. There vas a departaent set up at that tiae KAKARCK: That's right. But it was his idea. One of the things that that John Williaas was in: Programming and Budgeting or something of we tried to do with the Statistics Division was •• I had gone up that kind. That department was supposed to contrOl the size of to the u. N. to see what the U. N. Statistics Office did. Basically missions. Woods blaaed Irving for it. and it wasn't Irving's fault at what they were doing was accepting whatever data the countries gave all. But that was the sort of thing that came up. them. One of the big problems in all the developing countries -- still OLIVER: Do you want to say more about the general work over which you a problem today -- is that their statistics are worthless. So one of the had supervision? things that we started. but then it died out. was to send out ICAKARQC.: Yes. I looked at the central econ0111.ic staff as having a statistical missions to upgrade the statistical work in the less nuaber of functions. We had. to start at the lowest level. the most developed countries. so that every country would have some data that prosaic level, the function of gathering certain basic data. Part of you could rely on. That was basic. that was external debt. We bad an external debt systea which we Then there were built up sector divisions which. in a sense. were expanded. We tried to get all the international lending agencies to be parallel to the Projects Department. We wanted to build up sector a part of it. so the Bank did the job for the Inter American Bank. the divisions to cover the sectors of econoay which the Projects Department Asian Bank. and the African Bank. Then we started to gather the basic didn't cover and which the Fund didn't cover either. What sector data that we needed on countries. We started building up what we divisions did we have'l The only one that pops in my mind right now (we 17 18 had two or three) is the Fiscal Division. The Fiscal Division was to KAMARCK: Dick Westebbe. And the guy on the Projects Department, on provide expertise when evaluating a country's fiscal policy. I talked the other band, was. • • with the Fund. and we worked out an agreeaent which lasted the whole OLIVER: Robert Sadove. time that I was there and then it lapsed. They bad a fiscal depa~ent KAMlRCK: Robert Sadove. Both of them were impossible. I remember a of about thirty people. We bad about five people. I agreed with nuaber of times when the bead of the Projects Department. Warren Baum. Richard Good that we would not build up beyond that. live people would and I would sit down and we'd have Sadove and Westebbe. We tried to cover countries that either were of special interest to us or that they pound it into their beads to cooperate. We never succeeded. We had were not able to cover for us. Once a aonth, we would sit down and one hell of a time with those guys. In all the other fields, our plot out the econaaic missions that the Baak would be sending out in division bad the intellectual ability and the diplomacy: and the people the field in the next year. For those aissiona that required a fiscal at the other side had enough modesty to realize that our people were man, so be would t~ to provide a fiscal person; a Fund III&D would be a making a contribution to them. and they accepted it. We had a very member of the Bank mission. When be came back, be would work with the good relationship. HeDD&n Van der Tak was bead of that division. Bank •iasion to prepare his report and to keep our fiscal people OLIVER: The projects-oriented division? informed. That was one of the sectors where we provided econoaic KAHARCK: The projects oriented division, the research backing up the input -- in the country •isaions that went out. projects department. Herman really did a wonderful job. Actually he Initially we had one division which becaae quite large to provide moved on when he got a chance to to get into projects. His job there the basic thinking theory for the Projects Department on how you do was to be in charge of the intellectual side of projects work. project analysis in different fields. We succeeded and we worked out a OLIVER: There was an Education and also a Population Division. very good relationship. The Projects Department caae to rely on us, KAMAR.CK: That's right. and the division that we were building up in and it worked most of the time. The only place where we had friction order to provide background for projects was the Urbanization was in your division. Division. OLIVER: The Economics of Urbanization? OLIVER: In any case. what was happening. I take it. is that there was KAMARCK: In all the other cases, we got along: we did well. In your economic-type analysis going forward that was related to a particular division the division chief, what was his name? projects sector. OLIVER: Dick Westebbe. KAHARCK: The people in that sector in the Projects Department had been 19 20 doing economic analyses of their projects. In fact, Warren Baua, KAMARCK: Oh yes. always. Herman Van der Tak and I and, later, Sandy Stevenson would sit down OLIVER: It was not identical to the more generalized and somewhat more periodically. Warren would set input fro. his projects people. abstract work going on in the universities under the general rubric of He~an also got, directly or indirectly, inforaation on the kinds of developaent econ011.ica:1 problems they were running into in their analysis. This was extreaely KAMARCK: Everything that we did in the Econc:mica Department was useful. Then we would sit down to discuss what we could do, what we had related to probl•s that came up in the Bank. in the way of staff. That worked very well. Tbe sector divisions There were a lot of things that we wanted to get into. We had Guy were not supposed to be doins that saae sort of thing for the area Orcutt whom Irving recruited. Guy was supposed to do more fundamental departments, because the area departments could call on us to provide research. and one of the things that I tried to get him to do was to that role in their aisaions. You'd have a country mission that was set up some kind of research on education in the developing countries. suppose to be an area departaent aisaion, and, very often, it would be particularly in Africa. With so many countries. you had a real staffed 1/2, 2/3'•• 3/4 1 & b7 our people. In saae eases it was laboratory there. The thing to do was to try to identify different caapletely staffed by our people. types of education and see which types were the most valuable in ~erma That had a lot of advantages but a lo~ of disadvantages also. of developmen~. Ge~ something out of ~he field. Guy didn't want to go The disadvantages were that we weren't evident, so that the Board to Africa. He didn't want to go to any Asian country. What he wan~ed didn't see what the Economics Department was doing. They didn't to do was to build models, and he finally left the Bank. As far as I realize that the reports they were getting were very often 2/3's or was concerned, I though~ what be wanted to do needn't be done a~ ~he 3/4'a produced b7 the Economics Department. So it had that Bank. disadvantage. It had a big advantage. The European Department was OLIVER: But the model building then went on even more under Hollis constantly shrivelling. Cope was gradually giving up his econamis~a, Chenery. so that be was gradually looking to us to do his econaaic reports. I KAMARCK: When McNamara came in. When did this occur'l think that if we wanted to, we could have gone on that way, and we OLIVJ!R: 1968. could have gradually taken over the econaaics of Europe. KAHARCK: No, No. When McNamara came in, the Economics Department had OLIVER: But the economics work was clearly related to the opera~ions grown very, very large. I~ was the biggest department in the Bank. of the Bank. We really needed reorganization. We should have had the department 21 22 either broken up into several departaenta. or we should have had &Oile zones. There wasn't very much information from the tropics. With the assistant directors -- because the number of divisions. of people help of the British. we set up a research project to provide the basic reporting to ae and Sandy Stevenson (Sandy's role is very. very kinds of parameters that you really need in planning for invesCDent in iaportant) v .. too aany. It had gotten to the point where we really road transport. We needed to be doing this in other areas in couldn't do it any more. We should have had assistant directors. development economics. When McNamara caae in, he and Irving got together. (I've never For the Development Economics Center to do that would have been understood what happened in this. I don't know whether it was very useful. It would aake sense to pull it aside from the Economics McNaaara'a idea or Irving's idea or what.) They decided to set up, to Department. because the Economics Department was more short term. This pull out of the Bconc-ica Departaent, various little special groups. sort of thing you should set up projects for to last five. ten, fifteen One of thea was called '"Development EconCIIlics Center" or "Basic years. Instead, it got colonized by the model builders. You bad Economics Center.• •Development Econaaics Center,• I think. people like Boureux who devoted his time to building a model for OLIVER: I think that's right. Mexico, then building a model for the Ivory Coast. Nothing useful has KAHARCK: This was going to do basic research. Then a group was pulled coae out of it. Of course with Hollis. this was accentuated, though out to do research on creditworthiness. There were a couple of other this isn't quite fair to Hollis, because be didn't push it to the groups that were going to be pulled out. The basic center wasn't a bad extreme that some people would have pushed it. It's true, he does tend idea. If you bad put in charge of it soaebody who was really into to go over in that direction, but he does have a feeling that what is basic problems and was willing to go out and, say. try to discover what done should have some applicability to policy. He is definitely not to it is that makes a faaily planning program successful in a particular be classified in that group of people that I regard as scholastics -- country the kinds of longitudinal studies that had been done on Economic Scholastics. poverty in this country. That kind of thing would have been eztremely OLIVER: We are running out of time. Another time I want to ask you valuable. some more general questions about the Woods Administration. but before We were doing it in transport. One of the things that we we totally leave economics, are there any things that I haven't asked discovered was that the recommendations as to how to build a road you about the economics work that you would like to answer? the thickness of the pavement, the kind of aggregate and that sort of KAMARCK: One of the things that I got started, and it has grawn since thing -- are all based on research that had been done in the temperate then, is a publications program. The Bank had done a little bit of 23 24 publishing off and on. but practically nothing was taking place when creditor reporting system. so we bad those two basic sources of data the Econaaica Departaent was set up. There wasn't aqy aacbinery for coaing in. it. and there was a lot of very useful work done in the Bank that I One of the things I also wanted to do (I started it too late thought ought to be ude available for the rest of the world. It would actually, so it never got institutionalized). I started trying to work help the econaaiata in the Bank to.hBYe people outside the Bank out coordinated research cooperation with the other banks. We did recognize the work they were doing. so we started a publications have. I think. two meetings of directors of research. one in prograa with the Occasional Papers. We were going on from there. That Washington. and one in Korea at the Asian Bank meeting. the idea being did get started. and we produced a lot of useful papers. that we would try to coordinate so that rather than each bank having OLIVER: The publication of working papers had not yet begun had it? half a person in a field. we would have one bank concentrate on one KAMAR.CX: We were just. let's see now. when did that begin1 I've particular field and another bank on another field. Of course. we in forgotten. the World Bank were much bigger than the others. but we would agreed OLIVER: a m.uat have been in the early '70s. with them what particular fields they wanted to do. Then we would all KAMARCK: I don't rem.•ber. With the Occasional Papers. we had a work together. The other banks loved the idea. I really think it publications committee set up in the Bank. We had a publications policy should have gone forward. but it went by the board. worked out and approved in the Bank. and then we went on from there. OLIVER: How about cooperative research between the Bank and various Another thing that I wanted to start was a sabbatical policy. so that other United Nations organizations like the FAO and so on. people in the Bank. after a certain period of tiae. would have a chance KAMARCK: Basically not. Of course. between the Bank and FAO and the to replenish their intellectual capital. Before I left the economics Bank and UNESCO and. later. the Bank and WHO. there was a coordinated deparcment. it got started. Herman Van der Tak was one of the first projects evaluation team. On the research side there was nothing. who did it. There wasn't anything coordinated. I think the truth of the matter was There was one thing I wanted to do and we did get going. I had that I didn't feel there was anything terribly much there we could this relationship with the Fund for the fiscal work that worked out coordinate with. very well. We set up and worked out treaty agreements with banks on There was a general point I wanted to make on that whole general this a world-wide external debt reporting system which we did for field. but I'm afraid I have forgotten now. I did mention this work all the international financial agencies. We worked out with OECD a that we started on upgrading the statistical work in the less developed 25 countries. In that we wanted to work with the statistical office of the United Nations. To aaae eztent we did have a little bit of success there, but that went by the board after I left the Econcmics Department. It vas still very auch in the eabryonic stage, and it never vent on. There is an enoraoua field of work there that needs to be doDe. OLIVER: Well, I wonder if this ian• t a good. tille to say thank you very much for a marvelous conversation. I hope we'll have another one.