E - 161 RESTRICTED 67086 This report is restricted to use within the Bank. INTERNA TIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT S Y RI A PORT OF LATAKIA AND ROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM 1une 12, 1951 Econo..nic Department Prepared by: Grace W. Finne 'S Y R I A. FORT OF LATAKIA .AND ROAD DEVELOPMENT PROGJlAr·1 -- ------ .. .... , ~----, ~-- . --.. --- ----------------------- Table of Contents Summary and Conclusions Page 1 II 2 Port of Latakia Table I n 7 II 8 Table II Table III " 9 If The five-year Road Program 10 II The Jezira Project 13 The Ghab Project II 16 The lJL~ri-Tartous~ Project " 17 Transportation Map_ Reference is made to I.E.R.D. Reuort E-152 " (Restricted) of April 20.1951, ti tled nSyrian Transportation- Problems". -1- 5mfMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 1. Transport projects are of primary importance for the realization of 'an economic de-reloprnent; program in Syria. Ir~ro'Ved transportation 1sneeessary to market the projected increase in prod\lction. In turn, the anticipated level of production and pattern of distribution .vill determine the type and extent of transport investment" 2.. Several transport projects have been technically surveyed and considered by the Government. Insufficient funds and a shortage of skilled labor have hampered their implementation. The Eank has been approached to finance an estimated $ 2.75 ~il­ lion foreign currency cost of the development of the port of Latakia, and about $1.9 mlllion estimated foreign eXChange expenditures to carry out road improvements. Closely interrelated and tied to the agricul- tural development schemes J these projects appear to be of first prior- ity to improve the S~i~ transuortation system. 3. The economic justification of the port of Latakia. and the Jezira road program rests on over-all economic considerations rather than de· tailed calcul.ations from preQise data. The documentation of the pro- ject is as yet incomplete. -,.2 - P 0 R T S I!!mortance Oceap.borne foreign trade· is of major importance to Syria.· However. Syria has onlY' part~y sheltered lighterage ports, like Latakia and Ta,rtouss,.· to serYe her foreign trade,. and small open roadsteads, ,like 13anias and Djeble .. for coastal traffic. --- :Beirut-Latakia Traffic . S~ia' s lack of efficient .. deep-t'later ports is partly due to the lack of. natural harbors on her. coastline, but ma.inly to historic and economic ·fac- tors: Syria was united ''lith Lebanon po+itically until 1943 and for custom wrposes until April 1950. The bulk of S;yr:la's foreign trade has tradi tion- ally been handled by the port of l3eirut. The shel tered.dee:p-water port of . :Beirut is 'linked to the main SyrIan cities by road and ra.ilroad,and possesses mechanized cargo equipm.ent, ample storage space, sh1-p repair facilities, etc:" About half of the prewar foreign trade at Eeirut (some 4QO.OOO·tonsper year) liaf! Syrian. About 30,000 - 60,000 tons.mostly eXt;>orts, i.rent through Lata1da, and a small part through Tartouss and the small Turkish port of 1s- kenderun. In 1948' total traffic at :Beirut was 692,000 tons, of,.,hich7"i'3. 000 tons ""ere imports. Latakia traffic \'laS 25..000 tons and is, in contras t with the prewar situation. mostly imports (Table I). In 1949 l3eirut's traffic increased by 5C),000 tons and in 1950 by about 85,000 tons, reaChing a level of about one million tons. Latakfa traffic' increased nearly six~fold during 1949, mainly due to the tremendous develop- ment of exports from 6,000 tons in 1948 to 122,000 tons in 1949. The in- crea~ed traffic in Latakia in 1949 was probably due to a policy of using La- takia for governmental shipments and to encourage private' traders to folJ.ow suit. A conSiderable amount of Syrian trade was also handled by Beirut in 1949 and the increases in imports, both in Beirut and,Latakia, were probably partly.to meet immediate demands in Syria and Lebanon, and -partly to hoard goods in an.tic11'ation of scarei ties and higher prices •. In 1950. e~orts through Lat~ia increased to 147,000 tons, while im- ports more than quintupled, reaching 118,000 tons. Total cargo loaded and unloaded thus reac..1ted 265 t OOO tons,. "11th the break of the Customs Union tlith Lebanon in April 19;;;0 and until the Commercial Agreement was signed in Decem- ber 1950, Syrian trade ,,,as channelled through Lata 1da ~o the extent it \'Jas physically :possible. Cargo thus disc!targed. TO Se from 2,000 tons. in A1Jril to 8,000 in May and reaChed a peak of 17,000 tons in July. Exports rose simul- taneously. but here seasonal factors may also have played a. part. Traffic at Latakia during the first four months of 1951 exceeded somewhat the traffic during the corresponding period in 1950 •. (Tables II and III.) These figures are derived frOID a. private source, The port h'nffic for Latakia in 1950 as cutr,ittl"d cffic'it1:U/ to tl".o !n-;.k ,..y ;'r. SC'J,"\';uf is ~tntd fl.t 3eo,.COO ten:::, or' ":hich 225,.C1CO tons c:t'I)trto €nd 124. COO to!:o 1j~c;rt. - :3 - Accord.1ng to the December 1950 Commercial Agreement, trade between Le- banon and Syria will be resumed subject to customs duties. Beinlt having a free port, transit trade consigned to Syrian importers 1I!il1 stHI be f:r ee from Lebanese customs. The 'Part of Syrian trans:!.t trade \"hich used Le-oanese merchants as middlemen \~r1l1, -however, be hit by :CebaneBe custom leviifs. Syr- ian exports through Lebanon via the port of ]eir~t could apparently be shipped in bond through Lebanese territory to thEl freeport at ]eil"t1.t. Port of Latakia Capacity The peak level of exports and imports of about :30,000 metric tons in July 1950 (Table n) about equalled the l~ghterage capacity of the port es .... timated at 1,000 - 1,200 tons per day. The average daily load handled by the lighterage neet in 1950 vTas 800 tons. FC'cilities Cargo is loaded and un~oaded by the ,hip's own gear and li~hters of 50-70 gross tons bring the cargo to and from the quay. The depth at the harbor entrance is 8 meters" Srrall vessels, draving.a maxilffilm of :3-4 me- ters t can moor at the jet~ieso The average size of oceangoing vessels v+s- iting the port in 1950 was 1,400 net registered tons. There are no bunkers or ship repair facilities. Description of storage facilities is lacking. The port of Latakia is connected ~d. th Alepno and '\old. th Te.rtouss by as- phal t roads. The standards and the condition of these roads are unknoNn. Finances - -- Income and expenditure accounts for the port of tat~k~a ~ave not been . availaO!e. On the basis of ~ort Charges related to traffic returns, the 1950 port income from dues may be estimated roughly at ;.s. 2.5 - :3 million. Port charges for a 1,400 net registered tons ves~el are! b. S. .-per net Regist({red tons Light charges 5.4 Anchorage (for each 72 hr. period) 0.045 ~uarantine and harbor dues 0.70 Stevedoring Stevedoring at Latakia~ left to concessioned firms. Since handling charges for cargo are unknO\1n, it is impossible to assess the cost ~or ton of shipping cargo through Latakia at the present time, nor can estimates be made of possible savings in cargo handling costs by increased mechanization. -4- The Latakia Port Development Plan The ~ostwar politioal situation has given added weight to the long cherished Syrian plan of developing Latakia into a modern,. deep':'waterp9 rt • At the request of the Syrian Government, the engineering firm of Sir Alexan- der Glbb & Company has drawn up a program ~for Latakia port development~ The main features are: l~ The construction of a main western brea.l;cwater, 1;450 metel's long and a northern brea.k\l}3.ter, 600 meters long. 2. The construction of 9QO meters of quayS. The main quay \.,il1 ac- commodate two cargo vessels of 10,000 - 15,000 .Dl"JT and hio or three smaller Vessels. The quay on th~ main breakwater ''Illl ac- Commodate hro large vessels and the quay on the lee breakwater will have berths for two large vessels. . Dredging of the harbor area allowing for a depth of 8-9 meters at the main quay and 11 meters at the moorings in the ·oasin 9 4. Con~truot1on of transit sheds, warehouses and workshops and ac- quisition of mechanical cargo-handling equipment, har"Dor crafts, etc. The program 'd.ll cover a five-year per iod, divided into tt~o stages, the main breakwater being the major item to be completed in the first three years~ OVerall Cost . . The total five-year program 'IIias originally estimated to cost b~S~ 28.5 million. of which t. S. 15 million was for the fi:rst stage. :t\ecalculated in 1951 the total project 'vas eXpected to cost about :&.·S~36million to I:..S,J8 million, of which the first stage 'vould cost l:~ S~ .24 m:tll1on... For eign ex",:, change eXpenditures of the first stage have be~n calculated at 40 rl, cr 2.75 million U~S.dollars at the eurrent free rate of exchange_ The foreign ex- change percentage of the ~.S. 12 million - b~S. 14 million second stage may be somewhat belot;, the first stage.• Inland Transnort C~nnections The cost of improving inland transport connections is not included in the project. Since the main traffic is expected to be between Latakia and Aleppo, it is essential to gear the capacity of this transport link to the increa~ed capacity of the port. With improved maintenance the existing road is deemed adequate to accommodate tr['Sfic up to about 41'\0, 000 tons of cargo a year. The necessary increase in the number of trucks is left to private initiative. A survey is said to be ccnter:mlated i:::1 order to detel'nine wt~ther to construct a super high'·Jay or a railroad ~o acconffiodate traffic be·,-ond the capac! ty of the existing road.. The cost of. constructing a rail ... road together with the necessaf'lJ rolling stock. etc. 'vas estimated by Sir Alexander Gibbs and Company at ~.s. J4 million in 1948. -5- fort Administration By a decree of Februar,y 12,1950 the Syrian Government rreated a joint stock company for the oonstruction and improvement of the port of.Lata~ia~ The capital of the company is set at 240,000 shares of hundred Syrian pO~'lds each, part. of which was offered publicly for sale on July 1.1950. Only 4,325 shares were sold to private individuals, and the rest was absorbed by the Governm~nt. The oompany h~s a fifty-year concession with annual amortization of 2-1/2~~ All property and assets of the company \11111 revert to the Government at the end of this period. The ]oard of Directors is appointed by the Syrian Govern- ment. . Tenders for bids for the const~ctlon of the port of Latakia accor&ing to the specifications worked out by tlle Alexander Giob Company were made Februa- ry 195).. R~asons for Port Development The S~ian Government seems determined to go ahead with the development of Latakia and un~oubtedly the question of national prestige plays a part in this ~es1re. From a strategic standpoint, it is precarious to be depend.ent on a foreign port. ~conomica1ly. delays at the frontier 1ncr~ase transport costs. Eecause of its proximity to Aleppo. the Ghab Valley. the Jezira and the Euphrates Valley, ta~a1da - if equi,ped with adequate port and inland transport facilities ~ Should be able to handle traffic fr9.ID these areas more economically than Beirut. The shorter distance between Damas~s and Beirut would favor continued use of Eeirut tor the Damas~s area. As for the inter- lying cities of Homs and.Hama, it seems possible that part of their trade '·.'Quld be direoted towards Aleppo, but that the established connections with Beirut also should be continued. The economic jllstification of the Latakia developrrent program thus hinges on the development of the Aleppo, Ghab, Jezlra and Euphrates areas. The buJ.k of the foreign trade to be generated in these areas after the completion 9f the program would be the export of cerealS. plus some cotton and ve,r;etablesl\ No authoritative estimates of the anticipated export levels are available. On the assumption that most exports of the agricultural products were channelled through Latakia in 1950. the 19~0 export level of almost 150,000 tons might be used as a basis for a traffic fQrecast~ If we assnme that increased agricultural production would increase exports through Latakia by 100,000 tons to about 250,000 tons and an increase in im- ports of about 30.000 tons to 150,000 tons. we would arrive at a total traffic forecas~ of about 400,000 tons annually. This is the capacity of the port en~ 'visaged by the Gibb Oompany after the completion of the entire development program. HO~'l difficult i t is to estimate port capacity is illustrated by the fact that the initial capacity of tl;te improved port Has set (1948) by Gibb at 200,000 tons, which was 50,000 tons less than the actual performance in 1950, when it was still a lighterage port. In a note to the Bank Mr. Crawford es- tima~ed the potential export volume throuph Latakia at ab9ut ~50,000 tons annually and import at 100,000 - 150,000 tons, making a total of about 800,000 tons. This estimate appears to be on the optimistic side. - 6 - The economic data on the port of Latakia are as yet incomplete. The statifltics mainly needed for a detailed analysfs" and' t....hich should be requested from the Syrian officials,.. are:: 1. Port of Latakia" Traffi,c St'atlstlcS"" 1938, 1948~ 1949" 1950, first quarter of 1951, by mt)nth" ahd a breakdo'tm of main cat- egories of import and export tonnage. 2.. Current costs of handling some main commodities at Latakia. (Export-import goods) and estifl'ated costs of shipping the same commodities at the completion of' the proposed first stage of the port improvement program. J. Information as to the to'tal incmne and expenditures of the port administration" upon the eompletion of, the first stage of development program. 4. Cost analysis of the alternatives of road development or railroad construction to Unk La:t:i~ia witll Alep1?o at dif- ferent assumed lavela of. traffiC' (400,.000 tons, 500,000 tons, ete., Up to 800.000 tons)., TA131E, I. Lata~ia Port Moyemantsc 1938-1250 Year Cargo discharged Cargo Load8d Total (Metric tons) (Metric tons) (Metric tYB.81 1938 11,'220 19? "563 JOy7S) 1939 18,680 ~!J, 686 62. }('2 1940 5.266 9,727 14,9'(3 1941 1,884 J.j 550 3,434 1942 786 1,569 2,355 194:3 1,54) 391 1,934 1944 2,376 3,435 5,811 1945 729 10,044 10,773 1946 2,775 7,880 10,655 194'7 5,212 13,679 18,891 1.946 18,536 6,389 24,925 1949 2),899 122,206 i46.105 1950 117,955 146.731 264.686 Beirut P~rt Mov~mentsi. ~9)2:l950 Year Cargo discharged Cargo Loaded Total __ _ ______.-Lr4etrj, c ~ons) (r4'etr1c.. tons l , . (!vietri c ton s ) 1939 522,000 110,400 632,400 lS40 264,000 50,.300 314,300 1941 183,600 21,100 204,700 1942 279,600 15,600 295,200 1943 156, 000 10,800 166,800 1944 86,400 30,400 116.800 1945 127,200 36,600 163,800 1946 300,000 86,800 386,800 1947 457,20n 62.900 520,100 1948 772,800 119,300 892,100 1949 805,200 141,600 946,800 1950 835,100 197,000 1,032,100 Source; "Bureau des Documentations Syriennas at Arabes, Damas, 1950". - 8 - TABLE II ~-'I'!""..,. ...--- Port of Latakia, Vessel Entrances and Clearances, Cargo Unloaded and Loaded Year 1950(:S1 Month) .. A. Oceangoin~ Vessels: DEPARTURES ARRIVALS :Het Net . Month No.of Registered Cargo Dis- 110. of Registered Cargo Vessels Tons of charged Vessels Tons of loaded Vessels. {tJietric Tons) Vessels {Metric Tons 2 January '7 11,620 2,028,441 10 17,280 18,696,496 February 5 8,676 500,146 5 8,676 1,696, 0:11 March 12 18,585 4,967,000 10 15,378 2,220,000 April 24 26,289 2,186,943 24 27,904 10,046,558 May 30 39,975 8,149,8;31 31 40,8'77 13,9'74,039 June 34 52,074 12,541,655 34 51,017 16,355,527 July 36 52,696 17,414,989 3'7 54,443 12,689,281 August 26 36,491 11,574,261 26 41,470 11,059,348 September 35 53,160 12,722,534 37 52,556 16,656,96'7 october 35 57, ~15 15, lSP;, 448 32 55,057 12,144,820 November 28 37,E85 11,992,792 27 33,9/J,g 8,880,629 Dec:::mber 23 35,618 4,023,217 25 38,136 10,624,996 Tota12 295 430,284 1Q3,257, 257 298 436,740 135,044,692 E. Small Crafts: 4 Total: 818 22,524 14,698,680 787 20,319 11,686,739 GRAND TOT.AL: -----_-______ 452,808 ___ -___ ~----- ___ 117,955.937 ~_- ~-~---------r- ________ ______ -_____________ 457,059 146,731.431 ~ • Source: ":Bu.reau des Documentations Syr1tnnes et Arabes, DamccG. 1950~ -9- TAJ3LE III :PORT OF LATAKIA Vessel Entrances and Clearances, Cargo ~nloaded and Loaded (First four months of 1951) Total Traffic . Arrivals l~et reg'd Cargo d1s- Departures Het regld ------:- Cargo Cargo unloaded Month tons of charged tons of loaded and loaded vessels (Metr.tons) vesqels (r.retr. tons) (iv;etrie tons) f~--"''''''' January 40,695 21,337 45,550 18,478 :39,$l5 Feb I"\lary 32,474 11,590 33.151 7,177 18,767 March 34,929 10,082 3~, 908 5,569 15,651 April 42,039 11,054 42,039 6',352 17,406 ~-~.~-- Total four lEo,137 54,063 156~648 37,576 91,639 months MonthlY :37,534 13~ 516 39,162 9,394 22,910 averoge: --------------------~--~------~--------------------~---~-------~~--------- Source; "Bureau des DocumentB.tions Syriennes at Arabes, Damas, 1950V - 10 - THE FIVE-YEAR PROGRAM --~------------------ The Syrian Government has prepared a five-year road development program. T~is program falls in three parts: 1. To improve 465 km of existing roads in the Jesira district. ~hese roads are presently in poor condition. They serve mainlY as feeder roads to the high~y and railroad to Aleppo and the road to the port of Latakia. Improved roads are conSidered necessary in order to move the anticipated increases in agricultural production to result from agricultural development schemes. 2. To improve and partly reconstruct the 105 km road in the Ghab Valley to accommodate anticipated increas~S in traffic from agricultural developments. The road connects to the south \"lith the city of Rama and to the north uith tJ;.te Aleppo-Port of Latakia road. 3. To ~onstruct a short cut between Akkari and Tartouss on the Horns - Port of Ta~touss road in order to avoid the present double crossing of the Lebanese frontier. The distance between Horns and Tartouss would thereby be reduced by 25 km. C,ost of Pro~ram The program is estlmate<;i to cost $;,.S. 26.6 million. The Jezira pro,ject is estimated at 78 ~ of the total cost. the Ghab Preject at 13.8 ~ and the Akkari-Tartouss project at 7. 9 ~t a.s follo'''s: Syrian =- Percent Length in kIn. - Cost 'Jer km(I:.'. S) ~ It Je~ira Road Project 2. Ghab Valley Road 20,834,00() 3,666,000 78;3 13,8 105 . 4(55 , 44804' 34,914 3. ~~ari-Tartouss Li~~ 2,100,000 7.9 . n.d. -_ n.d •...-_._-- Total! 26,600,000 100 About 71 ~,of the estimated expenditures or about I:..S. 6 million annual- ly ~cheduled to be spent during the first three years of the program ~nd about 29 'or about I:..S. 4 million annually during the concluding two years. 1l~anc1ng of the Program ~. .. .. The ~aru{ has been approached to finance the foreign currency cQst of the program, estimated at I:..S. 6.7 million. The foreign curr~ncY,re~~ireme~ts have a1')parently been cc.lculated at the free market rate of exchange. On this basis the size of the possible Bank lQan "Jould be about, US $1. 9 million. To cover, the local currency cost, estimated at I:..S. 19.9 million, a bill has been prepared authorizing h.S. 26.6 milli~n high'~ expenditures over the 5-year period. - 11 - If pa~$ed, a fund of boSe 6.7 million over and above the estimated local cur~ency recpirements for the five-year program would be available for other road ,,,orke. No information is available as to whether this bill calls for ~p:oropriation; in addition to the high,,,ay e?=penditures as sch~uled in the annual budget. Such road expenditures f9r.co~struction and maintenance hays varied in the postwar period from about b.S. 3 million to b.S. 9 million an- nually and they are tentatively set at boS. 7.5 million annually 1952-1955. If the Bill for ~he five-year Road~rogram is in addition to the regular a~l­ propriation. the, total outlay for roads in local currency would be in the magnitude of b.S. 12.8 million annually, or abput 7~ of the average estimated budget 1952.....1955. High\"ayexpenditures of this magnitude '-!ould seeminglY constitute a considerable burden of the budget. In order to secure an effici~nt road.system, it is essential that main- tenance is regular and sufficient. It "TUI seem that the Syrian system of relying completely on Parliamentary appropriations for highway expenditures easily results in an uneven flo,... of funds for roaos. It is suggested, there- fore, that automatic flnanctng of routine road improvem~nts by earmarking highway taxes (fuel t~es, vehicle reg1stration fees, etc) '1rould be desira.ble and that only e;xtraordinary Norks on the road should be subject to specific budget ap~ropriatitna. Utilization of Forei~n Currency The foreign currency requirements of .the five-71ear Road Program will cover the import of road equipment and road materials as follows: Syrian 1> Road equipment 2,800,000 Road material 3,547,000 t·a scellaneous 350,000 Total: 6,697,000 All of the equipment is to be :9urcha.sed during the first year of the program. Main items are: light and heavy rollers, bulldozers, trucks, as- phalt sprayers and heaters. The road rraterial costs include ~.S. 2.3 million for as~halt and L.S.l.25 million for cement and steel. The inadequacy of the proposed equipment to carry out the road ~1."'og,-am has been pointed out by the 'mgineering Department. I~ regard to imports of asphalt, the question may be raised ,,,hether it ,,,,auld be possible to utilize the la,,, grade Syrian asphalt depoe! ts near DeiI' Ez Zor. Concerning gement, it '''ould be interesting to be informed whether it is the high price or the non-availability of Syri~ cement that determines the proposed imports. Syria pos~e~ses a cement nlant at Doumar near Damascus and. a ne,,, cement plant near Aleppo is contemplated. Dqmestic cement prices aTe at the high level of about b. S. 100 per ton, and produotion is belo'... capacity. - 12 - . It ~'1ill seem' that. the #.5. 350,000 set aside for miscellaneous expen-, ditures is too small to cover any substantial technical assistance. (~ch assistance would seem a corallery to the contemplated imports of equipment. Also not included in the foreign currency cost of the program 1s the . necessary e.dditional investment for trucks, to.increase the carrying capacity of the vehicle fleet commensurate with the increased capac! ty of the roads. The Syrian Government is considering,to purehaselOO Diesel trucks of 20 tons capacity. the eost of which should rightly be considered a part of the foreign exchange requirements of the program. In view of the inade~ate e~ipment expenditures, the exclusion of the cost of teChnical assistance and veh~cles and possible changes in the expen~ dltures on road material, it would seem advisable to recalculate the foreign exchange requirements of the program • • U~ilization of ~ocal Currenc~ Expenditures lifo brealOO.o\m in categories of main expendi~ures of the b.S., 19.9 million local currency cost has been sub' ., ted. The cost of labor and management and of road materials are presumably the main items. In view of the regular shortage of manpower for road Norks in "eaic agri- cultural seasons, competitive bidding might increase the CO$t of labor. In reg~d to road ~aterials economy of production should perhaps be achieved in the stone crushing plants by consolidation of some quarries and a discontin- uance of others. It "',ould be interesting to knO\'! whether the construction of grain storage facilities is contemplated in conju.ncture ",lith the road program. Seasonal storage of agr1eul tv.ral produce \\fould tend to spread the dema'ld for trans1)ort facilities over the year, thus providing for more economic utilization of transport equipment. - 13 - THE J'Ezru PROJECT Description The roads in the Je~ira di~trict are reportedly the worst in S~rria. The road project calls fo~ improvements on these roads to make them motorable the year round. Some roads are to be asphal ted, others \~rill be macadam roads ~~th a gravel surface. . . The proposed \vorks include surfacing, widening, stabilization and con- struction of culverts. The roads \'1111 be 4 m. - 6m •. \IT;de. The standard of the Jedra roads after completion of the proposed improvements "rill conform roughly to the standards for rural highways in the U.S. Seven roads are to be improved under the project, viz: Distance in KM. II< 47 km - Hassetche 47 ~ Hassetche - Qamichllye 90 Qamichliye - Demir Kapcu 60 Demir Kapou ~ Kerik 38 Demir Kapou - Tellkotchek 30 Qamichliye - Ras El A1n 120 Ras El A1n - Hassetche 80 Total: 465 IDIt. *) from a point close to the town of Ohaddadi. Importance , of Jezira Roads Jezira being a main agricultural producing region ,·!ith few and small population centers, the mai~ function of. the Jezira roads is to link ,.!i th transport arteries to marketing centers. The most important market fol;' Je- zira is Aleppo, ~ome 300 km. from Jezira. Part of the Jezira produce moves on from Aleppo to be exported through the port of Latakia, some 200 km. by road from Aleppo. The character of the Jezira road network as feeder roads make it imoe- rative to examine the connecting trans~)ort l111es outside the province. ~raffic from the Jezira to Aleppo moves both by road and by rail. Road traffic moves primarily over Raqqa, \l1here an asphal ted primary road links tvi th Aleppo. The link between the Jezira roads and Baqqa is, hQwever, only a dry-t'leather road through the desert. True, this road is motorable most of the year, since the annual rainfall is only 5 inches to 10 inches. Nevertheless., since this road is such an important link between t1,le Jezira road network and the arterial Toad to Aleppo, the standards of this road should be compared with the pro- posed standards of the Jezira roads. If the des~rt road from the Jezira to Raqqa tends to limit the t~affic, improvements on this road should be under- taken in connection "r1th the Jezira road project. Another road junction ,.r1 th the t.Tezira road nehrork is Ras El Ain. on the Turkish border. Though the dis~ance from Jezira to Alep~o over Ras El Ain is apuroximately the same as over Raqqa, the road is only a secondary one, open for traffic only in dry ,,,eather. This northern route from Aleppo must there- fore be considered of secondary importance. - 14- Raii,.ray traffic from the .ab project Dust rest on the same reasoning as the Jezira project; it seems sound on geneI'1;l.l principles. but ~,Ullot be estaolished on specific economic d8ta. ... 17 - THE AIarARl - TAB.TOUSS PROJECT _________ 4 _________________ __ Description~ The ~~ari-Tartou~s.project include~ mainly the construction of ~ short cut on the road between Homs and the port of Tartouss. The cost of the pro- ject is estimated at t.S. 2,100,000 or 7.9~ of the total Road program. The ]ank has not bee~ informed about the exact distance of the new road link to be constructed, nor of the nature of other contemp+ated improvements on the Homs-Tartouss road. It appears from the map that the nell)' road to be construc~ed '",auld be relatively short, perhaps about 30 km. The cost of this pr~ject is relativety more per km. than the cost of the Jezira and the Ghab projects. This 1s probably due to the high cost of road construction in mountainous t~rrain. Justification . The main reason for the construction of the AIocari-Tartouss road lin~.is to avoid the present double crossing of the Lebanese frontier. Front~er for- malit1es delay the transport of goods and tend to increase transport costs. A relaxation of frontier inspection m~ght lead to extensive smug~ling. Never- theless. it "'ould seem a rather simple t~sk to reduce frontier formalities so as to avoid delays on transit traff~c. Simplification and reduction of tra- di tionally established frontier formal! ties have been brought abou.t in Et'lrope by negotiat~ons under (J ~C auspices. It \-,ould seem an even more obvious step behreen Syria and Lebanon which until recently has been in Custom's Union \'Jith one another. Another reason brought fonrard in the R9ad Program as Sllbmitted to the ][lnk in favor of the AIckari-1!cms road link is that the d:'stance between Horns and .A.1c..1{ari thereby '''Iould be reduced by 25 km. This reduction does n~t £~:;;:gear significant enougJ). to warren t the high cost of constrncting the lin.le. The t,·co main reasons submitted to justify the Akk'.ari-Tartouss project thus do not appear convincing. An important problem which should be clarified in order to determine the justification of the Tartouss-A1