lr el E N V I R O N M E N T ,Cx ^ ~~~D E P A R T M E N T EP ARTMENT SPAPER NO. (f32 j PAPERS TOWARD ENVIRONMENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RESETTLEMENT SERIES Resettlement and Development The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993 March 1996 -A" 'A ~\ Environmentally Sustainable Development The World Bank ESD Acronyms and Atbbreviations AFR Africa Regional Office AGR Agriculture & Natural Resources Department ASTEN Environment & Natwral Resources Division of Asia Technical Departmuent ASTHR Human Resources & Social Development Division of Asia Technical Department CAM Country Assistance Management CASEC Interagency Working Group (Colombia) CD Country Department Dla Department of Water Works (Turkey) EAP East Asia & Pacific Regional Office ECA Europe & Central Asia Regional Office EDI Economic Development Institute ENV Environment Department ESD Environmentally Sustainable Development Vice Presidency GNP Gross National Product GOI Government of India ICLARM International Center for Aquatic Resource Management IDA International Development Association IEN Industry and Energy Department JAC JointAuditCommittee JICA Japan Institute for International Cooperation Agency LAC Latin America & Carilbbean Regional Office LEG Legal Department MNA Middle East & North Africa Regional Office MP.S Management & Personnel Services M&E Monitoring and Evaluation NGO Non-Governmental Organization NTPC National Thermal Power Corporation (India) OD 4.30 Operational Directive 4.30 "Involuntary Resettlement" OED Operations Evaluation Department OMS Operational Manual Statement OPN Operations Policy Note ODA Overseas Development Administration (England) OECD Organization for Ecornomic Cooperation and Development PCR Project Completion Report PPAR Project Performance Audit Report R&R Resettlement and Rehabilitation SA2 South Asia Country Department II SAR Staff Appraisal Report SAS South Asia Regional Office TD Technical Departmenlt TM Task Manager TWU Transport, Water & Urban Development Department WDR World Development Report i.i Resettlement Series Social Policy and Resettlement Division Resettlement and Development The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Involuntary Resettlement 1986-1993 The World Bank Environment Department 1996 Papers in this series are not formal publications of the World Bank. They are circulated to encourage thought and dis- cussion. The use and citation of this paper should take this into account. The views expressed are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the World Bank. Contents Acronyms and Abbreviations ii Acknowledgments vii Preface ix Executive Summary 1 Resumen Ejecutivo 21 Resumn Analytique 47 Resettlement and Development 73 1. The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy 75 The Nature and Feasibility of Resettlement 75 Resettlement Policy as Codified Good Practice 81 2. Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 87 Magnitude of Resettlement 87 Composition by Regions and Sectors 88 Socio-Economic Characteristics 93 Future Trends 95 The Bank's Program in Context 95 3. Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement 97 Main Findings 97 The Bank's Impact on Resettlement Policies 98 Difficulties in Policy Reform 103 Reducing Displacements in Projects 105 Environment Department iii Resettlement and Development 4. Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods 109 Main Findings 109 Assessing Income Restoration 110 Impoverishment Risks and Trends 114 Land and Jobs for Recovering Livelihoods 121 5: Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement 129 Main Findings 129 Resettlement Planning 130 Preparation of Plans to Restore Lost Income 132 Progress in Resettlement Appraisal 137 Resettlement Costs and Project Budgets 141 Ensuring Adequate Finance 142 The Economic Costs of Resettlement Programs 147 Common Factors in Preparation and Appraisal Difficulties 148 6: Project Supervision and Implementation Performance 153 Main Findings 153 Supervision in Practice 154 Accounting for Variability in Supervising Resettlement 157 Recent Improvements 159 Supervision Findings 161 Improving the Effectiveness of Resettlement Supervision 163 7. Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality 167 Technical Assistance for Portfolio Quality 170 Corrective Actions 173 Sustaining the Trend 177 Training for Borrowers and Bank Staff 179 Other Products of the Bankwide Review 180 Is There a Change in Bank Culture? 181 8: Actions to Improve Performance 183 Annex 187 Generic Terms of Reference: Resettlement Review Supervision Mission 187 iv Resettlement Series Contents List of Boxes 1: The Bank's resettlement policy . 5 1: La politica de reasentamiento del Banco 26 1: Politique de la Banque en matiere de reinstallations 52 1.1: Key steps in the evolution of the Bank's resettlement policy 82 1.2: The Bank's resettlement policy 83 3.1: Creating and affirming policy ownership: Colombia 100 3.2: Bank Impact on non-Bank financed works: flood control in a river basin 101 3.3: Does Bank involvement make a difference to displaced people? 104 3A: Avoiding displacement 106 4.1: Learning about income restoration 111 4.2: Reservoir fisheries as new inconme sources 112 4.3: Evidence of successful urban resettlement 113 4.4: From violent expulsion to reduced displacement 118 4.5: Social integration and political instability 120 4.6: Informal social networks and resettler economics 121 4.7: The reasons of success: why does resettlement in China work? 122 4.8: Innovative ways to identify lancl for resettlers: land consolidation 125 5.1: How much baseline survey work is enough? 132 5.2: Is participation in resettlement possible? . 135 5.3: Good and bad practice - two resettlement timetables 136 5A: The importance of ensuring government ownership 138 5.5: Developing institutional capacilies 140 5.6: Lessons learned the hard way 141 5.7: Absence of timely planning makes the task more difficult 142 5.8: Innovative approaches to resettl]ement in sector loans 143 5.9: A summary presentation of resettlement costs 144 6.1: Does resettlement supervision matter? 157 6.2: Effective portfolio management - resettlement inUpper Krishna II project 158 6.3: Contrasting examples of Bank supervision and follow-up 159 6A: The price of ignorance 161 6.5: Project supervision cannot substitute for country strategies 163 6.6: Effective resettlement management: an example from Africa 164 6.7: Monitoring panels and mid-term reviews 165 7.1: Technical resettlement assistance: Brazil 171 7.2: Staffing inadequacy and remedies 173 7.3: Corrective actions in Madagascar Tana Plain project 175 7.4: Yacyreta: one year of review anid supervision work 177 Environment Department v Resettlement and Development List of Figures 2.1: A year by year image of the Resettlement Portfolio Projects closed, approved and active during each FY 88 2.2: A year by year image of the Resettlement Portfolio People displaced by projects closed, approved and active during each FY 89 2.3: People displaced by region - projects active during FY '93 90 2.4: People displaced by sector - projects active during FY '93 91 5.1. Resource allocation for resettlement 146 6.1: Resettlement supervision in percentage 155 List of Tables 2.1: Entry of projects into the resettlement portfolio 87 2.2: Regional distribution of projects active in FY93 89 2.3: Sectoral distribution of projects active in FY93 91 2.4: Distribution of projects by cause of displacement 92 2.5: Large Bank-assisted resettlement projects 93 2.6: Distribution of the resettlement portfolio by size of displacement 94 2.7: Projected entry of projects into the resettlement portfolio 95 5.1: Active projects with baseline surveys by appraisal, FY86-FY93 130 5.2: Project impacts of inaccurate baseline surveys 131 5.3: Appraisal of resettlement plans in Bank-assisted projects, FY1986-1993 137 5.4: Active projects with appraisal resettlement plans by region, FY86-FY93 139 5.5: Sensitivity of the internal economic rate of return to resettlement 149 6.1: Resettlement supervision by region 1986-1993 156 6.2: Resettlement supervision by sectors, 1986-1993 156 6.3: Resettlement supervision, 1993 160 7.1: Review field work on resettlement during 1993 168 vi Resettlement Series Acknowledgments The Task Forcefor the Bankwide Resettlement The members of the Steering Committee consisted Review. A Task Force to coordinate the review of: Ismail Serageldin (Chairman); Mohamed T. El- of Bank-financed projects involving involurn- Ashry, Chief Environmental Adviser to the tary resettlement (1986-1993) and carry it out President and Director, Environment Department; jointly with the regional operational units was M. G. Sri-RamAiyer,Director, LatinAmenca and established in the Environment Department by the Caribbean Technical Department; Kevin M. the end of 1992 and carried out its work urLtil Cleaver, Director, Africa Technical Department; May 1994. Daniel Ritchie, Director, Asia Technical Depart- ment; Andres Rigo, Assistant General Counsel, The Resettlement Task Force was led by Michael Legal Operations; Anil Sood, Director, Middle M. Cernea, Senior Adviser, Social Policy and East, North Africa, Eastern Europe and Central Sociology; it consisted of Scott Guggenheim, Asia Regions Technical Department; Michael senior anthropologist, Lars Soeftestad, Deepali M. Cernea, Senior Adviser, Social Policy and Tewari and Warren Van Wicklin m. Part-time Sociology, Environment Department; Andrew members of the Task Force were also Dan Steer, Deputy Director, Environment Department; Aronson, Abdul Salam, and Tova Solo. Dennis Anderson, Adviser, Industry and Energy Department; David R. Steeds, Division Chief, Michael M. Cernea and Scott Guggenheim wrote Natural Resources Division. the report. Warren Van Wicklin m developed the review's data bank and prepared Chapter U. A large number of Bank staff and consultants contributed to the preparation of this report, The preparation of the report was carried oult through their field work and reports. Much of the under the overall guidance of Ismail Serageldin. analysis and fieldwork data on which this Mohamed T. El-Ashry, Andrew Steer, Pierre overall report is based came from each region's Landell-Mills and Gloria Davis read drafts of own resettlement report. In Asia, regional work- various chapters and provided very valuable ing groups led by Robert S. Drysdale and comments and insights. Abdallah El Maaroufi were both supported, particularly by Ashraf Ghani, Ellen Steering Committeefor the Bankwide Resettle- F. Schaengold, and David Butcher. Latin America ment Review. The activities of the Bankwide and the Caribbean's regional report was the joint Resettlement Review were guided by a Steering product of William L. Partridge, Maria Clara Committee chaired by Ismail Serageldin, Viae Mejia, and Maria Teresa Serra. In Africa, Cynthia President for Environmentally Sustainable C. Cook and Kristine M. Ivarsdotter formed a Development (ESD), and included representatives regional resettlement working group and pre- from all regional Vice Presidencies, the Environ- pared their regional overview. Anand K. Seth, ment Department, the Legal Department, the Ayse Kudat, and Stan Peabody prepared the Agriculture and Natural Resources Department, regional report for the Middle East, North Africa, and the Industry and Energy Department. Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. Sectoral Environment Department vii Resettlement and Development studies for the agriculture, industry and energy, Several experienced consultants, academics, and transportation, water, and urban sectors and NGO researchers and activists also were prepared with the able assistance of David contributed studies for the review: David Steeds, Herve Plusquellec, Horst Wagner, Rachel Pearce, John Eriksen, Walter Fernandes, and Crossley, Mei Xie, Dennis Anderson, and Pablo Maria Fides Bagasao. Gutnan. Ian Newport, S. Al Habsy, and M. Gopal prepared the Legal Department's review. Gracie M. Ochieng, Paula McPoland, Anju Sachdeva and Kerri Brady ably managed the The Spanish version of the Executive Summary review's documentation and processed the text was prepared under the supervision of Enrique more than once. Bruce Ross-Larson, John A. Fernandez, Secretary General of Solidarios, a Kellenberg, Jocelyn Mason, Camille Weithers, non-governmental organization in the Domini- Joyce Said, Debra Sequeira, and Samantha can Republic. The translation of the French Merton assisted with editing or data research. version of the Executive Summary was reviewed and managed by Dr. Veronique Lassailly-Jacob, a The preparation of the present reprinting of the resettlement researcher, of the Centre d'Etudes April 1994 edition of the study was done by Africaines at L'Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Warren Van Wicklin II. The desktop work was Sciences Sociales in Paris. done by Valentina Alekhina. Viii Resettlement Series Preface This study is a comprehensive analysis of the tion of resettlement plans, analyzes the socio- involuntary resettlement of populations dis- economic impacts of resettlement, and docu- placed by development projects. The study vwas ments the actions taken to improve resettlement first published in 1994 as a word-processed work and performance. report. The responsibility for the Bankwide resettlement Due to the wide interest and the continuous review was assigned to the Environment Depart- demand this study has generated, it is reprinted ment, which created a special Task Force headed now, without modifications, in the new series of by Michael M. Cemea, the Bank's Senior Adviser Envirornent Department Papers, a series widely for Social Policy and Sociology, to coordinate the available to all interested readers. To increase review and carry it out jointly with the regional accessibility, the present volume also includes, departments. To support the central Task Force, for the first time, Spanish and French transla- review "working groups" were created in all tions of the study's detailed Executive Summary, Bank Regional Vice Presidencies, consisting of in addition to its original Englsh version. technical and country department representa- tives, plus the Senior Operations Adviser. The Since 1979-1980, when its resettlement policy Legal Department and several central sectoral was adopted, the World Bank has paid increas- departments (Agriculture, Energy) undertook ing attention to involuntary population resettle- special studies for the review. ment issues, both in its project operations and in its policy dialogue with borrowing countries. A Bankwide Steering Committee chaired by Consistent with this continuous concern, by the Ismail Serageldin, the Vice President for Environ- end of 1992 Bank management initiated an in- mentally Sustainable Development (ESD), depth review of the Bank's entire resettlement including the Chief Environmental Adviser to portfolio. This Bankwide review was carried out the President and Director of the Environment between January 1993 and April 1994. The Department, and the operational complex's review encompassed all projects entailing technical department directors, was created for resettlement active between 1986 and 1993 in all overall guidance to the review. lending sectors. The central Task Force acted as the focal point for This vast study of the institution-wide project the entire Bankwide review and provided direct portfolio aimed at assessing consistency between guidance and support to regional activities and policy and operations, ensuring increased "working groups". attention to ongoing projects with resettlement, and strengthening processing procedures for The specific objectives of the study were: new projects. The present report explains the * To ascertain the scale of involuntary study's objectives, describes the scale and resettlement in the Bank's portfolio, and composition of resettlement operations undier determine regional and sectoral trends and Bank-financed projects, assesses the implementa- composition. Environment Department ix Resettlement and Development * To analyze ongoing resettlement programs The main product of this comprehensive field- for their quality, consistency with stated based analysis was not simply the final report re- policy, and actual outcomes. published in this volume, but the vast work process on resettlement that the review triggered * To identify recurrent problems affecting throughout 1993 across the Bank and on the resettlement performance, initiate midstream ground. Mandated to analyze the consistency of remedial actions to enhance quality, and operations with policy, this review moved from prepare a follow-up strategy for addressing simply assessing consistency to enhancing it. involuntary resettlement more effectively. Thus the resettlement review became one of the central actions undertaken to strengthen and For comparative purposes, the review's Task improve the management of the Bank's project Force also studied selected Bank-assisted portfolio. projects with important resettlement components completed before 1986, as well as numerous Because the review coupled field work on all resettlement projects outside the Bank's own major operations with in-depth back-up studies portfolio - financed either from domestic on each geographic region and on all key sources only, or co-financed by other donors. The lending sectors, as well as with a set of issue- pipeline of forthcoming projects (FY94-FY97) focused sociological, legal, and economic was examined as well, to discern resettlement studies, it provided the Bank with its first truly trends in future Bank lending. comprehensive picture of resettlement. The Task Force has also consulted and inter- The Task Force designed the review so that its viewed a very large number of project Task key feature would be on-site analysis through Managers and Division Chiefs. Professionally field missions, rather than remain a desk-bound conducted focus groups were carried out with 20 headquarters' exercise. By design, it initiated a percent of the Task Managers of projects with broad problem-solving effort, involving staff from resettlement components. The Task Force orga- all regions jointly with the Bank's Borrowers. nized consultations with various non-govern- mental organizations (NGOs) and resettlement For the first time, the study provides estimates of researchers. Several NGOs were also invited to the worldwide magnitude of development- carry out field studies of involuntary resettlement caused displacements, assessed to affect at least operations as part of the Bankwide review. 10,000,000 people each year, as a result of dam construction, urban and transportation develop- The 1993-1994 resettlement review had a broader ment programs. scope than the first resettlement review, carried out in 1985-86, and was different from the usual While the study found an overall improvement way in which such reviews are often done. To in resettlement performance in recent years, the obtain on-the-ground results, the review's study also concluded that in a number of projects concept and methodology were broadened at the actual resettlement operations and outcomes are beginning of 1993 enabling it to pursue inmmedi- not consistent with the standards defined and ate improvements in the quality of the resettle- demanded by the Bank's resettlement policy. The ment portfolio throughout 1993. The review study discussed important conceptual and stimulated intensified field supervision by the policy issues regarding resettlement and poverty Bank of ongoing resettlement, through more alleviation, analyzed methodological issues in frequent and better staffed field missions, and social impact evaluation, and made recommen- worked out with borrowing governments and dations for improving strategies of managing agencies reasonable measures for adjusting relocation processes. The study also presents, in resettlement operations gone awry. conclusion, the important measures adopted by x Resettlement Series Preface the World Bank, as a result of the review's The Task Force submitted a mid-term Progress findings, to minimize resettlement in future Report to management in August 1993 about the projects whenever possible, mitigate its adverse first half of the review period, which was effects, and improve work in this domain. These forwarded to the Bank's Executive Directors for newly adopted measures include increased information. The Executive Directors discussed financing of resettlement, better project vehicles, the review's prelimninary findings as part of the strengthening of institutional capacities,, 1993 Annual Report on the Environment. The resettlers' involvement in resettlement planning, mid-term findings were also presented and monitoring and evaluation of results, and discussed with a large number of resettlement remedial actions in a number of ongoing projects. researchers, practitioners, and NGO representa- tives, in the framework of an international Overall, the resettlement review asserted the conference on refugees organized by the Refugee central importance of social issues and concerns Studies Program in Oxford, England. The final in development projects and opened up a report on the review was completed on April 8, broader space for work on social analysis and 1994 and released that same day at a public social design in the Bank's project activities imd press conference. in research. The Bank's Board of Directors discussed the Task The present report is organized as follows: Force report on May 3,1994, and the Chairman's Summary of the Board discussion was issued The Executive Sunmnary provides a detailed and one week later as a press release. The Bank's comprehensive overview of all the major findings Board "expressed broad support for the report of the study. It also summarizes the actions taken and the approach which had been followed, by the Bank's senior management based on the which involved not only a review but also taking review's conclusions. action. The report's findings and action plans were all supported. There was a general sense Chapter I defines conceptually the nature of that the Bank's resettlement policy is sound." involuntary resettlement and the substance of the The Board also emphasized that "the review Bank's resettlement policy. itself had resulted in substantial progress over the past 18 months, that the Review was very The next five chapters present and discuss the much part of a learning process, and that close main findings of the review: the extent of the attention to resettlement projects must be contin- Bank's resettlement portfolio (II); the impact of ued to ensure that lessons are quickly translated Bank policy on national policies in borrowing into action so that policy implementation countries and the reduction of displacements continues to improve." Overall, the Board (In); the restoration of resettlers' livelihood and expressed satisfaction that problems in older the risks of impoverishment (V); and work projects are being addressed as a result of the processes that account for resettlement project review and that new projects show significant performance (V and VI). Chapter VII reports on design improvements. the corrective actions to improve ongoing resettlement operations taken during, and largely During the almost two years since the Bankwide due to, the review itself, in 1993-1994. resettlement review was completed, there has been substantial follow-up and improvements The last chapter, Vm, describes strategic actions were made to resettlement operations. In fact, taken by Bank senior management to improve Chapter Vm of the present report has served as resettlement performance, and remedial and an outline of the follow-up strategy. Aprelimi- retrofitting actions in ongoing projects with nary description of the steps taken and progress resettlement problems. made were reported in a "Status Report: Re- Enviromnent Department xi Resettlement and Development gional Remedial Action Planning for Involuntary The reprinting of the "Resettlement and Develop- Resettlement", which was transmitted to the ment" review almost two years after its initial Bank's Board on November 4,1994. publication is intended to further support the dissemination of the important lessons of A fuller report on the progress made over the first experience drawn through this study. Sustained post-review year, which summarized the imple- public interest in these complex socio-economic mentation of the regional remedial action plans, issues of resettlement is necessary for continu- was discussed by the Board's Committee on ously improving work in this difficult and Development Effectiveness onJune 26,1995. important domain. These foilow-up reports reflect the intensive, ongoing work process to sustain the improvements in the quality of the resettlementportfolio initiated Michael M. Cernea by the Bankwide review. They also document Senior Advisor actual specific improvements in the pLanning and Social Policy and Sociology implementation of resetdement operations since the The Environment Department Bankwide ResettlementReview. February 1996 xii Resettlement Series Executive Summary A Worldwide Challenge started each year in developing countries are estimated to displace some additional 6 million Involuntary resettlement has been a companion people. Over the past decade, it is estimated of development throughout history and has that about 80 to 90 million people have been been indelibly written into the evolution of resettled as a result of infrastructure programs industrial as well as developing countries. for dam construction, and urban and transpor- Installing major hydropower dams, irrigation tation development. Investments in other and drinking water systems, or extending sectors have increased this number further. highway networks has entailed displacements fraught with hardships and deprivation. The World Bank-financed programs account for a drama of forced urban displacement in Boston's small, but significant, share of this total. West End has spawned an entire sociological Projects currently in the Bank's active portfolio literature. The beautiful master-plan of today's are expected to involve the resettlement of 2 Paris was made possible by painful relocation in million people over an eight-year period. Bank- the days of Baron Haussmann. New York's funded projects account, conservatively, for impressive Cross Bronx Expressiway slashed some 3 percent of the resettlement caused by through many neighborhoods, of which some dam construction worldwide and for about 1 at least in hindsight - could have been saved. percent of the displacements caused by urban Huge hydroelectric complexes in Canada have and transportation projects in the developing required the uprooting of many indigenous world. groups. Involuntary displacements continue to occur in all countries for reasons related to the While limited in relative terms, the Bank's betterment of living conditions, environmental involvement in resettlement is nonetheless of infrastructure, or expansion of public services. great importance. For those people resettled The experience with various types of involun- under Bank-financed projects, the Bank has a tary displacement and resettlement has genier- responsibility to help borrowers ensure that ated increased knowledge for planning and for every effort is made to restore, and if possible protecting the entitlements and livelihoodsi of improve, their livelihoods. But the Bank's those affected. involvement also has a broader significance that far exceeds the size of resettlement under Bank- In developing countries, the scale of develop- financed projects. Indeed, over the past fourteen ment-related population displacement has years since the Bank established its path- grown rapidly in the past few decades, due to breaking resettlement guidelines, it has increas- the accelerated provision of infrastructure and ingly sought to work with governments to growing population densities. The displace- promote better policies and legal frameworks for ment toll of the 300 large dams that, on average, resettlement, at and beyond the project level, and enter into construction every year is estimated with project-executing agencies to promote better to be above 4 million people. The urban devel- procedures for implementation. opment and transportation programs being Environment Department Resettlement and Development Improving resettlement is difficult for developing review was assigned to the Environment Depart- country governments, particularly in low income ment in the Environmentally Sustainable Devel- countries with land scarcity, which face compet- opment Vice Presidency (ESD); the Environment ing needs, resource limitations, and constraints Department established a Task Force to coordi- on institutional capacity. Progress has been nate the review and carry it out jointly with the substantial over recent years and, in some regional departments. Each of the Bank's countries, has been remarkable. However, major operational regions and the Bank's Legal problems and difficulties associated with Department formed resettlement review working involuntary resettlement operations continue to groups. All regions prepared comprehensive occur, and often implementation performance is analytical reports on their resettlement portfolios, lower than expected. and these formed the basis of this report. Contri- butions were also received from the Bank's The costs of inadequate resettlement can be very central Vice Presidencies. high, resulting in increased poverty for large numbers of people. This is especially serious The three objectives of the resettlement review since many of those affected are already very were: poor. They tend to live in disadvantaged areas where infrastructure is lacking and social * To ascertain the scale of involuntary re- services are very limited. The remote locations settlement in the Bank's portfolio, and of many dam sites are often inhabited by determine regional and sectoral trends and indigenous people, ethnic minorities or pastoral composition. groups. This heightens the moral imperative of ensuring sound policies and effective imple- * To analyze ongoing resettlement programs mentation. for their quality, consistency with policy, and outcomes. Done right, resettlement programs can be an To identify recurrent problems affecting element of a nation's strategy to reduce poverty, performance, initiate midstream remedial This requires not only sound policies and actions, and prepare a forow-up strategy adequate resources, but also a change in mind- for addressing resettlement more effectively. set - towards recognizing resettlers' entitle- ments to share in the benefits of the projects Rather than being carried ott as a desk-bound which cause their displacement. and static stock-taking exercise, this review was deliberately designed as a broad process of mpriovitA resettlement rent e resettlement analysis in thefield, carried out by priorty. Achieving sound resettlement requires the Bank's relevant regional and central units improving our understanding of the social, jointly with the Borrowers. The main product of cultural, economic and ecological complexities this comprehensive review is not simply its final involved, and in frankdy facing up to the lessons report, but the process that the review triggered from success and failure. This current review is rpr,bttepoesta h eiwtige arto suces anofir. T throughout 1993 across the Bank and on the ground. part Of this process. The review process consisted of intensified field supervision, analysis of project preparation, appraisal, supervision, and implementation, on- The Bankwide Resettlement Review site consultations with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), sectoral resettlement The Bankwide Resettlement Review was studies, development of new technical tools for initiated in 1992 to encompass all projects with resettlement planning, and a considerable resettlement in the Bank's portfolio between number of joint remedial actions initiated by the 1986 and 1993 and to assess consistency be- Bank and the Borrowers for projects failing to tween policy and operations. The Bankwide meet set objectives. 2 Resettlement Series Executive Summary Conceptual Issues among the most difficult in development work. The complexity of involuntary resettlement and The needfor investment in infrashrute the enormous diversity of project situations make achieving good resettlement a formidable Developing countries invest around $200 billion task. Recognizig the intrinsic difficulty of per year in new infrastructure. The social eaid resettlement is the prime step for addressing economic returns from these investments have this task seriously. been high'1 In the past 15 years, the share of households with access to clean water has risen When people are displaced, production systems by 50 percent, bringing dramatic improvenments may be dismantled, kinship groups are scat- in health and the quality of life. Per capita tered, and long-establishpd residential settle- access to electric power and telephones has ments are disorganized. People's lives are doubled in the same period, enabling increased affected in very painful ways. Many jobs and productivity and human welfare. Food produc- assets are lost. Health care tends to deteriorate. tion has risen sharply - doubling in the past Links between producers and their customers quarter century - with over half this gain often are severed, and local labor markets are coming from investments in irrigation. And disrupted. Informal social networks that are ovestments in transportation have reducer part of daily sustenance systems - providing costs and improved farm gate and producer mutual help in child care, food security, revenue prices. transfers, short-term credit, labor exchanges, - ~~~~~~~~~~~~and other basic sources of socio-economic Such developments often involve changes in or bare solved. socaore aon s land and water use patterns, and in some r instances this requires that people be displaced. and formal and informal associations disappear The numbers of people requiring resettlement because of the dispersion of their members. can be reduced and, as shown in this report, Traditional community and authority systems progress in this areas has been substantial. But can lose their leaders. Symbolic markers, such the need for resettlement cannot be eliminated. as ancestral shrines and graves, are abandoned, Nor should it be assumed that the volume of breaking links with the past and with peoples' resettlement will be much lower in the futhre. cultural identity. More than 2 billion people still lack access to electricity and are forced to use sticks and dung The cumuative effect can tear apart the social for their energy needs; 1.7 billion lack sewerage fabric and local economy, and is profoundly systems and 1 billion lack access to clean piped disruptive to large numbers of people. The water, resulting in the unnecessary death of 2-3 main risk is impoverishment - through million infants and children each year. Food landlessness, joblessness, food insecurity, production will need to double again in the next deteriorating health, or the loss of access to 40 years - an impossibility without additional community assets. That is why carrying out investment in irrigation. And the world's resettlement adequately is an impoverishment population will grow by almost 1 billion each prevention and poverty reduction task - decade over the same period. Substantial further central to the Bank's main mission. In working investment in infrastructure will thus be abso- to reduce poverty, the Bank and its member lutely essential if poverty is to be reduced and countries must adopt mitigation measures to population growth rates brought down. ensure that project-induced displacement and resettlement do not make additional people The nature of the resettlement probilem worse Off. Involuntary resettlement consists of two ckosely Moving people involuntarily also raises legal related yet distinct processes: displacing pieople issues. The potential for violating people's and rebuilding their livelihood - processes individual and group rights makes compulsory Environment Department 3 Resettlement and Development relocation unlike any other project activity. The policy based on equitable principles and sound fact that projects frequently are delayed by approaches, the Bank has delivered the sharpest courts, and that compensation levels are often criticism of bad displacement practices that raised significantly on appeal, reflects the cause the impoverishment of those displaced. recognition in legal systems that people cannot be arbitrarily displaced without just compensa- Bank resettlement policy tion, regardless of national need. When resettle- The Bank was the first international develop- ment processes are carried out in a lawful ment agency to respond to the complexity and manner that fully respects people's rights, difficulty of displacement by adopting, in 1980, opposition to projects by adversely affected a formal policy and institutional procedures to people is reduced (although not eliminated) and address displacement processes and resettlers' overall project implementation is likely to needs (see Box 1). This policy is based on actual unfold more effectively. Resettlement that experiences with resettlement in both developed reflects the needs and rights of affected persons and developing countries and on social science is not just compliance with the law, but also research. By adopting this policy, the Bank constitutes sound development practice. rejected the argument that impoverishing resettlers was an unavoidable, if lamentable, The international debate on resettlenent facet of development. The fundamental goal of Because of its complexity and adverse effects, the Bank's policy is to restore the living stan- involuntary resettlement has become the focus dards and earning capacities of displaced of a wide international debate, engaging and persons - and when possible to improve them. polarizing governments and nongovernmental Its provisions protect and enlarge the entitle- organizations, public opinion groups, parlia- ments of displaced people and promote a safety mentarians, development agencies, and the net approach for restoring their livelihoods. The media. Criticism of involuntary resettlement Bank's policy calls for transforming people's often evolves into rejection of the goals and involuntary resettlement, whenever possible, legitimacy of the project causing the resettle- into an opportunity for development and for ment, and sometimes of development itself. enhancing their prior living standards by Two arguments are advanced. One denies, in enabling resettlers to share in thebenefits of principle, the acceptability of any involuntary the development project that causes their resettlement. The second criticizes the quality displacement. of specific resettlement operations. Consider- able criticism of both kinds is directed at Bank- Restoring previous standards of living is a supported projects. formidable task in practice. By pursuing a development-oriented outcome, the Bank's The rejection of all resettlement is unrealistic. In resettlement policy raises a major challenge for many situations involuntary resettlement is both Borrowers and the Bank, but a challenge unavoidable; the question is how to minimize fully consistent with the poverty alleviation its magnitude and how to respond effectively to policies of borrowing governments. However, the needs of the people being resettled. Thus, the nature and the dimensions of the tasks at the Bank shares the views of those critics who hand in implementing this policy must be well deplore bad resettlement operations. Their understood. The absence in many developing concern for the welfare of the displaced popula- countries of effectively functioning land and tions is fully justified - and germane to the labor markets, the substantive and procedural Bank's own mandate and policies. In practice, inadequacies of compensation systems for criticism of resettlement failures by NGOs or property appropriated by the state, and the other interested groups frequently has helped absence of adequate social safety nets are three improve the Bank's policies and operations. central reasons why the simple cash compensa- Through its very decision to adopt a formal tion of property losses under eminent domain 4 Resettlement Series Executive Summary Box 1. The Bank's resettlement policy Based on feedback from field experiences and findings from social science research, the develop- ment of the Bank's resettlement policy has evolved steadily since 1980 through several key steps in 1986,1988, and 1990. The basic elements of the Bank's resettlement policy are: * Involuntary displacement should be avoided or minimized whenever feasible, because of its disruptive and impoverishing effects. * Where displacement is unavoidable, the objective of Bank policy is to assist displaced persons in their efforts to improve, or at least restore, former living standards and eaming capacity. The means to achieve this objective consist of the preparation and execution by the Borrower of resettlement plans as develop- ment programs. These resettlement plans are integral parts of project designs. * Displaced persons should be: (i) compensated for their losses at replacement cost, (ii) given opportunities to share in project benefits, and (iii) assisted in the transfer and in the transition period at the relocation site. * Moving people in groups can cushion disruptions. Minimizing the distance between departure and relocation sites can facilitate the resettlers' adaptation to the new socio-cultural and natural environments. The tradeoffs between distance and economic opportunities must be balanced carefully. * Resettlers' and hosts' participation in planning resettlement should be promoted. The existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their hosts should be relied upon in conducting the transfer and reestablishment process. * New communities of resettlers should be designed as viable settlement systems equipped with infrastruc- ture and services, able to integrate in the regional socio-economic context. * Host communities that receive resettlers should be assisted to overcome possible adverse social and environmental effects from increased population density. * Indigenous people, ethnic minorities, pastoralists, and other groups that may have informal customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the project, must be provided with adequate land, infra- structure, and other compensation. The absence of legal title to land should not be grounds for denying such groups compensation and rehabilitaition. laws cannot realistically be expected at this time Meeting it successfully demands that a system- to provide satisfactory outcomes for project- atic effort is made each time, including improv- affected people in developing countries. This ing policy, allocating appropriate resources, and makes the need for the Bank's approach to fostering the participation of resettlers and resettlement compelling, in order to prevent hosts. impoverishment under Bank-financed projects. Attaining this goal often requires changes in the For nations as for the Bank, policy goals must be policies, legal frameworks, institutional capaci- translated into systematic implementation. ties, and current practices of many Borrowers. While implementation in Bank-financed projects This challenge is faced anew in every single has not consistently been at the level required development project that entails displacement. by the policy, it has been improving. It also is Environment Department Resettlement and Development undeniable that treatment of affected popula- The review has shown, once again, that resettle- tions under projects that apply Bank policy is, in ment is nearly always more difficult, more general, considerably better than under non- expensive, and more time-consuming than Bank financed projects, which account for up to generally realized. The largest resettlemnent 97-98 percent of total involuntary resettlement operations move tens of thousands of people - in the developing world. Bank-supported often very poor people - long distances in a projects, however, should not be isolated from very short time, and reestablishing their stan- broad national policy contexts and frameworks. dard of living is a hard task. The inherent One of the most important findings of this difficulty in reestablishing standards of living review is that addressing the plight of these and community services is compounded by the many millions through government commit- limited technical and institutional resettlement ment to better policies on resettlement (which - capacity of most Borrowers, and by weak would apply to both Bank-financed and non- commitment from some executing agencies. Bank financed projects) is also the key way of improving the performance in that portion of Field research, project evaluations, and sectoral the Bank's portfolio where resettlement issues and legal studies confirm that: remain problematic. Hence in countries where the Bank is financing, or is considering financ- (a) The Bank's policy toward involuntary resettle- ing projects which involve resettlement, the ment, described in Box 1, while ambitious, is Bank also assists governments in establishing or sound and its goals reasonable. improving national policies, building on project- level experiences. (b) Projects that follow Bank policy have demonstrably better resettlement outcomes Key Findings of the Review than projects that bypass these require- ments. Resettlement operations under The single most important message of the projects effectively guided by the Bank's review is that good resettlement can prevent policy occur at standards usually superior impoverishment and even reduce poverty by to those outside Bank-assisted projects. rebuilding sustainable livelihoods. If resettle- ment is not done adequately, resettlers end up (c) Resettlement performance is directly worse off than before. Socially responsible associated with the presence or absence of a resettlement is also economically beneficial domestic policy and organizational frame- because the heavy costs of poorly handled works on resettlement. Countries, states, or displacement extend well beyond the imnmedi- sectors with an adequate resettlement policy ately affected population - to the regional generally achieve better outcomes in economy, and to the host population in reloca- preventing impoverishment and restoring tion areas. Inadequate resettlement induces livelihoods than do countries or sectors local resistance, increases political tensions, which lack such policies. entails extensive project delays, and postpones project benefits for all concerned; the benefits (d) The Bank's portfolio of resettlement opera- lost because of such avoidable project delays tions is in much better health than in 1986, sometimes far exceed the marginal cost of a good the year the previous resettlement review resettlement package. Ensuring that involuntary was completed - and radically different resettlement is minimized - and when unavoid- from the state of the portfolio at the time able, is carried out without impoverishing the when the resettlement policy was issued. people displaced - is fully justified on both However, in a number of projects actual economic and ethical grounds. resettlement operations and outcomes are not consistent with the standards defined and demanded by the Bank's policy. 6 Resettlement Series Executive Summnary (e) The planning processes and criteria estab- (c) Sound social analysis, reliable demographic lished through the Bank's policy have assessments, and technical expertise in significantly improved the practices of some planning for development-oriented resettle- borrowing governments, other intemational ment; donors, technical agencies implementing large projects, and the Bank itself. How- (d) Accurate cost assessments and commensu- ever, progress in this respect has been rate financing, with resettlement timetables insufficient and uneven. Much more ne-eds tied to civil works construction; to be done to ensure consistency of plan- ning, outcomes, and impact monitoring (e) Effective executing organizations that with policy goals. respond to local development needs, opportunities and constraints; and The in-depth review of resettlement experiences has generated important knowledge for both the (f) Public participation in setting resettlement Bank and Borrowers about ways to carry ouit objectives, identifying reestablishment more effective resettlement, and has identified solutions, and implementing themn. good practices and ways of correcting unsatis- factory performance that are described in this The Bank's Resettlement Portfolio report. The social dimensions of civil works construction projects require much greater During 1986 to 1993 involuntary resettlement attention by member country governments,, as was a part of 192 projects, displacing a total of the recent OED review also concluded, as well 2.5 million people over the life of those projects. as by the Bank.2 Unless these aspects are Forty-six projects had closed by 1993, having mastered, development itself will continue to be resettled over half a million people. Under the dogged by some public criticism, rather tham current portfolio of 146 projects active in 1993, obtain the full, and increasing, support that it nearly two million people are in various stages needs and richly deserves. Hence, beyond of resettlement. These projects represent eight project-by-project activities, institutional percent of the Bank's currently ongoing 1,900 development for addressing resettlement issues projects, and account for US$23 billion or needs to be pursued as a valuable development 15 percent of Bank lending. The large majority objective in its own right. of the Bank-funded projects (60 percent) are located in East Asia and South Asia, due to the Important learning has taken place over the last rapid development of these countries and their 10-14 years, building up towards the positive high population densities. Nearly 100 projects, changes now underway. Despite the vast with a preliminary estimate of about 600,000 differences among countries and populations people to be relocated, have been proposed by involved, much more is now understood albout the Borrowers for the 1994 to 1997 pipeline of the major common factors that explain - by their projects. presence or absence - why resettlement worked in some cases and failed elsewhere. Within the 146 active projects with resettlement These are: in the portfolio, the scale of resettlement per project varies from less than 500 to more than (a) Political commitment by the Borrower, 200,000 people. However, the bulk of resettle- expressed in law, official policies, and ment is concentrated in a handful of projects in resource allocations; India, China, Indonesia, and Brazil: eleven large projects situated in these countries account (b) Systematic implementation by the Borrower for over half -1.1 million - of all the people and the Bank of established guidelines and being resettled. Projects in the South Asia and procedures; East Asia regions account for 80 percent of the Environment Department 7 Resettlement and Development population to be resettled. Latin America's share Bank has promoted this policy with the Borrow- in the resettlement project portfolio is 9 percent ers whose projects include involuntary popula- and Africa's is 23 percent. The number of tion displacement. One main result of the Bank's countries with multiple resettlement operations catalytic impact during 1986 to 1993 is that is expanding: growing economies in Pakistan, several Borrowers enacted or improved domestic Bangladesh, Vietnam, and Indonesia expect policies and legal frameworks for resettlement. significant increases in the number of Bank- supported projects with resettlement. Resettlement works when governments want it to work. The main way governments express The most significant sectoral shift in the Bank's their commitment to good resettlement is by resettlement portfolio is the rapid rise of trans- creating adequate institutional capacity, defined port, water and urban infrastructure projects. as the synergy between policy, organizations, This is now the largest sector in terms of num- and resources. Where Borrowers do not genu- ber of projects, accounting for 75 of the 146 inely concur with the Bank's resettlement policy ongoing projects involving resettlement. How- objectives from the outset, resettlement is ever, these resettlement operations are smaller generally not carried out well, regardless of the than the average in hydropower or agriculture number of covenants, follow-up supervision projects. Dams for irrigation, hydropower and missions, or the frequency of Bank threats to drinking water are the single largest cause of suspend disbursements. Similarly, when the displacement (63 percent of displaced people), Bank itself does not consistently adhere to its and transportation corridors are the second policy principles or procedures, project perfor- largest cause (23 percent). In sectoral terms, mance is weakened. agricultural projects continue to account for the largest segment of resettlers (52 percent). The 1986 to 1993 period has been marked by some notable policy successes. Stimulated by a Performance in Resettlement Bank sector project in 1990, based on the Bank's policy, Brazil's Electrobras developed satisfac- The Bank made significant progress during 1986 tory resettlement guidelines for the country's to 1993 in three major areas: power sector. Colombia adopted similar sectoral guidelines in 1992. China, with Bank * Influencing the resettlement policies of involvement, improved its policy guidelines in borrowing countries. the water resources sector. In 1993, India's National Thermal Power Corporation adopted a * Assisting Borrowers in avoiding unneces- sectoral rehabilitation policy for all its opera- sary resettlement operations or reducing the s,cfollowingfdetaile notiation with the scale of unavoidable displacements. tions, following detailed negotiations with the scale ounvialdiBank as part of preparations for a sector loan. * Assisting Borrowers in improving the The Bank has been far more effective overall- and circumstances of resettlers and their ability immediate operations have benefited more-when to restore their income. itsucceededinreachingagreementwithborrowing governments on the broad domestic or sectoral At the same time, however, when projects were policy frameworkrelevant to Bank-assisted not consistent with policy and processing operations, than when its efforts were only con- guidelines, a number of resettlers ended up fined to legal agreements for individual projects. In worse off. turn, the obligations laid down in individual loan legal agreements and the agreed upon "project Influencing policies policy" have sometimes formed thebasis for Having been the first international development discussingandimprovingmoregeneraldomestic agency ever to adopt a resettlement policy, the policy and legal frameworks. 8 Resettlement Series Executive Summary Major multilateral and bilateral donors also have created by the very project that displaced them. recently issued resettlement guidelines similar to Examples include helping resettlers develop the Bank's - for instance, the Inter-American aquaculture and fisheries in the new reservoirs Development Bank in 1990- and the Asian (Indonesia), moving them into the newly irri- Development Bank is now considering formally gated command areas (China, and some projects in India) or favoring them to cash in on the adopting simiflar guidelines, At the OECD's commercial opportunities created around the request, the Bank provided support in preparing newly constructed infrastructure (Argentina, resettlement guidelines, congruent with the China, Turkey). In many projects, living stan- Bank's guidelines, and in 1991 the development dards for urban resettlers improved through ministers of all OECD countries sanctioned more durable housing, more floor space per similar unified guidelines for their countries' aid capita, and better access to sanitary services - agencies. even though this came at the cost of a longer commute. Avoiding or reducing displacement Although Bank policy defines a measurable goal The Bank has become more effective in assisting for all resettlement operations - restoring pre- Borrowers in implementing the first principle of move income levels - very few projects have the resettlement policy: to avoid resettlement or included sufficient measures or methods to reduce its size whenever technically and assess whether income restoration is being economically feasible. The potential for recluc- achieved. Regional resettlement reports and .. . . . . ~~~~~most OED audits could not document whether ing or eliminating resettlement exists in many project proposals submitted for Bank financing. nmcomes were improved or restored. Available The redesign of the Saguling high dam in evidence documents numerous cases of impov- Ineredoesia, ofo instane, Sagulow dam hi erishment of displaced people through unsatis- Indoesi, fo intane, lwerd dm hegh, by factory resettlement. Better monitoring systems five meters, thus avoiding the displacement of faco resettleen. etiter mnditi sems 35,000 people. In the Cote d'Ivoire forestry panded. project, the Bank proposed revisions that reduced the Borrower's proposal to displace up to 200,000 people by 80 percent, to 40,000, and Compared to the findings of the Operations set substantially higher standards for those to be Evaluation Department in assessing the "early relocated. In Thailand, resiting the Pak Mtm experiences with resettlement" (1993), which dam and lowering its height has reduced mostly referred to projects started in the early displacement from 20,000 to 5,000 people. In and mid-1980s, the review found better perfor- Ecuador's Guayas flood-control project, the mance in recently completed or ongoing redesign of canal layouts completely eliminated projects, particularly in countries with robust t neede to displ ayo e. resettlement policies and implementation capacities such as China. However, the review comes to the same conclusion as the OED studies Restornag incomes - that, although the data are weak, projects appear The ultirnate test of consistency between resettle- often not to have succeeded in reestablishing ment operations and policy is income restoration resettlers at a better or equal living standard and and improvement. Bank-financed projects that that unsatisfactory performance still persists on a resettle people productively on land and in jobs wide scale. Though fragmentary, the weight of tend to restore income more effectively than available evidence points to unsatisfactory projects that deliver compensation without income restoration more frequently than to institutional assistance. Incomes were success- satisfactory outcomes. Performance in income fully restored particularly when resettlers were restoration is of particular concern in some country enabled to share in the immediate benefits portfolios, such as India and Indonesia, which Environment Department Resettlement and Development have numerous projects entailing displacementbut Difficulties occur particularly where land is do not have a country-wide policy or legal frame- scarce and land markets are thin. "Land for workforresettlement with income restoration. land" also implies land of approximately The key explanatory variable for success in equal capability and, when such solutions are restoring livelihoods on a productive basis is the not available, trade-offs must be provided to presence of a national commitment to help open up off-farm income sources. In urban resettlers, reflected in sectoral or national policy areas, resettlement difficulties revolve prima- postures on the issue. rily around entitlements of owners, tenants, or transient groups, access to altemative jobs and Declines in post relocation incomes are some- business opportunities, and affordable hous- times significant, in certain cases reaching as ing. Participatory approaches and involve- much as 40 percent for people who were poor ment of local urban NGOs have been very even before their displacement. Losses often effective in finding alternative fill-in locations include important income-generating assets that for urban resettlers and in mobilizing are not replaced, as well as loss of shelter. Field resettlers' energies for reconstructing their findings show that for farm families, loss of habitat at higher standards, with better environ- their land has generally far more severe conse- mental services. quences than displacement from their homes; this is true even when partial loss of farming The question this review has posed for analysis land leaves an economically nonviable unit. For is whether it is possible to identify the causes urban families, hardest to replace is the loss of for the gap between Bank policy objectives - small businesses and workshops, or of access to primarily recovering income levels - and gainful employment. Retrofitting actions have actual project outcomes, which leave many been started during the review in some recently people worse off. While there are cases of identified cases, and other corrective actions evident neglect and departures from institu- wil follow up on this review. tional norms, more fundamental reasons account for problems in resettlement perfor- The risks of declining standards of living occur mance. Other lessons learned through this along several lines - economic, social, health, review concern questions of institutional capaci- nutrition, and cultural alienation - and the ties of both Borrowers and the Bank, the costs of risk-model identified by the review provides a successful resettlement, and the need for long- warning model that helps planners and term development strategies. policymakers to prevent impoverishment. Not all risks affect various resettler groups equally, Despite the enormous variability between and some vulnerable groups and people (such projects and countries, a relatively small num- as indigenous and tribal groups, or women ber of factors account for the uneven perfor- headed households) have more exposure to the mance of resettlement operations: risks of economic and habitat displacement. Understanding the risks specific to different * Compensation provisions and property social groups helps explain how impoverish- acquisition practices do not provide enough ment occurs and what must be done to effec- resources to allow resettlers to purchase tively avoid these risks in future operations. replacement lands and other assets. While no law prevents governments from provid- The single most important factor for countering ing adequate assistance to resettlers, in such risks in rural resettlement is making practice compensation procedures frequently available adequate land with clear title to the exclude or underpay significant numnbers of members of displaced communities. In most affected people. Borrowers use institutional situations, the "land for land" strategy leads to means to displace people but do not use results far superior than cash compensation. enough of their institutional abilities to 10 Resettlement Series Executive Summary facilitate "land for land" alternatives on the alleviation policies and strategies. Some of the ground. Bank's most successful resettlement experiences have emerged from sectoral dialogues; where * The overall financial resources earmarked Borrowers and the Bank concentrate on overall for resettlement often fall short, often by resettlement objectives and planning principles large amounts. Cost overruns for resetile- that will guide individual resettlement projects. ment operations exceed overruns for civil works by an average of 50 percent, mainly Important differences exist between countries' because of initial underestimates. Budget abilities to implement resettlement, and, within constraints and inflexible allocation prcce- individual countries, between sectoral capabili- dures limit resources still further. ties. Strong and profitable sectoral agencies such as utilities and some parastatals can * The institutions charged with managing allocate the resources to carry out resettlement resettlement often lack the legal framevvork, successfully, provided it is part of their legal mandate and skill needed to help resetllers responsibility, and sound relocation standards and their hosts. Rigid procedures and lack become normal business practices. Administra- of experience with resettlement exacerbates tive departments typically lack the resources, weak commitment and poor performarLce. budgetary flexibility, and managerial skills to carry out resettlement programs without major * The affected and host communities are not improvements in their internal structure. All adequately participating in the resettlement resettlement programs, including smaller-scale process. Local knowledge is rarely used in operations such as the ones found in many designing resettlement programs or finding urban or environmental protection programs, viable solutions, and effective legal mecha- can be handled more effectively by involving nisms for resolving grievances are often local NGOs or community organizations of both lacking. Top-down planning and weal. resettlers and hosts. institutional field presence do not mobilize project beneficiaries in host areas to act as Preparation and Appraisal of stakeholders for resettlement success by accommodating resettlers amongst the m. Resettlement Certain preconditions exist for creating the Considerable improvements in the preparation enabling environment needed to help displaced and appraisal of projects involving resettlement families rebuild their lost livelihoods and were implemented between 1986 and 1993, production systems. Knowledge is available for bringing quality markedly above the levels creating such a n enabling environment, despite found by the 1986 resettlement review. But the enormous variability in each resettlement some work processes and procedures were situation. Favorable policy and legal framle- found not to have been carried out fully either works, sufficient financing, able institutions, and by Borrowers or the Bank. The project processing local involvement in program design and and porfolio management issues identified by management are the foundation for successful this review are partly similar to those found by resettlement. the recent portfolio management task force for the Bank at large, though often more acute in the Borrower capacities case of resettlement; they explain some of the uneven performance on the ground. Specific Improving resettlement practice within Bank problems that were found to recur, particularly in operations and beyond requires incorporating the early part of the review period, are: (i) failure resettlement issues into the broader develop- by many borrowing agencies to prepare satisfac- ment discussions between the Bank and its tory resettlement plans (quality at entry); (ii) Borrowers, and within the agenda of poverty laxness in fulfilling in-house responsibilities for Environment Department Resettlement and Development review and clearance in early project stages; (iii) result in project underdesign, inadequate cost irregular or insufficient project supervision; and estimates, resource shortfalls, institutional (iv) insufficient follow-up actions by Borrowers inability to prepare adequate solutions, and the and the Bank when implementation problems impoverishment of resettlers. Special indepen- areidentified. dent studies sponsored by the Bank appear sometimes necessary, and will be done in the For sound project preparation and execution, future, to clarify perceived discrepancies in four elements are defined as mandatory for survey information received from Borrowers' Bank financing of projects entailing displace- feasibility assessments. ment: population and income surveys; resettle- ment plans and development packages; resettle- Resettlement planning ment timetables synchronized with civil works; Requirements for Borrowers to prepare and the and distinct resettlement budgets for financing Bank to appraise resettlement plans have been compensation and resettlement-related invest- at the heart of World Bank policy since 1980. ments. With significant regularity, the failures Appraisal missions should not proceed to the in implementation and in restoring income can field unless the Borrower has submitted a be traced to poor work processes particularly in resettlement plan to the Bank that will allow the early project stages during project identification, Bank to appraise resettlement feasibility and preparation, and appraisal. cost in the context of the full project. Substan- Baseline surveys tial progress has been made since the 1986 resettlement review, which found that only Information about the population affected and 14 percent of the then-active projects had its resource base is essential for assessing and prepared resettlement plans that included the planning resettlement. The use of baseline minimum requirements of a baseline survey, surveys has increased substantially - from timetable, budget, and a set of rehabilitation 21 percent in FY80-FY85 to 43 percent in FY86- proposals. For the 1986 to 1993 period, an FY93, to 72 percent in projects approved in average of about 55 percent of Bank-assisted FY92-FY93, and 100 percent in the first ten projects could claim to have appraised full months of FY94. The majority of these Borrower resettlement plans. socio-economic surveys for ongoing projects still do not include income data. Assessing pre- A progressive improvement trend is clearly visible move income levels is not easy, but is feasible within the period under reviw, with momentum and necessary, since lack of income data at start rapidly building up over the last couple of years. deprives the design and execution of projects of For the FY93-FY94 all the key indicators for the defimed implementation targets and basic project processing and portfolio manage- monitorable benchmarks for income recovery. ment activities are considerably higher than for the first years of the period under review. Resettle- The greatest initial difficulty in many instances ment operations are now better prepared and fully is that borrowing agencies undercount the appraised. As with the increase in baseline affected population in project preparation and surveys, the proportionof projectresettlement provide inaccurate information to appraisal plans at appraisal stage has increased as welL in missions. The Turkey Izmir Water and Sewer- FY93 and the first ten months of FY94 all but one of age project (FY87) started with an estimate of the 18 projects approved had a resettlement plan at 3,700 affected people and now has a revised appraisal. assessment of 13,000 people. The Madagascar Tana Plain project (FY90), for which the While an improvement over the 1986 review Borrower's preparation estimate was 3,500 findings has been made, the level achieved still people, now has a revised estimate of 11,000 means, nonetheless, that many Bank-financed people. Incorrectly assessed displacement sizes projects currently under implementation got off 12 Resettlement Series Executive Summary to a poor start due to difficulties in planning. innovative solution was introduced in FY94, Projects with significant displacements, such as wherein China's Xiaolangdi dam and the Indonesia's Jabotabek Urban project (FY88), resettlement it causes are treated as two interre- China's Sichuan Highways project (FY88) and lated but distinct projects: one for the dam and Jiangsu Provincial Transport project (FY91), the other for resettlement as a full-scale develop- India's Talcher Thermal project (FY87) and ment project. This allows the resettlement Purnab Irrigation project (FY90), Guinea's project fully to plan and design, in well-speci- Second Urban project (FY90), Nigeria's Multi- fied steps, its redevelopment approach, based on State Water project (FY92), and others, did not differential packages tailored to the incomes and have a prepared, feasible resettlement plan alt potential of the affected populations, categoryby appraisal. The absence of such a plan means the category. absence of a fully funded package to assist resettlers. Remedial actions have been taken or Many of the projects lacking resettlement plans are underway for these projects to improve at appraisal developed such plans afterward. planning and resources. However, until 1992 overall compliance with Bank requirements for resettlement plans was The quality and adequacy of resettlement incomplete, both in preparation work and in planning has varied widely. Despite an overall staff appraisal reports (SARs). Largely because objective of restoring incomes and living stan- of the resistance or weak capacity of borrowing dards for displaced families, less than 30 percent agencies, or insufficient staff resources, divi- of the resettlement plans have made income sional managers did not always insist on full restoration a primary goal. This has affected compliance with operational directives. In performance. While superior to resettlement turn, instances of noncompliance were not cases in the same country that were not funded systematically identified by in-house reviews of by the Bank, the technical quality of resettlement preappraisal project documentation and of planning by Borrowers for projects financed by SARs. Clearance was given to projects that did the Bank has often remained below the high not fully meet Bank safeguards, and such standards required by the Bank. noncompliance was not flagged to regional managers and the Loan Committee before loan A side-by-side comparative study of involuntary approvaL These departures from internal and voluntary settlement programs highlighted project processing norms weakened project the significant contrast between the resources quality at entry. In particular, lack of resettle- and approaches used to prepare settlement ment plans has undercut the chances of satisfac- programs where development is the main tory recovery. While involuntary resettlement objective, and programs where involuntary is feasible when sound approaches are applied, resettlement is a subordinated component. The doing it adequately is hardly possible when institutional and development packages of long-set procedures, germane to poLicy goals, are projects assisting voluntary settlements offer not rigorously applied. Rather than accelerating valuable models that can be adapted and emu- execution, bypassing procedures merely post- lated in involuntary resettlement projects. Fur- pones problems. Such gaps in the Bank's own thermore, the large size of some involuntary work become particularly significant in cases resettlement operations, treated as project corapo- where the Borrower does not share the same nents ancillary to civil works, typically exceeds perspective on resettlement and has no national the capacity and expertise of the engineering policy framework to address the issue. In entities that manage infrastructural projects. The practice, Bank staff often have had a hard uphill experience of stand-alone voluntary settlement struggle to obtain compliance with agreed projects suggests the suitability of such full project guidelines, especially when the work of projects as vehicles for involuntary resettlement, technical agencies executing the project is not particularly in large-scale operations. An systematically monitored by the borrowing Environment Department 13 Resettlement and Development governments. Actions to improve work pro- works, were found to be missing from more than cesses and strengthen accountability have been half of the ongoing projects. During this review, initiated during the resettlement review, and Country Departments have initiated measures to additional measures to increase staff and work with Borrowers to devise explicit timetables managers' awareness have been adopted. for resettlement in all ongoing projects. In some cases, the divisions in charge agreed Financing for resettlement that Borrowers could submit resettlement plans Inadequate financial planning has been a major considerably after project inception. This * proved to be of little help and tended to con- poemen p retlmen eain ing much es don uneetmto of ree.lmn by. uneven performance. Many borrowing agencies done underestimation of resettlement by borrowing aecsdo not recognize and calculate all the costs of borrowing agencies, while holding the Bank hostage to practices it has long rejected. Experi- displacement incurred by the people affected ence has shown that postponing consideration and do not incorporate full resettlement and of resettlement plans until after appraisal is rehabilitation costs in overall project expendi- tures. This leaves resettlement underfinanced. costly~ ~ totebroig agnce aswl. For The review also found methodological weak- the ongoing Andhra Pradesh Irrigation II project nessesinew wa Astra theonogic and (FY86), estimated initially to displace about fin dienSios of resettlement. Bank 63,000 people, the division in charge agreed to t ech nical guidelines for s tandardizing the appraise without a resettlement plan and then td-clgieie o tnadzn h mapre wubmisitou a rsettlemenr plan an t economic and financial analysis of resettlement mnade submission of a satisfactory plan a condition of project effectiveness. However, the components, issued in 1988, were seldom used Borrower did not submit a satisfactory p either by Borrowers or by Bank economists. The thus missing three successive deadlines for distinction between compensation costs for lost project effectiveness; as a result the project was assets and the costs of new investments needed delayed and started only 14 months later. for reestablishing resettlers on a productive Commitment fees incurred by the Borrower for basis, with adequate shelter and services, has the delay exceeded the cost of preparing the been seldom made, and such investment costs resettlement plan. Lack of correct project have not been budgeted. When the costs of preparation resurfaced again in mid-term when relocating public sector infrastructure and of it became apparent that the actual number of relocating resettlers are consolidated, lack of ' ' . . . ~~~~~~distinction tends to mask low per capita alloca- affected people in this project was more than tin s to mask ow erap aesoca- double the appraisal estimate, totaling about tions to displaced families. The overall result 150,000 people. For over 85,000 people- resources earmarked for resettlement fall short additional to what the Borrower indicated of what is needed. during preparation, appraisal and negotiations The Banks overal financing of resettlement costs - no resettlement resources had been earmarked in FY86-FY93 projects has not been commensurate at appraisal. with the importance the Bank attaches to this Timetables project component Less than 15 percent of project resettlement components are cofinanced by the Good practice prudently spreads massive Bank - and when they are, the share of Bank relocations over the entire duration of the financing is usually small. Substantially increas- project, carrying out resettlement a step in ing the Bank's financing for productive develop- advance of civil works to avoid bunching at the ment at relocation sites could improve resource end of a project. Poor practice leaves the bulk of flows to resettlers, enhance resettlement quality the population transfer for the last one or two and project capacity to restore incomes, and years of a project's 8-to-10-year lifetime, subject- stimulate local development in relocation host ing resettlers to increased risks. Explicit re- areas. Direct lending for resettlement should settlement timetables, synchronized with civil support Bank policy more consistently. 14 Resettlement Series Executive Sunmmary Implementation and Supervision of Borrowers' compliance with legal agreements Resettlement has been monitored primarily for specific dated covenants for physical targets and seldom for the Gradual but uneven progress has been made quality of resettlement work. Many problems betweenu1986 buto 1993n suprogrvisig hbesen de were found by supervision missions, including between 1986 to 1993 in supervising resettle- departures by Borrowers from resettlement plans ment. The supervision of resettlement compo- and provisions of legal agreements. Better nents improved immediately after the 1986 monitoring and enforcement of legal agreements review, but afterward the frequency of supervi- regarding resettlement hold great potential for sion missions settled at a new plateau (higher increasing consistencybetween operatiotn and than the pre-1986 level) until the beginning of policy. In the last 18 months disbursements on this review, during which it again went up three projects were suspended for resettlement- sharply. Resettlement components in all large related reasons. irrigation and hydroelectric projects received regular supervision, but in transport, water, and One outcome of the 1993 review is to increase urban development projects and in projects with considerably the resources devoted to resettle- smaller resettlement operations, supervision ment supervision across the Bank. Two-thirds was sporadic. Where resettlement in some of all resettlement supervision mnissions during projects with large displacements, particularly 1993 included resettlement specialists, often in the urban sector was left unsupervised for through the temporarily intensified use of several years - such as in the Indonesia resettlement consultants needed for quick jabotabek urban project - it was difficult for capacity build-up. The 1-2 ratio.of staff to the Bank to get a good grasp on how people resettlement consultants employed during the 1993 review helped, but it is neither sustainable nor healthy for the institution in the long term, The recent improvements in the quality and as it does not build in-house capacity and continuity of resettlement supervision must be expertise (the same ratio of staff to consultants sustained. Resettlement specialists are regularly in overall portfolio management is 1:0.5). As used for the group of projects involving large consultants respond to other demands, continu- resettlements, but social staff scarcity kept ity in resettlement portfolio management specialist supervision of medium-sized and suffers. smaller resettlement components below desir- able levels, a situation partly corrected throligh Improvements in Portfolio more frequent employment of consultants. Technical Departments are thinly staffed with Management During 1993 social specialists, and must split their efforts among many Country Departments. Resettle- The management and the performance of the ment involves not only social but also many Bank's resettlement portfolio were improved in technical dimensions in both agricultural and important ways in 1993. As the review identified urban settings. Technical staff of Country problems, relevant Bank units, jointly with Departments, with some important exceptions, Borrowers, initiated measures to address them. are only sporadically used to cover resettlement Throughout this process, the Bank: (i) strongly during normal supervision. The results are often intensified supervision of resettlement; (ii) tardy identification of implementation difficulties increased technical assistance to Borrowers for - with late signals about problems to manage- corrective actions; and (iii) improved the ment and delayed Bank reaction to borrowing immediate work on new projects in the FY94- agencies responsible for implementation. The FY97 pipeline. Bank's store of multidisciplinary technical talent is an important resource that regularly During the 1993 review, the Bank tripled its must be brought to bear on resettlement. resources for resettlement supervision. Most Environment Department 15 Resettlement and Development projects involving the resettlement of more than nized resettlement training seminars in India, 1,000 people were supervised at least once, and China, and Turkey, and agreed with various over 40 projects, including the largest, were Borrowers to continue such training. supervised twice. The regions sent more supervision missions for resettlement during the The entire review process has been an excep- past 12 months than in the previous three years tional opportunity for learning how to do taken together. resettlement better, for identifying good prac- tices, adjusting general approaches to particular Remedial actions begun during the review sectors and circumstances, building institutional include: (i) reassessing the magnitude of capacity for resettlement, and refining analytical resettlement; (ii) adjusting timetables for and evaluation methodologies. While a consid- resettlement; (iii) increasing the participation of erable part of these lessons are presented in this affected people; (iv) finding better relocation report of othe eonomic, sociologi- solutions or ways to reduce displacement; (v) report, a number of other economic, sociologi- providing additional financial resources; and completed oedundray. The find (vi) supporting Borrowers' efforts to expand completed or are underway. The findings of organizational capacity. These remedial actions these studies wil be widely disseminated to have considerably improved the Bank's overall help expand available knowledge and best portfolio, as a number of "problem resettlement practices. Contributions from the Legal Depart- pmrojects' -such as Turkey's Izmir Water and ment include pioneering studies by the Bank's pewerage project, Madagascar's Tana Plain General Counsel on the legal issues involved in project, and several projects in India - have population displacement by public sector been put on a sound path to improvement. In development interventions, which help both the India, for instance, following intensive support Bank and Borrower in protecting resettlers' by Bank staff and management, significant rights and entitlements. The Environment remedial actions have been agreed upon in the Department also prepared a set of new instru- Maharashtra Irrigation III Project, with 168,000 ments for improving future resettlement work, affected people, in the context of project including: revised guidelines for the economic restructuring; and in the Upper Krishna and financial analysis of resettlement; a com- Irrigation 11 Project, with over 220,000 affected puter-based project-level monitoring system for people, where improved resettlement work has resettlement execution; guidelines for develop- recently made possible the lifting of disburse- ing reservoir fisheries for resettlers; and studies ment suspension. More corrective actions are on experiences with urban resettlement. Sup- envisaged. port was given for the preparation of a technical manual for planning urban resettlement by the In-house analytical work, and training offered Rotterdam Institute for Housing Studies. The to country officials, have also contributed Africa Region (AFrES), which has synthesized during 1993 to improving portfolio manage- and published its bi-annual reviews of resettle- ment. All regions have prepared reports ment carried out since 1988, also organized an analyzing the status of resettlement operations international conference and published a volume not only on a project-by-project basis but also as on resettlement in Africa. a subset of the region's portfolio. Central departments have prepared sector-focused and The activities throughout 1993 in the Bank and issue-focused resettlement reports on agricul- in the field demonstrate the Bank's and the ture, hydropower, and urban and transporta- Borrowers' abilities to learn from experience, to tion; they will continue to monitor specific respond effectively to resettlement problems, aspects of the resettlement portfolio. The legal and to set clear institutional priorities. Both are aspects of resettlement have been analyzed by now better equipped to carry out resettlement the Legal Vice Presidency. In 1993, EDI orga- work in forthcoming projects. Nonetheless, 16 Resettlement Series Executive Summary since considerable additional resources were institutional development projects to assist the needed and allocated to achieve these results, it government in improving organizational capaci- will be a challenge for all to maintain the recent ties for addressing resettlement needs through- level of effort. out project design and implementation (e.g., capacities for site preparation, land resource Actions to Improve Bank Resettle- studies, monitoring and evaluation, training). ment Work Such Bank institutional support will focus primarily on national and state agencies - such as central irrigation and water departments, The general conclusion of the resettlement electricity boards, corporations - aiming to review is that the quality of the Bank's resettle- develop their overall capacity on technical, ment project portfolio has improved, particut- social, and environmental matters, and specifi- larly after 1991. The review also revealed cally to develop design standards, rules and important weaknesses, and actions have been, regulations that could help translate resettlement or will be, taken to achieve further improve- policy and legal provisions into project practice. ments. NGOs can play a big role in increasing local institutional capacity, and the Bank will encour- Strategic priorities age their involvement. Within the Bank's existing policy for resettle- ment centered on income restoration, work will Improve project design be guided by the following strategic priorities, Bank-assisted projects should avoid or reduce which match the key lessons described in this displacement as much as possible through report. technical and social studies for project design Ensure the Borrower's commitment and execution. Every effort willbe made before Ensure the Borrower's commitment project start to search for technical and social The Bank will not finance projects involving options to reduce resettlement. The Bank will make large resettlement operations unless the govern- special efforts to identify and disseminate best ment concerned adopts policies and legal practices, particularly as regards resettlement in frameworks apt to lead to resettlement with urban and semi-urban contexts for which opera- income restoration. Agreement on policy tional approaches must be further refined. Project should be explicit from the outset, with due design and explicit timetables should create consideration given to circumstances in coun- internal mechanisms that link progress in civil tries with a federal system, where the policies/ works with gradual advance in resettlement. These legal frameworks may fall within the jurisdic- willbe described in project SARs. tion of the state/provincial governments. Loans in sectors with high resettlement needs should Promote people's participation provide for gradual extension of irnproved The Bank requires the active participation of resettlement standards from the project level to would-be resettlers in the preparation, planning, imnpact more broadly the whole sector. and implementation of resettlement. As part of regular environmental assessments (EA), re- Enhance the Borrower's institutioinal settlement plans are made available to the capacity public. Reliable information must be available The Bank will help Borrowers build their to the project-affected people regarding resettle- institutional capacity to implement resettlement ment and rehabilitation policy, entitlements, before displacement starts, including the eligibility, options, due process, and appeals clarification of legal frameworks, with a view to mechanisms. Public consultation on resettle- protect people's rights. For Borrowers with ment plans will stimulate participation of several Bank-assisted resettlement operations, resettler and host populations in preparing such the Bank will be prepared to support special plans, and later in executing them. Environment Department 17 Resettlement and Development Provide adequate Bankfinancing performance monitoring and evaluation. Man- To prevent impoverishment, all future projects agers will allocate sufficient resources from will internalize the full cost of resettlement and within their budgets to achieve these improve- of the investments required for income restora- ments. To support overall strengthening of work tion within total project costs. In the coritext of on the social dimensions of projects, the Bank the overall project financing plan, the Bank will will allocate financial resources to a central fund be prepared to increase its share in financing designed to provide support for innovative resettlement operations, as needed from case to projects addressing priority social dimensions, case. As adequate financing still remains a such as participatory poverty assessments, problem in some recently approved projects, the methodologies for social analysis, the organiza- Bank will consider supplementary financing tion of natural resource users, NGO involve- whenever appropriate. Increased financing ment in project design and implementation, and from domestic - and, when appropriate, from others. bilateral sources - for resettlement activities Remedial and retrofitting actions should be also sought. Near-term remedial actions will be continued or Diversify project vehicles initiated for active projects that fall short of The Bank will consider twin-project ap- policy and legal provisions. For the ongoing proaches for large-scale civil works causing projects identified by each region as having resettlement. Future infrastructural operations serious resettlement problems, remedial action that displace a large number of people will plans are being prepared by the Borrowers with normally be processed as twin projects, with Bank assistance, and the preparation of all such the actual threshold for the stand-alone project plans will be completed by mid-1995. Some to be determined on the basis of country and projects may require restructuring, additional local capacity. Processing of large-scale financing, or the creation of resettlement resettlement operations as components of agencies. larger projects will require justification in the Staff Appraisal Report. Treatment of major For the projects assessed by the regions as resettlement operations as full fledged projects having moderate or minor problems, Bank will better mobilize the appropriate adminis- assistance will continue to be provided through trative frameworks and skills needed to carry regular or intensified supervision by each out resettlement successfully. An additional Country Department. Borrowers would be option is to use two-project sequences, with a expected to reallocate financial resources within rural or urban development project immedi- project budgets to complete resettlement ately following up in the resettlement zone on successfully, and, when requested, the Bank will the heels of the infrastructure operation consider additional financing. involving displacement; this option should be considered based on needs in each project area The review identified cases where resettlement situation. plans agreed with the Bank were not imple- mented by the Borrower and completed projects Strengthen the Bank's institutional have left a number of resettlers worse off. The capacity Bank stands ready to provide assistance to The Bank is increasing its capacity to address Borrowers in the remedial actions they propose the social and technical dimensions of resettle- to take. Such 'retrofitting" actions by the ment projects, in order to sustain and build on Borrower, to the extent possible, should identify the recent improvements. Particularly important the people affected and seek to reverse their are better use of existing staff skills, additional impoverishment. The retrofitting actions agreed staff capacity in critical fields such as social upon between the Bank and India's National areas, enhanced project review, and ongoing Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC) for several 18 Resettlement Series Executive Summary completed thermal projects is a recent example the decisive preparatory phases. In major that represents progress. operations - particularly for dams - consider- ation is increasingly given in the early identifica- Improving project processing tion stages to using a resettlement advisory Full compliance with procedures and estab- panel, along the lines pursued in establishing lished safeguards for ensuring project quality - dam safety panels. such as baseline income surveys, resettlement plans and packages, timetables, and budgets - Bank provisions for resettlement appraisal, as is essential. The fact that nearly all FY93-FY'94 defined in OMS 2.20 and OD 4.30, are adequate projects submitted to the Regional Loan Corn- and will be implemented. Appraisal will explic- mittees comply with established procedures itly assess and report on the social and economic indicates that Regional Vice Presidencies are risks involved in the proposed resettlement focusing on these requirements. While ful operation, distinct from other project risks, and implementation responsibility rests with ensure that the socio-economic reconstruction borrowing governments, Bank staff have their package addresses these risks. Consistent with own responsibility to follow up carefully on the Bank management decision on preparing an performance, impacts, and outcomes. Because Implementation Plan for each project at ap- of the high risks involved in sensitive projects praisal, the resettlement plan will be incorpo- that dismantle and reconstruct peoples' liveli- rated in the overall implementation plan. hoods, particular prudence and care are war- ranted by Bank and Borrower staff. It is essen- The content of SARs for projects involving tial that the Bank address - and be clearly seen resettlement is being improved to ensure that to address - its own responsibilities more essential information about resettlement is effectively, in addition to the Bank's call on provided to management and the Board. A borrowing governments to do the same. distinct SAR subsection for the resettlement component will include the basic indicators on Improvements have been and are being made in affected populations, development packages, (i) the analysis of resettlement at appraisal and risk mitigation, timetable, and budget. The in the design of development packages for overall cost of resettlement will be specified as resettlers, (ii) the in-house review of resettle- an identifiable part of project costs and will ment components before project submission to distinguish compensation costs from the costs of the Regional Loan Committee, and (iii) the investments needed to reconstruct a viable socio- staffing and organization of operational units to economic basis for resettlers. enable them to address resettlement profession- ally and consistently. Much of the knowledge Supervision needed for doing sound, successful resettlement resides in the Bank, and the present review has Considerable scope exists for further improving enriched it. With well-deployed staff resources, the content and frequency of resettlement this knowledge must now be more fully used. supervision. Regular and adequately staffed supervision missions will take place at least At project identification and during the prepara- every 12 months, including on-the-ground visits tion of large resettlement operations, the Bank to the places where displacement and relocation will encourage Borrowers to-carry out pilot actually occur. Intensively using local specialist schemes to test the adequacy of proposed consultants will significantly increase the reach solutions and arrangements. Systematic use of of Bank supervision work. The good practice Project Preparation Facility resources and of the introduced by the East Asia and Africa regions to Institutional Development Fund (IDF) will open support monitoring panels appointed by the additional financial windows for technical Borrower improves implementation and will be support and capacity building to Borrowers in extended. Environment Department 19 Resettlement and Development Bank divisions responsible for projects with the Bank, and the limited in-house capacity for complex resettlement need to allocate increased social analysis is being strengthened. Diversi- staff time to supervise these operations. How- fied project vehicles and more financial resources ever, no amount of increased Bank supervision will be used by the Bank to assist Borrowers with can substitute for Borrowers' defaults or weak large scale resettlement operations. commitment to carry out agreed actions. When compliance with legal agreements is found By setting more exacting norms for the opera- lacking, decisions to continue disbursements tions it assists, and promoting resettlers' rees- require approval at the same regional manage- tablishment at comparable or improved income ment levels that clear proposals to suspend levels, the Bank is working to narrow the gap disbursement (this applies to all non-compli- between resettlement goals and past entrenched ance and not only to non-compliance with practice in many countries. Closing this gap resettlement agreements). Because of the requires time, resources and steady effort by sensitivity and risks of resettlement, current both the Bank and its Borrowers. Unfortunately, mechanisms for reporting field findings to bad standards continue to prevail in much of divisional and regional managers (through the displacement taking place today outside Form 590) will be improved. Bank-assisted programs; as Bank-financed projects do not occur in isolation, such stan- To sustain the progress achieved during the dards slow progress under Bank-financed review and to monitor continued compliance projects as well. For this reason all governments with Bank guidelines and procedures, regional and multilateral and bilateral development units will prepare annual reports on projects agencies must pursue similar policies and with resettlement in their portfolio, as part of approaches, to maximize the prospects for the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance improving the livelihood of resettlers. (ARPP). These reports will cover the manage- ment of the resettlement project portfolio along By supporting resettlement centered on prevent- measurable indicators - specifically the ing impoverishment, the Bank promotes policies frequency of supervision missions, and assess- and approaches that are relevant far beyond the ments of livelihood recovery as displaced Bank-assisted projects. Improving Borrower's people resettle, and major implementation capacity will benefit not only Bank-assisted problems, if any. As regards the processing of operations, but also the much broader resettle- new projects with resettlement, the reporting will ment activities of entire sectors, affecting larger cover the presence of resettlement plans, income numbers of people. This is the road that must surveys, timetables and budgets, and consulta- be travelled in future resettlement work, even tion with local people. though it is not an easy one. There will be many difficulties, because resettlement remains a formidable challenge for Borrowers as well as for the Bank The Bank recognizes its important Strengthening its assistance to Borrowers on responsibility to help its Borrowers move resettlement work and improving resettlement progressively along this road, to improve performance is of high priority for the Bank, resettlement whenever displacement cannot be and part and parcel of the Bank's central avoided, and to extend improved approaches to mission to alleviate poverty and promote sector and national contexts. sustainable development. The important learning process that has taken place over the Notes last few years has increased awareness of the See World Development Report, 1994 for a detailed complex issues and risks involved, and the Bank discussion. and its Borrowers are much better equipped 2 See Operations Evaluation Department, Early than in the past to work in this area. Much of the Experiences with Involuntary Resettlement, Report No. necessary technical talent for this work exists in , June o, 20 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo Un Reto en Todo el Mundo proyectos de desarrollo ha crecido rapidamente en las uiltimas decadas, debido al aumento del El reasentamiento involuntario ha acompariado nuimero de obras de infraestructura y la los procesos de desarrollo a traves de la densidad poblacional.. Se estima que de un historia y ha marcado de manera indeleble la promedio de 300 represas de gran tamanio que evoluci6n tanto de los paises industrializados inician construcci6n cada afio, ocasionan el como de los paises en desarrollo. La desplazamiento de mas de 4 millones de construcci6n de importantes represas para la personas. Los programas de desarrollo urbano generaci6ri de energia, irrigaci6n y sistemas de y de transporte que se inician cada afio en los agua potable o la extensi6n de las redes de paises en desarrollo provocan adicionalnente carreteras han ocasionado desplazamientos el desplazamiento de alrededor de 6 millones cargados de infortunio y deprivaci6n. El de personas. En la uiltima decada, se estima drama del desplazamiento forzoso en el sector que entre 80 y 90 millones de personas han sido West End de la ciudad de Boston ha sido reasentadas como resultado de programas de divulgado en toda la literatura sociol6gica. El infraestructura para construir represas y para hermoso plan maestro de la actual ciudad cle proyectas de desarrollo urbano y transporte. Paris fue posible gracias a la dolorosa Las inversiones en otros sectores hacen que se reubicaci6n de parte de sus habitantes en los incremente aun mas este niumero de dias del Bar6n Haussmann. La construcci6n de desplazados. la impresionante autopista denominada Cross Bronx Expressway en la ciudad de Nueva York Los programas financiados por el Banco cercen6 muchos barrios algunos de los cual Mundial son responsables de un porcentaje algunos podrian haber sido preservados. Los pequefio pero significativo de este niumero de gigantescos complejos hidroelectricos en personas afectadas. Los proyectos que en la Canada requirieron la movilizaci6n de muchos actualidad estAn activos en el portafolio del grupos indigenas. Los desplazamientos Banco involucran el reasentamiento de 2 involuntarios ocurren hasta el presente en millones de personas en un perfodo de ocho todos los paises por razones relacionadas con la afhos. Calculando en forma conservadora, los mejora en las condiciones de vida, la proyectos financiados por el Banco provocan infraestructura ambiental y la expansi6n de los un 3 porciento de los reasentamientos causados servicios puiblicos. La experiencia con varios por la construcci6n de represas en todo el tipos de desplazamientos involuntarios y e1 mundo y un 1 porciento de los reasentamiento ha generado un creciente desplazamientos causados por proyectos de cuerpo de conocimnientos para la planificaci6n y desarrollo urbano y transporte en los paises en para proteger los derechos y los medios de desarrollo. subsistencia de la poblaci6n afectada. Aunque en terminos relativos la participaci6n En los paises en desarrollo la escala de los del Banco en reasentamiento es limitada, no desplazamiento de poblaci6n relacionada con deja de ser de gran importancia. En los casos Environment Department 21 Resettlement and Development de los proyectos que ha financiado, el Banco Los programas de reasentamiento bien tiene la responsabilidad de ayudar a los ejecutados pueden ser un elemento en la Prestatarios para asegurar que cada esfuerzo es estrategia de un pals para reducir la pobreza. dirigido a restablecer y si es posible mejorar los Esto requiere no s6lo politicas racionales y medios de subsistencia de la poblaci6n recursos adecuados sino tambien un cambio de afectada. Pero la participaci6n del Banco tiene mentalidad para reconocer los derechos que un significado mas amplio que va mas alla del tienen las comunidades afectadas de participar tamafio del reasentamiento realizado en los en los beneficios del proyecto que causa su proyectos financiados por el. De hecho, desplazamiento. durante los dIltimos catorce aftos desde que el Banco estableci6 sus innovadores lineamientos El mejoramiento de los reasentamientos es pues para el reasentamiento, ha trabajado cada vez una prioridad urgente. Para lograr mnas con los gobiemos para promover mejores reasentamientos racionales se requiere mejorar politicas y marcos legales para el nuestro entendimiento de la complejidad reasentamiento, tanto a nivel del proyecto social, cultural, econ6mica y ecol6gica como en su entorno, asi como con las agencias involucrada asi como afrontar con franqueza que ejecutan los proyectos, con el fin de las lecciones de exito y fracaso. Esta revisi6n promover mejores procedimientos para la que Ilevamos a cabo es parte de ese proceso. gesti6n. Es dificil para los gobiernos de paises en Revisi6n de los Proyectos del Banco desarrollo mejorar los reasentamientos, que Implican Reasentamiento particularmente en aquellos de bajos ingresos donde la tierra es escasa y en los cuales La Revisi6n de los Proyectos del Banco que diferentes necesidades de la poblaci6n implican reasentamiento se inid6 en 1992 para compiten entre si y donde existen limitaciones cubrir todos los proyectos del portafolio del de recursos y capacidad institucional. En los Banco entre 1986 y 1993 y detemirnar la filtimos afios se ha registrado un progreso consistencia con que se aplican las politicas en sustancial y en algunos paises los avances han las operaciones. La Revisi6n fue asignada al sido admirables. Sin embargo, continiuan los Departamento de Medio Ambienfe en la problemas y las dificultades asociadas con el Vicepresidencia para el Desarrollo Ambien- reasentamiento involuntario y a menudo la talmente Sostenible. El Departamento del calidad de la gesti6n es menor que la Medio Ambiente establecio un Grupo de esperada. Trabajo para coordinar la Revisi6n y para ilevarla a cabo conjuntamente con los Los costos de reasentamientos inadecuados departamentos regionales. Cada una de las pueden ser muy altos, provocando el aumento regiones operativas del Banco y el de los niveles de pobreza en un gran ndmero Departamento Legal, formaron subgrupos de de personas. Esto es especialmente serio ya trabajo para la revisi6n de los reasentamientos. que muchos de los afectados son muy pobres. Todas los departamentos regionales prepararon Estas poblaciones habitan normalmente en las reportes analiticos comprensivos sobre su Areas menos favorecidas donde no existe portafolio de proyectos que implicaron infraestructura y donde los servicios sociales reasentamiento, los cuales sirvieron de base son muy limitados. Los lugares renotos donde para este reporte. Se recibieron ademas se ubican muchas represas a menudo estan contribuciones de otras Vicepresidendas habitados por pueblos indigenas, minorfas centrales del Banco. etnicas o religiosas. Esto agrava el imperativo moral de exigir politicas racionales y su Los tres objetivos de la revisi6n del aplicaci6n efectiva. reasentamiento fueron: 22 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo * Establecer la magnitud del reasentamiento uiltimos quince afios, el porcentaje de familias involuntario en el portafolio de proyectos con acceso a agua potable ha aumentado en un del Banco as! como su composici6n y 50 porciento, lo cual ha hecho posible una tendencias regionales y sectoriales. mejora dramatica en la salud y la calidad de vida. El niumero de personas con acceso a * Analizar los programas de reasentamiento servicios de energia electrica y telefono se ha existentes en cuanto a su calidad y coni- duplicado en el mismo periodo, lo cual ha sistencia con las politicas y resultados. permitido una incremento en la productividad y el bienestar social. La producci6n de * Identificar los problemas recurrentes que alimentos se ha elevado significativamente afectan la ejecuci6n; iniciar acciones ilegando a duplicarse durante el uiltimo cuarto correctivas y preparar una estrategia de de siglo. La mitad de este aumento se ha seguimiento para dirigir los producido como resultado de inversiones en reasentamientos mas efectivamente. proyectos de irrigaci6n. Las inversiones en programas de transporte han reducido los Esta Revisi6n fue deliberadamente diseflada costos y mejorado los precios de los insumos y como un proceso amplio de analisis de los productos agricolas. reasentamientos en el campo y no como un ejercicio de gabinete y fue llevado a cabo con la Estos logros implican a menudo cambios en los participaci6n de las unidades regionales y patrones de uso de la tierra y del agua y en centrales del Banco relevantes al proceso, algunos casos obligan al desplazamiento de la conjuntamente con los Prestatarios. El prinicipal poblaci6n. El nuimero de personas que producto de esta Revisi6n comprehensiva no es requieren reasentamientos se puede reducir y simplemente el reportefinal, sino el proceso que se tal como demuestra este reporte, se ha desencaden6 en 1993 en todo el Banco y en el alcanzado un progreso sustancial en tal terreno. El proceso de revisi6n consisti6 en, una sentido. Pero la necesidad de los intensa supervisi6n de campo, un analisis de la reasentamientos no se puede eliminar. preparaci6n, evaluaci6n, supervisi6n e Tampoco se debe asuniir que el volumen de los implementaci6n de los proyectos, asi como reasentamientos sera mucho menor en el consultas sobre el terreno con Organizaciones futuro. Mas de 2 mil millones de personas No Gubernamentales (ONGs), estudios continuaran careciendo de electricidad y seran sectoriales sobre reasentamiento, desarrollo de forzadas a utilizar lefia y desperdicios para nuevos instrumentos tecnicos para la cubrir sus necesidades energeticas; 1.7 mil planificaci6n del reasentamiento y un niunero millones de personas viven sin sistemas de considerable de acciones correctivas alcantarillado y mil millones no tienen acceso a conjuntamente iniciadas por el Banco y los agua potable en tuberia, lo cual provoca la Prestatarios para aquellos proyectos.que no muerte innecesaria de 2 a 3 millones de niflos cumplian los objetivos fijados. e infantes cada aflo. La producci6n de alimentos necesitara duplicarse en los Temas Conceptuales pr6ximos 40 afios lo cual es inalcanzable sin realizar nuevas inversiones en sistemas de Necesidad de inversiones en irrigaci6n. La poblaci6n del mundo infraestructura aumentara en mil millones cada decada durante el mismo periodo. Una inversi6n Los paises en desarrollo invierten alrededor de sustancial en nueva infraestructura sera $200 mil millones por aflo en nueva absolutamente esencial si se desea reducir la infraestructura. El rendimiento econ6mico y pobreza y disminuir las tasas de crecimiento social de estas inversiones ha sido alto.4 En los de la poblaci6n. Environment Department 23 Resettlement and Development La naturaleza del problema en la salud y la perdida del acceso a los activos de reasentamientos la comunidad. Es por eso que la ejecuci6n del reasentamiento de forma adecuada es una tarea Los reasentamientos involuntarios consisten en de prevenci6n del empobrecimiento y de dos procesos fntimamente relacionados y al reducci6n de la pobreza, ambos objetivos son mismo tiempo distintos: el desplazamiento de centrales dentro de la niisi6n del Banco. Al las personas y la recuperaci6n de sus medios trabajar para reducir la pobreza, el Banco y sus de subsistencia. Estos son los procesos mas paises miembros deben adoptar medidas de dificiles en el trabajo de desarrollo. La mitigaci6n que aseguren que los complejidad del reasentamiento involuntario y desplazamientos y reasentamientos producidos la enorme diversidad de situaciones de los por el proyecto no aumenten el numero de proyectos hacen que la labor de Ilevar a cabo familias qup e viven en estas condiuones. un reasentamiento exitoso sea una tarea formi- dable. El primer paso para dirigirnos hacia la La movilizaci6n involuntaria de la poblaci6n soluci6n de estos problemas debe ser reconocer tambien implica consecuencias legales. La su dificultad intinseca. facilidad de violar los derechos individuales y colectivos hacen que el desplazamiento Cuando las personas son desplazadas, se compulsivo sea distinto a cualquier otra desmantelan los sistemas productivos, se actividad de un proyecto. El hecho de que los dispersan los grupos de afinidad, y se proyectos a menudo son demorados por las desorganizan los asentamientos residenciales cortes, y de que los niveles de compensaci6n a con larga tradici6n.5 La vida de las personas se menudo se elevan significativamente en las afecta de forma muy dolorosa. Se pierden los cortes de apelaci6n, refleja el reconocimiento en empleos y el patrimonio. Se produce una los sistemas legales de que las personas no tendencia al deterioro de los servicios de salud. pueden ser desplazadas arbitrariamente sin Se cortan los vinculos entre los productores y una compensaci6n justa, aun cuando exista una sus clientes y se disloca el mercado de trabajo necesidad de interes publico. Cuando los local. Se disuelven redes sociales que son parte procesos de reasentamiento se Blevan a cabo en del sistema diario de supervivencia como la concordancia con la ley y respetando en su ayuda mutua en el cuidado de los nifios, la totalidad los derechos de las personas, se seguridad alimentaria, las transferencias de reduce (aunque no se elimina) la oposici6n al ingresos, los prestamos a corto plazo, el proyecto por parte de las personas afectadas y intercambio de trabajo manual y otras fuentes la implementaci6n general del proyecto basicas de apoyo socio-econ6mico. Como probablemente se desenvolvera mas resultado de la dispersi6n de sus miembros, las efectivamente. Un reasentamiento que toma en organizaciones locales y las asociaciones cuenta las pecesidades y los deredios de las formales e informales desaparecen. El sistema personas afectadas adenmls de cumplir con la tradicional de comunidad y de autoridad ley constituye un ejercico eficaz de desarrollo. puede perder sus lideres. Se abandonan los lugares simb61icos tales como santuarios y El debate internacional sobre cementerios y se cortan los vinculos con el pasado y con la identidad cultural de la reasentamiento comunidad. Atendiendo a su complejidad y efectos negativos, los reasentamientos involuntarios El efecto cumulativo puede destruir la entretela han sido el foco de un amplio debate inter- social y la economia local y es profundamente nacional que involucra y polariza a los desvastador para un gran numero de personas. gobiernos y a las ONGs, a los grupos de El riesgo principal es el empobrecimiento a opini6n publica, a los congresistas y traves de la perdida de la tierra, falta de parlamentarios, a las agencias de desarrollo y a empleo, inseguridad alimentaria, deterioro de los medios de comunicaci6n. La critica al 24 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo reasentamniento involuntario a menudo se Banco rechaz6 el argumento de que el convierte en un rechazo de las metas y la empobrecinIento de los desplazados era una legitimidad del proyecto que ocasiona el faceta lamentable pero inevitable del reasentamiento y a veces del desarrollo en sl desarrollo. La meta fundamental de la politica mismo. Se manejan dos argumentos. El del Banco es restablecer las condiciones de vida primero niega en principio la aceptabilidadl de y la capacidad de ingreso de las personas cualquier reasentamiento involuntario. El desplazadas y mejorarlas cuando sea posible. segundo critica la calidad de una operaci6n Sus lineamientos protegen y amplian los especifica de reasentamiento. Los proyectos derechos de las personas desplazadas y apoyados por el Banco reciben profusamente promueven el despliegue de redes de ambas criticas. seguridad para restablecer sus medios de subsistencia. La politica del Banco propone El rechazo de todo reasentamiento es poco que siempre que sea posible el reasentamiento realista. En muchas situaciones el reasenta- involuntario se convierta en una oportunidad miento involuntario es inevitable. El asunto es para el desarrollo, mejorando las condiciones c6mo minirnizar su magnitud y responder de vida y permitiendo que las personas efectivamente a las necesidades de las personas desplazadas se beneficien del proyecto de que serfn desplazadas. El Banco comparte la desarrollo que origin6 su desplazamiento. posici6n de aquellos criticos que deploran las malas operaciones de reasentamiento. Su El restablecimiento de las anteriores preocupaci6n por el bienestar de las condiciones de vida es, en la prfictica, una tarea poblaciones desplazadas es totalmente formidable. Al buscar un resultado orientado justitificada y ajustada a los mandatos y al desarrollo, la politica de reasentamiento del politicas del propio Banco. Es frecuente que las Banco presenta un gran reto tanto al Prestatario criticas hechas por las ONGs y otros grupos como al Banco, el cual es totalmnente consistente sobre las fallas de los reasentamientos ayuden a con la politica de alivio de la pobreza de los mejorar las politicas y las operaciones del gobiemos prestatarios. Sin embargo, es Banco. Precisamente a traves de su decisi6n de necesario entender la naturaleza y la dimensi6n adoptar una politica formal basada en de las tareas que se enfrentan al implementar principios de equidad y enfoques racionales, el esta politica. Existen tres razones centrales por Banco ha lanzado la mas aguda critica contra las cuales la simple compensaci6n en efectivo las malas praccticas de desplazamiento que de las perdidas de propiedad bajo las bien ocasionan el empobrecimiento de los conocidas leyes de dominio no pueden proveer desplazados. en la practica resultados satisfactorios para los La politica de reasentamiento desplazados: la ausencia en muchos paises en desarrollo de mercados de trabajo y de tierras del Banco que funcionen efectivamente, la incapacidad El Banco fue la primera agencia intemacional sustantiva y de procedimiento de los sistemas de desarrollo que respondi6 a la complejidaed y de compensaci6n para las propiedades dificultad de los desplazamientos adoptando expropiadas por el estado y la ausencia de en 1980 una politica formal y procedimientos mallas de seguridad social adecuadas. Esto institucionales para atender a los procesos (le aumenta la necesidad de aplicar la politica de desplazamiento y las necesidades de las reasentamiento del Banco para evitar que los personas que son objeto de reasentamientos proyectos financiados provoquen el (ver cuadro 1). Esta politica esta basada en empobrecimiento. Para alcanzar esta meta a experiencias concretas con reasentamientos menudo se requieren cambios en las politicas, tanto en paises desarrollados como en aquellos marco legal, capacidad institucional y practicas en desarrollo, asi como en investigaciones die vigentes de muchos Prestatarios. Este reto se cientificos sociales. Al adoptar esta politica el enfrenta de nuevo en cada proyecto de Environment Department 25 Resettlement and Development Cuadro 1. La politica de reasentamiento del Banco La poiftica del Banco sobre reasentamiento ha evolucionado constantemente desde 1980 a traves de varias etapas claves en 1986, 1988 y 1990. Los elementos funtdamentales de la poiftica del Banco sobre los reasentamientos son: * El desplazamiento involuntario debe ser evitado o minimizado siempre que sea factible debido a sus efectos de empobrecimiento y desordenamiento de las comunidades. * Cuando el desplazamiento sea inevitable, el objetivo de la poiftica del Banco es asistir a las personas desplazada en sus esfuerzos por mejorar o por lo menos restaurar sus anteriores condiciones de vida y capacidad de ingreso. Los medios para alcanzar este objetivo consisten en el disehio y ejecuci6n por parte del Prestatario de planes de reasentamiento que operen como programas de desarrollo. Estos planes de reasentamiento seran parte integral del disenio del proyecto. * Las personas desplazan deben recibir: (i) compensaci6n por sus perdidas al costo de reposici6n, (ii) oportunidades de participar en los beneficios del proyecto, y (iii) asistencia en la transferencia y en el periodo de transici6n en el lugar de la reubicaci6n. * La movilizaci6n de las personas en grupo puede disminuir el desordenamiento. La reducci6n de la distancia entre el lugar original y la nueva ubicaci6n puede facilitar la adaptaci6n a las nuevas condiciones socio-culturales y ambientales. Se deben ponderar adecuadamente los costos y beneficios entre la distancia del lugar original y las oportunidades econ6micas. * Se debe promover la participaci6n de las personas reasentadas y de aquellas que los reciben en su comunidad, en la planificaci6n de todo lo relacionado con el reasentamiento. Las instituciones sociales y culturales existentes en ambas comunidades deben jugar un papel importante en la conducci6n del proceso de traslado y reasentamiento. * Las nuevas comunidades de las personas reasentadas se deben disefiar como sistemas viables de asentamiento, equipados con infraestructura y servicios y con capacidad para integrarse al contexto socio-econ6mico regional. * Las comunidades que reciban a personas desplazadas deben ser ayudadas para evitar cualquier efecto social o ambiental adverso que resulte del incremento poblacional. * Las poblaciones indfgenas, minorfas etnicas, religiosas y otros grupos que disfruten derechos informales sobre el uso de la tierra u otros recursos requeridos por el proyecto deben recibir tierras, infraestructura y compensaci6n adecuada. La carencia de titulos de propiedad sobre la tierra no debe ser motivo para negar a estos grupos la compensaci6n y rehabilitaci6n. desarrollo individual que involucra Tanto para los paises como para el Banco, las desplazamiento. Para enfrentarlo con exito, se metas de las politicas se deben traducir a una requiere en cada ocasi6n un esfuerzo implementaci6n sistematica. A pesar de que la sistemrtico que incluya mejores politicas, implementaci6n de los proyectos financiados asignaci6n de recursos adecuados y promoci6n por el Banco no ha sido consistente con el nivel de la participaci6n de las personas reasentadas exigido por la politica, la misma ha ido y de aquellos que los reciben en su comunidad. mejorando. Es tambien innegable que el 26 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo tratamiento de las poblaciones afectadas por deben de generar. Las perdidas ocasionadas los proyectos que han aplicado las politicas del por estos atrasos que podrian evitarse muchas Banco es, en general, considerablemente mejor veces exceden el costo marginal de un buen en comparaci6n con aquellos proyectos no paquete de reasentamiento. Los esfuerzos que financiados por el Banco los cuales originan se hagan para asegurar que el reasentamiento hasta un 97 o 98 porciento del total de los involuntario sea mininiizado y cuando sea reasentamientos involuntarios en los paises en inevitable se Ileve a cabo sin empobrecer a las desarrollo. Sin embargo, los proyectos personas desplazadas, se justifican totalmente apoyados por el Banco no se deben aislar del tanto desde el punto de vista econ6mico como amplio contexto y del marco de las politicas por razones eticas. nacionales. Uno de los hallazgos mas importantes de esta revisi6n es que la atenci6n La revisi6n ha mostrado, una vez mis, que el a las dificultades de estos millones de personas reasentamiento es casi siempre mas dificil, a traves de la adopci6n por parte de los costoso y prolongado de lo que se pens6. Las gobiemos de mejores politicas sobre operaciones de reasentamiento de mayor reasentamientos (que aplicarian tanto a envergadura mueven a decenas. de miles de proyectos financiados por el Banco como a los personas, -a menudo muy pobres-,a traves demas) es tambien la clave para mejorar la de largas distancias en un tiempo muy corto y ejecuci6n en esa parte del portafolio de el restablecimiento de sus condiciones de vida proyectos del Banco donde los asuntos de es una tarea muy dura. La dificultad inherente reasentamientos continuan presentando en el restablecimiento de las condiciones de problemas. De aquf que en paises donde el vida y los servicios comunitarios se aumenta Banco estfi financiado o esta considerando por la limitada capacidad tecnica e institucional financiar proyectos que involucren en asuntos de reasentamientos de la mayoria reasentamientos, el Banco tambien asiste a los de los Prestatarios y por el debil compromiso gobiemos en el establecimiento o mejoramiento que existe de parte de algunas agencias de las politicas nacionales basandose en ejecutoras. experiencias a nivel de proyectos. La investigaci6n de campo, las evaluaciones de Principales Hallazgos de la Revision los proyectos y los estudios sectoriales y legales confirman que: El mensaje mas importante de la revisi6n es que los buenos reasentamientos pueden evitar (a) La politica del Banco sobre reasentamientos el empobrecimiento o mejor aun reducir la involuntarios, descrita en el Cuadro 1, a la pobreza, recuperando los medios de subsisl- - vez que ambiciosa, es s6lida y sus metas encia sostenibles. Si el reasentamiento no se son razonables. hace adecuadamente, las personas reasentadas terminan en peores condiciones que antes. Los (b) Los proyectos que siguen las politicas del reasentamientos que se ejecutan con Banco han generado resultados ostensible- responsabilidad social son ademas beneficiosos mente mejores que los proyectos que dejan econ6micamente si se toma en cuenta que los de lado dichos requisitos. Las operaciones altos costos de un desplazamiento mal de reasentamiento guiadas efectivamente manejado se extienden mas alla de la poblaci6n por las politicas del Banco se ejecutan afectada directamente impactando la economia usualmente con standares superiores a regional y la poblaci6n que ya habitaba en la aquellos proyectos que no son apoyados zona de reubicaci6n. Los reasentamientos por el Banco. inadecuados inducen la resistencia local, aumentan las tensiones politicas, atrasan los (c) La ejecuci6n del reasentamiento esta proyectos y posponen los beneficios que estos directamente asociada con la existencia o Environment Department 27 Resettlement and Development ausencia de una politica domestica y del Evaluaci6n de OperacionesO. A menos que se marco organizativo para el reasentamiento. dominen estos aspectos, el desarrollo en si Los paises, estados, o sectores con una nmismo continuara siendo objeto de algunas politica adecuada sobre reasentamientos crfticas puiblicas en vez de obtener el apoyo generalmente alcanzan mejores resultados decidido y creciente que necesita y merece. Es en la prevenci6n del empobrecimiento y el por eso que se necesita promover el desarrollo restablecimiento de los medios de institucional mas alla de las actividades subsistencia el portafolio que aquellos que proyecto por proyecto, para atender los asuntos no cuentan con dichas politicas. del reasentamiento como un objetivo de desarrollo valioso en si mismo. (d) El portafolio de proyectos del Banco que implican operaciones de reasentamiento Durante los dItimos 10 a 14 afnos hemos esta mucho mfs sano ahora que en 1986, logrado un aprendizaje importante que permite afho en que se llev6 a cabo la ultima avanzar en el camino de los cambios positivos revisi6n sobre reasentamiento y es que estan sucediendo. A pesar de las grandes radicalmente diferente a la situaci6n diferencias entre los paises y poblaciones encontrada cuando se estableci6 la politica involucradas, es mucho mas lo que entendemos sobre reasentamiento. Sin embargo, en sobre los principalesfactores comunes que por su algunos proyectos las operaciones de presencia o ausencia explican porque el reasentamiento y sus resultados no son reasentamiento funcion6 en algunos casos y consistentes con los standares definidos y fall6 en otros. Estos son: exigidos por la politica del Banco. (a) Compronilso politico por parte del. (e) El proceso de planificaci6n y los criterios Prestatario, expresado en leyes, politicas establecidos en la politica del Banco han oficiales y asignaci6n de recursos. mejorado significativamente las practicas de algunos gobiernos prestatarios, otros (b) Implementaci6n sistematica de los linea- donantes internacionales, agencias tecnicas mientos y procedimientos establecidos, por que implementan grandes proyectos y el parte del Prestatario y del Banco. mismo Banco. Sin embargo, el progreso en este campo ha sido insuficiente y disparejo. (c) Anflisis social s6lido, evaluaciones Se necesita hacer mucho mas para asegurar demograficas confiables y experiencia la consistencia de la planificaci6n, los tecnica en la planificad6n de resultados y el monitoreo del impacto con reasentamientos orientados al desarrollo. las metas establecidas en la politica. (d) Evaluaci6n cuidadosa de los costos y La revisi6n a fondo de las experiencias de sufidente financiamiento asi como un reasentamiento ha generado aprendizajes calendario de reasentamiento amarrado a importantes para el Banco y los Prestatarios la construcci6n de la obra civil. sobre las formas de realizar los reasentamientos mAs efectivamente y ha identificado buenas (e) Organizaciones ejecutoras capaces que practicas y maneras de corregir las ejecuciones respondan a las necesidades locales de no satisfactorias que se describen en este desarrollo, a las oportunidades y a las reporte. Las dimensiones sociales de los dificultades. proyectos de construcci6n de obras civiles requieren mucho mayor atenci6n por parte de (f) Participaci6n de la poblaci6n en la fijaci6n los gobiernos de los paises miembros asi como de los objetivos del reasentamiento, en la por parte del Banco, tal y como ha concluido identificaci6n las solucdones de reubicaci6n una reciente revisi6n del Departamento de y en su implementaci6n. 28 Resettlement Series Resunen Ejecutivo Portafolio de Rroyectos del Banco El cambio sectorial mas significativo en la que Implican Reasentamientos cartera de proyectos del Banco que implican reasentamiento es el rapido crecimniento de los Durante 1986 al 1993 se produjeron proyectos de transporte, agua e infraestructura reasentamientos involuntarios en 192 proyegctos uraa see hr l etrmw rnee que desplazaron a 2.5 millones de personas t&minos niimero de proyectos y * ^ r ~~~~~~~~~~corresponde a 75 de los 146 proyectos que durante la vida de dichos proyectos. Cuarenta d l 1 r que y seis proyectos habian concluido en 1993 implican reasentamientos. Sin embargo estas reasentando a rnas de medio mill6n de perso- operaciones de reasentamiento son mas nas. En el portafolio actual, con 146 proyectos pequefias que el promedio en los proyectos activos en 1993, hay cerca de dos millones die hidroelctricos o agricolas. Las represas para personas en diversas etapas de reasentamiento. irrigaci6n, generaci6n electrica y agua potable Estos proyectos representan el ocho porciento son la causa mas importante de los de los 1,900 proyectos que el Banco ileva a cabo desplazamientos (63 porciento) y los corredores en la actualidad y ascienden a un valor de para vias de transporte son la segunda causa US$23 mil millones de d6lares que corresponde (23 porciento). En trrminos sectoriales los al 15 pordento de los prestamos del Banco. La proyectos agricolas continuan representando el gran mayoria de los proyectos financiados por segmento mas grande de las personas el Banco (60 porciento) se ubican en el Oriente reasentadas (52 porciento). y en el Sur de Asia como resultado del rapido desarrollo de estos paises y su alta densidad Desempeno en Reasentamiento poblacional. Cerca de 100 proyectos que incluyen un estimado de 600,000 personas que El Banco alcanz6 un progreso significativo del deberAn ser relocalizadas, han sido propuestos 1986 al 1993 en tres areas principales: por los prestatarios para el portafolio correspondiente a 19941997. 0* nfluy6 en las politicas de los paises Dentro de los 146 proyectos activos en la prestatarios sobre reasentamiento. cartera que incluyen un componente de * Asisti6 a los Prestatarios en el proceso de reasentamiento, la escala del reasentamniento por evitar las operaciones de reasentamiento o proyecto varia desde menos de 500 hasta mAs de de reducir 200,000 personas. Sin embargo, el grueso de los e as escala en caso de que fuesen reasentamientos se concentra en un grupo reducido de proyectos en India, China, Indolesia Asisti6 a los Prestatarios en el proceso de y Brasil: once grandes proyectos en estos paises mejorfa del entomo de las familias incluyen 1.1 millones de personas o sea mas de la reasentadas y de su capacdad para niitad de todas las personas que estAn siendo reaseraras y de ingreso r reasentadas. Los Proyectos en las regiones del recuperar su nivel de ingreso. Sur y del Este Asiatico incluyen al 80 porcienrto de la poblaci6n que esta siendo objeto de Sin embargo, cuando los proyectos no se levaron reubicaci6n. La participaci6n de Latinoamr&ica a cabo de acuerdo con la politica y los linea- en la cartera de proyectos con reasentarnientos es mientos de procedimientos establecidos, se de 9 porciento y la de Africa de un 23 porciento. presentaron casos en los cuales la situaci6n de las El niumero de paises con mas de una operaci6n familias reasentadas termin6 siendo peor. de reasentamiento esta aumentando: las crecientes econoniias de Pakistan, Bangladesh, Influyendo sobre las politicas Vietnam e Indonesia esperan un incremento El Banco fue la primera agencia intemacional significativo en el n(umero de proyectos apoyados de desarrollo que adopt6 una politica de por el Banco los cuales conlIevaran reasentanientos. Environment Department 29 Resettlement and Development reasentamiento, la cual esta ha sido promovida prestatarios sobre un amplio marco de polftica para los proyectos de los Prestatarios que domestica o sectorial, aplicable a las operaciones incluyen desplazamientos involuntarios. Uno fnanciadas por el Banco en comparaci6n con de los principales resultados de este impacto otros casos cuando sus esfuerzos se limitaron a catalitico del Banco durante 1986 al 1993 es que acuerdos legales para proyectos individuales. A varios Prestatarios establecieron o mejoraron su vez, las obligaciones detalladas en acuerdos sus politicas domesticas y marco legal para los legales para prestamos especfficos y las -politica reasentamientos. de proyecto> acordadas han formado en ocasiones la base para discutir y mejorar la El reasentamiento funciona cuando los politica nacional a nivel mnas amplio asi como el gobiemos asi lo desean. La creaci6n de una marco legaL capacidad institucional adecuada defmida como la sinergia entre las politicas, las Los principales donantes multilaterales y organizaciones y los recursos, es la mejor bilaterales han emitido recientemente lineamien- manera que tienen los gobiemos de expresar su tos sobre reasentamientos sinilares a los del compromiso de ejecutar buenos proyectos de Banco. Asi lo hizo el Banco Interamericano de reasentamiento. Cuando la aceptaci6n de los Desarrollo en 1990 y el Banco Asiatico de objetivos de la politica de reasentamiento del Desarroilo esta considerando en la actualidad la Banco por parte de los Prestatarios no es adopci6n de lineamientos sinijlares. A solicitud genuina, generalmente el reasentamiento no se de la OECD, el Banco ayud6 en la preparaci6n de ileva a cabo bien, sin importar el nudmero de lineamnientos sobre reasentamientos congruentes compromnsos, misiones de supervision y con los del Banco y en 1991 los ministros de seguimiento o la frecuencia de las amenazas del desarrollo de todos los pafses miembros de la Banco de suspender los desembolsos. Por otro OECD aprobaron lineamientos unificados y lado, la implementaci6n del proyecto se similares para las agencias de desarrollo de sus debilita cuando el propio Banco no es respectivos paises. consistente en la aplicaci6n de sus principios de politica y procedimientos. Evitando o reduciendo El periodo de 1986 a 1993 se caracteriza por el desplazamiento algunos exitos notables en el area de las El Banco ha sido mas efectivo en cuanto a su politicas. La empresa Electrobras de Brasil, capacidad de asistir a los Prestatarios para estimulada por un proyecto sectorial del Banco implementar el primer principio de la politica en 1990 estableci6, basandose en la politica del sobre reasentamientos: evitar los Banco, lineamientos muy satisfactorios para los reasentamientos o minimizarlos siempre que reasentamientos en los proyectos del sector sea factible desde el punto de vista tecnico y energetico en dicho pafs. Lo mismo hizo econ6mico. Muchos proyectos sometidos a la Colombia en 1992. China mejor6 sus consideraci6n del Banco cuentan con el lineamientos de politica en el sector de recursos potencial para reducir o eliminar los hidraulicos con la asistenda del Banco. En reasentamientos. Por ejemplo, redisefiando la 1993 la Coporaci6n Nacional de la India para la represa de Saguling en Indonesia se disminuy6 Energia Termica adopt6 una politica de la altura de la misma cinco metros evitando el rehabilitaci6n sectorial para todas sus desplazamiento de 35,000 personas. En un operaciones luego de negociaciones minuciosas proyecto forestal en Costa de Marfil las con el Banco como parte del disefno de un propuestas de revisi6n del Banco redujeron en prestamo sectorial. En general el Banco ha un 80 por ciento el estimado del Prestatario sido mas efectivo y las operaciones inmediatas Ilevando el numero de 200,000 a 40,000 a la vez han resultado mas beneficiadas, cuando se que elev6 los standares para las condiciones de logr6 llegar a un acuerdo con los gobiernos aquellos que serian relocalizados. En Tailandia 30 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo la reubicaci6n de la presa Pak Mun y la proyectos han incluido suficientes mediciones o reducci6n de su elevaci6n hizo posible metodos para estimnar si se alcanz6 a disminuir el niumero de personas desplazadas restablecer dichos niveles de ingreso. Los de 20,000 a 5,000. En el proyecto de control de reportes regionales sobre reasentamientos y la inundaciones del Guayas en Ecuador el mayoria de las auditorias del Departamento de redisefio del canal elimin6 totalmente la Evaluaci6n de Operaciones no pudieron necesidad de recurrir a los reasentamientos recopilar informaci6n que permitiera medir si los niveles de ingreso fueron mejorados o Recuperando los niveles de ingresco restablecidos. La evidencia disponible documenta numerosos casos de La prueba definitiva de la consistencia entre las empobrecimiento de las personas desplazadas operaciones de reasentamiento y la polltica a traves de programas de reasentamientos vigente es la recuperaci6n o mejorfa de los insatisfactorios. Recientemente se han niveles de ingreso. Los proyectos financiados establecido mejores sistemas de seguimiento por el Banco que logran reasentar en forma los cuales seran objeto de ampliaci6n. productiva a las poblaciones sobre terrenos agricolas y en actividades que generan En comparaci6n con los hallazgos del empleos, tienden a restablecer los niveles die Departamento de Evaluaci6n de Operaciones ingreso con mayor efectividad que los (DEO) en su analisis de las vprimeras proyectos que simplemente compensan a los experiencias con reasentarnientos>> (1993), los afectados sin ningun tipo de asistencia cuales se refieren a proyectos aprobados al institucional. En aquellos proyectos en los que inicio y a medidados de la decada de los las personas reasentadas pudieron participar ochenta, la Revisi6n encontr6 una mejor de los beneficios inmediatos creados por el ejecuci6n en los proyectos vigentes y en mismo proyecto que los desplaz6 los niveles de aquellos terminados recientemente, particu- ingreso se restablecieron de forma larmente en aquellos paises con politicas de particularmente exitosa. Se pueden mencionar reasentamiento adecuadas y con capacidad de ejemplos en que las personas reasentadas implementaci6n como es el caso de China. Sin desarrollaron proyectos de acuacultura y embargo la Revisi6n llega a la misma crianza de peces aprovechando las nuevas conclusi6n a que lLega el estudio del DEO en reservas de agua (Indonesia), otros casos en cuanto a que a pesar de que los datos son que fueron reubicados en las nuevas zonas bajo escasos, los proyectos aparentan no haber irrigaci6n (China y algunos proyectos en la tenido exito en el restablecimiento de los India) o favoreciendolos para que pudierarL niveles de vida de las personas reasentadas en posicionarse ventajosamente en las nuevas condiciones sinilares o mejores y este oportunidades comerciales creadas alrededor problema todavia persiste en gran escala. de la infraestructura a ser construida (Argen- Aunque en forma fragmentaria el peso de la tina, China, Turquia). En muchos proyectos las evidencia disponible sugiere que los proyectos condiciones de vida de los reubicados en zonas a menudo no ha tenido exito en la recuperaci6n urbanas mejoraron gracias a viviendas mas de los niveles de ingreso. La gesti6n para durables y espaciosas y mejor acceso a los restauraci6n de ingreso es preocupante en la servicios sanitarios aiun cuando esto pudiera cartera de proyectos de ciertos paises tales significar un costo mayor de transporte hasta la como India e Indonesia en los cuales muchos nueva ubicaci6n. proyectos involucran desplazamiento pero no tienen una politica nacional o un marco legal Aunque la politica del Banco define una meta para el reasentamiento que incluya el medible para todas las operaciones de restablecimiento de los niveles de ingreso. La reasentamiento y la cual consiste en restablJecer variable clave para explicar el ,xito en la los anteriores niveles de ingreso, muy poccos restauraci6n de los medios de subsistencia a Environment Department 31 Resettlement and Development traves de bases productivas, es la existencia de un sinos es otorgar a los miembros de las compromilso nadonal de ayudar a las personas comunidades desplazadas tierras adecuadas reasentadas que se refleje en posiciones con un titulo de propiedad debidamente sectoriales o regionales sobre este tema. saneado. En la mayoria de los casos la permuta de un terrreno por otro es mucho La reducci6n del ingreso luego del mejor que la compensaci6n mediante el pago reasentamiento es a veces muy significativa en dinero. Las dificultades ocurren Ilegando en muchos casos al 40 porciento para principalmente en aquellos lugares donde la personas que ya eran pobres antes de su tierra es escasa y su mercado muy limitado. La desplazamiento. Las perdidas incluyen a compensaci6n a travds de una permuta de menudo importantes activos que generaban tierra implica que la nueva parcela sea de ingresos que no son reemplazados, asi como la aproximadamente la misma capacidad y que perdida de su morada. Los datos obtenidos en cuando este tipo de soluci6n no sea posible se el terreno muestran que para las familias ofrezcan incentivos adicionales para permitir campesinas la perdida de su tierra tiene nuevas fuentes de ingresos que no esten consecuencias mucho mAs severas que la vinculadas a la actividad agricola. En las p6rdida de sus hogares. Esto aplica tambien Areas urbanas las dificultades de los cuando la perdida parcial del terreno les deja reasentamientos tienen que ver una unidad que no es viable desde el punto de principalmente con los titulos de propiedad, vista econ6mico. Para las familias en la zona el inquilinato, grupos transeudntes, acceso a urbana lo mas diffcil de reemplazar es la puestos de empleo alternativos, perdida de pequefhos negocios y talleres o el oportunidades de negocios y vivienda al acceso a fuentes de trabajo. Durante la alcance del presupuesto familiar. Los ejecuci6n de la Revisi6n se introdujeron enfoques participativos y la colaboraci6n de medidas correctivas en algunos casos que se las ONGs locales han sido ser muy efectivos identificaron y en el futuro se emprenderan para encontrar localizaciones alternativas y otras acciones similares como parte del movilizar las energias de las familias seguimiento a esta Revisi6n. reasentadas para la reconstrucci6n y mejora de su habitat, obteniendo mejores servicios El riesgo en la disminuci6n de los niveles de para su entorno. vida ocurre en varios frentes: econ6mico, social, salud, nutrici6n y alienaci6n cultural. El Esta revisi6n se ha cuestionado si es posible modelo de riesgo identificado por la Revisi6n identificar las causas que originan la brecha provee un sistema de alarmas que ayuda a los entre los objetivos de las politicas del Banco, planificadores y a los que dictan las politicas a en lo que se refiere a recuperar los niveles de prevenir el empobrecimiento. No todos los ingreso, y los resultados reales de los riesgos afectan a todos los grupos en igual proyectos que han dejado a muchos en peores forma y algunos grupos y personas vulnerables condiciones de vida. Aunque existen casos (tales como tribus y grupos indigenas y hogares de evidente negligencia y violaciones a las cuyo jefe de familia es la mujer) estan mas normas institucionales, hay otras causas mas expuestos a los riesgos del desplazamiento fundamentales que explican el por que de los econ6mico y la perdida de su habitat. Para problemas en la ejecuci6n del reasentamiento. explicar c6mo ocurre el empobrecimiento y Otras lecciones aprendidas e esta Revisi6n determinar que debe de hacerse para evitarlo tienen que ver con la capacidad institucional eficazmente en futuras operaciones, es de los Prestatarios y del Banco, los costos de necesario entender los riesgos especificos a los reasentamientos exitosos y la necesidad cada diferente grupo social. de estrategias de desarrollo a largo plazo. La f6rmula mAs efectiva para eliminar estos A pesar de las enormes diferencias entre riesgos en el caso de reasentamientos campe- proyectos y paises, un nuimero relativamente 32 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo pequefio de factores explican la disparidad en Existen ciertas condiciones previas para crear la ejecuci6n de las operaciones de el entomo adecuado para ayudar a las famnilias reasentamiento: desplazadas a reconstruir sus sistemas productivos y medios de subsistencia perdi- * Falta de recursos siuficientes para dos. Aunque existe enorme variaci6n en cada compensaciones y pr5cticas de situaci6n de reasentamiento, se cuenta con los expropiaci6n que no permiten quc los conocirnientos necesarios para crear ese afectados repongan su tierra u otros entorno adecuado. Los cimientos de un activos. Aunque no hay ninguna ley que reasentamiento exitoso son: una politica y un prohiba a los gobiernos el proveer una marco legal favorables, financiarniento compensaci6n adecuada, en la practica los adecuado, instituciones capaces y participaci6n procedirnientos de compensaci6n a menudo local en el disefno y la adnministraci6n del excluyen a muchos afectados o se les paga proyecto. de menos. Los prestatarios usan mecanismos institucionales para desplazar La capacidad del prestatario a las personas pero no usan adecuadarn,ente sus capacidades institucionales para Para mejorar la practica de los reasentamientos facilitar las permutas de los terrenos. en las operaciones del Banco se requiere incorporar estos temas a las discusiones que se * Los recursos financieros presupuestados llevan a cabo entre el Banco y sus Prestatarios para el reasentamiento a menudo son y a la agenda sobre las estrategias y politicas altamente insuficientes. Los excesos en la para el alivio de la pobreza. Algunas de las ejecuci6n presupuestal de las operaciones experiencias de reasentamiento mas exitosas de reasentamiento son en promedio 50 del Banco han surgido como resultado de los porciento mas comunes que los excesos en dialogos sectoriales en los cuales los los proyectos de obras civiles, debido casi Prestatarios y el Banco se concentran en los siempre a calculos iniciales mal hechos. Las objetivos generales del reasentamiento y en los restricciones presupuestales y la principios de planificaci6n que orientaran a los inflexibilidad en los procedimientos para proyectos especfficos de reasentamiento. modificar los presupuestos, limitan aiuin m--s los recursos. Existen diferencias importantes de un pais a otro en cuanto a su capacidad para imple- * Las personas afectadas y las comunidades mentar los reasentamientos y dentro de cada que los reciben no participan adecua- pais entre las capacidades de diversos sectores. damente en el proceso de reasentamiernto. Aquellas agencias sectoriales fuertes y Rara vez se utilizan los conocimientos rentables como lo son los servicios piublicos y locales para disefiar programas de las corporaciones aut6nomas pueden disponer reasentamiento o para encontrar soluciones de recursos para ilevar a cabo el viables y a menudo no existen mecanismos reasentamiento con exito siempre que sea su legales efectivos para resolver las quejas. responsabilidad legal y que los standares para La planificaci6n de arriba hacia abajo y la las reubicaciones se conviertan en prfctica debil presencia institucional en el terreno de comudn en sus negocios. Los departamentos los hechos no moviliza a los beneficiarios administrativos carecen tipicamente de los del proyecto en las areas de influencia para recursos, flexibilidad presupuestaria y que actuen como parte interesada en el capacidad gerencial para llevar a cabo exito del reasentamiento a traves del programas de reasentamientos, a menos que acomodamiento en su comunidad de las mejoren su estructura intema. Todos los personas a reasentar. programas de reasentamiento, incluyendo las Environment Department Resettlement and Development operaciones en menor escala como las que se y paquetes de medidas para estimular el necesitan en muchos programas urbanos o de desarrollo, cronogramas para los planes de protecci6n ambiental, pueden manejarse con reasentamiento, sincronizados con los trabajos mayor eficacia si se involucra la participaci6n de la obra civil y presupuestos especfficos para de las ONGs locales o de las organizaciones el reasentamiento, que cubran la compensaci6n comunitarias de la poblaci6n desplazada y de financiera y las inversiones relacionadas con el la poblaci6n receptora. reasentamniento. Las fallas en la implementaci6n y en el restablecimiento de los Preparaci6n y Evaluaci6n del niveles de ingreso se pueden atribuir Reasentamiento regularmente a procedimientos de trabajo equivocados particularmente en las etapas Entre 1986 y 1993 se efectuaron mejoras iniciales del proyecto durante su identificaci6n, considerables en la preparaci6n y la evaluaci6n preparaci6n y evaluaci6n. de los proyectos que implican reasentamiento, Base de datos lo cual mejor6 sustancialmente la calidad por encima de los niveles encontrados cuando se La informaci6n sobre la poblaci6n afectada y llev6 a cabo la Revisi6n de 1986. Pero algunos sobre su base de recursos es esencial para procesos y procedimientos no se ilevaron a evaluar y planificar el reasentamiento. El uso cabo en su totalidad ni por parte de los de encuestas con informaci6n de base ha Prestatarios ni por parte del Banco. Los aumentado sustancialmente de un 21 porciento asuntos relacionados con el procesamiento de en los afios fiscales 80 al 85 a un 43 porciento en proyectos y el manejo del portafolio de los afios fiscales 96 al 93 y a un 72 porciento en proyectos identificados en esta Revisi6n son en los proyectos aprobados en los afhos fiscales 92 parte similar a los que se encontraron en un y 93 y a un 100 porciento en los primeros diez grupo de trabajo sobre el manejo del portafolio meses del afho fiscal 94. La mayoria de estas que recientemente hizo una revisi6n general del encuestas socio-econ6micas ilevadas a cabo por Banco, aunque a menudo fueron mas agudo en los Prestatarios todavia no incluyen el caso del reasentamiento; ellos explican informaci6n sobre los niveles de ingreso. No es algunas de las disparidades de implementaci6n ffcil determinar el ingreso antes del en el terreno. Los problemas especificos que reasentamiento pero es posible y necesario ya aparecen en forma recurrente, particularmente que la falta de datos iniciales sobre los ingresos en la parte inicial del periodo de la Revisi6n hacen imposible disefhar y ejecutar proyectos son: (i) falla por parte de muchas agencias con metas de implementaci6n definidas y con prestatarias en cuanto a la preparaci6n de indicadores que permitan hacer una monitoria planes de reasentamientos satisfactorios de la recuperaci6n de los niveles de ingreso. (calidad inicial); (ii) laxitud en el cumplimiento de las responsabilidades de gabinete en cuanto La dificultad inicial mrs importante es que, en al estudio y aprobaci6n en las primeras etapas muchos casos, las agendas prestatarias en la del proyecto; (iii) supervisi6n irregular o fase de disefho del proyecto subestiman el insuficiente del proyecto; y (iv) acciones de numero de personas afectadas y proveen seguimiento insuficientes por parte de los informaci6n inexacta a las misiones de Prestatarios y del Banco cuando se evaluaci6n. El proyecto Izmir para Agua identificaron problemas de implementaci6n. potable y Alcantarillado en Turquia (afno fiscal 87) se inici6 con un calculo de 3,700 personas Cuatro elementos son indispensables para la afectadas y ahora tiene un estimativo revisado preparaci6n y ejecuci6n adecuadas de los que ilega a 13,000 personas. El proyecto del proyectos financiados por el Banco que Valle del Tana en Madagascar (AF90) para el implican reasentanmientos: encuestas sobre cual la estimaci6n del Prestatario en el disefho poblaci6n e ingresos, planes de reasentamiento del proyecto era de 3,500 personas, ahora tiene 34 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo un nuevo estimativo de 11,000 personas. Una proporci6n de planes de reasentamientos para estimaci6n incorrecta del nuimero de personas proyectos en la etapa de evaluaci6n inicial ha desplazadas ocasiona un proyecto mal aumentado tambien: en AF93 y durante los disefhado, con estimaci6n de costos inadecuada, primeros diez meses del AF94 todos excepto escasez de recursos e incapacidad institucional uno de los 18 proyectos aprobados contaba con para disefhar las soluciones requeridas asi como su plan de reasentamiento y correspondiente el empobrecimiento de las personas que sufren evaluaci6n. el reasentamiento. En ocasiones se hace necesario hacer estudios independientes Aunque se han logrado mejorias con relaci6n a especializados patrocinados por el Banco y la Revisi6n de 1986 el nivel alcanzado significa estos se llevaran a cabo en el futuro para que todavia muchos proyectos financiados por clarificar las discrepancias que se perciben en la el Banco y que estan siendo ejecutados en la informaci6n contenida en las encuestas actualidad se inician pobremente debido a recibidas como parte de los estudios de dificultades en su planificaci6n. Existen factibilidad preparados por los Prestatarios. proyectos con desplazamientos importantes los cuales no contaban con un plan de Planificacion del reasentamiento reasentamiento factible al momento de su evaluacion tales como el proyecto urbana de Desde 1980 ha sido una politica central del Iabotabek en Indonesia (AF88), el proyecto de Banco Mundial que los Prestatarios preparen y Carreteras de Sichuan (AF88) y el proyecto Provincial de Transporte en Jiangsu (AF91) en reasentamiento. Las misiones de evaluacie6n no China, el proyecto Termal de Talcher (AF87) y deben ir al terreno a menos que el Prestatario el proyecto de Irrigaci6n de Punjab (AF90) en la haya sometido al Banco un plan de India, el Segundo Proyecto Urbano de Guinea reasentamiento que permita que el Banco (AF90) y el proyecto de Agua Potable Multi- evalde su factibilidad y su costo en el contexto Estado de Nigeria (AF92) y otros mas. La del proyecto completo. La Revisi6n de 1986 inexistencia de estos planes implica que no se sobre reasentamiento determin6 que un 14 cuenta con un programa bien financiado para porciento de los proyectos activos en esa epoca asistir a las personas reasentadas. En los casos contaban con planes de reasentamiento que de estos proyectos se han ejecutado o se incluyeran los requisitos minimos de una contemplan acciones correctivas para mejorar encuesta de datos iniciales, calendario, la planificaci6n y los recursos. presupuesto y un paquete de medidas de rehabilitaci6n. Para el periodo 1986 3/4 1993 el La caidad y adecuaci6n de los planes de 55 porciento de los proyectos financiados por el reasentaniiento ha variado ampliamente. A pesar Banco incluyeron planes de reasentariento del objetivo general de restaurar los niveles de completos y evaluados. ingreso y las condiciones de vida de las famnlias Se puede observar una clara tendencia a la, desplazadas, menos de un 30 por ciento de los mejoria dentro del periodo de esta Revisi6n, con un planes de reasentamiento han establecido como impulso creciente en los dos ultimos atlos. meta principal la recuperaci6n de dichos niveles Para el AP93-AF94 todos los indicadores claves de ingreso. Esto ha afectado la implementaci6n. para las actividades del procesamiento basico La planificaci6n del reasentamiento para los de proyectos y el manejo del portafolio eren proyectos financiados por el Banco por parte de mucho mas altos que para los primeros afios los Prestatarios con frecuencia se ha mantenido del periodo bajo revisi6n. Las operaciones de por debajo de los elevados standares requeridos reasentamiento se disefian ahora mejor y se por el Banco aunque en el niismo pais estos evaluan en su totalidad. As! como ocurrid6 en el hayan sido superiores a otros reasentamientos aumento de las encuestas de datos base la que no fueron financiados por el Banco. Environment Department 3 Resettlement and Development Un estudio comparativo paralelo de programas Ademas los casos de incumplimiento no se de reasentamiento voluntario e involuntario identificaron sistemAticarente al efectuar las subray6 el contraste existente entre los recursos revisiones internas de la documentaci6n de y enfoques utilizados para disefiar los pre-evaluad6n de los proyectos y de los REIS. programas de asentamiento en los cuales el Se autorizaron proyectos que no cumplian en principal objetivo es el desarrollo y aquellos su totalidad con las garantias requeridas por eL programas en los cuales el reasentamiento Tales incumplimientos no fueros sefhalados a involuntario es un componente subordinado. los gerentes regionales y al Comite de Los paquetes institucionales y de desarrollo Prestamos antes de la aprobaci6n del prestamo. que apoyan al asentamiento voluntanio ofrecen Estas disparidades con las.normas intemas vaLiosos modelos que pueden adaptarse y para el procesamiento de proyectos apLicarse en los proyectos de reasentamientos deterioraron la calidad del proyecto desde sit involuntarios. Ademas, la magnitud de algunas inicio. En particular la falta de planes de operaciones de reasentamiento involuntario y reasentamiento disminuy6 la posibilidad de que se tratan como componentes de una de una recuperaci6n satisfactoria. El obra civil, tipicamente excede la capacidad y reasentamiento involuntario es factible cuando experiencia de las firmas de ingenierna que se aplican enfoques s6lidos pero es casi administran los proyectos de infraestructura. imposible lograrlo con exito cuando no se La experiencia de proyectos voluntarios de aplican con rigurosidad los procedimientos ya asentamiento que se disefian separadamente probados y que son relevantes a las metas de la sugiere la conveniencia de tales proyectos como politica. En vez de acelerar la ejecuci6n de los vehiculos para el reasentamiento involuntario proyectos, el incumplimiento de los particularmente en las operaciones de gran procedimientos simplemente pospone los envergadura. Una soluci6n innovadora fue problemas. Estas inconsistencias en el propio introducida en AF94 en donde la represa trabajo del Banco se tornan muy significativas Xiaolangdi en China y el reasentamiento que en casos en que el Prestatario no comparte las Psta ocasion6 fueron tratados como dos mismas perspectivas sobre el reasentamiento y proyectos interrelacionados pero distintos: uno no cuenta con un marco de politica nacional para ia represa y el otro para el reasentamiento sobre el tema. A menudo el staff del banco se como un proyecto de desarrollo completo. Esto encuentra en la practica en una lucha contra la permite que el proyecto de reasentamiento corriente para obtener el cumplimiento de los disefne y planifique de forma especffica su lineamientos acordados para los proyectos, enfoque para el desarrollo basado en paquetes especialmente cuando el trabajo de las agencias diferenciados preparados a la medida de los tecnicas que ejecutan el proyecto no esta siendo niveles de ingresos y el potencial de las objeto de monitoreo sistematico por parte de poblaciones afectadas en cada categoria. los gobiemos prestatarios. Durante esta Revisi6n sobre Reasentamiento se han Muchos proyectos que no contaban con planes iniciado acciones para mejorar los procedi- de reasentamiento al ser evaluados, los desar- mientos de trabajo y fortalecer los sistemas rollaron despues. Hasta 1992 el cumplimiento de responsabilides y supervisi6n a la vez que general con los requisitos del Banco sobre se han adoptado medidas adicionales para planes de reasentamiento era incompleto tanto aumentar la atenci6n del staff y de los en los trabajos de disefho como en los reportes gerentes. de evaluaci6n inicial del staff (REIS). Debido a la resistencia o la poca capacidad de las En algunos casos las divisiones encargadas agencias prestatarias, o a la escasez de recursos aceptaron que los Prestatarios enviaran los humanos, los gerentes de divisi6n no planes de reasentamiento mucho despues de insistieron siempre en que se cumplieran a concebirse el proyecto. Esto ayud6 poco y cabalidad las directrices operacionales. condon6 la subestimaci6n del reasentamiento 36 Resettlement Series Resurnen Ejecutivo por parte de las agencias prestatarias a la vez explicitos para el reasentamiento en todos los que oblig6 al Banco a aceptar practicas que proyectos en ejecuci6n. desde hace tiempo habia rechazado. La experiencia demuestra que posponer la Financiacio'n para el reasentamiento consideraci6n de los planes de reasentamiento hastadesp6s d -suevalud6n nicil esLa planificacion financiera inadecuada ha sido hasta despues de su evaluaci6n mnicial esnga rbem elsraenanetsyl costoso tambien para las agencias prestatarias. un gran problema de los reasentamsentos y la En~ ~ ~ ~~~. el pryet deI..c6 ndr rds causa de los desniveles en su ejecuci6n. En86 se oetimd inician un Muchas agencias prestatarias no identifican ni (AF86) se estim6 inIcialmente un calculan todos los costos del desplazamiento en d.s..acargo de 63 pevrsas .. la los cuales incurren las personas afectadas y no divisi6n a cargo acepto ilevar a cabo la evaluaci6n sin el plan de reasentamiento incorporan la totalidad de los costos de exigiendo luego la presentaci6n de uin plar reasentamniento y recuperaci6n en los gastos satisfactorio como condici6n para que el generales del proyecto. Esto deja al proyecto fuese efectivo. prestatario d,j6 reasentamiento sin financiamiento adecuado. paroectr fese esctino.El presentatelplaro de La Revisi6n tamrbi6n encontr6 debilidades pasar tres plazos smn presentar el plan lo cual metodol6gicas en la forma en que los REIS produjo una dilaci6n de 14 meses. La coirisi6n trtnlas enioe financieras y por compromiso pagados por el Prestatario por tratan las dlmensaones financteras y culpa del retraso excedieron el costo de la los Prestatarioseoslosamconooistas delaBvnc preparaci6n del plan de reasentamiento. La los Prestatarios o los Economistas del Banco falta de un disefio correcto del proyecto surgi6 utlrizaron de los lieamoentos tycicos para de nuevo al ejecutarse cuando se hizo aparente sealosrcorn entesid eaontrieo. En que el nurnero de personas afectadas era rmAs del doble del estimado inicial o sea 150,004) pocos casos se hizo la distinci6n entre los personas. Mas de 85,000 personas en adici6n a costos de la conupensaci6n por los activos las identificadas por el Prestatario en la fase de perdidos y la nueva inversi6n requerida para disefio, evaluaci6n y negociaci6n no contal.an restablecer a las personas reasentadas sobre en la evaluaci6n inicial con recursos para u bases productivas con alojamiento y servicios reasentarniento. adecuados y los costos de esta inversi6n no han sido presupuestados. Cuando se consolidan Cronogramas los costos de reubicar la infraestructura puiblica con los de reubicar a las personas desplazadas, La experiencia demuestra que es mejor la falta de detaile tiende a esconder distribuir las reubicaciones masivas a lo lairgo presupuestos per capita muy bajos para las de la vida del proyecto, llevando a cabo el familias desplazadas. Como resultado, los reasentamiento con un paso por delante de los recursos presupuestados para el reasen- trabajos de la obra civil para evitar el acunulo tamiento no son suficientes. al final de la ejecuci6n del proyecto. En aquellos casos en que se deja al grueso de la El financiamiento por parte del Banco de los poblaci6n para ser reubicada durante el ultimo costos del reasentamiento en los proyectos afho o los iltirmos dos afios de un proyecto que ejecutados durante AF86-AF93 no se se ejecuta en 8 o 10 afhos la experiencia ha corresponde con la importancia que el Banco le resultado negativa ya que se aumentan los asigna a este componente de los proyectos. riesgos de las personas reasentadas. Mas de la Menos del 15 porciento del componente de mitad de los proyectos en ejecuci6n no reasentamiento del proyecto es co-financiado contaron con un cronograma de reasentarniento por el Banco y cuando esto ocurre, su participa- explicito y sincronizado con la obra civil. ci6n en el financimiento es usualmente Durante esta Revisi6n los Departamentos de pequefha. Un aumento sustancial del finan- Paises habian tomado medidas para trabajar ciamiento del Banco para el desarrollo con los Prestatarios y desarrollar cronogramnas productivo en los lugares del reasentamiento Environment Department 37 . Resettlement and Development podria mejorar el flujo de recursos para las componentes de reasentamientos de taxmaiio personas reasentadas, mejorar la calidad del mediano y pequefho. Esta situaci6n estA siendo reasentamiento y la capacidad del proyecto corregida parcialmente por medio de una mas para restablecer los niveles de ingreso asi frecuente contrataci6n de consultores. Los como estimular el desarrollo local en las departamentos tecnicos cuentan con un staff areas donde se efectua el reasentamiento. minimo en lo que se refiere a especialistas en Los prestamos directos para el reasenta- ciencias sociales y deben dividir sus recursos miento serian un apoyo mas consistente a la entre los multiples Departamentos de Paises. politica del Banco. Los reasentamientos contienen no solamente dimensiones sociales sino tambien tcnicas Implementaci6n y Supervisi6n del tanto en agricultura como en asuntos urbanos. Reasentamiento Salvo algunas excepciones importantes, el staff tecnico de los Departamentos de Paises se utiliza solamente esporadicamente para Entre 1986 y 1993 se ha logrado tn progreso atender al reasentamiento durante la gradual aunque desigual en lo que se refiere a supervisi6n normal de los proyectos. Como la supervisi6n de los reasentamientos. La resultado, las dificultades en la implementaci6n supervisi6n de los componentes del reasenta- se identifican con tardanza, la gerencia recibe miento mejor6 inmediatamente despurs de la informaci6n sobre los problemas con atraso y revisi6n de 1986 pero despues la frecuencia de se dilata la reacci6n del Banco ante las agendas las rnisiones de supervisi6n se estancaron en un prestatarias responsables de la implementaci6n. nivel plateau (m-s alto que el de los niveles La capacidad existente de talento tecnico en el anteriores a 1986) hasta el comienzo de esta banco, es un recurso importante que debe revisi6n durante la cual aument6 de nuevo utilizarse en los temas de reasentamiento. significativamente. Los componentes de reasentamiento en todos los grandes proyectos E t d de irrigaci6n e hidroelectricidad recibieron .El moptoreo del cumpliento de los acuerdos .uev6 con reuardd peol legales por parte de los Prestatarios se ha supervisi6n con esularida ero d Ilevado a cabo principalmente para el caso de supervisi6n fue esporadica en las areas de cov.o es ,fio y. cnlidsypr transporte, agua potable y desarrollo urbano conveaios especaficos ya concluidos y para asi~~ cooe.o rycoscnoeainsd metas fisicas; rara vez para medir la calidad del reasncomoientlos prquefas con aqperadons de trabajo de reasentamiento. Las misiones de reasentamientosde peq yecas. En graq*s supervisi6n encontraron muchos problemas reasentmiento d roycscogane que incluyen tin abandono de los planes de desplazamientos, particularmente en el sector reasentamiento y un desconocimeiento de los urbano y en los cuales no se efectu6 supervisi6n durante varios af.os, como es el acuerdos legales por parte de los Prestatarios. caso del proyecto urbano Jabotabek en Indone- Si se mejora el monitoreo y se exige el sia, .ue mu . dificil para el Banco entender cumplimiento de los acuerdos contractuales y sia, fue muy drficil para el Banco entender legales relacionados con el reasentamiento, como fueron reubtadas las poblaciones aumenta el potencial para mejorar la consistencia entre las operaciones y la politica. En los iiltimos 18 meses se suspendieron los Las recientes mejorfas en la calidad y desembolsos a tres proyectos por razones continuidad de la supervisi6n de los vinculadas con reasentamiento. reasentamientos deben ser mantenidas. Con regularidad se utilizan especialistas en Un resultado de la Revisi6n de 1993 es el reasentamiento para aquellos proyectos que considerable aumento de los recursos dedica- involucran grandes reasentamientos, pero una dos a la supervisi6n de los reasentamientos en escasez de cientificos sociales mantuvo los todo el Banco. Dos tercios de las ninsiones de niveles de supervisi6n especializada por debajo supervisi6n de reasentamientos durante 1993 de lo deseable en aquellos proyectos con incluyeron especialistas en reasentamientos 38 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo utilizandose a menudo consultores (ii) ajustes a los cronogramas de especializados en asuntos de reasentamiento lo reasentamiento, (iii) mayor participaci6n de las cual fue necesario para fortalecer a corto plazo personas afectadas, (iv) bCsqueda de mejores la capacidad en esta area. La proporci6n de 1:2 soluciones de reubicaci6n o medios para entre el staff y los consultores en reducir el desplazamiento, (v) asignaci6n de reasentamiento que oper6 durante la Revis:i6n recursos financieros adicionales, y (vi) apoyo a de 1993, ayud6 pero no es sostenible ni los esfuerzos de los Prestatarios para expandir saludable para la instituci6n a largo plazo ya la capacidad organizacional. Estas acciones que no mejora la capacidad propia y la correctivas mej oraron considerablemente el experiencia (la nmisma proporci6n entre el staff portafolio de proyectos de todo el Banco y un y los consultores utilizados en el manejo de la numero de < se encaminaron por la ruta de el manejo del portafolio sufre en la medida en la mejorfa como son los casos del proyecto de que los consultores atienden otros asuntos. Agua y Alcantarillado de Izniir en Turqufa, el proyecto del Valle de Tana en Madagascar y Progresos en el Manejo del varios proyectos en la India. En este tiltimo Portafolio Durante 1993 pais, por ejemplo, luego de un apoyo intensivo de parte del staff y la gerencia del Banco se La administraci6n y la ejecutoria del portalolio acord6 emprender importantes acciones de reasentamiento del Banco mejor6 en forma correctivas en el Proyecto de Irrigaci6n significativa en 1993. A medida que la Revisi6n Maharashtra M con 168,000 personas afectadas, identificaba los problemas, las unidades dentro del contexto de la reestructurac6n del identolicrabalos prdbelmBas lasjuntdadest co s proyecto. En el Proyecto de Irrigaci6n del Alto involucradas del Banco conjuntaente con s Krishna II con mas de 220,000 personas Prestatarios iniciaban medidas para corregirlos. Krashnas dej 220,000 ersonas A~~~~~~~ trvw deet*rcso lBn afectadas, las mejorias en el trabajo de Antevsc . uertemetel Bas rol reasentamiento hicieron posible que se diera fin (i) intensific6 fuertemente la supervision de los a la suspensi6n de los desembolsos. Se reasentamientos, (ii) aument6 la asistencia visualizan atm mis acciones correctivas. tecnica a los Prestatarios para emprender acciones correctivas y (iii) mejor6 el trabajo E trabajo analftico de gabmete y el inmediato de los nuevos proyectos que est.in entrenamiento ofrecido a los profesionales del bajo consideraci6n en el portafolio durante pats, tambidn contribuyo a mejorar el manejo AF94-AF97. de la cartera durante 1993. Todas las regiones Durante la Revisi6n de 1993 el Banco .ri6 han preparado reportes que analizan la los recursos para supervisi6n de los reasen- situaci6n de las operaciones de reasentamiento tamientos. La mayorfa de los proyectos que no s6lo para cada prayecto individual sino implicaban el reasentamiento de mas de 1,000 tambien para el subconjunto dentro del personas fueron supervisados por lo menos portafolio de la regi6n. Los departamentos una vez y mnas de 40 proyectos incluyendo el centrales prepararon reportes sobre m grnd reiieo do.iitsd reasentamiento enfocados por sector y por mas grande recibieron dos visitas de supervisi6n. Las regiones enviaron mas tema sobre agricultura, generaci6n hidraulica, misiones de supervisi6n al reasentamiento y transporte y asuntos urbanos a la vez que durante los ultimos doce meses que en la continuaran haciendo un monitoreo de taduade lstos does a esos qn e en .r aspectos especificos de la cartera de proyectos totalidad de lOS tres anios anteriores. que implican reasentamientos. Los aspectos Las acciones correctivas que se iniciaron legales del reasentamiento han sido analizados durante la Revisi6n incluyeron: (i) re- por la Vicepresidencia Legal. En 1993 el evaluaci6n de la magnitud del desplazamiento, Instituto de Desarrollo Educativo (IDE) organiz6 seminarios de capacitaci6n sobre Environment Department Resettlement and Development reasentamniento en India, China y Turquia y acord6 con varios Prestatarios continuar dicho Las actividades a traves de 1993 en el Banco y entrenamiento. en el terreno demuestran la capacidad del Banco y de los Prestatarios para aprender de El proceso completo de la Revisi6n ha sido una las experiencias y responder mas eficazmente a oportunidad excepcional para aprender c6mo los problemas de reasentamiento asi como para implementar mejores asentamientos, para fijar prioridades institucionales. Ambos estan identificar las practicas correctas y ajustar los ahora mejor equipados para Ilevar a cabo enfoques generales segdin las circunstancias trabajos de reasentamiento en los proyectos particulares y los sectores, para fortalecer la futuros. Sin embargo, sera un reto para todos capacidad institucional para los mantener este nivel de esfuerzo, si se toma en reasentamientos y para refinar las cuenta la considerable cantidad de recursos metodologias analiticas y de evaluaci6n. adicionales que se requirieron y utilizaron. Mientras una parte considerable de estos aprendizajes se presentan en este reporte en la Acciones Para Mejorar el Trabajo de actualidad se han completado o estAn en Reasentamiento por Parte del Banco ejecuci6n otros estudios econ6micos, sociol6gicos, legales y tecnicos. Los hallazgos La conclusi6n general de la Revisi6n sabre de estos estudios serAn diseminados Lamiento eneral de la care ampliamente para ayudar a expandir los reasentamiento es que la calidad de la cartera conocimientos disponibles y las experiencias de prayectos que implican reasentamiento que positivas. Las contribuciones del ejecuta el Banco ha mejorado particularmente Departamento Legal incluyen estudios despues de 1991. La Revisi6n tambien revelo pioneros por parte del Consejero General del debilidades importantes que dieron origen a Banco sobre los asuntos legales involucrados en acciones que se ejecutaron o se han iniciado el desplazamiento de las poblaciones como para alcanzar mejorias adicionales. resultado de las acciones de desarrollo de parte del sector puiblico y las cuales ayudarAn tanto Prioridades estrategicas al Banco como a los prestatarios a proteger los En relaci6n a las politicas de reasentamiento derechos y el patrimonio de las personas vigentes en el Banco, centradas en el reasentadas. El Departamento del Medio restablecimiento de los niveles de ingreso, el Ambiente tambien prepar6 un conjunto de trabajo se orientara de acuerdo a las siguientes nuevos instrumentos para mejorar los trabajos prioridades estrategicas, las cuales concuerdan futuros de reasentamiento incluyendo: guias con las lecciones claves descritas en este revisadas para el anAlisis econ6mico y finan- reporte. ciero del reasentamiento; un sistema computarizado para llevar a cabo el monitoreo Asegurar el compromiso de la ejecuci6n del reasentamiento a nivel del del prestatario proyecto; lineamientos para desarrollar proyectos para las personas reasentadas El banco no financiara proyectos que mediante el aprovechamiento de peces en los involucren operaciones de reasentamiento a embalses, y estudios sobre las experiencias de menos que los gobiemos involucrados adopten reasentamiento urbano. Se le dio apoyo al las politicas y establezcan el marco legal Instituto Rotterdam de Estudios de Vivienda necesario para hacer posible reasentamiento para la preparaci6n de un manual tecnico para con restablecimiento del nivel de ingreso. El la planificaci6n urbana. La Regi6n Africana acuerdo sobre dichas politicas debe ser claro resumi6 y public6 sus revisiones bi-anuales desde el inicio, dandosele la debida sobre reasentamnientos ilevadas a cabo desde consideraci6n a las circunstancias de aquellos 1988 y organiz6 una conferencia intemacional y paises dentro de un sistema federal donde las public6 un volumen sobre reasentamiento en politicas y los marcos legales puedan caer Africa. 40 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo dentro de la jurisdicci6n de los gobiemos sociales para el disefto y la ejecuci6n de los provinciales o estatales. Los prestamos a proyectos. Antes de que el proyecto se inicie se sectores con grandes necesidades de haran todos los esfuerzos para buscar opciones reasentamientos deberan proveer una extensi6n tcnicas y sociales que dismninuyan el gradual de los standares mejorados de reasentamiento. El Banco hard un esfuerzo reasentamientos, desde el nivel del proyecto especial para identificar y diserninar las individual hasta tener un impacto mas amplio experiencias positivas particularmente en lo en la totalidad del sector. que se refiere a reasentamientos en contextos urbanos y semi-urbanos para los cuales los Fortalecer la capacidad institucional enfoques operacionales debe aun afinarse. El del prestatario diseflo del proyecto y los cronogramas explicitos deben crear mecanismos internos que El Banci ayudara a los Prestatarios a mejorar vinculen el progreso de los trabajos de la obra su capacidad institucional para implementid r civil con el avance gradual del reasentamiento. los reasentamientos antes de que se inicie elL Estos seran descritos en los REIS de los desplazamiento y a clarificar los marcos legales Etoss de forma que se protejan los derechos de las proyectos. personas. En el caso de aquellos Prestatarios Promover la participacion de la que ejecuten varios proyectos de reasentamientos financiados por el Banco, i'ste gente estara preparado para apoyar proyectos El Banco requiere la participaci6n activa de especiales de desarrollo institucional que aquellos que seran afectados por el ayuden al gobierno a mejorar su capacidad reasentamiento en la preparaci6n, planificaci6n institucional para atender las necesidades dce e implementaci6n del mismo. Como parte de reasentamiento en las fases de disefno y de las Evaluaciones Ambientales (EA) los planes hnplementaci6n de los proyectos (por ejemplo de reasentamiento se ponen a la disposici6n del la capacidad de preparaci6n del terreno, piblico. Las personas afectadas por el estudios sobre recursos de tierra, capacidacl de proyecto deben recibir informaci6n confiable monitoreo y evaluaci6n, y entrenamiento). Este sobre la politica para el reasentaninento y para apoyo institucional del Banco se enfocara la rehabilitaci6n y sobre los derechos, la principalmente en las agencias nacionales y, elegibilidad, las altemativas, los procesos de estatales tales como los departamentos reclamo y mecanismos de apelaci6n. La centrales de irrigaci6n y agua potable y discusi6n publica sobre los planes de reasenta- corporaciones de electricidad de forma que! se miento estimulara la participaci6n de las desarrolle su capacidad general en asuntos personas a ser reasentadas y de las que los tecnicos, sociales y ambientales y mas recibiran en su comunidad, en la preparaci6n especificamente para desarrollar standares de de dichos planes y luego en su ejecuci6n. disefio, reglas y reglamentos que puedan ayudar a llevar a la practica las politicas y Proveerfinanciamiento adecuado disposiciones legales relacionadas con los por parte del Banco reasentamientos. Las ONGs pueden jugar Eun papel importante para fortalecer la capacidad En adelante pra prevenir el empobrecimiento, institucional local y el Banco promovera su todos los proyectos deberan incorporar dentro participaci6n. de los costos totales del proyecto el costo total del reasentamiento y de las inversiones Mejorar el disef*o de los proyectos requeridas para recuperar los niveles de ingreso. Dentro del contexto del plan de Los proyectos apoyados por el Banco deben financiamiento del proyecto el Banco estara evitar o disminuir el desplazamiento tanto preparado para aumentar su participaci6n en el como sea posible mediante estudios tecnicos y financiamiento de la operaci6n de Environment Department 41 Resettlement and Development reasentamiento en la medida en que cada caso ampliar la capacidad en areas criticas tales lo requiera. Como el financiamniento adecuado como la social, intensificar las evaluaciones de sigue siendo un problema en algunos proyectos los proyectos y el actual proceso de monitoreo aprobados recientemente, el Banco considerara y evaluaci6n. Los gerentes dedicaran recursos financiamiento suplementario siempre que sea suficientes dentro de sus presupuestos para apropiado. Tambien se buscara un aumento en alcanzar estas mejoras. Para apoyar el el financiamiento de las actividades del fortalecimiento del trabajo sobre las reasentamiento por parte de fuentes domesticas dimensiones sociales de los proyectos el Banco y cuando sea apropiado por parte de fuentes asignara recursos financieros a un fondo central bilaterales. disefiado para proveer apoyo a proyectos innovadores que enfoquen las dimensiones Separar los proyectos sociales prioritarias tales como evaluaciones El Banco estudiara el enfoque de proyectos participativas sobre Ia pobreza, metodologias gemelos para obras cviles grandes que de analisis social, la organizaci6n de usuarios ocasionen reasentamientos. Las futuras de recursos naturales, participaci6n de las operaciones de infraestructura que desplacen ONGs en el disefho e implementacion de un gran numero de personas normalmente proyectos y otras. seran procesadas como proyectos gemelos. El umbral que definira si un proyecto se divide en Acciones correctivas y de restauracton dos sera determinado en base a la capacidad Se continuaran o emprenderan acciones local y la del pais. El procesamiento de correctivas inmediatas para aquellos proyectos grandes operaciones de reasentamiento como en ejecuci6n que no cumplen los requisitos componentes de proyectos mas grandes establecidos por la polftica o los acuerdos requerira una justificaci6n en el Reporte de legales. Para aquellos proyectos en ejecuci6n Evaluaci6n Inicial del Staff (REIS). El que fueron identificados por cada tratamiento de las operaciones de departamento regional con problemas serios de reasentamiento mayores, como proyectos en si, reasentamiento, se estAn preparando planes de pondrA en funcionamiento estructuras acci6n correctivas por parte de los Prestatarios administrativas mas apropiadas y las con la asistencia del Banco. Estos planes se habilidades necesarias para ilevar a cabo el terminarAn a mediados de 1995. Es posible que reasentamiento con 6xito. Una opci6n algunos proyectos requieran reestructuraci6n, adicional es usar una secuencia de dos financiamiento adicional o la creaci6n de proyectos donde el proyecto de desarrollo rural agencias para el reasentamiento. o urbano sigue inmediatamente despues en la zona del reasentamiento tan pronto se concluye Para aquellos proyectos evaluados por los la operaci6n de infraestructura que implic6 el departamentos regionales, los cuales tienen desplazamiento. Esta opci6n debera ser solamente problemas menores o intermedios, la considerada segun las necesidades y la asistencia del Banco se continuara situaci6n de cada proyecto. suministrando a travds de una supervisi6n regular o intensificada por parte de cada Fortalecer la capacidad institucional departamento de pais. Los Prestatarios del Banco deberan reasignar recursos financieros dentro del presupuesto del proyecto para completar El Banco esta aumentando su capacidad de exitosamente el reasentamiento y cuando sea atender las dimensiones sociales y tecnicas de requerido, el Banco considerara un los proyectos de reasentamiento para poder financiamiento adicional. mantener y expandir las mejoras. Es particularmente importante utilizar mejor la La Revisi6n identific6 casos en los cuales los capacidad de los profesionales existentes y planes de reasentamiento acordados con el 42 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo Banco no fueron implementados por el operacionales lo cual les permite atender los Prestatario y algunos proyectos ya concluidos asuntos de reasentandento de manera m5s han dejando a un niumero de personas profesional y consistente asi como en (ii) el reasentadas en peores condiciones. El Banco an5lisis del reasentamiento en la evaluaci6n est5 listo para ayudar a los Prestatarios a tomar inicial y en el disefio de los paquetes de acciones correctivas que elLos propongan desarroLLo para las personas a ser reasentadas y emprender. Estas acciones de restauraci6n por en (iii) la revisi6n intema de los componentes parte del Prestatario deben identificar a las del reasentamiento antes de someter el personas que fueron perjudicadas y revertir su proyecto al Comite Regional de Prestamos. empobrecimiento siempre que sea posible. Las Muchos de los conocimientos necesarios para acciones de restauraci6n sobre las cuales se Ilevar a cabo reasentamientos exitosos se lleg6 a un acuerdo entre el Banco y la encuentran dentro del Banco y esta Revisi6n los Corporaci6n de Energia T&emica de la India ha enriquecido. Mediante una buena son un ejemplo reciente que refleja progreso en distribuci6n de los recursos humanos se deben esta area. aprovechar cabalmente estos conocimientos. Mejorar el procesamiento En la fase de identificaci6n de los proyectos y durante el disefio de grandes operaciones de de proyectos reasentamientos el Banco estimularA al Es esencial el cumplimiento a cabalidad de los Prestatario para que lleve a cabo proyectos procedimientos y de las medidas establecidLas piloto que pongan a prueba la conveniencia de para salvaguardar y asegurar la calidad de los los arreglos propuestos. El uso sistematico de proyectos tales como encuestas sobre datos los recursos de la Facilidad para Disefno de base de ingreso, planes y paquetes de Proyectos y del Fondo para Desarrollo reasentamiento, cronogramas y presupuestDs. Institucional abrira nuevas ventanillas El hecho de que casi todos los proyectos de los financieras para el apoyo tecnico y para AF93-AF94 sometidos al Comite Regional cle ampliar la capacidad de los Prestatarios en las Prestamos cumplieran con los procedimientos fases preparatorias decisivas. En los casos de establecidos indica que las Vicepresidencias operaciones mayores, especialmente en casos Regionales estan prestando atenci6n a estos de represas, se estA dando cada vez mAs requisitos. Aunque la responsabilidad total de importancia a la utilizaci6n de un panel la implementaci6n recae sobre los gobiemos consultivo sobre reasentamiento en las prestatarios, el equipo del Banco tiene su primeras etapas de identificaci6n, siguiendo la propia responsabilidad de darle un experiencia del establecimiento de paneles seguimiento cuidadoso a la ejecuci6n, el sobre seguridad en las represas. impacto y los resultados. En vista del alto riesgo envuelto en proyectos sensitivos que Los requisitos del Banco para la evaluaci6n de desmantelan y reconstruyen los medios de vida los reasentamientos tal como se definen en la de las personas se requiere un cuidado y uta secci6n 2.20 del Manual de Operaciones (OMS) prudencia especiales por parte del staff del y la Directiva Operacional (OD) 4.30 son Banco y del Prestatario. Es esencial ademars adecuados y seran aplicados. La evaluaci6n que el Banco asuma su propia responsabilidlad analizara explicitamente y reportara sobre los con mayor efectividad y que este esfuerzo sea riesgos sociales y econ6micos involucrados en percibido claramente. El Banco debe ademas la operaci6n de reasentamiento propuesta, solicitar a los gobiemos prestatarios que hagan separindolos de otros riesgos del proyecto y lo mismo. asegurandose de que el paquete de recuperaci6n socio-econ6mica tome en cuenta Se han logrado mejorias en (i) los recursos dichos riesgos. En consistencia la decisi6n de humanos y organizaci6n de las unidades la administraci6n del Banco que requiere un Environment Department 43 Resettlement and Development Plan de Implementacion para cada proyecto al Cuando no hay cumplimiento de los acuerdos momento de evaluarlo, el plan de legales, las decisiones de continuar los reasentamiento sera incorporado en el plan de desembolsos requieren la aprobaci6n al rnismo ejecudi6n general. nivel de la gerencia regional que aprueba las propuestas de suspender los desembolsos (esto El contenido de los REIS para proyectos que aplica para todos los incumplimientos y no s6lo involucran reasentamiento esta siendo a los que violan los acuerdos relacionados con mejorado para asegurar que la informaci6n el reasentarniento). Debido a la sensitividad y esencial sobre los reasentamientos se provea a los riesgos del reasentamiento, se mejoraran los la administraci6n y a la Junta de Directores. mecanismos existentes para reportar el Una sub-secci6n especifica de los REIS para el progreso y los problemas detectados en el componente de reasentamiento incluira los terreno a los gerentes de divisi6n y de las indicadores basicos sobre las poblaciones regiones (usando el Formulario 590). afectadas, los paquetes de desarrollo, la disminuci6n del riesgo, el cronograma y el Para mantener el progreso alcanzado durante presupuesto. El costo total del reasentariento la Revisi6n y para el continuo monitoreo del se especificara como parte de los costos del cumplimiento de los lineamientos y proyecto y se separaran los costos de procedimientos del Banco, las unidades re- compensaci6n de los costos de la inversi6n gionales prepararain reportes anuales sobre los necesaria para reconstruir una base socio- proyectos con reasentamiento en su portafolio, econ6mica viable para las personas como parte de la Revisi6n Anual de la reasentadas. Ejecuci6n de la cartera. Estos reportes cubriran la administraci6n del portafolio de proyectos Supervision de reasentamiento con sus indicadores Existe un amplio margen para mejorar el cuantificables, especfficamente la frecuencia de contenido y la frecuencia de la supervisi6n de las misiones de supervisi6n, la evaluaci6n de la los reasentamientos. Por lo menos cada 12 recuperaci6n de los medios de subsistencia en meses se llevaran a cabo misiones regulares de la medida en que las personas desplazadas son supervisi6n con un staff adecuado incluyendo reasentadas y los principales problemas de visitas de campo a los lugares donde el implementaci6n, si es que existen. En lo desplazamiento y la reubicaci6n realmente relativo al procesamiento de nuevos proyectos ocurren. La utilizaci6n intensiva de con- con reasentamiento, el reporte cubrira la sultores locales especializados aumentarA existencia de planes de reasentamiento, significativamente el alcance del trabajo de encuestas sobre niveles de ingreso, supervisi6n por parte del Banco. La exitosa cronogramas presupuestos y consultas practica introducida por los departamentos efectuadas con las comunidades locales. regionales del Este de Asia y Africa de apoyar a los paneles de monitoreo nombrados por el Prestatario mejora la implementaci6n y sera extendida a otras regiones. El fortalecimiento de su asistencia a los Prestatarios para el reasentamiento y la mejora Las divisiones del Banco responsables de de su gesti6n, constituye una prioridad muy proyectos con reasentamientos complejos importante para el Banco y es parte integral de deben asignar mayor tiempo del staff para su rnisi6n central de aliviar la pobreza y supervisar estas operaciones. Sin embargo, promover el desarrollo sostenible. El ningtin aumento en la supervisi6n por parte del importante proceso de aprendizaje que tuvo Banco puede substituir las fallas de los lugar durante los ultimos ahios ha aumentado Prestatarios y su bajo nivel de compromiso los niveles de consciencia sobre la complejidad para ilevar a cabo las acciones acordadas. y los riesgos involucrados; el Banco y sus 44 Resettlement Series Resumen Ejecutivo Prestatarios estAn mucho mejor equipados que Por esta raz6n, todos los gobiemos y las en el pasado para trabajar en esta area. El agencias de desarrollo multilaterales y bilater- Banco cuenta ampliamente con el talento ales deben establecer politicas y enfoques tecnico necesario para esta y tarea y la limitada similares para hacer posible una mejora en los capacidad interna para el analisis social esta, medios de vida de las personas reasentadas. siendo superada. El Banco asistira a los Prestatarios que ejecutan grandes operaciones Al apoyar un enfoque sobre el de reasentamientos con mas recursos econ6rni- reasentamiento centrado en la prevenci6n del cos y promovera esquemas de dos proyectos empobrecimiento, el Banco promueve separados cuando el caso lo amerite. politicas y enfoques que tienen relevancia mas alla de los proyectos por Al apoyados. El Banco esta trabajando para reducir la brecha La mejora en la capacidad de los Prestatarios entre las metas del reasentamiento y las viejas beneficiara no s6lo a las operaciones practicas realizadas en muchos paises. Para. apoyadas por el Banco sino tambien toda la lograrlo esta fijando normas mas estrictas para gama de actividades de reasentamiento en las operaciones que apoyan y promueven el amplios sectores, los cuales afectan un mayor restablecimiento de los niveles de ingreso de nuimero de persona. Esta es la ruta que debe las personas reasentadas a un nivel similar o recorrerse en el futuro trabajo de mejor al que tenian con anterioridad a su reasentamiento, aunque la misma no sea facil. desplazamiento. Esta labor requiere tiempo, Existiran muchas dificultades porque el recursos y un esfuerzo sostenido por parte del reasentamiento sigue siendo un reto formi- Banco y de los Prestatarios. dable para los Prestatarios y para el Banco. Desafortunadamente bajos standares El Banco reconoce su gran responsabilidad de prevalecen en muchos de los desplazamientos ayudar a los Prestatarios a avanzar mas que ocurren hoy en dia por fuera de los rapidamente para mejorar el reasentamiento programas apoyados por el Banco; los donde quiera que no puedan evitarse los proyectos financiados por e1, no ocurren de desplazamientos y para extender este forma aislada por lo que dichos standares enfoque mejorado al contexto sectorial y tambien retrasan el progreso de sus proyectos. nacional. Environment Department I . Resume Analytique Un Defi A L'echelle Mondiale Dans les pays en developpement, l'ampleur des deplacements de population lies aux projets de Le deplacement force de populations a toujours developpement a rapidement augmente au ete inseparable du processus de cours des dernieres decennies, en raison d'une developpement; sa marque ind6l6bile est part, d'une multiplication de plus en plus inscrite dans l'evolution des pays industrialises rapide des infrastructures et d'autre part, de comme des pays en developpement. La densites demographiques de plus en plus construction de grands barrages hydro- elevees. On estime que plus de. 4 miLLions de Llectriques, les projets d'irrigation, la pose dLe personnes sont victimes, chaque annee, de reseaux d'approvisionnement en eau potab]Le deplacements forces duis a la mise en construc- ou l'extension des reseaux routiers entra^ment tion de 300 grands barrages en moyenne. Les des deplacements de populations extr6mement programmes de developpement urbain et de douloureux et dramatiques. Le drame d'un transports lances chaque annee dans les pays deplacement force en milieu urbain, dans le! en developpement entramneraient le <'West Endo de Boston, a suscite une abondante deplacement de 6 autres miDLions de personnes litterature sociologique. Le magnifique plan environ. Durant la decennie ecoulee, 80 a 90 directeur du Paris modeme n'a pu se realiser millions de personnes ont ete reinstallLses du qu'au prix de douloureux transferts forces dLe fait de programmes d'equipements comme la populations au temps du baron Haussmanrn. construction de barrages, ainsi que des La perc&e de l'impressionnante transversale du programmes de developpement urbain et de Bronx (Cross Bronx Expressway), a New York, transports. Ce chiffre s'accroit encore en raison a eventre bien des quartiers dont certains -- du des deplacements lies a des investissements moins a en juger retrospectivement -auraient faits dans d'autres secteurs. pu etre epargnes. Les immenses complexes hydro-electriques du Canada ont deracine cde Les programmes finances par la Banque nombreux groupes autochtones. Dans tous les mondiale representent une part- assez faible, pays, des deplacements forces de population mais non insigniflante, de ce total. On estime continuent de se produire pour des raisons que les projets dont la Banque poursuit liees a l'amelioration generale des conditiorns activement l'execution entraemeront la de vie, a la mise en place d'infrastructures cle reinstaDlation de 2 millions de personnes sur protection de l1environnement ou a l'extension une periode de huit ans. Les projets finances des services publics. Grace a l'experience par la Banque sont responsables au moins de degagee des precedentes realisations de divers quelque 3 % des reinstallations consecutives a types de reinstallations forcees, les la construction de barrages dans le monde connaissances se sont accrues pour mieux entier, et a 1 % environ des deplacements forces planifier les reinstallations de populations et dus aux programmes de developpement urbain mieux proteger les droits et les moyens et de transports dans les pays en d'existence des individus concernes. developpement. Environment Department 47 Resettlement and Development Bien que comparativement limitee, la participa- ethniques ou des groupes pastoraux. Arreter tion de la Banque aux operations de des politiques de reinstallation appropriAes et reinstallation revet cependant une grande les appliquer efficacement est donc un importance. Dans le cadre des projets qu'efle imperatif moral d'autant plus fort. finance, la Banque se doit d'intervenir aupres des Emprunteurs afin que tous les efforts soient S'ils sont correctement executes, les faits pour retablir, et si possible ameliorer, les programmes de reinstallation peuvent moyens d'existence des populations constituer un element de la strategie nationale transferees. Toutefois, l'intervention de la de lutte contre la pauvrete. Cela exige non Banque a une port&e qui depasse de loin la seulement des politiques judicieuses et des dimension des reinstallations operees dans le ressources adequates, mais aussi un cadre des projets qu'elle finance. Depuis que la changement de mentalite, dans le sens d'une Banque a adopte, il y a 14 ans, ses directives reconnaissance du droit des populations novatrices en matiere de reinstallation, celle-ci reinstallees a tirer benefice des projets qui ont a cherche de plus en plus a ameliorer, non cause leur deplacement. seulement les politiques d'intervention et les cadres juridiques relatifs a l'ensemble des Offrir de meilleurs programmes de operations de reinstallation de populations, de reinstallation est donc une priorite urgente. concert avec les gouvernements, mais aussi les Pour cela, il faut s'attacher a mieux procedures d'execution de ces operations en comprendre la complexite et l'imbrication des liaison avec les agents d'execution des projets. facteurs sociaux, culturels, economiques et dcologiques qui entrent en jeu dans un tel Am6liorer les politiques de reinstallation de processus et admettre avec franchise les lecons populations est une tache difficile pour les des succes et des echecs precedents. La gouvemements des pays en developpement, presente etude s'inscrit dans cette recherche. surtout pour ceux a faible revenu qui connaissent un manque de terres arables, une B*la des Op*rations de Rd competition des besoins a satisfaire, des ressources limitees et une insuffisance de leur d L'ehelle de la Banque capacite institutionnelle. Toutefois, ces dernieres annees ont vu des progres sensibles L'initiative d'un bilan des operations de dans ce domaine; dans certains pays, ces reinstallation a l'6chelle de la Banque date de progrds ont meme ete remarquables. Mais 1992. Ce bilan couvre tous les projets assortis d'importants problemes et difficultes lies aux d'une reinstallation dont la Banque s'est reinstallations de personnes deplacees activement occupee entre 1986 et 1993 et evalue continuent de surgir et ces operations se dans quele mesure la mise en pratique de ces deroulent souvent moins bien que prevu. opdrations est conforme aux directives de la Banque. La tache de ce bilan a ete assignee au Les coCits d'une reinstallation inappropriee departement de l'environnement (vice- peuvent etre tres eleves, entrainiant presidence de l'co-d4veloppement durable); le l'appauvrissement d'un nombre considerable departement de l'environnement a cree une d'invidus, un sujet de preoccupation d'autant equipe speciale chargde de la coordination et de plus serieux que les personnes concernmes sont la realisation de ce bilan conjointement avec les souvent ddj& tres pauvres. Elles vivent departements regionaux. Chacune des regions gdn4ralement dans des zones defavorisees ohL opdrationnelles et le departement juridique de infrastructures et services sociaux sont tres la Banque ont constitue des groupes de travail limites. Bien des barrages sont construits dans charges de l'valuation des reinstallations. des regions reculees otu vivent souvent des Toutes les regions ont etabli des rapports populations autochtones, des minorites analytiques detailles sur les operations de 48 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique reinstallation dont elles s'occupent, et c'est a Prob1kmes Theoriques partir de ces rapports que le pr6sent bilan a ete etabli. Les autres Vice-Pr6sidences centrales ont La necessite d'investir egalement apporte leur propre contribution. da nelessinfrastr stirs dans les infirastmdcures Lexamen des reinstallations avait les trois Les pays en developpement investissent objectifs suivants: environ 200 milliards de dollars par an dans des infrastructures nouvelles. Ces * Determiner l'etendue, la composition et investissements leur ont assure dimportants l'orientation des op6rations de benefices sur les plans economique et social.2 reinstallation encadrees par la Banque, par Au cours des 15 dernieres ann6es, le nombre de grandes regions et par secteurs. menages ayant acces a leau salubre a augmente de 50 °JO, ce qui a permis une * Analyser les programmes de rdinstallation amelioration spectaculaire de l'etat de sante et en cours au plan de leur qualit6, leur de la qualite de vie. L'acces a l'energie fidelite aux grandes directives, et leurs electrique et au telephone a double durant la resultats. meme periode, ce qui a entra^me un accroissement de la productivite et du bien- - Identifier les problemes les plus frequients etre. La production vivriere a enregistre une qui compromettent le deroulement des hausse vertigineuse - doublant durant le operations, prendre des mesures dernier quart de si&le - et ce progres est dui correctives en cours d'execution et elaborer pour plus de moitie aux investissements faits une strategie de suivi pour repondre plus dans le secteur de lirrigation. Quant aux efficacement aux besoins d'une investissements dans les transports, ils ont r6installation reussie. permis de reduire les couits de production et d'augmenter les prix agricoles au producteur. Deliberment concu comme un large outil d'analyse des operations de reinstallations, le Cette evolution suppose souvent des present bilan a e effectu6 sur le terrain, par les changements dans les modes d'utilisation des ddlegatiorns regionales et centrales de la Banque, terres et de l1eau et, dans certains cas, exige des coniointement avec les Emprunteurs et non pas deplacements de population. II est possible de dans le cadre sedentaire d'un bureau sous la limiter limportance numerique des popula- forme d'un inventaire statique. Le principal tions a reinstaller et, comme on le verra dans le resultat de cet examen approfondi nest pas present rapport, des progres sensibles ont ete uniquement le rapportfinal, mais aussi les realises sur ce point. Mais il est impossible changements qu'il a dicdench6s durant toute l'ann& d'eliminer en totalite les deplacements forces. 1993 tant A la Banque que sur le terrain. Ces On ne saurait non plus prevoir si les changements comportent un renforcement de la reinstallations toucheront dans l'avenir des supervision sur le terrain, une participation au populations moins nombreuses. Plus de deux niveau de la preparation des projets, leur milliards de personnes n'ont pas acces A evaluation, et leur execution, des consultatians l'lectricite et ne disposent que de fagots et du sur place avec des organisations non fumier animal comme source dL'nergie; 1,7 gouvernementales (ONG), des etudes sectorieUles milliard ne disposent pas de reseaux d'egout et d'operations de reinstallation, la mise au point de un milliard n' pas acces a l'eau salubre nouveaux outils techniques de planification cles canalisee, ce qui cause chaque .ann6e le deces - reinstallations, et un nombre considerable de qui serait evitable - de 2 a 3 millions de mesures correctives prises conjointement par la nourrissons et denfants. La production Banque et les Emprunteurs concernant les projets alimentaire devra de nouveau doubler au cours qui n'atteignent pas les objectifs fixes. des 40 prochaines annees - ce qui n'est Environment Department 49 Resettlement and Development possible qu'au prix de nouveaux les systemes hierarchiques coutumiers risquent investissements dans l'irrigation. Et la popula- de perdre leurs chefs. Les symboles culturels et tion mondiale augmentera d'au moins un religieux visibles, comme les autels et les milliard chaque decennie durant la meme tombes des ancetres, sont abandonrns, ce qui a periode. n est donc absolument essentiel de pour consequence de rompre les liens avec le faire de nouveaux et considerables passe et d'effacer l'identite culturelle du investissements dans les infrastructures si l'on groupe. entend reduire la pauvrete et faire baisser les taux de croissance demographique. L'effet cumulatif de ces bouleversements peut detruire les fondements d'une societe locale, La nature du probleme des ruiner son economie et perturber la vie de I . d p l nombreux individus. Le risque le plus imniediat est un appauvrissement collectif dui Transfert et reinstallation d'tne population - & la disparition de terres, au chBmage, a comprennent deux processus etroitement lies et l'inseurite alimentaire, a la degradation de neanmoins distincts: deplacer un groupe l'etat sanitaire ou a la perte d'acces aux biens humnain et reconstituer ses moyens d'existence communautaires. C'est pourquoi, realiser une - processus parmi les plus difficiles d'une reinstallation de population reussie est une operation de developpement. La complexite mesure preventive contre l'appauvrissement et des facteurs qui interviennent dans les fait partie de la lutte contre la pauvret -tun r6installations de populations et la grande theme essentiel de la mission de la Banque. diversite des projets sont autant d'obstacles Dans leur lutte pour reduire la pauvrete, la pour reinstaller un groupe d'individus dans de Banque et les pays membres doivent adopter bonnes conditions. Reconnaitre la difficulte des mesures preventives afin que le transfert intrinseque de toute reinstallation, tel est le d'une population impose par tn projet ne soit premier pas vers une approche serieuse de pas soutrce d'aggravation des conditions de vie cette tache. de cette population. Un deplacement force peut entramner le Transplanter des personnes souieve aussi des demantelement des systemes de production, la questions juridiques. Une reinstallation dispersion de groupes apparentes et la irnposee, par le risque qu'elle entra^me de violer ddsagregation d'etablissements humains crees les droits fondamentaux, au niveau tant de longue date. La vie des individus peut etre individuel que collectif, est une operation qui affectee de facon fort douloureuse. Nombre se differencie de toutes les autres. Souvent, d'emplois et de possessions sont perdus. l'execution des projets est differee par les Souvent, la qualite des soins de sante diminue. tribunaux et le montant des indemnites, Les liens entre les producteurs et leurs clients considerablement augmente en appel; ces faits sont souvent detruits et le marche du travail a demontrent que, selon un principe reconnu l'echelle locale est desorganise. Les reseaux dans la legislation de nombreux pays, lYon ne. sociaux non structures qui sont le support saurait deplacer arbitrairement des individus quotidien de strategies de survie - assurant sans leur verser une juste indemnite, quelles une entraide a la fois a l'echelle de la garde des que soient les raisons qui, a l'echelle nationale, enfants, la securite alimentaire, les transferts de imposent ce deplacement. On observe que revenu, le credit a court terme, les echanges de lorsqu'un transfert de population se deroule main-d'oeuvre, et d'autres sources dans la legalite et que les droits de l'homme fondamentales de soutien socio-economique - sont integralement respectes, les groupes sont detruits. Les organisations locales, les affectes par le projet s'y opposent moins associations formelles ou informelles violemment (sans aller jusqua l'accepter de disparaissent parce que leurs membres sont plein gre) et l'execution d'ensemble du projet a disperses. Les communautees traditionnelles et une chance de s'accomplir avec plus de succes. 50 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique Reinstaller les groupes leses en tenant comjpte La politique de reinstallation de leurs besoins et de leurs droits, c'est non de la Banque seulement respecter la loi, mais aussi avoir une conception appropriee du developpement, La Banque a ete la premiere institution internationale de developpement a reagir Le de'bat international face a la complexite et a la difficulte des s les renstallations deplacements forces de populations; c'est en sur les remstalcahons 1980 qu'elle adopta une politique officielle et En raison de leur complexite et de leurs effets des procedures institutionnelles pour realiser negatifs, les reinstallations de populations se un transfert et pour repondre aux besoins des placent au centre d'un large debat interna- populations reinstallees (Encadre 1). Cette tional, oui interviennent et s'opposent vivement politique est fondee sur une experience les gouvernements, les organisations non effective de la reinstallation, dans les pays gouvemementales, les groupes d'opinion developpes comme dans les pays en publique, les parlementaires, les institutions de developpement, et sur des recherches en developpement et les medias. La critique des sciences sociales. En adoptant cette reinstallations se transforne souvent en une politique, la Banque a rejete l'argument selon refutation des objectifs et de la legitimite du lequel l'appauvrissement des populations projet qui les imposent, et parfois de l'id6e reinstallees constituait un aspect inevitable, menme de developpement. Deux polemiques bien que deplorable, du developpement. La sont soulevees: l'une consiste a declarer politique de la Banque a pour objectif inacceptable, par principe, toute reinstallation fondamental de retablir le niveau de vie et les involontaire. La deuxieme est une critiqu,e de capacites productives des personnes la qualite de certains exemples de deplackes et si possible de les ameliorer. Les reinstallation. L'une et l'autre polemiques sont grandes dispositions de cette politique tres souvent dirigees contre les projets soutenus protegent et elargissent les droits des par la Banque. personnes deplacees et encouragent la mise en place d'une sorte de filet de securite, Le refus de toute reinstallation est une atfitude visant a leur restituer leurs moyens d6pourvue de realisme. Bien des projets d'existence. Dans tous les cas possibles, la entrainent un inevitable d6placement foro= de politique de la Banque invite a transformer populations; la question est de savoir comment toute reinstallation involontaire en une limiter au maxinum l'ampleur de ce occasion d'amdliorer le niveau de vie deplacement et repondre efficacement aux anterieur, ceci en mettant les groupes de besoins des groupes reinstalles. La Banque population reinstalles en mesure d'avoir part partage le point de vue des critiques qui aux benefices du projet de developpement deplorent les reinstallations mal conduites. Leur qui a entraine leur reinstallation. souci du bien-etre des populations deplacees est entierement justifie - et peu eloigne du mandat Retablir le niveau de vie anterieur constitue et des politiques propres de la Banque. La dans la pratique une tache tres difficile. En critique des reinstallations manqu&es, faite par cherchant a obtenir un resultat orient6 dans la des ONG ou d'autres groupes concemes, a voie du developpement, la politique de d'ailleurs aide la Banque a ameliorer ses reinstallation de la Banque lance un defi politiques et ses interventions. Par sa decision redoutable, tant a elle-meme qu'aux meme d'adopter officiellement une politique Emprunteurs, mais un defi en parfaite bas6e sur des principes equitables et des direc- harmonie avec les politiques de lutte contre la tives judicieuses, la Banque a ete elle-meme le pauvrete que suivent les pays emprunteurs. 11 critique le plus energique des op6rations, de importe toutefois de bien comprendre la nature deplacement mal concues qui entraineni: et les dimensions des actions que suppose l'appauvrissement des populations d6p]ac6es. l'application de cette politique. Dans les pays Environment Department 51 Resettlement and Development Encadre 1. Politique de la Banque en matibre de rkinstallations Inspiree des resultats d'experiences de terrain et des conclusions de recherches en sciences sociales, la politique de la Banque concernant les reinstallations n'a cesse d'evoluer depuis 1980, passant par plusieurs etapes decisives en 1986, 1988 et 1990. Les elements fondamentaux de cette politique sont les suivants: * Les deplacements forces doivent etre evites ou limites chaque fois que cela est possible, en raison de leurs effets d'appauvrissement et de perturbation. * Lorsque le deplacement est inevitable, l'objectif de la politique de la Banque est d'assister les personnes deplacees afin qu'elles ameliorent ou au moins retrouvent leur niveau de vie anterieur et leurs moyens d'existence. Les moyens d'atteindre cet objectif sont les suivants: l'Emprunteur doit preparer et executer des programmes de reinstallation concus comme des operations de d6veloppement. Ces programmes de reinstallation font partie integrante des plans d'intervention d'un projet. * Les personnes deplacees doivent: (i) recevoir un dedommagement d'une valeur egale a celle des pertes subies, (ii) pouvoir beneficier des avantages crees par le projet, et (iii) Otre assistees pendant le transfert et la periode de transition sur le nouveau site. . Transferer les individus en respectant leurs regroupements originels peut attfnuer les traumatismes. Reduire la distance entre la zone de depart et les sites de reinstallation peut favoriser l'adaptation des personnes deplacees a leur nouvel environnement socio-culturel et physique. Compenser les effets ndgatifs de la distance par les effets positifs des opportunites economiques doivent etre soigneusement peses. * La participation des personnes evacu&es et de leurs h6tes a la planification de l'operation de reinstallation doit etre encouragee. 11 faut s'appuyer sur les institutions sociales et culturelles presentes de la population evacuee pour effectuer le transfert et le processus de reinstallation. . Les nouvelles communautes reinstallees doivent Otre concues comme des etablissements humains viables, equipes d'infrastructures et de services et capables de s'integrer dans le contexte socio- economique regional. . Les communautes locales qui accueillent les personnes reinstallees doivent etre assistees pour surmonter les possibles effets negatifs sociaux et environnementaux dOs aux densites croissantes de populations. . Les populations locales, minorites ethniques, tribus pastorales et autres groupes qui peuvent avoir des droits coutumiers informels sur la terre ou sur d'autres ressources confisquees par le projet, doivent etre dedommagees avec de nouvelles terres adequates, des infrastructures et autres indemnites. L'absence de titres lIgaux sur la terre ne doit pas servir de motifs pour refuser I ces populations des dsdommagements et une aide a la reintegration. en d6veloppement, l'indemnisation en especes developpement de marches officiels du travail en vertu de la legislation de l'Etat pour les ou de la terre, les insuffisances des systemes terres et possessions perdues ne peut offrir une d'indemnisation des terres r6quisitionndes par solution satisfaisante aux personnes lesees par l'Etat, l'absence enfin d'une protection sociale des projets pour trois raisons fondamentales: adequate. C'est pourquoi, il est indispensable l'absence dans de nombreux pays en que la Banque approche les problemes de la 52 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique reinstallation sous l'angle qui est le sien, afin de ou ameliorer une politique nationale en prevenir l'appauvrissement qui resulteraiit s'inspirant de 1'exp&rience tiree des projets des projets qu'elle finance. Cet objectif ne precedents. peut souvent etre atteint que si bien des Emprunteurs modifient leurs politiques, Conclusins Essentielles Tir6es cadres juridiques, capacites institutionnelles- de ce Bilan et, de maniere generale, leurs pratiques actuellement en vigueur. Chaque projet cle Le message le plus important qui se d6gage developpement qui comporte un de ce bilan est le suivant: utne rqinstallation deplacement est un nouveau defi. Pour le bien conduite peut pravenir relever avec succes, il faut faire chaque fois ienppauitement prevenir un effort methodique pour ameliorer les l'appauvrissement, voire reduire la pauvrete politiques et l'affectation de ressources de la population concemee en lui reconstituant appropriees et encourager la participation des moyens d'existence durables. Lorsqu'une des groupes de population reinstalles et cle operation de reinstallation n'est pas bien leurs h6tes. conduite, la population affectee se retrouve dans une situation pire qu'auparavant. Une Pour les pays concernes comme pour la - reinstallation conduite avec succes au niveau Banque, il importe de tout mettre en oeuvre social entrarne aussi de eves defe economiques pour atteindre les objectifs definis. Si positifs car les couts eleves dune reinstallation l'execution des operations de reinstallation manquee ne se limitent pas seulement au liees a des projets finances par la Banque n'a groupe directement conceme - ils affectent pas CM toujours conforme aux normes requises aussi l'conomie regionale et la population hote par la politique, on note cependant des de la zone de reinstallation. Une reinstallation ameliorations. II est par ailleurs indeniable que inadequate suscite des resistances locales, les groupes de population affectes par les aggrave les tensions politiques, entraine de projets qui suivent la politique de la Banqute longs retards dans l'execution du projet et beneficient de meilleures conditions de differe le moment oii tous les individus reinstallation que ceux qui subissent les eflets concernms pourront tirer profit de ce projet; de projets non finances par la Banque; ces les benefices perdus a cause de ces retards projets representent 97 a 98 % du total des evitables depassent parfois de beaucoup le reinstallations involontaires dans le monde en cofit supplementaire d'une reinstallation bien developpement. II ne faut cependant pas conduite. S'assurer que la dimension considerer les projets soutenus par la Banque humaine d'un transfert est limitee au mini- hors des contextes et des cadres g6n6raux de la mum et que, lorsqu'il est inevitable, ce politique nationale du pays ou ils se situent. transfert est realise sans appauvrir les L'une des conclusions les plus importantes du personnes deplacees, est un objectif present bilan peut se formuler ainsi : Encour- pleinement justifie pour des raisons tant ager les gouvemements a ameliorer leurs economiques qu'6thiques. politiques en matiere de reinstallation pour secourir la detresse de millions de personnes Le bilan a montr i une fois de plus qu'une (ce qui vaudrait pour tous les projets, quTils operation de reinstallation est presque toujours soient ou non finances par la Banque) est tin plus difficile, plus couiteuse et plus longue moyen cle d'obtenir de meilleurs resultats dans qu'on ne le pense generalement. Retablir le les projets soutenus par la Banque oiu les niveau de vie anterieur des populations problemes de reinstallation n'ont pas encore e transferees est une lourde tache lorsque les resolus. C'est pourquoi dans les pays oiu la operations de reinstallation les plus Banque finance, ou envisage de financer, des importantes deplacent des dizaines de milliers projets qui comportent une reinstallation, celle- de personnes, le plus souvent tres pauvres, sur ci aide les gouvernements concernes a instituer de longues distances et une courte periode. Les Enviromnent Department 53 Resettlement and Development problemes propres au retablissement du niveau projets actuels, les resultats des operations de vie anterieur et des services communautaires de reinstallation n'ont pas atteint les sont accrus du fait que la plupart des objectifs definis et imposes par la politique Emprunteurs ne disposent que de moyens de la Banque. insuffisants, tant techniques qu'institutionnels, pour mener a bien une operation de e) Les procedures et criteres de planification reinstallation, et que certains agents d'execution institues par la Banque ont sensiblement sant peu preoccupes par ces questions. ameliore les pratiques de certains gouvemements emprunteurs, d'autres Les recherches sur le terrain, les evaluations de donateurs intemationaux, d'organismes a projets et les etudes sectorielles et juridiques vocation technique qui executent de vastes confirment les points suivants: projets et de la Banque elle-meme. Neanmoins, les progres realises sur ce plan a) La politique de la Banque en matiere de ont ete inegaux et insuffisants. II faut transfert et reinstallation de populations est continuer les efforts pour garantir que la ambitieuse, mais elle est aussi bien concue planification, les resultats et le suivi des et poursuit des objectifs rationnels operations de reinstallation soient en (Encadre 1). accord avec les objectifs definis. b) Les projets dont 1'execution est conforme a L'examen approfondi des experiences faites en la politique de la Banque ont des resultats matiere de reinstallation a permis a la Banque nettement meilleurs, en matiere de et aux Emprunteurs d'enrichir reinstallation, que ceux qui en ignorent les considerablement leurs connaissances quant exigences. Les operations de reinstallation aux moyens d'operer plus efficacement une menees dans le cadre des projets qui reinstallation; il leur a perrnis aussi d'identifier s'inspirent de la politique de la Banque des pratiques appropriees et divers moyens de sont generalement de meilleure qualite que corriger les defauts d'execution, qui sont celles relevant de projets non assistes par la decrits dans le present rapport. La dimension Banque. sociale des projets de travaux de genie civil exige une plus grande attention aussi bien de la c) La qualite d'une operation de reinstallation part des gouvernements des pays membres, est directement liee a l'existence, ou a comme l'a montre aussi l'examen recemment l'absence, d'une politique nationale en la mene par le Departement d'Evaluation des matiere et de cadres administratifs charges Operations, que de la part de la Banque.3 A d'en organiser le deroulement. Les Etats moins que ces insuffisances ne soient palliees, ou les ministeres qui se sont dotes d'une c'est l'oeuvre de developpement elle-meme qui politique de reinstallation adequate continuera de faire l'objet de critiques reussissent generalement mieux a prevenir persistantes au lieu d'obtenir le soutien sans l'appauvrissement et a retablir le niveau de reserve dont elle a besoin et qu'elle merite vie anterieur que ceux qui en sont amplement. C'est pourquoi, au-dela des depourvus. evaluations menees projet par projet, il faut poursuivre le projet institutionnel d'une d) L'ensemble des operations de reinstallation politique de reinstallation, qui en elle-meme est de la Banque se deroulent aujourd'hui - un objectif de developpement de grand prix. dans de bien meilleures conditions qu'en 1986, annee oiu fut acheve le bilan Les 10 a 14 dernieres annees ant apporte precedent, et de maniare radicalement d'importantes lecons, dont 1'ensemble a fraye differente par rapport au moment oui la la voie aux changements positifs aujourd'hui en politique de reinstallation a ete arretee. cours. Malgre les immenses differences entre Cependant, dans un certain nombre de les pays et les groupes de population 54 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique concernms, on comprend bien mieux desormais personnes. Pour 1'ensemble des 146 projets en les principauxfacteurs communs qui expliquent cours d'execution en 1993, pres de 2 millions de -qu'ils soient presents ou au contraire fassent personnes sont en voie de reinstallation, quelUe defaut - pourquoi les operations de que soit la phase de l'operation. Ces projets reinstaUation ont reussi dans certains cas et representent 8 % des 1.900 projets de la Banque echoue dans d'autres. Ces facteurs sont les en cours; leur budget total s'eleve a 23 mil- suivants: liards de dollars, soit 15 % du montant des prets de la Banque. La grande majorite des a) Engagement de l'Emprunteur, qui se projets finances par la Banque (60 %/6) sont traduit par des textes legislatifs, des situes dans l'Asie de l'Est ou du Sud, en raison politiques officielles et des affectations; de du developpement rapide de ces pays et de ressources; leurs fortes densites d6mographiques. Pres de 100 projets qui entraineraient la reinstallation b) Application integrale par l'Emprunteur et d'environ 600.000 personnes, selon les par la Banque des directives et procedures evaluations preliminaires, ont ete proposes par etablies; les Emprunteurs pour la filiere de projets des ann6es 1994 a 1997. c) Analyse sociale en profondeur, evaluations demographiques fiables et competence Dans les 146 projets en cours comportant des technique pour toute planification d'une operations de rinstallation, l'echelle des reinstallation orientee vers le deplacements varie selon les projets de moins developpement; de 500 a plus de 200.000 personnes. Mais les operations de reinstallation les plus d) Evaluation adequate et precise des coiits et importantes se concentrent dans une poign6e du financement a la mesure des besoins, le de projets situes en Inde, en Chine, en calendrier de la reinstallation etant etabli Indonesie et au Bresil: onze grands projets en fonction de l1'tat d'avancement des concemant ces pays representent plus de la travaux de genie civil; moiti6 - 1,1 million - de toutes les personnes en voie de reinstallation. Les projets situes e) Efficacite des agents d'execution, qui dans l'Asie de l'Est et du Sud groupent 80 % de tiennent compte des besoins en matiere de la population a reinstaller. La part de developpement, de ses possibilites et l'Amerique latine est de 9 %/o, celle de l'Afrique contraintes au niveau local; de 23 % du nombre de projets comportant une reinstallation. De plus en plus de pays f) Participation des populations concernmies comptent de multiples operations de pour definir les objectifs de la reinstallation: le Pakistan, le Bangladesh, le reinstallation, identifier des solutions pour Viet Nam et l'Indonesie, pays dont l'economie retablir le niveau de vie et le cadre de vie et se d6veloppe, prevoient une augmentation mettre en oeuvre ces solutions. sensible du nombre de projets soutenus par la Banque qui sont assortis d'une operation de Les Op&rations de Reinstallation reinstallation. Supervisees par la Banque Du point de vue de la repartition sectorielle, les projets relatifs aux transports, a l'eau et a Entre 1986 et 1993, les operations de l'infrastructure urbaine sont de plus en plus reinstallation ont e liees a 192 projets, souvent assortis d'une operation de deplaqant au total 2,5 millions de personnes reinstallation. Ils constituent maintenant sur ce pendant la duree de vie utile de ces projets. point le secteur le plus important Quarante-six projets avaient pris fin en 1993, numnriquement, avec 75 des 146 projets en apres avoir conduit a la reinstallation de 500 000 cours. Mais les operations de reinstallation Environment Department 55 Resettlement and Development qu'ils entrainent sont d'ampleur moindre que des deplacements forces de population de la moyenne des operations necessitees par les suivre cette politique. L'un des principaux projets des secteurs de l'hydro-electricite et de resultats du role de catalyseur de la Banque l'agriculture. Les barrages construits dans le entre 1986 et 1993 est que plusieurs cadre de projets d'irrigation, de production Emprunteurs ont promulgue ou ameliore leurs hydro-electrique et d'approvisionnement en politiques nationales et cadres juridiques en eau potable sont a l'origine de la majorite des matiere de reinstallation. deplacements forces (63 % des persornnes deplacees), l'amenagement de corridors Une operation de reinstallation ne peut reussir reserves aux transports venant au deuxieme que lorsque les gouvenements veulent qu'il en rang (23 %/6). Sur le plan sectoriel, c'est toujours soit ainsi. La meilleure preuve de leur engage- aux projets agricoles qu'il faut imputer le plus ment dans cette voie se confirme lorsqu'ils grand nombre de personnes deplacees (52 % creent un appareil institutionnel adequate, qui des personnes touchees). se definit comme la synergie entre une politique, des interventions et des ressources. Bilan des Operations Quand les Emprunteurs ne partagent pas de Reinstallation veritablement des l'origine les objectifs de la politique de reinstallation de la Banque, les operations de reinstallation ne sont La Banque a rdalise d'importants progres entre gneralement pas bien menees, en depit du 1986 et 1993 dans trois domaines essentiels: nombre de conventions, de missions de super- • Influence sur les politiques de r&sinstalation vision du suivi ou des frequentes menaces de la dInfluencesurles p olirtiqurs dereinstallatio Banque de suspendre ses deboursements. De des pays emprunteurs. meme, quand la Banque elle-meme n'observe * Assistance aux Emprunteurs pour qu'ils pas de maniere coherente ses propres principes i Assstanc aux mpruneurs our qtilsou procedures, le deroulement du projet est dvitent les operations de reinstallation non compromis. necessaires ou qu'ils limitent l'ampleur de deplacements forces inevitables. Les annees 1986-1993 ont ete marquees par plusieurs succes notables sur le plan de la • Assistance aux Emprunteurs pour qu'ils apolitique. Encouragee par un projet sectoriel ameliorent les conditions de vie des popu- de la Banque de 1990, conforme a sa politique, lations reinstallees et qu'ils les aident & la societe bresilienne Electrobras a elabore des reconstituer leur niveau de revenu directives de reinstallation satisfaisantes anterieur au deplacement. concernant le secteur energetique national. En 1992, la Colombie a adopte des directives Dans le meme temps, nearnmoins, lorsque sectorielles similaires. La Chine, avec l'execution des operations ne s'est pas deroulee l'assistance de la Banque, a ameliore les conformement aux directives fixees, la grandes lignes de sa politique de reinstallation reinstallation s'est souvent soldee par une dans le domaine des projets hydrauliques. En dt&rioration des conditions de vie. 1993, la Societe nationale d'energie thermique (National Thermal Power Corporation) (Inde) a Influence sur les politiques des pays adopte une politique sectorielle de emnprunteurs en matiere de r6am6nagerment applicable N toutes ses emrutersop&rations, & la suite de ndgociations reinstallation approfondies avec la Banque dans le cadre des Ayant ete la premiere institution internationale preparatifs d'un pret sectoriel. Lintervention de developpement a adopter une politique en de la Banque a ete dans l'ensemble bien plus matiere de reinstallation, la Banque a conseille efficace - et plus Wnefique. pour ses activites aux Emprunteurs dont les projets comportent immediates - quand elle a pu parvenir a un 56 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique accord avec les pays emprunteurs sur un de personnes que l'Emprunteur envisageait de document-cadre de politique nationale ou deplacer, et a etabli de meilleures conditions sectorielle relatif aux activites qu'elle assiste, pour la reinstallation de la population affectee. que si elle se limitait a conclure des accords En Thallande, le choix d'un nouveau site pour juridiques valables pour un seul projet. En le barrage de Pak Mun et la decision d'en revanche, les obligations enoncees dans les reduire la hauteur ont permis de ramener de accords relatifs a un pret determine et une 20.000 a 5.000 le nombre de persomnes (politique de projetb convenue d'un cominun deplacees. En Equateur, le projet de accord ont parfois servi de base a un d6bait sur regularisation des crues dans le Guayas et un une politique nationale et des cadres juridliques nouveau plan des reseaux de canaux ont rendu de portee plus generale, ou permis de les tout deplacement de population inufile. ameliorer. Retablissement des niveaux de D'importants donateurs multilateraux et bilateraux ont aussi recemment promulgu6 des revenu directives de reinstallation similaires a celles de Le dernier test de conformite des operations de la Banque - par exemple, en 1990, la Banque reinstallation a la politique arretee reside dans interamericaine de developpement - et La le retablissement et l'amelioration des niveaux Banque asiatique de developpement envisagent de revenu. Dans le cadre des projets finances officiellement de faire de meme. A la dermande par la Banque, les reinstallations assorties de l'OCDE, la Banque a prete son appui a la d'activites productrices fondees sur preparation de directives de reinstallation qui l'exploitation de terres ou l'exercice d'emplois soient en harmonie avec ses propres directives remuneres reussissent en general a mieux et, en 1991, les ministres du developpement de retablir le niveau de revenu que celles qui tous les pays membres de l'OCDE ont comportent le versement d'une indemnite sans sanctionne l'adoption de directives similaires, assistance institutionmelle. Les niveaux de identiques pour chacun, par les organismes revenu ont ete retablis notamment dans les cas d'aide de leurs pays respectifs. out les populations reinstallees ont pu beneficier des retombees immediates derivant du projet Assistance visant a eviter meme qui etait a l'origine de leur deplacement. les operations de reinstallation Par exemple, des personnes d6placdes ont ete ou a en limiter l'ampleur aidees pour developper une aquaculture et des ou a en limiter Ieampleur pgcheries dans les nouveaux reservoirs L'assistance de la Banque aupres des (Indonesie), d'autres ont ete rdinstallees dans Emprunteurs est devenue plus efficace dans les perimetres recemment irrigues (Chine, I' application du premier principe de la politique certains projets en Inde), d'autres enfin ont regu de reinstallation: eviter ou reduire l'ampleur des un droit prioritaire d'exploiter les possibilites operations de reinstallation chaque fois que cela commerciales creees par l'infrastructure est techniquement et economiquement possible. nouvelle (Argentine, Chine, Turquie). Dans de La possibilite de limiter ou d'eliminer un nombreux projets, les groupes reinstalles en deplacement force de populations existe dans zone urbaine ont vu leur niveau de vie bien des propositions de projets soumises k la s'ameliorer parce qu'ils beneficiaient de Banque pour financement. Par exemple, en logements moins precaires, d'une plus grande modifiant les plans du grand barrage de surface par habitant et d'un meilleur acces aux Saguling, en Indonesie, dont la hauteur fml: services sanitaires - meme s'ils devaient payer reduite de cinq metres, on evita le deplacement ces avantages d'un eloignement accru entre le de 35 000 personnes. En Cote d'Ivoire, la domicile et le lieu de travail. Banque a propose de remanier le projet de foresterie de maniere a ramener de 200.000 a Bien que la politique de la Banque definisse un 40.000, soit une reduction de 80 °/O, le nombre objectif quantifiable pour toutes les operations Environrment Department S Resettlement and Development de reinstallation - a savoir le retablissement reinstalles, qui se traduit par une prise de posi- du niveau anterieur de revenu -, tres rares sont tion en ce sens au niveau sectoriel ou nationaL les projets qui ont integre des mesures ou des methodes d'evaluation de ce niveau de revenu La baisse de revenu apres reinstallation est suffisamment precises pour determiner si cet parfois sensible, allant dans certains cas jusqu'a objectif avait et atteint. Les rapports regionaux 40 % pour des personnes qui etaient d4j& sur les operations de reinstaUation et la plupart pauvres avant le deplacement force. Les pertes des audits du Departement de l'Evaluation des englobent souvent des biens producteurs de Operations n'ont pu indiquer si le niveau des revenu qui n'ont pas ete remplaces, ainsi que revenus avait ete ameliore ou du moins retabli. ceile du logement. Les enquetes sur le terrain Les donnees disponibles attestent de nombreux montrent que pour les familles d'exploitants cas de reinstallations mal conduites qui ont eu agricoles, la perte des terres a generalement des pour consequence un appauvrissement des consequences bien plus dommageables que groupes de populations deplacees. Des celle du domicile; cette observation reste vraie systemes de suivi plus efficaces ont ete meme si une perte seulement partielle de terres recemment mis en place et seront multiplies. arables ne laisse a la famille qu'une exploitation non viable. Pour les familles urbaines, les Si on le compare aux conclusions tirees par le pertes les plus difficiles a compenser sont celles D6partement de l'Evaluation des Operations au de petits commerces ou ateliers, ou la sujet des ocpremi6res experiences de possibilite d'acceder a un emploi retribue. r6installation>> (1993), qui se rapportent surtout Dans certains cas recemment identifies au aux projets commences au debut ou au milieu cours du bilan, des mesures correctives ont ete des annees 80, l'actuel bilan a permis d'etablir prises et d'autres suivront. que les projets recemment acheves ou en cours, notamment dans les pays qui, conume la Chine, Les risques de baisse du niveau de vie se ont arrete des politiques fermes en matiere de manifestent sur plusieurs plans - conornique, reinstallation et disposent de solides capacites social, sanitaire, nutritionnel, sans parler de d'execution, se deroulaient avec de meilleurs l'alienation culturelle - et le modele multi- resultats. Quoi qu'il en soit, l'actuel bilan risque identifie grace au bilan permet de aboutit a la meme conclusion que les etudes du formuler une mise en garde type qui aide Departement de l'Evaluation des Operations - planificateurs et decideurs a prevenir a savoir que, malgre l'insuffisance des donnees, l'appauvrissement. Tous les risques n'affectent il semble que les projets n'aient souvent pas pas de maniere egale les divers groupes reussi a retablir ou ameliorer le niveau de vie reinstalles: certains groupes et individus des groupes reinstalles et qu'en de nombreux vulnerables (comme les groupes autochtones et cas le bilan demeure peu satisfaisant. Ainsi, tribaux, ou les families dont le chef est une pour fragmentaires qu'elles soient, les informa- femme) sont plus exposes aux risques du tions disponibles suggerent massivement que le deplacement et du changement economique. plus souvent le revenu des groupes reinstalles En observant a quels risques specifiques sont est moins eleve qu'avant leur deplacement. particulierement exposes tels groupes sociaux, C'est lI un point particulikrement preoccupant on comprend mieux le processus dans le cas de certains pays, comme l'Inde et d'appauvrissement et les mesures a prendre l'Indonesie, qui ont de nombreux projets pour eviter que ces risques ne se repetent dans assortis d'un deplacement, mais n'ont pas mis en les operations futures. place une politique nationale ou un cadre juridique en matiere de reinstallation prevoyant En cas de reinstallation en milieu rural, le le retablissement du niveau de revenu des moyen le plus efficace de parer les risques groupes deplaces. Le facteur clef du succes en la d'appauvrissement consiste a mettre a la matiere reside dans l'existence d'une volonte disposition des membres des groupes deplaces nationale d'aider les groupes de population des terres de dimension adequate dont la 58 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique propriete leur soit clairement reconnue. Dans la * Les indemnites versees et les pratiques de plupart des situations, la stratdgie de rachat de biens immobiliers ne fournissent remplacement ((terre pour terre)) donne des pas aux personnes deplac&es des resultats de loin superieurs a toute ressources suffisantes pour qu'elles indemnisation en espees. Les difficultes puissent acheter des terres de surgissent surtout si les terres sont rares et le remplacement et d'autres avoirs. Si marche foncier quasi inexistant. Cette strategie aucune loi n'interdit aux gouvernements de remplacement suppose aussi que les terres de preter une aide adequate aux personnes soient de qualite tres comparable et quand de deplacees, les procedures d'indemnisation telles conditions ne sont pas reunies, il faut excluent frequemment dans la pratique un offrir des compensations et creer des sources de nombre appreciable de ces personnes ou revenu en marge de l'agriculture. Dans les bien ne leur versent que des indemnites zones urbaines, les difficultes inherentes a la tres faibles. Si les Emprunteurs utilisent reinstallation tournent autour des droits des largement les cadres institutionmels a leur proprietaires, des locataires ou des groupies de disposition pour deplacer des groupes de passage, ou bien concernent l'acces a des population, ils ne se servent pas emplois de remplacement ou a la creation suffisamment de ces memes instruments d'entreprises, ou encore le prix des logements. institutionnels pour faciliter sur le terrain Les approches participatives et l'intervention les strategies d'acquisition fonciere oterre des ONG locales ont beaucoup aide les groupes pour terreo> reinstalles en milieu urbain a trouver des sites de remplacement et a mobiliser leurs energies * L'ensemble des ressources financieres pour qu'ils se reconstruisent des logements de affectees aux operations de reinstallation meilleure qualite et pourvus de services plus sont souvent inferieures aux besoins, et respectueux de l1environnement. de beaucoup. Les depassements de cofits dans les operations de reinstallation sont La question proposee a l'analyse dans le souvent superieurs de 50 % en moyenne cadre du present bilan est de savoir s'il est a ceux constates pour les travaux de possible d'identifier les causes de l'ecart entre genie civil, ce qui tient en premier lieu a les objectifs de la Banque - en premier lieu, l'insuffisance des estimations initiales. le retablissement du niveau de revenu - et Les contraintes budgetaires et les les resultats effectifs des projets, qui portent procedures rigides d'affectation de fonds prejudice a un grand nombre d'individus, Si aggravent encore l'insuffisance des on releve des cas d'incurie manifeste et de ressources. meconnaissance des normes institutionnelles, ce sont des raisons plus fondamentales qui * Les organisations chargees de gerer les expliquent les problemes rencontres dans les operations de reinstallation ne disposent operations de reinstallation. Les autres souvent ni du cadre juridique, du mandat lecons a tirer du present bilan portent sur les et des competences necessaires pour aider capacites institutionnelles tant des les groupes reinstalles et leurs hotes. La Emprunteurs que de la Banque, sur les cc-ts rigidite de leurs procedures d'intervention d'une reinstallation reussie et sur la necessite et leur manque d'experience en matiere de d'elaborer des strategies de developpement h reinstallation s'ajoutent a leur absence long terme. d'interet pour leur tache et a la mediocrite de leur action. Malgre l'extreme diversite des projets et des situations nationales, un nombre relativement * Les groupes reinstalles et les communautes faible de facteurs communs rendent compte de h8tes ne participent pas suffisamment au la qualite inegale des operations de processus de reinstallation. Les savoirs et reinstallation: Environment Department Resettlement and Development opinions des populations sont rarement operation de reinstallation et, a l'interieur des utilises pour elaborer les programmes de pays, dans leur potentiel par branche reinstallation ou pour trouver des solutions d'intervention. Des organismes sectoriels viables et les mecanismes juridiques robustes et rentables, comme les entreprises de efficaces susceptibles de resoudre les services publics et certaines societes semi- doleances font souvent defaut. Une publiques, ont les moyens d'affecter les planification concue aux echelons ressources necessaires au succes d'operations superieurs et imposee a la base, ainsi que la de r&installation entrafrn6es par leurs interven- faiblesse de la representation de l'agent tions, a condition que ces operations relevent d'execution sur le terrain, ne permettent de leur responsabilite juridique; ainsi, des pas de mobiliser les beneficiaires du projet directives appropriees en matiere de pour qu'agissant en tant que parties reinstallation deviennent des regles normales concernees, ils assurent le succes de la d'intervention des entreprises. Par contre, les reinstallation en faisant place parmi eux services administratifs n'ont generalement pas aux groupes de population reinstalles. les ressources, la souplesse budgetaire et les competences de gestion necessaires pour mener Certaines conditions prealables existent pour a bien des programmes de reinstallation, a crier l1environnement capable d'aider les moins d'ameliorer considerablement au familles deplacees a reconstituer leurs moyens prealable leur structure inteme. Tous les d'existence et systemes de production. Les programmes de reinstallation, y compris ceux moyens de crier cet environnement sont de petite dimension comme en comportent connus, malgre l'immense diversite des situa- beaucoup de projets urbains ou de projets de tions. Pour reussir, une operation de protection de l'environnement, peuvent ere reinstallation suppose au depart un cadre conduits plus efficacement en obtenant la juridique favorable, des financements participation des ONG locales ou des suffisants, des organismes d'intervention a la organisations communautaires tant des popula- hauteur de leur tache et une participation au tions reinstallees que des communautes h6tes. niveau local a la conception comme a la gestion du programme. Preparation et Evaluation Les capacite's des Emprunteurs des Ope'rations de Re'installation On ne peut ameliorer les pratiques de La preparation et l'valuation des projets reinstallation, dans le cadre des operations de comportant une operation de reinstallation se la Banque comme en dehors, sans les integrer sont considerablement ameliorees entre 1986 et dans un debat plus general sur le 1993, de sorte que la qualite de ces operations developpement entre la Banque et les est maintenant tres superieure a celle qui etait Emprunteurs, ainsi que dans l'ordre du jour apparue dans le bilan de 1986. Mais on s'est des politiques et strategies de lutte contre la apercu que ni la Banque ni les Emprunteurs pauvrete. Certaines des experiences les plus n'avaient pleinement applique certaines reussies de la Banque en matiere de directives ou procedures. Les problemes reinstallation sont issues de dialogues entre relatifs a l'tude du dossier des projets et a la secteurs, au cours desquels les Emprunteurs et gestion d'ensemble de ceux-ci ressemblent par la Banque se concentrent sur un ensemble certains cotes a ceux qu'a releves l'equipe d'objectifs de reinstallation et sur des principes speciale de gestion dan, l'enquete menee sur de planification qui orientent l'execution de tous les services de la Banque, mais ils se chaque projet particulier. manifestent souvent avec plus d'acuite en matiere de reinstallation; et ils expliquent II existe d'importantes differences entre les l'inegalite de l1ex4cution sur le terrain. Les pays, dans leur potentiel de realiser une problemes specifiques qui se repetent et que 60 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique V'on retrouve surtout dans la premiere partie de facile d'evaluer les niveaux de revenu avant le la periode couverte par le bilan sont les deplacement, l'operation s'avOre pourtant suivants: possible; eDLe est aussi necessaire, parce que i) manquement de nombreux organismes l'absence de donnees au depart ne permet pas emprunteurs a l'elaboration de programmes de d'inclure dans la conception et l'ex6cution des reinstaDlation satisfaisants; ii) manque de rigueur projets des objectifs precis et des reperes dans l'execution des responsabilites intemes contr8lables en matiere de retablissement du lorsqu'il s'agit d'examiner et d'approuver les niveau de revenu. stades initiaux du projet; iii) supervision irregu]iere ou insuffisante du projet; iv) actions Dans bien des cas, la plus grande difficulte au de suivi insuffisantes de la part des Empruntiurs depart tient au fait que les organismes comme de la Banque quand des problemes emprunteurs rninimisent le chiffre de la popu- d'execution sont identifies. lation touchee lors de la preparation du projet et fournissent des informations inexactes aux Pour assurer dans de bonnes conditions la missions d'evaluation. Le projet preparation et 1'execution des operations de d'approvisionnement en eau et reinstallation, la Banque ne doit accorder son d'assainissement d'Izmir (Turquie) (exercice financement aux projets comportant un budgetaire 1987) a ete engag6 avec une deplacement force que si les quatre conditions evaluation de 3.700 personnes touchees; le suivantes sont reunies: enquetes d'ensemb[Le chiffre a e aujourd'hui porte a 13.000. Le sur la population et ses revenus; plans de projet de la plaine de Tana (Madagascar) reinstaDLation et programmes de (exercice budgetaire 1990), pour lequel ddveloppement; calendriers de reinstallation l'evaluation initiale de l'Emprunteur etait de synchronises avec les travaux de genie civil; et 3.500 personnes, semble devoir en affecter budgets distincts pour le financement des aujourd'hui 11.000. Une evaluation inexacte du indemnites et pour les investissements lies , la groupe de population deplace a des effets reinstallation. Avec une r6gularite lourde die dommageables: le projet est sous-dimensionne, sens, les echecs de l1ex6cution et l'impuissance l1estimation des couits est inadequate, les A retablir le niveau du revenu anterieur ressources sont insuffisantes, il y a incapacite semblent imputables a de mauvaises methcodes institutionnelle d'elaborer des solutions de travail, surtout aux stades initiaux du projet appropriees et enfin, la population reinstaDle (identification, preparation et evaluation). souffre d'appauvrissement. La Banque est Enquites de rifirence parfois obligee de commanditer des 6tudes Enquetes de reference speciales a des experts independants et Pour evaluer et planifier une operation de continuera cette procedure dans l'avenir, afin reinstailation, il est essentiel de rassembler des d'elucider les contradictions qu'elle percoit informations sur la population affectee et ses dans les informations fournies par les etudes de moyens d'existence. Les enquetes de reference faisabilite des Emprunteurs. sont devenues sensiblement plus frequentes, passant de 21 % des projets pour les exercices Planification de la retinstallation budgetaires 1980-1985 A 43 % pour les exercices budgetaires 1986-1993, puis a 72 % pour les Depuis 1980, la politique de la Banque a et projets approuves durant les exercices d'exiger des Emprunteurs qu'ils preparent des budgetaires 1992 et 1993 et a 100 % pour les 10 programmes de rinstallation, ces programmes premiers mois de l'exercice budgetaire 1994,. devant etre evalues ensuite par la Banque. Les Toutefois, la majorite des enquetes socio- missions d'evaluation ne doivent pas aller sur economiques menees par les Emprunteurs pour le terrain avant que l'Emprunteur n'ait les projets en cours ne comprennent toujoutrs presente a la Banque un plan de reinstallation, pas de donnres sur les revenus. S'il n'est pas qui permettra a la Banque d'apprecier la Environment Department 61 Resettlement and Development faisabilite et le couit de 1'op&ration dans le budg. 1991), le projet thermique de Talcher contexte d'ensemble du projet. Des progres (Inde) (ex. budg. 1987), le projet d'irrigation du sensibles ont et realises depuis l'examen de Panjab (Inde) (ex. budg. 1990), le deuxieme 1986, lequel avait etabli que 14 % seulement projet urbain de la Guinee (ex. budg. 1990), le des projets alors en cours disposaient de projet d'approvisionnement en eau relatif a programmes de reinstallation comportant le plusieurs Etats du Nigeria (ex. budg. 1992), minimum d'elements requis, a savoir une etc., ne disposaient pas d'un plan de enquete de reference, un calendrier de reinstallation 61abor6 et realisable qui pouvait reinstallation, un budget et une serie de propo- etre soumis h evaluation. L'absence de ce plan sitions en matiere de reinsertion. Durant la signifie I'absence d'un programme d'assistance periode 1986-1993, environ 55 % en moyenne convenablement finance pour le groupe des projets assistes par la Banque etaient reinstalle. Des mesures correctives ont deja ete assortis de programmes complets de prises ou sont en cours pour ameliorer la reinstallation. planification et les ressources allouees a la reinstallation dans tous ces projets. Une amelioration progressive se fait clairement jour dans les limites de la periode La planification de la reinstallation est de consideree, cette tendance s'affirmant qualite et de pertinence tres inegales selon les rapidement durant les deux dernieres annees. cas. Bien que l'objectif general soit de retablir Pour les exercices budgetaires 1993 et 1994, les niveaux de vie et de revenu des families tous les indicateurs clefs de l'instruction des deplacees, moins de 30 % des plans de dossiers de projet et des activites de gestion r6installation ont fait du retablissement du des projets sont nettement plus favorables niveau de revenu leur objectif primordial. Les que durant les premieres annees de la resultats des op6rations s'en sont ressentis. periode consideree. Les operations de Tout en etant superieure a celle des reinstallation, desormais, sont mieux reinstallations en cours non financees par la preparees et sont evaluees dans leur Banque ayant lieu dans le meme pays, la integralite. La proportion des programmes qualite technique de la planification demand6e de rinstallation en cours d'evaluation a aux Emprunteurs pour les projets fmnances par augmentd parallelement au developpement la Banque n'est souvent pas a la hauteur des des enquetes de reference: pour l'exercice normes elevees qu'impose la Banque. budgetaire 1993 et les 10 premiers mois de l'exercice budgetaire 1994, les 18 projets Une etude comparee des programmes de approuves comportaient tous, a l'exception creation - volontaire et involontaire - d'un seul, un programme de reinstallation en d'etablissements humains a mis en lumiere le cours d'evaluation. contraste saisissant entre d'une part les ressources ou approches utilisees pour preparer Si l'on enregistre une amelioration par rapport une installation quand le developpement est aux conclusions de l'examen de 1986, on l'objectif premier, et d'autre part, quand une constate cependant que beaucoup de projets reinstallation involontaire constitue une finances par la Banque et actuellement en cours composante auxiliaire du programme. Les d'execution ont connu des debuts decevants en programmes (mise en place d'institutions, raison des difficultes rencontrees au stade de la developpe,ment) de projets facilitant la creation planification. Des projets qui comportent volontaire d'un etablissement humain offrent de d'importants deplacements de population, precieux modees qu'il est possible d'adapter et comme le projet urbain de Jabotabek d'imiter dans les projets de reinstallation (Indonesie) (ex. budg. 1988), le projet routier du involontaire. Par ailleurs, l'ampleur de certaines Sichuan (Chine) (ex. budg. 1988), le projet des operations de reinstallation involontaire, transports provinciaux du Jiangsu (Chine) (ex. consid&eres comme des composantes de projet 62 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique secondaires par rapport aux travaux de genie chances de redressement. Si une reinstallation civil, excede generalement la capacite et la involontaire peut reussir quand on utilise des competence des services techniques charges de methodes judicieuses, les risques d'chec sont gerer les projets d'infrastructure. L'expdience immenses si Y'on n'applique pas des projets de creation delbere d'6tablissemrents rigoureusement les procedures etablies de humains autonomes donne a penser qu'ils longue date. Loin d'accelerer l1ex&cution, on ne peuvent servir de vehicule aux reinstallations fait que repousser les problemes en ignorant les involontaires, surtout dans le cas des operations a procedures. De telles lacunes dans les activites grande echelle. Une solution novatrice a ete de la Banque deviennent particuli limt introduite dans l'exercice budgetaire 1994, OiL la dangereuses quand l'Emprunteur ne partage pas construction du barrage de Xiaolangdi (Chine) et les memes vues sur la reinstallation et n'a pas la reinstallation qui en decoule sont traitees arret en la matiere de principes d'action au comme deux projets connexes, mais distincts: niveau national. Dans la pratique, le personnel l'un porte sur la construction du barrage, I'autre, de la Banque a souvent dui se battre durement sur l'operation de reinstallation, contue coimme pour faire respecter les directives convenues, un projet de developpement complet Cela surtout quand le gouvernement du pays permet de planifier et de concevoir emprunteur ne contr6le pas systematiquement integralement, en une serie de phases distinctes, l'activite des services techniques charges de tne methode d'execution basee sur des apports l'execution du projet. Des initiatives visant a distincts, calibres en fonction du revenu et diu am,liorer le deroulement des travaux et a mieux potentiel des groupes de population touches, marquer les responsabilites individuelles ont ete categorie par categorie. prises durant l'examen, et de nouvelles mesures propres a intensifier la prise de conscience du Beaucoup de projets qui ne comportaient pas personnel et des administrateurs ont ete de plans de reinstallation au stade de adoptees. l'valuation en ont ete assortis plus tard. Cependant, jusqu'en 1992, les regles imposees Dans quelques cas, les divisions responsables par la Banque en matiere de plans de ont accepte que les Emprunteurs presentent reinstallation n'ont pas te entierement des plans de rinstallation longtemps apres le respectees, tant au stade de la preparation que debut du projet. Cela s'est r6v6ld peu utile et dans les rapports d'evaluation. En raison propre a fournir des excuses aux organismes surtout de la resistance ou de la faible capaicitM emprunteurs qui sous-estiment les besoins des organismes emprunteurs, ou encore de d'une reinstallation, tout en contraignant la l'insuffisance des effectifs, les directeurs de Banque a se soumettre a des pratiques qu'elle a division n'ont pas toujours insiste sur la sbticte rejet&es de longue date. L'experience a montrb observation des directives operationnelles. Et qu'il est egalement couiteux pour les les cas de non-observation n'ont pas ete organismes emprunteurs de repousser au-dela systematiquement identifies au cours des de l1'valuation l'examen des plans de examens intemes de la documentation de reinstallation. Pour le projet Irrigation II de preevaluation et des rapports d'evaluation. On l'Andhra Pradesh (ex. budg. 1986), en cours a autorise des projets qui ne repondaient pas d'execution, dont on avait initialement pense entirement aux normes de securite fixees par qu'il entraemerait le deplacement de la Banque et leur non-observation n'etait pas 63.000 persormes environ, la division signalee aux chefs regionaux et au Comite des responsable a accepte de proceder a prets avant approbation du pret correspondant. l'evaluation sans disposer d'un plan de Ces manquements aux normnes intemes de reinstailation, pour faire ensuite de la l1'tude de dossiers ont appauvri des le depart presentation d'un plan satisfaisant une condi- la qualite des projets. En particulier, l'absence tion de la mise en oeuvre du projet. Mais de plans de reinstallation a amoindri les l'Emprunteur ne presenta pas de plan Environment Department 63 Resettlement and Development satisfaisant, manquant ainsi trois dates limites tous les frais du deplacement force des successives; le projet fut donc retarde et son personnes affect&es et n'incorporent pas les execution ne commenca que 14 mois plus tard. couts integraux de la reinstallation et de la Le montant de la comnmission d'engagement reinsertion dans les depenses globales du versee par l'Emprunteur pour le retard a projet. I1 en resulte que la reinstallation est depasse le cout d'etablissement du plan de sous-financee. Le bilan a aussi permiis de rdinstallation. On s'est de nouveau apercu a relever des faiblesses methodologiques dans la mi-parcours que le projet n'avait pas e maniere dont les rapports d'evaluation traitent correctement prepare, quand il est apparu que des dimensions economiques et financieres de le nombre reel de personnes lesees par le projet la reinstallation. Aussi bien les Emprunteurs etait plus de deux fois superieur a celui que les economistes de la Banque n'ont que figurant dans l'valuation, atteignant au total rarement applique les directives techniques de environ 150.000. Pour les 85.000 et davantage la Banque relatives a la normalisation de qui s'ajoutaient au chiffre indique par l'analyse economique et financiere des l'Emprunteur durant la preparation, composantes de la reinstallation, directives l'evaluation et les negociations, on n'avait pas promulguees en 1988. On a rarement fait la pr6vu lors de l'evaluation les ressources distinction entre les couits de l'indemnisation necessaires a leur reinstallation. des actifs perdus et les cofits des nouveaux investissements necessaires pour rendre les Calendniers de reinstallation groupes de population reinstalles de nouveau productifs, en les dotant des logements .et La bonne pratique est d'etaler les phases d'une services appropries, et ces depenses importante reinstallation sur toute la duree du d'equipement n'ont pas ete budgetisees. projet, avec un temps d'avance sur les travaux Quand on amalgame les couts de de g&ene civil pour eviter une periode retablissement des infrastructures du secteur d'engorgement vers la fin. La mauvaise public, d'une part, et ceux de reinstallation des pratique est d'attendre la derniere ou les deux populations, de l'autre, le manque de distinc- dernieres annees d'un projet qui occupe huit a tion entre ces deux categories de couats tend a dix ans pour operer un transfert de population masquer la faiblesse des allocations massif, ce qui expose les groupes de population individuelles versees aux familles deplacees. d6plac6s a de serieux risques Le resultat final est que les ressources affectees d'appauvrissement. On a constate que plus de a la reinstallation sont tres inferieures aux la moitie des projets en cours ne comportaient besoins. pas de calendriers de reinstallation explicites, etablis en synchronisation avec les travaux de Le financement global, par la Banque, des couts genie civil. Durant le present bilan, les des operations de reinstallation au titre des departements geographiques de la Banque ont projets executes durant les exercices pris des mesures pour mettre au point, de budgetaires 1986-1993 n'a pas ete a la mesure concert avec les Emprunteurs, des calendriers de l'importance que la Banque attache a cette precis de reinstallation dans tous les projets en composante des projets. Moins de 15 % des cours. composantes ardinstallationx> de projet sont finances par la Banque; et elie n'en finance Financement des operations ordinairement qu'une faible part, merme dans de reinstallation cette minorite de cas. En augmentant sensiblement le financement par la Banque Les operations de reinstallation ont gravement d'un developpement productif sur les sites de souffert de l'insuffisance de la planification reinstallation, il serait possible de gonfler les financiere, ce qui explique en grande partie leur flux de ressources au benefice des groupes qualite inegale. De nombreux organismes reinstalles, d'ameliorer la qualite de emprunteurs ne reconnaissent ni ne calculent l'operation, d'esperer davantage du projet en 64 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique matiere de r6tablissement du niveau de revenu, departements techniques ne disposent que d'un enfin de stimuler le developpement local dans petit nombre de specialistes de l'action sociale les zones d'accueiL En accordant des prets et doivent eparpiller leurs activites entre un directs au benefice de la reinstallation, la grand nombre de departements geographiques. Banque introduirait plus de coherence dans sa La reinstallation comporte des dimensions non politique. seulement sociales, mais aussi techniques, en milieu rural comme en milieu urbain. Durant Ex&cution et Supervision les activit*s normales de supervision, le per- des Operations de Reinstallation sormel technique des departements geographiques, a quelques importantes excep- - a supervision des operations tions pres, n'est affecte qu'assez rarement a De 1986 a 1993, la supervision des operations suivre les operations de reinstallation. nI en de reinstallation s'est progressivement resulte que amelioree, quoique de fa,on in6gale. La r6sulte que les difficult6s dex6cution ne sont supervsion, q e depoan instale. La souvent identifiees que tardivement - les suer vision des cmpodant ar&nstllan services de gestion ne sont avises d'un sdest986 maioseinsim iatemlafruente ads nlesbilans probl6me qu'avec retard, qui se transmet aux de 1986, mais ensuite la frequence des missions 'instructions donnes par la Banque aux de supervision a plafonne (a un niveau plus ansmes eonters car la de Olev6 qu'avant 1986) jusqu'au debut du pre sent rg pxeution. Le r s chnicie bilan qui a marqu6 un nouveau et tres net 1'exdcution. Le r6servoir de techniciens progrbs. La composante n roeinstallation de multidisciplinaires dont dispose la Banque ptouslesgrandsLa cproja .rigation dt constitue une precieuse ressource qu'il faut tuydro dlectrands pro jetsdd unrriationie faire intervenir regulierement au benefice des d'hydroelechnotric a fait 1 objet d'tune supervi- oprations de rdinstallation. sion reguliere, mais la supervision n'a ete cue sporadique pour les projets relatifs aux trans- On s'est assure que les Emprunteurs ports, a l'eau et au developpement urbain, ainsi respectaient les accords juridiques que pour ceux comportant des operations de essentie*ement au sujet d'arrangements reinstallation de faible ampleur. Dans le caedre spscifiques dates portant sur des objectifs des projets entrainant un vaste deplacement de materiels, rarement pour contr6ler la qualite population, surtout dans les zones urbaines, des activit- s de rinstallation. Les missions de lorsque la rndnstauation Woa pas t supervicsde supervision ont constate maints problemes, y plusieurs anndes de suite - comme cest le cas compris les manquements des Emprunteurs du projet urbain de Jabotabek, en Indonesie -, il aux plans de reinstallation et aux dispositions a ete difficile a la Banque de savoir avec des accords juridiques. Un suivi plus attentif et precision comment cette reinstallation sWteait une application plus stricte des accords effectude. juridiques relatifs a la reinstallation permettraient de mieux harmoniser les activites I1 faut maintenir les ameliorations recemment et les principes. Au cours des 18 derniers mois, apportees a la qualite et a la continuite de la la Banque a suspendu les decaissements sur supervision. On utilise regulierement les trois projets pour des raisons liees au services des specialistes de la rsinstallationl deroulement de la reinstallation. pour le groupe de projets comportant de viastes deplacements de population, mais la penuwie L'un des resultats du bilan de 1993 est de personnel d'action sociale a oblige a ne faire d'augmenter considerablement les ressources superviser les composantes ((rdinstallation>, des affect&es a la supervision des oprations de projets de moyenne ou faible ampleur que par reinstallation par tous les services de la un nombre insuffisant de specialistes, situation Banque. Les deux tiers de toutes les missions paUliee dans une certaine mesure par le de supervision conduites en 1993 ont integre recrutement plus frequent de consultants. Les des specialistes de la reinstallation, souvent au Environment Department 65 Resettlement and Development prix d'un recours momentanement accru aux Les mesures correctives engagees durant la services de consultants, indispensables pour periode du bilan portent sur les points des evaluations rapides. Le fait que, durant suivants: i) reevaluation de l'ampleur de la l'examen de 1993, les consultants recrutes a reinstallation; ii) amenagement des calendriers titre temporaire aient ete deux fois plus de la reinstallation; iii) participation accrue nombreux que les membres du personnel de la des groupes affectes; iv) recherche de Banque a permis de mener a bien cet examen, meilleures solutions au probleme de la mais ce ratio n'est ni viable ni sain a long terme reinstallation, ou de moyens de limiter les pour l'organisation, car il n'aide pas a deplacements; v) apport d'un complement de constituer un reservoir interne de capacites et ressources financieres; vi) appui aux efforts de competences (dans les services de gestion de faits par les Emprunteurs pour elargir leur ces m6mes projets, les membres du personnel pouvoir administratif. Ces mesures correctives sont au contraire deux fois plus nombreux que ont considerablement ameliore la situation les consultants). Les consultants repondent d'ensemble : un certain nombre de *projets aussi a d'autres sollicitations, ce qui a pour assortis de reinstallations problematiques> - effet de compromettre la continuite de la comme le projet d'approvisionnement en eau et gestion des operations de reinstallation. d'assainissement d'Izmir (Turquie), le projet de la plaine de Tana (Madagascar) et plusieurs Ameliorations Apportees en 1993 projets en Inde - se sont achemines vers une a la Gestion des Projets Comportant amelioration certaine. En Inde, par exemple, une Operation de Reinstallation grace au soutien intensif du personnel et des En 1993, la gestion et le d&sroulement des services de gestion de la Banque, d'importantes operations de reinstallation de la Banque se mesures correctives ont e d&cid&es pour le sont sensiblement ameliores. A mesure que Projet d'irrigation m du Maharashtra, qui 1'examen permettait d'identifier les problemes, touche 168.000 personnes, dans le contexte les services competents de la Banque, agissant d'une restructuration du projet; et dans le de concert avec les Emprunteurs, prenaient des Projet d'irrigation IT du Haut Krishna, qui mesures propres A les resoudre. Au cours de ce touche plus de 220.000 personnes, processus, la Banque a: i) fortement intensifie la o supervision des operations de reinstalation; l1am6lioration des composantes de la ii) accru l'assistance technique pretee aux reinstallation a recemment permis de lever la Emprunteurs pour des mesures correctives; suspension des decaissernents. D'autres iii) ameliore le travail deja en cours sur de mesures correctives sont envisagees. nouveaux projets introduits dans la filiere (ex. budg. 1994-1997). Le travail d'analyse mend a la Banque meme et la formation offerte a des fonctionnaires Durant l'examen de 1993, la Banque a triple le nationaux ont aussi contribue, en 1993, a montant des ressources affectees a la supervi- ameliorer la gestion des projets comportant une sion des operations de reinstallation. La operation de reinstallation. Toutes les regions plupart des projets comportant la reinstailation ont etabli des rapports analysant le degre de plus de 1.000 personnes ont ete supervises d'avancement des operations de r&insta11ation au moins une fois, et plus de 40 projets, dont le non seulement projet par projet, mais aussi en plus important en matiere de reinstallation, tant que sous-cat4gorie de l'ensemble des l'ont ete deux fois. Les diverses regions ont projets de la region. Les departements envoye sur le terrain plus de missions de centraux ont etabli des rapports sur les supervision d'operations de reinstallation operations de reinstallation, par secteur et par durant les 12 demniers mois que pendant probleme, qui concement l'agriculture, l'ensemble des trois annres precedentes. l'nergie hydro-electrique, les zones urbaines et 66 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique les transports; Us continueront a suivre des urbaine, par lInstitut des etudes sur le aspects specifiques des projets assortis d'iune logement de Rotterdam. Le Bureau regional reinstallation. Le Bureau du Vice-Presidernt du Afrique, qui a synthetise et publie ses examens Departement juridique a analyse les aspects semestriels des operations de reinstallation juridiques de la reinstallation. En 1993, l'IDE a menees depuis 1988, a aussi organise une organise des seminaires de formation aux conference interationale et publie un volume problemes de la rinstallation en Inde, en Chine sur les reinstallations en Afrique. et en Turquie, et convenu avec divers Emprunteurs de poursuivre cette formaticn Les activites conduites tout au long de l'arme 1993, tant a la Banque que sur le terrain, Considere dans son ensemble, le processus prouvent que la Banque et les Emprunteurs d'elaboration de ce bilan a offert une occasion savent tirer les lecons de l'experience, reagir exceptionnelle d'apprendre comment mieux efficacement aux problemes de reinstallation et conduire une reinstallation, d'identifier les fixer de claires priorites institutionnelles. Ils methodes saines, d'ajuster les approches sont maintenant mieux equipes pour conduire generales a des secteurs et circonstances des activites de reinstallation dans les projets a determines, d'edifier une capacite venir. Toutefois, puisque d'importantes institutionnelle au service de la reinstallation et ressources additionnelles ont e necessaires de perfectionner les methodes d'analyse et pour obtenir ces resultats, ce sera pour tous d'evaluation. Une part considerable de ces une difficile tache que de maintenir le rythme lecons ont e presentees dans ce rapport, mais des efforts actuellement deployes. bon nombre d'autres etudes d'ordre 6conomique, sociologique, juridique et tech- nique ont ete menees a bien ou sont en cours. Mesures Destinees h Amiliorer Les conclusions de ces etudes seront largement les Activites de Reinstallation diffusees pour aider a faire conna-itre les de la Banque connaissances acquises et les meilleures methodes pratiques. Parmi les contributions L'examen aboutit a la conclusion geneale que du Departement juridique, il faut citer les la qualite d'excution des projets comportant 6tudes novatrices dues au Conseiller juridique une composante s'est de la Banque sur les problemes que souleve a amelioree, surtout apres 1991. L'examen a cet egard tout deplacement de population par aussi revele de graves faiblesses et des mesures le secteur public, etudes qui aident la Banque et ont e prises, ou le seront, pour introduire de 1'Emprunteur a proteger les droits des nouvelies ameliorations. personnes reinstallees. Le Departement de l'environnement a aussi elabore une serie de nouveaux instruments qui permettront Priorites strategiques d'ameliorer les futures operations de Dans le cadre de la politique actuelle de la reinstallation, a savoir: directives revisees Banque en matiere de reinstallation, qui est regissant l'analyse economique et financiere axee sur le retablissement du niveau de revenu, des reinstallations; systeme de suivi les activites seront orientees par les priorites informatise, au niveau des projets, du strategiques ci-apres, qui sont en harmonie deroulement des operations de rdinstanlation; avec les lecons enonc&es dans le present directives concernant la creation de pecheries rapport. dans les reservoirs, au benefice des groupes reinstalles; et etudes sur les donnees Veiller a obtenir l'engagement d'experience en matihre de reinstallation en d zone urbaine. La Banque a prete son appui & la de I'Emprunteur preparation d'un manuel technique concernant La Banque ne financera pas de projets la planification de la reinstallation en zone! comportant de vastes operations de Environment Department 67 Resettlement and Development reinstallation a moins que le gouvernement dispositions juridiques. Les ONG peuvent concemr n'adopte des politiques et ne mette en conhtibuer dans une large mesure a augmenter la place des cadres juridiques propres a garantir capacite institutionnelle locale et la Banque le retablissement du niveau de revenu des encouragera leur paricipaion. personnes deplacees. L'accord sur les principes doit etre explicite des le depart, compte Ameliorer la conception des projets dument tenu de la situation particuliere des II faut eviter ou reduire au minimum les pays dotes d'un systeme federal, oil les operations de reinstallation dans le cadre des politiques/cadres juridiques peuvent relever projets assistes par la Banque en menant des de la competence des gouvernements d'Etats/ etudes techniques et sociales de nature a de provinces. Les prets consentis dans les faciliter la conception et l'execution des-projets. secteurs oui les besoins lies a la reinstallation On n'epargnera aucun effort, avant la mise en sont le plus importants doivent subvenir aux route d'un projet, pour identifier les options frais d'une application progressivement techniques et sociales permettant de limiter etendus des normes de reinstallation, a partir l'ampleur de la reinstallation. La Banque du cadre du projet, de maniere a avoir plus s'efforcera tout specialement d'identifier et d'impact sur l'ensemble du secteur. de faire largement connaltre les meilleures methodes pratiques, surtout en ce qui Renforcer la capacitt institutionnelle concerne la reinstallation dans un contexte de l'Emprunteur urbain ou semi-urbain, cas dans lequel il faut La Banque aidera les Emprunteurs a eiifier perfectionner encore les approches leur capacite institutionnelle afin de mettre en operationnelles. La conception et les oeuvre la reinstalation avant meme que le calendriers precis du projet doivent assurer la d6placement ne soit effectif, ce qui comporte mise en place de mecanismes internes qui notamment une clarification des cadres feront progresser de pair les travaux de genie juridiques, inspiree par le souci de proteger les civil et la reinstallation progressive. Ces droits individuels. A l'intention des mecanismes seront decrits dans les rapports Emprunteurs qui ont plusieurs operations de d'evaluation de projet. reinstallation assistees par la Banque, ceile-ci P a p sera prete a soutenir des projets speciaux de . l p d6veloppement institutionnel pour aider le de la population pays conceme & aameliorer ses capacites La Banque exige une participation active des administratives, ceci dans le but de repondre groupes a reinstaller a la preparation, a la aux besoins des operations de reinstallation en planification et a la conduite de la concevant et en appliquant les projets voulus reinstallation. Les plans de reinstallation qui (par ex., capacites de mise en etat des sites, font partie d'evaluations environmementales etudes sur les ressources en terres, suivi et regulieres, sont a la disposition du public. I1 evaluation, formation). Ce soutien institutionnel faut comnmuniquer des informations fiables aux de la Banque ira principalement aux personnes touchees par le projet concernant la organismes nationaux ou a ceux des Etats - politique de reinstallation et de par exemple, services centraux d'irrigation et r6amenagement, leurs droits, les conditions I d'approvisionnement en eau, commissions de reunir pour les faire valoir, les options l'energie electrique, societes - qui cherchent a ouvertes, les procedures a suivre et les developper leur capacite de prise en charge des mecanismes d'appel. En consultant le public problemes techniques, sociaux ou ecologiques, sur les plans de reinstallation, on stimulera la et plus particulierement a elaborer des normes participation des groupes reinstalles et des et reglements leur permettant de transposer populations h6tes a la preparation, puis a plus fadlement au niveau de l1ex6cution des l'ex6cution de ces plans. projets les politiques de reinstallation et les 68 Resettlement Series Resume Analytique Assurer la fourniture par la Banqtue Consolider la capacite de moyens definancement suffisantts institutionnelles de la Banque Afin de prevenir le risque d'appauvrissement, La Banque est entrain d'etendre ses tous les projets incluront a l'avenir, dans leurs competences pour mesurer les dimensions couts totaux, le cout integral de la reinstallation sociale et technique des projets comportant et des investissements requis pour retablir le une reinstallation, afin de maintenir les niveau de revenu. Dans le contexte du plan ameliorations. Il importe particulierement de general de financement du projet, la Banque mieux utiliser les competences du personnel sera prete a accroitre sa participation au existant et la capacite du personnel d'appoint financement des operations de reinstallation, dans des domaines critiques tels que les selon les besoins propres a chaque cas. Comme secteurs sociaux, l'examen des projets il reste difficile de trouver des moyens de renforces, enfin le suivi et li6valuation per- financement suffisants pour certains projets manents du deroulement des projets. Les recemment approuves, la Banque envisagera de administrateurs degageront des ressources fourmir des fonds d'appoint dans tous les cas suffisantes, imputees sur leurs budgets, pour necessaires. Il faut aussi chercher a obtenir plus realiser ces ameliorations. Pour soutenir le de ressources dans le pays meme - et, s'il y a renforcement des activites portant sur les lieu, aupres de donateurs bilateraux. dimensions sociales des projets, la Banque assignera des ressources financieres a un Diversifier les approches du projet fonds central ayant pour r6le d'appuyer les La Banque envisagera de recourir a des projets projets novateurs qui abordent les dimen- jumeaux pour les travaux de genie civil de sions sociales prioritaires (par exemple, grande ampleur qui necessitent une operation evaluations de la pauvrete par enquetes de reinstallatiori. Les poses d'infrastructuwe participatives , methodes d'investigation qui entrainent des deplacements de population pour l'analyse sociale, enquete sur importants seront normalement, dans l'avenir, l'organisation des utilisateurs de ressources articulees en deux projets, le seuil au-dessous naturelles, participation des ONG a la con- duquel un seul serait preferable etant ception et a l'execution des projets, etc.). determine en fonction des capacites nationales et locales. Il conviendra de justifier dans le Mesures correctives et de rattrapage rapport d'evaluation la dkision d'integrer des Des mesures correctives seront poursuivies operations de reinstallation de grande ampleur ou introduites dans tous les projets, meme a des projets plus importants. Considerer les ceux presque termines, dont l'execution n'a operations de reinstallation de grande ampleur pas respecte les normes instituees et legales. comme des projets a part entiere permettra de Pour les projets en cours dont il est reconnu, mieux mobiliser les cadres administratifs dans chaque region, qu'ils se heurtent a de appropries et les competences necessaires jpour graves problemes en matiere de conduire la reinstallation avec succes. Une reinstallation, les Emprunteurs sont entrain autre option consiste a executer deux projets de mettre au point avec l'aide de la Banque consecutifs, un projet de developpement rural des mesures correctives, et la preparation de ou urbain dans la zone de reinstallation, faisant ces actions devra etre achevee au milieu de dimmediatement suite au projet de pose 1995. Certains projets peuvent exiger une d'infrastructure qui a entra^me le deplacemLent, restructuration, un financement d'appoint l'interet de cette option doit etre apprecie en ou la creation d'un organisme de fonction des besoins dans chaque situation r,installation. particuliere. Environment Department 69 Resettlement and Development de la Banque a ses propres responsabilites, Lorsque les departements regionaux estiment qui sont de suivre attentivement le que des projets connaissent des problemes de deroulement, l'impact et les resultats des faible ou moyenne gravite, la Banque projets. En raison des risques dlev6s que continuera de preter son assistance a ces projets comportent des projets qui detruisent, puis par le biais d'une supervision reguliere ou recreent les moyens d'existence de groupes intensifiee du departement geographique de population, le personnel tant de la Banque competent. On attend des Emprunteurs qu'ils que de l'Emprunteur est tenu de faire preuve affectent de nouvelles ressources aux budgets d'une extreme prudence. Il est capital que la de projet pour realiser avec succes l'operation Banque s'acquitte de ses propres de reinstallation et la Banque envisagera sur responsabilites avec plus d'efficacit - et demande de fournir un financement d'appoint. que cela soit clair aux yeux de tous -, et que la Banque elle-meme invite l'Emprunteur a Le bilan a permis d'identifier des cas out faire de meme. l'Emprunteur n'a pas suivi les plans de reinstallation arretes en accord avec la Banque Les ameliorations ont porte, et continuent de et oui le projet, une fois acheve, a laisse un porter, sur les points suivants: i) I'analyse certain nombre de personnes dans une situa- d'une operation de rinstallation en cours tion pire qu'avant leur deplacement. La d'evaluation et sa conformite aux programmes Banque se tient a la disposition des de developpement destinds aux groupes de Emprunteurs pour leur preter assistance dans population reinstalles; ii) examen inteme des le cadre des mesures correctives qu'ils composantes d'un projet avant envisagent de prendre. Ces mesures ((de presentation au comite regional des prets, iii) rattrapage,) de l'Emprunteur doivent, dans la composition et organisation des unites . mesure du possible, viser a identifier les operationnelles qui doivent etre en mesure de personnes lesees et a effacer les effets de faire face aux problemes de la reinstallation I'appauvrissement constate. Les mesures de avec competence et coherence. La Banque est rattrapage convenues entre la Banque et la depositaire de l'essentiel des connaissances qui Soci&t6 nationale d'energie thermique (Inde) garantissent le succes des operations de pour plusieurs projets thermiques constituent reinstallation, connaissances enrichies par le un exemple recent qui marque un progres. present bilan. II faut maintenant tirer pleinement parti de ces connaissances grace a Ameliorer les modalites d'etude un deploiement avise du personnel. des projets Au stade de l'identification des projets et II est essentiel de respecter int.gralement les durant la preparation d'op6rations de procddures et les mesures de securite rinstaiation de grande ampleur, la Banque destinees a garantir la qualite des projets - encouragera les Emprunteurs A conduire des par exemple, enquetes initiales sur le revenu, programmes experimentaux pour deterniner si plans et programmes de reinstallation, les solutions et arrangements proposes sont calendriers et budgets. Le fait que presque adequats. L'utilisation systematique des tous les projets inscrits dans les exercices ressources du Mecanisme de financement de la budgetaires 1993 et 1994 qui aient ete preparation des projets (PPF) et du Fonds de presentes aux comites regionaux des prets developpement des institutions ouvrira de tiennent compte des procedures etablies nouveaux guichets financiers accessibles aux constitue la preuve que les Bureaux des Vice- Emprunteurs, pour le soutien technique et la Presidents regionaux sont attaches au respect mise en place de capacites, durant les des procedures. Si les gouvernements des importantes phases preparatoires. Pour les pays emprunteurs sont responsables en opdrations d'importance majeure - en derniere analyse de l'execution, le personnel particulier la construction de barrages -, on Resettlement Series Resume Analytique envisage de plus en plus d'instituer, durant les devront comporter des visites sur le terrain, sur etapes d'identification preliminaire, un cornite les sites memes du deplacement et de la * consultatif de la reinstallation, sur le modele reinstallation. Le recours aux services de des comites de securite des barrages. specialistes recrutes localement permettra d'atteindre plus aisement la portee de supervi- Les dispositions arretees par la Banque sion de la Banque. La judicieuse pratique concernant l'evaluation des operations de introduite par les regions d'Asie de l'Est et reinstallation (voir Directive du manuel d'Afrique, qui est de soutenir les comites de operationnel 2.20 et Directive operationnelle suivi crees par l'Emprunteur, a pour effet 4.30) apparaissent satisfaisantes et seront d'ameliorer l'execution et sera appliquee dans appliquees. L'evaluation portera expliciternent d'autres regions. sur les risques sociaux et economiques impliques par l'operation de reinstallation Les divisions de la Banque responsables de proposde, A distinguer des autres risques projets comportant de complexes operations de inhrents au projet, et garantira que le reinstallation doivent affecter davantage de programme de reconstruction socio- temps de travail leur supervision. &conomique aborde ces risques. N*anmoins, si stricte que soit la supervision de Conformement a la decision prise par le la Banque, elle ne saturait palier les personmel de direction de la Banque de manquements de saunt a les preparer un Plan d'execution pour chaque manquements des Empruntetrs a leurs obliga- projet au stade de l'evaluation, le plan de tions ni compenser leur trop faible reinstallation sera integre au plan d'execution determination d'executer les mesures d'ensemble. convenues. Quand les accords juridiques ne sont pas respectes, la decision de poursuivre les Le contenu des rapports d'evaluation des decaissements devra etre approuvee par les projets comportant une operation de memes instances regionales qui cautiornent les r6installation est en voie d'amelioration, dims propositions tendant a les suspendre (cette le but de garantir que le personnel de direction regle s'applique a tous les cas de manquement, et le Conseil recoivent les informations et non pas seulement a ceux concemant les essentielles concemant la reinstallation. Unae accords relatifs aux operations de sous-section distincte du rapport d'evalualion, reinstallation). En raison du caractere delicat consacree a la composante or6installation*, de ces operations et des risques qu'elles fournira les indicateurs de base sur les poptula- impliquent, les mecanismes actuels de commu- tions touchees, les programmes de nication aux chefs de division et aux chefs developpement, l'attenuation des risques, Ile regionaux des constatations faites sur le terrain calendrier et le budget. Le cout global de la (Imprime 590) seront ameliores. reinstallation sera identifiable parmi les autres couits du projet et une distinction sera faite Pour maintenir les progres realises durant entre les co(bts d'indemnisation et les coats des l1examen et pour verifier si les directives et investissements necessaires pour reconstituer procedures de la Banque sont respectees en une base socio-conomique viable au benefice permanence, les services regionaux etabliront des groupes de population reinstalles. des rapports annuels sur les projets comportant une composante 'rdinstallationo dans le cadre Supervision du Rapport annuel sur la performance du portefeuille. Ces rapports apprecieront la II est encore possible d'ameliorer la supervision gestion des projets comportant une composante des operations de reinstallation, tant sur le plan ccrdinstallationD en fonction d'indicateurs de la qualite que de la frequence du contr6le. mesurables - a savoir la frequence des mis- Des missions de supervision periodiques et sions de supervision, l'evaluation du degre de dotees d'un personnel suffisant et competent recouvrement des moyens d'existence et, le cas auront lieu au moins tous les 12 mois; elles echeant, les principaux problemes d'execution. Environment Department 71 Resettlement and Development En ce qui concerne l'etude du dossier de pas en vase dos, de pareilles normes nouveaux projets assortis d'une operation de ralentissent aussi les progres que ceux-i reinstallation, les rapports feront etat des plans pourraient marquer. C'est pourquoi tous les de r&installation, des enquetes sur le revenu, gouvemements et tous les organismes de des calendriers et des budgets, ainsi que des developpement bilateraux et multilateraux consultations menees avec la population locale. doivent suivre des politiques et des approches similaires, afin de dormer aux groupes de * * * population r6installds d'aussi bonnes perspec- tives que possible d'amelioration de leurs C'est une priorite absolue pour la Banque que moyens d'existence. de renforcer son assistance aux Emprunteurs pour realiser et ameliorer les operations de En soutenant une politique de reinstallation reinstallation; lutter contre la pauvrete et axee sur la prevention de l'appauvrissement, la promouvoir un developpement durable fait Banque encourage des politiques et des aussi partie integrante de la mission approches dont la portee depasse de loin les fondamentale de la Banque. L'important projets assistes par ses soins. Ameliorer les processus d'apprentissage qui a pris place ces modalites d'intervention de l'Emprunteur, c'est dernieres annees a mieux fait prendre con- servir non seulement les op*rations assistees science des problemes complexes et des risques par la Banque, mais aussi l'ensemble des de toute reinstallation; la Banque et les operations de reinstallation liees a des secteurs Emprunteurs sont beaucoup mieux equipes entiers et qui touchent d'importants groupes de que dans le passe pour oeuvrer dans ce population. Telle est la voie qu'il faut suivre domaine. Les competences techniques dans les futures activites de reinstallation, ndcessaires sont concentrees surtout parmi le meme si elle n'est pas aisee. On se heurtera a personnel de la Banque, qui se preoccupe de nombreuses difficultes, parce que toute actuellement de renforcer sa capacite inteme reinstallation constitue un redoutable defi tant d'analyse sociale encore limitee. La Banque pour les Emprunteurs que pour la Banque. La fera usage de modeles de realisation de projets Banque reconnait la lourde responsabilite qui plus diversifies et de ressources financieres lui incombe d'aider les Emprunteurs a plus abondantes pour assister les Emprunteurs progresser le long de ce*te voie, d'ameliorer les dans la conduite des operations de resultats de la reinstallation quand il est reinstallation de grande ampleur. impossible d'eviter le deplacement et d'etendre le benefice de ces meilleures approches a En imposant des normes plus rigoureuses pour l'chelle de l'ensemble des secteurs et meme les operations ou: elle intervient et en favorisant des nations. le retablissement d'un niveau de revenu egal ou superieur pour les groupes reinstalles, la I Voir le comite special d'execution et le Banque s'efforce d'amoindrir l'cart entre les comite de direction charges du bilan des objectifs de la reinstallation et la pratique operations de reinstallation de populations. Obstin6ment suivie en de nombreux pays. Cela exige du temps, des ressources et un effort 2 Voir le Rapport sur le developpement dans le constant de la part tant de la Banque que des monde de 1994 (a paraitre) pour une etude Emprunteurs. Malheureusement, des normes detaille. deplorables continuent de prevaloir dans bon nombre de deplacements forces qui se 3 Voir Departement d'Evaluation des deroulent aujourd'hui en dehors des Operations, Early Experiences with Involun- programmes assistes par la Banque; comme les tary Resettlement, rapport ne 12142, 30 juin projets finances par la Banque ne se deroulent 1993. 72 Resettlement Series Resettlement and Dlevelopment The Bankwide Review of Projects Involving Invo:luntary Resettlement 1986-1993 1. The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy An old adage says that a drop of water may light the social, cultural, and economic com- reflect an ocean. Sinilarly, involuntary resettle- plexities of resettlement, and to address them ment reflects the complexity of social develop- better in practice. It comes after three rounds ment. One can hardly find a greater paradox of improvements in the Bank's 1980 policy and than dismantling the socio-economic system of operational procedures which were introduced large groups of people for the sake of future in 1986, 1988, and 1990. development. And one can hardly find a greater challenge than rapidly reconstructing The Nature and Feasibility of Re- dismantled microsocieties and rebuilding the settlement livelihoods of uprooted people. It is thereifore no wonder that resettlement, which affects only 15 percent of the Bank's lending, has gained Defining resettlement: two processes such central visibility in the Bank's activities. It is appropriate to begin this report by asking And it is no wonder that the intrinsic complex- "What is the social nature of involuntary re- ity, pain, loss, and hardship of involuntary settlement? Why is resettlement such a diffi- displacement make such projects controversial. cult part of development"? The answer defines the unusual kinds of processes that Borrowers Complex as it inevitably is, however, involun- and Bank staff have to grapple with in projects tary resettlement is neither technically nor involving forced resettlement. socially intractable, and can be successful. If addressed with political commitment, adequate What is usually described as "involuntary financial and institutional resources, and resettlement" consists of two distinct, yet participatory execution, the formidable task of closely related social processes: displacement of population relocation may result in beneficial people and reconstruction of their livelihood; development. this reconstruction is also often called rehabilita- tion. Each has its own demands, risks, costs, The present review is rooted in the understand- logistics, and socio-cultural and economic ing of involuntary resettlement as an integral effects. part of some major development programs. The starting point of the Bank's resettlement Displacement concerns how land and other policy, adopted in 1980, was to give its staff assets are expropriated to allow a project for and Borrowers a simple message: it is essential the overall social good to proceed. Rehabilita- to handle the difficult process of resettlement tion concerns the fate of the displaced people. equitably and efficiently; if involuntary resettle- In theory, the two processes are segments of a ment is mnismanaged, the displaced people will single continuum; in practice, the first does not suffer unjustifiably and will be impoverished.' always bring about the second. When people are displaced by projects for "right of way", The current review is one more step in the they lose either their land - in full or in part- continuous efforts of the World Bank to high- Environment Department Resettlement and Development or their dwelling, or both. As a consequence, and drinking water systems, or extending resettlement outcomes may vary considerably highway networks has entailed displacements from people's initial standards of living. fraught with hardships and deprivation for Indeed, whether or not involuntary resettle- many. The drama of forced urban displace- ment results in re-establishing people's incomes ment in Boston's West End has spawned an and livelihood depends largely on how dis- entire sociological literature.2 The beautiful placement is planned and carried out. It also master-plan of today's Paris was made possible depends on whether resettlers are assisted to by painful relocation in the days of Baron rebuild their livelihood. In India - a country Haussmann. New York's impressive Cross tested by much resettlement and distinguished Bronx Expressway slashed through many by a vast social science literature about it - neighborhoods, of which some - at least in this understanding has been refined and two hindsight - could have been saved.3 Huge distinct concepts are used for the two pro- hydroelectric complexes in Canada have cesses: resettlement i rehabilitation (R&R). required the uprooting of many indigenous Thus, the Indian social science and legal groups.4 The experience with various types of literatures emphasize the fact that "rehabilita- involuntary resettlement has generated in- tion" does not occur automatically, just because creased knowledge for planning resettlement people are resettled. Indeed, resettlement may and a robust set of policies and legal frame- occur without rehabilitation, and unfortunately, works that effectively guarantee the rights and it often does. entitlements of resettlers. Involuntary resettlement is also distinct from The need for investment in voluntary population movements. Voluntary infrastructure mobility, including rural-urban migration, Each year developing countries invest around stimulates economic growth, reflecting people's US $200 billion in new infrastructure. The willing pursuit of new opportunities. In contrast, social and economic retums from these invest- involuntary p resettlement does not inlude the ments have been high.3 In the past 15 years, the choice to remain in place, and resettlers often face share of households with access to clean water more risks than opportunities, has risen by 50 percent, bringing significant Are involuntary displacements improvements in health and the quality of life. inevitable? Per capita access to electric power and tele- phones has doubled in the same period, en- Clean drinking water, energy for expanding abling increased productivity and human industries, and irrigation water for thirsty welfare. Food production has risen sharply - fields are needed for improving human liveli- doubling in the past quarter century - with hoods in developing countries. So are wider over half this gain comning from investments in roads in clogged downtowns, hospital build- irrigation. And investments in transportation ings and schools in residential areas, or sewage have reduced costs and improved farm gate treatment plants in polluted cities. Such and producer prices. developments make dramatic rearrangements in human settlements inevitable, and they are The infrastructure projects underpin growth not new: historically, involuntary resettlements and development, but they typically involve go back to ancient times and become ubiqui- changes in land and water use patterns: often tous in modem times. this requires that people be displaced. The numbers of people requiring resettlement can The inevitability of involuntary resettlement is often be reduced, in specific situations, but the written into the history of industrial countries. need for resettlement cannot be eliminated. Installing major hydropower dams, irrigation Nor should it be assumed that the volume of 76 Resettlement Series The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy resettlement will be much lower in the future. importance. For those people resettled under More than two billion people still lack access to Bank-financed projects, the Bank has a respon- electricity and are forced to use sticks ancd dung sibility to help Borrowers ensure that every for their energy needs; 1.7 billion lack sewerage effort is made to restore, and if possible im- systems and 1 billion lack access to clean piped prove, their livelihoods. But the Bank's in- water, resulting in the unnecessary death of 2-3 volvement also has a broader significance, that million infants and children each year. Fcood far exceeds the size of resettlement under the production will need to double again in the projects it assists directly. Indeed, over the past next 40 years - an impossibility without fourteen years since the Bank established its additional investment in irrigation. And the path-breaking resettlement guidelines, it has world's population will grow by almost 1 increasingly sought to work with governments billion each decade over the same period. to promote better policies and legal frame- Substantial further investment in infrastructure works for resettlement, at and beyond the will thus be absolutely essential if povertyt is to project level, and with project executing be reduced. agencies to promote better procedures for implementation. A problem of worldwide proportions Although development makes displacements Due to accelerated provisions of infrastructure inevitable as a class of social processes, in and growing demographic pressures, popula- practice, not every individual case of proposed tion displacement caused by development displacement is unavoidable or justified. programs is a growing problem. The displace- Htolcmn incungvrecent or experi- ment toll of the 300 large dams that, on aver- History-including recent World Bank experi- age, enter into construction every year is ences - confirms that the magnitude and estimated to be above 4 million people. The outcomes of individual displacements can be urban development and transportation pro influenced. As this report will show, there are grams being started each year in developing realistic ways to avoid, reduce, or mitigate countries are estimated to displace an addi- specific instances of involuntary population tional 6 million people. It is estimated that displacement. Finding and using these possi- about 80 to 90 million people have been invol- bilities is the cornerstone of the Bank's resettle- untarily resettled over the past decade, as a ment policy. result of infrastructure programs for dam construction, and urban and transportation Economic and social disruption development. Investments in other sectors The reasons for avoiding or reducing forced have increased this number further. displacements are social, economic, ethical, and cultural. While most projects causing displace- World Bank-financed programs account for a ment may be necessary and beneficial for the small, but significant share of this totaL larger society, for those directly affected Projects currently in the Bank's active porifolio compulsory displacement represents the are expected to involve the resettlement of 2 imposed unravelling of their microsociety. million people over a 10-year period. Ban]k- When people are forcibly moved, production funded projects account, conservatively, fcr systems may be dismantled, long-established some 3 percent of the resettlement caused by residential settlements are disorganized, and dam construction worldwide and for about one kinship groups are scattered. Many jobs and percent of the displacements caused by urban assets are lost. Informal social networks that and transportation projects in the developing are part of daily sustenance systems - provid- world. ing mutual help in child care, food security, revenue transfers, short-term credit, labor The Bank's involvement in resettlement, while exchange, and other basic sources of socio- limited in relative terms, is nonetheless of great economic support - collapse because of Environment Department Resettlement and Development community breakdown. Health care tends to those rights. When resettlement processes are deteriorate. Links between producers and their carried out in a lawful manner that fully customers are often severed, and local labor respects the rights of resettlers and hosts, markets are disrupted. Local organizations opposition to projects by adversely affected and formal or informal associations disappear people is reduced (although not eliminated) because of the sudden dispersion of their and overall project implementation is likely to members. Traditional authority and manage- unfold more effectively. Carrying out resettle- ment systems can lose their leaders. Symbolic ment in a manner that respects the rights of markers, such as ancestral shrines and graves, affected persons is not just an issue of compli- are abandoned, breaking links with the past ance with the law, but also constitutes sound and with peoples' cultural identity. Not always development practice. This requires not only visible or quantifiable, these processes are adequate legal frameworks, but also a change in nonetheless real. The cumulative effect is that mind-set - towards recognizing resettlers' the social fabric and economy are torn apart. entitlements, rights, needs, and cultural identities. The risk of impoverishment The international debate around The main risk arising from forced displacement resettlement is the impoverishment of the affected people. Because of its adverse effects, in recent years This risk is not abstract. Criticism of involun- population displacement by development tary resettlement has mounted, and a vast body projects has become the focus of a wide inter- of research - especially research by develop- national debate, engaging and polarizing ing and developed country scholars over the governments and non-governmental organiza- last 10 to 15 years,6 including pioneering work tions, public opinion groups, parliamentarians, by the World Bank' - has documented that development agencies, and the media. The poorly managed resettlement can cause in- critique of involuntary resettlement often creased poverty. Well managed resettlement, evolves into a rejection of the goals and legiti- on the other hand, can be an integral part of a macy of development itself. By and large, the nation's poverty reduction strategy. While Bank has not engaged directly in this contro- working to reduce poverty, the Bank and its versy and perhaps has not contributed enough member countries cannot overlook project to clarifying either the development issues at factors that make some population segments stake, or the historical record. worse off. The impoverishment risks involved in forced displacement (see risk model, Chap- Two major streams of arguments are advanced ter 4) heightens the moral imperative of ensur- by critics of resettlement. The first denies in ing adequate resettlement. principle the acceptability of any involuntary resettlement and argues that no development Moving people involuntarily also raises legal program that entails resettlement should be issues. The potential for violating individual undertaken. The second criticizes the quality and group rights under domestic and intema- of specific resettlement operations. Consider- tional law makes compulsory resettlement able criticism of both kinds is directed at Bank- unlike any other project activity. The fact that assisted projects - primarily in hydropower, projects are frequently delayed by courts, and irrigation, and flood control. that compensation levels are raised signifi- cantly on appeal, reflects the recognition in It is clearly unrealistic to reject all resettlement. legal systems that people cannot be arbitrarily Developing nations cannot forego the benefits displaced without just compensation, regard- of major infrastructural investments that also less of national need. Affected parties fre- entail unavoidable population relocation. The quently have access to legal remedies to enforce question is how to minimize the size of dis- 7 8 Resettlement Series The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Banks Policy placement and how to respond effectively to ing their social and cultural identity as well as the needs of the people being resettled. Thus, their incomes. This is why recognizing the the World Bank fully shares the concerns of the intrinsic difficulty of resettlement is the prime critics who deplore bad resettlement operat- step for addressing this task seriously, with tions. The Bank has become increasingly all the means that can be mobilized. This is receptive to their specific signals and construc- the only realistic lens through which the tive contributions. It regards their concernt for requirements of resettlement work can be the welfare and livelihood of the displacecL viewed without self deception. populations as justified and germane to the Bank's own mandate and policies. Criticism by If the disorganization induced by displacement NGOs and other groups of poor resettlement is so profound and traumatic, can it be over- operations, including failures under Bank- come? Can this challenge be realistically met? assisted projects, has helped the Bank improve What does it take for a development project to its policies and operations. The Bank itself make adequate resettlement feasible? has delivered perhaps the strongest, most consequential criticism of bad displacement Meeting the challenge: an example practices by its very decision to adopt an from China institutional policy based on equitable prin- cile an son.prahs h akas The Min River flows majestically through some states unambiguously that progress in policy of the most fertile lands of Fujian province in naeeds to be followed by systematic progrss m southeastern China. It irrigates lush paddy effective implementation, a process that is not fields and orchards, crosses pine and fir forests, effective snplem entation, aaprocess that rr wst and flows around the commercial center and always smooth, as this report will show. But lowland suburbs of Nanping City. Years ago a by setting a policy and promoting its imple- lorlandropof waspinvisaged at mentation the Bank helps improve performance major hydropower dam was envisaged at in a manner relevant to the worldwide resettle- Shuikou: the intended dam would provide a ment problem. dependable capacity of 1,000 MW and generate energy vital for the entire industrial develop- ment of East China, that would otherwise come The challenge of income restoration from coal-fired thermal plants. To build the The basic thrust of resettlement - to restoire dam, however, 88 villages belonging to 15 comparable standards of living to those di;s townships in three counties, and large parts of placed, leaving people no worse-off is a sound Nanping City would be inundated, displacing objective, but not an easy or simple one. To more than 20,000 households with about 68,000 dismantle a functioning production system, is rural and urban people. "easy" and fast; to reconstruct a new one is slow, risky, and difficult. Closing a small In 1986 the Bank appraised the project for workshop or business may be done overnight; building the Shuikou Hydropower Dam on the setting up a thriving new one that must gain Min River. This was the first Bank-assisted new customers in a strange new location is a project in China to which the Bank's resettle- difficult challenge, fraught with uncertainty. ment policy and the recommendations of the When this task concerns not one producer, or just-completed 1986 resettlement review were one hundred, but many thousands or tens of fully applied; it was based on a substantive thousands of people, the inherent complexities policy dialogue with the Borrower, whose of the task are compounded exponentially. The national resettlement policy and legal provi- restoration process is also compounded and sions provide for resettlement with develop- lengthened because its actors, the displaced ment. The project became a set model for the people, are traumatized by the material and many subsequent projects involving resettle- spiritual losses imposed on them, often affect- ment that the Bank is assisting in the country. Environment Department 7 9 Resettlement and Development The resettlement component in Shuikou was strong concem of the project's management. carefully prepared - 600 local staff years went The balance - about half the population - has into resettlement preparation alone. The been resettled through a land-based strategy on project and the Bank have assisted independent a newly created productive basis. New village sociological research, throughout implementa- sites have been constructed by the project. tion, on resettlement progress and impacts. With the housing compensation and materials Bank missions have evaluated income restora- received - timber, cement and iron - villagers tion for the first groups resettled around the were able to hire their own contractors and dam and ascertained that now they are gaining build new housing with more floor space than average incomes per family from on-farm and before and modern equipment. off-farm activities that are higher than they had before resettlement. The old landscape around the Min River has now virtually disappeared, and even old roads, Project planning emphasized restoring graves, shrines, and landmarks have been people's productive capacity, bringing new moved. But the cultural shock of displacement land into cultivation, creating jobs or new has been gradually absorbed and overcome: commercial opportunities, and providing new and better-built schools receive their new housing with more floor space per capita children in the regrouped villages; new residen- and new social amenities. Detailed resettle- tial and public buildings have replaced the ment provisions were included in the project lowland areas of Nanping City. Moving people SAR and legal agreement. The project started in groups, and only to short distances, has in 1987, and by end 1988 the first 1,400 preserved much, even if not all, social ties. resettlers moved from the dam site to new Family networks have helped cushion the houses. The borrowing agency was strongly difficulties, and project staff continue to moni- committed to successful resettlement. Relo- tor adaptation and respond to unresolved cation advanced at a well-synchronized pace problems. Altogether, a considerable amount with dam civil works and regular supervision of well-managed change has been compressed by Bank specialist staff provided technical into a short period. In Shuikou, resettlemtent has assistance. proven to be not onlyfeasible but successful. Resettlers describe their new life as a consider- The project terraced land and removed stones able improvement over life in the pre-displace- on formerly uncultivated steep hills. On the ment period. The vast amount of energy to new terraces, fruit trees were planted at project flow from the Shuikou Dam's turbines will expense four to five years in advance of feed new industries, create more employment resettlers' arrival. By the time displaced and better lives for many throughout Fujian families moved in, the new orchards were close province and beyond, and also supply electric- to fruition and produced cash crops. Project ity to all resettlement sites. The Shuikou budgets for resettlement have been supple- project experience demonstrates that involun- mented when necessary; food rations were tary resettlement can be done well, relocated distributed to resettlers for short intervals; and people can share in project benefits, and can village and township leaders have been in- improve their livelihood. volved in planning the relocation jointly with project authorities. By 1993, six years into The broader question that looms beyond this project implementation, about 67,200 people and similar cases is how to move from good (99 percent) had moved. Families comprising case practice to good general practice. The 27,700 people had obtained jobs at a rate of one answer lies in the power of political commit- per family; families comprising another several ment and the role of policy. It is therefore thousand people still need jobs, a remaining appropriate to examine the basic elements of 80 Resettlement Series The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy the Bank's resettlement policy, not just as The fundamental goal of the Bank's policy is to embodied in Shuikou, but as the main tool improve the former living standards and adopted by the Bank more than a decade ago earnrng capacities of displaced persons - or at for generalizing an effective treatment cof least to restore them.' Its provisions protect resettlement issues. and enlarge the entitlements of displaced people and promote a safety net approach for Resettlemen Policy as Codified restoring their livelihoods. Whenever possible, Resettlement Policy as CodifiedU the Bank's policy calls for transforming Good Practice people's involuntary resettlement into an opportunity for development and for enhanc- The Bank's policy on involuntary resettlement ing their prior living standards by enabling was prepared in 1979 and issued early in 1980. resettlers to share in the benefits of the development In the 1960s and 1970s, before the policy was project that causes their displacement. adopted, involuntary resettlement in many projects had been dealt with on a case-byrcase Restoring previous standards of living is a basis, as a low-priority side-effect of major formidable task in practice. By pursuing a infrastructural works that was entirely left to development-oriented outcome, the Bank's borrowing agencies, with little, if any Bank resettlement policy raises a major challengefor assistance. The lack of explicit norms, proce- both Borrowers and the Bank, but a challengefully dures, and adequate resources for handling consistent with the poverty alleviation policies of resettlement resulted in serious negative effects borrowing governments. However, the nature on the people displaced, on the host popula- and the dimensions of the tasks at hand in tions at relocation sites, and on the environ- implementing this policy must be well under- ment. Allowing such effects to occur witht little stood. The absence in many developing mitigation was generally an unwritten yet countries of effectively functioning land and accepted rule in developing countries, tolerated labor markets, the substantive and procedural by governments and overlooked by sponsors of inadequacies of compensation systems for major projects. property appropriated by the state, and the absence of adequate social safety nets, are three By issuing resettlement policy guidelines, and central reasons why the simple cash compensa- procedures the Bank became the first multilat- tion of property losses under eminent domain eral institution to enact a policy framework for laws cannot realistically be expected at this displacement and to provide landmark think- time to provide satisfactory outcomes for ing about resettlement. As the Bank's firsit project-affected people in developing countries. major environmental policy, it defined the This makes compelling the need for the ap- sociological, economic, and institutional proach to resettlement that the Bank has content of Bank work regarding resettlement. adopted as its policy, in order to prevent the The Bank's share in actual resettlement world- impoverishment of people displaced by Bank- wide is very limited, between 1 and 3 percent financed development projects. depending on the given sector, but the impor- tance of the Bank's policyfar exceeds the scope of Attaining this objective often requires changes in resettlenent under its direct operations. By the policies, legal frameworks, institutional moving away from a focus on compensation capacities, and current practices of many Borrow- and removal, the policy regarded resettlement ers. This challenge is faced anew in every single as a development issue, providing guidance on development project that entails displacement. how development-oriented planning coukl Meeting it successfully demands that a systematic address the difficult, costly, and painful prob- effort is made each time, including improving lems that arise whenever people are involun- policy, allocating appropriate resources, and tarily removed from their land and homes,, fostering the participation of resettlers and hosts. Environment Department 81 Resettlement and Development Box 1.1. Key steps in the evolution of the Bank's resettlement policy Based on feedback and lessons from field experience, the formulation of the Bank's resettlement policy has evolved steadily through several rounds of improvements. 1980: The World Bank issues its initial resettlement policy, prepared in 1979, entitled Social Issues Associated with Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects (OMS 2.33). 1986: An in-house policy and operational review of how the resettlement guidelines were applied makes new recommendations, adopted by management and issued formally as an Operations Policy Note (OPN 10.08). This second policy statement strengthened the 1980 guidelines by emphasizing that every project with resettlement must develop a new productive base for resettlers. 1988: Both policy documents are integrated into one detailed policy-cum-technical Bank paper. For the first time, the Bank went public with its resettlement policy (World Bank Technical Paper No. 80). 1990: The resettlement policy was revised and reissued as Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary. Resettlement (World Bank, 1990). Bank-supported projects, however, are not other steps gradually followed. The Bank isolated from national policy contexts and rejected the argument that impoverishing frameworks. Hence, in countries where the Bank resettlers was an unavoidable, if lamentable, is financing, or is considering financing projects facet of development, and predicated its which involve resettlement, the Bank also assists approach on the argument that appropriate govenmments in establishing or improving development strategies could produce better national resettlement policies and legal frame- outcomes. By that step, the Bank set new works, building on project-level experiences (see standards for itself, for the development further, Chapter 3). community at large, and for borrowing and executing agencies - standards that would Over the years, the Bank's policy has been inevitably take time to be absorbed by all concerned, confirmed and strengthened (see Box 1.1). but that in the long run would place resettle- Current policy is formulated in Operational ment operations in the developing countries on Directive 4.30 Involuntary Resettlement, issued in a new path. The Bank's policy is also consid- 1990; the basic Bank approach to the social ered by independent evaluators to be sound issues in resettlement, and in general in projects and advanced. The Morse Independent appraised for Bank support, is also formulated Review, which criticized the design and imple- in the Operational Manual Statement 2.20 mentation of the Bank-assisted Narmada regarding project appraisal, particularly in the Sardar Sarovar projects in India, also assessed definition of sociological elements of project ap- the Bank's resettlement policy and concluded praisal.9 Through its institutional guidelines, that the Bank has 'set the highest standards of the Bank provides leadership in addressing one any aid or lending organization in the world for of the thorniest issues in development. mitigating adverse consequences to human well- being caused by involuntary resettlement."10 By formulating a policy framework for resettle- ment operations, the Bank made at the end of Between the time the Bank's policy was first the 1970s one major step on a new road, issued in 1980 (OMS 2.33) and the publication recognizing the social dimensions of induced of its latest resettlement directives development and starting to include such (O.D. 4.30), the policy's provisions were dimensions in the Bank's lending. Several strengthened, refined, and adapted better to 82 Resettlement Series The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy Box 1.2. The Bank's resettlement policy Based on feedback from field experiences and findings from social science research, the development of the Bank's resettlement policy has evolved steadily since 1980 through several key steps in 1986, 1988, and 1990. The basic elements of the Bank's resettlemenlt policy are: * Involuntary displacement should be avoided or minimized whenever feasible, because of its disruptive and impoverishing effects. * Where displacement is unavoidable, the objective of Bank policy is to assist displaced persons in their efforts to improve, or at least restore, former living standards and earning capacity. The means to achieve this objective consist of the preparation and execution by the Borrower of resettlement plans as develop- ment programs. These resettlement plans are integral parts of project designs. * Displaced persons should be: (i) compensated for their losses at replacement cost, (ii) given opportuni- ties to share in project benefits, and (iii) assisted in the transfer and in the transition period at the relocation site. * Moving people in groups can cushion disruptions. Minimizing the distance between departure and relocation sites can facilitate the resettlers' adaptation to the new socio-cultural and natural environ- ments. The tradeoffs between distance and economic opportunities must be balanced carefully. * Resettlers' and hosts' participation in planning resettlement should be promoted. The existing social and cultural institutions of resettlers and their hosts should be relied upon in conducting the transfer and reestablishment process. * New communities of resettlers should be designed as viable settlement systems equipped with infra- structure and services, able to integrate in ilhe regional socio-economic context. * Host communities that receive resettlers should be assisted to overcome possible adverse social and environmental effects from increased population density. * Indigenous people, ethnic rninorities, pastcralists, and other groups that may have informal customary rights to the land or other resources taken for the project, must be provided with adequate land, infra- structure, and other compensation. The absence of legal title to land should not be grounds for denying such groups compensation and rehabilitation. (Based on Operational Directive 4.30: Involuntary Resettlement). project needs on the ground (see Box 1.2). Therefore, displaced people must also share in The essential message of the Bank's resettle- the benefits which they make possible. ment policy is that the affected people should be protected from impoverishment. Many Means and institutional procedures people adversely affected by relocation are already poor or marginal; further deprivation Together with its policy guidelines, the Bank of income and economic marginalization is also defined the means to achieve its objectives. contrary to the very purpose of development. By codifying the lessots of best practice, the Many more people who reside either in the Bank has established institutional procedures, project area or at vast distances benefit in particular four requirements: that Bank- substantially from the projects' outcome. assisted projects that involve resettlement start Environment Department 83 Resettlement and Development with population and income surveys; that they Resettlement plans formulate resettlement action plans containing E develpmen pacages defne atimeable and Essential to the Bank's policy is to require the development packages; define a timetable; and Borrower in Bank-financed projects entailing are based on adequate budgets. These proce- Bisplaemen tonprepared crout a dures describe not only what Bank staff must d do to assist governments, but also the condi- population and income survey, a detailed tions that borrowing agencies are expected toresettlement plan, a timetable, and the budget mtions Bank-assowist operations involvingtedt for resettlement. These must be prepared meet involunt-arysresettlemopenat. onsinvolvbefore appraisal and must be linked closely to involuntary resettlement. the timetable for the main civil works causing Responsibiliy .the displacement. Resettlement plans should be built around a development strategy and The responsibility for resettlement rests with package of provisions able to improve or the Borrower. The ownership by Borrowers restore the economic base of those relocated. of the projects and all their components, Just as general Bank procedures require profes- including resettlement, is the foundation of sional appraisal of project investments, prepar- that responsibility, and is reaffirmed in the ing and appraising a resettlement plan equally legal agreements between Borrowers and the well as the main investment assures the Bank Bank. The resettlement policy defines clearly that its policy objectives are incorporated into the Bank's role as well: the Bank "supports the project. Borrowers' efforts through: (i) assistance in designing and assessing resettlement policy, The 1985 resettlement review strategies, laws, regulations, and specific When the first Bank experiences with the new plans; (ii) financing technical assistance to resettlement policy were accumulated, a strengthen the capacity of agencies respon- portfolio review was carried out in 1985 for ayl sible for resettlement; and (iii) direct financ- portfioarev asried oti195or ing of the investment costs of resettlement.""1e Bank-financed agrculture and hydropower Bank staff are accountable for pursuing the prosects approved between 1979-1985. That goals defined by the institution's policy and substantial improvements in resettlement for carrying out the basic work procedures sbtnilipoeet nrstlmn instarritu outo the polcry effctive, components. The "consistency curve" between projects and policy oscillated, however, run- Pursuing adequate resettlement is not easy for ning higher in projects appraised in 1980 to developing country governments, who face 1982, shortly after the policy was issued, than competing needs, resource limitations, and in projects appraised during 1983-1984, when many institutional constraints. The Bank attention lapsed and the curve declined. In works with governments to promote better February 1986, Bank management discussed policies for resettlement, and with borrowing and adopted the review's recommendations on agencies to promote better methods in resettle- operational policy and staffing. By manage- ment operations. The Bank recognizes its ment decision, joint remedial work with responsibility to help its Borrowers on a wide Borrowers was initiated on a number of front, primarily through the model set by its projects, and the review generated improve- policy as well as through its financial and opera- ments in the Bank's technical and policy tional assistance, so that improved resettlement provisions. approaches under Bank-assisted projects can gradually extend to full sectors and national The present comprehensive portfolio review, contexts. Helping developing countries address covering the period from 1986 to 1993, goes resettlement is part of the Bank's broader strategy farther in both breadth and depth, and is more to address the social consequences of economic exacting in its methodology than the 1985 growth and to improve the treatment of social review. It encompasses eight years, has shifted issues in development. the analysis from headquarters to the field, and 84 Resettlement Series The Nature of Involuntary Resettlement and the Bank's Policy goes beyond projects in hydropower and Beijing, 1987; S. C. Varma, Human Resettlement in the agriculture to cover the Bank's entire porl:folio, Lower Narmada Basin, Bhopal: Government Central aicluluen , . . Press, 1985; E. Ganguly-Thukral ed., Big Dams, including lending for urban, mining, tkarspor- Displaced People, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992. tation, thermal power, and water supply ' Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, 'Involuntary Resettlemnent in projects. World Bank Financed Projects' and "The World Bank and Human Rights," in vol. Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The World Bank in a Changing World, The Netherlands: Notes Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991, pp. 181,97; Michael M. Cernea, Involuntary Resettlement in Development World Bank Operational Manual Statemnent (OMS) 2.33, Projects. Policy Guidelines in World Bank Financed Social Issues of Involuntary Resettlement in Bank-Financed Projects, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1988; Projects, February 1980. M. Cernea, Anthropological and Sociological Research 2 Herbert J. Cans, Peopk and Plans: Essays on Urban for Policy Development on Population Resettlement, in Problems & Solutions, New York: Basic Books, 19,68. Anthropological Approaches to Resettlement, eds. 3 Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker- Robert Mose. and the M.M. Cernea and S. Guggenheim, Boulder: Fall of New York, New York: Random House, 1975. Westview Press, 1993; M.M. Cernea, Bridging the Janet Mancini Billson, "Opportunity or Tragedy: The Research Divide: Studying Refugees and Development Impact of Canadian Resettlement Policy on Inuiit Oustees, Environment Department, Washington, DC: Families", American Review of Canadian Studies, 1990. World Bank, 1993; Scott E. Guggenheim, "Develop- See World Development Report 1994, (forthcoming) for a ment and the Dynamics of Displacement", in vol. detailed discussion. Rehabilitation of Persons Displaced by Development See for example, Hussein Fahim, Egyptian Nubians: Projects, ed. Aloysius P. Femandez, Bangalore: Resettlement and Years of Coping, Salt Lake City: Institute for Social and Economic Change, 1989, p. 9;. University of UtahPress, 1988; Walter Fernandes and William L. Partridge, "Involuntary Resettlement in E. Ganguly-Thukral, Development, Displacement and Development Projects, Journal of Refugee Studies, Rehabilitation, New Delhi: Indian Social Institute, 1989; Vol. 2, No. 3,1990, p. 373; David Butcher, Review of Thayer Scudder, "What it Means to be Dammed.: The the Treatment of Environmental Aspects of Bank Energy Anthropology of Large Scale Development Projects", Projects, PRE Working Paper, Washington, DC, Engineering and Science, Vol. 54,4,1981; T. Scuddler, March 1990. 'Development-Induced Relocation and Refugee Operational Directive 4.30, Involuntary Resettlement, Studies: 37 Years of Change and ContinuityAAmong June 29, 1990. Zambia's Gwembe Tonga', ournal of Refugee Sttudies, 9 World Bank Operational Manual Statement 2.20, Vol.6,1993, p. 1; Anthony Oliver-Smith and Art Project Appraisal, 1984. Hansen, eds., Involuntary Migration and Resettlenment, ' Sardar Sarovar "The Report of the Independent Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982; F.R. Franco Review", Ottawa, Canada, Resource Futures Suarez and E. Cohen, Efectos Sociales de las Grandes Intemational Inc., 1992, p. 37. Represas en America Latina, Buenos Aires, 1985; Yao Fei " Operational Directive 4.30, Involuntary Resettlement, Huang, On the Reform of Resettlement Policies in C'hina, para. 23. Environment Department 85 I 2. Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 This chapter provides an overall picture of the more than estimated before the review. Over portfolio of projects involving displacement and the last 10 years, the number of projects with resettlement. The Task Force reviewed the resettlement approved per year has increased entire Bank project portfolio for FY 1986-1993 slightly, while the number of people affected with regional resettlement teams, identifying by new projects per year has decreased since projects relevant for the present analysis. A the mid-1980s (see Table 2.1). Master Data Bank was constructed in EN\ for all projects involving resettlement up to FY971. Number of projects - This chapter analyzes the portfolio of projects Projects involving resettlement have remained involving resettlement along several dimn'- a very small minority of active Bank projects, sions: distribution by regions and breakdown by 146 out of approximately 1900 in FY93, or sectors; weight in the Bank's total lending; trends about 8 percent of the Bank's lending opera- and evolution by fiscal year; concentration in key tions. Each year more projects entailing countries and Country Departments (CDs); resettlement entered the portfolio t gan closed, composition by size of resettlement operation; accounting for the gradual but steady increase and impacts in terms of affected people. Tac n io the nugber of projects in the Bank's total chapter also examines the current Bank pipeline intthe nmrtof poec inute Bank toa of projects for FY94-FY97. Portfolio analysis helps actie portfolio (see Figure 2.1). Duri g the define the magnitude of resettlement on the presettlement Bafink'srenth ragenda,uidentify re cent and ftne~ increased in number by 125 percent. This large Bank's cunrent agenda, identify recent and future inraesprtlydutobtr enfcin trends for which the Bank needs to prepare, and icrease is partialy due to better identification assess the staff workload demanded by . e.- of projects with resettlement, especally in ment. The Task Force is confident that the Bank Table 2.1. Entry of projects into the resettlement now has a good grip on its resettlement poritfo- portfolio lio, by sectors, size and composition. Finally, in order to put displacements caused by Bank- Fiscal Year Projects Approved People Affected assisted projects in a broader context, compari- 1984 13 275,000 sons are made with non-Bank assisted displace- ments occurring world-wide. 1985 10 187,000 1986 10 422,000 Magnitude of Resettlement 1987 15 143,000 1988 14 187,000 Portfolio size 1989 21 308,000 The FY86-FY93 portfolio had 192 projects 1990 17 126,000 involving displacement and resettlement, 59 1991 14 55,000 approved before FY86, and 133 after. Of these, 1992 forty-six closed before FY93, and 146 projects 21 160,000 were still active in FY93, almost 50 percent 1993 21 155,000 Environment Department 87 Resettlement and Development Figure 2.1 A YEAR BY YEAR IMAGE OF THE RESETTLEMENT PORTFOLIO Number of Projects Closed, Approved, and Active During each Fiscal Year APPROVED FISCAL YEAR TWU. By comparison, the total number of many Borrowers at preparation and appraisal active Bank projects increased 32 percent, from have commonly understated the number of 1438 at end-FY85 to 1897 at end-FY93. people affected. The real number became apparent only part way through the project. Number of affected people About 2.5 million people have been scheduled Composition by Regions and Sectors to be moved from their homes, their lands, or Regional distribution both, under the 192 projects of the FY 1986-93 review period: 543,000 people have already The 146 active projects with resettlement are been relocated under the 46 projects that had spread among 39 countries. Because of their high closed by the end of FY93, and almost 2 million population density and land scarcity, the East more are in various stages of resettlement Asia and South Asia regions have a much larger under the current active portfolio. Like the share of the Bank's resettlement projects (60 per- number of projects, the number of people to be cent) and people displaced (82 percent) than their resettled by new projects has generally ex- share in the Bank's overall project portfolio ceeded the number resettled under projects (32 percent) (see Figure 2.3). India2 (974,000 closed that year (see Figure 2.2). The total people) and China (483,000 people) together number of people to be resettled is 47 percent account for 74 percent of the people to be dis- higher, or an additional 625,000 people, than placed under the current active portfolio. The the estimate made at the time of appraisal, reverse is true for Latin America, whose share in which totaled 1.34 million. Data supplied by the total Bank project portfolio is 18 percent, 88 Resettlement Series Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 Figure 2.2 A YEAR BY YEAR IMAGE OF THE RESETTLEMENT PORTFOLIO People Displaced by Projects Closed, Approved, and Active During each Fiscal Year 2,000.000 1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400 .000 w 1,200,000 o 1,000,000 0. 800,000 o 600,000 400,000 200,000 while its share for both the number of projects the people in the resettlement portfolio, and each and the number of people in the resettlement of their shares of the resettlement project portfolio portfolio is only 9 percent (see Table 2.2). Africa, is smaller than their share in the Bank overall Europe/Central Asia, and Middle East/Noith project portfolio. Africa together account for less than 10 percent of Table 2.2. Regional distribution of projects active in FY93 Region Total Bank Projects Projects with Resettlement Number Pa. Number Pd. People Pd. Africa 656 34.6 34 23.3 113,000 5.8 South Asia 277 14.6 29 19.9 1,024,000 52.1 East Asia 326 17.2 58 39.7 588,000 30.0 Europe/Central Asia 120 6.3 5 3.4 27,000 1.4 Middle East/N. Africa 178 9.4 7 4.8 32,000 1.6 Latin America 340 17.9 13 8.9 180,000 9.1 Total Bank 1897 100 146 100 1,963,000 100 Environment Department 89 Resettlement and Development Figure 2.3 - PEOPLE DISPLACED BY REGION Projects Active During FY 193 LATN AMERICA & CA AFRICA 180,000 113,000 MIDDLE EA5T & NORTH AFRICA EUROPE & CENAL ASIA 32,000 27,000 EAST ASIA& PACIFC 588,000 SOUIrH ASIA 1,024,000 Sectoral distribution The causes of displacement The most significant shift in the Bank's resettle- Categorizing projects according to sector does ment portfolio since 1986 has been the increase not necessarily describe the physical infrastruc- in the number of transportation, water supply ture components that caused resettlement. and urban projects (TWU) involving resettle- Hydropower, irrigation, and drinking water ment. Roads, railways, sanitary infrastructure, projects, which fail into three different Bank and facility upgrading have joined the tradi- sectors, displace existing occupants for the tional urban housing projects as important same reason: dam and reservoir construction. causes of displacement. Indeed, because of the Similarly, a project may contain components emphasis by Borrowers and the Bank on which cause displacement that are not readily lending for improved urban infrastructure and imagined as belonging in the sector to which the services, TWU, which represents 23 percent of project has been assigned. Thus, for example, total active Bank projects, is now the sector AGR operations examined include two phos- with the most projects involving resettlement phate industry projects, and IEN operations (51 percent) - more than agriculture (AGR) include open pit coal mining and land-banking (14 percent) and energy (EN) (29 percent) for an expected expansion of thermal projects, all combined (see Table 2.3). However, while of which lead to resettlement. TWU accounts for more projects, AGR affects more people (52 percent of the total displaced) Dams and reservoirs are the most frequent than TWU (28 percent) and IEN (18 percent) cause of displacement, and account for 63 per- combined (see Figure 2.4). 90 Resettlement Series Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 Figure 2.4 PEOPLE DISPLACED BY SECTOR Projects Active During FY 193 TRANSPORT/WATER/URBAN 550,000 AGRICULTURE & NATURAL RESOURCES 1,030,000 INDUSTRY & ENERGY 360,000 cent of the people displaced. Transportation way along canals, drains, and transmission, ranks second, both in numbers of projects and water, and sewerage lines are now more evident people displaced (see Table 2.4). However, as causes of displacement. Projects in the forestry there are several other causes of displacement sector have also grown in importance as causes of besides dams and highways. Extensive rights of resettlement. The project with the largest resettle- Table 2.3. Sectoral distribution of projects active in FY93 Region Total B!ank Projects Projects with Resettlement Number Pct. Number Pct. People Pct. Agriculture 482 25.4 21 14.4 1,030,000 52.5 Industry and Energy 437 23.0 43 29.4 360,000 18.3 Transport/Water/Urban 436 23.0 75 51.4 550,000 28.0 Other 542 28.6 7* 4.8 23,000 1.2 Total Bank 1897 100 146 100 1,963,000 100 * Five population and human resource projects; two environment projects. Enviromnent Department 91 Resettlement and Development Table 2.4. Distribution of projects by cause of displacement Cause of Displacement* Projects with Resettlement People Displaced Number % of Total Number % of Total Dams (including access) 39 26.6 1,233,000 62.8 Transportation 36 24.7 311,000 15.8 Water supply, sewerage 18 12.3 59,000 3.0 Thermal (including mining) 15 10.3 94,000 4.8 Urban infrastructure 12 8.2 73,000 3.7 Irrigation, canals 7 4.8 71,000 3.6 Environmental protection 5 3.4 74,000 3.8 Industry 4 2.7 2,000 0.1 Forestry 2 1.4 45,000 2.3 Other 8 5.5 1,000 0.0 TOTAL 146 100 1,963,000 100 * Projects with more than one cause of displacement are categorized by the component that displaces the most people. ment in Africa, for example, is the Cote d'Ivoire Size of resettlement components Forestry project. The Borrower proposed to Resettlement varies from a few families to more displace as many as 200,000 people, but this number was reduced to 40,000 after the Bank's than 200,000 people i the largest project. Five intervention. Environmental protection, particu- large agriculture projects in India account for larly flood control infrastructure, is also emerging 41 percent of the people displaced in the total as a cause of resettlement. Bank portfolio. Eight other projects, more broadly distributed regionally and sectorally, Thermal power projects are also a significant account for another 20 percent of the people cause of resettlement. These projects usually displaced (see Table 2.5). The other 133 do not displace many people, but two India projects displace the remaining 39 percent, or projects - Farakka II and Singrauli II- 770,000 people, of which 85 displace more than displaced about 50,000 people each. At the 1000 people each (see Table 2.6). The impor- time of appraisal, neither the Borrower nor the tance of projects with resettlement components appraisal mission addressed the issue of in the "below 1000" category or "below 500" resettlement in either project. Singrauli is still category at appraisal should not be underesti- resettling people nearly five years after the mated. Often projects that start with low project closed. In thermal projects people are numbers multiply by orders of magnitude usually displaced not by the physical works per during execution. The severity of the problems se, but mainly by land banking for waste individually incurred by the people affected is disposal (ash), open pit mining, subsequent the same, and large aggregate sizes at project expansion, and other related land uses. level tend to compound these problems. 92 Resettlement Series Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 Table 2.5. Large Bank-assisted resettlement projects Country Project 7-te Sector FY People Displaced Percent India Upper Krishna lI AGR 89 220,000 11.2 India MCIP HI Irrigation AGR 86 168,000 8.6 India Andhra Pradesh Irr. n AGR 86 150,000 7.6 India GujaratMediumIrr.II AGR 84 140,000 7.1 India Sardar Sarovar AGR 85 127,000 6.5 China Shuikou I & II Hydro IEN 87/91 67,000 3.4 India Farakka II Thermal EEN 84 53,000 2.7 Argentina Yacyreta I & II IEN 80/92 50,000 2.5 Brazil Itaparica AGR 88 50,000 2.5 Indonesia Jabotabek Urban I TWU 88 28,000* 2.3 India Hyderabad Water/San. TWU 90 42,000 2.1 COte d'Ivoire Forestry Sector AGR 90 40,000 2.0 China Yantan Hydro EEN 86 40,000 2.0 * Data on this project are currently under verification. An additional 56,000 people are reported to be adversely affected in various ways. Focussing on resettlement size per project Socio-Economic Characteristics highlights a paradox in typical Bank and Borrower practice. When the Bank finances voluntary settlement operations, much smaller The people displaced population sizes are sufficient to justify a stand- Comprehensive information on the socioeco- alone Bank-assisted project. The Bank has nomic composition of displaced populations financed stand-alone voluntary settlement and their sustenance strategies is lacking. The projects for as few as 5,000-6,000 people. Even majority of the displaced are rural and poor the largest voluntary settlement operations because new projects are brought to the most were smaller in terms of the number of relc- under-developed, poorest areas, where cated people than the largest involuntary infrastructure is largely lacking and where resettlement operations. However, in the case land and political costs are lowest. For of involuntary resettlement, despite the enor- example, in Thailand's Third Power project mous size of the population to be resettled in area, per capita incomes of the resettlers are some projects, these operations are treated as less than one-third the national average. The components which are subsidiary to the main remote locations of many dam sites are often infrastructural content of the project. inhabited by indigenous people, ethnic Environment Department 93 Resettlement and Development Table 2.6. Distribution of the resettlement portfolio by size of displacement Range of people displaced Projects with Resettlement People Displaced Number Percentage Number Percentage 100,001-200,000 5 3.4 806,000 41.1 40,001-100,000 6 4.1 307,000 15.6 10,001-40,000 27 18.5 591,000 30.1 1,001-10,000 58 39.7 243,000 12.4 501-1,000 12 8.2 10,000 0.5 0-500 38 26.0 6,000 0.3 TOTAL 146 100 1,963,000 100 minorities, or pastoral groups, which ex- vators with only customary tenure, suffer more plains why issues pertaining to tribal and from displacement because domestic policies cultural differences are so prominent in rarely provide them with adequate compensa- resettlement. Half of the 16,000 persons tion and rehabilitation. displaced by India's Upper Indravati project, for instance, are tribal people, as are more Women may experience the adverse conse- than half of the people affected by the quences of resettlement more strongly than Narmada dam and canal projects. The Miao men. First and foremost, this is because and Li ethnic minorities represent the major- compensation payments are usually paid only ity of the 24,000 people the Daguangba to the heads of households, converting the reservoir in China will displace. collective assets of the family to cash in male hands, and leaving women and children at In urban areas the demographic and occupa- higher risk of deprivation. Female-headed tional composition of affected people is differ- households, which in some cases range from ent. People to be relocated are employed in 20-40 percent of the affected households, suffer industry and services. Small business people most from such exclusionary policies, as in the such as shopkeepers, artisans, food-stall Guatemala Chixoy project. In urban areas owners and vendors are a much larger propor- being upgraded there is evidence that dis- tion than in rural areas. But projects consid- placed women are harder hit by resettlement ered "urban" also displace farmers and other than men since they are more likely to earn rural inhabitants whenever drinking water their living from small businesses located at or reservoirs or peri-urban infrastructure is near their residences. Women may also be financed. Since the people in urban projects are affected disproportionately in rural areas since socially and culturally different from those in they are often more dependent on common rural projects, and depend on different income property resources. For example, gardens may sources, the trend toward more urban displace- more frequently be on unregistered land than ment is placing new and different demands on fields owned by men. In semi-arid regions of those responsible for resettlement programs. In India, 91-100 percent of firewood, 66-84 percent general, landless laborers, tenants, urban of domestic fuel, and 69-80 percent of grazing squatters (some of whom may have been needs of the poor come from common proper- residents for a generation or more), and culti- ties.3 We return to these points in Chapter 4 94 Resettlement Series Resettlement in Bank Operations: 1986-1993 during the discussion of income restoration estimate is about 135,000 people (see Table 2.7). and impoverishment risks. This early assessment allows better advance preparation and allocation of staff resources. Project beneficiaries Projects beusinefdisplaciar nt have many t'nies A significant amount of the estimated displace- Projects causing displacement have many times ment announced by Borrowers in their project more beneficiaries than victims. Urban conn- proposals may still be reduced or avoided, muters, slum dwellers, farmers with non- however. The earlier the recognition of poten- irrigated lands, industries and their employees, tial involuntary resettlement, the more possible and cities as a whole may all gain significanit it is to consider alternatives that reduce or advantages from projects that entail resettling eliminate the need to displace people. For people. In the large Bank-assisted irrigation example, Pakistan Sindh Special Development projects in India, 15 families benefit for each project was able to reduce the number of family displaced (India Irrigation Sector people to be displaced in the first phase of the Review, 1991), while the ratio is even higher in project from 40,000 to less than 1000 (see TWU projects. Chapter 3, para. 24). Future Trends Distribution Regional and sectoral distributions predicted Lending trends for the coming years are similar to those for the Investment in major infrastructure remains' active portfolio, although energy and agricul- essential in promoting equitable development tural projects may register some decline rela- (see World Development Report, forthcoming, tive to urban projects. 1994). So too, rearranging human settlement patterns - voluntarily and involuntarily -- The Bank's Program in Context will remain a constant companion of develop- ment in the context of urban population growth There are no official statistics on how many and competing demands for land, water, and people are displaced world-wide outside Bank- forests. In light of this, the number of opera- assisted projects. In the world as in Bank- tions involving resettlement is likely to be assisted projects, the two principal causes of approximately the same or to increase in the resettlement are dams and urban development. coming years despite deliberate efforts made World-wide construction of high dams (above by the Bank to reduce the size of proposed 15 meters) has averaged about 300 new dams displacements. Preliminary estimates of per year during the early 1990s. By compari- displacement from all projects to be approved son, the construction of Bank-financed new in FY94 were about 437,000 people; in FY95- dams averaged 18 per year during 1980-1985 FY96 the preliminary, and still incomplete, but has decreased to 6 new dams per year during 1986-1993, and is thus only 2 percent of Table 2.7. Projected entry of projects the global total. Similarly the Bank's share of into the resettlement portfolio people displaced in dam projects accounts for only 3 percent of world-wide resettlement caused by dams: that is approximately 100,000 Fiscal Year No. of Projects People Affected people per year out of a global total estimated 1994 31 437,000 at over 4 million. Preliminary estimates for the next three years remain at 6 new Bank-assisted 1995 45 115,000 dams per year. 1996 18 20,000 Urban displacement in developing countries is estimated to be approximately 6 million people Environment Department Resettlement and Development per year. By comparison, since 1988 the Bank small number compared to various estimates has approved projects each year that are ranging from 16-21 million people relocated in expected to displace a total of approximately India from 1951 to 1990. Outside India and 85,000 people over the lifetime of the projects. China the Bank's role diminishes sharply. In The Bank's share is about 1.4 percent of the Turkey, ranking second in the world with over developing countries' totaL 150 dams under construction', the Bank is involved in only 4 dams, none of them displac- Even in regions and countries where resettle- ing more than 20,000 people. The Bank is ment under Bank-financed projects is particu- currently financing only one or two darns in larly high, such as in India and China, the each of fourteen other countries. No more than Bank's share of people displaced is dwarfed by 50,000 people are being displaced by Bank- involuntary resettlement under projects with- financed dams in any of these fourteen other out Bank intervention and, typically, with much countries. less mitigation. In China, transportation, urban, and water resource projects displaced Notes: an estimated 31.5 million people between 1950 l The Data Bank created for this review, if maintained, and 1989.4 China built 523 dams a year from could ensure full recording and monitoring in the 1951-1982, and was still starting construction future. on 150 dams a year in the early 1990s.5 By 2 A special, in-depth study on involuntary resettle- since 1980the Bank hs financedment in all the Bank-assisted projects in India is comparison, since 1980 re Bank has financed rently being a prepared by the India Country the construction of 7 dams in China displacing Department. a total of 167,000 people. Furthermore, the 3 Debra Sequeira, Gender and Resettlement: Impacts and Bank has not financed the Chinese dams with Implications, draft, December 1993. the largest displacements: Sanmenxia (319,000), 4 China and Mongolia Country Department, China Involuntary Resettlement, June 8,1993, p.2. - Danjiangkou (383,000), and now Three Gorges 5 International Commission on Large Dams, World (1.1 million). Register of Dams, 1988, p.11; and 'International Commission on Large Dams Survey of Dams Under The Bank has played a relatively larger role in Construction in 1991", Water Power and Dam India. Bank-assisted active projects will tIbid o displace over 900,000 people, but this is still a 96 Resettlement Series 3. Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement Having identified the composition of the ence, and are aimed at overcoming perceived Bank's resettlement portfolio, the review now problems. answers the key questions on performance. Three questions are asked: Closing this kind of "development gap" is precisely the challenge at hand in resettlement. * First, what has been the impact of the Bank Examining performance in this review means resettlement policy on the resettlement examining how, step by step, this gap becomes policies of Borrower countries? narrower in Bank-assisted operations. Like any - Second, what has been the Bank's perfor- other development gap, it cannot be closed mance in implementing the first principle overnight, byfiat. Lifting up averages on a wide of its policy - to avoid or reduce displace- front, in many countries, is a very complex process, ment magnitude whenever feasible? and changing entrenched bad practices takes time. - Third, to what extent has the Bank accom- Every step on this difficult road is one more plished its policy goal of restoring step away from the unacceptable displacement resettlers' incomes? practices of the past. Such practices, unfortu- nately, continue to prevail in much of the The first two questions are addressed in this displacement taking place currently in many chapter. The following chapter is dedicated to developing countries - and not only in the the third question. small share of infrastructure projects financed by the World Bank. This is why the Bank's Narrowing the "development gap" effort to promote an improved policy for Narrowing resettlement in borrowing countries is ulti- As the Bank's policy sets new standards - mately even more consequential than the standards that are above routine practice in assistance provided by the Bank to individual resettlement - a "development gap" is cre- resettlement components. The overall resettle- ated, between the new standard and the old. ment record in many developing countries, as Such "gaps" appear always when new policies are documented by an expanding volume of social formulated in any domain, policies that set science research, provides a sobering context challenging objectives intended to improve! for discussing the progress and problems prior practice and to induce change and identified by the present review. development. For the Bank, setting more exacting norms for the operations it assists, Main Findings including resettlement operations, is intrinsic to its role and responsibilities as a development The Task Force has found that, during 1986- institution. However, the norms and objectives 1993, the Bank's resettlement policy has made the Bank has set for resettlement operations are considerable progress among Borrowers, and not arbitrary or subjective: they codify good that it has provided increased protection to the practice, are based on social research, embody interests and entitlements of resettlers. The lessons learned the hard way from past experi- main findings are: Environment Department Resettlement and Development * Changing policy environments. The ing, policy dialogues and agreements should explicit adoption by a number of Borrowers precede Bank financial support to prcaects of new domestic policies and legal frame- that entail population displacements. works for resettlement, or the improvement of existing frameworks, has been one of the The Bank's Impact on Resettlement principal results of the Bank's capacity Polices building work and policy dialogues with Borrowers during 1986-1993. By enacting guidelines at the national or sectoral level, National Policies the Borrower assumes political and institu- tional responsibility for sound resettlement, Enacting policy frameworks for resettlement is and not only for compensating the losses pivotal for expanding Borrowers' institutional caused by expropriation. capacity. The review ascertained that the Bank intensified its catalytic efforts, particularly after * Policy modifies performance. There is a 1986, in working with both Borrowers and clear association between resettlement donors for expanding the adoption of policy performance and the presence or absence of principles regarding resettlement. Sustained a domestic policy and organizational frame- changes in Borrowers' planning approaches to works on resettlement. Perfornance is resettlement can hardly be promoted by the strongly country-dependent, rather than Bank through projects alone, if the proposed strictly project-dependent. The Task Force standards and entitlements for affected people has concluded that the Bank has been far are not based in domestic policy and law. As more effective, has reached a broader the Bank's general counsel has concluded, sectoral-scale impact, and actual operations "lessons derived from Bank-assisted projects have gained more when the Bank succeeded in involving resettlement [show] that in many this policy-adoption effort than when the countries the national legal framework of Bank's efforts were confined to legal resettlement operations is incomplete.... Re- agreements for individual projects only. In settlement legal issues [are treated] as a subset turn, the obligations laid down in indi- of property and expropriation law. For various vidual loan legal agreements, and the reasons, these national laws do not provide a agreed upon "project policy", have some- fully adequate framework for development- times formed the basis for discussing and oriented resettlement.... New legislation often improving broader domestic policy and must be introduced, or existing laws must be legal frameworks. modified, in order to plan and carry out involuntary resettlement adequately."' There- * Displacement can be reduced. In a number fore, the Bank has recommended policy reforn of projects the scale of displacement was in this area to all Borrowers whose projects entail considerably reduced, and sometimes involuntary resettlement. In turn, the Bank has displacement was avoided altogether, studied country policies and approaches and through policy-driven technical redesign of has learned from national experiences with civil works. effective provisions for resettlement. * Unused potential. There is considerable Encouraging policy reform is part of a broader room to expand and elevate vigorously the Bank effort to foster local institutional capacity, Bank's efforts for policy reform, particularly defined as synergy between policies, organizations, with countries with large resettlement portfo- and resources. To achieve such reform, the Bank lios. As the number of growing economies has initiated: policy dialogues on resettlement with both high demographic pressure and with some Borrowers; negotiations on resettle- multiple resettlement operations is expand- ment strategies and legal issues as part of 98 Resettlement Series Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement sector lending and studies; as well as technical Grande) because of their displacement discussions and legal work in the context of effects. That would have required forcibly project preparation and appraisal. During the removing between 154,000-188,000 period under review, the Bank also published people; these projects are to be restudied. its internal resettlement guidelines for the first time.2 In a collective letter to the Bank's * China. Initial policy guidelines and legal President, the largest international NGOs provisions for resettlement were developed saluted the publication of the Bank's policy and in China independent of the Bank's guide- its content. lines. Since the mid-1980s, however, there were several rounds of policy dialogues The policy environments surrounding develop- with the Bank, particularly over China's ment-caused resettlement have changed water resources sector. In the case of considerably over the last six years. Unprec- reservoir resettlement, Bank involvement edented progress has been achieved in the appears to have significantly helped in the policies of several developing countries and improvement of Chinese policy guidelines, international agencies. These changes were, in legal provisions, planning practices, and part, a result of the Bank's policy influence, as resettlement performance. In turn, the well as a consequence of public opinion demands, of Bank has learned from the effective policy resistance to displacement by affected people, and of approaches used in China in the last strong advocacy by many NGOs. Several devel- decade and their implementation. oping countries have recently adopted explicit policy or legal frameworks defining their own * India - Gujarat State. In the context of commitment to income restoration, resettlers' the major problems affecting the implemen- eligibility for compensation and other entitle- tation of the Narmada Sardar Sarovar ments, and to the consultation of affected projects, extensive negotiations between the people: Bank and the Government of Gujarat, India, have resulted in significant improve- @ Brazil. Resettlement guidelines very ments in the state's legal regulations for similar to the Bank's guidelines were resettlement, formally granting certain developed in 1990 for Brazil's power sector important entitlements to displaced people. by Electrobras, jointly with major power These entitlements exceed the provisions of sector companies. Bank-Borrower work to the Narmada Tribunal for Gujarat oustees. prepare Brazil's power sector loan resulted, However, the improved regulations are inter alia, in guidelines aimed at fully project specific and should be extended to internalizing the costs of resettlement and similar on-going projects in Gujarat state, reducing its magnitude; these were intro- but this has not yet happened. duced in the sector's second Environrmental Master Plan (1990) and in subsequent * Colombia. Country-wide policy guidelines expansion plans. The advantage of the for resettlement in the power sector were sectoral rather than the piecemeal project adopted in 1990. The dialogue between the approach appears obvious: Brazil's new Bank and the Borrower during a sector loan guidelines are valid for all the new hydro- preparation, and the process which was electric plants (about 36 in a ten-year followed by Colombia's power utilities, led period), much more than the two or three to the generation of resettleinent guidelines which might have been cofinanced by the with clear Borrower ownership (see Bank. Brazil's central power planning box 3.1). group excluded from the ten-year expan- sion plan four dam construction projects * The Philippines. One of the very few in the (Santa Isabel, Belem, Pedra Branca and Mlha world policies on urban resettlement was Environment Department 99 Resettlement and Development Box 3.1. Creating and affirming policy ownership: Colombia The Bank has worked with Colombia's energy sector to revise the country's resettlement norms to focus on restoring the economic and social basis of those displaced. The context for this sectoral policy dialogue was the preparation of the 1988 electric power sector loan. At the Bank's suggestion, an interagency working group was created to prepare an environmental and social policy framework for the sector. The working group (CASEC) consisted of representatives of power utilities, company managers, social scien- tists, and planners, as well as the Ministry of Mines and Energy and the National Environment and Natural Resources Department. The working group had three tasks: To develop a set of resettlement guidelines, explaining the policy objectives for all projects that entail displacement and other adverse impacts. To prepare terms of reference keyed to the sector's project cycle, outlining what kind of resettlement planning information had to be available at each stage of project development. To make a sector-wide assessment of the needs of professional social staff for resettlement work, and of training needs in each utility. The policy draft developed by CASEC went beyond analyzing the impacts of resettlement within indi- vidual projects, include methodologies for resettlement issues across the entire power sector. The legal agreement with the Bank required formalizing the sector's policy, and this policy was issued in 1990. For the first time the energy sector had spelled out explicit criteria, procedures and objectives for projects involving displacement and resettlement. The 1988 World Bank loan also included funding to strengthen the sector's environmental and social planning capabilities. Based on an internal diagnosis of likely resettlement needs, each utility created a social and envirornmental wing, with professionally trained staff. issued in the Philippines as the Urban categories of project affected people, Development and Housing Act of 1992, emphasizes the principle of income im- which puts restrictions on displacement provement or at least restoration, and and mandates participation and consultation. guarantees specific entitlements to each category of displaced individuals as well as Turkey. One of the few developing coun- to communities, entitlements that were not tries having a clear law for regulating provided for in displacements caused by resettlement, Turkey has welcomed policy earlier NTPC projects. discussions with the Bank and has im- proved its legal provisions. Because of this Fighting policy vacuums legal framework and recent improvements The Bank's concem for countries adopting their in its application, the gover.nent can own guidelines results from learning the hard allocate substantial financial resources to way that the absence of policy is a policy by resettlement, including supplemental default. The fact that a number of borrowing allocations for corrective actions initiated countries have not adopted strict guidelines for under this review (see Chapter 7). displacement reflects the assumption that there is no need for such a policy or that resettlement India. Following negotiations with the projects should not be done differently from the Bank, in May 1993 India's National Ther- past. Some borrowing agencies prefer to mal Power Corporation (NTPC) adopted a maintain a policy vacuum rather than issue Resettlement and Rehabilitation Policy for binding norms and legal strictures. In effect, all its operations, an important sectoral * * l precedent.3 The policy clearly defines all some agencies are aggressive y reluctant to formulate or accept public sector guidelines for 100 Resettlement Series Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement activities that they know are going to be vacuums and the beneficial impact of policy problematic, difficult, or controversial; the niet driven restrictions (see next chapter, box 4.4) result of such an anachronic posture and mind- set is that the interests of the displaced people, The adoption of sound national or sectoral and of development in a broader sense, are resettlement guidelines in a gradually increas- negatively affected. Avoiding formal policy ing number of borrowing countries extends the commitments may leave more operational impact of the Bank's policy beyond the projects flexibility in the short term, but at the expense of the Bank is financing directly, helping to higher long term costs, externalized to others, contain unnecessary impoverishment on a Low level policy responses to such issues are an wider scale (see box 3.2). For example, over 97 enduring cause of poor performance. percent of the high dams constructed world- wide in the last decade have been built without Legal vacuums and absence of policy for World Bank financing. Because dam reservoirs resettlement result sometimes in the use of are - and are likely to remain - the single violent displacement procedures, without dlue largest cause of displacement, the enactment of recognition and protection of the basic rights domestic sectoral resettlement policies can and entitlements of those uprooted. The Bank have positive effects for a population far larger has steadily and effectively opposed such than under Bank financed projects. practices as unacceptable, and prevented them from occurring in Bank-assisted projects. A The Bank can decline altogether project propos- comparison of two projects in the same secitor als that entail displacement, particularly where but in two different countries, one not assisted country policies do not yet exist. However, this by the Bank and another financed by the Benk, approach will leave important projects in reveals the perverse consequences of policy, crucial sectors without support. If those Box 3.2. Bank impact on non-Bank financed works: flood control in a river basin The impact of Bank resettlement policy on programs that are not financed by the Bank is illustrated by China's Taihu Basin Flood Control project (FY93). Major floods caused extensive damage in the Taihu basin, and the high risk of reoccurrence prompted a basin- wide plan consisting of ten work components along several rivers in the basin. The program requires perma- nent land acquisition of some 46,000 mu (equal to 3,068 hectares), temporary land acquisition of some 74,000 mu (4,936 hectares), affecting more than 46,000 persons whose lands or houses will be lost. The basin-wide civil works program consists of ten independent but related components. Four of these, the costliest and most important ones, are financed by the Bank and have resettlement and rehabilitation plans consistent with Bank policy. At project appraisal and negotiation the Bank asked for, and the Borrower agreed to, a linkage arrangement: namely, that the six domestically funded components apply the same approach for land compensation and population resettlement as the four components financed by the Bank. The basic principle agreed for all ten compon,ents is that: No decrease in income shall be incurred by the local inhabitants after land acquisition and relocation existing standard of income shall be maintained with opportunities for future enhancements" (SAR, Taihu Basin Flood Control Project: 83). Altogether, the ten project components in the Taihu Basin will provide flood protection for more than 20 million people and 1.6 million hectares of farmland, an area that includes 25 counties and five cities. Environment Department 101 Resettlement and Development projects are indeed justified on solid develop- requires making resettlement a development ment grounds, they would eventually be opportunity and improving resettlers' liveli- undertaken anyway, without Bank assistance, hood after relocation. without a country resettlement policy in place, and without an agreed project framework for The benefits of enacting policy are also resettlement. The ultimate purpose of large obvious in that it avoids marginalization of infrastructure projects for power generation, resettlement to the weakest agencies, defining irrigation, or urbanization is to overcome instead clear institutional responsibilities for under-development and improve the quality of both the central government and the entities life of large numbers of people. Ensuring that at regional or local levels. In the case of such projects protect as well the interests of China, for instance, national resettlement law those to be resettled is more beneficial than typically establishes general principles; it bypassing such projects altogether. Govern- leaves more detailed regulation to the sector, ment officials of several developing countries, and makes provincial and local administra- as well as some NGOs otherwise critical of the tion accountable for adjustments and execu- Bank, have emphasized that the Bank's policy tion. With some limited differences, Chinese has positively influenced, and can further influ- law and regulations now generally converge ence, the development of improved domestic with the Bank's policy directives on resettle- policy frameworks and practices. But for nations, ment. The tangible benefits to China from as for the Bank, progress in adopting policy needs to enacting an encompassing domestic policy befollowed by systematic implementation. and legal framework are major improvements in resettlement performance compared to the Consequences of policy reform past. The case of China demonstrates that its im- proved on-the-ground performance achieved in Impact on Other International the last decade is directly associated with the Policies major changes introduced in its national policies and legal environment surrounding In addition to recent changes in domestic resettlement. The Bank's lending to China has policies on resettlement, the Bank has been been greatly facilitated by China's reform of its instrumental in promoting important policy policy framework.4 Before the late 1970s, vast changes at the international level. A large displacements caused by high dams in China number of multilateral and bilateral donors resulted in the disastrous impoverishment of have very recently prepared or adopted re- many people and in serious social and political settlement guidelines similar to the Bank's for instability. At that time, China lacked a legal or the projects they support: policy framework for resettlement: the results were tragic displacement operations, such as * The Inter-American Development Bank those from the Sanmenxia and Danjiangkou adopted an internal set of resettlement dams reservoirs in the 1960s and 1970s. To guidelines in 1990. correct this, a series of laws and regulations were adopted and refined in steady succession * The Asian Development Bank prepared - in 1978, 1982, 1985, 1988, 1991, and 1992- and published detailed guidelines for either with national applicability or tailored to resettlement congruent with the World specific investment sectors such as water, Bank's guidelines in 1992, and is consider- transport, industry, and urban. These regula- ing adopting them formally for the projects tions apply to all types of resettlement projects it finances.' and, taken together, protect the living stan- dards of those affected and affirm the principle of * The Overseas Development Administration "resettlement with development". This principle (UK) has adopted guidelines that essen- 102 Resettlement Series Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement tially are the same as the Bank's. ODA also For example, Indonesia issued a new decree on proposed that within the OECD all bilateral land acquisition in 1993, emphasizing consulta- donors formally institute similar guidelines tions with affected people, but restoration of for their aid agencies. living standards is not one of the goals of the new decree.' While regulations for land * Japan's International Cooperation Agency acquisition have been improved in Korea, (JICA) is currently preparing its own restoration of living standards for displaced technical guidelines for resettlement, to people is not an explicit policy objective; the which the Bank has contributed advisory review has found that there remain "some assistance. significant differences between Bank and Korean policies"8. The degree of receptivity or * During 1989-1990, the World Bank was opposition to Bank proposed policy guidelines invited to provide support to the OEC) in varies among different executing agencies in preparing resettlement guidelines for the same sector, because the sector itself does bilateral aid agencies congruent with thLe not have an unified approach. One example in Bank's guidelines. In 1991 the develop- Indonesia (box 3.3) shows that the rejection or ment ministers of all 23 OECD countries acceptance of Bank guidelines by local agencies have sanctioned and enacted uniform results in widely different consequences for the resettlement guidelines for their countries' affected population. aid agencies.6 Similarly, the resettlement report of the South The concerted effort of many international Asia region emphasized that "...the absence of agencies for promoting better resettlement national resettlement policies in countries like approaches will help narrow the gap between Pakistan, Nepal, and India has been a key new sound standards and entrenched practices factor in preventing a coordinated approach to in many countries in the past. Where bad planning resettlement." In India, where many standards are tolerated in displacements taiking resettlement operations in both non-Bank and place outside Bank-assisted programs, includ- Bank-assisted projects have failed to rehabili- ing some projects that receive intemational] aid tate a proportion of the displaced people, no financing, they slow down progress under federal legislation or policy statement defines Bank-financed projects as well. This is why all the country's general resettlement norms; Covernments and multilateral and bilateral resettlement is being regarded as a state, not a development assistance institutions must federal matter. In turn, however, most Indian pursue similar policies and approaches, if ithere states still lack state-level resettlement policies; is to be hope of improving the livelihood of they use expropriation laws, which provide for resettlers. compensation only but do not provide for socio-economic rehabilitation. This has often Difficulties in Policy Reform strongly hampered performance. Dialogue between the Bank and borrowing state govern- Notwithstanding such significant progress, the ments, with some notable exceptions, has still Bank has also encountered serious difficulties in to yield significant results. In several Bank- dialogues with some Borrowers about adopting assisted irrigation projects causing displace- domestic resettlement regulations. Advances in ments in Orissa, the state government commit- instituting policy are always subject to various ted to issue a resettlement policy, yet during a domestic factors - including financal, instiltu- four to five year period the Bank supervision tional, and land-scarcity difficulties that Borrow- missions were told that a "draft is still under ers themselves are facing - and many comrnit- preparation." In Karnataka, a state resettle- ments made by Borrowers are still to be met. ment policy regarded by the Bank as crucial for Environment Department 103 Resettlement and Development Box 3.3. Does Bank involvement make a difference to displaced people? The protection of a Bank-assisted project consistent with Bank policy makes a major difference. One case is descnbed below: two projects, the same country, the same sector, yet two approaches and two totally different outcomes. In 1990, the appraisal mission for the Indonesia-Jabotabek II project leamed that about 2800 people in 500 "squatter" families living by a river channel scheduled for widening were to be displaced. Com- pensation would have provided Rps. 60,000 (about U.S. $35) per household. Since the agency (DIG) was reluctant to offer more by way of a resettlement package, and Bank staff argued that the Borrower's solution was clearly not in keeping with Bank policy and with improving livelihoods, the DKI took out the specific components entailing forced displacement from the Bank-financed project, in order to execute these components on its own, without Bank participation. This outcome did nothing to help the affected people resettle adequately. In contrast, under the same type of project in the same country (Semarang Drainage Improvement Program 34 Ln 2408), a component to widen river channels to improve water flow was part of the Bank-assisted project. It entailed the displacement of 13,000 people (2,230 families) of whom only 113 families had land certification. About 1,900 families were eventually compelled to relocate. However, the Bank's appraisal mission had successfully negotiated the application of Bank policy to the Semarang project. As a result, in addition to cash compensation, the municipal government released three areas of "official land" for resettlement, and provided the resettlers with serviced plots and infrastructure on the outskirts of Semarang. Regardless of their prior tenurial status, the former "squatters" were given title to the new houseplots 3/4 a direct increase in their resources compared to large scale projects was agreed upon at project operate within a dual system of modem and inception, but nevertheless it has not been customary law for lands. Under the Cote finally signed and enacted six years after d'lvoire Forestry project, for example, the project start. Recently, India informed the Bank govemrnment committed to issuing a formal that some federal ministries are drafting policy during the project's first year, 1989, but guidelines for resettlement and rehabilitation, five successive deadlines and commitments but no such guidelines have yet been issued.10 were not met by the Borrower. The draft policy In the meantime, a group of Indian NGOs is still awaiting government ratification. proposed and circulated a draft national policy for resettlement. There is growing positive Many engineering consulting firms, responsible recognition in India that a shift toward a full- for the technical design of major infrastructure fledged socio-economic approach to resettle- projects worldwide, routinely display oblivi- ment issues, rather than an "eminent-domain" ousness to the adverse social implications of approach, is necessary and must be formally the designs they propose, sheltered by the instituted. absence of policy or legal demands in the client countries. Too often their feasibility studies An independent legal survey of country display an "engineering bias" and underestimation policies and legislation across Africa has found of social-cultural variables, an approach that that in sub-Saharan Africa no country has a backfires later during project execution. The resettlement policy or legal framework,;" this studies prepared by such firms tend to end up finding is confirmed by the Africa region's with misleading budgets whenever the real, report on resettlement."2 The issue is compli- full costs of displacement and resettlement are cated by the fact that in Africa most countries omitted. Insufficient attention in many such 104 Resettlement Series Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement studies is given to integrating resettlement into Reducing Displacements in Projects a river basin planning perspective. The lesson from progress to date in creating pocy Project-level technical alternatives environments conducive to improved resettlement is During 1986-1993, the Bank has significantly to persevere. The Bank should carry out this, improved its performance in implementing the effort primarily through policy and legal dialogue first principle of the resettlement policy: to with its Borrowers, not just through imposing avoid resettlement or reduce its magnitude project conditionality. The approach to policy whenever feasible. To achieve this, Bank work dialogue with Borrowers has not been the same paid more attention to the technical parameters in all the relevant Country Departments of the of proposed displacements. Bank. In some cases, and depending on country-specific contexts, more staff time and The 1986 review found that technical optimiza- effort was invested in squeezing out incremen- tion studies for alternative designs that would tal piecemeal improvements from project avoid resettlement were seldom undertaken. executing agencies rather than in negotiating By comparison, in the last several years the agreements on basic issues of vision and policy concern for avoiding or reducing resettlement reform at political decision-making levels. This is increasing in the Bank's work culture, when lesson of the present review is particularly the likelihood of displacement is identified important not only for the current country early. Important lessons about creative, inno- portfolios with many resettlement operations. vative ways of reducing displacement have It is also strongly relevant to future Bank been learned (box 3.4). However, project lending to countries with growing economines, proposals and feasibility studies, many pre- high infrastructural needs, and high demo- pared by respected consulting firms, are too graphic pressures - such as Pakistan, often too permissive about displacements. The Bangladesh, Vietnam and Indonesia - which Bank has declined financing for some civil will experience resettlement increases in their works and has worked with Borrowers to find industrialization and urbanization programs. economically viable trade-offs or engineering altematives that cause less displacement. One of the most important findings of this review is that addressing the plight of the * Indonesia. Redesign of the Saguling Dam many millions of people being displaced by engineering proposal lowered the dam public or private sector programs through height by five meters, reducing displace- better policies on resettlement (which wou]d ment from 90,000 to 55,000 people, with apply to both Bank-funded and non-Bank only a small loss in generating capacity. funded projects) constitutes a key premise for improving the performance of the Bank's * Thailand. Resiting the Pak Mun Dam to a resettlement portfolio. Better resettlement less populated location and lowering its legislation is part of better governance. While height has reduced displacement from each project is an opportunity to develop a about 20,000 people to about 5,000. "project policy" jointly with the Borrower and confirmed in legal loan and credit agreements,13 * Ecuador. Redesign of canal layouts in the the Bank should also systematically provide Guayas Flood Control project has elimi- assistance to Borrowers interested in tailoring nated the need to displace any people their broader policy environments to the under this project. demands of development and in strengthening their institutional capacity for dealing with * China. Resiting the main pipeline in the displacements and other socially adverse effects. Shanghai Sewerage project and using Enviromnent Department 105 Resettlement and Development Box 3A. Avoiding displacement In Brazil's arid northeast states of Ceara, Bahia, and Piaui, the Bank is assisting the Irrigation I Project that will provide irrigation of 51,700 hectares and the settlement of about 5,376 farmers with medium and small holdings. The project provides sprinkler irrigation, electricity, and extension services, in addition to land title for small farmers. The borrower's original design called for acquiring land for project works currently belonging to cattle ranchers, smallholders, squatters, and share croppers. This land was to be reallocated to new settlers, thereby displacing about 1,170 families (some 6,500 people) from land and current employ- ment. In exchange for expropriation of their land, the displaced families were to be provided new irri- gated lands in distant new agricultural communities (Agrovillas). After the project started, the Bank's Task Manager for the project convinced his country counterparts that it was possible to replace forced displacement with voluntary land exchange by redesigning the approach and reallocating lands to the people slated for relocation close to their present homes. The project agency agreed to the new approach, even though the project was already underway. Detailed redesign work resulted in making six-to-eight hectare irrigated plots available to 190 affected small farmers who were entitled to get larger plots, and two-to-four-hectare irrigated plots to the other 982 affected families, in areas adjacent to their homes. This obviated the need for displacement. tunnels rather than surface channels for instance, when phase one of the Karnataka pipes reduced anticipated resettlement of Irrigation project14 was approved in 1978, *more than 8,000 people by half. In other before the Bank's policy was adopted, the ongoing projects, such changes have been Borrower indicated a displacement of 20,000 made even after project appraisal: in the people, At the start of phase two, in 1987, it Beiliugang Thermal project transmnission appeared that more than 220,000 people faced line corridors were altered, reducing displacement, at an enormously increased displacement from 1,500 to 300 people; in project cost. By that time, however, dam Zouxian Thermal, resettlement was re- construction was well under way. A much duced from 200 families to only 5; in the better resettlement plan was prepared with the Taihu Basin project, redesign of flood dikes support of an experienced non-governmental reduced displacement by 1,800 people organization, MYRADA, this time at the Bank's below the initial estimate. steady insistence. But whether or not the Bank would have financed this investment had the * Pakistan. Bank dialogue with the govern- true size of displacement been reflected cor- ment led to the redesign of the Left Bank rectly in the initial cost-benefit studies, is not Outfall project, one of the world's largest clear. In most cases projects with resettlement drainage operations, that reduced displace- can tolerate the increases in cost estimates ment by half (about 5,000 people). needed to reflect true resettlement scale and investment costs. However, it is likely that in Reducing the scale of resettlement depehds on some particular cases projects would not have having accurate information and analysis of the been least-cost investments had full population implications of displacement early in project data and resettlement costs been factored into design. When such information is not accurate the economic and financial analysis. Costing the opposite occurs: the number of would-be resettlement accurately in the future will resettlers "increases" after project start, as a encourage more strenuous searches for techni- result of massive initial underestimation. For cal altematives that require less displacement. 106 Resettlement Series Performance: Influencing Policy and Reducing Displacement Macro-policy deterrentsfor reducing * Second, the orientation toward downsizing displacements displacement has also yielded tangible results in a number of projects, and the Beyond engineering redesign, the potential for Bank has been able, in these cases, to avoiding or reducing displacement resides in finance altematives with less harmful improving the macro policies that guide invest'ments effects. Experience shows also that the in energy and water. Displacement occurs potentialfor minimizing population displace- mainly with dams for irrigation, energy or ment through improved engineering and potable water. Many developing countries better design alternatives is much larger than subsidize energy and water. The World Devel- previously realized, particularly in urban opment Report 1992 on Development and the development and transportation projects. Environment found that prevailing electricity This type of social optimization of prices represent, on average, only about 30 infrastructural investments must be firmly percent of the costs of supply. If consumeis pursued by the Bank and its Borrowers in paid the long run marginal cost of supply, they the future. would likely use some 20 percent less electric- ity; if less energy is demanded, fewer commu- Notes: nities would be dislocated. To some extent, the problem of displacement is thus a problem of l Ibrahim FEI. Shihata, "Involuntary Resettlement in disorted pricigoene rs and wae itl. oe World Bank Financed Projects", in The World Bank in a distorted priwg ol energy anp water in tue Changing World, The Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff developing world. Although pricing issues Publishers, 1991, p. 181. may seem removed from the social dynamics of 2 InvoluntaryResettlement in Development Projects. Policy population relocation, changes in broad pricing Guidelinesfor World Bank Financed Projects,World Bank poplaio * * * ra Technical Paper No. 80, Washington, DC, 1988. (In policies can exercise some beneficial deterrent addition to the Bank's publication in English, French and effect on displacements. The Bank's policy for Spanish, the paper was independently translated and the electric power sector pursues such changes published in China, Indonesia, and recently in Turkey). by promoting realistic pricing for energy: this 3 National Thermal Power Corporation (NTPC). Rehabilita- policy supports both the development of new tion and Resettlement Policy, June 4,1993. (See World policy ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Bank Staff Appraisal Report, India - NTPC Power energy sources and increased investments by Generation Project, Annex 2.4, Appendix 3, June 1993). developing countries in strategies for dematid 4 East Asia Region, Report on Resettlementfor the management." By following strategies for Bankwide Resettlemnent Review, December1993. demrand management for the outputs from S Asian Development Bank, GuidelinesforSocial Analysis projects that would cause resettlement, develop- of Development Projects, March 1991, p. 47. projects that would cause resettlement, develop- r Development Assistance Committee, GuidelinesforAid ing countries can reduce displacements as well. Agencies on Involuntary Displacements and Resettlement in Development Projects, Paris: OECD, 1992. Summing up the answers to the two key 7 Another Indonesian law, issued in 1961, provides more Summing ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~explicit criteria for 'fair" compensation. It specifies questions asked at the start of this chapter, it that compensation must allow former owner/tenants appears that: to continue their productive activities at the same "economic level" as prior to expropriation. First, throughout the period under review, s East Asia Region, Report on Resettlementfor the the adequacy and effectiveness of the Bankwide Resettlement Review. Bank's orientation to promotg policy 9 Asia Technical Department, South Asia Region Report on Resettlementfor the Bankwide Resettlement Review. reform in resettlement has been fully '- South Asia Region, Report on Resettlementfor the confirmed by the positive results achieved. Bankwide Resettlement Review, November1993. The impact on domestic and international C. Okidi-Okidi, Policy and Legal Framewrk in Develop- poiisrelevant to involuntary resettle- ment-Driven Involuntary Resettlemnent in Aifrican policies relevant to irtvoluntary resettlcz Countries, Kenya: Moi University, School of Environ- ment has been strong, wide, and conse- mental Studies. The study was sponsored under a quential for practical purposes. There is grant from the government of the Netherlands. See considerable room and need to continue this also, H.W.O. Okoth-Ogendo, Tenants ofthe Crown: in the following years. Ewlution of Agrarian Law and Institutions in Kenya, effort m tne lollowing years. Nairobi, 1991. Environmnent Department 107 Resettlement and Development 12 Africa Technical Department, Report on Resettlementfor '5 The World Bank's Role in the Ekltric Power Sector- the Bankwide Resettlement Review. Policiesfor Effective Institutional, Regulatory, and 13 Legal Department, Legal Issues in Involuntary Resettk- Financil Reform, a World Bank Policy paper, and ment, draft, November 1993. Energy Efficiency and Conservtion in Development u This case is carefully reviewed in the OED study, Early Countries - the World Bank's Rok, a World Bank Policy Experiences with Involuntary Resettlement. paper, Washington, DC, 1993. 108 Resettlement Series 4. Performance: Rtestoring Incomes and Livelihoods Poverty reduction is the benchmark against which very project that caused displacement, by: our performance as a development institution must moving resettlers into the newly irrigated be judged. commnand areas; helping them develop Lewis T. Preston reservoir aquaculture; favoring resettlers to exploit commercial opportunities around The ultimate test of consistency between newly constructed infrastructure; or resettlement operations and policy is the assisting them in building more durable degree to which the Bank's basic goal reestab- housing. Overall, ongoing Bank assisted lishing resettlers at an improved or at least the projects create better conditions for same level of living is achieved. Continuing resettlers than similar Bank-assisted the analysis of resettlement performance, the projects did in the past present chapter addresses the question: to what extent has the Bank accomplished its goal * Policy yields results. Where policy of restoring resettlers' income? agreements reached at the project level between the Bank and its Borrowers are Main Findings applied consistently, resettlement perfor- mance on-the-ground is usually better The Task Force has found considerable progress than in comparable operations without in Bank-assisted projects in providing dis- Bank-assistance. When guidelines and placed families with access to sufficient pro- agreed procedures for protecting ductive resources to help recreate, and some- resettlers' entitlements are incompletely times improve, lost productive systems and applied or ignored the results drop to livelihoods. The analysis of on-the-ground unsatisfactory levels. performance - based on Borrowers reports, Bank assessments, OED analyses, and the * Poverty impacts. Inadequate resettlement resettlement anthropological literature - design or implementation in a number of shows what works for good resettlement and completed projects has left many resettlers where unsatisfactory performrance results in worse off. While systematic documenta- impoverishment tion is not available for all projects com- pleted during 1986-1993, existing evidence Effective income restoration. Projects that points to unsatisfactory income restoration resettle people productively on land and in more frequently than to satisfactory out- jobs restore income more effectively, after a comes, particularly in projects completed in transition period, than projects which hand the earlier years of the period analyzed. out compensation only, without institu- Declining income among affected popula- tional assistance for resettlement. Success- tions is significant, reaching in some cases ful income restoration was achieved as much as 40 percent among populations primarily when projects enabled resettlers that were poor even before displacement. to share in the immediate benefits created by the Contraction or non-replacement of income- Envirornent Department 109 Resettlement and Development generating assets reduces the resettlers' required now, without which a significant ability to recover in a sustainable manner. number of people now to be resettled will Unsafisfactory performance in reestablish- not recover their previous income and ing resettlers at an equal or better level of livelihood levels. Such remedial work has living still persists on a wide and unaccept- been initiated under this review, is cur- able scale. Retrofitting actions have been rently ongoing, and must continue system- started in some recently identified cases atically after the review's completion. and other corrective actions will follow up after this review. * Methods for improvement. The causes of income deterioration and the review's * Mitigating risks. The risks intrinsic in findings about both the strengths and displacement occur along several lines - weaknesses in recovery strategies demand landlessness, joblessness, homelessness, substantial changes in: the way policy food insecurity, decrease in health levels, or objectives are translated into operational cultural alienation. Not all risks affect strategy and project provisions for vanous resettler groups equally, and some resettlers by Borrowers and the Bank; the vulnerable groups have higher degrees of way resettlement is co-financed by the exposure to the risks of economic and Bank; the way each resettlement project habitat displacement and to the loss of their component and its effects on people's social support networks. Increased popula- welfare, are monitored.' tion density at relocation sites often in- creases the risk of environmental degrada- Assessing Income Restoration tion and of adverse effects on hosts' access to natural resources. Understanding these Regional reports analyzed resettlement perfor- specific risks, as identified by the review, mance in terms of income restoration levels. informs policy makers and planners how The paucity of baseline information, however, impoverishment occurs and how to target in most of the projects for which QED reports projects to mitigate and eliminate such are available, and insufficient data even in nsks in future operations. Better monitor- arent PCR and OED audit reports, have ing systems have been ixitiated through limited the ability of the resettlement reports by tis review and will be expanded to pre all Bank regions to develop comparative vide the Bank with operationally usable aggregate data on the achievements or failures information about income restoration. of various countries to meet income restoration * Strategy effectiveness: land versus cash. objectives (box 4.1). The lack of adequate data The single most important strategy variable is itself a finding that points to the need to in rural resettlement is whether people are sharpen the design of rehabilitation provisions relocated on land of adequate capability as well as to improve monitoring systems. The relocted n lad ofadeqate apablltycurrent resettlement review called attention to and with clear title. In most situations, the this rma n roblem and tered th "land for land" strategy leads to results far thls isformaton proble and triggered the superior than payment of cash compensa- establishment of baseline populaefon income tion. Four technical land-related issues are during FY94 and beyond. All new projects of paramount importance for effective wtrslent comon en proved resettlement land valuation; land compen- dwng the first eight months of FY94 instituted sation; land capability; and the institutional income surveys. ability to identify and facilitate "land for land' resettlement programs. The review concluded that the shortage of * Continuing remedial work. Remedial data reflects something deeper than a mere action by Borrowers and the Bank is lack of ex-ante or ex-post information or 110 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods Box 4.1. Leanung about income restoration Regional resettlement working groups tried Io leam whether displaced families were recovering their incomes and productive capacities. To do so they reviewed performance in active and recently completed projects. Lack of systematic monitoring data appeared to be a serious constraint. Africa concluded that 'Given the inadequacy of the baseline data and the uncertainty of the numbers, it would be meaningless to speculate as to the number of resettled people who will have their incomes restored immediately upon resettlement or sometime thereafter". The Middle East and North Africa, noted that 'the primary measure of project success on the resettlement issue refers to income restoration for the affected populations', and concluded that 'the portfolio did not take this critical factor into consideration andl failed, in all but one case, to systematically build into the design of the project the provisions needed to determine specific income levels of affected households following resettlement". East Asia and Pacific reports a mixed record. "There is one demonstrated example of successfully restor- ing the standard of living of people and stronig indirect evidence that the affected people in China, Korea, and Thailand might be benefitting from the rapid pace of development of these countries. The detailed information required to demonstrate that people in specific 7rojects are able to improve or restore their standard of living are not available. However, the available evidence suggests that most of the affected people in Indonesia have not been able to regain their former standard of living. Vulnerability of certain groups in other countries of the region may have also increased. Insufficient baseline information is, therefore, a major factor in preventing an obj,ective analysis of the achievements and failure of the countries of the region to meet Bank policy objectives." South Asia found that 'Bank procedures for processing and documenting resettlement issues at early stages of most SAS projects have generally not been followed...Inadequate baseline information has made it difficult to determine how the projects have affected the standard of living of project-affected people". Latin America and the Caribbean, noting recent improvements in project design, stated that "few of the resettled people in the earlier period can be said to have improved their living standards and incomes as a result of the resettlement process. Baseline data, as mentioned above, are often non-existent". The Operations Evaluation Department (OE.D) recently analyzed resettlement outcomes, and reported that "A striking finding is how few of the projects for which OED reports (49 reports) are available have iriformation on incomes of the displaced populations, even though over forty percent were approved after the 1980 guidelines and about one quarter at least a year after the guidelines were published." Improving the quality of baseline and monitciring data is fully feasible with local resources in all borrow- ing countries. Farming system studies for assessing on- and off-farm income sources, and other types of income surveys, are tools well known to all Ebrrowers and consulting firms. All Bank regions have taken action to ensure that income data will be available for every new project, and that evaluation of income restoration performance will be induded in every future PCR. OED's evaluation of all completed projects will incorporate post resettlement income assessments. simple neglect in data gathering: it reflects payment of compensation rather than the the persistence of a conceptually differenit restoration of incomes, they do not design stand on the part of many borrowing agen- resettlement with a clearly defined economic cies, mirrored in their design of resettlement recovery target and benchmarks to measure without full focus on rehabilitation. When it, but provide only for compensation such agencies still see their task to be the vaguely worded as "rehabilitation." Environment Department 111 Resettlement and Development The Bank has done much tenacious ground- Thailand Khao Laem Hydroelectric project work to change this conceptually inadequate reports that incomes for all households rose stand. It has succeeded with a good number of after resettlement. This is a project in which country agencies, as shown in the previous the basic policy goal was achieved. The same chapter, and still needs to persevere with many was true for about half the families in the other agencies. The message the Bank is giving Maharashtra Irrigation II project - signifi- its Borrowers is that reestablishment strategies cantly, these are the resettlers who were able to must be guided from the outset by the disci- share in the project's immediate benefits by pline of a comparative stance between two points in moving into the irrigated command area. time - pre-displacement time and target-time - for income restoration. Income data should also Resettlers succeeded in restoring their incomes be gathered by the Borrowers' monitoring and most often where the productive potential evaluation mechanism after relocation, to created by the project was used to reestablish measure project impact, and be reported in the displaced families. The clearest case, well PCRs and PPARs. documented through both Bank and indepen- dent sociological studies, is the way several Successfil income restoration projects harnessed the new reservoirs' potential to involve resettlers in aquaculture and other Despite the fragmentary character of the fishery-related employment. Indonesian available information, partial data enabled the resettlers who converted from rice farming to review to discern certain trends about success aquaculture generated 2.6 times more revenue and failure. The impact assessment for the per acre (see box 4.2). Box 4.2. Reservoir fisheries as new income sources Using reservoir fisheries for resettlement provides an enlightening example of how development planning can be harnessed for resettlement. Indonesia's Saguling (completed in 1984) and Cirata dams (completed in 1987) displaced more than 115,000 people living in the Citarum River basin in Western Java. Resettle- ment planning made incorrect assumptions about resettlers' willingness to join the transfigration pro- gram and the suitability of cash compensation for achieving rehabilitation goals. Studies carried out shortly after displacement found that incomes for farmers resettled on land had declined an average of 40 percent to 50 percent. A significant segment of the displaced families, however, with support from a program launched by the Government of Indonesia, the Bank, and ICLARM took advantage of the newly created reservoirs to develop an innovative reservoir fisheries enterprise using fish culture technologies designed especially for small farmers. By 1992, cage aquaculture systems in the two reservoirs employed an estimated 7,500 families, produced 10,000 tons of fish 3/4 up from 10 tons produced in the original river fishery 34 and provided 25 percent of the total fish supply entering the Bandung district, an area of approximately 3 million people. Indonesia's Institute of Ecology reports that landless resettlers hired for cage aquaculture earn Rps. 56,000 per person per month 3/4 more than rice field workers in nearby areas. Fisheries revenues from the two reservoirs exceeded $10 million a year, more than the revenue lost by the regional economy from sub- merged ricelands. Cage aquaculture created an additional 21,000 jobs for resettlers in secondary small enterprises such as fish feed farms, cage maintenance, and marketing. Current estimates suggest that final production revenues will level off at approximately $34.5 million a year, nearly seven times the value of the lost rice production from the submerged farms. A recent re-study of Cirata found that 59 percent of the resettlers considered themselves to be better off than they were before displacement. Both reservoirs have become sources of economic growth for their surrounding communities. 112 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods Prelimnaq findings in more recent projects discontent caused by earlier development- suggest somewhat better average performrance related resettlement during the 1960s and early regarding economic reestablishment. Clear 1970s (see previous chapter). Since 1980, evidence of the value of government comuit- comprehensive national regulations express the ment for resettlement performance is provided government's commitment to reconstructing by projects with resettlement in China (bor 4.3). resettlers' essential production systems. The Projects in China receive no more attention Bank's sectoral analysis of resettlement impacts from the Bank than those in other countries. in China reached the following conclusions: However, China overhauled its policies after internal evaluation studies showed the exltent * Urban Resettlement: In urban projects, of disastrous imnpoverishment and politicgd urban housing standards, floor space per Box 4.3. Evidence of successful urban resettlement Resettlement in Chinese cities usually provides net benefits to the affected people. The table below pro- vides estimates of the depreciated value of old dwelling units, the actual constuction costs of the replace- ment units (excluding land or infrastructure costs) and net differences between the two costs, taking into consideration changes in the size of the new unit provided to the tenant. In some cases, the value of the new unit is nearly four times greater than the value of the unit replaced. Comparison of the Economic Value of Old Dwelling Units and New In-Kind Replacement Units lHousing Size Housing Value Projea Households (square meters) (Yuan) Ratio Original New Old Unit Value Replaced Ol/dNew AnfDeng 108 60 85 12,000 26,010 2.17 Jin Hua 7,492 44 42 8.800 12,852 1.46 Xiao Fuqing 120 S0 79 10,000 24,174 2.42 lian Guo 1,394 15 60 3,000 18,360 6.12 Hu Lang 553 14 48 2,800 14,688 5.25 Hui Yi 264 30 49 6,000 14,994 2.50 Ordinary 3,620 28 55 5,600 16,830 3.01 Tian He 204 60 83 12,000 25,398 2.12 Ying Xiang 1,400 22 71 4,400 21,726 4.94 Pingshan 253 35 59 7,000 18,054 2.58 Wujiayao 612 26 57 5,200 17,442 3.35 Note: The economic value of the old unit is based on an estimated value of Y 200/m2 of constructed area. The economic value of the new unit is based on the actual construction cost of the housing and indudes costs for land, infrastructure and fees. Source: China - Urban Land Management in Energy Market Recovery, Washington, DC: World Bank, 1993. Environment Department 113 Resettlement and Development capita and services tend to be much im- studies that projects have too often not suc- proved through resettlement, although ceeded in reestablishing resettlers at a better or frequently at the cost of a longer commute. equal living standard and that unsatisfactory The value of the new housing unit is often performance still persists on a wide scale. two to four times higher than the value of Results from many investment projects are the unit replaced. Enterprise failure as a consistent neither with the anticipated project result of expropriation is rare. People who benefits, nor with the Bank's policy goals. lost their jobs get some form of economic protection until new jobs are found. Performance regarding income restoration is of particular concern in India and Indonesia, * Transportation: County and township which lack country-wide resettlement policies govermment persistence in finding ful and which together account for 54 percent of employment for resettlers results in gener- the number of people being resettled under ally successful job reestablishment. current Bank-financed projects. The South Asia and the East Asia regions' resettlement reports, * Reservoirs: Where the standard of income the India Country Department's sectoral report restoration is pursued, as it is for Bank- on resettlement (June 1993), various PCRs, and funded projects, international experts rate OED audits found and analyzed failures in Chinese reservoir resettlement performance several major projects in rehabilitation and among the best in a difficult business. income restoration. Not all projects in China do well: projects in Issues in the India portfolio the poorest regions, particularly those with Conclusions on projects in India are available indigenous minorities, face difficulties and from the South Asia regional report, and the have a less satisfactory record. There also SA2 sectoral resettlement report. In the Gujarat appear to be some differences between Bank- Medium Irrigation project, which totals a supported and non-Bank supported projects. displacement of over 140,000 people, "...above Because government comnitment exists, all, the poorest and tribal people, representing however, most such differences concern the more than 50 percent of all affected families, more limited financing of the latter rather than have not recovered their living standards."2 the legally mandated approach. On the whole, The Farakka II thermal project affected some projects with resettlement in China, which 53,500 people: "in total, 353 families have been represent 25 percent of the Bank's total portfo- employed by National Thermal Power Corpo- lio of projects with resettlement, appear to meet ration (NTPC) and about 3,000 families ob- the Bank's policy objective of improving or tained temporary jobs with the contractors. restoring lost production capacity and living The condition of the remaiing 7,000 families is standards. not known to the Borrower." In the Upper Indravati Hydroelectric project, which dis- Impoverizhment Risks and Trends placed some 16,000 people, most of them tribal farmers, affected families have been able to Compared to the OED studies, "Early Experi- purchase only 1.2 acres of non-irrigated land on ences with Involuntary Resettlement," which average, whereas the state-recognized viable mostly referred to projects started in the early minimum is 3 acres.3 In the Maharashtra and mid-1980s, this review found better Composite Irrigation m project, which totals a performance, as detailed above, in a number of displacement of nearly 168,000 people, "landed recently completed or ongoing projects, par- families have regained a reasonable standard of ticularly in countries with robust resettlement living but the landless families, representing policies such as China. However, the review more than 50 percent, have been severely comes to the same conclusion as the OED affected." Based on the projects it evaluated 114 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods after completion, OED's recent report concludes How does such serious failure in resettlement that "as far as projects in India are concemned, performance occur? What has this review available evidence indicates that until 1992 mrkost learned about resettlers becoming worse off? affected families may have not been able to regain And how can borrowing agencies leverage tieir previous standard of living."4 Recent their knowledge about risks for preventing procects in India approved dunng the last three to impoverishment in the future? To better four years have started on a much better fooling understand the salient trends, and to augment and are expected to yield better resettlement and the body of empirical data for analysis, the rehabilitation results. review examined information from both Bank- assisted and non Bank-assisted projects, includ- Issues in the Indonesia portfolio ing projects financed either from domestic The performance in Indonesia combines sources alone or with assistance from aid donor successful income restoration and land ttling agencies with or without policy guidelnes. in some projects, as detailed earlier in this chapter, with serious failures in other projects, How impovershment happens: parficularly in the urban and transportation a nisk model projects. Such performance variation is ac- When displacement and relocation leave people counted for by the lack of unified country worse off, the empirical evidence reveals a set frameworks and slow transfer of experiences of eight recurrent characteristics that need to be and approaches between agencies. monitored closely. While each is irreducible to the others, they have a common denominator: Indonesia has nine active projects with resettle- they contribute to a process of impoverishment ment and will require more resettlement if the These characteristics make up a risk model.6 country's rapidly growing needs for urban and The model points to the "risks to be avoided" sanitation infrastructure are to be met. In mnost in displacement. These major risks capture cases, cash compensation has not been ad- social and economic processes that occur with equate - neither in amount, nor as an ap- higher frequency than others, despite the proach - and the resettlers have not been able enormous variability of individuals situations. to restore their former living standards.5 T1he These are: Regional Cities Urban Transport project af- fected 13,000 people in 2,530 families. Howr- (a) Landlessness; ever, out of the 840 displaced families, project (b) Joblessness; authorities helped to relocate about 60. At least (c) Homelessness; half the 1,690 partially affected households (d) Marginalization; received no compensation for their land. (e) Morbidity; Interviews with people from the Jabotabek I (f) Food insecurity; project - which displaced about 28,000 people (g) Loss of access to common property and negatively affected in various ways an. assets; and other 56,000 - indicate that the compensation (h) Social disorganization. rate offered to those with legal ownership wvas only about 40 percent of the estimated value of Taken together, these characteristics of impov- their land at the time of acquisition. Those erishment provide a risk model that synthe- with any of the several weaker forms of terLure sizes the lessons of many complex real pro- on their houseplots were eligible for only 25 to cesses; it is, at the same time, a warning model. 90 percent of the market value - maldng their Abstracting the particular (local) details be- real compensation somewhere between 13 ;md yond the tale of case-by-case anthropological 40 percent of the market value and dearly studies, government accounts, OED audit insufficient to repurchase a houseplot. reports, or media stories, and recognizing Environment Departnent 115 Resettlement and Development patterns beyond the accidental, is necessary for primarily because of loss of land, with a acting to contain such processes. These ad- 25 percent loss from their previous income verse processes must be brought under control levels.9 Similar evidence is available from with a strategy, rather than just through case by Brazil.10 Findings from sociological and case responses. anthropological field studies show that for farm families loss of farm land has gener- However, these processes are not unavoidable. ally far more severe consequences than the They must be seen as a set of risks that either loss of their house. become real, or can be avoided if known and counteracted. Like every risk forecast derived * Joblessness affects both urban and rural from past experience, this risk-predictive resettlers. For several categories of people model is apt to serve as a "self-destroying whose existence depends on jobs - indud- prophecy."7 It alerts policy makers and plan- ing landless laborers in reservoir areas; ners to the kind of targeted actions that are employees of community based services; needed. and shopkeepers, shop-workers, and small businessmen - displacement effects are The evidence that substantiates these trends is stronger through the loss of job than the abundant; to explain them, several examples loss of home. The employed landless, rural will be cited for each: or urban, lose in three ways: they lose access to land owned by others and leased Landlessness. Land expropriation takes or share-cropped; job opportunities, away the foundation upon which social primarily in urban areas; and foregone and economic production systems are assets under common property regimes. In constructed. Unless that foundation is the Madagascar Tana Plain project, private reconstructed elsewhere, or replaced with small enterprises being displaced in 1993 - steady income-generating employment, workshops, food-stalls, artisan units - are landlessness sets in, social and economic entitled to no compensation, and lose their productivity cannot be re-established, and place of trade and their customers. A 1988 the affected families are impoverished. In study of people resettled in the first phase the Kiambere Hydropower project in (early 1980s) of the Argentina-Paraguay Kenya, a Borrower-sponsored study found Yacyreta project found a 17 percent unem- that farmers' average land holdings after ployment rate in the resettled communities, resettlement dropped from 13 to 6 hectares; much higher than the rates in the popula- their livestock was reduced by more than a tion as a whole." Vocational re-training, third; yields per hectare decreased by offered to some resettlers can provide skills 68 percent for maize and 75 percent for but not necessarily jobs. Creating new jobs beans. Family income dropped from as a mitigation measure, particularly in Ksh. 10,968 to Ksh. 1,976, a loss of 82 per- urban settings, is one of the costlier and cent-s In Indonesia, the Institute of Ecology least certain strategies, and is infrequently of Padjadjaran University carried out a used. Similar findings come from devel- social survey several years after reservoir oped countries: in the Churchill-Nelson families who were given, in early 1980s, Hydro project in Manitoba, Canada, the cash compensation; it was found that their economic activities of resettled indigenous land ownership was 47 percent lower and people - fisheries, waterfowl capture, fur their income was halved. Impact studies processing - were curtailed; field studies for the Cirata dam, also in Indonesia, found found a significant increase in non-produc- that while 59 percent of the poor house- tive time in the community. Evidence holds improved their incomes after reloca- compiled from several non-Bank financed tion, about 21 percent were worse off and some Bank-financed dam projects,'2 116 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods shows that the employment boom created nent residences, in which resettlers shared by the new construction temporarily conmmon sleeping spaces with their ani- absorbs some resettlers but severely drops mals. But homelessness - like joblessness, toward the end of the project, compound- nargimazation, morbidity, or other social ing the incidence of permanent or tempo- risks - are not imninent and unavoidable rary joblessness among the displaced in involuntary resettlement. The compari- population. son between two very similar projects in the same sector (see box 4.4) convincingly * Homelessness. Loss of shelter is temporary illustrates that homelessness is an avoid- for most of those displaced, but for somne able condition, inflicted often by poor families it may remain a chronic condition. resettlement practices. If resettlement policies do not explicitly provide improvement in housing condi- * Marginalization. Marginalization occurs tions, or if compensation for demolished when families cannot fully restore lost shelters is paid at assessed marked value economic strength. Middle-income farm rather than replacement value, the risk of households do not become landless, but homelessness is increased. A 1990 Bark becbme smallholders. Families previously report on the Cameroon-Douala UrbarL in precarious balance above the poverty resettlement completed in 1989 found that line may fall below it and never recover, over 2,000 displaced families were hin- even without becoming landless. For farm dered in their efforts to set up new perma- families, partial but significant loss of nent houses; less than 5 percent received farning land to roads or canals may make loans to help pay for assigned houseplots. some farms economically nonviable. High From the Danjiangkou reservoir, not Bank- productivity farmers on fertile valley- financed, China has reported that about 20 bottom land are nargilazed when moved percent of the relocatees became homeless uphill to marginal, unfertile soils, even and destitute; this and the disastrous though they may be given the same area of results of Sanmenxia project displacernent, land. In the Nepal Kulekhani Hydroelec- although not Bank-financed, led to the tric project, an independent study found adoption of new resettlement policies in the majority of displaced people worse off China. Violent destruction of houses of socially and economically, due to lower people labeled as squatters is a procedure productivity of new land, and less diversi- still used in some places to speed up fied production. Marginalization also evictions. The "emergency housing center" occurs through the loss of off-farm income or "relocation camps" used as fall-back sources; in Sri Lanka's Kotmale project solutions in poorly planned resettlement financed by a European donor, a field study tend to make homelessness chronic raither assessed that marginalization occurred than temporary. When resettlers cannot because opportunities for non-farm income meet the time and labor costs involved in generation were lost or limited through rebuilding a house, they are compelled to displacement, increasing the economic move into "temporary" shelters, whim differentiation between evacuees and then tend to become long-term shelters. At hosts.14 Marginalization of resettlers is the Foum-Gleita irrigation project, implicitly accepted in all cases when local Mauritania, only 200 out of the 881 dis- agencies consider it a matter of course that placed families reconstructed their housing, those displaced cannot be provided reestab- the rest living precariously for two years or lishment at their prior standard of living. longer in tents or under tarpaulins.s3 A Bank field review of a large scale reseitle- * Morbidity. People forced to relocate have a ment found that prolonged lack of support higher degree of exposure to illness, and to made the temporary shelters into perma- comparatively more severe illness, than Environment Departnent 117 Resettlement and Developnent Box 4.4. From violent expulsion to reduced displacement Major differences exist in how social risks are treated and how displacements occur within the samn sector. The difference is made primarily by policy. The two project cases described below show how these major risks - homelessness, landlessness, food insecurity, and morbidity - either become full-blown realities or can be prevented through decisive policy resctions supported by alternative solutions. Two ongoing projects in the forest sectors of two African countries, both of which seek to eliminate encroachment in gazetted forests, demonstrate this difference dramatically. A forest management project financed by a multilateral European donor agency in Uganda proposed the massive displacement of communities livng in the Kibale game corridor and forest reserve, without offering any viable economic alternative. The population obviously refused to move. The country's Forest Department, which had long threatened the local population with displacement, decided to implement the threat in 1992. The following is an excerpt from a field report written by a social anthropologist about how expulsion took place: On March 31,1992 and fof some days following, an attack without prior warning was launched by game wardens, foresters, local government officials, and perhaps prison labor. All houses were burned, and personal property and food stores were either destroyed or looted. A handful of people were killed on the spot. Patrols have kept people from returning since. About 35,000 people were violently displaced and evicted in 1992 from the Kibale forest. After many weeks, plans were made to take the displaced people to new settlemnents 150 miles away, in the under- populated county of Bugangaizi. From September 1992 to May 1993, the Ministry of Labor, with the aid of several NGOs, placed about 19,000 people in 22 village blocks. People were given only a few tools from relief agencies and virtually no government services, but were left to fend for themselves. They have struggled to build shelter and produce sufficient food, and have to cope with poor health and sanitary conditions. OXFAM has drawn intemational attention to this case and has spearheaded an effort to provide relief to those displaced and clustered in camps. Little is known by project authorities about the many thousandsof other people evicted from the Kibale forest. A Bank-assisted forestry sector project in Cote D'lvoire, West Africa, was handled very differently. The project was intended to prepare and introduce forest management plans for several high priority areas. Before the project, the Forestry Department initiated a crash campaign to recover control of forests by using forestry staff trained as a paramilitary force, with no compensation and little concern for evicted forest communities. Learning at appraisal that the policy of the Forestry Department was to evict up to 200,000 residents in a similar manner, the Bank's mission opposed and rejected this approach. The Bank sought and received agreement on a different approach, congruent with Bank policy, which will: reduce displacement from about 200,000 people to less than 40,000; provide better conditions for resettlers; consolidate existing scattered populations into "agroforestry zones" within the legal limits of classified forests; and integrate resettlers into forest management general plans. This approach is new for Cote d'lvoire and was never considered before the Bank-assisted project. What could have been a massive and violent uprooting for tens of thousands of people was averted. The Bank-assisted Cote d'lvoire project is still very far from having solved all problems: the new govem- ment policy has been drafted but is not yet formally issued; the "forest-farmers" commissions are only partly active; and management plans are still in preparation. Because of this, the Bank keeps this project on its problem project list and monitors it closely. Although forest authorities and the project's executing agency have renounced violent, uncompensated displacement, they are still leaming how to do construc- tive relocation, how to provide better conditions for the 20 percent of forest people scheduled to move to agroforestry zones, and how to integrate resettlers effectively into forest management plans. The Bank has increased its assistance to the proect to help the country achieve its economic, social, and environmental objectives in the forest sector and to set a precedent for reducing displacement in other sectors. * This is not an isolated example: In a neighboring East Af*ican country, within a similar forest protection project financed by another bilateral European donor agency, several villages were burned down in order to displace their inhabitants rapidly. 118 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods those who are not. Adverse health effects the risk that people will fall into chronic of displacement, particularly when projects food insecurity, defined by the Bank as do not incorporate preventative epidemio- calorie-protein intake levels below the logical measures, are well documented, minimum necessary for normal growth though much more for projects not assisted Sudden drops in food production and loss by the Bank. The direct and secondary of harvests during the transfer from old to effects of involuntary dislocation without new sites are predictable; in addition, preventative health measures range frorn rebuilding food production capacity at the diseases of poor hygiene, such as diarrhea relocation site may take years. At the and dysentery, to outbreaks of parasitic and Foum-Gleita irrigation project, Mauritania, vector-bome diseases such as malaria anI when multiple cropping and husbandry schistosomiasis caused by unsafe, insufficient was replaced with paddy-rice water supplies and inadequate sanitary monocropping, diet and cash-crop income waste systems. At Akosombo, an early deteriorated. In 1986 at the Victoria dam 1960s reservoir resettlement in Ghana, the project, financed by a European donor, prevalence of schistosomiasis around the some 55 percent of resettled families were reservoir rose from 1.8 percent prior to still receiving food stamps after a long resettlement to 75 percent among adult lake- period, compared to a much lower rate n side dwellers and close to 100 percent among the country as a whole. Because the area of their children, within a few years after cultivated land per capita in the BaiLiambe impoundment In the Foum-Gleita irrigation reservoir in China (not Bank financed) project, Mauritania, the predicted increase of decreased from 1.3 mu to only 0.4 mu after schistosomiasis was exceeded, reaching 70 relocation, local food production became percent among school children; farmers' insufficient and 75,000 tons of food relief health worsened from contaminated dririldng annually had to be provided for several water and agrochemical intoxication. An, years. outbreak of gastro-enteritis occurred alorg the Victoria dam reservoir in Sri Lanka (not * Loss of access to common property. For Bank-financed).'5 At Nam Pong, a dam in poor and marginal people, particularly for Thailand (not Bank-financed), monitoring the landless and otherwise assetless, loss of confirmed that local rates of morbidity - common property belonging to communi- from liver fluke and hookworm infection - ties that are displaced represents a cause of were higher than provincial levels, the income stream deterioration that is system- result of deteriorated living conditions and atically overlooked. Fruit and other edible poor practices of waste-disposal. Increased forest products, firewood and deadwood mortality rates are also reported, as a result for use and sale, common grazing areas, of epidemic outbreaks of malaria in dis- and use of public quarries, account for a placed populations around new bodies of significant share of poor households' water and to accidents associated with new income. The review found that only the reservoirs. Lack of proper precautionary Lesotho Highlands Water project includes measures resulted in 106 deaths by drown- explicit provisions for compensating this ing at Saguling Lake during the first 14 loss, but the project's management unit is months of operation; at Cirata reservoir lagging behind in the implementation of (Indonesia) ten people drowned in the first the rural development program for ten months after impounding.'6 resettlers. Losing access to common property under traditional or controlled Food insecurity. Undernourishment is both circumstances, displaced people tend to a symptom and result of inadequate encroach on reserved forests or increase the resettlement. Forced uprooting increases pressure on common property resources of Environment Department 119 Resettlement and Development the host area population, a source of social sociological study found various manifes- tension and increased environmental tations of social disarticulation, such as deterioration. Secondary adverse effects of growing alienation and anomie, the resettlement on the environment occur also loosening of intimate bonds, the weaken- when oustees who do not receive cultivat- ing of control on interpersonal behavior, able land move uphill in the reservoir and lower cohesion in family structures. wasteland, intensify deforestation and Marriages were deferred because dowry, cultivation of poor soils, and accelerate feasts, and gifts became unaffordable. reservoir siltation. Resettlers' obligations and relationships towards non-displaced kinsmen were Soaal disorganization. The disintegration eroded and interaction between individual of social support networks has far reach- families was reduced. As a result, partici- ing consequences (see box 4.5). It com- pation in group action decreased; leaders pounds individual losses with a loss of became conspicuously absent from settle- social capital: dismantled patterns of ments; post-harvest communal feasts and social organization, able to mobilize pilgrimages were discontinued; daily people for actions of common interests informal social interaction was severely and for meeting pressing immediate curtailed; and common burial grounds needs are hard to rebuild (see box 4.6). became shapeless and disordered.'7 Such loss is higher in projects that relo- cate people in a dispersed manner rather Taken together, these eight characteristics of than in groups and social units. Field impoverishment provide a warning model studies have documented that such that concentrates the lessons of many real. "elusive" disarticulation processes processes and clearly points to what must be undermine livelihoods in ways un- avoided. The predictive capacity of such a counted and unrecognized by planners, model informs what are the main social risks and are part of the complex causes of to be expected in population dislocation and impoverishment. In the Rengali dam helps adopt timely counteracting or compen- project in India, not Bank-financed, a sating measures for risk management. Box 4.5. Social integration and political instability Involuntary displacement causes a certain amount of social disarticulation even when carried out ad- equately. When executed with disregard for people's basic entitlements, it leads to social protest, demon- strations, sharp political tensions, and instability. Poorer members of communities affected by expropriation and given unfair compensation often do not have the social and economic resources to appeal to the courts. A common recourse s public demonstrations in order to draw the attention of politicians and journalists to their situation. A Bank supervision mission reported, for instance, that in the Singrauli Thermal Project, people opposed the bulldozers which were sent to force them out of their houses, and successfully blocked construction of a project building. Another mission to the Subemarekha Irrigation Project reported strong local protests, which have contributed to delaying the impoundment of the Chandil reservoir for two years. In Mexico, protests over the proposed San Juan Tetelcingo project (for which the Bank had previ- ously declined financing) included highway blockades and a large demonstration in Mexico City, contrib- uting ultimately to the cancellation of the project. 120 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods Box 4.6. Informal sociial networks and resettler economics A Bank-sponsored research project, unrelated to resettlement, documented how essential the informal networks among households are in the daily economic life of the poor. During resettlement such networks are dismantled and dispersed, a net loss to their members. Household networks help cope with poverty through informal loans; exchanges of food, clothing and durable goods; mutual help with farming, building houses, and caring for children. "Household networks pass around large amounts of money, goods, and services, and may substitute for public subsidies.... But recognition of the importance of private transfers for economic policy is relatively recent.", Such transfers flow from better-off to poorer households and help equalize the distribution of income. Bank economists, measuring and quantifying the contribution of such informal social networks, have documented what anthropologists and sociologists have long described in qualitative terms. Research has found that in developing countries 19 to 47 percent of people report recurrent transfers, representing as much as 20 percent of household incomes, compared to only 5 percent in the United States. In the Philip- pines, for instance, private transfers among household in the lowest quintile boost their income by more than 75 percent. The support can reach high levels: in Peru, the pre-transfer income of households that are net givers of transfers is 60 percent higher thian recipient households. Such private transfers also function as informal credit arrangements and as mutual insurance mechanisms. Simulation analysis shows that in Colombia such transfers contribute up to 40 percent to stabilizing incomes in households experiencing unemployment. The dismantling of such multifunctional, yet virtually "invisible", social networks through displacernent acts as one of the "hidden" but real causes ojf impoverishment through displacement. This is a loss of social capitaL It is difficult, and it takes time, to reconstitute similar social structures and networks among resettlers and their hosts, capable of exercising similar support functions at the new relocation sites. a Donald Cox and Emmanuel Jimenez, "Achieving Social Objectives through Private Transfers: A Re view," World Bank Research Obswrver, Vol. 5,1990, p. 205. It is crucial to emphasize that impoverishment frequent and severe cases of impoverishment through displacement is not inevitable in re.. have occurred in programs unguided by domes- settlement. The advantage of identifying and tic or international policy norms. That sometimes anticipating trends and risks is that it offers one or another Qf these general risks become the possibility to take policy and project reality even in some projects where policies do actions that could counter the risks. Con- exist, shows how sensitive and vulnerable these versely, failure to recognize the risks inherent operations are. It also shows how imperative it is along these lines allows such social riskis to to implement policy norms consitnly as the first unfold unimpeded, causing impoverishanent. and most important line of protection. Improved approaches to planning, financing and implementing resettlement are apt to Land and Jobs for Recovering transform the impoverishment risk model Livelihoods into a self-destroying prophecy. Resettlement programs aiming to prevent An extensive review of the anthropological and impoverishment, restore income and create sociological research literature on resettlement, new, economically-viable communities nor- carried out by the Task Force to assess dispace- mally adopt one of two general strategies. ment impacts worldwide, found - and thi& Land-based resettlement programs are based on conclusion bears repeating - that the most providing resettlers with enough productive Environment Department 121 Resettlement and Development land to rebuild farms and small rral busi- populations, and strong institutional support nesses. Non-land based resettlement strategies are necessary (see box 4.7). includes activities such as occupational train- ing, directed credit, or industrial and service Lessons learned about preventing sector development for job creation. impoveishment Both strategies may sometimes be necessary Reviews in social science literature, as well as the when a particular resettlement operation review of Bank prect expeis, showed that involves both urban and rural people. Suc- the most important strategy vanable for prevent- cessful experiences document that, whichever ing impoverishment in rural resettlement is strategy is selected, a set of common factors relocation of resettlers on land of adequate such as incentives for resettlers, involvement capability and with clear title. In urban resettle- of all stakeholders and particularly of host ment, it is the restoration of gainfid employment or Box 4.7. The reasons for success: why does resettlement in China work? Like many developing countries, China faces problems of high population densities, poverty, and lack of available land. China's own assessment of its resettlement performance until the 1980s was not favorable. Resettlement was frequently associated with impoverishment, and resistance to resettlement was common. Yet, resettlement in China is now generally considered to work well and even adds to project benefits, while resettlement elsewhere has been problematic and a source of friction. How can this difference be explained? Incentives. Resettlers receive strong incentives to move. In urban areas, resettlers receive two to three times their current living space, a powerful motivator in a context where "normal" applications for better housing can take ten years or more to fill. In rural areas, where land is owned by the commune rather than the individual, compensation payments provide a strong incentive to host communities; in some cases, host communities bid to receive resettlers. The reverse side of the coin is that counties that do not ensure that resettlers recover their productive capacity are forced to support them from county revenues. Decentralization. Responsibility for nearly all aspects of resettlement is devolved to local or city govem- ments. Resettlement solutions are developed locally, and resettlers and their hosts can hold local authori- ties accountable. Furthermore, by routing resettlement through local govenmments, resettlement programs can draw upon diverse technical skills and other development projects. Institutional policies and procedures. China has developed sophisticated, binding policies and procedures for each of the three major sectors involved in resettlement, agriculture, energy, and urban development. Special "preferential policies" assign priority for general government assistance programs to relocated communities. Projects cannot proceed without resettlement plans approved by government regulators; national auditors review project expenditures to ensure accountability. Giving resettlers a stake. Resettlement in China hinges on providing productive resources to resettled communities. Many use the opportunity to launch new enterprises that they previously could not afford. While resettlers are guaranteed a minimum package, rnany add their own resources to improve their housing and household economy. (Based on the sectoral review of resettlement in Bank-assisted projects in China carried out by the China Country Department.) 122 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods sef-emploment, access to adequate services and, formal title to land but dependent on it are if possible, improved housing. also affected. These can include tribal groups whose ancestral lands were expro- The principal resettlement activity in rural priated or never titled, while in urban areas areas is providing displaced families with they often include established squatter replacement land. In most situations, the 'I;md neighborhoods and informal urban settlers. for land" strategy leads to results far superior The recognition of these affected people's than payment of cash compensation. Bank entitlements is weak, most often experience with compensation exclusively in unlegislated, and prone to subjective money has been largely negative, especially in interpretations of rights and duration of rural resettlement.1s Bank findings about the residence. The Bank has taken the position differential performance of cash versus land that customary land rights should be forms of compensation are similar to those of recognized under Bank-assisted projects as independent evaluations of the non-Bank- valid and eligible for land compensation. financed Srisailam, Lower Manair, and Rengali dams in India and in many other countries.9 * Land valuation. Recognition of land rights, however, is the preliminary step only to The need for forms of compensation other than assessing land value. Bank policy requires cash is most apparent in the case of tribal or that "displaced persons should be compen- other minority populations whose ancestral sated for their costs at full replacement lands have been expropriated. Resettlement prior to the actual move." In most coun- poses a special challenge to approaches based tries, however, property values are calcu- on cash compensation because the initial lated on an assessed, or "book" value that displacement is not the result of a voluntary is often significantly less than the replace- land sale, where people can choose how to ment value of the lost asset. The absence of invest cash, but a forced 'sale" by people with efficient land markets makes the calculation no choice. The economnies of many tribal of market values a difficult process, and groups is often semi-monetized, and people are most governments use indirect methods not accustomed to managing cash, especiaDly in such as tax records or land ceiling laws to. large amounts. Cash received is not only assess the market worth of land. The Legal typically insufficient in a competitive market Department's review and other studies situation, but also tends to be frequently used found that in several countries the compen- for paying off debts, or making ritual expendi- sation is commonly chaDLenged, where tures, rather than for productive investments. courts routinely enhance the award by 50 to Cultural reasons converge with economic 200 percent for those who are able to bring factors into leaving resettlers impoverished and suit. Such decisions reflect the inadequacy unable to reconstitute their former economy. of land valuation mechanisms. In urban areas, where land is scarce and expensive, Four land-related issues are of paramount the question is whether it is possible to pay importance for effective resettlement in rural enough compensation to enable a person to areas: (i) eligibility; (ii) land valuation; (iii) buy a comparable property, or whether replacement land quality; and (iv) the institu- cash compensation should be supple- tional ability to identify and transfer "land for mented by provision of replacement assets land" to resettlers. (i.e., an apartment or shop) to reconcile national needs and individual entitlements. Eligibility. Land acquisition laws usually provide compensation only to formal * Land quality. In many projects, the land owners of land. However, in most project proposed for resettlement is surplus areas, a large number of people without government land, little suitable for farm- Environment Departnent 123 Resettlement and Development ing. Few projects covered during the The first is to centralize the task in the hands of course of this review had induded land the organization carrying out the project. The capability surveys. Soil surveys carried out typical method used is to find one or more in the first resettlement sites proposed for large resettlement sites, to which rural commu- the Mexico Hydroelectric project, for nities or urban neighborhoods move more or less example, showed that the resettlement in their entirety, or as natural social subgroups. areas could not support viable farming The main advantage of this approach has typi- systems. Implementation of the resettle- cally been that it takes advantage of land already ment plan for the Hyderabad Water Supply owned by the govemment Land acquisition project similarly found that the farms will costs are thus low, and the land is readily avail- not receive the irrigation on which the able. Nevertheless, experience has shown this resettlement farm model depended. method to be of limited effectiveness. Land that is not developed is often not very good quality Institutional ability to locate land. There land, that it is expensive to make productive. are mnany agencies and procedures in- However, the resettlement operation does not volved in both expropriating condemnned always require uniformly large plots or high land and acquiring replacement land for development costs. Projects that already plan to resettlers. The role of institutions and invest in improving land quality, such as irriga- projects is essential, and institutional tion commands or urban improvement opera- assistance, rather than simple cash, must be tions where large housing stocks are being made available to resettlers to enable their created, can open up resettlement opportunities relocation on land. There are two appar- provided that provisions are made to ensure ently similar but analytically very distinct resettlers' access to the new sites. aspects to replacing lands. First, sufficient, good-quality land must be identfied. In A second method is for the project to act as the most parts of the world, agricultural land broker for individual plots of land. In the state that can be cultivated is already being of Gujarat, for example, land purchase commit- cultivated. Countries under high demo- tees were convened to help individuals negoti- graphic pressure such as India, Bangladesh, ate fair prices for land and to help resettlers China, or Indonesia do not have large assess its technical suitability. The land pur- amounts of uncultivated land that can be chase committees, which include local NGO used for resettlement, and per capita land and government representation, have had ratios are decreasing. The second problem considerable success in identifying land which is that, once identified, land must be oustees alone were unable to find, and in transferred. A recurrent feature of the - assuring orderly land transactions. Priority for unsuccessful resettlement schemes re- the institution acting on resettlers' behalf in viewed by the Bank is that market mecha- acquiring land through the market is particu- nism are rarely used to identify replace- larly appropriate when farmers who have ment land, nor are market prices paid by newly received irrigation sell off surplus land project agencies to obtain it for resettlers. to gain capital and avoid land ceiling laws, which are usually lower for irrigated lands. Practical approaches to finding land Land consolidation in newly created command A practical difficulty faced by many projects is areas, in addition to its technical advantages finding the land necessary for resettling people for water management, provides another very productively. Experience has revealed some promising approach for the reestablishment of methods for locating land that may be used to those affected (see box 4.8). advantage. Three highy contrasting approaches for acquiring adequate land can work success- A third approach is to allow resettlers or their fully, each under appropriate conditions. representatives to find land themselves. This 124 Resettlement Series Performance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods Box 4.8. Innovative ways to identify land for resettlers: land consolidation Although most resettlement operations concentrate on locating replacement land specifically for displaced families, in a number of situations a more wide-ranging approach is used. It frames resettlement within a broader agricultural technical improvement and reform program of land consolidation. Land consolida- tion involves reassigning plots to permit a rational network of canals, drains, and roads suitably oriented for surface water applications. Such programs bring resettlers and hosts together in the areas being improved by the project; they provide opportunities for resettlers to share in the irrigation benefits and generally introduce effective irrigation management. Land exchanges and consolidation reform were used in such projects as China's Shaanxi Provincial Agricultural and the Irrigated Agricultural Intensification projects, Brazil's Irrigation Subsector program, and Thailand's Chao Phrya project. In these cases, people displaced primarily by canals and roads, rather than by reservoirs alone, were included in the pool of farmers provided with consolidated, irrigated farms. Experience shows that although some initial nrsistance to land consolidation can be expected, farmers have eventually supported the concept strongly because of the dramatically increased production and its fair manner of spreading small losses of land amonrg both categories: farmers displaced by new canals or roads and farmers benefiting from the irrigation that the project offers. Land consolidation is not an easy solution, neither technically nor socially, but is superior to many other approaches. It requires careful advance planning that includes land tenure surveys, land evaluation, and advance design of the irrigation infrastructure. This process requires continuous participation of the farmers and their representatives by means of mechanisms to resolve grievances and generates the confi- dence that the claimed benefits will materialize for the greatest number of people. lnmits the burden on the agency, and allows the Other income generating packages complex personal strategies and knowledge of Most resettlement exercises currntly focus on individuals to come into play. In Orissa state in replacing assets. While this is a necessary step, India, the Resettlement Unit of the Upper it is a limited one. In many cases, replacement Indravati project put compensation and ex- . s ,yti fnsitblceaconsfrrstes, i S hampered by a shortage of resources (e.g., gt breasied at t ofnth lan trasae- availability of arable land, particularly in Asian to be released at the trme Os the lane transac- countries) and strict duplication of pre-move resettlement needs are relatvely Wh er conditions is often not possible, nor is it always opertionst tees w ith ly assan, - desirable. Households can and often wish to operations, at times with NGO assistance, - adapt to -new envirornments by changing their minimize resettlement distances. A transition adp o ne envroes by changnei period in which people have access to their old altemi inves are rea,stic aprd sustainable. sites to sustain their income while the new sites are being made more productive can keep The Bank's experiences with land settlement resettlers' incomes at satisfactory levels. Such and irrigation projects reinforce the need for a access is especially important where new land broader approach to income restoration. Rural as treatments, tree crop plantings, or the synergies well as urban comnunities almost never engage needed for intensification will take several in single occupations. Furthemore, in large years to be profitable. Particularities of differ- projects that displace entire communities rather ent crops demand careful timetables for mov- than individual households, significant propor- ing people. Whenever income streams tend to tions of people affected by the project may not fall, direct food support should be incorporated themselves be landowners: the rural landless into project planning to address temporary who lose their employment, for example, may pauperization and the risks of malnutrition L constitute up to 50 percent of displaced commu- Environment Department 125 Resettlement and Developrnent nities. In land settlement and irrigation and disquieting results. It also leads to impor- projects, an important part of project imple- tant lessons about how resettlement can be mentation is devoted to furnishing new done better. It shows that with appropriate settlers with technical advice on crops, approaches and resources, livelihoods can be agricultural practices, loans, marketing restored sooner rather than later, but that opportunities, etc. All these activities are without sound project approaches resettlers necessary to attain project benefits (measured will inevitably find themselves worse off. It by the increase in farmers' output). A similar shows that recovery is intrinsically difficult approach should be adopted in resettlement and complex - difficult for resettlers, diffi- planning, namely to design income-generat- cult for the hosts, difficult for borrowing ing packages that foster the productivity of agencies, difficult for the Bank as well. Some the resettled population (a more detailed socio-economic risks, real as they are, are not discussion follows in the next chapter). easy to counteract; and there are multiple and surreptitious social risks that need to be Job creation counteracted. The need for generating employment for involuntary resettlers is real and must be The analysis also provides warnings, and most addressed; but doing this for a large number of importantly, knowledge about what needs to be resettlers is not a likely prospect unless sub- done, and can be done, when some displace- stantial numbers of jobs are already being ments become inevitable, particularly about created by an expanding economy. The Bank's such basic issues as those related to land experience with employment generation holds identification and teallocation. Mobivzing the few clear signals on how to produce sustained enere es of am the soci, actoss involved in employment for people, especially when many reserdement-resetters, hosts, governmental of them have few of the skills needed for off- agencies and non-governmental organizations farm work. China regularly prornises employ- - is the only way to overcome the difficulties ment in new local industries to resettlers, intrmic in such processes. allowing them to "jump the queue" ahead of The followig chapters of this review wil other job aspirants, but so far there has been analyze "work processes' that are crucial for little evaluation of the success of this effort. proje "work and thay are ccount Experience with small-scale credit programs is project success and that may largely account Expernixed,nce wimpr thsmallscale redi ralmss is for the achieved results. Some of the causes for mixed, and improving, but the real issue is both success or failure can be traced back to the the range of economic possibilities for which initia preparation and subsequent manage- credit may be useful. It is unlikely that more ment of resettlement components. than some fraction of resettlers in any par- ticular situation will be able routinely to use credit as a key ingredient of their economic Notes: rehabilitation, and it is unrealistic to dispense Some of these aspects refer to work processes credit too liberally in the hope that it will be during the project cycle and their discussion an effective lever for restoring lost incomes. will be continued in the next two chapters. More promising are the strategies described 2 Asia Technical Department, South Asia Regional in the first part of this chapter, that make Reportfor the Resettlement Review; Country immediate use of project-created new re- Department SA2, India: A Reuiew of Resettlement and Rehabilitation, June 1993. sources (e.g., reservoir fisheries, commercial 3 Asia Technical June 1993. opportunities, etc.) for the benefit of the Rep th Deptmet, South Asia Regional resettlers. l~~~~~~~~Rpot orfh eseikent Review, CounAtry resettlers. Department SA2, India: A Review of Resettlement and Rehabilitation. The review of the economic performance of 4 OED, Early Experiences uith Involuntary Resettle- resettlement schemes reveals both successes ment, Report No. 12142. 126 Resettlement Series Performnance: Restoring Incomes and Livelihoods S Ti. 14 Lars T. Soeftestad, "On Evacuation of People in 6 Michael M. Cemea, Poverty Risksfromn Popula- the Kotmale Hydro Power Project Experience tion Displacement in Water Resources Develop- from a Socio-Economic Impact Study", ment, Cambridge: Harvard University, HIID/ Bistaandsantropologen, June 1990. DDP 355, 1990. Is Rew, Alan W. and PA. Driver (1986) Evaluation 7 Robert K Merton, The Sociology of Science, of the Victoria Dam project in Sri Lanka. Volume Theoretical and Empirical Investigations, Chi- m. Initial Evaluation of the Social and Environ- cago/London: University of Chicago Press. mental Impact of the Victoria Dam project. ' Edward K. Mburugu, A Resettlement Survey in Annex J Social Analysis. Annex K Environmen- the Kiambere Hydroeectric Powur Project - tal Analysis. (Mimeo). Preliminary Report, March 1988. 16 Environmetal Impact Analysis of the Cirata Dam, 9 Envtronmental Impact Analysis of the Cirata Dam, Padjadjaran University. Padjadjaran University: Institute of Ecology, 17 P.K. Nayak, Resettlement at Rengali Dam, March 1989. Bhubaneshwar, Orissa, 1986, p. 50. 10 Mougeot, -Luc J.A., Hydroelectric Development 18 For a fuller discussion of land issues in resettle- and Invwluntary Resettlement in Brazilian ment, see Land Acquisition and Resettlement in Amazonia: Plan.ning and Evaluation, Edinburgh: Asia, ASTHR, draft 1991. Cobhan RourloYacyrensa Evaluation Study 19 See Rehabilitation of Srisailam Project Affected Syracuse University, 1992. Person and S xic Survey of Pmod-Affectd 12 E.g., the China-Gezhouba dam, Brazil-Tucruxi Persons Under Lower Manair Dam, Hyderabad: dam, and Turkey-Ataturk dam, which were all Bureau of Economics and Statistics, Goverfment not Bank-financed; or Togo-Benin Nangbelo of Andhra Pradesh, 1986; N. Behura and P.J. Hydropower dams, and Korea-Chungju dam as Nayak, Inwluntary Resettlement and the Changing Bank-financed projects. Frontiers of Kinship: A Study in Orissa, 1993; E. i3 Ngaide, Tldiane (1986) Socio-Economic Implica- Ganguly-Thurkal and W. Fernandes, eds., tions of Irrigation Systems in Mauritania: Th Developntent, Displacement and Rehabilitation, Boghe and Foum-Gleita Irrigation projects. Thesis New Delhi: hIdian Social Istitute, 1989; submnitted for Master of Science (Land Re- OED, Early Expinces with Involuntary sources), University of Wsconsin-Madison. Resettlement, Report No. 12142,1993. Environment Department 127 I~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 5. Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Bank Borrowers are expected to prepare a recurrent failures in project preparation and resettlement plan that addresses the compensa- appraisal remain the root cause of much tion, relocation, and rehabilitation of people problematic resettlement. Regional and displaced by projects in a way that meets th7e sectoral assessments of the resettlement portfo- resettlement policy objectives. Project ap- lio show that praisal evaluates the technical, financial, social and legal resources and capabilities to imple- * The availaility of baseline information has ment the plan. This chapter is about the improved. Since FY91, 72 percent of all new congruence between institutional policy proce- projects included baseline surveys and this dures, and their actual implementation. figure rose to nearly 100 percent during the review year (1993). Inadequate baseline Four basic requirements have guided Bank work means that project planners lack a resetflement operations since 1980. All invest- realistic picture of the numbers or the social ment projects with resettlement supported by and economic organization of affected the Bank are expected to include: people, which prevents realistic design of rehabilitation options. Forty-four percent • Baseline planning surveys of affected of FY86-FY93 projects with resettlement populations included baseline population surveys * Resettlement timetables coordinated with civil works construction * The number of projects involving resettlement * Resettlement plans to restore lost incomnes with appraised resettlement plans rose from * A resettlement budget. approximately 50 percent between 1986-1991, to 77 percent in FY92, 93 percent in FY93 and Main Findings 100 percent in FY94. Thus, while there has been a major turnaround in the past two Previous reviews determined that a major years, almost half of all active projects weakness in resettlement work is a failure to involving resettlement have gone to the prepare and appraise resettlement plans Board without resettlement-plans prepared adequately. Between 1986 and 1992 there were by Borrowers and appraised by the Bank gradual improvements in resettlement prepara- All of these were approved well after the tion, but problems in the quality of project resettlement policies came into effect in preparation remained a concern. Since 1992 1980. there has been a significant improvement in the resettlement portfolio characterized in particu- * Levels of financial allocations earmarked for lar by local involvement and participation by resettkment also rose. On the whole, resettle- NGOs, institutional reforms that increase ment budgets rose from an average 2 to 3 Borrowers' capacity to carry out resettlement times per capita GDP in the early 1980s to 3 operations, and better assessment of rehabilita- to 5 times per capita GDP by the 1990s. tion costs. But despite recent improvements, Financial reporting also improved over the Envirornent Department 129 Resettlement and Development review period, and in 1993 100 percent of When resettlement plans were not incorporated investment projects with significant re- into project documents, Borrowers' understand- settlement included a separate budget for ings of their rettlement obligations have not land acquisition and resettlement. Never- been cdear, nor was Bank management assured theless, the availability of resources re- that projects contain the mneasures needed to mains a major constraint on successful attain the Banks resettlement policy objectives. resettlement. Cost analysis and financial As a result of poor appraisal, there is a significant planning for resettlement are often inad- number of active projects that do not contain the equate and financial obligations unclear, planning provisions needed to restore the income and resettlement operations frequently of the people who wil be displaced. suffer from lack of funds. Resettlement Planning Appraisal work for resettlement operations has also been uneven, although there have bee Resettlement plans can only be as good as the sigrificant, demonstrable improvements in the infoemation on which they are based. Bank past two years. Latin America and the Carib- policy since 1980 has required baseline surveys bean show the greatest improvement, and to: (i) identify the scale of resettlement and energy projects are appraised relatively welL establish eligibility criteria; (ii) calculate the TWU projects, particularly those involving incomhe levels that resettlement planning must urban infrastructure rather than housing, often aim to restore; and (iii) monitor progress and contain little more than broad proposals that assess the success of resettlement programs. must be reformulated in significant ways during implementation. While some reformu- Baseline Sur7eys lation during implementation is normal for all project activities, many ostensible plans depart The availability of baseline information has dramatically from field realities: the plans are improved substantially since the 1986 review, not acceptable to the people affected; resettle- particularly in the energy sector. Only 21 per- ment sites are already occupied or unsuitable cent of FY80-FY85 projects reported baseline for resettlement; and resettlement agencies lack census data. In the FY86-FY93 period this mandate, experience, and ability. figure rose to 45 percent (table 5.1), and, since Table 5.1: Active projects with baseline surveys by appraisal, FY86-FY93* Region Projects with Projects Conducting Reseutlement Baseline Surveys Number Percent Africa 18 7 39 East Asia and Pacific 39 19 49 East Europe and Central Asia 3 1 33 Latin America and Caribbean 6 3 50 Middle East and North Africa 5 1 20 South Asia 16 8 50 Total 87 39 45 * Does not include sector projects or projects assumed to displace less than 200 people, or projects identified late in the review. 130 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement FY91, 72 percent of new projects include * Project preparation often uses outdated baseline surveys. - secondary sources or indirect counting methods such as aerial photographs rather Incorrectly assessing the size of the population than data generated through up-to-date to be displaced by significant amounts usually site-specific social surveys. leads to major problems during project execu- tion: project delays, resource shortfalls, com- * Inadequate policies may be revised during pensation disputes and an institutional inability project implementation to increase the to prepare adequate replacement resources; for eligibility of affected people not covered the resettlers. Without baseline surveys, under the initial, inadequate policy frame- population counts rise unexpectedly during work.' project implementation, and program indica- tors and implementation benchmarks lose their * Project components are often undefined effectiveness. Table 5.2 describes some of the until they are underway and resettlement is widest gaps between Borrower and Bank one of nany factors considered during estimates and the actual numbers discovered detailed desigrL during project implementation. The lack of baseline work also makes it impossible to -make * Long overall project life spans or imple- definitive statements about the extent to mrhich mentation delays often associated with in-migration of people hoping for compensa- land acquisition problems lead to existing tion accounts for the number inflation, al- families growing and increasing the num- though follow-up studies for most of the ber of affected people. projects cited in table 5.2 did not find this t:o be a major problem (box 5.1). All of these reasons argue for advance agree- ments on resettlement principles, procedures, There are four main reasons why affected and adjustment mechanisms that can provide populations are often significantly larger than projects with the flexibility to respond to such expected: changes. Table 5.2: Project impacts of inaccurate baseline surveys Country Project Name Year Appraised SAR Revised Estimate Estimate (no. people) (no. people) Zaire Ruzizi I[ 1984 135 15,000 India Singrauli I&I 1982 0 49,000 India Farakka 1984 0 53,500 Turkey Iznir Water Supply 1987 3,700 13,000 Colombia Guavio Hydroelectric 1981 1,000 5,500 Cameroon Second Urban 1989 12,500 24,000 India Madhya Pradesh Medium Irrigation 1981 8,000 19,000 India Andhra Pradesh Irrigation II 1986 63,000 150,000 Environment Department 131 Resettlement and Development Box 5.1. How much baseline survey work is enough? The level of detail needed in a baseline survey varies tremendously. At a minimum, however, any project should have an up-to-date field-based census of the number of people who will be displaced, impact categories, income levels and assets, and a rough idea of occupational categories. Beyond that, there are a variety of ways to obtain more detailed planning information that can be phased into project designs. As important as the baseline work for the displacement, is the preparation that goes into planning the relocation. Sample surveys based on land-use capabilities are particularly relevant for rural resettlement operations, while affordability studies are useful in urban areas. For both rural and urban operations, introducing early, effective consultation mechanisms provide a useful way to assess what options are feasible. Projects where resettlement needs are not known in advance, such as program and sector loans, or infra- structure projects whose final designs are finalized on a periodic basis, need less advance information than projects where full designs are already available. In such situations, an overall census can be enough, provided that project designs include provisions for gathering the more detailed information later. The operative principle for resettlement planning is one of paralleism between the level of detail available for the design of the main project and the detail needed for the resettlement operation. Sectoral planning guidelines such as those prepared by the Colombian energy sector systematize information gathering by- preparing standard resettlement information categories keyed to the sector's project development cycle. Preparation of Plans to Restore How can the lack of planning for economnic re- Preparation asestabshment be explamed? Developmg Lost Income economic production is the Bank's core activity, and the Bank has decades of planning experi- Restoring income is the core of the Bank's ence on which to draw. Nevertheless, fewer resettlement policy. Planning for income than 30 percent of all resettlement plans men- restoration is needed because traditional tion economic rehabilitation programs beyond procedures for land acquisition and property compensation. Despite an unambiguous Bank expropriation often do not provide adequate requirement that resettlement programs means for displaced people to replace their lost concentrate on income restoration, a first assets. Nevertheless, many projects lack explanation for resettlement failures is that in technically sound resettlement plans, and most projects restoring incomes is not a project several lacked plans to restore income alto- objective from the outset. gether. This finding is buttressed by the regional reports. Both the East and South Asia Comparison of voluntary and resettlement reviews reported that resettlement involuntary resettlement schemes programs rarely included adequately prepared income restoration programs. The India Useful lessons about why resettlement projects Country Department singled out as its highest have often been unable to restore incomes can priority the need to provide operationally be drawn by comparing Bank preparation of meaningful definitions of "income restoration" voluntary and involuntary settlement schemes. that address the poverty profiles of affected Differences between voluntary and involuntary villages and prospective communities. Latin resettlement in rural areas revolve largely America also found that until recently projects around preparation and project recruitment. In lacked adequate mitigation plans to prevent involuntary schemes, all families must leave, income deterioration among affected people. no selection can be made to recruit the volun- 132 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement teers most likely to succeed, and return migra- critical to the overall success of the project. tion is impossible if the resettlement does not This was not the case in any of the infra- worik Thus, involuntary resettlement shouid structure development projects that m- be more difficult than voluntary ones and volved involuntary resettlement. should reflect more careful attention to ensur- ing adequate planning. * Assessment of income generating potential of new sites. In most of the voluntary settle- The record is very different. Five pairs of ment programs, efforts were made to relate projects involving voluntary and involuntary the resource conditions faced by farmers to resettlement designed and implemented in the realistic appraisals of the income generation same period and in adjacent areas were corn- potentials of the enterprises being promoted, pared in terms of Bank staff inputs, preparation including assessments of alternative sce- quality, and design features.2 Pairing the narios and assumptions. None of the invol- projects showed striking contrasts in their untary resettlement programs benefited from approaches. Voluntary settlement programs a comprehensive analysis of the resources brought a variety of technical skills to bear, available to displaced families. prepared detailed programs to help farmers adapt to new physical and socioeconoric * Farm models. The package of resettlement environments, and internalized settlement costs options was much broader in the voluntary within project budgets. With the exception of programs. They not only presented a range the Chinese project, involuntary components of farm models, but they also assisted were treated as an unfortunate side-effect of the settlers to develop off-farm based income mamn project, with poorly defined costs ancl no sources to complement farm income. Not defined benefits.3 only were the voluntary farm models far more detailed at appraisal, but they were Staff inputs differed considerably between the also more intensively monitored during two types of project. The projects with invol- implementation and in some cases modi- untary resettlement components concentraited fied as monitoring systems corrected almost exclusively on civil works and used mistaken assumptions. The involuntary almost none of the Bank's staff expertise for programs either had a single, generalized assisting with rural development, except for farm model or none at all, except for the the Shuikou hydroelectric project in China. By Chinese project, which prepared a variety comparison, voluntary schemes used a diverse of resettlement farm options. mix of Bank specialists to review the technical, social, and economic soundness of proposed * Risk. Planners of voluntary programs farm models. This suggests that a second cause produced preparation reports that had for poor performance lies i the kevel and diversity much better discussions of risks to farmers of staff inputs into resettlement project designs. initiating agricultural enterprises in new and unfamiliar locales. They also assessed The comparison of voluntary and involuntary risks from uncertain delivery of support, projects provide insight into other aspects of and tried to adopt conservative assump- resettlement program design and management: tions and back-up mitigation plans. Dis- cussions of risk for involuntary programs * Managerial focus. In all of the voluntary were in every case wholly devoted to settlement projects, managerial focus was investment risks by the Bank and partici- either on resettlement as the core of an pating donors. There was no indication agricultural development project, or on3 an that planners analyzed the comparative agricultural development process in which risks to the displaced families from adopting an effectivefarm resettlement program was different resettleiiient options. Environment Department 133 Resettlement and Development • Duration. Voluntary programs included tribespeople would willingly abandon herd- analysis of the support that settlers would ing to work on forest plantations, an assump- need until full farm development and tion that proved to lack any foundation once described provisions made to be sure the project started. support would be in place when the project finished. The single biggest planning Excluding affected people and local govern- deficiency with involuntary programs was ments from participating in resettlement limiting the life of the project to the time planring has been at the root of many problems necessary to complete main project infra- (box 5.2). Preparation problems in many large structure, without providing sufficient investment projects can often be traced to post-relocation assistance to the resettlers. expatriate consulting firms that do the engi- Subsequent Project Completion Reports neering work but lack the experience, staff or showed repeatedly that there was no willingness to work with local populations and correlation between the time needed to governments. More recent projects such as the complete hifrastructural development and Berke Hydropower Dam i Turkey or the that needed to stabilize new farm enter- Lesotho Highlands Water Supply project, prises. which icorporated resettlement into the consulting firms' terms of reference, prepared * Investment levels. Voluntary settlement plans that met Bank requirements and have programs invest in productive assets eight made good progress during implementation. to ten times the amount of money they plan Nevertheless, the review found that consulting to produce as an annual income stream for firms often still fail to incorporate resettlement settler families. The best - generally the skills, especially local expertise, into their most recent - projects in the Bank's design teams, nor do they prepare resettlement resettlement portfolio attain this level of components with the same rigor as the engi- investment, but the large majority appear neering components. to fall significantly short. All of the regional reports found that involving Planning adequacy affected populations in project preparation and Implementation often reveals major plannig project designs that built in mechanisms for deficiencies that make resettlement components sustained local participation were more effec- technically or socially unacceptable. The tive than traditional, top-down plans. Aided original plan developed for the Mexico Hydro- by consultation procedures developed for electric project, for example, failed to evaluate environmental assessments, more recent project the quality of the soil in the principal relocation designs show much more attention to method- area which was not suitable for agriculture. In ologies that promote participation in planning. later sites selected by the resettlers themselves, Pakistan's Sindh Special Development project soil quality turned out to be adequate. Poor (FY94), for example, set an important precedent quality preparation work also has been a by involving an experienced NGO with a problem in many projects in Africa. Early strong field presence in setting up fora for preparation for Swaziland's Komati River identifying resettlement options and managing Basin project, for example, assumed that the resettlement program. Remedial action pastoral populations could be transformed programs prepared for the Upper Indravati into sugarcane workers once the project and Gujarat Medium Irrigation I projects converted traditional grazing lands into similarly use NGOs and community organiza- canefields. Ethiopia's Amibara Forestry tions to promote income restoration in resettle- projeet similarly assumed that Afar ment communities. 134 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Box 5.2. Is participation in resettlement possible? In recent years a growing number of projects with resettlement have come to recognize the value of participation by the people being resettled. There are many entry points for introducing parficipatory procsses in resettlement. Among them are: * National and sectoral resettlement strategws. Developing national and sectoral policies through a consultative process ensures more 'buy-in" from a broad social group than do policies prepared in isolation. Brazil's energy sector, for example, instituted a series of consultabtions and discussion with universities, NGOs, state governments, and unions before producing its environmental and social policies. Prior to beginning detailed plannirlg, the executing agency and project monitors jointly spon- sored a series of annual, on-site "resettlement summits" during the first two years of a project, which brought together company engineers, social and environmental staff, state and municipal governments, project monitors, national resettlement specialists, researchers, and project critics. Participants were able to air concerns, agree on objectives and procedures where possible, and exchange experiences from previous projects. The resettlement policies, developed for the Philippine urban sector also went through a long process of public consultation and revision. * Planning. Planning with the people rather ihanfor them offers advantages that range from better knowledge of local technical conditions such as land quality, to better options such as house types, occupational alternatives, or site location. Making resettlers part of resettlement planning arso reduces settler dependence: once they have a stake in the final design, they are far more likely to make sure the project succeeds. * Project implementation. Many resettlement functions can be devolved to local people if accompanied by adequate funding. Lessons leamed froma rapidly abandoned contractor-built resettlement housing programs have, for example, led to self-built construction in many projects, where the company provides money and materials but resettlers build or contract their own houses. Other possibilities for direct involvement include resettlement site identification, negotiation, and involvement in handover activities. * Project monitoring/accountability. Involving resettlers in project monitoring vastly increases project accountability. In Mexico's Zimapan hydroelectric project, project funds allowed the resettler's bargain- ing committee to hire their own master architect to supervise construction of their new houses. In Colombia's Urra I project, resettlers maintained their own set of records describing the frequency and outcome of visits by project staff, which were then checked by independent monitors. Use of pilot projects schedules on the main project. Limited flexibil- Because resettlement is often neglected unlil ity in construction schedules reinforces the late in project preparation, there are few cases need for advance planning to ensure that where pilot operations have fed back into results from pilot programs can inform overall project designs. Field-testing resettlement implementation. proposals should be a high priority because few countries have a sufficient body of accu- Timetables mulated resettlement experiences. Once A significant test of preparation quality and resettlement operations are underway, fine- SAR adequacy is the presence of a sound tuning resetdement proposals is usually schedule for executing the resettlement opera- difficult because of their logistical complexity tion evenly over the project's duration and and the pressures created by construction avoid the dangerous risks of end-bunching (see Envirmment Department 135 Resettlement and Development Box 5.3. Good and bad practice - two resettlement timetables The following timetables embody two different approaches to planning resettlement. The Yantan Hydroelectric project in China relocates 40,000 people. To evenly spread the relocation over'the duration of the project, and to tailor the size of relocation to the project's organizational capacity, a time- table was designed at the beginning, appraised by the Bank, and included in the Staff Appraisal Report. An average of 5,000 people are scheduled to move each year for eight years. This pace has not strained the project's organizational capacity and has not subjected people to emergency removal. The timetable reflects the good practice of correlating dam construction with peoples' relocation. Budgetary allocations are specified year by year. Timetable I - Yantan Hydroelectric Project Calendar Year 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 Total Project affected people 700* 4,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 7,500 2,400 2,400 40,000 * Construction site. Source: Staff Appraisal Report, 1986; see Annex 18. The Narmada Sardar Sarovar project, India did not prepare a relocation timetable at the outset and the Bank could not appraise it. Late in the project's life (May 1992), the following timetable was prepared by the project authority (Narmada Control Authority) and submitted to the Bank in May, 1992. It covers the remnaining five years of project implementation, 1993 to 1998. Seventy percent, or about 86,000 people, are "planned" to move in one year - the last year of the project. This contrasts sharply with the fact that during the full seven initial years of the project (1985-1992), only fewer than 20,000 people (15 percent) were resettled. The lack of organizational capacities in the submer- gence states for relocating the people was a chronic problem even before the large resettlement work began. Timetable 2- Narmada Sardar Sarovar Project Year** 1985-92 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total Relocated Villages 15 5 4 11 27 13 170 235 Project affected people 19,152 3,940 1,694 3,381 8,780 2,589 86,636 126,172 **Each year ending in June. Source: Narmada Control Authority. Based on the submergence schedule approved by the SSP Construc- tion Advisory Committee in 1992. The families affected total 4,500 in Gujarat, 2,464 in Maharashtra, and 23,180 in Madhya Pradesh; the official statistics for average family size is 6.1 persons, but a smaller, more conservative average of 4 persons per family was used in this table. The risks involved in the Narmada approach are that it forces 'bunching" in the last stage of the project, which may overwhelm the organizational capacity of the resettlement agency, result in emergency reloca- tion under the pressure of increasing water levels, and worsen the situation of the resettled people. The basic principle in such situations is synchronization of resettlement with the gradual advance of dam construction. Although the Narmada SSP loan was canceled at the Borrower's request, the benchmarks eventually recommended by the Bank emphasized the necessity to change this timetable, through a more balanced distribution of relocations over the project's remaining implementation years. 136 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement box 5.3). Carefully developed schedules are project. Nevertheless, the review found very indispensable in projects with large resettle- few projects that included a resettlement ment components, where planning must timetable in the appraisal report, although coordinate the logistics, budgetary outlays, some have timetables on file. With a few technical preparation and staffing needs important exceptions, most relocation time- involved in moving tens of thousands of people tables were driven by construction timetables at a time. Monitoring progress is similarly rather than resettlement needs (box 5.3). hindered when there is no timetable describing They did not link displacement to plans for where resettlement operations are supposed to preparing new resettlement sites, nor did be at a given point in time. Projects that do not projects include formal mechanisms to adhere to the schedule must either patch recalibrate timetables and resources when together last-minute resettlement operations or delays occurred. Re-adjusting timetables to delay civil works to avoid resettlement crises. reflect realistic targets has been a major function of the special corrective actions Useful resettlement timetables link resettlemnent carried out as part of the Bankwide Review, programs to key points on the critical path of and close Bank follow-up will be required. the project's civil works in ways that meet construction deadlines but do not overwhelm Progress in Resettlement Appraisal the administrative abilities of resettlement agencies. These linkages provide both planning Resettlement plans coordinates and measuring points during implementation to ensure synchronization of Resettlement plans appraised by the Bank and different activities.. Effective timetables also negotiated prior to Board presentation have require a mechanism to confirm that new been a core Bank requirement since 1980. The sites are ready to receive settlers. Both 1986 review reported that only 30 percent of principles were strongly emphasized by 13ank the active projects with resettlement had management and the Board in the bench- appraised resettlement plans. Between 1986- marks set for the Narmada Sardar Sarovar 1991, the number of plans actually appraised Table 5.3: Appraisal of resettlement plans in Bank-assisted projects, FY 1986-1993* FY Projects with Resettlement Projects with Plan at Appraisal Number Percent 1986 7 1 14 1987 13 5 38 1988 12 4 33 1989 13 9 69 1990 10 5 50 1991 6 2 33 1992 13 10 77 1993 13 12 92 TOTAL 87 48 55 * Does not include sector project; or projects assumed to displace less than 200 people, or projects identified late in the review. Environment Department 137 Resettlement and Development by the Bank remained limited, hovering around quent submission and planning quality. The 50 percent. Over the last two years, however, ECA/MNA report, for example, found that the number of projects with appraised plans "commitments to submit resettlement plans increased to 77 percent of all projects with subsequent to Staff Appraisal Reports were resettlement in FY92, 92 percent in FY93 (see not always upheld." Nevertheless, even if a table 5.3), and 100 percent in FY94. plan is presented later, failing to appraise resettlement plans concurrently with other Plans have not been appraised in a significant project components deprives Bank manage- number of still-active projects. Only six out of ment of staff's best assessment of the ad- the 22 active projects listed in the June,1993 equacy and estimated costs of the full project, India portfolio review had submitted resettle- including resettlement proposals, and signifi- ment plans prior to Board presentation5. cantly reduces the room available to reach Failure of the responsible organization to agreement with Borrowers on basic objectives submit a formal resettlement plan in and processes for resettlement. Bangladesh's Dhaka Urban Development project (box 5.4) led to cancellation of the The quality of resettlement plans component, and no resettlement plans were appraised for the three projects active in The quality of resettlement plans varies consid- Pakistan when the review began. Of five erably. Resettlement plans for projects such as projects in Indonesia known to involve land the Curitiba urban resettlement component in acquisition and resettlement, only two had the Brazil Water Quality and Pollution Control resettlement plans when the projects were project and the Ertan Hydroelectric project in appraised; all of the projects without plans China reflect close attention to preparation of have required corrective actions and remain viable resettlement packages, coordination with problematic. Only LAC consistently required civil works construction, and effective institu- resettlement plans for projects involving tional delivery mechanisms. displacement prior to their appraisal (table 5.4). By contrast, in Africa, only 15 of the projects Several projects that proceeded without active during the review period included appraised plans have since incorporated appraised resettlement plans; of these, only 10 requirements for plans into conditions for were considered to be adequate by Bank Board presentation or loan effectiveness, with reviewers. No plan other than a consultant's varying degrees of success in terms of subse- report identifying likely resettlement issues Box 5.4. The importance of ensuring government ownership Although the proposed Dhaka Urban Development project would displace nearly 20,000 of the city's poor, project preparation failed to develop a resettlement plan. The omission was flagged after project appraisal, and a last-minute plan was provided by one of the borrower agencies shortly before negotiations. When negotiations took place, however, the representative of the Government of Bangladesh was startled to discover a plan that his government had not approved. Project negotiations continued despite the clear lack of government commitment or full understanding of what was being proposed; adoption of a resettlement plan financed by the International Development Association became a condition of credit effectiveness. FoUow-up supervision found that the proposed resettlement sites were not acceptable nor had progress been made to staff the appropriate agencies. Three years into project implementation, the Bank and the Borrower canceled the component. 138 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Table 5A: Active projects with appraised resettlement plans by region, FY86-FY93' Region Projects with Resettlement Projects with Planat Appraisal Number Percent AFR 18 10 56 EAP 39 23 59 ECA 3 1 33 LAC 6 6 100 MNA 5 1 20 SAS 16 7 44 TOTAL 87 48 55 Does not include sector projects. or projects assumed to displace less than 200 people, or projects identified late in the review. was ever located for the Malawi Transport of careful resettlement appraisal. To the extent project or the Guinea Urban II project, both of that resettlement plans are not apprafsed by the which experienced significant resettlement Bank along with other project components, it is problems during their implementation. rarely clear whether resettlement proposals have been fully embraced by the govenmuent. The India Department's review also highlights The Africa regional report, for example, con- problems in plan quality, particularly in the cluded that income restoration aspects of the resettlement program. The plan for the Maharashtra Com- Little is known about the quality of posite Irrigation IH project consisted of little preappraisal and appraisal work in the field, more than a re-statement of government except in the few cases where resettlement compensation principles, and it is no surpidse specialists have been involved. Most Staff that this was one of the first projects that had to Appraisal Reports devote only one or two be restructured following the Morse reviewv. paragraphs to resettlement. Reports often use The PPAR for the Subernarekha project noted vague expressions such as "some families" or similar weakness in the appraisal report: "a few families" rather than mentioning specific numbers, and state only that "a plan The SAR stated that the Goverunent of Bihar has been developed' or "a program has been had formulated a general policy on R&R; but prepared" to recompense the affected people. the policy could not substitute for planning Few details are given on planning, implementa- and the statement turned out not to be tion and financing. The project files, on the correct. The identification of relocation other hand, generally contain evidence of villages, their layouts, the preparation of a careful resettlement planning. The frequent detailed logistic plan for relocation and more divergence between these good plans and specific plans for economic rehabilitation performance in the field as noted by recent should have been insisted upon, and the legal supervision mnissions indicates that appraisal documents should have been suitably missions have not paid enough attention to worded (PPAR, p. 6). ensuring that these plans, usually prepared by consultants, were realistic and were fully Regional reports prepared for the Bankwide endorsed by the govemment, the participat- Resettlement Review highlight the general lack ing agencies, and the people involved. Environment Department 139 Resettlement and Development Excess appraisal optimism Sectoral and program loans One of the major criticisms made by the Lending for urban/municipal development, Wapenhans and Morse reports and repeated by water and sewerage, medium-scale irrigation, the 1993 OED resettlement study was that Bank forestry, and other types of projects is often appraisals tended to overestimate likely channelled through sector or program loans. performance and thus failed to put enough Such sub-projects are prepared and appraised emphasis on capacity building needed to by Borrowers during project implementation, ensure proper implementation (see box 5.5). but the Bank appraises the adequacy of the The current review confirms this assessment. overall approach rather than individual invest- Correcting this deficiency requires careful ments. In cases where resettlement needs are assessments of previous project performance in not known in advance, the Bank requires only restoring resettler incomes, yet very few that appraisal assesses overall resettlement appraisal reports have included assessments of policies, institutional capacities, and broadly past resettlement performance (see Box 5.6). estimated numbers of affected people, although individual sub-projects should prepare resettle- Legal documentation ment plans consistent with Bank policy as part of their design. The Pakistan Private Sector A review by the Legal Department6 found Energy project provides a positive example of that wherever project descriptions included innovative arrangements (Box 5.8). appraised resettlement plans, Borrower obligations were adequately reflected in the Where resettlement was dealt with explicitly, relevant legal documents (loan agreements, sector loans have been powerful instruments agreed minutes of negotiation, etc). Lawyers for improving resettlement, combinimg project- have been attuned to the legal obligations of specific improvements with more general resettlement plans and frequently incorporate strengthening of sectoral capabilities. resettlement and rehabilitation obligations Colombia's Energy Sector project, Pakistan's into project documents where preparation Sindh Special Development Program, and and appraisal were lacking. Nevertheless, India's National Thermal Power Corporation last minute covenants cannot substitute for loan have coupled sectoral policies with programs planned by the Borrower (see effective programs to fortify social and box 5.7). environmental capabilities. In sector loans Box 5.5: Developing institutional capacities The Yacyreta n project in Argentina and Paraguay assigned responsibility for implementing the resettle- ment plan agreed with the Bank, to the Department of Complementary Works. At the time of appraisal, the department had only five professionals, dearly inadequate for managing the resettlement of 50,000 people. The Bank and project owner agreed on a plan to strengthen the department by: (i) recruiting an internationally reknown consultant for an experienced resettlement coordinator; (ii) hiring approximately 50 additional professionals for resettlement and environmental operations; (iii) utilizing existing agencies to deliver key services such as health and education, and financing expert consultants as their staff; (iv) designing an integrated training program for all resettlement staff; (v) adding two resettlement specialists to the project's Panel of Experts; and (vi) establishing through the Secretariat of Natural Re- sources and Human Environment, a national forum for non-governmental and governmental organiza- tions to review annual implementation reports. 140 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Box 5.6. Lessons leamed the hard way The history of the Gujarat Medium Irrigation Phase I and Phase II projects (Cr. 1496-IN/808-N) shows the consequences of not promptly learning in a isecond project from the experience of an earlier one. The phase II project consists of 24 dams, which displaced a total of 140,000 people. The project completion report for the first phase noted the following lessons: * Resettlement planning was not considered an integral part of the overall preparation of projects under Phase L * Resettlement actions tended to be implemented in an ad hoc manner and were not consistently included in the implementation schedules for project construction works. * Effective institutionalized monitoring procedures were lacking. * The Govenmment of Gujarat was unable to determine the extent to which the compensation packages offered to displaced persons enabled theiri to set up sustainable income-generating arrangements. In recognizing the lessons of these deficiencies, the GOG agreed to prepare and implement detailed resettlement plans for nine sub-projects under Phase II of the project. Phase II was expected to remedy some of the problems that occurred under Phase I. However, this hardly happened even in the first years of Phase II, and progress in Phase II was sloiw and difficult. Resettlement planning was not adequately improved. The Bank extended the project closing date three times to allow project authorities time to improve resettle- ment performance and apply the lessons they learned. A fourth extension of the project was granted in 1993, judged necessary in order to provide economic rehabilitation programs for the same nine sub- projects. This time an NGO (SEWA) was put in charge of implementing the improved income generating schemes. Sources: PCR 6841; India Department, Project Specific Backup Notes. where improvements to social and environ- weakness in resettlement components, and mental capacities have not been explicit explains much of resettlement's uneven perfor- goals, resettlement performance is much mance. Particularly serious are: more difficult to evaluate. The review was not able to assess the effectiveness of the * The poor quality of financial reporting in sectoral approach in achieving the Bank's project documents. resettlement policy objectives in such cases, particularly in urban sector loans. * Incomplete calculations of all the costs accruing to displaced people. Resettlement Costs and Project Budgets . Inadequate budgets for resettlement activities. A major finding of the 1986 review was that resettlement costs were poorly calculated and * The failure to include the full costs of were not adequately reflected in project bud- resettlement in the economic and financial gets. Despite some notable improvements, assessment of the overall project. inadequate financial planning remains a Environlment Department 141 Resettlement and Development Box 5.7. Absence of timely planning makes the task more difficult The presence of good resettlement plans before appraisal is a good indicator of the borrower's commit- ment to adequate resettlement. No plan was prepared for the appraisal of the Andhra Pradesh Irrigation II Project. Appraisal nevertheless continued, contrary to Bank directives. At negotiations, a covenant was included that made project effectiveness subject to submission of an adequate resettlement plan. The Borrower promised to submit good resettlement plans within three months, when the loan was expected to become effective. At that time, however, the plan was not ready. The Bank enforced the covenant and postponed effectiveness for another two months. Again, the plan was not ready and project effectiveness was delayed another five months. The Borrower still did not produce an acceptable resettlement plan, and the project was again delayed for another six months. The project finally became effective fourteen months after the date initially planned. The weaknesses in Borrower project preparation, as well as the Bank's failure at appraisal to assess accurately the number of resettlers and the adequacy of the technical measures needed haunted this project well into implementation. The initial estimate of the size of the population to be displaced was extraordi- narily low, rising from 63,000 people to as many as 150,000 people. Adjusting the plan's provisions continues to this day, but the process has been slow, difficult, and behind the schedule. Ensuring Adequate Finance difficult resettlement process (Colombia: Guatape 11). Reporting-financial information Prior to 1990, financial information available in Only 50 percent of the currently active projects SARs reflects little concern for adequate displacing more than 200 people included a financial provisioning for resettlement activi- budget for resettlement. The number of SARs ties. Although written specifically for resettle- earmarking resettlement funds follows the ment planning, Bank economic and financial same overall pattem described earlier for other guidelines (see box 5.9) have rarely been used, resettlement activities: less than half of the despite recurrent problems with resettlement FY86-FY91 projects include resettlement financial analysis. Several projects merged budgets, followed by a sudden jump to 85 per- resettlement costs and land acquisition as cent in FY92, and approaching 100 percent in "preliminary costs". Others - such as FY93-FY94. Mexico's Hydroelectric Development project, India's Uttar Pradesh Power project and the Costs for compensation and resettlement can be Central African Republic's M'bali Energy substantial components of a project's total cost. project - added environmental investment A sample of 20 closed projects involving to resettlement. Project budgets often did not resettlement shows that resettlement averaged distinguish between land acquisition, com- nine percent of appraisal costs, thus illustrating pensation costs, and the costs of providing that for many projects resettlement has been development opportunities to resettlers in known to be a significant cost for some time. their new sites. They rarely distinguish Resettlement costs can climb as high as 35 per- between the costs of compensation for public cent where very high compensation payments and private assets, though the cost of reim- are involved (Korea: Taegu Urban), large bursing a railway company for a single numbers of people are relocated (China: bridge may outweigh the costs of resettling Shuikou - 67,000 people, Argentina: Yacyreta an entire village. The distinction is more -50,000 people) or the project undergoes a than formal, because apparently high resettle- 142 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Box 5.8. Innovative approaches to resettlement in sector loans The Pakistan Private Sector Energy Project (FY88) is a sector loan that contains thorough and fair provi- sions concerning resettlement. The project, which totals $1.4 billion with a loan of $150 million, finances private sector power projects (each one callec an "investment project') through an Energy Development Fund providing up to 30 percent of subproject costs. Project designers realized that some of the anticipated sub-projects could entail involuntary resettlement. The following provisions were included to ernsure good resettlement practice: * The Government of Pakistan (GOP) would distribute guidelines describing the policies and procedures for evaluating and approving proposals for funding to all subproject proponents aind investors. Bank review and approval of the documentation and of the GOP provisions for subsequent supervision were made conditions of loan effectiveness. * Investment Project approval would require that the proposal "furnish evidence satisfactory to the Borrower and the Bank, showing that the [subproject would] include... a resettlement plan for displaced populations." Moreover, in both the subproject's Letter of Intent and in each implementation agreement, a requirement is a "suitable provision obligating the Investment Enterprise sponsoring such Investmnent Project to ensure compliance with such standards." * A further condition of effectiveness was the appointment of technical consultants to the National Development Finance Corporation (which administers the Private Sector Energy Development Fund), to assist in the appraisal, approval and superrision of resettlement work, under conditions acceptable to the Bank. The core elements of this project are the explicit provisions to assist resettlement; the transparency of the requirements for subproject proposals; the close attention to borrower ownership of the approach to resettle- ment; and the capacity building proposals for ithe project implementing agency. ment budgets often mask very low per-catpita information currently available, it is very resettlement allocations. difficult to: Resettlement cost reporting has improved in * Check for coverage and accuracy of re- the last three years. Resettlement plans aftier settlement costs. 1990 usually have a fairly detailed cost presen- tation that discriminates between the costs of * Evaluate indicators useful for reviewing land expropriation and socio-economic resltitu- overall adequacy such as price-per-hectare tion, as in Turkey's Berke Hydro project, or investment-per-person ratios. Thailand's Third Power project, the Lesotho Highlands Water Supply project, and * Compare resettlement costs across coun- Argentina's Yacyreta II project. Even so, tries or projects. because no standard presentation form (see box 5.9) based on systematic criteria is currently * Arrive at systematic standards or criteria to used to break costs down, comparison and help country departments prepare or assess retrospective analysis remains difficult. resettlement programs. The lack of a standard presentation of resettle- * Provide guidelines and establish require- ment costs has several drawbacks ; with the ments for Borrowers, consultants, and Environment Departnent 143 Resettlement and Development Box 5.9. A summary presentation of resettlement costs While cost reporting exercises must remain sufficlently flexible to reflect the needs of individual projects, the adoption of a simple set of resettlement costs for sunmmary presentation in appraisal reports and project completion reports could significantly enhance the quality of cost estimates and comparisons. Guidelines for the economic and financial analysis of resettlement were provided in 1988. The following grouping could be considered to ensure uniformity in project evaluation. * Compensation costs. Mainly the costs of land, houses, and other assets acquired and compensation payments for lost incomes; also includes the costs of censuses, surveys, and valuations studies in the project area. * Resettlement costs. These include costs of land acquisition in the resettlement area, new housing and local infrastructure, necessary studies, transportation of people and their belongings, transitional income payments, investments to compensate the host population affected by the resettlement, and efforts to protect the environment in the resettlement area. * Rehabilitation costs. Costs of activities to support income restoration and improved living conditions of the affected population beyond compensation and resettlement components: may include additional local development projects, new services, agricultural extension, training, employment creation, and loans. * Administrative costs. Costs of staff, offices, technical assistance, community participation activities, communication, and similar items, if it is possible to separate them from general project overheads. * Costs of lost regional or national public assets. Replacement costs over and above the infrastructure built for the local resettlement component. This would include national roads, bridges, and any other national or regional infrastructure that has to be rebuilt because of the project. Source: Michael M. Cernea, Involuntary Resettement in Development Projects, World Bank Technical Paper No. 80, 1988. contractors to assess and present resettle- are both common. Bank policy cautions ment costs.7 Borrowers against providing compensation at less than market rates because the resettlers These limitations affect the Bank's own ability themselves, involuntarily displaced from their to evaluate and finance resettlement proposals. homes, have no choice but to buy new assets. In China, private businesses are often Costs accruing to displaced people undercompensated for lost assets; in projects such as the Shanghai Metropolitan Urban When resettlement costs are assessed incor- Transport or Shanghai Sewerage, state-owned rectly, local communities must bear an undue enterprises and private businesses are expected share of the burden. Two types of problems are to absorb many resettlement costs.8 Since prominent. profitability affects the enterprise worker whose salaries are made up in significant First, compensation rates rarely reflect the true part of bonuses from profits, such cost replacement value of lost assets, particularly apportioning techniques force employees to for resettlers who must replace lost land. bear a disproportionate share of Depreciation of assets that must be replaced at resettlement's costs. In the Karnataka Irriga- market costs and property underassessments tion project in India, local courts raised 144 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement compensation rates up to five times the value equally serious. Of eight projects, none began assessed by project officers, but only for with an adequate budget and the average cost those who could afford to bring a case. A overrun in the region exceeded overall project Bank review of compensation in four Indian cost inflation by approximately 70 percent. states found chronic problems in compensa- tion assessments and payment.' Recalculated More recent projects show a significant increase costs for land acquisition and resettlement in in per capita budget allocations for resettle- Turkey's delayed Kayraktepe project went ment, reflecting better financial provisioning in from an estimated $30 million in 1986 to general, with significant variations between more than $180 million in late 1993, an projects. On average, projects that closed in the increase due partially to economic growth 1980s spent two to three times the per capita but primarily to initial underassessments of GNP of the Borrower country on resettlement property values. by project completion. Staff Appraisal Reports of most recent resettlement projects estimate Second, delays in paying compensation erode per capita resettlement costs at 3 to 5 times the the real value of the compensation and force per capita GNP of the Borrower country in the displaced families to maintain themselves, appraisal year. The close correlation between leaving them with inadequate means to acquire per capita expenditure and overall resettlement a new permanent site. Long delays in paying performance suggests that this growth repre- compensation are common: a case study in sents a positive trend, provided that the all too Nepal found an average delay of ten years common increase in the number of people to be between property expropriation and compensa- resettled does not pull down final per capita tion payment. OED's 1992 study of the figures. Karnataka Irrigation project found families, displaced in the mnid-1970s, that had yet to Figure 5.1 graphs resettlement budgets by receive their compensation. In Ghana's Kjpong comparing per capita resettlement allocations project, governmental shortfalls meant that with per capita GNP figures.u The graph compensation was never paid to the 7,000 shows the high degree of variance in the capital affected people and their host communities. investments allocated for resettlement China's Ertan Hydroelectric project, for example, Adequacy of resettlement budgets provides resettders with nearly 13 times the Reviews of recently completed projects point to resources/income ratio that the Tana Plain recurrent underestimations of resettlement's project does in Madagascar. As a whole, in true cost as a chronic problem. No active fact, China's investment ratios compare favor- projects have spent less than appraisal esti- ably with resettlement in the United States, mates on per capita resettlement except by Canada, or France. There was little variation dropping the component, and the majority are by sector, although within the same country spending significantly more. Cost overrnls for agricultural projects reserved somewhat less resettlement have generally exceeded overall money for resettlement than energy or infra- project cost increases considerably. The Bank's structure projects. As noted below, on average Industry and Energy Departmnent's analys]is of newer projects invested considerably more all energy projects involving resettlement money in resettlement than did older projects. found overall cost overruns averaged 35 percent for hydroelectric dams and 10 percent There is a close correlation between the invest- for thermal power plants, while resettlement ment levels described in table 5.5 and project cost overruns averaged 54 percent.-' The two capabilities. None of the projects with a ratio Asia regional reviews found shortfalls in initial of 3.5 or higher has reported major resettlement financing in all projects reviewed. Cost infla- difficulties. In contrast, virtually all of the tion for resettlement in Latin America has been projects with a ratio lower than 2.0 are experi- Environent Department 145 Resettlement and Development r~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ Figure 5.1 RESOURCE ALLOCATION FOR RESETTLEMENT China Emn Hy dto Kenya.- Third laiobir Water Nepal - Arm III R:ad China-T anjin Urban China- - Slmil Hy dto Chine - ailan y China - Shandong Hwy China - Taihu Flood Prot Uganda -Powerlt A.ii Thailand - Mae Mb Lignirt ldia - NTPC: Vmd. Cbina - imniA Hwy Leodijo- HagMaia sWamr Y China - D gagaMeldt China - Inner Mongolia Ratilway Malawi - Norfhern Transport Cameroon - Urban l&Il Argendena - Yacy retiL Hydro. India - Maharasua I1rg J hrail - Water Quality India- GujarmtMed Irgl India-NTPC:Ran.. nda-Upper Kfishna II Nigeria - Mulutete Water Madagascar - Tans Plain India - pezIdaat.yr India - Hly derabad W ater 0 2 4 6 a 1C 12 Resetiler Compensafion/GDP 1991 encing serious implementation difficulfies. ment of refources is clearly the first step Throwing money at resettlement will not solve towards a resettlement failure. all resettlement problems, but starving resettle- 146 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Bank financefor resettlement actual or expected econoniuc rate of return of several projects to very low levels (India: Fewer than 15 percent of the projects reviewed Andhra Pradesh hrrigation; Mauritania: Gorgol included Bank funding for resettlement activi- An; Pra: Irng ah Mauntion). ties. Lack of Bank participation in resettlement Irrigation; India: Subemarekha Irrigation). finance is a common cause cited by task m- Colombias Guatape II Hydro project offers an agers and counterpart staff for many resettle- P ment problems. Constrained budgets and ...the resettlement and compensatio of un-rehable financial provisioning can be over- the individuals who were affected by come by increasing the Bank's share m resettle- inundation required lengthy negotiations, ment finance. Post-relocation development is lagely because the Borrower and the Bank eligible for Bank assistance. More recent . . . projects such as the Hyderabad Water Supply failed to anticlpate the complexity of the proiect in India or the Vietnam Highways problem involved .........The final costs of the project increase Bank support for resettlement. resettlement, in US$ equivalent, was more than double the original estimate and the The Economic Costs of Resettlement process took about three years longer than envisaged. This delay, which in turn Programs delayed the filling of the reservoir and Poor resettlement can undermine a project's storing of water energy, cost the economy economic objectives in two senses. First, the equivalent of...energy generation for an inadequate preparation can cause project entire year. (World Bank, 1981 PPAR delays, which in turn can reduce project Colombia Guatape II Hydroelectric Project, benefits. Second, in some cases, failing to Report No. 3718, p.iv). account adequately for resettlement can exaggerate a project's attractiveness and, in The resulting electricity losses amounted to extreme cases, can encourage economically $25.5 nillion of unsold energy, equivalent to marginal projects to proceed when alternative 18 percent of the total project cost. investmnents would have been superior. Solnd resettlement preparation, on the other hand, When the benefits of a project are delayed by can enhance a project's retums. It facilitates one or more years, the economic rate of return smooth implementation, and the increased can fall by several points. A one-year delay in incomes of resettlers can boost a project's rate project benefits (with no delay in the schedule of return. of project costs) will reduce some project's net present value by almost a third; a two-year Poorly planned resettlement often leads to delay, by more than half. Gains from avoiding delays in project benefits. In a recent review of these large losses are usually more than suffi- 123 projects in the Asian region, as many as cient to finance the entire cost of resettlement. 30 percent were delayed because of land In Colombia's Guatape I, a project with very acquisition and resettlement problems; the high resettlement costs -22 percent at evalua- average delay was approximately two years. A tion - foregone benefits from even a one-year draft review of more than 580 irrigation delay rather than the three years actually projects (OED, 1993) found that 22 percent of experienced, would have amounted to 83 per- the projects reported delays from similar land cent of resettlement costs. This proportion can acquisition and resettlement problems. Prcjects be much higher for projects with small resettle- in Africa, such as the Cameroon Urban II, have ment components. In Turkey's Berke Hydro- been halted because counterpart compensation electric project, where resettlement costs are funds failed to materialize and local residents only 1 percent of total costs at appraisal, a refused to be resettled. Such delays and cost hypothetical delay of one year would reduce overruns have contributed to driving downi the the project's present value by $30 million Environment Department 147 Resettlement and Development dollars, five times the project's appraised are not much greater than the opportunity cost resettlement costs. of capital, the viability of the project may be threatened if full provisioning is made for Successful resettlement, on the other hand can resettlement. In such cases, major rethinking of augment project benefits. In India: Maharashtra the project dearly is required. For most cases, Composite Irrigation II project, individuals who however, the evidence suggests that it is poor were resettled in the cornmand area maeased resettlement planning and management rather their productivity significantly. Likewise, fisher- than providing adequate financing for resettle- ies in the Saguling reservoir (Indonesia: Tenth ment that reduces project returns. Power project) have come up with a thriving business that adds to overall project benefits. It has been argued that if all resettlement costs Indeed, 5 percent of the resettled population were assessed, some projects would be dis- produces several times the previous agricultural carded on economic grounds. This argument production of the entire flooded area (see Chap- assumes that resettlement and environmental ter 4, box 42). costs are much higher than currently estimated at project appraisal. However, while several Resettlement costs and project evaluations of several closed projects in the returns Bank's portfolio confirm that cost overruns have reduced projects' economic benefits, Providing adequate finance for resettlement to overruns were rarely large enough to jeopar- ensure income restoration, and accounting fully dize the project's economic benefits by them- for such costs in a project's economic appraisal selves. Instead, a combination of overall cost will affect the overall attractiveness of the increases (including resettlement costs) and project. But could providing adequate finance reduced earnings are usually identified as the for resettlement jeopardize project viability? sources of project failures (examples include The evidence suggests that in most cases this is Zaire-Rwanda-Burundi: Ruzizi II; Guatemala: unlikely. A careful review of completed Chixoy). Projects shows that cost overruns for resettle- ment were not a major cause of disappointing Common Factors in Preparation and project performance. Cost overruns for physi- cal works and delays brought about by resettle- Appraisal Difficulties ment were the dominant reasons why some projects perform less well than anticipated. This chapter has documented recent progress in project preparation and appraisal, but has It may be argued, however, that even where focused primarily on areas needing improve- resettlement costs rose above what had been ment. In reviewing existing weaknesses, a projected at the time of appraisal, financial number of common factors emerge: allocations were still inadequate. Would further cost increases have jeopardized project * Compensation, not income restoration kas viability? Here again the evidence suggests been the objective of many resettlement that providing adequate resources for rehabili- plans prepared by Borrowers. If straight tation would seldom make the overall project compensation rather than socioeconomic unattractive because resettlement generally restitution is the goal, it is not surprising (though not always) accounts for a small that baseline survey work and develop- proportion of total costs. This is illustrated in ment of rehabilitation packages are weak table 5.5, which shows the sensitivity of rates of Only 30 percent of the reviewed resettle- return in dam projects to increased spending ment programs defined income restoration on resettlement. In a small number of projects as their objective. Technical skills normally where resettlement is large and project returns used by the Bank and Borrowers for rural and urban projects that intend to develop 148 Resettlement Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement Table 5.5: Sensitivity of the internal economic rate of return to resettlement cost overruns in active hydropower projects with resettlement Region/Country/Project Project Approved Estimated Rate Resettlement as % Necessary % increase of Return (1) of total project in resettlement costs cost (2) to lower theproject's return below 12 percent (3) Africa C.A.R., M'Bali Energy I 1989 14.6 5.3-8.9 337-566 Lesotho, Highlands 1992 12.0 4.8 416 Asia China, Yantan Hydro 1986 12 12.9 77 China, Ertan Hydro 1992 15 6.4 375 China, Daguangba Hydro 1992 15 17.3 145 China, Sbuikou I and II 1987 14-19 28.2 71-248 India, Upper Indravati Hydro 1983 12 5.2 200 india, Kerala Power 1985 13 3.0 500 India, Nathpa Jhakri Hydro 1989 17 0.04 11,250 Thailand Power System m 1992 16 4.8 625 Europe, Mddle East and Norlh AImerica Turkey, BerkeHydro 1992 15 1 3,000 Latin America and the Caribbean Argentina, YacyretaIandlI 1992 24-28 14 571 Mexico Hydroelectric 1989 13 2.3 652 Average for 13 projects where estimated resetalemaet costs in SARs were 4 percent or more of total costs 259 Average for 6 projects where estimated resettlement costs in SARs were 10 percent or more of total costs 158 (1) Estimated internal economic rate of return ([ERR) at appraisal. (2) Figures are taken from Anderson and Gutman, 1994 with all the restrictions mentioned therein. (3) Ihis measures the percentage increase in resettlement costs that would reduce the IERR below the opportunity cost of capital (assumed to be 12 percent conservatively). Environment Department 149 Resettlement and Development productivity are rarely used in resettlement rather than the result of careful preparation operations. by the Borrower that has been reviewed by the Bankl Attempts have been made to * Failure to consult with affected people, correct this through the revised EA proce- other government agencies, and NGOs dures and greater use of FEPS and Regional produces poor quality plans. Plans that are Loan Conmmittee meetings. negotiated with affected people and establish grievance procedures are more * Processing has continued despite incom- realistic and likely to work. Top-down plete planning. An appraised resettlement plans are often technically inappropriate plan has been a Bank processing require- and not accepted by the people and agen- ment since 1980. Nevertheless, although cies expected to implement them. project appraisal may determine that plans are inadequate, project processing often *The financial provisioning and adequacy of continued through to negotiations, Board resource flows for resettlement has fallen presentation, or project implementation short of what is needed. Resettlement costs rather than requiring an acceptable plan are often measured against outdated and before any further processing took place, as inadequate compensation records rather is standard practice with other compo- than the real costs of income restoration nents. that the resettlers must bear. Constrained budgets and rigid procedures within Each of these problems can be remedied. project agencies further limit their ability to Government planning capabilities are being make investments needed for income strengthened and new approaches introduced restoration, to sectoral agencies. Processing resettlement components that meet the spirit as well as the * Preparation and appraisal resources have letter of Bank resettlement policy must be often been earmarked for other project internalized within individual country components and are not available for departments, and resettlement needs to developing resettlement programs. Be- become an integral part of project designs. cause it is complex, resettlement is a Country department directors, project advis- staff-intensive activity, yet few projects ers, and regional managers need to be kept allocate adequate, incremental resources fully aware of the status of resettlement for preparing and appraising resettlement operations, and must erhance their efforts to and available Bank resources (PPF) are ensure that the final design for each project -rarely used by Borrowers for resettlement involving resettlement fully reflects Bank planning. policy. Actions underway to address short- comings in preparation and appraisal are * Intermal review procedures within the Bank discussed in Chapter 8. have not adequately captured projects with resettlement at a sufficiently early stage. Notes Until 1990, there was no systematic flag- Nts ging of resettement at an oES stage and In the Nannada Sardar Sarovar project, the Borrower ging of reettlementat an IEPSstage andinitially did not include many of the tribal cultivators no mechanism to check the quality of lcking formal land titles. Borrower policies were project preparation. Resettlement planning adjusted to include all people affected by the project, often began late in project development, as agreed with the Bank and required by the without adequate technical design or government's original Narmada Water Dispute tribunalAward. When surveys were updated and adequate understanding or agreement by adjusted to reflect expanded entitlements, the total Borrowers. Many of the plans are prepared resettler population rose from 67,000 people in 1985 to to meet a formal processing requirement, approximately 127,000 in 1992. 150 Resettletnent Series Preparation and Appraisal of Projects with Resettlement 2 These were: Brazil: Paolo Afonso IV (involuntatry), 6 Lgal Aspets of Involuntary Resettement, draft report Agricultural Development and environmental prepared by the Legal Department for the Bankwide Protection, Mato Grosso Rural Development (volun- Resettlement Review, February, 1994. tary); Indonesia: 13th Power (involuntary), ' See David Pearce, The Economics of Involuntary Transmigration 11,, IV (voluntary); India: Gujarat Resettlment: A Report to the World Bank, fora more Irrigation (involuntary), Rajasthan Canal Command detailed treatnent of the financial cakulation of Area Development (voluntary); China: Shuikou resettlement costs in Bank projects. Hydroelectric (involuntary), Red SoilsArea Develop- 8 China: Involuntary Resettlement,Report No. 11641- ment (voluntary); Ghana: Kpong Hydroelectric CHA, June 8,1993. (involuntary), Volta Region Agricultural Development SumitBse India Land Acquisition and Resettlement: (voluntary). Pro cesss and Procedures, March, 1991. 3 lo See Dennis Anderson and Pablo Gutman, Involuntary 3 . Eriksen,k A CospcnW son of Volunitay and Pe Inolup Resettlement in Hydro Provects, paper prepared by Resettlement in World Bank-Assisted Projects, paper IENED for the Bankwide Resettlement Review, 1993. prepared for the Bankwide Resettlement Reviewv, 1993. Certain caveats are relevant. First, per capita GNP 4 Important exceptions include two very large projects: figures are at best a rough indicator regional and bcal India, Upper Krishna Irrigation II, and the China, variation can render them irrelevant. Comparing Xiaolangdi project. investment budgets with current income would have Of the remaining 16 projects, one was a sector loan, been preferable, but there were so few cases where while another involved only 17 families and dki not baseline surveys recorded current income that this was require a fonnal plan. Fourteen projects involving a not possible. Second, przect budgets often aggregate total of 500,000 resettlers did not conform to this basic resettlementbudgets with compensation forcivil works; Bank requirement of preparing a resettlement plan by in this case plans were reviewed to remove them. All the time of appraisal. figures are adjusted to 1991 levels. Environment Department 151 I I 6. Project Supervision and Implementation Performance Implementation of resettlement components is substantialy in the past two years. Neverthe- the responsibility of the Borrower, but the Bank less, problems remain that require significant also has a responsibility to ensure that imp]e- changes in how country departments approach mentation is consistent with project documents resettlement supervision. and Bank policies. The Bank has several tools to assess project implementation, of which * Frequency. The proportion of supervision project supervision is the most important.1 missions reporting on resettlement was Supervision missions constant or increased slightly between FY86-FY92, with a major improvement Monitor Borrower compliance with devel- taking place during the FY93 review opment objectives and project plans. period. Resettlement components in virtually all large irrigation and hydroelec- - Provide technical assistance. tric projects now receive regular supervi- sion, many by resettlement specialists. - Suggest mid-course corrections. Nevertheless, only 56 percent of all FY86-93 missions to projects with resettlement * Inform Barnk management on implementta- actually reported on resettlement progress, tion status and request intervention if and less than 25 percent used resettlement required. specialists. Resettlement supervision is in principle no * Quality. The quality of Bank supervision is different from the supervision of any other variable. Neither the Bank as a whole nor project component, although the time, re- most country departments have had sources, and skills required for effective super- sufficient specialist resources to provide vision of resettlement may differ. Effective adequate supervision. Technical depart- supervision depends on Country Departmients' ments, which are expected to provide ability to alocate resources commensurate with specialist assistance, have tended to con- the complexity and specific needs of individual centrate their scarce resources primarily on projects, and their wilingness to act promptly project design and appraisal. Recent on the findings. Project performance, on the initiatives to strengthen supervision other hand, depends largely on Borrowers" capabilities by developing Bank regional commitment to project objectives or "owner- offices or resident missions and Borrowers' ship", and their institutional and other capaci- own monitoring abilities have led to ties to execute the project. significant improvements. Main Findings * Availability of information. Lack of resettlement plans and inadequate report- The frequency, quality, and effectiveness ofE ing formats have made it difficult for Bank resettlement supervision have improved supervision missions to obtain necessary Environment Department 153 Resettlement and Development information in a consistent manner.. The additional instruments as nid-term reviews quality of Bank back-to-office reports has and sometimes independent technical review been mnixed, reflecting a limited ability of panels appointed by the Borrowers to assess supervision missions to make field visits. project implementation. Effectiveness. Supervision has not been This improvement is in contrast with earlier used as effectively as it could have been. years. The review of 80 active projects involv- Resettlement supervision is most effective ing resettlement reveals great variability in the as a form of technical assistance to help intensity of supervision between FY86-FY93. Borrowers refine and improve resettlement The review of supervision files found that, plans already agreed with the Bank. It is prior to FY93, 130 missions which supervised least effective as a substitute for adequate 15 projects resettling 105,000 people, made no planning. Supervision also helps to assure reference to resettlement. At least annual that policy objectives will be achieved supervision of resettlement occurred in only 55 when advance planning is not possible, percent of the sample, and only 30 percent of such as for program lending or projects the projects in the sample were visited regu- where detailed designs are finalized only larly by Bank resettlement specialists. Resettle- during implementation. Such projects ment specialists were involved in 24 percent of typically receive the least supervision. the 696 missions supervising projects with resettlement. However, until the review began, Borrower implementation approximately 40 percent of all specialist perfonnance missions had concentrated on just nine Supervision missions have identified five projects with the largest resettlement opera- Supervision missions have identified five tions and with the most complex implemen- factors that account for uneven project imple- tation problems. mentation. These are: (i) inadequate govern- ment commitment and non-compliance with Significant regional differences exist in the project agreements; (ii) failure to allocate extent towich reserences exised. resources; (iii) institutional weaknesses; (iv) extent to which resettlment is supervised. lack of people's participation in project design LAC scores particularly well: task managers and execution; and (v) poor technical designs supervise resettlement on a regular basis, and in resettlement pans. this region takes greatest advantage of special- in resefflement plans. ist expertise (table 6.1). South Asia's supervi- Supervision in Practice sion capacity has been strengthened signifi- cantly since the formation of the resettlenent Supervision of active projects reflects the unit in the New Delhi office. In contrast, overall progress on resettlement made by the resettlement in projects in Africa was super- Bank between 1986 and 1993.2 The number of vised only intermittently either by specialists or projects where resettlement was supervised by task managers until the review began. increased immediately after the 1986 review but declined somewhat until the beginning of There are also significant variations in sectoral the current review. The extra attention and approaches to resettlement. Resettlement was resources recently assigned to resettlement supervised at least annually in nearly all produced a dramatic increase in resettlement agriculture and energy projects, but 45 percent supervision in the FY93-FY94 review period of the 49 transportation, water supply, and (figure 6.1). Resettlement components in all urban (TWU) projects with resettlement in the large irrigation and hydroelectric projects now sample did not refer to progress in resettlement receive regular supervision. Projects involving in any mission reports. Specialist supervision large-scale displacement increasingly use such shows a similar distribution (table 6.2). 154 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance Figure 6.1 RESETTLEMENT SUPERVISION Percent 100 6 0 *. , , 1-, -.-.:. Percentage of missions by resettlement specialists . Percentage of missions I supervising resettlement 20 I n ~ .. ' ..,-.....7 , 86 87 SS 89 90 91 92 93 Year Use of specialists. All of the regional reports compensate forlack of capacity on the part of prepared for the review indicate that social the implementing agency. But the general specialists contribute a distinct "value added" conclusion from these specialist visits is that to implementation quality and performance in much more could be done to enhance the develop- resettlement. The Africa regional report states ment impact of projects by attending more closely this point well: to the problems of displaced people, even when resettlement is being executed in a satisfactory "The links between project performance and way. Resettlement specialists have been able to participation of a resettlement specialist are assist governments in dealing with unantici- increasingly clear. Continuous involvement of pated problems and to bring other actors a specialist helps produce good project designs (NGOs, donors) into the picture. Such assis- and resolve implementation problems as they tance has generally been welcomed by the come up. Of course, it carmot overcome thte implementing Governments, and their supervi- obstacles presented by lack of political wiLl on sion recommendations have been followed up the part of government, and can only partly on the ground."3 Environment Departnent 155 Resettlement and Development Table 6.1. Resettlement supervision by region 1986 - 1993 REGION AFR EAP ECA L4C MNA SAS TOTAL Number of projects with resettlement 19 26 4 6 3 22 80* % with resetlement sperised at least once per year 47 42 50 100 33 68 55 % with specialist supervision at least once per year 11 27 25 100 33 32 30 * This number refers to the sample for the in-depth supervision study. Actual use of resettlement expertise on projects programs adequately without requiring special has been uneven. Only 18 percent of TWU Bank attention. Resettlement in India's Nathpa projects were supervised annually by special- Jhaki hydropower project also appears to have ists, despite the fact that TWU accounts for 51 performed relatively welL percent of all projects involving resettlement. Participation of resettlement specialists is thus In most cases, however, ignoring resettlement not routine. Specialists tend to be used when until it becomes a problem is counter-produc- resettlement is identified as an issue during tive for the Bank as well as Borrowers (box 6.1). project design and appraisal or when resettle- Resettlement operations in several previously ment has become a major problem, either unsupervised projects, such as the Douala because it delays implementation or triggers Infrastructure project in Cameroon, the Nigeria public criticism. Multi-State Water Supply project, and the Regional Cities Urban Transport in Indonesia Does it matter? Lack of resettlement supervi- have already become problematic. In such sion does not necessarily mean that projects are cases, belated supervision is better than no not performing welL Several Chinese projects supervision, but it is unrealistic to expect much supervised during the Bankwide Review, for to be accomplished so late into project imple- example, were implementing resettlement mentation. Table 6.2 Resettlement supervision by sectors, 1986 - 1993 Seaors AGR ZEN TWU Number of Projects* 10 24 44 Resetlement supervised at least once per year (percent) 80 75 39 Specialists used at least once per year (percent) 50 42 18 Total Supervision Missions 147 216 316 Missions reporting on resettlement (percent) 67 64 46 Missions using specialists (percent) 40 27 15 * The sample of 80 projects included 1 ENV and 1 PHR project. They are not included in this table. 156 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance Box 6.1. Does resettlement supervision matter? The Kedung Ombo Multipurpose project in Indonesia was appraised in 1984 and became effective in 1985. A total of 5,268 families from 20 villages were required to relocate because of the project. Planning began early, and a detailed plan was appraised by the Bank. The plan assumed that 75 percent of the displaced population would join Indonesia's overall transrmigration program. Government reports to the Bank indicated a regular process of relocation through transmigration along with the project's civil works. By 1987 the government assured the Bank that only 80 families remained in the area. Project supervision occasionally commented on resettlement, but primarily in terms of project delays caused by slow land acquisition. Three years into implementation, letters to the Bank from Indonesian NGOs giving different information prompted a specialist supervision mission to assess the contradictory reports on resettlement. The mission found that a majority of the affected people had refused to join the transmigration program and were still in the part of the reservoir scheduled to be flocded. Compensation offered to these 3,800 families was substantially less than the cost of replacing their lost assets, and most refused to accept it. The Government failed to take the recommended actions, and irn 1989 the authorities made the dam operational in spite of assurances to the Bank that it would not do so until the people had moved out of the reservoir. After a Bank specialist mission was refused aocess to the flooded area, strategic higher level discussions reached agreement on a new resettlement plan. Follow-up Bank specialist missions worked wit-h the government and local NGOs to prepare corrective action for the remaining resettlers. Implementation of this plan has produced a significantly better outcome, but the cost of not supervising resettlement in the early years was high for all involved parties. the debate over "incrementalism". For sorme edented resource levels into the incremental years there has been an active debate in the approach, the Bank found that while there were Bank over the suitability of incrementar many improvements, "much of this progress approaches to resettlement. "Incrementalismr" was needed simply to overcome original means that supervision is used to obtain succes- shortfalls and back-sliding".4 Furthermore, sive, small improvements to achieve overall incrementalism was increasingly resented by project resettlement objectives when preparation the Borrower, which saw not incrementalism, has not been adequate arnd the Bank and Bor-' but moving goal posts. In contrast, preparation rower have not agreed on resettlement objectives of the Upper Krishna Irrigation II project reached and means. Much of the debate over the Bank's agreement on resettlement's objectives and the strategy in the Narmada Sardar Sarovar project, resettlement plan (box 6.2). Supervision thus for example, was about the adequacy and focused on the adequacy of plan implementation. effectiveness of incrementalism. The debate, however, is more semantic than Accounting for Variability in substantial. All development is in some sense Supervising Resettlement incremental: no amount of advance planning can avoid the need for adjustments, improve- Focus groups and interviews with task manag- ments, and close attention to field realities. Yet ers and division chiefs reveal a number of to the extent that "incrementalism" is used as a common causes for the variability in supervi- substitute for the resettlement planning defined sion intensity in the period up to 1992 (box 6.3). by Bank policy, the field record of its failure as an operational strategy is clear. Even in the Absence of perceived need. Because resettle- Narmada case, where the Bank put unprec- ment has often been scheduled to occur in the Environment Department 157 Resettement and Development Box 62 Effective portfolio management - resettlement in the Upper Krishna II project The Almatti and Narayanpur damns being built in the Indian state of Karnataka will displace over 220,000 people. The project appraisal report and legal documents provide thorough descriptions of the resettlement activities to be financed under the project and carried out by the Government of Karnataka. A resettlement action plan was prepared with the assistance of a large non-govemmental organization (MYRADA) as part of project preparation and appraisal, and a pilot program tested the feasibility of the project's resettlement proposals. During the first years of the project, 1989 and 1990, Karnataka's performance was not satisfactory. Follow- ing a mid-term review and follow-up supervision, the Bank suspended disbursements. Reinstatement of project disbursement was to follow a two-step procedure: (a) disbursements for the resettlement and canal components could begin once an initial set of benchmarks was met, expanding entitlements and linking resettlement with civil works timetables; and (b) disbursements for the project as a whole could resume once a second set of benchmarks was met, including purchase of replacement agricultural land and starting income generating programs. In all, the Bank set ten monitorable benchmarks that had to be met before the full suspension would be lifted. The Government responded to the suspension by appointing a high-level comrnittee to ensure that the benchmarks would be met. Resettlers were informed of their rights, the project's resettlement wing became operational, and money was allocated to the resettlement works. Despite these improvements, the Bank maintained the suspension until the fuhl set of benchmarks were met. Over the next year, close supervision and sustained discussions with the governnent helped the Borrower meet all ten benchmarks, and the suspension was lifted in March 1994. Several important lessons were learned about managing problematic resettlement components. Prompt action by Bank management sent the borrower a clear signal that resettlement performance counted as much as performance on other project components. Decisive action by the Bank and transparent bench- marks actually improved dialogue with the government. In addition, the creative use of legal remedies - the partial suspension - allowed the borrower to make up for time lost on resettlement, so that when disbursements resumed, the resettlement and engineering timetables were again synchronized. Finally, insisting on full compliance with the Bank's benchmarks, rather than hoping for incremental improve- ments, led to major improvements in the Borrower's approach to the entire resettlement program. latter phases of a project, task managers have procurement components. In large operations, often not perceived a need to supervise resettle- resettlement sites can be at substantial dis- ment in the project's early years. In reality, the tances from the main project works. The early years are vital for relocation preparatiorL number of available mission days is often insufficient to visit resettlement operations and Absence of resources for supervision. Task make site assessments of performance. Meet- managers have sometimes assumed that ings with resettlers, local government officials, supervising resettlement requires sacrificing and local organizations require additional time supervision of other project components. unlikly to be available for teams whose main Unless there is an explicit demand to supervise concerns and professional expertise are else- resettlement, it has been less likely to happen where. during general project supervision because of time constraints and demands on mnission time Absence of performance indicators. To a large for reviewing civil works, financial, and extent, the problem of absent performance 158 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance Box 6.3. Contrasting examples of Bank supervision and follow-up Pakistan's Left Bank Outfall project did not include resettlement plans appraised by the Bank. Bank supervision missions found that the scale of resettlement was much larger than initially anticipated and that compensation procedures would not restore displaced people to their pre-project living standards. Even though bids for contracts had already been let, action by the Bank included a specialist review mission and reformulation of the project to develop appropriate resettlement programs. Close collabora- tion between the Bank and Borrower have led to redesigns that lower resettlement needs and provide adequate measures to resettle the remainder. Indonesia's Jabotabek Urban Development project displaced nearly 30,000 and adversely affected in various ways twice as many people, yet no special measures were taken to address land acquisition and resettlement. Both concerns were flagged early, and the Bank and the Borrower agreed to study the resettlement situation and develop approprialte action plans. No sound resettlement options were devel- oped, and no measures were taken to address cash compensation problems. Shortly before the loan became effective, a Bank specialist reviewed the project and urged close supervision and follow-up, but no follow up action was taken. Two missions briefly noted land acquisition problems, but no agreements on how to proceed were reached with project authorities. This project has now reached the point where major corrective actions are needed. indicators flows from the lack of adequate the neighboring sectoral divisions within the plans against which progress can be assessed, same Country Departments. and lack of reliable project-generated informna- tion. Task managers and specialists alike have Recent Improvements difficulty interpreting the findings of brief field visits unless there is a consolidated initial plan The quality and intensity of resettlement and timetable for what is supposed to happ'en, supervision improved dramatically over the against which progress on the variables critical course of the Bankwide review. The 12 month for resettlement success can be measured. period provided time for two rounds of super- vision, particularly of projects with large Absence of appropriate skill mixes. Task resettlement components. The first round managers have sometimes felt ill-equipped to identified issues and reached agreements with assess whether resettlement operations are Borrowers on specific remedies; the subsequent being successfully inplemented. In hydro- round evaluated and reported on the improve- power projects, for instance, rural resettlement ments actually implemented (table 6.3). In total, involves a high degree of agricultural develop- 93 projects were reviewed in the field, includ- ment planning and urban resettlement caused ing almost aDL projects with resettlement by transport or water projects essentially affecting over 1000 people, through a total of involves housing and urban development: 158 missions. both sets of skills are very different from those of the power or highway engineer. Not includ- Sending out such a large number of missions in ing technical specialists is only part of a 1993 was a substantial effort; a limited segment broader problem. The most successful opera- of the portfolio, consisting of projects with less tions include mies of skills, such as agricu3Ltural immediate supervision needs, could not be economnists, soil specialists, architects, or urban covered. The capacities of all Technical Depart- planners as they are needed, in addition to ments (TDs), relevant Country Departments, overall specialists in resettlement operations as and many staff were stretched to meet the such. These technical skills normally exist: in review's supervision schedule, as well as to Environment Department 159 Resettlement and Development Table 6.3. Resettlement supervision, 1993 First Supervision Second Supervision Total Region Projects with Resettlment Janury - June July - December January - December Projects Specialist Projecs SpeciaUst Projects Specialist Visited Assistance Visited Assistunce Visited Assistance AFR 26 22 16 22 15 26 23 SAS 32 13 12 14 12 19 16 EAP 55 25 13 9 2 30 15 ECA 5 4 4 4 4 5 S MNA 8 5 2 5 2 6 3 LAC 8 7 7 7 3 7 7 TOTAL 134* 76 54 61 38 93 69 * In some active projects, resettlement has been completed and did not require resettlement supervision. The table does not include projects identified in the latter part of the Review, continue to prepare FY94-FY95 projects with exception of the Cote d'Ivoire Forestry, the resettlement The field program would not Lesotho Highland Water project, the Central have been feasible without the $500,000 mid- African Republic M'bali Energy project, and the year supplementary budget allocated by Kenya Third Nairobi Water project, none of the management for this exercise. It was used active projects with resettlement in the region primarily for additional consultants to join had been supervised by a resettlement special- supervision missions. ist. During this review, the Africa region sent resettlement specialists to analyze project The review's field missions were carried out situations and propose remedial actions not under "Generic Terms of Reference" for the only where Task Managers had identified a review/supervision missions, developed by crisis, but also to many projects where regular ENV's Task Force and approved by the Steering project supervision had reported no problems.5 Committee. The terms of reference required By the completion of the review, more than the missions to go beyond short-term aspects two-thirds of active projects in the portfolio and explore basic goals and technical issues in (with the exception of recently identified resettlement components: restoration of pre- projects) were visited at least once, and in some displacement income levels; land availability cases twice, by a resettlement specialist. Re- and valuation; cash compensation pattems; settlement specialists, staff or consultants, were consultation with affected people; and the on 71 percent of supervision missions in the Borrower's organizational capacity for resettle- first round and 58 percent in the second round. ment (see Annex, Generic TOR). The same is true for the Middle East/European and Latin America Caribbean departments. The skill mix used for supervising and guiding projects was changed to increase specialist use. Much of the specialist expertise used on Bank Task Managers perceived this as welcome resettlement came from the country. Experi- support. In the Africa region, for example, ence in the review thus demonstrated that projects with resettlement rarely had the significant human resources exist to help solve benefit of specialist supervision. With the resettlement difficulties that can be used more 160 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance extensively by the Bank in future work that Lack of government commitment would not irvolve the high costs and compli- to resettlement cated arrangements of hitemnatimnal recruit Terstemnpofooelcsinir- ment. Involving specialists from area institu- The resettlement portfolio reflects in micro- tions on Bank supervision missions also helps cosm problems reported by the portfolio the Ba, an Bo.oe ag.ce deeo management Task Force concerning Borrowers' national capacity. lack of overall compliance with legal covenants and project agreements (box 6.4). In the Chandrapur Thermal Power project, for Regional managers note that it is unlikely that example, supervision found cash compensation supervision levels achieved during the review being paid to resettlers despite an explicit can be sustaimed afterwards unless in-house agreement to resettle people on land as spei- specialist staff are available. The MNA/ECA fied in the Maharashtra Displaced Persons Act regional report points out that even if Task The PCR for the Madhya Pradesdh Medium Managers obtain short-term consultant exper- poecR for that- tise 'they do not have the capacity to follow up project found that recommendations of consultants. Without in- ... by far the most unsatisfactory aspect of house staff expertise available to them, Task project implementation was R&R of dam Managers will continue to have difficulty with oustees. This may be considered to be due compliance; without regional oversight, this to ...the inability to proceed according to the MP lack of compliance will go unnoticed."' Resettlement Act 1985 as rules to apply the Act had never been promulgated. The last point is Supervision Findings of particular importance as GOMP had assured the Bank at Credit negotiations that the Act Supervision missions tend to report a relatively was being introduced and would be the vehicle small number of recurrent implementation for R&R activities under the project. In the problems in resettlement operations. event, it was never applied. (PCR Cr. 1108-IN) Box 6.t, The price of ignorance The experience of the Guavio Hydroelectric project in Colombia highlights the people's "need to know" about their resettlement nghts. Although rumors about the project abounded in the remote valley of the Colombian Andes, little concrete informationi about the project was made available to the poor, rural, and largely illiterate people who would be affected by it. The ominous chalk marks across the hillside to mark the limits of the future reservoir were the only indication of what was to come. It did not take long for local entrepreneurs to realize that money was to be made. They provided people with false information that was not countered by the construction company. Uneasy farmers were told that bulldozers would raze their houses, that government tax men would take away their compensation, that promised checks would take years to be paid. In exchange for small cash payments, the frightened people were persuaded to relinquish land rights against promises of future compensation. The entrepre- neurs soon cashed in their new land tatles for the government's cash. Soon after the government reported to the Bank that all the land needed for the project had been acquired, government surveyors came to take over the land they had bought from the entrepreneurs. They found it occupied by people who had received, at best, a pittance for their titles, but who had neither deeds to their land nor the money to move. Unable to take possession of the farms and unable to verify who had legitimate claims, project authorities in Guavio began a costly, difficult and protracted program to investi- gate the programmatic land fraud. Environment Departnent 161 Resettlement and Development Failure to provide counterpart versely affected by failures to assign key staff; resources in aD of these projects, at one point or another supervision found Borrowers' staffing to be Thnely availability of adequate funds is a half or less than agreed levels. severe constraint in a large number of projects; it may be the single most powerful explanatory . operational variable behind the failure to Lack of participaton implement resettlement operations well. In Lack of participation of affected communities addition, costs often rise because of faulty and host populations in resettlement design preparation that underestimates the numbers of and management is a major cause of implemen- people affected and the costs of compensating tation problems, especially when the institu- them. Because Bank participation in financing tions charged with executing resettlement resettlement programs is very snall or non- programs are themselves weak. Involving local existent in most projects, the entire burden of people reduces the burden on institutions and resettlement financing fals on Borrowers. gives a monitoring role to people with the These funds frequently do not materialize. greatest interest in good performance. In Supervision for the January-June 1993 period of China's Daguangba Multipurpose project, for the Bankwide review found that a rmajor issue example, failure to involve local people in in approximately half of the projects was selecting designs led to a near-universal inadequate resource levels available for re- rejection of the contractor-built houses. Not settlement activities. Thus, the South Asia providing adequate information to affected resettlement report concluded that timely people leads to entitlement abuse (box 6.4) and disbursements of agreed-upon resources to hostility to project authorities. Inadequate resettlement organizations, and from the participation also cuts off project access to an resettlement organizations to the resettlers, has important source of necessary information. In generally been the exception rather than the the Mexico Hydroelectric project, for example, rule. In projects such as Cameroon Second relocation sites selected by project authorities Urban and Indonesia Regional Cities Urban lacked sufficient water. Significantly, when the Transport, failure to release compensation project adopted a more participatory approach, funds has led to costly implementation delays. later sites selected by the resettlers have proven to be satisfactory. Projects with greater local Inability to meet institutional contact and involvement, such as the Khao commitments Laem Hydroelectric project, the Third Urban Major problems with resettlement mstitutions Development project in Jordan, or the Kenya are very frequent: for example, two-thirds of Third Nairobi Water Supply project, have also the projects supervised in the second half of experienced fewer conflicts and delays because FY93 reported major institutional difficulties of more participatory approaches to resettle- due mainly to lack of institutional coordination ment. and Borrowers' failure to allocate adequate Technical problems qualified staff. Although local governments must often bear many of the medium and long There are several recent examples of technically term costs of resettlement, few projects include faulty planning. Resettlement planning for the measures that enhance their capacity for 42,000 people affected by the Hyderabad Water responding to additional needs. Resettlement Supply project, for example, depended on in large projects, such as the Narmada Sardar providing irrigation facilities in the 140 resettle- Sarovar, Daguangba Multipurpose, Hyderabad ment villages: recent feasibility studies found Water Supply, Rio Flood Reconstruction and that groundwater supplies are not adequate for Prevention, Upper Indravati Hydroelectric, and irrigation. The resettlement plan for the Water the Yacyreta II Hydroelectric projects, is ad- Quality and Pollution Control project in Brazil 162 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance Box 6.5. Project supervision cannot substitute for country strategies The India resettlement portfolio includes resettlement projects that range from some poorly prepared to some relatively well prepared. The key problems, however, are more or less identical in all projects. The vast amount of work invested in resettlement portfolio management focused on individual projects and their immediate problems. This meant addressing problems only as they surfaced. Similar problems in several different projects under the same state governnent institutions were addressed, often indepen- dently of one another, over and over again (e.g., Madhya Pradesh Major (FY82) and Medium (FY81), and MP's portion of Sardar Sarovar (FY85); Gujarat Medium (FY84), Sardar Sarovar in Gujarat (FY85); Karnataka Power (FY87), and Upper Krishna Irrigation (FY89) in Karnataka). In each case, policies, institutional arrangements, and compensation packages had to be negotiated and agreed upon separately. In the absence of institutions well equipped to plan and carry out resettlement, supervision missions gave very detailed recommendations, for which acmpliance could be monitored without addressing the basic flaws of the system. The India Department ranked highest in supervision among all Bank departments, both in the aggregate and on a per-project average basis. However, supervision energy was spent mostly on piecemeal, project-by-project problem resolutions, and maintaining pressure on the project executive and the government. Resettlement occurs in projects in several sectors: agriculture, thermal, urban, hydropower, and water supply. Despite the intensive effort of the past seven years, project supervision could not substitute for the absence of broad country strategies, and resettlement in Indian projects has remained problematic. Over the past year, the Country Department has prepared a report on resettlement in Bank-assisted projects in India, for discussions with the government. turned out to be impossible to implement Supervision effectiveness depends prirnarily on because environmental clearances for the niew four major factors: sites had not been obtained in advance. Super- vision of the resettlement site proposed for the * Borrower ownership. Where countries do Bangladesh Urban project found that it was not agree with Bank policy and have not under several feet of water and no technical prepared good resettlement plans by analysis of its potential suitability for resettle- appraisal, supervision will not be able to ment had been performed. correct the deeper disagreement, regardless of the number of covenants and condition- Improving the Effectiveness of alities incuded in loan documents (box 6.5). ImResttemnt SprionSupervision can lead to constructive Resettlement Supervision . actions during implementation when it follows upon overall agreement on resettle- The Bank's legal department found that tle ment objectives and strategy. main obligations of Borrowers and implement- ing agencies are covered adequately in the * The technical quality of identification, projects' legal documents. Lack of covenants preparation and appraisal. In many of the has not been a barrier to effective supervision 80 active projects examined in the sample, or action by the Bank whenever operational inadequate attention was paid to resettle- staff have sought to exercise remedies for ment during preparation and appraisal. failure to carry out resettlement, they have not Notable exceptions are Mexico Hydroelec- been thwarted by legal documentation. Dlever- tric, India - Upper Krishna Irrigation II, theless, the effectiveness of Bank action varies China - Ertan Hydroelectric, and other considerably. more recent projects. Many active projects Environment Department 163 Resettlement and Development lack resettlement plans. Thus, faulty been reported by the Bank's supervision population underestimates, inadequate missions to the Sardar Sarovar project, yet compensation, and failure to plan rehabili- tecnical assessments had not caused an tation options surface during supervision. appropriate response, a finding also Resettlement supervision missions spend a repeated in the OED evaluation of resettle- great deal of time trying to cope with these ment in the Karnataka Irrigation project. inadequacies, rather than assessing imple- The readiness of Country Department mentation of a previously agreed plan.! management to follow-up on mission findings varied significantly (boxes 6.3, 6.5, Adequacy of monitoring arrangements. and 6.6). Not sending a clear signal to a Many Borrowers have not included sys- Borrower when resettlement programs are tems for monitoring project performance. not proceeding according to plan, suggests Even when monitoring and evaluation to Borrowers that resettlement is not a high systems are included, however, they are priority. often not effective. The Africa regional report notes, for example, that "project Until recently, the overall impact of supervision funds intended for monitoring and evalua- on resettlement performance has been limited. tion activities were often diverted to other Achievements, with some notable exceptions, purposes during implementation." The were largely restricted to smaller projects and sectoral reviewfor China similarly con- projects operating under favorable conditions. duded that while the overall approach to In spite of significant progress made over the resettlement was satisfactory, an inability to past five years, resettlement supervision monitor project performance and impacts became routine only with the extra attention was a recurrent weakness. Lack of ad- and resources for resettlement that were equate monitoring limits the ability of generated by the review. For supervision to supervision missions to make informed make significant contributions to improving judgements about progress. performance, basic changes are being made in the way projects are supervised. Prompt managementfollow-up. The Morse Commission noted that much of the Supervision requirements for monitoring and necessary field information on which their technical assistance must be rationalized recommendations were based had already through a careful assessment of the specific Box 6.6. Effective resettlement management an example from Africa The resettlement program for the 1,000 people who were to be displaced by the Central African Republic Energy Project began with severe difficulties. Although an overall, resettlement plan had been prepared, lack of capacity in the implementing agency and lack of political will at higher levels of government had led to serious delays in implementing this good program. Strong early action by the task manager and the assistance of an international expert produced a step-by- step remedial program with a well-defined timetable monitored by the Bank. The Bank generated the necessary political will by giving formal notice of impending suspension of disbursements, while support- ing improved capacity in the implementing agency. As a result, resettlement was completed on time, no delays in the main project were experienced, and follow-up reviews confirmed that people's living condi- tions had improved. Source: Africa Technical Department: Regional Report for the Bankwide Resettlement Review 164 Resettlement Series Project Supervision and Implementation Performance inputs needed to improve resettlement perlor- local technical knowledge in resettlement mance. The supervision strategy should form project design and execution. There is an integral part of the project implementation considerable local talent and competence plan, and progress should be reflected in thie regarding resettlement that can be used by Annual Review of Project Performance (ARPP). the Bank for monitoring and technical Where resettlement is large or particularly assistance work, and by Borrowers, for complex, projects should include additional better implementation work. forms of assistance such as mid-term reviews and technical review panels that include * Project-specific performance indicators. resettlement specialists (box 6.7). The Bank and Borrowers should agree in advance on a relatively small number of Until recently, the quality and frequency of objective, project-specific indicators and supervision was not commensurate with the actions to be carried out at specified stages complexity of resettlement or its importance to in the project cycle. At a minimum, the Bank. However, greater frequency of progress on key indicators, measured supervision alone will not be sufficient: futnda- against a resettlement timetable, should mental enhancement of supervision strategies is include project staffing, compensation required. payments, allocation of productive re- sources, and the status of resettlement Collaborative effort. The focus of this financial accounts. Assessing progress on work is to build up the institutional capaci- these actions should be the focus of super- ties of project implementing agencies and vision. create a framework for agreeing on overall objectives and procedures. The Bank needs * Strengthen non-fornal supervision mecha- to work with Borrowers to encourage nisms. The most effective control over resettle- greater use of national social science and ment performance is by the people affected. The Box 6.7. Monitoring panels and mid-term reviews Many of the more recent projects involving resettlement complement regular Bank supervision with other mechanisms to improve resettlement implernentation. Projects such as the Lesotho Highlands Water Supply Project, the China Ertan Hydroelectric Project, and the Argentina-Paraguay Yacyreta II Hydroelectric Project include internationally known resettlement specialists in their Environmental Review panels. These are appointed by the Borrower as an additional support to the executing agency, and they submit their reports to both the Borrower and the Bank. The panels visit the project at least once each yealr. The China Shuikou Hydroelectric Project and the Kenya Third Nairobi Water Supply Project have planned mid-term resettlement performance reviews by the Bank and Borrower to assess perforrnance and agree on necessary rnid-course corrections. Such reviews are carried out at a higher level and in more detail than normnal project supervision. The Mexico Hydroelectric Development Project and the Pakistan Sindh Special Development Project Fund employ independent monitors and advisers to provide close monitoring and regular reporting of plan implementation. In the case of the Mexico project, monitors include an intemationally known Mexican social scientist who reports to the company's top management, as well as a government social develop- ment agency to do field monitoring. Environment Department 165 Resettlement and Development Bank can facilitate and promote greater and involvement in projects is an important control of resettlement by helping Borrowers: opportuhity to help both the Bank and (i) promote effective communication between Borrowers. EDI is contributing by expand- project authorities and representative bodies ing its "training of trainers" programs in of affected people; (ii) provide more access to resettlement information related to the project and resetflement; and (iii) ensure that proects Notes: include effective, neutral medhanisms for See OD 13.05, ProjectSupasi 1989 (revised resolving disputes and monitoring imple- January 1993). mentation of weettment plans. 2 This chapter is based on supervision records for a sample of 80 projects. Coding the adequacy of * Build upon the linkages between the resettlement supervision presents several method- resettlement component and the cvil ological difficulties. For the purposes of the review, resettlement was counted as supervised if either the works. The review showed that over time aide-memoire left with the government or the mission progress on resettlement often falls behind back-to-office report explicitly commented on advances in civil works. Project supervi- resettlement. Because several additional proects with sion thus needs to calibrate the resettlement previously unsuspected resettlement were identified during the course of the review which were rarely component with overall project progress. supervised for resettlement, sample bias skews supervision frequencies upwards. * Improve the caliber and availability of 3 Africa Technical Department, The Reginal Resetkment national resettlement expertise. Many R>tf the Bankwide Review, November15, 1993. projects iU contine to relyon local BankwideLessons Learnedfrom the Experience witit the projects will continue to rely on local India SardarSanwa r (Narmada) Procft,e Secm93-516, consultants for project supervision. Train- May 24,1993. ig programs are needed to improve the S Africa Technical Departnent, The Reginal Rettlmet available expertise needed to assist task Reportfor the Bankwide Review, November15, 1993. managers. Vrtualy every developing 6 ECA/MNATechnical Department, The ECAIMNA Regirnal Resettlement Report, December 22,1993. country has skilled professionals, and 7 This finding supports a major lesson learned from the developing local capacity through training Narnada experience. 166 Resettlement Series 7. Recent Improviements in Portfolio Management and Quality Important improvements in the management ment Department in cooperation with all and content of the Bank's resettlement poritfolio regions, and the significant effort deployed were accomplished during the 1993 review, by Bank staff engaged in the review. consisting of A process across the Bank * Increased on-the-ground supervision. * Expanded on-thedcarouand sertiBrowr In more than one way, these streams of impor- * Consistency with policy and basic proce- tant organizational decisions and staff efforts dures in all new projects. converged and reinforced each other: their synergy made the Bankwide review more effective. The review focused on both processes As a result, intensive review work and correc- adpout,t epipoei-os n tive actions have resolved serious problems in and products, to help improve in-house and some ongoxng operations. The foundations were Boroe wokpoess.roiecretv stor longer tertm improements through adtli- actions, additional knowledge, and develop a tional em on reginal porolio analye folow-up strategy. The main product of the and shrategy work. review is not simply this report, but the process the review triggered throughout 1993 across the Bank. Improvementfactos _Continuing this process after the review's Improvement factors completion will ensure better performance. These overall improvements are the result of important decisions and measures adopted in The review has pursued the goal re-affirmed by 1992, and of a very sustained effort throughout the Bank's President at the beginuing of 1993: 1993. T:hese are: "The Bank's objective in lending is to reduce poverty. On-the-ground benefits rather than * Decisions made by management regarding loan approvals should be the measure of our the Bank's resettlement work, together with success.... We are changing our processes... to the Board's recommendations following the underline that point across the Bank." 1992 Morse Independent Review; Improving portfolio management and finding * Decisions regarding portfolio manageraent solutions to identified problems was an exer- adopted in light of the Wapenhans report; cise involving the Bank and Borrowers' execut- ing agencies. The resources spent directly on * The end-1992 Bank reorganization and the improving resettlement supervision roughly creation of the Central Vice-Presidencies tripled during 1993. If the estimated costs of (CVPs), one of which was given a special additional analytical and research work are mandate to improve resettlement; included, expenditures quadrupled. * The institution of the Bankwide resettle- More supervision missions for resettlement ment review, conducted by the Environ- were sent out during these 12 months than in Environment Department 167 Resettlement and Development the three previous years. By design, the 12 Table 7.1 reflects the vast volume of staff and months of the review provided time for two managerial work and time devoted to resettlement rounds of supervision, particularly to projects portfolio management during 1993. It also shows with large resettlement components. The first the intensified analysis and increased technical round identified problem issues and reached assistance given to Borrowers. The resettle- Bank-Borrower agreements on specific rem- ment project portfolio has never been examined edies; the subsequent round evaluated and so comprehensively as in 1993, and the scope of reported on the improvements that took place. work of most missions exceeded regular Resettlement components that had not been supervision. Vrtually all projects with resettle- supervised for two or three years came under ment affecting over 1000 people were reviewed analysis, and more itan 40 complex projects in the field, through a total of some 160 mis- were visited twice. When major implementa- sions. tion problems surfaced in the first mission, the follow-up was more substantial and prompt. Several CDs sent more than two nissions to This considerably increased the substantive projects with serious, previously unknown, technical assistance offered to Borrowers and implementation problems. Several complex helped overcome, rather than simply identify, projects, such as Turkey Izmir Water Supply problems. and Sewerage and the Argentina-Paraguay Yacyreta Dams, had up to five supervision Plans made by the regions called for covering missions in one year, responding to Bank 59 projects in the first half of January 1993; in concerns and to explicit Borrower requests that fact, 76 projects with resettlement were cov- Bank specialists provide increased direct ered. In the second half, supervision missions assistance to executing agencies. to 61 projects went to the field compared to the 70 planned. All regions except EAP spread An illustration of some of the more intense their supervision efforts more or less evenly project efforts, as required by the situation over the year, as needed. found in the field, is the 1993 review work on Table 7.1: Review Field Work on Resettlement during 1993 Region Projects with Resenlement Projects Visited in the Field Both Rounds Ist Round 2nd Round Total Projects Only Only Not Vsited* AFR 26 17 4 5 26 0 SAS 32 8 5 6 19 13 EAP 55 4 21 5 30 25 ECA 5 3 1 1 5 0 LAC 8 7 0 0 7 1 MNA 8 4 1 1 6 2** TOTAL 134 43 32 18 93 41 * In some active projects, resettlement has been completed and did not require resettlement supervision. This table does not include projects identified in the latter part of the Review. **One project interrupted by war. 168 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality the Turkey - Izmir Water Supply and Sewerage * Direct involvement of resettlement and project. The first review mission in March 1993 other technical specialists in preparing found that the project did not have a plan for alternative production-based options for resettling the estimated 3,700 people. Mom- resettlers; over, the size and cost of the resettement component had been grossly underestimated * Institutional reforms within the implement- by both the Borrower and the Bank. Together ing agency to strengthen capacity for with the Borrower's staff, the mission reas- meeting higher resettlement standards; sessed the size of the affected population to be up to 13,000 people, and re-estimated the real * Better Bank-Borrower collaboration in costs, staffing, and time requuiements. The} addressing specific resettlement difficulties. mnission worked out a substantially revised resettlement approach with the Borrower, The key explanation for the overall increase in including an implementation plan and time- supervision work during the 1993 Bankwide table. In turn, the governmnent agreed to review, and for more prompt Bank follow-up supplemental financing for resettlement. The on missions' signals, is the enhanced importance real cost of land acquisition, initially assessed given by CD and TD managers to improving at appraisal to be $30 million, was reassessed portfolio management. by the project task manager and the Borrower at $125 million, more than a 300 percent in- The review's Steering Commnittee, consisting of crease. The Borrower agreed to shift funds representatives of all regions, and the Task from cancelled components and to allocate Force, have closely monitored the progress of additional resources to meet the real land costs. this intensified supervision process and its In turn, for certain project expenditures, the lessons. Throughout the review, serior Bank Bank agreed to increase from 30 percent to and regional operations managers received 35 percent the share eligible for disbursement. regular month-by-month Progress Reports from Four more Bank missions went to this project the Task Force.- Bank senior management during the review, in May, June, November, requested regional Vice-Presidents to translate and December 1993, following up with the this intensified schedule into direct involve- Borrower on the measures adopted during the ment of Country Departments (CDs) and Task March mission. In cooperation with a Tur]kish Managers in resettlement as "an integral part of NGO and various line agencies, EDI, EMT and the (Bank's] commitment, and to convey this ENV organized in October 1993 a five-day message to all Borrowers"2. resettlement training course in Turkey for [zmir project staff and for officials of other domestic Resource constraints projects involving resettlement. This overall, sustained effort averted a potentially disastrous For the Techncal Departments and Country outcome in a project with more massive volved, sending out such a large number of displacement than initially assumed. missions in 1993 was a taxing endeavor; a Best practice dissemination limited segment of the portfolio, consisting of projects with less immediate supervision needs, Field missions have also identified a number of could not be covered. The field-work program "best practices" that involve resettlers' partici- was made possible through a significant mid- pation in finding relocation options. As a year supplementary budget allocated by general pattern, such "best practices" include: management for this exercise, used primarily for hiring temporary consultants. * Early involvement by the Bank in resettle- ment pldnning and in consultations with In part, however, such shortages of resources affected people; are also a byproduct of past project packaging Environment Department 169 Resettlement and Development and can be corrected through the decisions Borrowers and in the design of corrective made based on this review regarding diversi- actions consistent with policy goals. The fied project vehicles (see Chapter 8, para. 2). In quality of many project components was practice, some infrastructure projects with improved through re-planning, resource concentra- massive resettlement components are itrinsi- tion, and innovative solutions to neglected cally two complex projects squeezed into one. aspects (box 7.1). In many projects the resettlers The standard allocation for supervising such themselves have been brought more directly into "double-barreled" projects is the same as for the process of finding solutions. The assess- projects that do not contain widely divergent ment system for monitoring and rating perfor- activities within a single framework. Real staff mance in resettlement operations used to costs to the divisions in charge of such projects concentrate heavily on physical progress in are much higher, and some aspects of the executing relocation; the review brought project, nainly resettlement, have received less impoverishment and income restoration issues attention. In the future, processing large to the forefront. The attention of Borrowers resettlement operations as stand-alone projects, from project units to responsible Ministries cross-linked to the civil work projects, will go a has been redirected to preventing impoverish- long way towards eliminating this constraint ment and destitution through bad resettlement Potential problems or failures were addressed Technical Assistance for Portfolio in a timelier manner than in previous situa- tions, and indicators to judge performance are Quality being shifted to socio-economic reestablish- ment, equity, and participation of resettlers in Improved quality of technical assistance to Borrow- project benefits. ers was achieved in two ways: by designing special Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Specialist supervision review's supervision work; and by improving The ski mix used for supervisig and guidig supervision skills through wider use of social 7he was changed ao d Bank ask Mang specialists capable of providing in-depth projects was changed and Bank Task Managers suidance to executing agengies perceived this as welcome support. In the Africa region, for example, projects with Basic goals and technical issues resettlement rarely had the benefit of specialist supervision. With three or four exceptions, The review's field mnissions were carried out projects in Africa had never been supervised by under "Generic TORs' developed by the a resettlement specialist3. During this review, review's Task Force and approved by the the Africa region sent resettlement specialists to Steering Committee. These shifted the empha- analyze projects and propose remedial actions sis away from strictly short-term physical not only where Task Managers had identified a progress aspects; the field reviews explored crisis, but also to many projects where regular performance in terms of basic policy goals, project supervision had reported no problems'. socio-economic, and technical problems in By the review's end, more than two-thirds of resettlement operations: restoration of pre- active projects in the entire Bank resettlement displacement income levels; land availability portfolio (with the exception of recently identi- and valuation; cash compensation patterns; fied projects) were visited at least once, and in consultation with affected people; and the some cases twice, by a resettlement specialist. Borrower's organizational capacity for resettle- Resettlement specialists, staff or consultants, ment (see in Annex: Generic TOR for resettle- went on mission to 71 percent of the projects ment supervision). supervised in the first round and to 62 percent in the second round. Supervision by specialist Priorty given to these policy and technical staff or consultants had increased immediately issues has resulted in more effective help to after the 1986 review, but decreased after- 170 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality Box 7.1. Techuical resettlement assistance: Brazil Designed to address the explosive needs of Brazil's fastest growing city, the Sao Paolo Water Quality and Pollution Control project consists of civil works for flood control, drainage, sewerage, tubed water sys- tems, and the relocation of slum dwellers away from high-risk flood zones and "right of way" areas for the civil works. At appraisal, however, detailed engineering designs were ready for only a small part (20 per- cent) of the civil works: the remainder had only pre-feasibility studies. For resettlement, there was no feasibility plan 34 only a brief conceptual outline, approved prematurely as a "plan" by the Bankl this pre- feasibility outline did not schedule any resettlement work. When the first specialist supervision mission took place in April 1993, it found that engineering plans for new sites were complete in one small area (49 families), less than 2 percent of the total affected population. Social assessments had not been conducted and the numbers of affected people, estimated from secondary data at about 18,500 people (3,700 families), were still unknown. The resettlement sites agreed with the Bank had not been, in fact, approved by local governments. New sites had yet to be identified. No program of popular participation or social communication had been designed. The policy and legal framework agreed with the Bank had not yelt been adopted by the municipal governunents responsible for implementation, which were completely unstaffed for the task. Unit costs were now estimated to be much higher than anticipated, causing a reconsideiation of design and financing arrangements. The specialist, task manager, and the govern inent's project management team agreed in 1993 on a tight schedule for bringing the project back on track. A policy framework meeting Bank standards was ap- proved by municipal governments in August. A revised implementation plan for the 1993-1997 period and detailed engineering designs for two additional sites were completed by October, and agency staff were strengthened by contracting experienced Brazilian social scientists in December. Institutional agreements between the state and the municipality were in place by February 1994. A new consultation procedure let the affected people choose their new land and participate in housing designs. The resettled families will receive better housing, water, sewerage, and clear title to their new homes. While not all problems are resolved, Bank support for the local governments and resettlement staff produced a major turnaround that has brought the project back on schedule and provides tangible benefits to the resettled families. wards, during the 1988-1992 period. It in- attending more closely to the problems of creased dramatically again during 1993 as a displaced people. result of management's decisions implemented through this review (see also figure 6.1 in the Task Managers ("TMs") are the staff directly previous chapter). responsible for the projects with resettlement components. The Task Force found that about Task Managers and specialist staff 92 Task Managers are responsible for the 146 All of the regional resettlement reports ernpha- projects in the FY93 active portfolio. By sized the task managers' need to use more professional skills, this group consists of 60 systematically the distinct "value added" that technical experts (civil engineers, etc.) and 32 social specialists provide - in addition to 'what economists (including financial analysts, generalists, engineers or financial analysts can operations officers, etc.). Ghren their main do - for managing resettlement operations. infrastructural content, projects with resettle- Specialists supplied technical guidance otlher- ment are twice as likely to be managed by an wise unavailable to some Borrowers and engineer or technical specialist than by an provided competent help to Task Managers in economist or financial analyst; the only region Environment Department 171 Resettlement and Development that deviated from this pattern was South Asia, social issues (not only resettlement) at the where economists slightly outnumber engineers beginning of the fiscal year sometimes exceed as Task Managers. Sixty-two percent of these by 200 to 300 percent what the TD could TMs are responsible for one project involving supply. As one regional report on resettlement resettlement, among the several projects they noted, the "latent demand" for such work is manage; 28 percent are responsible for two considerably higher6 but it is not formulated as projects; and 10 percent have each between effective CAM demand because it cannot be three and six projects involving resettlement as satisfied anyway. The best option for the future their resp&nsibility. appears to be placing more social staff re- sources in the CDs themselves, as well as in Typically, most Task Managers devolve work resident offices, togeher with regularly using on resettlement to the resettlement specialists more local consultants in counties with large in the TD. The leitmotifs heard strongest from resettlement portfolios. A few Country Depart- Task Managers throughout the review, particu- ments have already taken this innovative larly during the direct interviews carried by the orientation in their staffing. Resident missions Task Force and during the two focus groups with capacity for resettlement exist in India and conducted by outside professionals5, were: (a) China, and the EAl Country Department has for a Task Manager, designing or overseeing recently created a resident unit for social and resettlement components is among the most environmental issues. staff-intensive activities; (b) Task managers feel they have little, if any, professional knowledge Staffing for resettlement is part of the broader for this job themselves; (c) they ask for consid- Bank concern for addressing the social and erable more staff input from Bank specialists environmental dimensions of development and consultants. activities. For FY94, senior management set the target of externally hiring 12 social specialists Portfolio size and pipeline trends are the incremental to those already existing in-house. measure of the workload required for resettle- The review's conclusion is that staff strengthen- ment staff-work, Bankwide and by regions. By ing emerges as a critical factor for meeting the this measure, current staffing patterns, al- demands of the resettlement portfolio, as well though improved during 1993, are inadequate. as of other social issues in the Bank's core While the resettlement portfolio has grown, work. However, as important as strengthening only partial adjustments of in-house skills have social skills in-house is, the recommendation of been made. Nowhere is this clearer than in the Task Force is that social specialists alone EAP and SAS: in FY93 the few resettlement would not be the adequate solution to improve specialists in these regions had to contribute work on resettlement. It is important to their work to 87 ongoing projects with resettle- organize the Bank's work on resettlement ment and, simultaneously, had to assist in the operations on a multidisciplinary team basis, so preparation of a project pipeline for the next that all needed technical specialists, jointly with several fiscal years containing nearly 70 the social specialists, get involved in address- projects by December 1993. Clearly, only part ing the complex problems of displacement and of this workload could be met satisfactorily, relocation, putting the focus on creating the despite the full-fledged efforts of all available productive base needed for reestablishing the staff specialists. resettlers at an improved or equal level of livelihood. The bulk of staff specialists' work on resettle- ment is carried out by TDs through CAM Consultant specialists on short-term assign- requests from CDs, but the resources of TDs ments, while able to advise Borrowers compe- are not commensurate with the task at hand. tently, cannot be as effective as in-house Bank Aggregate CAM requests from CDs to TDs on staff specialists: the latter can pursue issue- 172 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality resolution uiith in-house continuity over long in- without regional oversight, this lack of compli- house periods and increase Bank institutional ance wil go unnoticed."7 Improving the capacity. An excessively high rate of consult- presence and continuity of in-house staff ants to staff specialists is not reinforcing the specialists will address this need. Bank's capacity for long-term effectiveness (see box 7.2). Regional managers noted that it is Corrective Actions unlikely that supervision levels achieved during the review (partly with additional During the review year, the need for remedial budgetary allocations) can be sustained after- actions at the project level emerged mainly as a wards unless more in-house specialist staff are result of identified weaknesses or failures in available; they indicate that such staff will be earlier phases of project processing activities gradually brought in. The MNA/ECA regional (as discussed mainly in chapters 5 and 6). report points out that even if Task Managers These were particularly the result of departures obtain short-term consultant expertise "they do from the Bank's well established work proce- not have the capacity to follow up recommLen- dures for handling resettlement operations. dations of consultants. Without in-house staff The responsibility of staff and Divisional expertise available to them, Task Manager. ; managers for complying with establsed continue to have difficulty with compliance; Box 7.2. Staffing inadequacy and remedies The ratio between staff and consultants working on social issues in general, and on resettlement cases in particular, is in sharp contrast to the Bank's oaverall averages. Work on resettlement portfolio management during the year long review offers an interesting comparison with the findings of the recent portfolio management Task Force. For all projects, the ratio of staff to consultants involved in portfolio management over a three year period was 66 percent to 34 percent or a 1:0.5 ratio 1:1550 staff, 820 consultants). In terms of time, staff contributed 80 percent and consultants 20 percent of the total time spent on portfolio management respectively.* In resettlement work, however, the review for 1993 shows the opposite: the ratio of specialist staff to resettlement consultants is 1:2. By total time spent, the ratio is an estimated 40 percent staff time compared to 60 percent consultant time. This proportion is out of line with the Bank's overall averages. It calls attention to the following two facts: * The Bank continues to be underequipped in terms of staff for treating the broad social issues of its development activities, of which resettlement is only one aspect. * SOD managers in Country Departments tend to use their technical and economic staff only sporadically for work on resettlement components, thus perpetuating the devolution of this domain to TDs, out of their own divisions' mainstream work. Both problems can be solved through actions at divisional and CD levels for improving skill-mix through redeployment, through new hiring when vacancies arise, and through improved task allocation among existing staff. In this respect, the present Bankwide review has demonstrated conclusively that technical- economic questions are as central in resettlement as the socio-cultural ones, and improved staff time allocation is required for both aspects. a Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact. Report of the World Bank's Portfolio Management Task Force, September 1992. Environment Department 173 Resettlement e- 1 Development project processing procedures, although operations; and restructuring Borrowers' organi- defined very clearly in the Bank, had not been zational and institutional capacity. In sufficiently enforced. Therefore, the potential Madagascar's Tana Plain project, for instance, for improving resettlement, intrinsic in the the field review resulted in a cluster of reme- Bank's directives, has been realized only dial actions, with energetic follow-up measures partially. Remedial actions initiated during the by the Bank Division responsible for the project review have helped correct problems arising (box 7.3). from such prior departures from established procedures. Scale The technical and social issues identified on the Several projects are displacing three, four, or ground by field missions ranged broadly from five times more people than estimated at those requiring relatively simple remedies to a project approval. This is hardest to correct in number of serious problems. The missions mid-stream, inasmuch as incomplete projects found cases of breakdown in policy agreements without the financial and organizational means between the Bank and Bofrowers, as well as in to address the problems. For example, in the basic procedures; serious unpreparedness by Nigeria Multi-State Water project, with an project authorities facing mounting resettle- estimated resettlement of 1,000 people at ment difficulties and lack of resources; unad- appraisal, the review mission found that some dressed tensions between project units and 4,000 people are affected. The corrective action would-be resettlers, absence of plans and pl is being prepared. unacceptable delays. Some of these resettle- ment operations are already in mid-stream, and Planning issues show only limited promise of income restora- All of the regional reports indicate that plan- tion for the first groups of people already ning problems are present with variable de- relocated; in these cases, the missions carried grees of intensity or concentration in several out substantial discussions with borrowing country portfolios. Basic problems, hard to agencies and worked out detailed, sometimes correct in a short time, have been identified by radical, corrective actions. the Country Department and Technical Depart- ment, primarily in the South Asia portfolio. Most of these corrective actions started right Some of these issues originate in weaknesses away. In the more serious cases, however, from earlier years, particularly the mid-1980s, these corrective actions address problems that and the relevant Bank units are focussed on do not lend themselves to quick resolution, and their adequate resolution. The regional report are not easy to remedy in rnid-stream, requir- indicates that "for the 23 projects covered in the ing consistent follow-up work after the India portfolio review of June 1993, resettle- review's end. ment plans had been submitted for only six projects prior to Board presentation.... Between Types of remedial actions 1988 and 1993, agreements were reached with Remedial activities initiated during the review the Borrower to prepare or substantially revise generally tend to be of several types: reassessing resettlement plans for 17 projects after ap- the magnitude of resettlement measures required; praisaL Similarly, a resettlement plan was adjusting resettlement timetables; increasing prepared prior to negotiations for only one of affected people's participation in formulating the four projects involving resettlement in SAI needs and claims; finding better relocation (Bangladesh portfolio). In the SA3 portfolio solutions or ways to reduce displacement; (Pakistan) resettlement plans were not pre- identifying additional financial and material pared for either of the two projects involv.ng resources to meet the costs of resettlement".8 174 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality Income restoration issues living... This suggests the real current diffi- Serious difficulties in restoring adequate culty in achieving the standards set out and the standards of living were identified in the need to consider separate investments for project- sectoral review prepared by the India Country affected persons' income geneation activities." Department (SA2) and in the regional TD report - presented together with suggestioins This last proposal - to consider follow-up about actions to remedy the situation. ThE! investments as a type of remedial action - project-by-project notes prepared by SA2 about puts the corrections that are hidispensable, yet projects in hidia provide clear evidence of unfeasible in the short-term, on the financial the decline in the standard of living of persons footing needed for resolution within a reason- who have been affected by some of the Bank- able period over the next few years. During financed projects.... [they] show that prior to the review it appeared that one root cause of the initiation of remedial actions the perfor- resettlers being worse off in a number of mance of none of the projects involving large- projects in India and other countries, is that the scale resettlement could be judged satisfac- approach to resettlement and rehabilitation was tory... Available evidence indicates that until primarily focused on expropriation/compensa- 1992 most project-affected people may have not tion, rather than socio-economic reconstruction been able to regain their previous standarcLs of of the productive capacity of the affected Box 7.3: Corrective actions in Madagascar Tana Plain project An early review mission (February 1993) found no resettlement plan for the 3,000 people to be resettled. At dose examination, it appeared that the population estimate covered only some of the project's many civil works, because at appraisal the Borrower had suppiied incomplete information. The total number of affected people was re-assessed to be about 200-300% larger. The first 300 people were displaced shortly before the mission's arrival, with simple cash payments; however, neither the project nor other relevant government agencies knew where they went and how they resettled. A housing site constructed at project cost for resettling displaced families had been made practically inaccessible for resettlers, because of a decision mnade just before the mission's arrival by a co- financing project agency. Political discontent was building up among many other people at immediate risk of losing their shelters. The mission worked closely with the government and three local NGOs to reassess the situation and to initiate the preparation of an adequate resetllement plan. To follow up on the mission's signals, the Bank's Division Chief for this project made a field visit. She also initiated contacts with the Bank's cofinancing partner, asking cooperation in solving outstamding relocation issues. The Bank also commnissioned a local non-governmental research organization to iLnunediately carry out a "tracer study" of the first groups displaced, assess the impact on their livelihood, and their need for re-establishment assistance. The study was completed in six weeks, and generated important findings. Furthermore, during 1993, the same Bank division sent two more missions to supervise the resettlement component, staffed by a specialist and the Task Manager, to help the project management unit redress the situation. In a relatively short time, the three NGOs prepared a resettlement plan for the two groups of people to be resettled next, according to the project's timetable. For the remaining people, plan preparation by the same NGOs and the project continues. Additional financing is being allocated to meet the expanded number of relocatees. The project remains in the focus of the division and country department for close supervision during FY94-FY95, until the problems with resettlement reach a satisfactory resolution. Environment Department 175 Resettlement and Development people'0. Moving from the first approach to the the review on the preparation of projects in the second, as Indian officials have recently indi- immediate pipeline: cated, would foster important changes and improvements in the borrowing agencies' * In Pakistan, during the pre-appraisal of the approaches and activities. Sindh Urban project approved by the Board in early FY94, a spring 1993 field mnission Assistance early in project cycle found not 500-600 people to be resettled, as Other types of technical remedial actions were the Borrower initially assumed, but some mcorporated during the review into projects m 40,000 people potentily affected by displacement, 11,000 of whom were to be which the basic approach was correct, yet relocatednt first po phase. Te delays in coordination among implementing relocated in the first project phase. The agencies create risks. This type of situation nwssion refocussed the first phase of the requires staff-intensive Bank assistance, plus *ne cpacity for rstlemngt wiathu strengthening the institutional will and capac- bional capagty for resettlement, without ity of borrowing agencies. The positive experi- begin.g any actual large-scale disolace- ence with the several Bank missions sent ment The tec alternatves or during 1993 to the Yacyreta project in Argen- win g explore technical altenatives for tina-Paraguay is illustrative (box 7.4). mnmizumzng displacement and will plan a reduced relocation for the second phase. Supervision after project closure n* n Indonesia, only one of several on-going A positive initiative of the SA2 Country De- projects involving resettlement had a partment was to continue sending supervision resettlement plan in place when the loan missions to some projects that were already was approved. For all the new projects closed, but where the unsatisfactory results at appraised to date during FY94 (not all yet closmg and the large number of resettled approved), resettlement plans have been people warranted the Bank's continued in- prepared and appraised in the field. volvement: for example, India-Subemarekha Irrigation, with 63,000 people affected, and * In Turkey, Borrower's work to create the India-Singrauli Thennal, with about 49,000 premises for full income restoration in the people. The Country Department also notified Kayraktepe Hydropower project has been the Borrower that it would not consider the intensified. The resettlement plan will be appraisal of a proposed second phase of the fully re-appraised in 1994, in the context of Subernarekha project unless satisfactory a re-appraisal of the project itself; a local resolution is achieved in the outstanding NGO has been commissioned by the resettlement problems of the first phase."1 This government to complete a socio-economic position led to the broader Bank decision that population survey. the Bank will not finance any new project involving resettlement for a borrowing agency * One of the most comprehensive cases of that is not living up to its existing conmmitments meticulous resettlement project preparation for resettlement in an ongoing project. - for which work parallelled the review throughout 1993 - is the China Xiaolangdi Impact on new operations Dam project, which will relocate 182,000 Even though the present review's focus is on people. Several preparation missions went current active projects, throughout the review to the field in 1993, with teams consisting Bank staff have been strongly concerned that of technical, social, and economic experts new projects under preparation be fully consis- working jointly on resettlement. This tent with all policy requirements. All regions project will include several specific strate- have reported the strong beneficial impact of gies for income reconstruction, aiming to 176 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality Box 7.4: Yacyreta: one year of review and supervision work Much attention during the review was devoted by the LAC region (both LA3 and LATEN) to the Argen- tina-Paraguay Yacyreta I project, where a new dam on the Parana River displaces 50,000 people from two cities (Posadas and Encarnacion). Five Ban; mnissions went to this project in 1993 for resettlement pur- poses, in addition to missions for civil work supervision. In January 1993, a Bank mission and project staff worked out a detailed implementation timetable for the relocation plan endorsed by Yacyreta management. A second supervision mission in May 1993, staffed with two resettlement and other technical specialists, found that implementation was seriously lagging because the two governments who owned the project were not making the political decisions to resolve these serious difficulties. Essential actions such as acquisition of replacement farmlands, information campaigns among affected families, and holusing construction, had not been carried out. While it was still technically possible to comtplete the initial resettlement in time to raise the spillway as planned, project nanagement needed to take key actions to overcome the backlog. A new accelerated schedule containing action deadlines had to be defined by project management, or the spillway could not be raised. The key action was acquisition oiF replacement farmlands before June 14, 1993. This was accomplished a few days after the deadline. Accepting the Bank's recommendation, project management held a day-long resettlement coordination workshop in June. For the first time managers and technic-al staff responsible for engineerin, legal affairs, resettlement and environment, fiscal management, land valuation and indemnification sat at the same table. The project owners invited a special Bank mission to the workshop's discussion of the accelerated schedule, which was then integrated into the work plan for each cooperating unit. Two months later, after intense work, the project owners asked that another Bank mission come to agree on whether or not the spillway could be raised as scheduled. The mission confirmed progress. Throughout the year, the CD management played a major role, as did the Task Manager, in ieading the negotiations for corrective actions. For 1994, the CD has planned four supervision missions, to follow-up on the corrective actions. One of these will be a full mid-term review of resettlement involving the two governments, the Bank, representatives of NGOs, and the panel of international experts. turn displacement into a genuine develop- ment. One project in Vietnam and two new ment opportunity for the affected popula- projects in Chin-a contain extensive summaries tion. Lending for this dam and its entailed of their resettlement and income restoration resettlement was processed under a twin- plans, incorporating timetables and budgets. projects approach - one project for civil works, and one stand-alone project for Sustaining the Trend resettlement - and represents an innova- tion in Bank activities for simultaneous, integrated treatment of such endeavors. Required contiuity All the portfolio management and quality Five new lending operations involving involun- improvements discussed above represent a tary resettlement were Board-approved in the solid start The completion of the 1993 review first half of FY94. Their sections on resetile- exercise, however, does not mean the end of ment demonstrate a significant improvement in corrective actions. It is of paramount impor- preparation and appraisal work, as well ats in tance that these are carried on with continuity, analytical Staff Appraisal Report (SAR) treat- commitment, and adequate resource allocation. Environment Department - 177 Resettlement and Development The momentum achieved in-house, and in the Indonesia's expanding resettlement portfolio, Bank's interaction with Borrowers, must be partcularly in urban and road projects, which sustained. will be completed during 1994. These three countries contain about 40 percent of the 1994- Two other types of important review activities, 97 pipeline of projects; policy dialogue with each with long-term impact, have contributed them is expected to have a multiplier effect on to the changes made through the 1993 review. a large segment of the future Bank resettlement These activities lay the groundwork for ensur- portfolio, and on other similar domestic ing long-term sustainability of improved work operations not financed by the Bank Concen- in resettlement on a country or portfolio basis: trating the attention of Borrowers and Bank analytical work inside the Bank, and training staff on country-level resettlement issues for Borrowers' and Bank staff. beyond individual projects is consistent with the Bank's current overall effort to shift from Regional reports project-by-project management to managing Considerable work has been carred out in al lending as a country portfolio unit. regions to analyze resettlement not only on a project-by-project basis with particular charac- The need for broader polcy approaches, on a teristics and demands but also as a subset of sector or country basis, is now perceived more the region's portfolio. Each region has final- dearly by some Borrowers. All regions have ized a report on its portfolio of projects with emphasized in their reports that this orienta- izedareport oanalyits portfolioofprrnancts wite, tion should be at the heart of their further work msettlement, analyzing perforiance to date, and country dialogues. Africa's regional report ile addressed. Based on dialogue between the forcefully reaffirmed this lesson based on its Envirornent Department, Country Depart- own resettlement portfolio, stating that "when ments, and Technical Departments, these governments do not give their formaL exphcit reports also outline steps to be taken in each agreement with Bank policies and guidelines, it region. The region-specific reviews are in- has been difficult, if not impossible, to imple- tended to become working tools in the hands of ment resettlement components with satisfac- regional managers for further portfolio im- tory results." Similarly, the LAC regional provement and management, for dialogue with -report emphasized that the Bank should go Borrowers about resettlement, as wedl as for beyond '...the project agreements reached in region-specific training colrses for regional the urban lending operations, which are merely Bank and Borrowers' staff. temporary accommodations to the proposals of the Bank and have little lasting and broader Country-reports - impact, and seek to reach agreements covering Country reports the sector or the country".12 In the same spirit, In addition to the regional reports, two Coun- the South Asia Region report emphasized that try Departments, EA2 and SA2, have prepared "the Bank should focus on encouraging Bor- reports on country resettlement portfolios for rowers to develop a general framework and China and India respectively. The reports sector policies."13 analyze in-depth policy and operational matters, and highlight best practices or weak- Less development impact than possible is nesses. The China country report was dis- achieved when policies formulated at a country cussed in a fornal policy dialogue with country or state level are decreed as applicable only to officials, and adhieved important agreements. Bank-assisted project investments, as happens A draft India report was submitted in 1993 to in some borrowing countries, or states in India. Indian authorities in anticipation of a policy The overall conclusion arrived at by the present dialogue and is being completed in parallel - review is that while "project policy" is very with the present Bankwide report. The EA3 important, and policy and legal arrangements Departmnent has started an internal review of must be agreed upon between the Bank and 178 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality Borrowers for each project, the broader coum- specific approaches and solutions in future try-level or sector-level policy will add corisid- lending operations entailing resettlement. erable strength to project-based arrangements and will build institutional capacity for the Training for Borrowers and Bank long term. Staff Sectoral studies Consultaton with Borrowers For a longer-term approach to portfolio mnan- agement - and to complement the project-by- In view of the difficulties many Borrowers project field reviews - the Task Force mivited encounter with resettlement, and to help several studies by central units (AGR and ]EN), explain Bank policy and dissemidnate good while others were carried out by the Environ- practices, a broad training program was ment Department. These studies focused cm developed jointly by the Economic Develop- fundamental issues in resettlement as seen ment Institute (EDI) and the Environment sectorally in the Bank's key lending subsectors Department. Its implementation has started of energy, agriculture, and urban/transporta- with regional support. EDI began this program tion/water supply. The Legal Department with a consultative workshop with officials carried out a study of institutional and legal from several Borrower countries and NGO issues across sectors in resettlement. These representatives, to define better the clients' studies covered: training needs. • Resettlement in downstream areas of Training courses irrigation dam projects, in light of issues In the second half of the review period, three raised by the Morse Independent Review training courses on resettlement policy and report regarding the Narmada Sardar practice were held in three major Borrower Sarovar Canals project (Agriculture and countries: Natural Resources Department). I india. A 12-day training seminar run - Forestry lending, resettlement trends, and jointly by EDI and the Administrative Staff altermatives to resettlement in forestry College of India, for staff in energy sector projects (Agriculture and Natural parastatals and for NGO representatives; Resources Department). September 1993. * Lending for hydropower and resettlement * China. A training seminar organized issues (Industry and Energy Department, jointly by EDI and the National Research FPD). Center for Resettlement (NRCR) and Hohai University, for 60 senior officials working * Legal aspects in Bank-assisted projects with on resettlement; November 1993. resettlement (Legal Vice Presidency). * Turkey. A seminar on planning and moni- * Resettlemnent issues and approaches in toring resettlement, run jointly by EDL, a urban and infrastructure projects (Environ- local NGO, and Turkey's Directorate for ment Department, ESD, and Transportation, Hydraulic Works, for 85 staff; November Water Supply and Urban Department, ESD). 1993. These issue-focused sector studies help enrich These training courses were effective and the Bank's understanding of sectoral specifici- highly appreciated by Borrowers. EDI, ENd SP ties in resettlement. They will assist Bank and and EMTEN are now engaged in further Borrowers operational units in framing sector- preparation and publication of training materi- Environment Department 179 Resettlement and Development als on resettlement, including a modular for testing. After adequate testing, these manual and videotapes. EDI's program for technical guidelines will be made available to FY94-FY95 increasingly emphasizes training of Borrowers and as a working tool for Bank staff. trainers on resettlement issues, particularly seminars for policy makers, support for Monitoring system for resettlement EMTEN training in Turkey, and collaborative implementation resettlement training with the Asian Develop- ment Bank in Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the A computer-based project level tool for moni- Philippines. toring resettlement from initial planning to final execution - the ARMS system - was In parallel, ENV and PAA organized inside the developed by ENV's Task Force, with the Bank two training seminars for project Task cooperation of Colombian consultants. This Managers during the review period. system was tested in Colombia and will be disseminated gradually to all Borrowers Other Products of the Bankwide interested in using it Review Technical studies While a considerable part of the lessons dis- Several technical studies on specific issues tilled by the review are presented in this report have been prepared by ENV and some Bank a number of other economic, sociological, legal, regional departments. These include a study and technical studies have been completed or on urban-resettlement published in 1993; are underway. The findings of these studies legal frameworks for resettlement developed will be widely disseminated to help expand by legal scholars in Kenya and applicable, available knowledge and best practices. Per- with adjustments, to other countries in ceiving a need for developing better instruments Africa; studies about sustainable reservoir for carrying out the Bank's resettlement work, the fisheries as a production resource for resettle- regional teams and the ENV's Task Force ment; a volume on involuntary resettlement concentrated on producing several such tools in Africa, the result of an international for use by Bank staff and Boseowers alikes conference on settlement and environment Some have been desfvered already . organized by the Africa region (AFTES);4 and Some haeenelvrearaa technical manual for urban resettlement The data bank planning developed by the Rotterdam Insti- tute for Housing Studies with assistance from The Task Force developed a full data bank on the Task Force. These studies will help the Bank's resettlement portfolio. Maintaining spread good practices and guide in the it beyond the review's completion as a regular resolution of practical resettlement issues. instrument will provide a better grasp on the resettlement portfolio, a system of experience Other review products transfer between regions, and the capability for operations and Bank management to monitor Work on three other instruments for improving progress and trends. resettlement operations was started during the review period. The LAC region commissioned Technical guidelines for economic and technical guidelines on resettlement prepara- Technial gudelitesfor conomc and tion and regional development planning. The financial analysis of resettlement India Department, supported by the Asia Simplified technical guidelines for improving Technical Department, is also preparing a the ex-ante economic and financial analysis of resettlement sourcebook that provides field resettlement and for internalizing it better methods and best practice examples tailored within overall project economic analysis have specifically for resettlement in India. The been prepared by the Task Force and are ready Environment and Social Policy division, in 180 Resettlement Series Recent Improvements in Portfolio Management and Quality collaboration with EDI, has started a series of gies. The review has heightened staff aware- training videos on resettlement. ness and knowledge at many levels about issues, difficulties, and approaches in resettle- Is There a Change in Bank Culture? ment. The project portfolio is better known, "owned" more fully, better supervised, and its status more regularly reported to relevant Bank In addition to the state of the resettlement managers at different levels. The project portfolio,ra-sale qust bo the Ba portfolio has been brought to an improved imtemcal work-culture must b an The degree of consistency with Bank pohicy and is impact of "organizational culture" on Bank mor ap.oa hni astyasaot staff and Bank performance are being incre as- more apt today than it was two years ago to ingly recoized. Looking beyond the iedi- reach the development goals set by bo ate .mecharucs' of a. the'corrective actions Borrowers and the Bank. The combination of ate "mechanics of allthecorrectivintensified field supervision, analyses of recently undertaken, it is important to ask. r p "has this review succeeded in influencing the Banks pol dialos, i oussed studies and sub-culture underpinning resettlement work, or has policy dhalogues, pssue-focussed studies, and it only introduced discrete and passing changes,?" traming -has proven effective for identbfyng problems, correcting them, or setting the stage for their correction in the follow-up period. At the start of the review, some staff ex- pressed in writing the skeptical belief that Most important for future work is that the large this review will be "destined for the back ' , burner. Under management's guidance and group of professonals e Bank s staff, as support, it has unfolded precisely in thewelathBnksanittuo,arnw oupposi,t dirtionted Bankwideyrenete- better informed and more alert to the complex- opposten direview ohas thengge Ballrelevntt ity, demands, risks, and hardships of displace- mentrevewhsegagdarelvn . Bk ment and resettlement. The social and human compartments - stretching from senior side of development programs have come more management who initiated it, to projectDTsk directly under the hmelight. The link between Managers at the project level, to country good resettlement and poverty alleviation - resident missions, and to many borrowing the Bank's main mission - is more clear than agencies. The Bank has good reason to be proud as an institution for its policy leader- sever before. The pain and impoverishnent of ship in a frontier area of development. m is many resettlers has become more visible and probably fair to say that the review has been the human values that underle the develop- an important step in modifying staff percep- ment enterprise was embedded in the very goal tions, attitudes, and practices towards trans- of the review. Significant building blocks of lating this polcy into project realty more cultural change are falling into place and systematically. adding up, and a climate of heightened aware- ness and responsibility is gradually infusing the yardstick, yet it is tangible. During 1993 work on new projects. Harnessing the powers resettlement work has learly moved up on the of organizational culture will help the Bank to rsetlmn wor has clal moe poh have better prepared and better designed agenda of all regions and of many CDs or divisions previously less concerned with it. operations in thds complex domain. The entire review process has been an excep- From culture to institutional tional opportunity for learning how to do resettlement better, for identifying good structure practices, adjusting general approaches to Cultural change may go a long way, but alone particular sectors and circumstances, builLding it is not sufficient. it needs further support institutional capacity for resettlement, arid from institutional structure. Sustaining the refining analytical and evaluation methodolo- improvements recently achieved, however, is Enviromnent Department 181 Resettlement and Development not an automatic, foreordained outcome. 7 ECA/MNATechnical Department, The ECAIMNA Critical areas of work emerge for the Bank to Regional Resettlement Report, December22,1993. build successfully on current trends, and it will s Asia Technical Department, South Asia Region, Report bea sucha ssfulleng or allutoreantain trend, re t onResettkmentfor the Bankwide Resettlement Revew, be a challenge for all to maintain the recert November1993. level of effort. 9 Asia Technical Department, South Asia Region, Report on Resettlementfor the Bankwide Resettlement Review, The next chapter presents the important actions November 1993. taken y the ank, bsed onthe fidings f theDiscussions in the JAC meeting on the OED reports, taken by the Bank, based on the findings of the Early Ezperiences with InvoluntaryResettlement, present review, in order to meet this challenge November 1993. successfully and improve future performance " This project has been under severe criticism for a su cessttly number of years from national and international groups. The review found that while the majority of the affected people had already been resettled and Notes: received grants for house construction, a considerable number were still awaiting, three years after project EightMonthly Reports fromENV's Task Force to closure, "...to be given either replacement land, jobs, Management are available on file. or to be covered by income generating schemes...'. 2 Memos from Mr. E. Stem to Regional Vice-Presidents, Periodic supervision after project closure is intended December 28,1992; March 22,1993; and May 17,1993. to satisfy the Bank that work to resolve these problems 3 Africa Technical Department, The Regional Resettlement continues. (Asia Technical Department South Asia Reportfor the Bankwide Review, November 15,1993. Report, p. 11). 4 tbid 12 LAC Technical Departnent, LAC Regional Reporton S The two focus groups were conducted by profession- Resettlementfor the Bankwide Resettlement Review, ally trained moderators from an independent October 23,1993. consulting firm and MPS: Dr. Janet BiDlson, a sociolo- 13 Asia Technical Department, South Asia Region: Report gist with field expertise in involuntary resettlement on Resettlementfor the Bankwide Review, 1993 research (Group Dimension Research, Alexandria, VA) 1 Involuntary Resettlement in Africa: Selected Papersfrom a and Randolph Harris (MPSVP). Conference on Environment and Settlement Issues in Africa, r ECA/MNATechnical Department, Regional Report on edited by Cynthia Cook, World Bank Technical Paper Resettlementfor the Bankwide Review. No. 227, Washington, DC, 1994. 182 Resettlement Series 8. Actions to Improve Performance The general conclusion of the resettlement government in improving organizational review is that the quality of the Bank's resettle- capacities for addressing resettlement needs ment project portfolio has improved, particu- throughout project design and implementation larly after 1991. The review also revealed (e.g., capacities for site preparation, land important weaknesses, and actions have been, resource studies, monitoring and evaluation, or will be, taken to achieve improvements. training). Such Bank institutional support will focus primarily on national and state agencies Strategic priorities - such as central irrigation and water depart- Within the Bank's existing policy for resetlie- ments, electricity boards, corporations - ment centered on income restoration, wor]k wil aiming to develop their overall capacity on be guided by the following strategic priorities, technical, social, and environmental matters, which match the key lessons described in this and specifically to develop design standards, report. rules and regulations that could help translate resettlement policy and legal provisions into Ensure the Borrower's commitment. The Bank project practice. NGOs can play a big role in will not finance projects involving large re- increasing local institutional capacity, and the settlement operations unless the government Bank will encourage their involvement. concerned adopts policies and legal frame- works apt to lead to resettlement with income Improve project design. Bank-assisted projects restoration. Agreement on policy should be should avoid or reduce displacement as much explicit from the outset, with due consideration as possible through technical and social studies given to circumstances in countries with a for project design and execution. Every effort federal system, where the policies/legal will be made before project start to search for frameworks may fall within the jurisdiction of technical and social options to reduce resettle- the state/provincial governments. Loans in ment. The Banr will make special efforts to sectors with high resettlement needs should identify and disseminate best practices, par- provide for gradual extension of improved ticularly as regards resettlement in urban and resettlement standards from the project level to semi-urban contexts for which operational impact more broadly the whole sector. approaches must be further refined. Project design and explicit timetables should create Enhance the Borrower's institutional capacity. intemal mechanisms that link progress in civil The Bank will help Borrowers build their works with gradual advance in resettlement. institutional capacity to implement resettle- These will be described in project SARs. ment before displacement starts, including the clarification of legal frameworks, with a view Promote people's participation. The Bank to protect people's rights. For Borrowers with requires the active participation of would-be several Bank-assisted resettlement operations, resettlers in the preparation, planning, and the Bank will be prepared to support special implementation of resettlement. As part of institutional development projects to assist the regular environmental assessments (EA), Environment Department 183 Resettlement and Development resettlement plans are made available to the Strengthen the Bank's institutional capacity. public. Reliable information must be available The Bank is increasing its capacity to address to the project-affected people regarding re- the social and technical dimensions of resettle- settlement and rehabilitation policy, entitle- ment projects, in order to sustain and build on ments, eligibility, options, due process, and the recent improvements (see paras. 66-71 in appeals mechanisms. Public consultation on the Executive Summary, and Chapter 7). resettlement plans will stimulate participation Particularly important are better use of existing of resettler and host populations in preparing staff skills, additional staff capacity in critical such plans, and later in executing them. fields such as social areas, enhanced project review, and ongoing performance monitoring Provide adequate Bank financing. To prevent and evaluation. Managers will allocate suffi- impoverishment, all future projects will inter- cient resources from within their budgets to nalize the full cost of resettlement and of the achieve these improvements. To support investments required for income restoration overall strengthening of work on the social within total project costs. In the context of the dimensions of projects, the Bank will allocate overall project financing plan, the Bank will be financial resources to a central fund designed prepared to increase its share in financing to provide support for innovative projects resettlement operations, as needed from case to addressing priority social dimensions, such as case. As adequate financing still remains a participatory poverty assessments, methodolo- problem in some recently approved projects, gies for social analysis, the organization of the Bank will consider supplementary fnanc- natural resource users, NGO involvement in ing whenever appropriate. Increased financing project design and implementation, and others. from domestic - and, when appropriate, from bilateral sources - for resettlement activities Remedial and retrofitting actions. Near-term should be also sought. - remedial actions will be continued or initiated for active projects that fall short of policy and Diversify project vehicles. The Bank will legal provisions. For the ongoing projects consider twin-project approaches for large- identified by each region as having serious scale civil works causing resettlement. Future resettlement problems, remedial action plans infrastructural operations that displace a are being prepared by the Borrowers with Bank large number of people will normally be assistance, and the preparation of all such plans processed as twin projects, with the actual will be completed by mid-1995. Some projects threshold for the stand-alone project to be may require restructuring, additional financing, determined on the basis of country and local or the creation of resettlement agencies. capacity. Processing of large-scale resettle- ment operations as components of larger For the projects assessed by the regions as projects will require justification in the Staff having moderate or minor problems, Bank Appraisal Report. Treatment of major re- assistance will continue to be provided through settlement operations as full fledged projects regular or intensified supervision by each will better mobilize the appropriate adminis- Country Department. Borrowers would be trative frameworks and skills needed to carry expected to reallocate financial resources out resettlement successfully. An additional within project budgets to complete resettlement option is to use two-project sequences, with a successfully, and, when requested, the Bank rural or urban development project immedi- will consider additional financing. ately following up in the resettlement zone on the heels of the infrastructure operation The review identified cases where resettlement involving displacement; this option should be plans agreed with the Bank were not imple- considered based on needs in each project - mented by the Borrower and completed area situation. projects have left a number of resettlers worse 184 Resettlement Series Actions to Improve Performance off. The Bank stands ready to provide assis- Bank will encouxage Borrowers to carry out tance to Borrowers in the remedial actions they pilot schemes to test the adequacy of proposed propose to take. Such "retrofitting" actions by solutions and arrangements. Systematic use of the Borrower, to the extent possible, should Project Preparation Facility resources and of the identify the people affected and seek to reverse Institutional Development Fund (IDF) will their impoverishment. The retrofitting actions open additional financial windows for technical agreed upon between the Bank and India's support and capacity building to Borrowers in National Thermral Power Corporation (NIPC) the decisive preparatory phases. In major for several completed thermal projects is a operations - particularly for dams - consid- recent example that represents progress. eration is increasingly given in the early identification stages to using a resettlement Improving project processing. Full compliance advisory panel, along the lines pursued in with procedures and established safeguards for establishing dam safety panels. ensuring project quality 3/4 such as baseline income surveys, resettlement plans and pack- Bank provisions for resettlement appraisal, as ages, timetables, and budgets 3/4 is essentia,l. defined in OMS 2.20 and OD 4.30, are adequate The fact that nearly all FY93-FY94 projects and will be implemented. Appraisal will submitted to the Regional Loan Committees explicitly assess and report on the social and comply with established procedures indicates economic risks involved in the proposed that Regional Vice Presidencies are focusing on resettlement operation, distinct from other these requirements. While full implementation project risks, and ensure that the responsibility rests with borrowing govern- socio-economic reconstruction package ad- ments, Bank staff have their own responsibility dresses these risks. Consistent with the Bank to follow up carefully on performance, impacts, management decision on preparing an Imple- and outcomes. Because of the high risks in- mentation Plan for each project at appraisal, the volved in sensitive projects that dismantle and resettlement plan will be incorporated in the reconstruct peoples' livelihoods, particular overall implementation plan. prudence and care are warranted by Bank and Borrower staff. It is essential that the Bank The content of SARs for projects involving address - and be clearly seen to address -- its resettlement is being improved to ensure that own responsibilities more effectively, in addi- essential information about resettlement is tion to the Bank's call on borrowing goven- provided to management and tLhe Board. A ments to do the same. distinct SAR subsection for the resettlement component will include the basic indicators on Improvements have been and are being made in affected populations, development packages, (i) the analysis of resettlement at appraisal and in risk mitigation, timetable, and budget. The the design of development packages for overall cost of resettlement will be specified as resettlers, (ii) the in-house review of resettlement an identifiable part of project costs and will components before project submission to the distinguish compensation costs from the costs Regional Loan Committee, and (iii) the staffing of investments needed to reconstruct a viable and organization of operational units to enable socio-economic basis for resettlers. them to address resettlement professionally and consistently. Much of the knowledge needed for Supervision. Considerable scope exists for doing sound, successful resettlement resides in further inproving the content and frequency of the Bank, and the present review has enriched it. resettlement supervision. Regular and ad- With well-deployed staff resources, this knovvl- equately staffed supervision missions will take edge must now be more fully used. place at least every 12 months, including on-the-ground visits to the places where dis- At project identification and during the prepa- placement and relocation actually occur. Inten- ration of large resettlement operations, the sively using local specialist consultants will Environment Department 185 Resettlement and Development significantly increase the reach of Bank supervi- learning process that has taken place over the sion work. The good practice introduced by the last few years has increased awareness of the East Asia and Africa regions to support monitor- complex issues and risks involved, and the ing panels appointed by the Borrower improves Bank and its Borrowers are much better implementation and will be extended. equipped than in the past to work in this area. Much of the necessary technical talent for this Bank divisions responsible for projects with work exists in the Bank, and the limited in- complex resettlement need to allocate increased house capacity for social analysis is being stiff time to supervise these operations. How- strengthened. Diversified project vehicles and ever, no amount of increased Bank supervision more financial resources will be used by the can substitute for Borrowers' defaults or weak Bank to assist Borrowers with large scale commitment to carry out agreed actions. When resettlement operations. compliance with legal agreements is found lacking, decisions to continue disbursements By setting more exacting norms for the operations require approval at the same regional manage- it assists, and promoting resettlers' reestablish- ment levels that clear proposals to suspend ment at comparable or improved income levels, disbursement (this applies to all non-compli- the Bank is working to narrow the gap between ance and not only to non-compliance with resettlement goals and past entrenched practice resettlement agreements). Because of the in many countries. Cosing this gap requires time, sensitivity and risks of resettlement, current resources and steady effort by both the Bank and mechanisms for reporting field findings to its Borrowers. Unfortunately, bad standards divisional and regional managers (through continue to prevail in much of the displacement Form 590) will be improved. taking place today outside Bank-assisted pro- grams; as Bank-financed projects do not occur in To sustain the progress achieved during the isolation, such standards slow progress under review and to monitor continued compliance Bank-financed projects as welL For this reason all with Bank guidelines and procedures, regional governments and multilateral and bilateral units will prepare annual reports on projects development agencies must pursue similar with resettlement in their portfolio, as part of policies and approaches, to maxmiize the pros- the Annual Review of Portfolio Performance pects for improving the livelihood of resettlers. (ARPP). These reports will cover the manage- ment of the resettlement project portfolio along By supporting resettlement centered on pre- measurable indicators 3 specificaly the fre- venting impoverishment, the Bank promotes quency of supervision missions, and assess- policies and approaches that are relevant far ments of livelihood recovery as displaced beyond the Bank-assisted projects. Improving people resettle, and major implementation Borrower's capacity will benefit not only Bank- problems, if any. As regards the processing of assisted operations, but also the much broader new projects with resettlement, the reporting resettlement activities of entire sectors, affect- will cover the presence of resettlement plans, ing larger numbers of people. This is the road income surveys, timetables and budgets, and that must be travelled in future resettlement consultation with local people. work, even though it is not an easy one. There will be many difficulties, because resettlement remains a formidable challenge for Borrowers Strengthening its assistance to Borrowers on as well as for the Bank. The Bank recognizes its resettlement work and improving resettlement important responsibility to help its Borrowers performance is of high priority for the Bank, move progressively along this road, to improve and part and parcel of the Bank's central resettlement whenever displacement cannot be mission to alleviate poverty and promote avoided, and to extend imnproved approaches sustainable development. The important to sector and national contexts. 186 Resettlement Series Annex Generic Terms of Reference Income Restoration - Given the Bank's policy Resettlement Review Supervsiorn objectives of restoring lost incomes, supervi- sion mission should concentrate on the follow- Mission ing key items: This note provides generic TORs for what (a) is there accurate baseline information of should be supervised about the resettlement what pre-move income levels are; component during upcoming nissions and reported back as an attachment to Form 590s. (b) do the proposals amount to an appropriate Field visits to departure and receiving sites are set of measures to restore incomes; a critical part of resettlement supervision, and adequate field time should be allocated to lthe (c) are people's living standards and income resettlement component. Taking a resettlement levels being adequately monitored by the specialist may be most useful for projects tfhat project authorities; and involve significant displacement-or particularly complex resettlement components. (d) in the mission's judgement,-how long will it take for resettlers to recover their lost The Bank's overall policy objective is to help living standards, and what measures will people displaced by project activities restore or sustain them until then. improve their income and productive capacity. Thus, supervision should focus on whether Where resettlement is land-based, missions executing agencies have developed a resettle- should assess the quality of the studies done, ment action plan able to achieve this goal, and the amount and pace of land identification, and on its implementation status. The main points how the acceptability of replacement land is to be addressed are: - evaluated. Proposals for using non-land based income generating schemes either alone or in (a) restoration of pre-displacement incomrte combination with land should be reviewed for levels; the success of their performnance. (b) organizational capacity for resettlement and follow-up; Baseline Numbers - Missions should obtain (c) physical progress of relocation work; the most up-to date estimates of the numbers of (d) consultation with affected people; people to be affected by loss of land, loss of (e) compensation; house, or both. Where the basis for the resettle- (f) project-specific issues. ment estimate is not dear, they should ask the borrower to explain how the number was To assist with the supervision work, a few, obtained, and the criteria used to detem7ine more detailed items are suggested for supervi- when people only partially affected by the sion for'each of the above points, to be used as project are eligible for resettlement. appropriate. Environment Department 187 Resettlement and Development Resettlement Organization - Mission should Monitoring - Supervision should review the (i) identify the position of the resettlement work done by the project's monitoring systems. organization or unit within the overall project What is the methodology used to obtain data, management structure; (ii) assess the adequacy, who receives it, how is it processed through the numbers, and skills of resettlement staff; (iii) executing agency, and how could it be im- review the efficiency of mechanisms that proved. coordinate the different agencies involved in resettlement; (iv) assess the usefulness of the Consultation - Resettlement plans normally role played by NGOs and local organizations include mechanisms for grievance/dispute and, where appropriate, indicate how it can be resolution. Areas of particular concem include improved. asset compensation, integration of resettlers with their host villagers, and timely delivery of Resettlement Budget - Missions should promised benefits. Missions should check to review and evaluate detailed resettlement see that such mechanisms do in fact exist, and budgets. Resettlement budgets should at a are working. minimum be divided into public and private compensation, and redevelopment costs for the Compensation - Common compensation resettled families. Missions should assess issues include (i) whether compensation is at (i) the adequacy of overall resettlement budget; replacement cost; (ii) compensation eligibility; (ii) actual expenditures; (iii) per capita bud- (iii) the efficiency of its delivery to the affected geted expenditure for resettlement; people; (iv) hidden charges against compensa- (iv) provisions for adjusting budgets; (v) the tion; (v) compensation for public property and availability of resources for field staff; (vi) the private businesses. causes of cost overruns or budgetary shortfalls. You may also wish to consult the technical Handover Concerns - Successful resettlement annexes to World Bank Technical Paper No. 80, involves transferring all administrative respon- "Involuntary Resettlement in Development sibilities to the resettled people and their Projects. Policy Guidelines in World Bank- representatives. How will this be accom- Financed Projects" for more detailed financial plished? Is there an adequate, phased program and economic guidelines; it is available in to devolve responsibilities, including budgetary Spanish, French, and English. resources? Timetables - The first, critical element to Proposals - Progress to date, as well as review is whether progress on the resettlement difficulties and problems with the resettlement action program is proceeding in tandem with component that are identified by the supervi- the main investment that is causing the dis- sion mission, should be discussed with the placement. Supervision should evaluate actual borrower in order to agree on actions for the versus planned resettlement performance, and next 6-8 months that will bring the resettlement match deviations from the resettlement sched- into line with project agreements and policy ule against the overall project timetable. A guidelines. second timetable concem refers to the ad- equacy of preparation of resettlement sites Reporting - Detailed back-to-office reports when resettlers are moved there, and supervi- should review the above points, and include sion should assess both the mechanism to proposals for what the Bank could do to signal that preparation is ready as well as its provide technical or other assistance. effectiveness. 188 Resettlement Series Environment Department. The World Bank 1818 H Street, N.W.: Washington, D.C., 20433 202 473.3641 202 477 0565 FAx Printed on I O% post-consumer recycled papter