SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HOW TO SERIES | vol. 3 n February 2008 43083 CDD and Elite Capture: Reframing the Conversation Power over local decision making has been Defining Elites and Elite Capture always been, and continues to be, · Elites are actors who have concentrated among elites. Indeed, even in disproportionate influence in the developed countries where democracy is well development process as a result of their established, elites have disproportionate superior social, political or economic influence over community decisions. status. Nevertheless, because they function in the · Elite capture refers to situations where context of political institutions which are elites shape development processes transparent and accountable to citizens, elites' according to their own priorities and/or actions often, though not always, reflect their appropriate development resources for constituents' priorities. private gain. · Though elite capture can involve explicit In the areas where Community Driven acts of corruption in some instances, in Development (CDD) operations are typically other situations it can primarily entail implemented, community involvement in elites exercising disproportionate control over community decisions at the expense choosing, constructing and managing a public of communities' priorities. good is often dominated by elites, who tend to be better educated, able to dedicate more time to community activities, and better communities on a path to lasting social connected with outsiders and aid agencies change. (Rao and Ibanez 2003). As a result, elite capture poses a major challenge for CDD Conditions That Increase the Likelihood operations. of Elite Capture While detractors of CDD often suggest that While elite capture does not eliminate all of the detrimental effects of elite involvement the benefits of CDD, it does have the cancel out many of the substantive benefits of potential to greatly decrease the effectiveness community driven interventions, the evidence of CDD operations. In order to most on this subject is decidedly mixed. Indeed, effectively promote social accountability, task recent research suggests while elite capture in teams should not only be aware of the CDD operations can result in graft and structural conditions which make elite capture corruption, elite involvement also has the more likely, but also sensitive to the fact that potential to facilitate positive development communities' must be sufficiently empowered outcomes and high levels of stakeholder before they can benefit from CDD satisfaction if appropriate checks are in place. operations. Negative elite involvement is particularly likely to occur when: To the extent that leadership is a critical factor in promoting collective action, this implies · Elites have significant control over that it is the quality of elite engagement and community decisions and/or the involvement-as opposed to its presence or autonomy to craft rules which discourage absence-that determines the short-run efficacy community involvement in the project. of CDD projects. Changing political culture is · There are higher levels of inequality at the an incremental process which inevitably village level, which gives elites more unfolds slowly. While it is unrealistic to expect influence over community decisions and a that CDD initiatives will completely greater ability to co-opt influential circumvent elites in the short run, in the long members of the community. term CDD has the potential to set Communities which are heterogeneous SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEP A R T M E N T n www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment 1 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HOW TO SERIES | vol. 3 n February 2008 What Does Positive Elite Involvement Look Like? The Jamaican Social Investment Fund (JSIF) uses a CDD approach to improve living standards for poor and vulnerable communities. Though a recent study found that community leaders and well- connected individuals dominated much of the decision-making, community members expressed high levels of satisfaction with the project's results. Moreover, the study found that JSIF's CDD approach increased trust and enhanced communities' capacity for collective decision making in comparison to communities which had not utilized the CDD approach. Taken together, these results suggests that "elite capture may be `benevolent' in the sense that such projects may serve to benefit the entire community in the long run with the vast majority of individuals in the community ultimately expressing satisfaction with it."1 and/or have large populations, both of involvement does not necessarily harm which act as barriers to collective action, project outcomes: are also more prone to elite capture. · Effectiveness: All things being equal, elite · Outside "development brokers" from involvement on community boards1 does urban based NGOs or other not impact board effort and performance. organizations are able obtain leadership This is important because boards which positions at the village level and gain function effectively and transparently are control of development resources. more likely to promote community · Projects are initiated before sufficient participation, especially of women and the capacity-building measures have been poor. (Fritzen 2005) implemented to ensure that community · Satisfaction: In recent studies, beneficiaries members have the skills and knowledge have expressed high degrees of necessary to effectively advocate for their satisfaction with projects where decision position with local elites. making was dominated by elites. For · Community facilitators are not trained example, elites may be able to improve well enough to increase community community level projects by contributing participation, educate citizens about their expertise and mobilizing resources. rights, and empower people to guide the However, it is important to note that development process. elites' were more likely to obtain projects · The project moves forward with that matched their preferences than the implementation before clear rules and poor. (Rao and Ibanez 2003) processes have been established to guide · Momentum: Positive outcomes, even if they its activities. are elite-led, increase communities' ownership over projects and empower them to remain involved with the project Setting the Record Straight: Positive Elite in the future. Over time, this can increase Involvement and Social Change community involvement in project While CDD often increases communities' decision-making. participation in development decisions, no one claims that it completely eliminates elites' It is important to note that this analysis does central role in the development process. not suggest that "benevolent" elite Nevertheless, in contrast to the conventional involvement is the optimal outcome. logic on the subject, recent research However, the findings above point to the fact demonstrates that elite involvement in CDD that elite involvement does not necessarily projects does not impact the effectiveness of lead to negative project outcomes. Given that operations in a uniformly negative way: elite capture can either be harmful or benevolent. 1 These results suggest that "benevolent" elite Boards refer to the village committees which make decisions in many CDD projects. It is important to note that not all CDD projects use this approach. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEP A R T M E N T n www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment 2 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HOW TO SERIES | vol. 3 n February 2008 The Importance of Community Facilitators In order to minimize the likelihood of harmful elite involvement, participatory planning should be properly facilitated by well-trained facilitators. Facilitators play a central role in CDD projects by mobilizing communities, ensuring adequate representation and empowering citizens to hold government accountable. In doing so, they play a crucial role throughout CDD operations in the formation or election of village committees, project preparation, and the implementation of subprojects. However, it is important to note that in some settings it can be difficult to find quality facilitators and/or accurately monitor facilitators' activities. Accordingly, task teams should attempt to create incentive structures­such as providing adequate salaries and designing effective monitoring systems- which increase the likelihood that facilitators will effectively advance the project's operational objectives. task teams will have difficulty eliminating elite · Use sequential and conditional releases of control in the short and medium term, they aid funds to increase accountability. should develop an understanding not only of Attempt to distribute funds directly to the what factors determine whether elite capture community.2 will be harmful or beneficial, but also how to design projects which increase citizens' Provide Citizens with the Tools they Need to Hold capacity to guide the development process. Government Accountable (Demand Side of Good Governance) Striking a Balance: Increasing · Ensure that community members are Participation While Enhancing Elite aware of operation's purposes and know Responsiveness board members and their roles. Task teams should place a strong emphasis on The goal of CDD is to empower the poor to information disclosure and transparency, guide the development process and achieve especially related to project budgets, development outcomes which are consistent financing, contracting, and procurement. with their needs and priorities. Though elites Public bid openings and the will inevitably be involved in the development corresponding financial and contract process, task teams can apply the following information should be discussed publicly approaches to increase community and displayed on information boards. participation while enhancing elite · Make certain that community members accountability in CDD projects. While elites are involved in all stages of the project will have disproportionate influence in the cycle from setting priorities, to short-term, CDD projects which include the monitoring progress and assessing results. correct checks and balances will ideally shift the balance of power in communities' favor in · Each community should form an the long-run. independent committee responsible for overseeing contracts, procurement, Provide Elites with Incentives to Serve the Needs of finances, and implementation of Communities (Supply-Side of Good Governance): development projects. These committees · should report on projects' finances and Democratic leadership selection helps physical progress. Provincial journalists ensure that the community board is less and NGOs should be invited to meetings dominated by elites. Democratic selection to further enhance accountability. mechanisms also increase accountability because board members know they can be voted out of office by the community. · Eliminate subsidies for community board members to increase the proportion of people on the board with a service 2 orientation. See the CDD Note on Disbursement Best Practices for more information on this topic. SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEP A R T M E N T n www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment 3 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HOW TO SERIES | vol. 3 n February 2008 Operational Questions to Ask About Elite Involvement During Project Preparation: Are the targeted communities structurally prone to harmful elite involvement? Do communities have previous experience with participatory governance? Have community members participated in these forums in the past? If not, why not? How can the project be designed to mitigate the deleterious effects of elite involvement? During Implementation: Are communities satisfied with project results? To what extent are communities' preferences being reflected in project selection? What measures can be taken to increase communities' influence relative to elites? As the Project Proceeds: Is the power balance between elites and communities shifting? In other words, do citizens have more influence over project decisions then they previously did? Are elites more responsive to communities' needs? How can the operation be adapted to achieve these objectives? Project Design formulation of strategies to reduce it · Enhance operations' clarity of purpose by through public policy. devoting sufficient time to training · Participatory Monitoring & Evaluation: A community facilitators and conducting a process through which various poverty mapping. Research shows that stakeholders engage in monitoring or the quality of facilitators is an important evaluating a particular project, program or predictor of project success. Facilitators policy. Stakeholders share control over should be recruited from among the local the content, the process and the results of population, not the capital city, in order the M&E activity and engage in to decrease the likelihood of harmful elite identifying and implementing corrective capture. Similarly, poverty mapping actions throughout the project cycle. increases the likelihood that operations will be able to more effectively fulfill the Conclusion: needs of the poor. Spurring political change is necessarily a long- · Implement CDD projects slowly to term endeavor. While elites will initially have provide communities with additional disproportionate influence in CDD projects, opportunities to make corrections to the over time CDD projects which include the project and replace ineffective leaders. correct checks and balances can lead to Make sure that facilitators proactively enhanced participation and community input disclose information on projects' status to into the development process. To the extent community members in order to resolve that CDD increases participation while asymmetries at the local level. aligning elites' preferences more closely with · Develop complaint handling mechanisms the communities' needs, it represents a step in to provide stakeholders with the right direction towards lasting change and opportunities to report elite capture to improved governance. project authorities through anonymous channels. For Further Reading: 1. Ghazala Mansuri and Vijayendra Rao, Social Development Tools for CDD "Community-Based and Driven Projects Development: A Critical Review", World · Community Scorecards: A monitoring Bank Research Observer, Vol. 19, No.1 tool that draws on techniques of social (2004) audit, community monitoring and citizen 2. Scott Fritzen, "Local Democracy Matters: report cards to increase transparency and Leadership, Accountability and Community project responsiveness. Development in Indonesia"(2005). Available · Participatory Poverty Assessments: An online at: instrument for including poor people's http://www.spp.nus.edu.sg/docs/wp/wp06- views in the analysis of poverty and the 07.pdf SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEP A R T M E N T n www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment 4 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT HOW TO SERIES | vol. 3 n February 2008 3. Vijayendra Rao and Ana Ibáñez "The The Social Development Department presents the Social Impact of Social Funds in Jamaica: A "How to Series", a set of occasional papers aimed at 'Participatory Econometric' Analysis of synthesizing social development research and Targeting, Collective Action, and Participation operational best practices in a format which is easily in Community-Driven Development", Journal accessible to development practitioners. of Development Studies, Vol. 41, No.5 (2005) For more information about the Series, visit us online 4. Jean Phillipe Platteau, "Monitoring Elite at www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment or contact Capture in Community-Driven us at socialdevelopment@worldbank.org Development", Development and Change, Vol. 35, No. 2 (2004) 5. Benjamin Powis, Systems Capture: Portions of this note were adapted from the readings Reassessing the `Threat' of Local Elites, listed in the sources section. The note was compiled World Bank (2008) and authored by David Post. The author would like to 6. Robert Chambers, Who Counts? The thank Caroline Kende Robb, Gillette Hall, Rob Chase, Quite Revolution of Participation and Scott Guggenheim, Dan Owen, Julien Labonne, Numbers, IDS (2007) Danielle Christophe, and Robin Mearns. 7. Learning from Change: Issues and Experiences in Participatory Monitoring and Evaluation, IDS (1998). Building a Culture of Citizen Oversight Adapted from Poriaman Sitanggang and Scott Guggenheim, "Picturing Indonesia: village Views of Development", Godown (2005). It was a brilliantly clear morning in central Sulawesi when the villagers first spied the large pile of lumber and the men that worked for the public works department there. The villagers were curious. Just last year they had received funds from the Kecamatan Development Project (KDP) to build a stone road from their rice field to the market route, and now here were the materials to repair the bridge. Had the government finally noticed their plight? "Friends what is this wood for? How much wood is there? What did it cost?" "That's none of your business. Just be thankful that the government will be building you a bridge" "But we want to know because this is our new rule here. You have to come and tell us about the project. Then you have to post a signboard so that all of us know how much this bridge costs. If KDP does it we want you to do it too." "You are mistaken. This is a government project, and we follow our own rules. Just be thankful you are getting a bridge." Early the next morning, the villagers heaved the wood on to a large truck owned by the son of the village council head. When the first parliamentarians arrived for work that morning they were met by a quiet delegation of villagers standing atop a large pile of wood. "What is this?" they asked. The village head replied, "This project is dead. We would rather have no bridge and no wood than go back to the corrupt ways of the New Order. From now on we only want projects that involve us in decisions. If KDP can do it, other projects can too". SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT DEP A R T M E N T n www.worldbank.org/socialdevelopment 5