Report Number: ICRR0022184

1. Project Data

Project ID	Project Name
P101415	SN-Transport & Urban Mobility (FY10)
Country	**Practice Area(Lead)**
Senegal	Transport

L/C/TF Number(s)	Closing Date (Original)	Total Project Cost (USD)
IDA-47370,IDA-57310	30-Sep-2014	101,715,750.18
Bank Approval Date	**Closing Date (Actual)**	
01-Jun-2010	31-Dec-2019	

	IBRD/IDA (USD)	Grants (USD)
Original Commitment	55,000,000.00	0.00
Revised Commitment	104,870,196.22	0.00
Actual	102,896,861.99	0.00

Prepared by	Reviewed by	ICR Review Coordinator	Group
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2. Project Objectives and Components

a. Objectives

The Project Development Objectives (PDOs) as stated in the Financing Agreement (Schedule 1, page 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, page 8) were:

(i) to improve effective road management and maintenance, both at national level and in urban areas: and (ii) to improve public urban transport in the Greater Dakar Area (GDA).

The PDOs were not changed when the Additional Financing (AF) was approved for the project on October 13, 2015.

b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?

Yes

Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?

Yes

Date of Board Approval

13-Oct-2015

c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?

No

d. Components

There were three components (PAD, pages 9 - 13).

1. Support to interurban road infrastructure development. This component provided financing for: (a) Technical Assistance (TA) to the road sector agencies: and (b) infrastructure investments. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$39.0 million (financed by IDA). Of this, US$3.0 million was for TA activities, and US$36.0 million for infrastructure investments. The revised estimate with AF was US$84.0 million. The actual cost was US$90.7 million.

a. The TA activities included: (i) strengthening the institutional framework for defining technical standards, the regulatory framework for road laboratories, and the reorganization of the Experimental Research Center for Equipment Studies (CEREEQ); (ii) strengthening the Autonomous Road Maintenance Fund (FERA); (iii) capacity building of the Directorate of Land Transport (DTT) for modernizing vehicles and driver's license registration and implementing a road safety pilot program; (iv) capacity building of the Road Management Agency (AGEROUTE); and (v) capacity building of the Infrastructure General Directorate (DGI) in the areas of strategic planning, axle load control, and road technical standards.

b. Investments for rural and interurban roads upgrades in the Grand Niayes region**.** Activities included**:** (i) rehabilitation of the Route Nationale 1 (RN1) between Rufisque and Bargny (a four-lane inter-urban road, and a main link between the Grand Niayes region and the GDA); and (ii) upgrading the Pompiers bus terminal.

The scope of this component was expanded with Additional Financing (AF). These activities were added: (i) construction of a new 69 kilometer (km) road section from Lampoul to Grandiole; and (ii) paving of 30 km of urban roads through the "high intensity labor-based method" (HILM). According to the clarifications provided by the team, HILM is a training/employment strategy used in transport projects to involve beneficiaries (often youth/women, but sometimes community level local organizations). As part of the contract, the company building the infrastructure trains an agreed number of beneficiaries in some technical aspects, and hires them as part of its labor force.

2. Capacity Building for developing public transport services in the GDA. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$7.8 million (financed by IDA). The revised estimate with AF was US$11.8 million. The actual cost was US$7.7 million.

Activities in this component included: (i) TA to the Executive Council for Urban Transport in Dakar (CETUD) for managing the public transport system and for preparing a framework for linking the Dakar Mass Transit Company (DDD) with small suburban train (PTB) operations. (The estimated cost appraisal for this sub-component was US$5.9 million); (ii) TA for preparing a pilot Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) system and feeder minibus facilities, and for developing the existing minibus leasing system. (The estimated cost at appraisal for this subcomponent was US$1.9 million). The other activities in this subcomponent included: preparing urban mobility improvement operations in the cultural park area around the Dakar Central Railway station, support for monitoring air quality in Dakar, and financing mass transport studies:

The scope of this component was expanded by AF to include TA for detailed engineering studies of the pilot line of a BRT system.

3. Support to implementation, coordination, monitoring and evaluations (M&E). The estimated cost at appraisal was US$3.2 million (financed by IDA). The revised estimate with AF was US$4.2 million. The actual cost was US$3.8 million.

This component provided project management support through: (i) training AGEROUTE and CETUD staff for preparing financial and technical audits; (ii) M&E support; and (iii) financing information and communication activities.

The project had a Project Preparation Advance (PPA), and provision for financing contingencies. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$5.0 million. The actual cost was US$0.5 million.

e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates

Project cost. The estimated cost at appraisal was US$97.0 million. The revised estimate of the project cost with Additional Financing was US$147.0 million. The actual cost was US$102.9 million,

Project financing. The project was financed by an IDA credit of US$50.0 million, and US$5.0 million from the Pilot Crisis Response Window. AF of US$50.0 million was approved on October 13, 2015. With this, the total Bank financing for the project was US$105.0 million. The amount disbursed was US$102.9 million.

Borrower contribution. The borrower contribution for the original project was estimated at US$42.0 million. According to the clarifications provided by the team, the government provided US$4.0 million as counterpart funding for the original project. The team clarified that the remaining US$38.0 million was for the fleet renewal, which was not part of the financing agreement. There was no borrower contribution for the AF project.

Dates. The original project approved on June 1, 2010, became effective on December 29, 2010, and was scheduled to close on September 30, 2014. The original project closed three years behind schedule on

October 31, 2017. AF was approved on October 13, 2015. The closing date for the AF project was December 31, 2019. The AF project closed as scheduled.

Other changes. The project was restructured thrice. This included two Level 2 restructurings and one Level 1 restructuring.

These changes were made through the first Level 2 restructuring on June 24, 2014.

- An activity - the upgrading of the Pompiers interurban bus terminal - was cancelled, as an interurban bus terminal (Gare des Baux Maraichers) was built by the government, in the Dakar suburb of Pikine. Hence, upgrading the Pompiers terminal was no longer a priority for the government. The funds allocated for this activity was reallocated for constructing additional km of roads in Niayes.
- The closing date of the original project, was extended from September 30, 2014, to October 31, 2017 for completing the ongoing activities, that were subject to delays in the initial years of implementation.

These changes were made through a Level 1 restructuring on October 13, 2015, following the AF for the project.

- The project scope was expanded to include additional activities (discussed in section 2d), and new indicators were added to monitor the added activities.
- The closing date for the AF project was set at December 31, 2019.

The following change was made through the second Level 2 restructuring on February 26, 2019.

- This restructuring was intended to finance 100% of the remaining contracts with IDA funds. As stated in the AF Agreement, the government was to finance 25% of the added activities through counterpart funding. These funds were not available, due to the country's constrained fiscal situation. The IDA funds were hence reallocated to ensure that the already contracted activities were completed before the closing date (ICR, page 11).

Split rating. A split rating was not applied, as the project became overall more ambitious.

3. Relevance of Objectives

Rationale

Country and sector context. Average Gross Domestic Product (GDP) growth of 5% percent had contributed to reducing poverty from 68% in 1994-1995 to 51% in 2005-2006. Growth before appraisal was however fueled by public investments and remittances from workers employed abroad. There was little economic diversification, and limited job creation in the private sector. Alleviating transport sector bottlenecks was important to the government strategy of accelerating economic growth. Alongside this, the population is concentrated in the west of the country, including the Greater Dakar Area (GDA), which accounted for 25% of the population. In Dakar, over 75% of the daily person-trips are made by the public transport system. The continued growth in the number of commuters has led to a significant increase in travel times, which has been worsened by poor traffic management methods, aging public transport vehicles, lack of intermodal coordination, inadequate regulations to govern the provision of services, and poor road conditions due to insufficient maintenance. Addressing urban sector issues is hence important to the government strategy.

Government strategy. At appraisal, the PDOs were relevant to the government's strategy articulated in the Accelerated Growth Strategy (AGS), and the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) for 2006-2010. The PRSP recognized the importance of the transport sector for supporting pro-poor growth through: (i) lowering costs of services: (ii) local employment generation: (iii) impact of better managed public transport modes, especially minibuses: and (iv) a stronger role for Dakar as the driver of national growth. The importance of the sector was also articulated in the government's Emerging Senegal Plan (PSE) from 2012 onward. This plan highlighted the need for improving access to economic infrastructure in value chains. The government's priorities were enunciated in the two Letters of Transport Sector Policy for the 2010 -2015 period and the 2016 -2020 period (provisional), and the Policy Letter for Urban Mobility in Dakar (2015-2020). The ICR however provides no details on the progress made on the commitments made in the three Letters of Transport Sector policies.

Bank strategy. The PDOs were well-aligned with the Bank strategy. At appraisal, they were relevant to two of the three pillars of the Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for 2007-2010. The first pillar, focused on growth, productivity, and wealth creation: The PDOs were consistent with the pillar, which placed emphasis on rural and urban connectivity and mobility through investments in urban roads and mass transport systems. The PDOs continue to be relevant to two of the three focus areas of the Bank's current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for 2020 - 2024: (i) boosting competitiveness and job creation through private sector-led growth: and (ii) increasing resilience and sustainability, in the context of growing risks. The PDOs were consistent with Pillar 2.1 of the CPF, which aimed at "improving digital and physical connectivity at the national and regional levels".

The Bank has executed several road projects in Senegal and urban projects in the GDA.
The Second Transport Sector project (PST2), that closed in 2007, had in addition to improving 69% of the road network, supported the government's efforts to increase the funds channeled to the Road Funds for addressing maintenance needs. However, studies conducted under the PST2 identified a US$400 million backlog in road maintenance needs, further confirming the need for improving the management of Road Funds. The Urban Mobility Improvement Project (UMIP) that closed in 2008, supported the urban transport sub-sector, in areas pertaining to traffic management and improving delivery of transport services.

The PDO was overly ambitious, however, given that the outcomes of the prior UMIP project were not realized, and the Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG's) Project Performance Assessment Report (PPAR) had rated the overall outcome of UMIP as Unsatisfactory. The project moreover had a very complex design, involving too many diverse components and lacking strategic prioritization, given that this project sought to start with the next stage of transport sector or modernization, when the institutional, the regulatory and sector financing had failed in previous projects. While taking into account that to date there is no secure basis for funding road maintenance activities that is required for preventing deterioration of the road assets build under the prior projects, the project's objectives are responsive to strategic priorities and their relevance is rated as substantial.

Rating
Substantial

4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)

OBJECTIVE 1
Objective

To improve effective road management and maintenance, both at national level and in urban areas.

Rationale
Theory of change. The causal chain between the project activities, outputs and outcomes were logical, and the intended outcomes were measurable. Road investments (upgrading the road section in Grand Niayes, rehabilitating RN1 between Rufisque and Bargny, and paving urban roads), were aimed at improving their condition. Capacity building activities aimed directly at institutional strengthening of specific road agencies (such as, the Autonomous Road Fund Agency (FERA), the Experimental Research Center for Equipment studies, Directorate of Road Transport, and Directorate of Land Transport). These activities were likely to improve road sector management under the assumption that strengthening FERA's capacity would contribute to providing a secure basis for funding road maintenance activities. These activities were causally linked and were expected to achieve the PDOs, hence the development outcomes were attributable to the project's interventions.

Outputs (ICR, pages 14 - 20).

TA was provided for the following activities as targeted.

- Preparation of regulatory texts on licensing of road laboratories and training the staff of the Experimental Research Center for Equipment Studies (CEREEQ).
- To the Directorate of Road Transport (DTR) for modernization of vehicles and registration of driver licenses through digitalization of driver licenses and car registration documents. These activities were intended to reduce the processing time for transport documents.
- A pilot program of road safety activities. This included publication of educational traffic regulations, a communication plan on road safety, preparation of the national road safety plan (adopted in 2012) and regional road safety plans (adopted in 2014), and an awareness campaign on 15 schools with 1,835 pupils and 400 youth groups.
- Training the engineers of the Directorate for Road Transport (DR) on project management, Geographic Information System (GIS), and environmental management. TA was provided to the DR for: (i) developing the National Roads and Motorway Master Plan for 2015-2030 for urban and rural roads and highways: and (ii) developing a quality assurance plan for road works in Senegal.

- TA was provided for evaluating the country's Third Policy Letter (LPST) for 2010 -2015, and developing the fourth LPST for 2016- 2020.The ICR does not however provide a concise assessment of the Bank's role and contribution on the Transport Policy letters.

The following investment activities were for the most part completed, as targeted.

- 173 km of roads were rehabilitated in the Grand Niayes area. This was 11 km more than the originally planned 162 km.
- 1,875 km of the RN1 road section between Rufisque and Bargny was rehabilitated. The ICR (paragraph 33) notes that this section was one of the main roads linking the Grand Niayes region with Dakar and its suburbs. This road segment is also the only interurban road, currently linking Dakar and its suburbs to neighboring countries (Mali, Mauritania and the Gambia). The ICR notes that this road was seriously damaged due to a combination of factors, including poor quality of prior rehabilitation works, heavy traffic to Mali because of the Ivorian crisis between 2010 and 2011, and lack of axle load control on freight carrying vehicles.
- 26.7 km of urban roads were paved in Dakar suburbs, as compared to the target of 30 km. The ICR (paragraph 34) notes that the targets were reduced, due to the issues associated with counterpart funding (discussed in section 5).
- 607 youth in the community, of which 23% were women, were trained in the techniques of paving under the High Intensity Labor-based method (HILB), as compared to the target of 600. 500 of the people who were trained, were hired to work on work sites. Wages paid to the youth during the implementation of the HILB program reached US$600,000, exceeding the target of US$400,000.
- In addition to the above, 1,310 temporary jobs at the work site were created, exceeding the target of 1,000 jobs. It is not clear if the jobs are expected to continue.
- 173 km of rural roads were rehabilitated at closure, exceeding the target of 162 km.
- A study on diversification of sources for funding road maintenance activities, for the Autonomous Road Maintenance Fund (FERA), was completed. (FERA's budget for funding road maintenance activities currently comes from the Special Tax on Petroleum Products (STPP), and from government contribution).

Outcomes.

- The PDO indicators were to reduce travel time on the project-intervened areas. The travel time on the selected road sections (Rufisque - Bayak - NottoDiogo - Lompoul), dropped from 211 minutes at the baseline in 2015, to 150 minutes at closure in October 17, 2019. This exceeded the target of 153 minutes.
- Travel time on the road section (between Lampoul - Grandiole), dropped from 202 minutes in 2015, to 80 minutes in 2019, exceeding the target of 100 minutes.
- Roads in good/fair condition, as a share of the total classified road network, increased to 71.3%. This exceeded the target of 60%.
- 900,607 people directly benefitted from project activities. This exceeded the target of 726,000. 50.4% of the beneficiaries were women, as compared to the target of 50%. The ICR (paragraph 32) notes that the number of beneficiaries was higher than targeted, due to the 11 km of additional roads that were rehabilitated to connect Leona, a populated town on the way to Saint-Louis and its market in Potou, the biggest in the area and located 1.5 km from the main road.

- The project target of raising CFA Francs (XOF) 57.7 billion for the road maintenance budget was not realized, with FERA only receiving 11 billion XOF from the government. The ICR (paragraph 38) notes that typically FERA collected the Special Tax on Petroleum Products (STPP), directly from the Central Bank for maintenance purposes. In 2019, the government changed the law in the face of fiscal constraints, and decided to directly collect the STPP, and then allocate the budget to FERA.
- The road maintenance budget to FERA coming from STPP, never exceeded 54% of the of the overall maintenance budget, as compared to the target of 80%.

In sum, given that most of the outcomes were realized, with the exception of the road maintenance budget and the share of STPP in that budget, the relevance of this objective is rated as substantial.

Rating
Substantial

OBJECTIVE 2
Objective

To improve public urban transport in the Greater Dakar Area (GDA).

Rationale
Theory of change. The causal links between the project activities, their outputs and outcomes were clear and logical. Capacity building of the road sector agencies in GDA sought to improve the capacity of the Dakar Urban Transport Council (CETUD) to manage the public transport system, and included the following activities: preparing a framework for linking the Dakar Mass Transit Company (DDD) with small suburban trains, preparing a pilot Bus Rapid Transport system and feeder minibus facilities, supporting air quality monitoring in Dakar and developing the existing minibus leasing system. These activities were aimed specifically at improving the delivery of public transport services. The outcomes of these activities were likely to contribute to the long term development outcome of increasing urban mobility in Dakar and thereby supporting national poverty reduction.

Outputs (ICR, pages 21-23).

- TA was provided to the CETUD for organizing, regulating and developing urban transport services in GDA. The staff of CETUD were trained as targeted. The ICR however provides no details on how the CETUD's capacity and value-added contributions have evolved over its entire existence and across previous Bank-supported projects.
- A leasing scheme allowing fleet renewal of public transport buses, managed by private operators, was financed by the government. The number of minibuses entered in the fleet renewal operation, increased from 505 at the baseline in September 30, 2009, to 1,405 in May 2015. This exceeded the target of 1307. The reimbursement rate for the leasing mechanism reached the target of 98%.
- 17 minibus operators were trained on aspects such as, the organization of urban transport, accounting and financial management, technical management of vehicles, managing the public transport network, and human resource management. 1,380 agents were trained (including 298 agents from the Dakar

Mass Transit Company (DDD), 63 drivers from the Small Suburban Trains (PTB), 331 drivers from the Urban Transport Financing Association (AFTU) and 671 bus fare collectors. There were no targets for this indicator.
- TA was provided to the Air Quality Managing Center (CGQA) for developing a database and framework for monitoring air quality in Dakar as targeted. The project also financed the following acquisitions for CGQA: (i) six stations for measuring urban pollution and air quality: and (ii) equipment for measuring automobile and industrial emissions. Three agents of the CGQA were trained in the use of measuring instruments.
- TA was provided for preparing the Dakar Bus Rapid Transit Pilot project, through introducing mass transit solutions.

Outcomes.

- The project activities were expected to contribute to the preparation of the Urban Policy Letter. The Urban Policy Letter for Dakar, financed by the project, was approved on July 27, 2015, by the Ministry in charge of Land Transport Infrastructure and Connectivity, and the Ministry in charge of Economy, Finance and Planning. This Policy Letter presented the strategies and policies for a sustainable transport system based on five pillars: (i) better integration of urban development planning with transport system planning: (ii) developing a multimodal transport network: (iii) improving traffic and parking management: (iv) strengthening the institutional framework: and (v) securing financial resources. The ICR (paragraph 42) notes that implementation of the actions for urban mobility in Dakar, presented in the Policy Framework ,are ongoing.
- According to the clarifications provided by the team, the recommendations of the policy letter were incorporated in Senegal's Emergence Senegal Plan (PSE). The team also clarified that the Bank is financing the ongoing Bus Rapid Transit Project (BRT), and that other financiers are involved in other projects that derived from the Transport Policy Letter.

In sum, although TA outputs were achieved, quantitative measures signaling actual improvements in public transport in GDA were not evident; moreover, adoption of the Transport Policy Letter by itself is not a measure of improvements in urban transport. Hence, the achievement of PDO 2 is rated as modest.

Rating
Modest

OVERALL EFFICACY

Rationale
The key outcomes were largely realized, although the project did not achieve the road maintenance target. While the adoption of a Transport Policy Letter by itself is not a measure of improvement in urban transport, the initial application of some of its provisions could eventually lead to improvements in urban transport. On this basis, overall efficacy is rated as substantial, with moderate shortcomings.

Overall Efficacy Rating

Substantial

5. Efficiency

Economic analysis. Economic analysis was conducted at appraisal and at closure, for activities associated with road investments, using the Highway Development and Management Model (HDM-4). These activities accounted for 80% of the appraisal estimate, and 88% of the actual cost. The methodology entailed a cost-benefit analysis. The costs included the costs of construction, rehabilitation and maintenance costs. The quantified project benefits were assumed to come from time savings on the rehabilitated roads. Other benefits, such as benefits due to air quality improvements, noise reduction, and reduction in road accidents were identified, but not quantified. The Net Present Value (NPV) at 12% discount rate at closure was US$26,253, as compared to the NPV of US$22,150 at appraisal. The ex post Economic Internal Rate of Return (EIRR) was slightly higher at 22%, as compared to the ex ante EIRR of 20.3%.The ex post EIRR is however contingent on the assumption that adequate funds would be allocated for road maintenance activities to prevent deterioration of roads rehabilitated under this project.

Administrative and Operational Issues. The delays in preparing technical studies (due to the procurement delays) led to the extension of the closing date for the original project by three years, which increased supervision costs. Following the AF for the project, there were significant delays in the completion of the Lampoul - Grandiole road, and activities associated with paving roads, due to issues associated with counterpart funding. These issues were resolved with the project restructuring in 2019, with only 11% of the paving in Dakar being cancelled. Savings realized in the award of contracts, allowed the project to construct additional roads on the Grandes Niayes road. While the closing date for the original project was extended, the AF project closed as scheduled.

In sum, despite moderate operational shortcomings, efficiency is rated as substantial, in view of the economic justification for the project.

Efficiency Rating

Substantial

a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the re-estimated value at evaluation:

	Rate Available?	Point value (%)	*Coverage/Scope (%)
Appraisal	✓	20.30	80.00 ☐ Not Applicable
ICR Estimate	✓	22.00	88.00 ☐ Not Applicable

* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.

6. Outcome

Relevance of the PDO to the government and Bank strategy is substantial. Overall efficacy is rated as substantial, as the key outcomes were largely realized. Efficiency is substantial. As per the OPCS guidelines, the above ratings would lead to a satisfactory outcome. However, this review concurs with the assessment of the ICR (paragraph 55), that since the project did not achieve the road maintenance budget target, which has a negative impact on sustainability, the appropriate overall outcome rating is moderately satisfactory.

a. Outcome Rating

Moderately Satisfactory

7. Risk to Development Outcome

Financial risk. There is no secure basis for funding road maintenance activities, both on the national roads, and on the roads paved in the GDA. There is the risk that without adequate arrangements for funding road maintenance activities on national roads, the project benefits could be undermined, even in the immediate period after project closure. And without a proper long-term maintenance strategy, there is the risk that the national roads built under this project could become obsolete and unsustainable. Likewise, roads in the GDA, which falls under the responsibility of the communities and mayors, require appropriate funding, and organization at the sub national level to ensure that they are adequately maintained.

Government commitment. There is a real risk that the roads rehabilitated under this project could be undermined, due to the lack of government commitment for allocating adequate resources for maintaining the road assets of the country.

8. Assessment of Bank Performance

a. Quality-at-Entry

Project preparation drew on the experience from prior Bank-financed projects in Senegal (the Second Transport Sector Project, and the Urban Mobility Improvement Project). The lesson incorporated at design, included combining physical investments with capacity building activities to ensure sustainability. (PAD, paragraph 42). Several risks were identified at appraisal, including risks associated with the government's uncertain commitment to provide adequate funds for maintaining roads, issues with counterpart funding, and the ability of the local government of GDA to address urban mobility issues. The mitigation measures incorporated at design, included oversight of the Road Fund and Road Agency boards, and adoption by the government of a Transport Policy Letter as a condition for project effectiveness. With these measures, the project risk was rated as moderate at appraisal (PAD, page

19). The arrangements made at appraisal for safeguards and fiduciary compliance, were appropriate (discussed in section 10).

There were shortcomings at Quality at Entry. One, delays in preparing technical studies led to delays in the initial years of implementation, which contributed to the extension of the closing date for the original project. Two, there were shortcomings in M&E design (discussed in section 10a).

Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

b. Quality of supervision

Sixteen implementation supervision missions were held during the project lifetime. However, the frequency of the missions was uneven, with only one mission between 2011 and 2013 for the original project (due to a combination of factors, including pre and post election period in the country and delays in processing and approvals at the Project Implementation Unit and national levels), and three missions in the last year. The formal missions were supplemented by regular videoconferences. Although there were four task team leaders during the project lifetime, the continuity of leadership was more or less maintained, as three of the task team leaders were involved in the project from the preparation stage. The supervision team included multidisciplinary specialists, and this aided in providing guidance along the way, in areas like management of works contracts and the High-Intensity Labor Based method. The supervision team aided in addressing the issue of lack of counterpart funding, through the Level 2 restructuring. The project's supervision was substantially strengthened in the latter years, with the location of the co-task team leader in the country. The support provided by the team aided in safeguards and fiduciary compliance (discussed in section 10).

In sum, overall Bank performance is rated as moderately satisfactory, in view of the shortcomings at the Quality at Entry.

Quality of Supervision Rating
Satisfactory

Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory

9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization

a. M&E Design

The three key outcome indicators - reduced transport cost on selected routes inside the Grandes Niayes area, road network condition in the project zone, and the number of direct project beneficiaries, were measurable, and appropriate for monitoring project performance, with respect to the first objective. These indicators had baseline data.

There were however some M&E design shortcomings. One, there was a disconnect between the wording of the PDO and the indicators chosen for its measurement. For instance, the assessment of the effectiveness of road maintenance was chosen at the national level, although project activities only focused on some intervention areas. With regard to the key outcome for the second PDO - the adoption of a transport policy letter, while the adoption of a transport policy letter could possibly lead to an improvement in urban transport, it was not sufficient measure for improving urban transport.

The ICR (paragraph 75) notes that some indicators were not tracked, as soon as the target was met for the original project. For instance, the number of passengers using urban transport was not tracked, with the AF for the project. Tracking this indicator through time, would have given a better picture of the evolution of passengers using urban transport. While the transport policy was adopted when the original project closed, there was no indicator to monitor whether the chosen policies were applied during the project lifetime.

The National Road Management Agency (AGEROUTE - Senegal), and the Dakar Urban Transport Authority (CETUD) were responsible for collecting the data for monitoring project performance. The M&E design envisioned monitoring of specific outcomes through periodic surveys (PAD, paragraph 57).

b. M&E Implementation

The ICR (paragraph 76) notes that despite the shortcoming in M&E design, the indicators were properly filled in throughout the project.

The Project Implementation Unit (PIU) used Microsoft Excel to track the various indicators. A more appropriate M&E system could have been used to assess the implementation of activities. According to the clarifications provided by the team, while periodic survey were used to monitor indicators for the original project, the indicators were not periodically measured through surveys for the AF project.

c. M&E Utilization

The M&E data was used as a checklist during implementation for monitoring performance, relative to the baseline. The ICR (paragraph 77) notes that a dedicated M&E specialist was recruited only in the second year of implementation. This contributed to systematic delays in reporting and problems with the quality of M&E reports.

In sum, given the shortcomings in M&E design, and the delays in having a M&E expert in the early stages of the project, overall quality of M&E is rated as Modest.

M&E Quality Rating

Modest

10. Other Issues

a. Safeguards

The project was classified as a Category B (Partial Assessment) project, under the World Bank safeguard policies. Three safeguard policies were triggered at appraisal: (i) Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); (ii) Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11); and (iii) Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12).

Environmental Assessment and Physical Cultural Resources. The PAD (paragraph 77) notes that the environmental and social impacts of the project were expected to be minimal and site-specific (such as, improper waste management, and noise pollution during construction). An Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) was conducted, and an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared and publicly disclosed, to address environmental and other issues pertaining to Physical Cultural Resources (such as due to "chance finds") at appraisal (PAD, paragraph 78). The ICR (paragraphs 81 and 82) notes that there was compliance with environmental safeguards and safeguards on physical cultural resources.

Involuntary Resettlement. The PAD (paragraph 75) notes that a Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF) was prepared and publicly disclosed at appraisal. The ICR (paragraph 83) notes that during implementation, a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) was prepared to identify the affected population, and that the RAP was implemented in the project areas. The ICR also notes that the displaced populations were informed of their rights, and were properly compensated during implementation. According to the ICR (paragraph 92), 185 people identified as affected by the project (including 20 women), were compensated from government resources, for a total amount of approximately US$433,000. Twelve complaints registered through the Grievance Redress Mechanism were resolved when the project closed.

b. Fiduciary Compliance

Financial management. An assessment was conducted at appraisal to assess the financial management capacity of AGEROUTE- Senegal. The financial risk was rated as substantial for a combination of factors, including governance issues, political interference, and implementation delays due to the involvement of multiple government entities. Mitigation measures incorporated at design, included institutional arrangements involving the stakeholders, and recruiting an independent external auditor. With these measures, financial risk was rated as modest at appraisal (PAD, page 67). The ICR (paragraph 87) notes that financial management was deemed to be satisfactory during implementation. Financial reports were submitted in a timely fashion, and the audits were unqualified.

Procurement. An assessment of the procurement capacities of the implementing agencies (AGEROUTE Senegal and CETUD) was conducted at appraisal. The agencies had implemented prior Bank-financed projects, and hence familiar with the Bank's procedures. The procurement risk was rated as moderate at appraisal (PAD, paragraph 68). The ICR (paragraph 85) states that procurement delays, due to the non-availability of needed experts, contributed to the slow start of the project in the initial years. However, these were rectified through appropriate measures; for example, contract management made it possible to stop works that was not progressing, and give them to more efficient companies. The ICR (paragraph 86) notes that the procurement team quickly adapted to the new system that was put in place to ensure transparency, i.e., the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in Procurement (STEP), and by the closing date, all activities were completed in STEP.

c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)

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d. Other

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11. Ratings

Ratings	ICR	IEG	Reason for Disagreements/Comment
Outcome	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Bank Performance	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	
Quality of M&E	Modest	Modest	
Quality of ICR	---	Substantial	

12. Lessons

The ICR draws the following three main lessons from the experience of implementing this project, with some adaptation of language.

1. Given that sustainability of the road assets is contingent upon road maintenance, a proper road maintenance strategy is required. In this project, budgeting for road maintenance fell short of the requirements, due to the government's budget constraints. The lesson from this project is that where road maintenance is concerned, alternative lending instruments or triggers in a future lending operation, may need to be considered.

2. While counterpart funding can signal government commitment, its adequacy and timeliness can have an impact on implementation. Implementation of activities in this project were subject to delays due to lack of counterpart funding. The lesson from this project is that issues relating to counterpart funding need to be carefully considered in the country context.

3. Stakeholder capacity building is particularly required in urban road projects, in countries where urban roads are the responsibility of sub-national agencies. The lesson from this project is that where communes and cities are responsible for road maintenance, capacity building of the beneficiaries can allow for a qualified local workforce to take care of road maintenance.

13. Assessment Recommended?

No

14. Comments on Quality of ICR

The ICR is well-written and provides a detailed overview of the project. It candidly discusses the issues pertaining to government funding for road maintenance activities, and counterpart funding. The ICR contains a theory of change that helps the reader to understand how the ratings were reached. The ICR draws good lessons from the experience of implementing this project. The ICR appropriately rates overall outcome as moderately satisfactory, given that the road maintenance target was not reached.

The ICR is unduly long (with the main text of the ICR at 30 pages, almost twice the recommended length of 15 pages). The ICR could have been more tightly written, and to the extent possible, the photographs in the text could have been inserted as part of an annex.

a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial