Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY REPORT No 21548 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT (IDA-24720) ONA CREDIT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 5.1 MILLION (US$7.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO BURKINA FASO FOR A PRIVATE SECTOR ASSISTANCE PROJECT December 21, 2000 Private Sector Group Africa Region This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the perfonnance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 2000) Currency Uiiit = (CAF Franc (CFAF) CFAF 697 = US$ I US$ I = SDR 0.752 FISCAL YEAR January I December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BCEAO Banque Centrale des Etats dAfrique de l'Ouest CBC Burkinabe Shipping Council MICM Ministry of Industy, Commerce and Mining ONAC National Office for External Trade OHADA Organisation en Afrique pour l'Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires UEMOA West African Economic and Monetaxy Union Vice President: Callisto Madavo Country Director: Hasan Tuluy Sector Manager: Demba Ba Task Team Leader: Marie-Ange Saraka-Yao FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY CONTENTS Page No. 1. Project Data 1 2. Principal Performance Ratings 1 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 2 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 5 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 10 6. Sustainability I1 7. Bank and Borrower Performance 11 8. Lessons Learned 13 9. Partner Comments 13 10. Additional Information 23 Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 27 Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 29 Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 31 Annex 4. Bank Inputs 32 Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 34 Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 3 5 Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 36 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not be otherwise disclosed without World Bank authorization. Project ID: P000289 Project Name: PRIVATE SECTOR ASSIS Team Leader: Marie-Ange Saraka-Yao TL Unit: PFG ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date: December 21, 2000 1. Project Data Name: PRIVATE SECTOR ASSIS L/C/TF Number: IDA-24720 Country/Department. BURKINA FASO Region: Africa Regional Office Sector/subsector: DB - Business Environment KEY DATES Original Revised/Actual PCD: 03/30/90 Effective: 10/13/93 01/31/94 Appraisal. 06/19/92 MTR. 06/30/95 06/30/97 Approval: 03/18/93 Closing: 12/31/97 06/30/2000 Borrower/lImplementingAgency: BURKINA FASO/MINISTRY OF COMMERCE; BURKINA FASO/INDUSTRY Other Partners: STAFF Current At Appraisal Vice President: Callisto Madavo Edward Jaycox Country Manager: Hasan A. Tuluy Katherine Marshall Sector Manager: Demba Ba Silvia Sagari Team Leader at ICR: Marie-Ange Saraka-Yao ICR Primary Author: Gabrielle Rooz; Jerome Chevallier 2. Principal Performance Ratings (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUJN=Highly Unlikely, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible) Outcome: S Sustainability: L Institutional Development Impact: M Bank Performance: S Borrower Performance: U QAG (if available) ICR Quality at Entry: U Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes 3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 3.1 Original Objective: The objective of the project was to help create an institutional environment capable of providing support to sustainable growth of the private sector. The project was designed to help implement a Government economic reform program to respond to increased macroeconomic imbalances resulting from large expansion in public consumption and investment in the 1980s, the result of the country's socialist orientation. Increased macroeconomic imbalances led Burkina Faso to seek assistance from the Bank and the IMF. A Policy Framework Paper (PFP) was agreed in 1991 and the Bank extended a first Structural Adjustment Credit. The objectives of the adjustrnent credit were to improve public resource management and create incentives for private sector development. To achieve the latter, the program included actions in the areas of public enterprise divestiture, banking sector restructuring, trade and price liberalization, and regulatory reform. Two technical assistance projects were designed to help the Government carry out its reform program, the Public Institutional Development Project approved in June 1992, and the project under review. Assessment of Project Objective. The project objective was in line with the country assistance strategy to help the Government create a policy and regulatory environment supportive of the private sector. It was also consistent with the Government's economic liberalization program. The objective was too narrowly defined, however. Focusing on institution building without clear indication of a purpose is a recipe for disappointment. The program lacked an overall private sector development strategy providing long-term objectives for the sector and the necessary tools for implementation. 3.2 Revised Objective: The original objective of the project was not revised but project design was modified. 3.3 Original Components: The project included three components: (i) assistance to the Ministry of Industry, Commerce and Mining (MICM) to implement the divestiture program and streamline administrative procedures related to external trade and the establishment of new enterprises; (ii) reorganization, privatization, and strengthening of the institutional support structure for private sector development; and (iii) support to the Ministry of Finance and Planning to complete the privatization of the banking sector and strengthen financial intermediation. 1. Assistance to the MICM (US$3.17 million). (a) Streamlining the Ministry's procedures relating to private sector activities. This sub-component was designed to help the two one-stop windows established under the SAL (one for external trade and one for investment) to improve their organization and procedures. (b) Support to the Privatization Commission This sub-component was to finance one year of operating costs of the Privatization Commission, established in 1992 under a PPF and PHRD grant, and consulting services to assist in the implementation of the Government's divestiture program, also for one year. Government's budgetary allocations were to support the Commission's operating costs starting in mid- 1994. Technical assistance was to be financed afterwards by proceeds from sale of public enterprises. 2. Assistance to the Chamber of Commerce, the Burkinabe Shipping Council (CBC), and the National Office for External Trade (ONAC) (US$2.75 million). (a) Reorganization of the institutional support structure. This component was designed to reorganize, privatize, and strengthen the support structure of the Chamber of Commerce, CBC and ONAC. It was to transfer to the Government all tasks of an administrative nature performed by the agencies, and to the Chamber of Commerce those providing extension services to private businesses. It was to rationalize the management of warehouses and shipping equipment that was under the control of the Chamber of Commerce and CBC. (b) Assistance to the -2- Chamber of Commerce This component was to strengthen the Chamber of Commerce's ability to assist private businesses obtain the support they needed. It was to strengthen the Chamber's capacity to evaluate private firms' needs for technical assistance, follow-up and assess results of this assistance. It was to establish a data base to record all available local and foreign sources of assistance to private enterprises' operations. It was to help private firms carry out feasibility studies and provide financial start-up support. 3. Financial sector component (US$0.81 million). (a) Assistance to the Ministry of Finance and Planning. This component was to finance technical assistance to help the Ministry manage the privatization process of financial institutions and improve the management of the Agency for Debt Recovery. (b) Strengthening of financial intermediation. This component was to finance: audits of the commercial banks prior to their privatization; a study to convert the Postal Services Agency and the National Savings Agency into an independent financial institution within the postal system; a review of the legal system to improve bad debt recovery; and a study to create long-term financing instruments and the necessary legal and regulatory framework for their establishment. Assessment of Components: The project was a complex operation involving a large number of institutions (10 in total), most of which with little experience with Bank procedures. The Government was ambivalent on private sector development and reluctant to reduce its involvement in the management of the economy. Under these circumstances, providing a large package of technical assistance (a total of 400 man/months was envisaged) was not the most appropriate approach. The strategic focus of the privatization program was short-term, targeting primarily a reduction of state subsidies to loss-making public enterprises in the public sector. The institutional arrangements of the privatization component were also deficient. The Privatization Commission was established as part of the Ministry of Commerce. This resulted in a slow and overly centralized decision-making process, with negative consequences on the Commission's decision-making ability. The combined effect of the slow and cumbersome decision-making process and lack of Government's commitment was a significant obstacle in moving forward the divestiture program. The objectives of the institutional reforms were relevant and consistent with the project's overall objective insofar as they sought to address bureaucratic bottlenecks to improve the business environment. However, private sector participation was not actively promoted during the design stage and remained limited during implementation. As a result, the reforms did not fully address the sector's needs. Measures under the financial sector component were relevant to the project's objective and supported the development of the private sector. The project over-estimated local capacity to implement the various components and placed unrealistic expectations on the pace of the privatization program. Shortfalls in counterpart funding substantially slowed down implementation of that component. Furthermore, during project preparation, insufficient attention was given to the country's economic and social background, which was shifting from a centrally planned to a more market-oriented economy, and the time lag required for the Government to adjust to the changes and buy into the reform process. This underestimation had a negative impact on the pace of project execution-particularly the privatization program, and was reflected in the Government's initial lack of commitment. The SAR correctly identified the slow pace of the privatization program as a risk but did not recommend adequate mitigating measures. 3.4 Revised Components. Project implementation was slow, and two months before the initial closing date of December 31, 1997, only US$2.2 million (about 30 percent) had been disbursed under the credit. Following the project's - 3 - mid-term review of June 1997, the Government, with intensive assistance from the newly-appointed Bank resident representative, launched the preparation of a private sector workshop to discuss private sector development issues with representatives of the public and private sectors and the donor community. The workshop took place in October 1997. It gave the private sector an opportunity to make a number of concrete recommendations for improving the business environment. The Government gave encouraging signs that it was ready to follow up on them. The Government and the Bank concluded that the project could be an effective instrument for implementing these recommendations, and more generally, the reforms agreed under the highly indebted and poor countries (HIPC) initiative. The project was restructured on the basis of an action plan based on the workshop proceedings, and the credit was extended by two years to December 31, 1999. An amendment was presented to the Board in April 1998. The amendment involved changes in the project description to include a new component relating to the telecommunications sector and to modify the component on business laws. It also involved a modification of Credit allocation. Project restructuring was as follows: The telecommunications reform component (US$0.4 million) was added to open up the sector and encourage private sector participation in the development of services. The reform component was to develop policies and strategies for the sector, promote national consensus-building for the Government's policy strategy, establish a legal and regulatory framework to foster competition as well as a regulatory agency, and introduce competition in mobile telephone market. The business laws component (US$0.3 million) was designed to help disseminate the new business laws expected to become effective in January 1998 under the OHADA treaty, provide training to judges and private operators to facilitate enforcement of the laws, and revise national laws to ensure their consistency with the new framework. The OHADA treaty signed by Burkina Faso and a number of francophone countries in 1993 aimed to streamline and update business legislation for member states through a uniform set of laws, and to strengthen the legal and judicial security for enterprises through effective settlement of disputes. Another objective was the promotion of arbitration as a means of settling contractual disputes and facilitation of regional and international trade. The matching fund within the Chamber of Commerce was canceled because of the Chamber's weak capacity to execute it and because of the existence of a number of other similar funds managed by multiple institutions. The study to review existing legislation on bad debt recovery was canceled because regulations to deal with this issue were being adopted under the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) of which Burkina Faso is a member. Two additional activities were added towards the end of the project: support for an agribusiness strategy and a competitiveness study. The agribusiness strategy was to help restructure the fruit and vegetable industry and identify entry points for potential sources of growth. The competitiveness study was the result of a joint collaboration between the Bank and the Government that started in late 1998, at a time of difficult dialogue between the Bank and the Government on the appropriate reforrn agenda for the country. The private sector development project was not going well because of resistance by various parties to major institutional reform, privatization and liberalization, which were perceived as World Bank dogma. As a way of moving forward and generating ideas, the Government agreed in October 1998 to carry out a comprehensive economic competitiveness study and analysis of sources of growth for Burkina Faso. The closing date was extended a second time from December 31, 1999 to June 30, 2000 to allow the Government to complete three specific ongoing activities in the areas of telecommunications reform, privatization and support to the private sector. - 4 - Component Cost (US$ million) 1. Assistance to the MICM 3.17 2. Assistance to the Chamber of Commerce, 2.75 CBC and ONAC 3. Financial Sector Component 0.81 4. Telecoms Reforms 0.40 5. Implementation of the OHADA Laws 0.30 Total 7.43 3.5 Quality at Entry: Quality at entry is rated "unsatisfactory" because of poor project design and deficient risk analysis. The project was complex in view of limited implementation capacity and weak Government commitment to private sector development. When the project was approved, the adjustment program was not implemented at a satisfactory pace. Performance indicators were detailed for each sub-component in the SAR, but they were mostly to measure outputs instead of outcomes. The risk section did not provide a thorough analysis of potential problems. Two main risks were identified. The first risk-- slow progress in privatizing public enterprises and banks--was considered low because of the Government's commitment to the reform program. The second risk was the business community's slow response to play an active role in the institutional system to support private entrepreneurs. This risk was also considered low because of the active participation of the Government and the private sector during preparation. The project pre-dates the QAG review process. 4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective: The project's outcome is rated satisfactory. The main achievement of the project is its contribution to a major shift in the Government's understanding of the strategic and development issues it is facing as the new century begins. This shift was initiated towards the end of the project through the highly participatory competitiveness study mentioned above. The study highlighted the need for the country to adopt a more aggressive reform program if it were to make a significant impact on poverty. The Government used the results to articulate a new development program that formned the basis for the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) presented to the Board in June 2000. The project also helped the Government implement its divestiture program, thereby reducing state subsidies and increasing firms' productivity and doubling employment. Through lessons leamed from the divestiture program, the Government decided to extend the privatization process to the infrastructure sectors--telecommunications, energy and air transport. The project was instrumental in initiating reforms in the telecommunications sector and opening it up to competition. Finally, the project was instrumental in strengthening the financial sector. The banking sector was restructured, leading to increased competition with the entry of five new financial institutions. The project was less successful in restructuring the institutional support structure to private entrepreneurs and streamlining the administrative procedures for private sector activities. 4.2 Outputs by components: Component 1. Assistance to the MICM. (a) Streamlining of the Ministry's procedures relating to external trade and establishment of new private businesses. This sub-component did not achieve its objective to improve the organization and procedures of the two windows. Expected output for this sub-component was a reduction in the processing time for investment code applications. A one-stop agency was created in 1994 to screen applications for investment code benefits and register new enterprises. It became operational in 1997. Although service standards were established to speed up the approval process, procedures remain cumbersome. The project - 5 - financed a study to recommend ways to eliminate unnecessary steps in setting up new businesses and ensure that procedures are consistent with the new OHADA regulations. The FIAS study has highlighted that, despite progress in streamlining the administrative procedures to better respond to the needs of new businesses, these procedures could be further streamlined. Private enterprises still have to go through several public agencies, six in total, to register their new business, despite the existence of the one-stop agency. Since the majority of these new businesses are small enterprises, these successive administrative steps represent a high cost to them, estimated to average 17 percent of their capital base. It is the Government's intention to transfer the one-stop agency to the proposed "Maison de l'Entrepreneur". The concept of the "Maison de I 'Entrepreneur" emerged during the national workshop of October 1997 as a one-stop center to provide information to entrepreneurs and streamline administrative procedures. The center will liaise with all existing agencies dealing with private entrepreneurs and provide support to their associations. The project financed a feasibility study to define the center's activities, its structure, and financing. The center is expected to become operational by the end of 2000. This sub-component is rated unsatisfactory because its main institution-building objective was not achieved. (b) Support to the Privatization Commission This sub-component has achieved its overall objective to complete the divestiture program encompassing the privatization or liquidation of 39 enterprises out of a total of 44 in the initial program. Seven laws and decrees were enacted from 1991 to 1999 to authorize the divestiture of these companies and to empower the privatization agency. The physical targets set at appraisal have been met. In the first phase of the privatization program from 1991 to 1994, out of 22 enterprises to be privatized or liquidated, 13 were privatized and two research centers were transferred back to their line Ministries because they had no profit orientation. Of the seven remaining from the first phase, five were privatized and two liquidated. Out of 22 companies from the second phase, 12 were privatized and 10 liquidated. In terms of impact, the program contributed significantly to the reduction of state subsidies to firms from CFAF 20 billion in 1991 to CFAF I billion in 1999. As of end-1999, privatization receipts and new investments amounted to CFAF I I billion and CFAF 20 billion, or US$16 million and US$29 million equivalent respectively. The program also resulted in an increase in employment despite some retrenchment due to liquidations and downsizing in the railway company. Gross value added of the privatized firms increased by more than 68 percent during the period. The program's largest impact might be assessed against the Government's decision to extend privatization to the so-called strategic infrastructure sectors (telecommunications, energy and air transport). Without the exposure and gradual learning experience gained throughout the current program execution, expansion to these sectors would not have taken place. A study to formulate a divestiture strategy for the remaining public enterprises, including the remaining utilities and a number of small-scale enterprises, has been completed. The study served as the basis for the preparation of a new privatization program in the infrastructure sector. Implementation of the divestiture program has taken much longer than initially expected, however. The strategy formulation phase, from recruiting the advisor to Government selection of a final sale strategy, took an average of 501 days. The centralized decision-making process with frequent cabinet involvement resulted in the privatization of an average of three companies per year, compared to a regional average of seven. The length of the process was detrimental to the financial situation of some of the companies to be privatized, which needed urgent capital inflows. A new decree was enacted in 1998 to improve the process -6 - but resulted only in marginal changes with little impact. Moreover, the privatization strategy adopted by the Government was not best practice from an economic standpoint. Bidders were guaranteed special import protections without any indication on the phasing out of such a protection. On the other hand, bidders were expected to retain all employees from firms to be privatized. Privatization of SOSUCO, the sugar company (by far the largest transaction) raised serious doubt on the integrity of the entire privatization program. The Government changed the rules of the game during the process and, eventually, selected the lowest bidder (a price difference of 11 percent with the best offer) based on the investor's promise to launch an ambitious investment program. On the capacity building front, despite the shortcomings mentioned above, technical staff in the privatization agency and in line ministries have considerably learned from the process. They have familiarized themselves with best practices through technical assistance and study tours abroad. They are now better equipped to handle the remaining transactions to be implemented under the new program. This sub-component is rated satisfactory because it has achieved its quantitative targets and helped develop capacity in the privatization commission. The privatization process is rated unsatisfactory, however, because of its lengthiness and the inadequate handling of the largest transaction in the program. Component 2. Institutional support: assistance to the Chamber of Commerce, the Burkinabe Shipping Council (CBC) and the National Office for External Trade (ONAC). This component has partially realized its objective to reorganize, privatize, and strengthen the institutional support structure. Although the Chamber of Commerce has been privatized, it has kept some of its previous functions, but more importantly it still operates as a public-sector institution. A new general assembly with representatives from the private sector and sectoral commissions were established. In 1996, a new Board of Directors was established by the general assembly, and a new general manager appointed by the Board of Directors. This new structure brought a clearer definition of responsibilities among the agencies and a disengagement from the Government. All enterprises are de facto members but do not pay membership fees. Most of the Chamber's resources originate from fees collected for the use of its warehouses and market facilities. The Chamber of Commerce provides market information to enterprises and support in preparing investment code applications. It operates three professional training institutions. The project also financed a study on reorganizing its human resources structure. Recommendations have been implemented. ONAC and CBC have not been privatized and continue to operate as public institutions. Their statutes however were changed to allow representation of the private sector on their boards. They also continue to be funded by the Government. Both institutions still need to define their respective role and position themselves to achieve credibility with the private operators. This is particularly the case for ONAC which is now attempting to position itself in the area of establishing and monitoring quality standards. On the other hand, private operators do see a role for CBC, in particular in providing assistance in handling products for small shippers. The agency needs however to move to a more privately oriented modus operandi and improve its performance to also establish credibility with private operators. This component is rated unsatisfactory because its main institution-building objective was not achieved. Component 3. Financial sector component. This component has achieved its overall objective to strengthen the financial sector. (i) Support to the Ministry of Finance -7 - (a) Privatization of banks. The banking sector was restructured, with the privatization and recapitalization of the main banks. Final agreements for the privatization of the Banque pour le Financement du Commerce et des Investissements au Burkina was reached in 1997, and the bank was renamed Societe Generale des Banques au Burkina. The Banque Nationale de Developpement was liquidated in January 1998. The Banque Arabe Libyenne Burkinabe was taken over by the Banque du Commerce du Burkina. Two new foreign banks (Ecobank and Bank of Africa) and three non-bank financial institutions entered into operation in 1997-98. All banks are observing the capital adequacy ratio of 4 percent currently in force, and five banks are already observing the revised ratio target of 8 percent established by BCEAO, the regional central bank, in mid-1999. All banks should be in compliance with the new target by end of 2001. The restructuring of the banking sector has also led to increased competition. (b) Restructuring of the Postal Services Agency and the National Savings Agency. The restructuring of the Postal Agency and the National Savings Agency was completed in April 2000, with separation of accounts from Treasury. Agreements have been reached on the compensation of debt between the Treasury and Sonapost. (c) Creation of new financial instruments for long-term lending Several new institutions were created including two leasing companies. (d) Support to Microfinance Sector. In January 1997 the Government and other micro-finance institutions adopted the PARMEC law that regulates micro credit financial institutions in the UEMOA countries. A micro-finance supervision unit was established within the Ministry of Finance. The unit was strengthened to enforce the PARMEC law. The project financed equipment and training for the microfinance unit in the Ministry of Finance. The project also financed a study to help the Government define a strategy for the sustainable development of the microfinance sector. The conclusions of the study will be discussed during a workshop which the Government will hold in the first quarter of 2001 to formulate such a strategy. (ii) Strengthening of the Agency for Debt Recovery. The objective of this component was achieved. The Agency for Debt Recovery has so far recovered 17 percent of the total amount of bad debt transferred during the period 1991-1999, corresponding to about CFAF 10.9 billion out of CFAF 64 billion. Of the total amount of bad debt, the proportion of private debt amounted to CFAF 27 billion, of which CFAF 9.7 billion was recovered, or 36 percent, which is a commendable result. The proportion of public debt was CFAF 19 billion, of which CFAF 1.2 billion was recovered, or 6 percent. It is not expected that the remaining balance on the total amount of bad debt will be recovered. The financial audit of the Agency was completed. Training of agency staff was also completed, as was the purchase of 12 computers. Given the Agency's positive performance, it was proposed to create a more permanent, privately oriented structure for bad debt recovery beyond the project. The Bank will assist the Government in exploring experiences with a similar agency in Cameroon to evaluate the possibility for the agency to continue operating on a private basis. (iii) Revise laws governing bad checks and delinquent debtors. This component was dropped because of adoption of a new law at the regional level. The overall project impact on the financial sector is considered highly positive. The project also helped establish an institutional framework that will be used to monitor the microfinance institutions and formulate - 8 - a broad policy for that sector. A note on the financial sector was prepared to define the next interventions to further develop the financial sector. Consequently, this component is rated satisfactory. Telecommunications Reform Component. This component has achieved its objective to initiate reforms in the telecommunications sector by implementing a sector strategy and a regulatory framework. The sector's restructuring program was successfully launched and has achieved tangible results on the ground. The Government adopted a sector policy to open up the sector to competition. To this end, two laws were also adopted by the Government: one to establish the legal and regulatory framework of the sector, the other to authorize the privatization of ONATEL, the public telephone company. The Government has agreed to transfer management control of ONATEL to a private operator. The studies on the regulatory framework were completed, and basic regulations were adopted by the Council of Ministers in February 2000. A regulatory authority was established in November 1999. Calls for bids were issued in December 1999, and two mobile telephone licenses were granted in May 2000, which brought in a total of US$19 million in license fees for the Government, i.e. more than the proceeds of all privatizations supported by the project (US$16 million). The privatization of ONATEL has been launched. Advisory services are currently being recruited to prepare the sale. More importantly, ONATEL has rebalanced its tariffs: a reduction of more than 50 percent on international traffic and more than 30 percent on long-distance traffic became effective on May 1, 2000. This component is rated satisfactory with respect to sectoral policies and physical targets. Business laws. This component has achieved its objectives. After a slow start, dissemination efforts were successfully completed with the information component. The training program for judges and private operators was completed. The new court register has been set up in the two largest cities. Harmonization of national laws with OHADA laws is underway. Studies to simplify administrative procedures to set up new businesses in keeping with new OHADA laws have been completed. Consequently, this component is rated satisfactory. Support to a new agribusiness strategy. At Government's request, the Bank has provided support to the restructuring of the fruit and vegetable industry. Given the structure of the Burkinabe economy and the identification of untapped potential in the production and export of non-traditional products, it was agreed that the analysis of the value chain for the horticultural sector could be a good entry point to analyze the sources of growth for the country. The project financed study tours for Government staff and private exporters to gain better understanding of success stories (such as in Kenya) and a workshop to disseminate findings. An action plan has been agreed with private operators to improve the sector's competitiveness. Competitiveness study. The project financed a competitiveness study that has triggered a significant turnaround in the dialogue between the Government and the Bank on the appropriate reform agenda for the country. Since its completion in April 1999, workshops and cabinet-level meetings provided a forum for discussions between the Government, the Bank, donors and civil society that have led to heightened awareness and consensus-building on how to move forward on the country's development program. As discussed above, the study has set the stage for Burkina Faso's new development program and put in place a more participatory process between the Government and the Bank in developing a new private sector development strategy, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, and the CAS under preparation. The Governnent is preparing a private sector development program to implement its new strategy. Summary rating of output -9- In the initial program, one major component (the financial sector) is rated satisfactory, one minor component (institutional support) is rated unsatisfactory and the rating for the other component (assistance to the Ministry of Commerce, including privatization) is mixed. The three new components are rated satisfactory. Overall, the program is rated satisfactory. 4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return: n.a. 4.4 Financial rate of return: n.a. 4.5 Institutional development impact: The project helped develop or strengthen the following institutions, as discussed above: the privatization agency, the loan recovery agency, the postal services agency, and the national savings agency. Training under the project was substantial and helped build capacity in best practices in privatization in line ministries and technical staff of the privatization unit. The project also helped the Government move from a cautious to a more engaged position in opening up sectors to competition and divesting itself of the more critical utility sectors. On the other hand, the project was partially successful in building the capacity of the Chamber of Commerce, the CBC and ONAC to better respond to the needs of the private sector. Accordingly, the overall rating on the institutional development impact of the project is rated partially satisfactory. 5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency: The 1994 devaluation of the CFA franc re-established the competitiveness of the economy and triggered strong growth. The devaluation provided a more favorable environment for some of the project's activities, such as divestiture of public enterprises and restructuring of the financial sector. It also increased the initial IDA credit allocation in local currency, which allowed the Government to achieve more than initially expected. On the other hand, the availability of large donor resources for private sector development made it difficult for the Government to adequately coordinate a variety of programs that were not always consistent among themselves. Another factor was the difficulty to attract private partners willing to invest in the banking sector, which slowed down the restructuring of the financial sector. In general, it has been difficult to attract solid domestic investors with the financial capacity required to meet investment needs to rehabilitate the privatized companies. 5.2 Factors generally subject to government control: Weak Governnent commitment to private sector development in the early phase delayed project implementation. A waiver on two conditions of effectiveness (to revise the statutes of the Chamber of Commerce and elections of the members of its executive bodies) had to be granted to avoid a further extension beyond the January 31, 1994 deadline, more than 10 months after Board approval. Insufficient counterpart funding was a recurrent problem throughout project implementation. Cumbersome procedures for public enterprise divestiture, requiring ministerial decisions at each step of the process, considerably delayed the divestiture program. - 10 - 5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control: The project unit has provided weak leadership during most of the implementation period. 5.4 Costs andfinancing: Detailed project costs and financing tables are presented in Annex 2. The disbursement profile reflects the project's slow pace of implementation, compounded by recurrent shortages of local counterpart funding. Over the period 1994-97, the project disbursed US$2.22 million (31%) of the total credit, and US$3.87 million (55%) between project restructuring and the end of the project, representing a total disbursement of US$6.09 million (86%). 6. Sustainability 6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating: Project sustainability is likely. It hinges on the broad dissemination of the analyses and conclusions of the competitiveness study. Recent Bank/Government dialogue on the country's competitiveness has demonstrated the Government's commitment to accelerating the reforms supported by the project. The Government is likely to continue implementing the divestiture program at an accelerated pace and to complete reforms in the telecommunications sector. Increased competition in the financial sector is likely to lead to improved services and lower costs. The OHADA business legislation has been disseminated, but basic weaknesses in the judiciary system remain to be corrected, including through increased funding for operating expenses. The institutional support structure for private sector development remains to be streamlined and fully privatized. Govemment's direct or indirect allocations to the Chamber of Commerce, ONAC and CBC should be discontinued. 6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations: The Bank is considering a new private sector development operation as a follow-up project in the following areas: e Support to divestiture program. The Government carried out a strategic analysis of the State portfolio of some 53 PEs. Based on the analysis, it will determine which companies will be part of the divestiture program. The project will support the implementation of the additional program; 3 Telecommunications reform The program will build on the initial results of the telecommunications reform successfully launched under this project to continue providing assistance in: (i) building capacity of policy makers and telecommunications regulators; (ii) establishing a rural telecommunications strategy and funding mechanisms and undertaking initial implementation; and (iii) completing the privatization of ONATEL. * Information and new technology to (i) establish a strategy on building an enabling environment for developing a country-wide Information Infrastructure; (ii) develop detailed policy on key building blocks of readiness of Internet and E-commerce throughout the country; and (iii) implement priority actions and applications. * Further reforms in the financial sector will be executed at the regional level, under regional programs. The BCEAO project currently in preparation will strengthen the regulatory framework at the regional level and develop new payments systems. The Bank will continue assisting the Government in finalizing the microfinance strategy to subsequently define specific areas of intervention in the implementation phase. 7. Bank and Borrower Performance Bank 7. 1 Lending: The Bank's performance in the identification, preparation and appraisal of the project is rated - 11 - unsatisfactory. The project was complex and poorly designed, including a large number of studies with little relevance to private sector development. The objective of the project was too narrowly focused on creating an institutional environment, and not enough on the purpose of this effort. Given the Government's weak commitment to privatization, the SAR was optimistic as to the pace of the program. Contrary to what was stated in the SAR risk section, there was insufficient dialogue between the Government and the private sector during project preparation. The project included too many conditions of credit effectiveness, resulting in a ten-month lag between approval and effectiveness. If these conditions were deemed critical for the success of the project, they should have been fulfilled before negotiations. It is not clear, however, whether these conditions were critical to justify delay in credit effectiveness: elections by private entrepreneurs of members of the Chamber of Commerce, bid issuance for the reorganization of the institutional structure, or Government adoption of appropriate legislation conferring collection privileges of tax services to the Agency for Debt Recovery. 7.2 Supervision: During the early years of project implementation supervision was unsatisfactory. However, despite delays in meeting effectiveness conditions and difficulties with critical institutional aspects, serious problems in counterpart funding and procurement, implementation progress was consistently rated satisfactory. Follow-up letters did not raise any substantive issues. Missions did not follow up on previous recommendations and agreed actions. Moreover, the project suffered from a series of changes in the organization of the Africa Region. Project management was transferred to a small trade unit created in 1995 in the Africa Region. The unit was later dismantled during the 1996 re-organization and the project remained unsupervised for a year during the transition period. From mid-1997 to credit closing, supervision has been highly satisfactory. During that period, the project has been supervised by the same task manager and essentially the same team members. Thorough supervision and continued commitment from the team helped the Government move on its reform agenda. The resident representative was closely involved in day-to-day problem solving. The Country Director provided the necessary resources and quality support needed to the team, which resulted in establishing a better policy dialogue with the Borrower. Approval of the two extensions enabled the Government to initiate a series of new activities that have helped create a new environment for private sector development. 7.3 Overall Bank performance: Overall, Bank performance is rated marginally satisfactory. It was unsatisfactory in the early years because of poor quality at entry and inadequate supervision. In the past three years, however, the Bank sharply focused its supervision effort and used the project as an instrument for a significant turnaround in its policy dialogue with the Government. Borrower 7.4 Preparation: The Borrower's commitment to the reform program and to the project objectives was lacking. Its involvement in preparation was minimal. Governmenfs ownership of the project was also minimal. 7.5 Government implementation performance: Insufficient counterpart funding of project institutions and inadequate qualifications of key project staff were a perennial problem. Procedures for project implementation were slow and cumbersome. Expected changes in the institutional framework for private sector development have not taken place. Instruments for - 12 - an effective dialogue between the Government and the private sector have not been used. It is important to note that towards the end of the project, new Government leadership demonstrated strong interest to use the project to move the reform agenda, as illustrated by the approach used to implement the competitiveness study. 7.6 Implementing Agency: Performance of the implementation unit was inadequate for most of the project's life. 7.7 Overall Borrower performance: Overall, the Borrower's performance is rated unsatisfactory. Government commitment to private sector development has been weak until recently. Project implementation suffered from inadequate funding and lack of leadership. 8. Lessons Learned Technical assistance is not a substitute for weak Government commitment. In the absence of a shared vision among all stakeholders on what a project is expected to achieve, little change can be expected. Other instruments than a large technical assisfance project should have been used to develop this shared vision. The private sector should have been more actively involved at all stages. The Government did not seem committed to really change the institutional framework for private sector development, and despite a number of studies financed by the project, little was achieved in this respect. Capacity building is incremental and part of a long-term process. It requires strong motivation for change in recipient institutions. To be effective, privatization should be part of a clear strategic vision, shared by all stakeholders. Emphasis on transactions for short-term gain is not appropriate. Transactions should be embedded in clear sector policies. Close donor coordination is essential in countries such as Burkina Faso, which are highly dependent on external assistance. The Bank, in close consultation with interested donors, should support a government program, based on a common approach. Special conditions for credit effectiveness should be avoided as much as possible. If a condition is critical for project success, it should be a condition of negotiations. Supervision should be systematic and issues-oriented. Continuity is essential. Close attention of Bank management is essential. The contrast between the quality of supervision during the first and second parts of project implementation is striking. Extending the closing date when performance is unsatisfactory is a difficult call. In this case, the two extensions served Burkina Faso well, if only for the competitiveness study, which was instrumental in changing deeply entrenched mentalities, and laying the ground for a much energized reform program. The Bank team sensed that the Govemnment was ready to provide a stronger leadership for moving the reform agenda. 9. Partner Comments (a) Borrower/implementing agency: - 13 - This is the summarized version of the Borroweres contribution to the ICR. DESCRIPTION DU PROJET Titre Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Prive (PASP) Credit IDA NO 2472-BUR Date d'entree en vigueur 31 Janvier 1994 Date de cloture 30 juin 2000 Couit neuf millions de dollars US (4 milliards FCFA) (sept millions en pret IDA, Deux millions en contrepartie nationale) Bailleurs de fonds Banque Mondiale Localisation du Projet Envergure nationale Organisme de tutelle Ministere du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat (MCIA) Organe de mise en muvre Cellule de coordination Personnel implique 06 agents (3 cadres + 3 agents d'execution) Duree contractuelle 3 ans (1994-1997) lere prorogation accordee 2 ans (1997-1999) 2eme prorogation - 6 mois (janv. a juin 2000) PREFACE Le present document constitue le rapport de fin d'execution du Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Prive (PASP) au Burkina Faso qui a fait l'objet du credit NO 2472-BUR du 15 juillet 1993 d'un montant equivalant A cinq millions cent mille (5.100.000) Droits de Tirages Speciaux, soit quatre (04) milliards de F CFA. Le credit sera clos le 30 juin 2000 au lieu du 31 decembre 1997 prevu initialement dans l'accord de credit. Ce rapport est base sur les differents documents du Projet et les informations foumies par les composantes et le secteur prive. C'est ici le lieu de remercier le secteur prive, la Banque Mondiale, les composantes, le Premier Ministere et les departements ministeriels pour tous les appuis apportes lors de l'execution de ce Projet. INTRODUCTION Dans le cadre du Programme d'Ajustement Structurel (PAS) mis en ceuvre depuis 1991 avec l'appui du Fonds Monetaire International (FMI) et de la Banque Mondiale, le Burkina Faso a entrepris une serie de reformes economiques visant le desengagement de l'Etat des secteurs concurrentiels et une liberalisation de l'dconomie nationale. Le secteur prive est desormais reconnu comme le moteur de la croissance economique. Afin de creer un environnement propice A son developpement, les autorites burkinabe et la Banque Mondiale ont e1abore le Projet d'Assistance au Secteur Prive (PASP). L'objectif principal du Projet etait de permettre le developpement institutionnel des organismes d' etat qui assurent des services administratifs au secteur prive et des intermediaires financiers A travers cinq (05) composantes: * composante secteur prive * composante secteur financier * composante Privatisation - 14 - * composante juridique * composante secteur telecommunications Au demarrage du projet, seulement trois (03) volets etaient prevus. Il s'agit des appuis au Ministere du Commerce, au secteur financier, et a la restructuration des institutions d'appui au secteur prive. Suite A la prorogation du projet deux (02) autres volets ont e ajoutes; il s'agit des secteurs juridique et des telecommunications. EVALUATION DES OBJECTIFS PAR COMPOSANTE 4.1. Resultats acquis 4.1.1 Composante secteur prive * La Commission de Concertation Etat Secteur Prive sur les reformes du systeme d'appui au secteur prive par arrete N° 92-058/MCIM/SG du 18 septembre 1992 qui a e remplacee par une Commission Permanente de Concertation Etat / Secteur Prive a beneficie pour son fonctionnement d'un photocopieur, d'une motocyclette YAMAHA Dame et d'equipements informatiques. * L'elaboration d'une strategie en faveur du secteur prive en mars 1999; ce document traduit la volonte du Gouvemement de mettre en ceuvre tous les moyens dont il dispose pour favoriser le developpement du secteur prive et la croissance des entreprises; 3 le fmancement de l1edition de quinze (15.000) depliants publicitaires a l'intention des operateurs economiques; le depliant presente le Centre des Guichets Uniques, donne ses objectifs et des informations sur les diff6rentes prestations; 3 la forte presence du prive dans les organes de decision suite a la restructuration de l'ONACet du CBC; * la mise en place d'un reseau informatique pour le CGU afin d'accelerer les traitements des dossiers; * la reduction des delais de traitement des dossiers au niveau des guichets uniques suite A la formation des agents ; les gains de temps sont principalement imputables: * au principe de regroupement geographique des procedures, * A la specialisation plus poussee des agents, * au reamenagement de certaines procedures. 4.1.2 - Composante secteur financier TRESOR La formation des agents a permis aux differents services (le service de suivi des institutions de micro-finance et le service monnaie et credit), d'accroitre substantiellement leurs capacites d'analyse et de traitement des dossiers. Les connaissances acquises ont perrnis 6galement de faciliter la preparation et l'execution des missions d'inspections et de contr6le des institutions de micro-finance. Depuis l'acquisition du materiel informatique, l'on note une certaine fluidite dans le traitement des dossiers et dans la confection des statistiques sur les institutions financieres, les services beneficiaires etant, avant la livraison des equipements informatiques, confrontes A un manque crucial de micro-ordinateurs. Les audits finances par le PASP dans le cadre de la restructuration des banques ont servi de base A I' assainissement de leurs bilans. SONAPOST La formation a ete benefique pour le personnel. En effet, la formation en marketing a permis la - 15 - sensibilisation de 44 agents sur leur responsabilite en ce qui conceme l'accueil de la clientele. Ceci a eu comme resultat, une amelioration de la qualit6 des prestations de la SONAPOST et un accroissement du chiffre d'affaires. L'obtention du materiel informatique a permis d'ameliorer le traitement des informations et surtout de la comptabilite. Les terminaux et le nouveau serveur permettront de traiter les operations en temps reel et donc de reduire le delai d'attente aux guichets. La s6paration effective des flux generes par les services financiers d'avec ceux des services postaux. Cette separation devra permettre A: o la SONAPOST et au TRESOR d'envisager leurs relations sur des bases nouvelles et plus saines, * A la SONAPOST d'assainir sa gestion et d'ameliorer la qualite des prestations offertes au public, * au Cheque Postal de retrouver sa credibilite avec le retour envisage du CCP A la compensation interbancaire. BRCB * La mise en place d'un reseau informatique : les tAches de gestion autrefois executees manuellement, s'effectuent maintenant avec plus d'aisance. Cela a permis de maitriser le volume trop important d'informations A gerer, reduisant ainsi le temps de travail lie A chaque poste. L'affectation de dix (10) terminaux informatiques dans les differents postes de travail a permis aux utilisateurs de consulter et de suivre l'evolution des traitements effectues sur les dossiers. * L'acquisition de micro-ordinateurs portables : leur portabilite a permis aux differents agents d'eviter le transport des dossiers lors de leurs rencontres avec les ddbiteurs et les avocats. En outre, ils ont permis aux agents d'effectuer des contr6les sur le terrain pendant leurs missions en provinces. - L'acquisition de micro-ordinateurs: la configuration mise en place (reseau Ethernet) a permis au secretariat de faciliter certaines taches administratives. * La communication entre secretaires, notamment I'echange de documents, de meme que leur impression sont desormais maitris6s. * La formation de l'informaticien: elle a permis au technicien informaticien de prendre en charge l'administration de l'ensemble du reseau surtout au niveau du systeme. Cette prise en charge lui confere les aptitudes suivantes: - Gestion et administration du reseau; - personnalisation de 1'environnement, - maintenance des applications. 4.1.3 - Composante Privatisation * sur 44 entreprises A privatiser: - 22 ont e privatisees, - 11 ont ete liquidees ou sont en cours de liquidation, - 03 entreprises ont ete retirees du programme (dont une restituee A son ancien proprietaire et deux affectees au Ministere des enseignement secondaire, superieur et de la recherche scientifique (MESSR) A des fins de recherches et huit sont en cours de privatisation . Une etude sommaire des performances de 09 entreprises privatisees demontre que l'impact economique des privatisations est positif . * Sur l'emploi: Les privatisations se sont traduites dans un premier temps par des compressions de personnel, puis ulterieurement par des embauches; * Sur l1'volution de l'activite et des performances: la progression est moderee en termes de volume d'activites, mais nettement sensible en terme de resultat et d'investissement, donc en termes d'imp6ts - 16 - per,us par l'Etat; * L'amelioration des performances economiques et financieres des societes privatisees s'est traduite: - Par une evolution positive du resultat net de la plupart des entreprises: sur 16 entreprises, 03 seulement ont realise des pertes en 1997 ; les autres societes etaient beneficiaires ; cette situation s' explique par l'introduction de methodes rationnelles de gestion, toute chose qui a pernis l'augmentation de la capacit6 de production des entreprises privatis6es; - Une evolution positive du chiffre d'affaires: sur 16 entreprises privatisees, 15 ont enregistre une augmentation de leur chiffre d'affaires; - Une evolution positive de la valeur ajout6e la valeur ajoutee a evolue en dents de scie. Cette valeur ajoutee a surtout augmente en 1998. Cela temoigne de la creation de richesses par les entreprises privatisees dans une certaine mesure; - Un accroissement notable des investissements nouveaux lies A la necessite pour les repreneurs de moderniser les outils de production (19,8 milliards FCFA d'investissements); * La contribution des entreprises privatisees a l'assainissement des finances publiques; * La reduction des depenses budgetaires : il y a lieu de souligner particulierement la suppression de la prise en charge des salaires des subventions et des exonerations fiscales et douanieres; * L'accroissement des recettes: 1'ensemble des recettes financieres liees aux transactions entre l'Etat et les repreneurs a rapporte au Tresor Public la somme de 10,5 milliards de Francs FCFA A la date du 31 decembre 1999. * Par ailleurs, les entreprises privatisees ont verse A l'Etat au titre de l'imp6t sur le benefice industriel et commercial la somme de 2,5 milliards de Francs CFA A la date du 31 decembre 1999. 4.1.4 - Composante juridique - les seminaires se sont deroules a la satisfaction des seminaristes tant au plan de l'organisation que du contenu des presentations. Les magistrats desornais appliquent tous le "droit OHADA" notamment en ce qui conceme les procedures de recouvrement et les voies d'execution; * recrutement de contractuels pour la reprise et l'immatriculation retroactive des declarations effectuees depuis le l er janvier 1998 comme si elles l'avaient ete ds l'origine; le numero de RCCM qutelles auraient recu dans cette hypothese leur sera respectivement affectee et un dossier individuel leur sera affecte; * la version definitive du rapport relatif a la mise en conformite des textes nationaux aux dispositions de l'OHADA permet une plus juste apprehension des questions de choix methodologiques qui se posent dans le cadre de la problematique de la mise en conformite. 4.1.5 - Composante secteur telecommunications * L'adoption de la loi 052/98/AN portant reforme du secteur des telecommunications; * L'adoption d'un document de politique sectorielle; * Le dossier d'appel d'offres pour l'attribution de deux licences de telephonie mobile a et lance le 15 decembre 1999; * Les textes reglementaires comme le regime tarifaire et le regime d'interconnexion sont en cours d' adoption; * Les autres textes d'application de la loi sont en cours d'elaboration par le consultant; * L'adoption du decret portant statuts de l'Autorite de Regulation le 20 decembre 1999; * La tenue du forum national sur la reforme du secteur les 28 et 29 avril 1999; * La formation en regulation de trois membres de la cellule; * L'acquisition d'une somme d'experience avec le voyage d'etudes d'une importante delegation conduite - 17 - par le Secretaire d'Etat aux Telecommunications en Amerique du sud. * La cellule de coordination au sein du Ministere de la Communication est maintenant pleinement fonctionnelle, les moyens materiels ayant ete mis en place par le PASP. 4.2 - Insuffisances 4.2.1 Composante secteur prive (CCIA-B ; ONAC ; CBC ; CGU) * D'une facon generale, la restructuration des structures d'appui a accuse du retard pour diverses raisons. * L'adoption des nouveaux statuts de l'ONAC et du CBC s'est faite seulement courant 1998. * Les dernieres instances de decision ont ete mises en place en septembre 1999. * Au niveau du CGU, si des progres ont e accomplis en matiere de reduction des delais de certaines formalites administratives, les procedures administratives restent encore a simplifier. Le CGU installe a Bobo est partiellement fonctionnel. * Une sous evaluation du projet d'informatisation du CGU n'a pas permis d'achever la mise en place du reseau informnatique (logiciels et cablage non prevus dans l'appel d'offTes). 4.2.2 Composante secteur financier TRESOR Les insuffisances que l'on peut relever a ce niveau sont: 3 Le volet formation : la formation des agents a 6te partiellement executee en raison de calendriers non conformes a ceux de certaines institutions de fornation. Sur 14 formations programmees, 08 ont ete effectivement realisees. * Le volet service consultant: le resultat reste mitige et les attentes non satisfaites au regard du champ de l1'tude non totalement couvert par les consultants, 3 Le volet equipement: celui-ci a connu une realisation tardive. Ce qui ne permet pas de juger a I'heure actuelle son impact reel sur les services. Mais d'ores et dejA on note une certaine fluidite dans le traitement des dossiers et dans la confection des statistiques. SONAPOST On peut relever a ce niveau les insuffisances suivantes: * Le volet 6quipements: la lourdeur administrative constatee dans les procedures de passation des marches. * Le non-respect des delais de livraison par les foumisseurs; * La non prise en compte de certaines preoccupations exprimees par l'institution paraissent fondamentales (equipement des centres de tri). * Tout cela a eu pour consequence la livraison tardive du materiel destine a la SONAPOST. BRCB * La prise en charge de l'environnement reseau n'est toujours pas effective. Cela constitue un handicap pour l'institution, car la gestion des stations leur echappe. * II en est de meme pour le transfert de fichier, la maintenance systeme et d'application a distance. * De facon generale, tout le protocole de communication (TCP/IP) n'est toujours pas maitris6. 4.2.3 - Composante Privatisation - 18 - Le programme de privatisation a accuse un retard dans la realisation de ses objectifs A cause des contraintes suivantes: * Un dMlai extremement long dexecution des differentes etapes du processus de privatisation, en grande partie dui A la lourdeur du processus de decision. * Un manque de programme de communication pour informer le public et les investisseurs potentiels sur ses enjeux majeurs et son role cle dans la politique de developpement economique A moyen terme. 4.2.4 - Composante juridique * Le demarrage des seminaires de sensibilisation a accuse un grand retard. Consequence, le demier seminaire programme ne pourra pas 8tre finance par le PASP. * Seule la formation des greffiers aux nouveaux formulaires et l'application des dispositions de l'Acte Uniforme de l'OHADA au Registre du Commerce de Ouagadougou sont effectives. 4.2.5 - Composante secteur telecommunications * Les travaux de la reforme ont mis du temps A demarrer; * Le recrutement du juriste s'est fait de facon tardive. ANALYSE CRITIQUE DE L'ACTION DE LA BANQUE MONDIALE ET DE CELLE DE LA PARTIE NATIONALE 5.1 Appreciation de l'action de la Banque Mondiale au cours de l'execution du Projet 5.1.1 Principales d6cisions ayant favorise I'execution du Projet 3 Le recrutement d'un comptable d'une secretaire venant du prive, et aussi d'un nouvel auditeur (SOFIDEC) au profit du projet; * Les differentes decisions de prorogation du Projet (31 decembre 99 etjuin 2000); * La tenue de l'atelier d'octobre 1997 sur le secteur prive; * La tenue d'un mini atelier sur l'assistance au secteur prive (novembre 1999); _ La restitution de l'etude sur la competitivite et les sources de croissance au Burkina Faso. 5.1.2 Principaux elements ayant freine l'execution du Projet * La decision de recruter un seul cabinet pour auditer les comptes du PASP et I'assister dans la gestion du systeme comptable. Le logiciel GESPROJ propose par le cabinet (ARTHUR ANDERSEN) n'etait pas satisfaisant; * La lenteur des reponses relatives aux avis de non-objection ont entrain^ des retards dans 1'execution des marches (surtout pendant la periode de octobre 1996 A juillet 1997); * La forte mobilite des superviseurs : en six ans, le Projet a connu cinq superviseurs; * Le manque de conformite des procadures de passation de marche de la Banque Mondiale avec celles nationales entraine souvent des retards dans les passations de marches; * L'absence de suivi du Projet: jusqu'en juillet 1997, aucune dvaluation A mi-parcours du Projet n'avait ete effectuee par la Banque Mondiale, alors que la date initiale de cloture etait fixee au 31 decembre 1997. * Mieux, d'octobre 1996 A juillet 1997, le Projet est reste sans superviseur. En effet, en septembre 1996, un superviseur etait affecte au PASP et en novembre 1996, une mission de supervision fut realisee par - 19 - ce demier. Et depuis lors, le Projet n'a recu ni d'aide-memoire de ladite mission, ni de messages, malgre les efforts de la cellule de coordination d'entrer en contact avec ledit superviseur; * L'identification et la preparation du Projet par la Banque Mondiale a et peu satisfaisante. En effet, certains documents de base tels que le manuel de procedure, n'ajamais existe au PASP. Les b6n6fices attendus du Projet etaient decrits en des termes tres generaux. Ce qui rend 1'evaluation difficile. * Les relations assez difficiles avec certains superviseurs ont influe negativement sur 1'execution de ce Projet (incomprehension, jugements non fondes, manque de concertation, d6cision unilaterale); * La decision de retenir 50% des demandes de remboursement pour justifier l'avance initiale a bloque les dernieres activites du Projet pour insuffisance de tr6sorerie; * Le changement du cadre du Projet : initialement Ioge au sein de la Direction des Etudes et de la Planification du Ministere du Commerce, de l'Industrie et de l'Artisanat, le Projet a et transforme par la suite en une structure autonome, sans aucune mesure d'accompagnement, principalement pour ce qui conceme les charges de fonctionnement. Cet etat de fait a ete une entrave A la bonne execution des activites du Projet. * Les difficultes du demarrage: elles sont dues en partie A l'inadaptation des conditions suspensives liees aux versements des fonds de demarrage. 5.2- Appreciation de la partie nationale au cours de 1'ex6cution du Projet 5.2.1 Principales decisions ayant favorise I'execution du Projet * La tenue de I'Assemblee g6n6rale des Chefs de Projet en Juin 1995, d'ou des decisions importantes relatives A la bonne marche des projets ont e prises. Il s'agit entre autres, du recrutement des chefs de projets, - Le pilotage de la reforme des structures d'appui par la Commission de Concertation Etat / Secteur Privi(CPCE/SP) nationale avec l'appui de consultants intemationaux; * Le desengagement de I'Etat de certains secteurs juges auparavant strategiques tels que le secteur des telecommunications, le secteur du transport aerien, et le secteur de l'energie... * Les decisions prises pour alleger le processus de privatisation ; il s'agit entre autres de la simplification du dispositif institutionnel, du renforcement des capacites au sein du secretariat permanent et du lancement de la campagne de communication sur le programme de privatisation. * L'implication financieres des composantes A certaines activites par des prefinancements pour permettre l'execution des actions programmees * Le financement du budget de fonctionnement de la CPCE/SP par les institutions d'appui. 5.2.2- Principaux elements ayant freine l'execution du Projet * La definition du Projet a ete peu satisfaisante et les termes de la Convention etaient assez imprecis; * La faible participation de l'Etat au budget du projet; cette faiblesse s'est traduite par l'irregularite et l'insuffisance de l'apport de l'Etat. Au cours de ces deux dernieres annees, l'absence de la contrepartie de l'Etat a entrave le bon fonctionnement du Projet; * Le faible effectif de la cellule de coordination (trois cadres, une secretaire de direction) face A la gestion de dix composantes appartenant a cinq ministeres; * La forte mobilite du personnel ; elle s'est traduite par le depart de plusieurs agents du projet. En effet, en six ans, l'on compte: trois responsables A la tete du Projet, quatre comptables, cinq charges d' etudes. * Cet etat de fait s'explique par l'absence de coherence dans le traitement des agents comparativement aux autres projets pourtant finances par le meme bailleur de fonds. - 20 - 5.3 - Autres appr6ciations 53.1- Evaluation de l'efficacite des cabinets, consultants ou fournisseurs ayant particip a ila realisation du Projet Le choix des cabinets, consultants ou foumisseurs pour la realisation de certaines prestations n'a pas toujours ete judicieux. Certains consultants intemationaux ont simplement abandonne NW&tude sans laisse d'adresses. Au niveau de certains foumisseurs, les delais de livraison n'ont pas toujours ete respectes. Ces insuffisances ont rejailli negativement dans les delais de mise en ceuvre des activites, et dans certains cas, le materiel livre n'etait pas conforme. 5.3.2- Evaluation des performances du Projet par les composantes Le Projet a souffert des changements qui se sont operes au gre des circonstances conjoncturelles. Certaines composantes ont assiste impuissantes a la suppression de certaines rubriques, pourtant inscrites dans les activites initiales du Projet. Beaucoup d'activites hors programme ont ete executees souvent au detriment de celles programmees (Etude sur la competitivite et sources de croissance de l'economie nationale, Relance de la fili&re fruits et 1egumes) . Consequences: certaines activites initialement programmees n'ont pas pu se realiser avant la date de cl6ture pour insuffisance de ressources financi&res. 5.4 - Evaluation des performances du Projet par le secteur prive * Le secteur prive apprecie positivement les reformes intervenues notamment a travers: * La restructuration des institutions d'appui (ONAC ;CBC; CCIA-BF); * La mise en place du CGU du CGU avec la centralisation de certaines formalites et la reduction des delais; * la reforme en cours du secteur telecommunications; * le disengagement de l'Etat de certains secteurs concurrentiels; * 'rimplication du secteur prive dans le processus de pilotage de I'6conomie nationale (creation de la Commission de Concertation Etat/Secteur Prive, I'entree de leurs representants dans les instances dirigeantes des structures d'appui au secteur prive ... ); * le projet de mise en place de la "Maison de l'Entrepreneur"; * l'adoption de la strategie du gouvemement en faveur du developpement du secteur prive. * On deplore le fait que le Projet ait consiste en la realisation d'etudes dont la pertinence n'a pas toujours 6t6 etablie, cela au detriment d'une assistance concrete qui aurait mieux profite aux entrepreneurs. 11 recommande cependant: * I'amelioration du systeme dtinformation et de formation; * Ia suppression de certaines taxes jugees arbitraires par le secteur prive; * I'amelioration de l'acces au credit . LECONS A TIRER 6.1 Composante secteur prive (CCIA-B, ONAC,CBC, CGU) CCIA-B - Pour un meilleur fonctionnement de la CCIA-B, les propositions suivantes peuvent etre faites: * Assurer la representation des differents corps de metiers a la Chambre, * Ameliorer l'attitude d'ecoute et la diffusion de l'information, de la formation. ONAC - Pour remndier a ces insuffisances, le secteur prive recommande: - 21 - * un elargissement de la sphere geographique des propositions commerciales notamment en direction des pays non encore touches (pays nordiques, Angleterre, Asie...), des ONG et autres organisation specialisees dans ce type de partenariat, * une assistance aux entreprises en matiere de design pour l'adaptation de leurs produits A l'evolution des marchds (gofits, label). CGU * Bien dimensionner les projets pour mieux satisfaire les besoins des beneficiaires. * Avoir necessairement un plan de communication pour le CGU pour une information des usagers et assurer les meilleurs relations publiques avec les usagers. 6.2 - Composante secteur financier BRCB: Valoriser le savoir-faire du BRCB. TRESOR - L'accent doit etre mis sur le choix des consultants afin d'eviter non seulement les cas d'abandon d'6tude (comme cela a ete pour l'etude sur les nouveaux instruments financiers), mais aussi, les etudes peu satisfaisantes (comme ltUtude sur la microfinance). SONAPOST: Revoir la procedure de passation des marches, et le sui'vi de leur execution. 6.3 - Composante Privatisation. Pour assurer une meilleure rdussite dans l'ex6cution de la suite du programme, il est necessaire que les actions soient mieux coordonnees, Banque Mondiale, Gouvemement d' une part, et Commission de privatisation et autres structures ou Ministeres impliques d'autre part. 6.4 - Composante juridique. Recommandations: Un programme d'urgence devra etre defini en vue de la mise en place du registre du commerce de Ouagadougou dans un premier temps et de celui des autres juridictions ensuite. RECOMMANDATIONS Les principales recommandations que l'on peut faire sont les suivantes: * D'enormes besoins demeurent encore insatisfaits au niveau du secteur prive. II serait souhaitable que la reflexion sur l'appui au prive puisse se poursuivre en vue de trouver la forme la plus efficace pour assister le secteur prive. D'oui la necessite de mettre en place un nouveau programme qui devra mettre l'accent sur un appui plut6t operationnel qutinstitutionnel au secteur prive. * Les groupements professionnels devraient etre responsabilises et renforces pour permettre au secteur prive de jouer un r6le plus efficace dans l'economie nationale. * Pour cela, il est recommande d'elaborer des programmes de formation / conseil tant pour les entreprises que pour les petites, moyennes et micro entreprises. * La poursuite de la reflexion que le Gouvernement burkinabe a entame avec la Banque Mondiale pour promouvoir la competitivite de l'conomie par une participation plus active du secteur prive. * La poursuite du desengagement de l'Etat dans les secteurs concurrentiels pour cela la realisation effective de l'etude sur le portefeuille residuel est indispensable. * L'appui A la relance de certaines filieres, telle celles des fruits et legumes. L'atelier sur la filiere fruits et legumes a pu mettre en evidence un certain nombre d'avantages comparatifs dont dispose le pays et a formule des recommandations dont l'impact pourrait se faire sentir rapidement si le comite de concertation propose par I'atelier etait rapidement mis en place. - 22 - * L'accent doit etre mis sur I'ame lioration de l'environnement reglementaire d'une part, et du systemre judiciaire d'autre part. CONCLUSION L'execution du Projet a souffert de difficult6s diverses, qui n'ont pas permis d'atteindre tous les objectifs fixes initialement dans I'accord de credit. C'est pourquoi, le Gouvemement souhaite la mise en place d'un nouveau projet qui puisse prendre en compte les aspects qui n'avaient pas pu etre executees par la formule actuelle du PASP, notamment, L'appui direct aux entrepreneurs. L'espoir est cependant permis compte tenu du changement des mentalites constates au cours de la periode d'execution du Projet. Le Burkina Faso dispose encore d'un certain nombre d'opportunites non encore exploitees comme il faut comme dans le domaine des fruits et lgumes, du sesame, etc. (b) Cofinanciers: n.a. (c) Other partners (NGOs/private sector): n.a. 10. Additional Information -23 - TELECOM SECTOR - SELECTED KEY INDICATORS Increase in Telephone Lines over the Period 1994-1999 1994 1 995_ 1996 1 997 12998 1 999l Number of lines 26,328 30,043 34,055 36,258 41,700 52,000 ncrease 20% 14% 13% 6% 15% 24.70% Number of lines/100 Deor le 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.31 0.38 0.51 Source: UlT et ONA TEL (1998 - 1999) Summary of Changes in Tariffs (as of May 2000) Internatinnal Natinnal ._ caL.l Mnbile USA: -67% -30% 20% -17% Asia: - 50% Europe: -30% Other African -40% countries:l Key Telecommunications Prices Amounts in US dollars (May 2000) Benin Burkina Togo RCI Niger Mali Connection fee 91.4 75.1 76.9 53.8 46.2 100.0 Monthly subscription 3.8 4.6 2.2 5.9 3.7 3.0 L.ocal call (I min.) 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 Call to UEMOA country 0.9 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 1.1 Call to France 2.6 1.2 1.8 1.4 2.0 2.1 Call to USA 2.7 1.2 2.5 2.1 2.8 4.6 - 24 - SITUATION OF THE BANKING SECTOR, END OF 1999 Name of Banks RICIA-R BIB SGBB BCB COBA.BB ROA CNCA Established 1974 1974 1973 1988 1997 1997 1981 Capital /I 5 4.8 1.6 2 1.5 1.24 3.5 No. of branches 11 21 3 2 2 2 18 Effectives 345 408 120 77 37 33 146 Deposits /1 80.4 58.7 - 8.5 15.2 3.8 14.6 Credits l1 55.5 67.6 6.7 11 .6 2.8 23.6 /1 in millions of CFAF - 25 - SUMMARY OF THE PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM FOR THE PERIOD 1992-2000 (in FCFA) Name of State State State Date Sale No. Firm Owned Divest Retained Sector Method of Sale price I IBRAKINA 9.43% 9.43% 0.00% Beverages Sale of shares 1992 262,487,500 2 SBCP 50.00% 50.99% 0.00% Textiles Sale ofshares 1992 10,287,900 3 SBMC 48.99% 48.99% 0.00% Textiles Sale of shares 1992 37.323,456 4 SOBEBRA 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% Beverages Merger with Brakina 1993 5 SIFA 32.00% 7.000/o 25.00% Manufact. Sale of shares 1993 71.500.000 6 SONAR 52.08% 27.08% 25.00% Insurance Sale of shares 1993 360.875.000 7 ZAMA-PUB. 100.00% 75.00% 25.00% Services Sale of shares 1993 102.454.000 8 FASO-PLAST 34.60% 27.40% 7.00% Industrv Sale of shares 1993 301 720,000 9 GMB 68.77% 43.77% 25.00% Agroindust. Sale of shares 1993 68 1.750.000 10 CIMAT 73.32% 61.77% 22.80% Construct. 1993 1,299.120,000 11 SOBECA 100.00% 81.32% 18.68% Leasing Leasing 1993 12 SONAPHARM 52.00% 43.60% 8.42% Pharnac. Sale of shares 1994 215,650,000 13 SCFB _ Railways Concession 1994 14 FLEX FASO 95.00% 69.77% 25.23% Agroindust. Sale of shares 1995 160,000,000 15 SHSB-CITEC 43.00% 43.00% 0.00% Agroindust. Lease/buy 1995 Lease/buy 16 Burkina&Shell 51.00% 26.00% 25.00% Petrol/dist. Concession 1995 825,500.000 17 SONACAB 58.82% 58.82% Tile industry Liquidation 1995 0 18 RNTC-X9 100.00% 75.00% 25.00% Transport 1996 Concession 19 CSPPA 100.00% 100.00% Agroindust. Liquidation 1996 0 20 FASO YAAR 98.75% 98.75% Trade Liquidation 1996 0 21 FASO-TOURS Services Sale of assets 1996 1 Franc 22 SOSUCO 82.36% 52.00% 30.36% Agriculture Sale of shares 1998 4.402.000.000 23 SOPAL 93.93% 86.07% 7.86% Agriculture Sale of shares 1998 753.000.000 24 INB 100.00% 82.00% 18.00% Services 1999 325 000.000 25 SOCOGIB 87.85% 63.15% 24.70% Real estate Sale of shares 1999 26 SNTB 46.00% 31.00% 12.00% Transport Sale of Shares 1999 398.970,000 27 SAVANA 82.73% 82.73% Agroindust. Liquidation 1999 120,000,000 28 SONACOR 90.80% 0.00% 90.80% Agriculture 1999 0 29 AIR BURKINA 99.75% 71.00% 23.75% Transport Ongoing ongoing 30 SLM 100.00% 95.00% 5.00% Services Ongoing ongoing 1.084,019,200 31 ONATEL 100.00% Telecoms Ongoing ongoing 32 SHG 100. 00% 100.00% 0.00% Hotel Ongoing ongoing 33 CNEA 100.00% _ | Agroindust. Ongoing ongoing 34 FASO FANI 71.27% 67.00% 4.27% Textiles Ongoing ongoing 35 SOFIVAR 76.76% 51.76% 25.00% A roindust. LiQuidation 0 36 SOBEMA 50.00% 50.00% Liquidation 0 37 ONAVET 100.00% 100.00% Pharmac. Liquidation 0 38 SONACIB 80.49% 80.49% Entertainment Sale of assets 39 SINAC 100.00% _ 100.00% Industry Liquidation 0 40 COMIKI 100.00% 100.00% Mining Liquidation 0 41 CNA 100.00% Agriculture Liquidation 0 42 MACEOU 100.00% 100.00% 0.00% Agriculture Sale to former owner 43 Feedlot 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% Ag. Research Back to Ministry 0 44 Fruicema 100.00%1 0.00%1 100.00% I Ag. Research Back to Ministry 0 -26 - Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix Outcome / Impact Indicators: IndicaoWMatiix Projt in last PSR ActuaLatast Estimate 1. Assistance to MICM - Streamlining of procedures required by - Services have improved, reducing time importers required to set up a new business. - streamlining procedures to administer Additional improvements are still needed to requests to benefit from the investment code eliminate remaining unnecessary - simplify procedures to set up businesses administrative steps. - State subsidies were reduced from CFAF 20 bn in 1991 to CFAF 1 bn in 1999. In 1999, privatiation receipts and new investments totaled CFAF 11 bn. and 20 bn - Prvatization program respectively. Employment doubled. Gross (a) privatize 15 enterprises by 1993 value added of privatized firms increased by (b) privatize 22 additional enterprises by more than 68%. 1996 2. Institutional support Limited impact since full privatization did not - privatize CCLA, CBC and ONAC to occur. improve efficiency of services provided to entrepreneurs 3. Financial Sector - Restructuring/privatization of the banking (a) remove the state from the management sector has led to increased competition with of commercial banks the entry of five new financial institutions. (b) improve overall financial intermediation Financial sector is now sound and meets prudentiai ratio requirements. Capacity built in agency for debt recovery. 4. Telecoms reforms - Opening up of sector to competition. Entry a) build consensus on sector reform of two new mobile licenses. Reduction of b) formulate sector policy more than 50% on ONATEL's int'l traffic and more than 30% on long distance traffic. - Regulator set up. 5. Reforms of business laws (OHADA) - Harmonization of national laws with a) judges fully aware of new laws OHADA laws in process. b) adjust national laws c) set up registry of court 6. Competitiveness study - Renewed policy dialogue between a) identify and measure impact of main Bank/Government. Major shift in Govt's competitiveness constraints understanding of the strategic and b) identify sources of growth and articulate development issues in new environment for strategy PSD development. Output Indicators: IndicatorlMatilx Projected in last PSR ActuallLatest Estimate 1. Assistance to MICM: - Creation of a single window for all A single window was created in 1994 and business authorizations and formalities was operational in 1997. including agreement to the investment code. - 27 - - Support to Privatization program Of 44 enterprises, 25 were privatized, 12 liquidated, 2 were transferred back to their Ministries, 5 still ongoing. 2. Institutional support - Privatization of CCIA: Elected representatives of private enterprises have taken over CCIA, all support to private entrepreneurs concentrated in CCIA - Reorganize CBC and ONAC: rationalize CBC and ONAC have been restructured but their activities, transfer admin. tasks to state not privatized. - Matching fund to help private firms carry Activity was dropped because of the out feasibility studies and provide financial existence of a large number of similar funds. start-up support 3. Financial Sector Privatization of banks All banks (5) were privatized. Restructuring of postal services Restructuring was completed in April 2000, with separation from accounts from the Treasury. - Creation of new financial instruments for Several new institutions were created long-term lending induding two new leasing companies. - Support to microfinance sector Adoption of PARMEC law by Govermment. Microfinance Unit within the Ministry of Finance was strengthened. Preparation of a sectoral strategy. - Strengthening agency for debt recovery Of a total amount of CFAF 64 bn of bad debt, CFAF 10.9 bn. was transferred, or 17% during 1991-99. Proportion of prvate debt recovered was CFAF 9.7 bn, or 36%., out of CFAF 27 bn. Proportion of public debt recovered was CFAF 1.2 bn, or 6%, out of CFAF 19 bn. Remaining balance is not expected to be recovered. - Revision of laws governing bad checks and This activity was dropped because of delinquent debtors adoption of new regulations at regional level. 4. Telecoms reforms Adoption by the Govemment of sectoral policy to promote competition. Adopbon of two laws to set up legaVregulatory framework and to privatize ONATEL. Competition in the sector achieved with two mobile telephone licenses, bringing in US$19 million equiv., in license fees to Govt. Training for judges and private operations 5. Reforms of business laws (OHADA) was completed. New court register was set up in the two largest cities. The study was completed in April 2000. Its 6. Competitiveness study results were used to develop a new PSD strategy, the PRSP, and the CAS. End of project - 28 - Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing Proect Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Apprais ActuaULatest Percentage of Estima Estimate Appraial Project Cost Cy Component US$ million US$ million Support to Privatization Commission 3.17 4.14 131 Institutional Support to Private Sector 2.75 0.97 35 Financial Support Component 0.81 1.11 137 Telecoms Reforms 0.00 0.91 0 Implementation of the OHADA Laws 0.00 0.24 0 Coordination Unit 0.72 1.02 142 PPF 0.51 0.18 35 Total Baseline Cost 7.96 8.57 Physical Contingencies 0.52 0.00 Price Contingencies 0.52 0.00 Total Project Costs 9.00 8.57 Total Financing Required 9.00 8.57 Source: Project Files. Project Costs by Procurement Arran ements (A raisal Estimate) (US$ million equivalent) Expendibe Catepry ICB Procurment Method1 N.B.F. Total Cost Expenditaire Categomy 1GB NCB Other2 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.81 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.81 (0.81) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.81) 3. Services 0.00 0.00 5.63 0.00 5.63 Studies, TA, training (0.00) (0.00) (5.03) (0.00) (5.03) 4. Inc. Operatings Costs 0.00 0.00 2.05 0.00 2.05 (0.00) (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.65) 5. PPF Refinancing 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.51 (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) () (0.51) Total 0.81 0.00 8.19 0.00 9.00 (0.81) (0.00) (6.19) (0.00) (7.00) Source: Memorandum of the President Project Costs by Procuremt Arrangements (Actual/Latest Estimate) (US$ million equival nt) Procurement MethodI Expenditure Category Ica5 NCB Other2 N.8.F. Total Cost 1. Works 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 2. Goods 0.00 0.45 1.01 0.00 1.46 (0.00) (0.45) (0.51) (0.00) (0.96) 3. Services 3.28 0.04 2.02 0.00 5.34 Studies, TA, training (3.28) (0.04) (1.55) (0.00) (4.87) -29 - 4. Inc. Operatings Costs 0.00 0.00 1.60 0.00 1.60 (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.00) (0.08) 5. PPF Refinancing 0.00 0.00 0.18 0.00 0.18 (0.00) (0.00) (0.18) (0.00) (0.18) Total 3.28 0.49 4.81 0.00 8.58 (3.28) (0.49) (2.32) (0.00) (6.09) Source: Project Files Figures in parenthesis are the amounts to be financed by the IDA Credit. All costs include contingencies. 2 Includes civil works and goods to be procured through national shopping, consulting services, services of contracted staff of the project management office, training, technical assistance services, and incremental operating costs related to (i) managing the project, and (ii) re-lending project funds to local government units. Project Financing by Component (in US$ million equivalent) Component Appraj;l Estimate 0 0:;: f4 Percentage of Appraisal C|mponent ::;Appra i sal Esimt Actual/La0000test Es§timate X: -______________ IDA Goov CoP iDA Govt CoF. IDA Govt. CoF. Assistance to MICM 1.17 2.00 1.96 2.18 167.5 109.0 Institutional Support 2.75 0.00 0.97 0.00 35.3 0.0 Financial Sector 0.81 0.00 1.11 0.00 137.0 0.0 Project Management 0.70 0.30 0.71 0.31 101.4 103.3 Telecoms Reform 0.00 0.00 0.91 0.00 0.0 0.0 OHADA laws 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.0 0.0 PPF Refinancing 0.51 0.00 0.18 0.00 35.3 0.0 Sources: Project Files. Disbursement Dept. - 30 - Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits n.a. - 31 - Annex 4. Bank Inputs (a) Missions: ____ _ Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating (e.g. 2 Economists, I FMS, etc.) Implementation Development Month/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective Identification/Preparation March 1992 Appraisal/Negotiation Appraisal - June 1992 7 TTL, I PSD, I Op. Off., 4 Consultants Negotiations-Feb. 1993 Supervision April 1993 1 Sr. Operations Officer S S January 1994 2 Sr. Op. Officer, Op. Officer S S June 1994 4 TTL, I PS, I PSD, I Op. Off. S S December 1994 3 TTL, I Op. Analyst, 1 PSD S S March 1995 3 TTL, I Op. Analyst, I PSD S S July 1995 3 TTL, I PSD, I Op. Officer S S November 1995 6 TTL, 2 PSD, I FS Spec., I S S Fin.Analyst, I Consultant June 1996 5 TTL, I PSD, 1 FS, I Fin. S S Analyst, I Consultant July 1997 5 TTL, I FS, I PSD, I Fin. U U Analyst, I Consultant Oct. 1997-Nov. 1997 7 TTL, 2 PSD, I Telecom, I U U Consultant, I FS, I Fin. Analyst March 1998 4 TTL, I PSD, I Fin. Analyst, I U U PF July 1998 7 TTL, I FS, I Telecom, I PSD, 2 U U Legal/Reg., I Consultant April 1999 5 TTL, I PSD, I Telecom, I PSF, U U I Consultant August 1999 2 TTL, I Fin. Analyst U U November 1999 7 TTL, I FS, I PSD, 2 Legal, I S U Fin. Analyst, I Consultant ICR November 1999 * 7 TTL, I FS, I PSD, 2 Legal, S U I Fin. Analyst, I Consultant May 2000 4 TTL, I FS, I PSD, Fin. Analyst S S * The first ICR mission took place in November 1999. However, because the closing date was extended to June 2000, a closing mission took place in May 2000. This mission was also an identification mission for the follow-up project. - 32 - (b) Staff Stage of Project Cycle ActualVLatest Estimate No. Staff weeks US$ (,000) Identification/Preparation 78.3 201.6 AppraisalJNegotiation 46.3 126.4 Supervision 298.8 852.0 ICR 10.0 8.9 Total 433.4 1,188.9 - 33 - Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components (H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable) Rating fMacro policies O H OSUOM O N * NA Z Sector Policies O H * SU O M O N O NA Z Physical OH OSUOM O N * NA Z Financial O H OSUOM O N * NA F Institutional Development 0 H O SU *M 0 N 0 NA Environmental O H OSUOM O N * NA Social Z Poverty Reduction O H OSUOM O N O NA Z Gender O H OSUOM O N * NA Z Other (Please specify) O H OSUOM O N * NA * Private sector development 0 H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA * Public sector management 0 H O SU * M 0 N 0 NA Z Other (Please specify) 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N * NA - 34 - Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory) 6.1 Bank performance Rating [ Lending OHS O(S *U OHU El Supervision O HS * S OU OHU O Overall OHS OS OU O HU 62 Borrower performance Rating L Preparation O HS O S * U O HU El Government implementation performance 0 HS 0 S 0 U 0 HU El Implementation agency performance 0 HS 0 S * U 0 HU El Overall OHS OS * U O HU - 35 - Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 1. Staff Appraisal Report 2. Aide-Memoires 3. "jAtelier de Reflexion sur la Creation de la Maison de I'Entrepreneur, Compte rendu des Travaux", Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, Juillet 1998. 4. "Burkina Faso - Competitivite et Croissance Economique: Orientations, Strategies et Actions", Ministere de I'Economie et des Finances-Banque Mondiale, Avril 2000. 5. Burkina Faso - "Note sur le Secteur Financier, 3 juin 1999". 6. Burkina Faso - Completion Point Document of the Original HIPC Initiative and Second Decision Point for the Enhanced HIPC Initiative. Prepared by the Staffs of the World Bank and the IMF, May 2000. -36 -