



1. Project Data

Project ID P144832	Project Name National Unified Registry and Outreach	
Country Jordan	Practice Area(Lead) Social Protection & Jobs	
L/C/TF Number(s) TF-15887	Closing Date (Original) 30-Dec-2017	Total Project Cost (USD) 9,312,872.32
Bank Approval Date 08-Oct-2013	Closing Date (Actual) 31-Dec-2019	
	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	9,500,000.00	9,500,000.00
Revised Commitment	9,500,000.00	9,500,000.00
Actual	9,312,872.32	9,312,872.32

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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objective (PDO) as set out in the Financing Agreement (p. 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (p. 13) was to *improve the targeting of social safety net programs and develop an efficient outreach mechanism.*



During a project restructuring in 2016, the scope of the project was reduced while project commitments remained constant (see Section 2d). Consequently, a split rating will be applied.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

No

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

Yes

d. Components

Component 1: Building and using a National Unified Registry (NUR) for targeting safety nets (estimated cost at appraisal US\$2.50 million; actual cost US\$2.46 million). The component, which was to improve enrollment and eligibility verification processes, had two sub-components:

Sub-component 1.1: Building a database. The project was to help improve the accuracy of a household database for eligibility to the government's compensation cash program for fuel subsidy reform. The database was being developed by the Income and Sales Tax Department (ISTD) of the Ministry of Finance (MOF). The project was to support that database development by defining stronger predictors of household welfare, and developing data collection strategies that would ensure broad coverage of prospective beneficiaries and data accuracy. Support was to focus on defining an assessment methodology; rolling out an information campaign; processing data electronically and ensuring its availability to government agencies; and putting in place a grievance redress system.

Sub-component 1.2: Developing and using the NUR platform at MOF. The project was to help consolidate a large number of existing databases into the NUR in MOF. The government was to mandate agencies (central and local government and others) to periodically submit required data to the unit. The NUR was to be updated every two years. The project was to finance the first two rounds of the NUR, consisting of the establishment of the database and one round of updating. Subsequently, it was expected that the MOF and the ISTD would have gained sufficient experience and expertise to operate the system on their own. Verification and validation was to be an integral part of the program with the support of an Integrated Outreach Worker Program (IOWP) established under Component 2 (see below).

Component 2: Piloting an Integrated Outreach Worker Program (IOWP) (estimated cost at appraisal US\$ 7.00 million; actual cost US\$6.85 million). The two sub-components were:

Sub-component 2.1: Outreach design, planning and training of Outreach Workers. The project was to support the: (i) development of assessment and documentation services and referral systems using evidence-based community assessment tools; (ii) development of a train-the-trainers model; (iii) establishment of household selection criteria; (iv) establishment of criteria for recruiting supervisors and outreach workers; and (v) collection of baseline data on households within the impact area. Training was to be launched upon completion of the design of the program. A leading educational university was to be



contracted to conduct the training of 56 supervisors and work with the supervisors as they trained 896 outreach workers. The government was to select the supervisors and outreach workers with the help of a lead non-governmental organization (NGO). The training and deployment of the workers was to be phased, eventually to reach 22,400 households.

Sub-component 2.2: Outreach deployment and monitoring. A lead NGO was to be responsible for recruitment of the outreach workers. The deployment was to be launched in phases, first in urban areas to take advantage of higher population density and higher absolute number of households in poverty. Under oversight by the supervisors, the outreach workers were to conduct face-to-face visits/sessions with households and monitor progress for each family. Supervision sessions were also to serve to reinforce performance expectations and augment an outreach worker's professional development. Real-time data collection was to provide rapid feedback on program interventions and processes, allowing for quick and targeted course correction and quality control, and also to allow assessment of the overall efficacy of the program through an impact evaluation.

Significant changes during implementation

The project underwent one Level 2 restructuring. The restructuring was approved on October 8, 2016, responding to a change in the project's context. Following a fall in international fuel prices in December 2014, the government suspended planned implementation of the fuel subsidy compensation program and discontinued ISTD's project-supported work on developing the database for that program. Instead, the scope of the project was reduced to focus on establishing the NUR to facilitate poverty targeting of benefit delivery by the National Aid Fund (NAF), the main public cash transfer program. While well targeted, it had only moderate coverage. This change also brought about a change in the implementation arrangements for the project, with the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC) given overall responsibility for project management, and NAF responsible for technical implementation. Indicators were revised to recognize the shift in focus from the cash compensation program to a more modest NAF.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. At appraisal, the total cost of the project was estimated at US\$10 million, including a Trust Fund Grant of US\$9.50 million. Actual project cost at closing was US\$9.31 million, reflecting lower-than-estimated spending on IOWP.

Financing. The project was financed by a US\$9.50 million grant from the Middle East North Africa Transition Fund (a multi-donor trust fund administered by the World Bank) and a Borrower contribution of US\$0.50 million to Component 2.

Dates. The project was approved on October 8, 2013 and became effective on November 23, 2013. The original closing date, December 30, 2017, was extended twice: a first time on September 19, 2017, to December 30, 2018, to allow the NUR platform to be implemented, and reflecting the nearly 12 months it had taken to negotiate the 2016 restructuring; and a second time, on October 2, 2018, to December 30, 2019, to allow the addition of an offline functionality to the NUR platform.



3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

The PDO was relevant to country needs, government policy, and Bank strategy. At appraisal, the after-effects of the international economic and financial crisis, and regional political and social uncertainties, were exerting pressures on fiscal balances. Efforts at consolidation, notably the phasing out of energy subsidies, while creating fiscal space, were having adverse effects on employment and poverty, and increasing the need for social protection programs. Jordan did have several public and private safety net operations, albeit largely uncoordinated low capacity ones, with different targeting methodologies, low coverage, and little capacity to be scaled up. In 2012, the government had launched a broadly targeted cash transfer system to alleviate the effects of the fuel subsidy removal. The project was initially intended to support the development of the NUR as a means of better targeting the program. With the abolishment of the fuel cash transfer program in 2016, the project was retooled to support the NUR as a registry providing a gateway to existing safety net programs, in particular the NAF, the biggest public safety net program. The IOWP was to complement the NUR by helping to activate the poor to enter the labor market and other tailor-made social programs, i.e. essentially operating as a graduation program.

The focus of the project – to develop a NUR - remains relevant. It aligns with the government’s social protection and poverty alleviation strategy for 2019-2025 that refers to NUR as a high priority activity. It also aligns with the current World Bank Group (WBG) Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) for FY17 to FY22. The CPS recognizes that social protection interventions to the poor and vulnerable remain a key challenge and continues WBG support for Jordan in creating a system of integrated data platforms for planning and implementing social programs as part of the NUR and the IOWP.

Rating

High

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1

Objective

Improve the targeting of social safety net programs (original outcome targets)

Rationale

The objective was to be achieved by building and implementing a national database (the NUR) to serve as a single gateway for people seeking government services where they can be registered and be considered for potential inclusion in one or more social programs based on an assessment of their needs and conditions. Activities were to include an information campaign, defining welfare rankings, verifying data, and developing a grievance system. The platform was to be based on a data-sharing agreement between NUR



and relevant government agencies. That agreement was never ratified by the government. A household database for targeting the fuel subsidy cash compensation program that was being developed by ISTD and supported under the project was cut short with the abolishment of the scheme by the government.

With no reported outcomes, achievement of this objective is rated Negligible.

Rating

Negligible

OBJECTIVE 1 REVISION 1

Revised Objective

Improve the targeting of social safety net programs (revised outcome targets)

Revised Rationale

The objective – better targeted safety nets -- remained the same but was refocused on supporting beneficiary selection to the NAF. Targets were adjusted to the smaller scale of the NAF.

Originally, under Objective 1, the project had targeted 3.4 million poor and middle-income beneficiaries that were most likely to be adversely impacted by the increases in fuel prices. At project closing in December 2019, the NUR was functional, and some 88,000 individuals had benefited from the selection process and were eligible for NAF benefits, against a revised target of 112,400. The number of beneficiaries had increased to 113,300 by end-January 2020, meeting the revised target. Over 50 percent of beneficiaries were women. The number of agencies connected to the NUR and providing data to NAF had reached 15 by project closing, exceeding the target of 3 agencies.

In summary, the objective - improving the targeting of social safety nets - was achieved with an established NUR in place as a gateway for registration and potential inclusion in one or more social programs as well as a gradually expanding database. Results indicate the number of NAF beneficiaries certified using the NUR platform. While it is reasonable to assume that introduction of the NUR has brought added rigor into safety net programs in terms of reduced errors of inclusion, the project does not provide quantitative information in that area.

Revised Rating

Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2

Objective

Develop an efficient outreach mechanism

Rationale

Achievement of this objective was to provide poor and vulnerable people with case management, and based on their needs, referral to appropriate services. These services in turn were to help them graduate from



poverty and facilitate their entry/re-entry into the labor market. The mechanism was to be piloted in three governorates, and success was to be measured by the numbers of beneficiaries, outreach workers deployed, and supervisors trained. The longer-term aim was to increase the impact of social programs and support graduation out of the welfare system. The targets did not change during implementation.

The following outputs and outcomes were achieved:

- 371 skilled outreach workers were deployed, against a target of 510.
- 51 supervisors were trained to train outreach workers, against a target of 50
- 93 percent of households were referred to (social) services by outreach workers, compared to a target of 70 percent
- 23,471 individuals benefited from the outreach worker program, compared to a target of 22,000.
- In all cases, a case management approach was used to assess the needs of participating households.

While the IOWP pilot did introduce the building blocks for working outreach and referral functions, it also identified challenges that still need to be addressed for a well-functioning outreach and graduation function. Inter-agency coordination may have been insufficient in the pilot. In particular, the Ministry of Social Development (MOSD) was involved in neither preparation nor implementation of the pilot. As a result, supply was insufficient; the network of social services was uneven and often hard to reach, and resources at service levels may have been inadequate for the increase in demand for services. Such challenges were further discussed in p. 12 and Annexes 5 and 6 of the ICR. The challenges were reflected in pilot performance service providers having accepted only a third of referral households, with only seven percent receiving benefits within six weeks of enrollment, and led to the relevant outcome indicator – beneficiaries receiving services – being dropped as services could not be assured.

The difficulties encountered during implementation of the IOWP justify the introduction of a pilot rather than a more ambitious launching as an appropriate intervention.

Rating

Substantial

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale

The negligible rating for the original Objective 1 indicates that no progress was made on meeting the original target: establishment of a single gateway for access to social programs. This was due to the abolishment of the country's main support program – fuel subsidy compensation – and the failure to ratify information exchange between public agencies and NUR. Satisfactory achievement of the second original objective reflects accomplishment of the outreach pilots as expected, albeit absent indications of the effects of the case management system. Efficacy under the original outcome targets is therefore rated **modest**.



Overall Efficacy Rating
Modest

Primary Reason
Low achievement

OVERALL EFFICACY REVISION 1

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rationale

The substantial rating for the revised Objective 1 reflects a more focused approach to building the safety net, initially limiting the gateway to one main poverty program, although one that is being gradually expanded to cover other programs. Efficacy for the revised Objective 2 remains substantial, as the activity remained unchanged from the original objective. With satisfactory achievement of both objectives under the adjusted scope and revised targets for Objective 1, efficacy under the revised outcome targets is rated **substantial**.

Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

The ICR did not undertake quantitative analysis to determine efficiency. An economic analysis on the cost-efficiency of the NUR for the fuel subsidy compensation scheme had been conducted at appraisal, but the ICR team refrained from doing so in view of the reduction in the scope of the project and in view of the related delays in implementation totaling 24 months. Implementation efficiency was also affected by several other factors: complex implementation arrangements with several agencies responsible for different components; resistance to adopting the program due to absence of early engagement by some implementing agencies; and absence of formal agreements early on in the outreach program. All of these factors made implementation more difficult. Still, the project was completed without cost overruns, and administrative costs were kept reasonable: the latter accounted for 5.5 percent of project costs, lower than the average of 11 percent for comparable situations. Given implementation inefficiencies, efficiency is rated **modest**.

Efficiency Rating

Modest

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal		0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable



ICR Estimate	0	0 <input type="checkbox"/> Not Applicable
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* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

According to OPCS/IEG guidelines for restructured projects, the final outcome rating is determined by the ratings for the original project and the restructured project, weighted by the percentage of the grant that disbursed before and after the restructurings. In this case, 73 percent of funds were disbursed under the revised outcome targets.

The weighted value of the outcome rating under the original objective is calculated as follows: 3 for moderately unsatisfactory x 27 percent of total disbursements before the introduction of the restructuring = 0.81. The weighted value under the restructuring is: 4 for moderately satisfactory x 73 percent = 2.92. The weighted average score is thus $0.81 + 2.92 = 3.73$, or 4 when rounded to the nearest whole number. Therefore, the combined overall outcome rating is **moderately satisfactory**, reflecting moderate shortcomings in the project's preparation and implementation.

- a. **Outcome Rating**
Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

The shift in focus from subsidy compensation transfers to strengthening safety nets has raised sustainability surrounding the NUR, which has become a government priority. It is highlighted as such in Jordan's national protection strategy for 2019-2025. Sustainability surrounding the IOWP is less, and commitment appears weak with no budget moneys allocated to further IOWP activities. Still, there has been institutional strengthening, with MOSD taking over the NUR system and the IOWP program with a well-qualified workforce to fall back on, and the NUR platform having become a key government resource for beneficiary targeting for social programs, including some 15 institutions participating in the NUR.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

The project was strategically relevant in its original form in supporting government efforts to maintain budget balance while at the same time helping to better target needy people, initially through the fuel price compensation program, and subsequently through the NAF. Design drew on lessons from similar Bank interventions in other countries, notably Latin America for the NUR, and on developed and



developing country experiences in developing the IOWP. At the same time, less attention was paid to potential challenges on the ground that seem to have influenced both restructuring and the pace of project implementation. The ICR (pp. 32 and 33) listed a series of institutional factors: the lack of a mandate to build a nationwide NUR linking administrative databases; unclear managerial responsibilities between Ministries of Finance and Planning; and the absence of the MOSD and NAF in project preparation. Moreover, implementation arrangements sometimes did not correspond to the core businesses of implementing agencies, raising issues of technical capacity during implementation. Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) arrangements were relatively straightforward, but may not have focused sufficiently on outcomes beyond beneficiary numbers; a stronger focus on targeting and beneficiary impact might have been introduced.

Quality-at-Entry Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Despite several changes in task management, supervision teams were able to adapt the project to changing circumstances on the ground, including new implementation arrangements as target programs changed. The ICR (p. 39) pointed to determined resourcing of task teams, especially in addressing the challenging technical requirements of platform development. Still, difficulties remained, especially in setting indicators and building the management structure for the IOWP, which post-project faces uncertainties concerning its future.

Quality of Supervision Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

In the original project design, project management units in ISTD and MOPIC were responsible for monitoring progress and evaluating results in implementing the NUR and the IOWP, respectively. Key outcome indicators focused on beneficiary numbers, drawing on participants in the subsidy compensation program. Intermediate indicators included some measures of the building and use of the NUR (for example, welfare rankings, the grievance redress system, functioning delivery and assistance mechanisms), and others for piloting the outreach worker program (supervisors, workers trained and deployed, use of case management approach). All of these indicators were relevant for the envisaged system, but did not go far



enough: there was an absence of means to measure benefit incidence. Moreover, measurement of the outcome indicator for the IOWP – beneficiaries receiving services – was beyond the control of the project.

In the revised project, NAF at the MOSD managed the NUR platform and its connectivity with safety net programs, with MOSD also managing the IOWP. The revised project maintained the key outcome indicators, albeit with targets scaled down to the size of the catchment population (beneficiaries now potentially numbered 100,000 rather than 3.4 million). Again, intermediate indicators measured progress in building the NUR system and piloting the IOWP. All of them were relevant, albeit absent indicators that would measure benefit incidence or behavior change.

b. M&E Implementation

Monitoring of the NUR was undertaken by the Bank supervision team in collaboration with the management teams at MOF and MOSD. Progress on the IOWP was monitored through a case management information system focusing on performance by outreach workers. Progress reports and quarterly interim financial reports were produced, as well as an annual audit.

c. M&E Utilization

Monitoring of progress on the NUR was used to determine the pace and quality of implementation, and determined decisions on project extensions. Monitoring of the IOWP was regularly analyzed and reported. Information from project M&E was also used to update the results framework and prepare annual progress reports.

M&E Quality Rating

Substantial

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was categorized as environmental assessment category "C," triggering no environmental safeguards policy.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management (as reported in the ICR, p. 37): The original project design delegated financial management responsibility to the ISTD for Component 1, and to MOPIC for Component 2, and two separate Designated Accounts were opened. The first restructuring transferred all financial management responsibility to MOPIC. The Project Management Unit (PMU) maintained adequate qualified financial management staffing and external auditing arrangements throughout implementation. The quarterly



unaudited Interim Financial Reports were of acceptable quality and content, and were submitted in a timely manner. All annual audited financial statements had an unqualified audit opinion, and the management letters did not report any significant weaknesses in the project’s internal controls. The last audit report will cover the year ended December 31, 2019 up to the grace period ending April 30, 2020, and was to be submitted by June 30, 2020.

Procurement (as reported in the ICR, p. 38). Prior to the first restructuring, the ISTD was responsible for procurement activities related to Component 1, and MOPIC for Component 2. The complex project implementation structure and the weak capacity of the PMU delayed procurement processes for Component 2 and slowed implementation. The procurement of consultancy services for the IOWP was also delayed by several months because the PMU asked for a bid security to be submitted with the technical proposal. As this went against Bank policy, the issue was escalated and all the short-listed firms were re-evaluated to finalize the selection. Following the first restructuring, the PMU became responsible for all procurement activities and appropriately conformed to World Bank guidelines.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

None noted.

d. Other

None noted.

11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Substantial	Substantial	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The following main lessons are drawn from the ICR (pp. 40-41):



High-level government support can be critical for project implementation. The cash compensation initiative depended on the implementation of politically sensitive energy subsidy reforms, which quickly lost traction as oil prices fell. On the other hand, the decision to build the NUR by anchoring it on NAF's cash transfer program enabled its development, because this was an established program. The subsequent high-level endorsement by the Government of Jordan to build the NUR platform was critical for establishing data access.

Complex implementation arrangements can influence coordination and ownership. The project had a complex implementation structure with critical responsibilities resting with different government institutions. This arrangement necessitated lengthy negotiations to clarify responsibilities and coordinate activities during project preparation, restructuring, and handover. Simpler implementation arrangements at project design, with clear lines of responsibility and accountability, would likely have expedited implementation significantly.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR was thorough in its description of the project. The narrative of key factors that affected the project during preparation and implementation provided a balanced overview of challenges and facilitated the IEG's validation. The Tables underpinning the changes in the project and the assessment of outcomes were straightforward and results-focused. The document was internally consistent and in line with guidelines, albeit with a body text of 31 pages, a bit on the long side.

a. Quality of ICR Rating

Substantial

