Document of The World Bank Report No: ICR00004114 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (TF-12347) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF US$38 MILLION TO THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH SUDAN FOR A RURAL ROADS PROJECT June 12, 2017 Transport and ICT Global Practice AFCE3 Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective November 30, 2011) Currency Unit = South Sudan Pound (SSP) SSP2.95 = US$ 1 FISCAL YEAR July 1 – June 30 Senior Global Practice Director: Jose Luis Irigoyen Country Director: Carolyn Turk Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez Project Team Leader: Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed ICR Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban ICR Primary Author: Virginia Maria Henriquez ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AA Audit Agent ACU Aid Coordination Unit AADT Average Annual Daily Traffic AfDB African Development Bank CE Central Equatoria CGC Community Grievance Committees CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement DFID Department for International Development (UK) DO Development Objective DRB Directorate for Roads and Bridges EE Eastern Equatoria EPP Emergency Project Paper ERR Economic Rate of Return ESIA Environmental and Social Impact Assessment ESMP Environmental and Social Management Plan ESMU Environmental and Social Management Unit ESSAF Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework ESW Economic Sector Work EU European Union EXIM Export-Import FM Financial Management FRC Feeder Roads Committee FY Fiscal Year GA Grant Agreement GRM Grievance Redressing Mechanism GRSS Government of the Republic of South Sudan HIV/AIDS Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report IDA International Development Association IPP Indigenous People Plan IPPDR International Public Procurement and Disposal Regulation ISR Implementation Status and Results Report M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAF Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MCDA Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis MDG Millennium Development Goals MoFEP Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning MDTF-SS Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan MRB Ministry of Roads and Bridges MTR Mid-Term Review NGO Non-Governmental Organizations NPV Net Present Value OP/BP Operations Policy/Bank Procedure PAD Project Appraisal Document PC Project Coordinator PFM Project Financial Management PDO Project Development Objectives PFMU Project Financial Management Unit PIM Project Implementation Manual PMT Project Management Team QAG Quality Assurance Group QEA Quality at Entry QSA Quality of Supervision RAP Resettlement Action Plan RED Road Economic Decision RF Results Framework SBD Simplified Contract and Bidding Documents SETIDP Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project SMoPI State Ministry of Physical Infrastructure SSDP South Sudan Development Plan SSP South Sudan Pound SSRA South Sudan Road Authority SSRF South Sudan Recovery Fund SSRMP South Sudan Road Maintenance Project SSRRP South Sudan Rural Roads Project SSTTF South Sudan Transition Trust Fund SS-EARTTDFP Africa Regional Transport Trade and Development Facilitation Project TA Technical Assistance TAs Technical Assistants TORs Terms of Reference UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services USAID Unites States Agency for International Development USD United States Dollars WE Western Equatoria WFP World Food Program Contents Data Sheet A. Basic Information ............................................................................................................ i  B. Key Dates ........................................................................................................................ i  C. Ratings Summary ............................................................................................................ i  D. Sector and Theme Codes................................................................................................ ii  E. Bank Staff ....................................................................................................................... ii  F. Results Framework Analysis ......................................................................................... iii  G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs ..................................................................... viii  H. Restructuring (if any) .................................................................................................. viii  I. Disbursement Profile ...................................................................................................... x  1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ................................................... 1  2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .................................................. 6  3. Assessment of Outcomes .............................................................................................. 15  4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ............................................................. 20  5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ......................................................... 21  6. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 24  7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners............... 26  Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .............................................................................. 27  Annex 2. Outputs by Component...................................................................................... 28  Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ..................................................................... 34  Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 43  Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ............................................................................... 45  Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results ....................................................... 46  Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ......................... 47  Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ........................... 51  Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 52  MAP .................................................................................................................................. 53  Data Sheet A. Basic Information South Sudan Rural Country: South Sudan Project Name: Roads Project (SSRRP) Project ID: P129000 L/C/TF Number(s): TF-12347 ICR Date: 06/12/2017 ICR Type: Core ICR REPUBLIC OF Lending Instrument: ERL Borrower: SOUTH SUDAN Original Total USD 38.00M Disbursed Amount: USD 37.56M Commitment: Revised Amount: USD 37.56M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Roads and Bridges Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 08/02/2011 Effectiveness: 08/15/2012 08/01/2012 Appraisal: 10/14/2011 Restructuring(s): 05/30/2016 Approval: 04/26/2012 Mid-term Review: 09/15/2014 11/05/2014 Closing: 06/30/2016 10/31/2016 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: High Bank Performance: Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Satisfactory Government: Satisfactory Implementing Quality of Supervision: Satisfactory Satisfactory Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Satisfactory Satisfactory Performance: Performance: C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments Indicators Rating Performance (if any) Potential Problem Quality at Entry Project at any time Yes None (QEA): (Yes/No): Problem Project at any Quality of No None time (Yes/No): Supervision (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Closing/Inactive status: Satisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Major Sector/Sector Public Administration Sub-National Government 4 4 Transportation Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 91 91 Public Administration - Transportation 5 5 Major Theme/Theme/Sub Theme Economic Policy Trade 15 15 Trade Facilitation 15 15 Public Sector Management Public Administration 2 2 Municipal Institution Building 2 2 Urban and Rural Development Rural Development 83 83 Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 83 83 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Carolyn Turk Bella Bird Practice Manager: Aurelio Menendez Supee Teravaninthorn Task Team Leader(s): Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Tesfamichael Nahusenay Mitiku ii ICR Team Leader: Emmanuel Taban Virginia Maria Henriquez ICR Primary Author: Fernandez F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) The Project Development Objective (PDO) is to enhance all season road connectivity to agricultural services for rural communities in high agricultural potential areas. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) The PDO was not revised. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Share of rural population with all-season access; Indicator 1: Value quantitative or 0 9 10.7 10.7 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target achieved. Population data was verified during implementation and (incl. % surpassed the estimations made based on the census of 2008. achievement) Supplemental information: Number of rural people with access to an all Sub-Indicator 1(a): season road (Percentage; number) Value quantitative or 0 36,515 43,413 43,413 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 The expected number of rural people with access to an all season road was Comments increased at project restructuring. Progress reports prepared by contractors (incl. % and supervision firms provided more accurate data than the estimations achievement) made based on the 2008 census. Reduction of travel time on roads targeted by the project (minutes/km) Indicator 2: Value quantitative or 3 1 1 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 iii Comments Target achieved. This indicator was measured by averaging the travel (incl. % times after works on all project roads. achievement) Number of agricultural production centers connected to all season roads Indicator 3: (Number) Value quantitative or 0 44 39 39 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target achieved. The number of agricultural centers connected to all (incl. % season roads was reduced from 44 to 39 at Project Restructuring. achievement) Direct Project Beneficiaries (number) Indicator 4: Value quantitative or 0 91,287 91, 090 91, 090 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. The number of direct project beneficiaries was reduced Comments from 91,287 to 91,090.00 at Project Restructuring, given that more (incl. % updated and accurate population figures were obtained during project achievement) implementation. Supplemental Information: Of which female (percentage) (Direct Project Sub-Indicator 4(a): Beneficiaries) Value quantitative or 0 48.1 48.1 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Comments The expected percentage of female beneficiaries was reached, despite (incl. % updated beneficiary population figures, as the difference was minor. achievement) Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads Indicator 5: (percentage) Value quantitative or 0 100 100 Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. The last road condition measurement was carried out by Comments June 2016, after the completion of most works. The total improved (incl. % classified road network increased from 0 to 465 km under the project, achievement) exceeding the originally expected 450km. iv Sub-Indicator Supplemental information: Size of the total classified network (km) 5(a): Value 0 450 465 465 quantitative or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 The total classified road network was increased from 450km to 465km at Comments (incl. % Project Restructuring, as a result of the additional road sections intervened achievement) by the project. (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Original Target Actual Value Formally Values (from Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value Revised approval Completion or Target Values documents) Target Years Roads rehabilitated, rural roads (Km) Indicator 1: Value (quantitative 0 150 175 175 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. The target was increased from 150 Km to 175 Km at Comments Project Restructuring, as the actual road lengths were verified during (incl. % project implementation. The Magwi-Labone (89km) and Amadi-Tali achievement) (86km) rehabilitated road sections totaled 175km. Travel time on Magwi - Labone road (Hours) Indicator 2: Value (quantitative 3 1 1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target achieved. Travel time was measured on a monthly basis. At (incl. % achievement) appraisal, 3 hours were estimated to go through the whole section. Employment generated under rehabilitation contracts (Number) Indicator 3: Value (quantitative 0 TBD 205 205 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. The target number was determined during Comments implementation and the Results Framework updated at Project (incl. % achievement) Restructuring. At project restructuring 205 employment opportunities was the target that had been achieved. v Roads improved, rural roads (Km) Indicator 4: Value (quantitative 0 300 290 290 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. At appraisal, the total road length to be improved was Comments estimated at 300 Km. During project implementation, the road lengths (incl. % were confirmed for each section and totaled 290km. The target value was achievement) updated at Project Restructuring. Travel time on Yei-New Lasu road (Hours) Indicator 5: Value (quantitative 3 1 1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target achieved. Travel time was measured on a monthly basis. At (incl. % appraisal, 3 hours were estimated to go through the whole length. achievement) Employment generated under spot improvement and maintenance Indicator 6: contracts (Number) Value (quantitative 0 TBD 396 402 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target exceeded. The target number was determined during Comments implementation and the Results Framework updated at Restructuring. (incl. % Spot improvement and maintenance contracts generated 290 labor-based achievement) and 112 mechanized employment opportunities. State Roads/Infrastructure Management Units established (Number) Indicator 7: Value (quantitative 0 4 0 0 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 This indicator was dropped, as it was not relevant. Although not Comments operational, State Level Units already existed under the SMoPI, whose (incl. % staff received training under the project and joined MRB teams in the achievement) management and supervision of works. Planning Department for MRB, including rural roads coordination unit Indicator 8: established (Yes/No) vi Value (quantitative No Yes No No or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Comments This indicator was dropped at Project Restructuring due to funding (incl. % shortfall. achievement) Business Plan for Rural Roads Development prepared (Number) Indicator 9: Value (quantitative 0 4 1 1 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 Target achieved. The aim was to prepare Business Plans for each pilot Comments state. This activity was delayed due to the low capacity at the state level. (incl. % As updated through Project Restructuring, one Business Plan was achievement) prepared applicable for every state. Staff from states trained (Number) Indicator 10: Value (quantitative 0 40 51 51 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 05/30/2016 10/31/2016 At Project Restructuring, the target established at appraisal had already Comments been exceeded, as 51 state officials had received procurement training in (incl. % April 2013 and August 2014. The target was updated to exactly 51 at achievement) Project Restructuring. Staff from Ministry of Roads and Bridges trained (Number) Indicator 11: Value (quantitative 0 10 59 or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target exceeded by 490%. Forty-nine additional staff from the Ministry of (incl. % Roads and Bridges received training under the project. achievement) Road Sector Development Program Prepared (Yes/No) Indicator 12: Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Comments Target achieved. This result was achieved in June 2016, through TA (incl. % achievement) provided by UNOPS and financed by the Project. The MRB submitted the vii Road Sector Development Program for approval by the cabinet after project closing, in November 2016. Strategy for road maintenance financing adopted (Yes/No) Indicator 13: Value (quantitative No Yes Mostly or Qualitative) Date achieved 04/17/2012 June 30, 2016 10/31/2016 Target mostly achieved. Preparation of the Strategy was completed in Comments June 2016 and submitted to Cabinet by MRB for onward submission to (incl. % Parliament. The adoption of the strategy is beyond the control of the achievement) project and is pending approval by Cabinet. G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 11/13/2012 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.00 2 05/27/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.00 3 12/05/2013 Satisfactory Satisfactory 13.46 4 06/03/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 17.50 5 12/30/2014 Satisfactory Satisfactory 22.63 6 06/30/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 26.41 7 12/24/2015 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 29.37 8 06/28/2016 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 32.95 9 11/09/2016 Satisfactory Satisfactory 34.01 H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions The purpose of this restructuring was to: (i) extend the project closing date by four (4) months 05/30/2016 N MS MS 32.45 from June 30, 2016 to October 31, 2016; (ii) introduce and drop activities from the three project viii ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions components; (iii) revise and update the results framework to reflect changes in project activities and targets; and (iv) re-allocating funds among disbursement categories in order to utilize funds from dropped activities. The four (4) months extension was requested to ensure the completion of the following activities: (a) provision of Technical Assistance (TA) for studies on the creation of a road fund, development of a transport sector business plan, the preparation of a road safety program, strategic studies and the preparation of the road sector development program; (ii) the upgrading and rehabilitation, as well as maintenance and spot improvement of selected rural roads, for which the contracts had to be extended - at no cost- given delays due to insecurity and the increase of market prices; (iii) hiring of TA to conduct technical and social audit. The dropped activities included (i) upgrading and rehabilitation of the Tali- Yirol road; (ii) the maintenance and spot improvement of Rasolo- Maridi road; (iii) supervision services for maintenance and spot improvement of selected ix ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions rural roads; (iv) the TA for establishing Planning Department for MRB; (v) procurement of motor vehicles for MRB/States; and (vi) accounting software. The activities introduced included: (i) the maintenance and spot improvement of the Magwi-Aru junction road. I. Disbursement Profile x 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1. The US$38 million South Sudan Rural Roads Project (SSRRP) supported the Government of the Republic of South Sudan’s (GRSS) and development partners' 1 initiative to develop the feeder roads network, as part of the reconstruction and state building for this new nation recovering from a protracted civil war. This project aimed at supporting the country’s agricultural potential development to improve the livelihood of the rural population, reduce food insecurity, improve basic services delivery and ensure peace through the provision of reliable access to high agricultural production areas and enhancing agricultural marketing. 2. This project was built on the work carried out under the previous Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Project (SETIDP) as well as on the subsequent Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project (SSRMP), both financed by the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for South Sudan (MDTF-SS)2. The SSRRP was financed by the South Sudan Transition Trust Fund (SSTTF), established by the World Bank with a total amount of US$75 million in response to the urgent call for the reconstruction and building of the country, to provide it with bridge financing in the period between its independence and becoming a member of the Bank. 1.1 Context at Appraisal Country and sector Background 3. South Sudan is Africa’s newest nation, founded on July 9, 2011, after decades of civil war in Sudan and the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) in January 2005, which provided a historic window of opportunity to create a peaceful and prosperous Sudan, though it remained deeply fragile 3 and among the least developed countries in the world, lacking many of the basic conditions to support development. As such, the GRSS called for state building, lifting its population out of poverty, ensuring 1 The partners include: The United States Agency for International Development (USAID), United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS), the European Union (EU), the Department for International Development (DFID), and the African Development Bank (AfDB). 2 The MDTF-SS was established in 2005 to help finance the reconstruction and development of Southern Sudan in a collaborative framework that brought together several of the key development partners and provided a one stop point of contact and information on the reconstruction and development effort. Donors of the MDTF included the Netherlands, Norway, United Kingdom, European Commission (EC), Sweden, Germany, Denmark, Finland, Italy, Iceland, Greece, Canada, Spain, and Egypt. The trust funds were administered by the World Bank, working together with UN partners, donors, civil society, and the respective governments. 3 Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of South Sudan, International Development Association, 2008. 1 security and focusing on equitable development. South Sudan, with a population of 8.2 million4, is endowed with abundant natural resources including a large amount of good quality agricultural land and significant oil reserves. Yet more than 50 percent of the population was poor and indicators of human well-being were among the lowest in the world. The improvement of the rural livelihood and agriculture sector was key for building this new nation, as well as for diversifying the economy and revenue base away from an over dependence on oil, whilst not affecting food security and employment, as well as macroeconomic stability. 4. Despite being a largely rural and agriculture-dependent country,5 most of the food was imported from the neighboring countries of Uganda and Kenya. Eighty-three percent of households resided in rural areas and 78 percent depended on farming or livestock as their primary livelihood. The majority of South Sudanese lived in near isolation, lacking access to income-generating opportunities and social services. South Sudan’s road network was approximately of 12,642 km (4,000 km were all weather gravel roads and the rest were tracks and trails) and was not receiving proper maintenance thus most roads were in poor to very poor condition, especially in rural areas that were largely inaccessible during the six-month rainy season (from April to October). These conditions made transportation in South Sudan slower and more expensive than anywhere else in Africa, which hindered farmers’ sourcing and transporting of key inputs (such as seeds or fertilizers) to their farms and moving their products to the local and regional markets, and limited the potential for agriculture to contribute to overall economic growth. 5. Transport infrastructure management institutions were at formative stage. The capacity of the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB), which had the overall responsibility of developing and managing the road infrastructure, was weak. Capacity at the State level, responsible for feeder roads development and maintenance, was also weak. Operation and maintenance of public infrastructure and utilities was challenging, as priority tended to be accorded to developing new infrastructure. 6. On January 15, 2010, the GRSS adopted the South Sudan Vision 2040, "Towards Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for All". This vision was anchored in six pillars, of which the second stated “a prosperous, productive and innovative nation”. An infrastructure and agriculture needs assessment was prepared by the African Development Bank (AfDB) in collaboration with the World Bank and other development partners, which found a vast infrastructure deficit reflected across all transport modes, and called for immediate action to improve the transport network and provide access to the hinterlands in 4 Housing and Population Census, Sudan, 2008. 5 United Nations Children Fund (UNICEF). (2001, July). UNICEF Humanitarian Action Update, Republic of South Sudan 2 order to enhance agriculture development.6 This assessment was carried as an input to the South Sudan Development Plan (SSDP) (2011-2013) that was in preparation at the time of appraisal by GRSS. Overall, the assessment confirmed the premise of the SSDP, "providing access to the rural areas of South Sudan", to reverse the current situation of food insecurity, poor rural livelihood, and sporadic insecurity threats. 7. The SSDP (2011-2013) was the framework for the reconstruction and building of the new nation, prepared by the GRSS to lay out the strategy for the reconstruction and nation building, which included calling for the support of development partners in addition to applying part of the country’s oil revenues for reconstruction purposes. This Plan was broken into four core building blocks, of which the second aimed at “achieving rapid rural transformation to improve livelihoods and expand employment opportunities”. Donors' strategy was consistent with both “South Sudan Vision 2040” and the SSDP. 8. The project was processed under OP/BP 8.00 as an emergency operation to specifically provide financing for the improvement of rural access roads. The Bank assistance was still needed to, among others, rebuild and restore physical assets, such as roads; restoring essential services and economic activities; as well as establishing and preserving human, institutional, and/or social capital and building capacity for longer-term reconstruction. With the Sudan-South Sudan border issue, security challenges within South Sudan and some disaffected militia leaders, there was a continuing need to support and facilitate peace building to overcome the residue of conflict. Rationale for Bank Assistance 9. The World Bank’s long-term engagement in the transport sector in South Sudan since 2005 has helped to deepen the understanding of transport infrastructure issues in the country whilst undergoing reconstruction and allowed for the strengthening of the transport sector across the board. During the course of this continuous engagement, through the implementation of previous road projects, the SETIDP 7 and SSRMP 8 , interstate roads were opened and road infrastructure and access were improved by rehabilitating, upgrading and providing maintenance to critical national and rural feeder roads. Critical urban infrastructure had been improved in Juba, the Capital of South Sudan, and institutional capacity strengthened at the MRB and other government institutions, through the creation of mass of human resources and the provision of technical assistance. 6 The short term (2012-2014) demand for infrastructure and agriculture development in South Sudan was estimated at about US$3.76 billion, of which, transport infrastructure accounted for about 61 percent (US$2.3 billion). The reconstruction and development of the secondary and tertiary roads, considered to be the rural roads network, required about US$500 million in the short term period. 7 The Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Project - SETIDP (P095081, closed in June 2012) 8 Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project – SSRMP P118579, closed in August 2012) 3 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) 10. The Project Development Objective (PDO) stated in both the Project Appraisal Document and the Grant Agreement (GA) signed on May 18, 2012 was to enhance all season road connectivity to agricultural services for rural communities in high agricultural potential areas. The PDO was intended to be achieved by: (i) improving access to high agricultural potential areas; and (ii) enhancing the capacity of participating states and relevant national government institutions to manage rural transport infrastructure. 11. The PDO indicators as specified in the Emergency Project Paper’s Annex 2 were: (i) Share of total population with all-season access; (ii) Reduction of travel time on roads targeted by the project; (iii) Number of agricultural production centers connected to all season roads; (iv) Direct Project Beneficiaries (number), of which female (percentage); and (v) Roads in good and fair condition as a share of total classified roads. 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 12. The PDO was not changed during the project’s implementation. Some key indicator targets were updated during implementation as shown in Section F of the Data Sheet. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 13. The Emergency Project Paper (EPP) identified the main beneficiaries as those rural people living within five kilometer of the catchment area on both sides of project roads, which are located in high agricultural potential areas. Due to the lack of access roads in South Sudan, the rural population had to walk long distances to get transportation services, hence a five kilometer distance is considered as an average. The Economic Sector Works (ESW), carried out by the World Bank, had confirmed that farmers had to take their products to road side markets, which were as far as five kilometers. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) The project consisted of three components, namely: (i) upgrading and rehabilitation of selected rural roads; (ii) maintenance and spot improvement of selected rural roads; and (iii) institutional development for rural infrastructure management. 14. Component 1 - Upgrading and Rehabilitation of Selected Rural Roads (US$22.5 million): This component financed the upgrading and/or rehabilitation of selected rural roads opening up high agricultural potential areas. Activities included: (i) rehabilitation of about 150 km of roads targeting areas identified by the agriculture sector for having high productivity for production of cereals, much needed to ensure food security; (ii) provision of supervision services; (iii) updating the draft Environment and 4 Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) for the transport sector; and (iv) preparing Environment and Social Impact Assessments/ Management Plans (ESIAs/ESMPs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and Indigenous Peoples Plans (IPPs) as required for roads to be rehabilitated and maintained under the project. 15. Component 2 - Maintenance and Spot Improvement of Selected Rural Roads (US$12 million): This component financed the maintenance and spot improvement of about 300 km of rural roads deteriorated due to lack of maintenance during the civil war period. This component also included the maintenance of: (i) feeder roads improved by the Government of Southern Sudan over the previous five years; and (ii) critical collector roads that will ensure connectivity of the priority feeder roads to trunk (interstate) roads. This component was executed by both mechanized and labor based contractors and was split into four subcomponents: (i) mechanized maintenance and spot improvement of about 180 kilometers of select rural roads; (ii) supervision of maintenance and spot improvement works for mechanized maintenance contracts; (iii) labor intensive maintenance and spot improvement of about 120 kilometers of select rural roads; and (iv) supervision of maintenance and spot improvement works for labor based maintenance contracts. 16. Component 3 - Institutional Development for Rural Infrastructure Management (US$3.5 million): This component supported institutional development initiatives at pilot states and national levels to enhance the capacity for rural infrastructure management. This component consisted of three sub-components namely: Sub-Component 3.1: strengthening of the capacity of Pilot States, in particular their ministries responsible for physical infrastructure, to manage rural infrastructure - encapsulating: (i) handling procurement, contract management and financial management matters, and (ii) preparation of business plans - through provision of goods, technical assistance, services and Workshops and Training required for the purpose. Sub Component 3.2: (i) TA to support establishment of a Planning Department for MRB; (ii) TA to support the preparation of Roads Sector Development Program; (iii) support to establishment of a Road Maintenance Fund; and (iv) road safety programs and strategic studies emerging during implementation. Sub- Component 3.3: carrying out of project coordination and management through provision of goods, technical assistance, services, Workshops and Training and Operating Costs required for the purpose, including: (i) training to the Project Management Team (PMT), states and Ministry of Environment staff; (ii) technical assistants (TAs) to the PMT, (iii) provision of technical, social and financial audit firm (Audit Agent -AA); (iv) procurement of desktops and installation of NAVISION Accounting System including training of staff in the ministry; and (v) operational costs for the PMT. 1.6 Revised Components 17. Changes introduced with the restructuring approved on May 30, 2016, resulted in the dropping of some activities across all three components. The dropped activities included (i) upgrading and rehabilitation of the Tali-Yirol road; (ii) the maintenance and 5 spot improvement of Rasolo-Maridi road; (iii) supervision services for maintenance and spot improvement of selected rural roads; (iv) the TA for establishing Planning Department for MRB; (v) procurement of motor vehicles for MRB/States; and (vi) accounting software. The activities introduced included: (i) the maintenance and spot improvement of the Magwi-Aru junction road. Details are provided in Section H of the Data Sheet. 1.7 Other significant changes 18. The project underwent restructuring, approved in May 30, 2016. The purpose of restructuring was to address the impact of the crisis from December 15, 2013 in project implementation. This restructuring was planned to be embedded within an Additional Financing (AF), which began being prepared in 2014. The preparation of the AF was delayed and ultimately dropped due to the non-availability of IDA resources, hence the team had to prepare a separate restructuring paper. Details are provided under Section H of the Data Sheet. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry 19. Soundness of the Background Analysis. Project preparation focused on addressing real emergency needs of the recently independent country recovering from a protracted civil war. It responded to an analysis of the national context and to an assessment of infrastructure and agriculture needs at the time, seeking to diversify the economy and revenue base away from an over dependence on oil. Being a largely rural and agriculture dependent country, South Sudan’s poor transport infrastructure represented one of the most significant constraints for development, hence the project aimed at responding to the immediate need of reconstructing rural infrastructure to improve the livelihood of the population in the project area by providing access to services and markets, as well as to facilitate the movement of agricultural products from rural production areas to local and international urban markets. 20. Project design reflected experiences from the previous SETIDP and SSRMP road improvement projects. Despite South Sudan’s commitment to planned transport projects, the implementation of the previous projects was challenged by the country’s budgetary constraints. Allocations for maintenance were often the target of budget amendment processes, given that these resources had to be diverted to emergency and security sector projects. This situation called for a major initiative by the GRSS to approach various donors within and outside of South Sudan 21. Following the learnings from previous projects and building on their efforts, the SSRRP was designed to continue seeking to move from emergency post-conflict interventions towards sustainable roads development, including construction and maintenance of roads, whilst supporting the institutional capacity strengthening of MRB 6 on project planning as well as the preparation and implementation of a maintenance strategy. MRB continued to be the institution responsible for the implementation of the SSRRP. Building on the experience acquired from past projects, MRB adopted previous Project Management Team (PMT) arrangements, which had the overall responsibility of project management, performance monitoring, and progress reporting. Core functions were organized as units and regular implementation tasks were to be led by a Project Coordinator (PC) throughout the project’s life. MRB also designated staff responsible for Environment and Social Safeguards, Planning and Monitoring, Financial Management/Project Accountant, and Contract Administration. Given that managing project funds was a new task for the MRB, it was defined to be carried out by MRB’s Directorate of Administration and Finance through the provision of Technical Assistance . 22. Adequacy of government’s commitment. The GRSS was fully committed to the project and actively participated in its preparation in a participatory and consultative manner with active involvement of the country’s Feeder Roads Committee (FRC), co- chaired by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (MAF) and the Ministry of Roads and Bridges (MRB), which is mandated to coordinate feeder roads development. 23. Assessment of project design. The project design was simple in scope as it straightforward aimed at improving the livelihood of rural people living areas with high agricultural production, through the provision of access by developing the feeder roads network of the county. SSRRP was designed to contribute significantly the reconstruction and state building of the new nation of South Sudan, which was somewhat challenging due to its fragile environment, resulting from years of civil war. The design was to be implemented in three components as earlier discussed in Section 1. The project design included measures to continue contributing to the creation of employment opportunities and development of local contractors, by incorporating labor based maintenance contracts. 24. The road works were spread across four out of the ten states of South Sudan, namely: Central Equatoria (CE), Eastern Equatoria (EE), Western Equatoria (WE), and Lakes. The state level institutional strengthening activities were to be carried out in four pilot states (EE, WE, Lakes and Western Bahr el Ghazal), selected taking the following factors into consideration: (i) have the highest potential for production of cereals; (ii) possible future extensive development of feeder roads due to favorable situation for surplus production of agricultural products; (iii) geographic spread of the pilot states to allow equitable distribution between Greater Equatoria and Greater Bahr El Ghazal regions; and (iv) strategic location of the states to serve as model for future replication to neighboring states. All ten states were interested in being benefitted by institutional strengthening activities , however, due to resource limitation, only the selected pilot states could participate. At project preparation, other development partners that were preparing to be engaged in feeder roads development expressed their interest in supporting the remaining states. 7 25. Assessment of Risks. Risk assessment was carried out and the overall risk of the project was classified as High both at preparation and during implementation. This classification was based on previous implementation experiences of road development projects in South Sudan, which suffered from delays due to the country’s post conflict environment and institutional capacity constraints. In general, the project’s potential risks and the measures to mitigate them were identified and incorporated adequately in the project design as shown in the EPP. Nevertheless, an important risk, which was not analyzed during project preparation and design was the probability of a new conflict to arise due to the then positive and forward looking country environment recovering from a post-conflict situation. 26. At project preparation, major government institutions had already begun functioning, such as the MRB, largely thanks to the implementation of the previous Bank projects and the collaboration of other international donors. The national currency, the South Sudan Pounds (SSP) was becoming stronger and people from neighboring countries, such as Uganda and Kenya, were migrating to the GRSS for potential better job opportunities. Due to this country scenario, there were no expectations of a new conflict to arise. As a result, the design didn’t identify mitigation measures in case of a future crisis. 2.2 Implementation 27. The SSRRP was approved on April 26, 2012 for an amount of US$38 million, signed on May 18, 2012 and declared effective on August 1, 2012. The project’s initial closing date was June 30, 2016 and was later extended to October 31, 2016 through a restructuring approved on May 30, 2016. Implementation was rated moderately satisfactory in the first two Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISR) due to an initial slow project implementation and low disbursements resulting from a delay in contracting specialists to support the PMT and contracting works. Thereafter implementation progress improved and was rated satisfactory in the following ISRs, until the armed crisis from December 2013 began affecting the project towards its third year, thus the rate was downgraded back to moderately satisfactory. By project closing, the SSRRP had achieved its PDO, hence the implementation was rated satisfactory in the final ISR. 28. Project Restructuring. The objectives of the restructuring, approved on May 30, 2016, were to: (i) extend the project closing date by four (4) months from June 30, 2016 to October 31, 2016; (ii) introduce and drop activities from the three project components; (iii) revise and update the results framework to reflect changes in project activities and targets; and (iv) re-allocating funds among disbursement categories in order to utilize funds from dropped activities. Details are provided in Section H of the Data Sheet. 29. Engagement of UNOPS. UNOPS and the GRSS signed an agreement on January, 2016 for the provision of TA for the carrying out of the following activities financed by 8 the project (totaling US$1.64 million): (i) development of the Road Maintenance Strategy; (ii) development of a Business Plan for Rural Roads applicable to every State; and (iii) development of a Road Safety Program and strategic studies; (iv) the preparation of the Road Sector Development Program. UNOPS also carried out a Bailey Bridge Assessment Study to support the future development of a strategic bridge development program in South Sudan. 30. Community-Led Development Initiatives, Cooperatives. The Project supported the improvement and upgrading of road side market places (agricultural cooperative centers and warehouses) on spots that were convenient to facilitate the distribution of agricultural inputs, marketing local farm products, obtain input for cultivation, and for farmers to receive training as well as guidance on business development from agricultural extension agents (all agricultural services). Each works contract had a provision for community-led development activities such as supporting markets and cooperative societies, all aimed to reduce potential intervention/conflict with local communities during project implementation. The location of the markets was determined by the community and county administration. As a result of the project, a total of 39 agricultural cooperative centers were connected to all season roads. Specifically, five warehouses were constructed and 15 agricultural extension agents were trained along the Magwi-Labone (89km) road section. It is worthy of noting that the warehouses were handed over to facilitate food security among the farmers’ groups. The Cooperative Bank of South Sudan trained and organized farmers to increase their organization in cooperatives groups to improve their marketing ability and status, and connected them with bulk buyers like agents/suppliers of the World Food Program (WFP). 31. Midterm Review (MTR). The MTR was carried out in November 2014. The PDO was found to remain relevant for the development of the GRSS as well as for the provision of food security in the region. The report provided a series of recommendations for all the aspects assessed, particularly highlighting the need for the GRSS and the Bank to seek additional financing to cover the activities that were going to have to be dropped due to the eminent funding shortfall, expand the project horizontally by increasing coverage with more roads and vertically by extending the project’s closing date to allow for the implementation of the additional activities. At MTR, the country’s situation was considered sound enough to move forward with project implementation. 32. Technical Audit. A technical Audit was carried out near project closing, in October 2016, which provided an independent and objective assessment and confirmed the compliance with World Bank procurement guidelines, works design standards and specifications as well as with the Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) framework for project implementation. The audit enabled the MRB to effectively discharge its supervisory functions with regards to the implementation of the audited works contracts in conformity with best international practice. The audit concluded that the project was completed successfully, with no major technical findings. A few recommendations were proposed to 9 improve the procurement and quality of works in future projects, including, among others, the need to develop a set of technical specifications tailored to the gravel feeder roads, and to continue incorporating maintenance components in road rehabilitation projects to ensure the sustainability of the road investments, involving the local communities and county offices. 2.2.1 Major factors affecting project implementation 33. Armed crises in South Sudan. South Sudan entered into an internal armed conflict starting December 15, 2013 that particularly affected the North and North Eastern parts of the country. However, the progress of the project was not affected, thus just suffering slight delays/disruptions which also stemmed from the uncertain situation of the country. The works and supervision services continued to be implemented as the sites were located in peaceful parts of the country and were not affected by the conflict. 34. Separately, in May 2015, fighting erupted between farmers from Mundri West and East, and Maridi counties, and nomadic cattle keepers who brought cattle from different parts of the country for grazing in these counties. These were localized conflicts that became severe to the extent of engaging the common commuters and military in random surprise attacks. The insecurity in these counties directly impacted the works progress on the Amadi-Tali and Maridi-Kozi road sections. The contractor on the Amadi-Tali rehabilitation contract was able to mobilize security to the site and managed to continue with the works, counting with only half of the staff at site and supervision provided from Juba on spot checks and visits to the site. The contractors on the Maridi-Kozi road maintenance contracts remobilized to the site in late July 2015, but continued working with constant disruption, and successfully completed the works before project closure. 35. On July 8, 2016, fighting erupted between the government and opposition forces in Juba town and various parts of the country. This greatly disrupted the implementation of the near closing construction contracts. Contractors’ camps in the Magwi-Lobone and Yei- New Lasu road sections were attacked and repeatedly looted by the unknown armed group since the upsurge of the violence. This resulted in the evacuation of the contractors’ and supervision consultants’ staff to Uganda or safer places within the country. The contractors were able to report to site in September to resume activities and completed the construction contract in a satisfactory manner. The overall security situation was highly risky at the time, due to a sudden increase in a number of unknown armed groups in a various part of the country including the project area. It is worthy of noting that both the MRB and the PMT remained actively pushing project implementation forward during the outbreaks of these crises. 36. High construction costs. Rehabilitation and upgrading works contracts were awarded between 31 to 43 percent above the initial estimates, mainly because the works were designed in 2011 and procured in 2013, and contractors would charge more to 10 safeguard their heavy machinery and employees given the country’s fragility. Some roads did not exactly have the length stated in the project documents, hence road construction costs were found to be higher than initially anticipated. Moreover, during project implementation it was found that due to the heavy deterioration and thick forest cover of some the roads, the budget originally assigned for maintenance contracts was not adequate. This was the particular case of the Rasolo-Maridi (71km) road section, which was dropped and replaced by the Magwi-Aru (55km) road section and by the length extension of some of the other selected road sections. As a result of the funding shortfall, the rehabilitation of the Tali – Yirol road section was also dropped with the intent to undertake it under a potential project Additional Financing. 37. Currency Crisis/Claims. The first armed crisis that erupted in 2013 triggered the beginning of a severe currency devaluation that greatly impacted contracts’ performance. During project preparation in November 2011, the exchange rate was SSP 2.95: 1 USD, as presented in the Emergency Project Paper and established in the works contracts. The GRSS changed the foreign currency regime from a fixed to floating rate in December 2015, which greatly impacted the performance of the contractors paid in SSP. In December 2015, the SSP was trading at approximately SSP 18:1USD. By April, 2016, near project closing, the SSP was trading at approximately SSP 41:1USD. 38. All civil works contracts were fixed price lump-sum, without any provision for price escalation, as they were awarded in a different country scenario, where the currency had become stronger. The government, with the aim to stabilize the economy following independence in 2011, encouraged contractors to request payment in SSP, hence the payment currency established for the works contracts financed by the project varied from a 100 percent in USD, a 100 percent in SSP and combined between both currencies (details in Annex 3, Table 3.3). This meant that any price escalation exposed the Client to funding shortfall not provided under the project. Due to the currency crisis, difficult access, security and unstable economy challenges, these fixed price contracts were affected by a significant increase in the costs of transport, construction materials, fuel, salaries, commodities, and spare parts among others. As a result, contractors requested payments for works carried out from December 2015 in USD. To ultimately resolve this issue, the Bank agreed to consider this conversion for the works from the date the order was issued, with justification for cost differences rising from of the currency devaluation, in accordance with contract provisions. 39. Additional Financing (AF). In view of the emergency crisis, approaching funding shortfall and the need to realign and scale up project activities, the GRSS formally requested a US$50 million AF in May 2014. This AF was sought to scale up the development effectiveness of the SSRRP and provide maintenance to the rural roads intervened under the SSRRP and previous Bank projects. Unfortunately, all IDA allocation for South Sudan had already been committed and no IDA resources were available to fund the AF. The initiative could not be retaken later, as the country instability and fragility continued to increase. 11 40. Second Extension of Project Closing Date. The first extension of the project closing date enabled the completion of all the works and most institutional strengthening activities including TA services. Yet, increasing challenges faced by the project after July 2016 affected the execution of close-out activities such as the Environment and Social Audit and the Client Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR). The Client submitted a two-month extension request to close the project in December 30, 2016. The country’s unstable situation at the time impeded the processing of this second extension of project closing date. The Social and Environmental Audit was carried out by an individual consultant directly hired by the Bank. The Client ICR could not be prepared, though comments on the Bank’s draft ICR were provided. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization 41. M&E Design. Project monitoring and evaluation (M&E) was planned against the project results framework designed at appraisal. The PDO outcome and intermediate results indicators were adequately and comprehensively designed at appraisal from a technical, social and sustainability standpoint. The indicators were properly aligned with the PDO and components. At appraisal, it was envisaged that the Planning and Monitoring Unit under the Directorate of Roads and Bridges would be established as responsible for project M&E. In addition, an M&E Specialist financed by the project through TA, had been engaged by the PMT to strengthen the capacity of the Unit. Further TAs were planned to be provided in the areas of financial management (for about three years), procurement, contract management, environment and social safeguards. The PMT was given the responsibility to review the progress of implementation and provide a report accordingly on a quarterly basis, including an update on the results framework indicators and financial progress summaries. A Mid-term Review was included in the M&E design, which was planned to be conducted by March 30, 2014 or a date to be agreed between the Bank and Recipient. 42. M&E Implementation. M&E was implemented according to design. Capacity building was provided throughout project implementation for staff at all levels directly involved in road sector planning, execution, monitoring, and evaluation. As part of the M&E development (i) the PMT provided Quarterly reports including updated results framework indicators and Financial Progress summaries; (ii) data collection tools were developed for the project; (iv) an M&E framework plan was developed; (v)The PMT developed M&E tools in Microsoft Excel for the SSRRP to simplify the monitoring work for the project staff and ensure the quality of the data that feed the progress reports (details provided in Annex 2, Table 2.2). Information was collected through both contractor and supervision monthly reports and a midterm review was conducted in November 2014. The World Bank and Borrower were proactive to recognize that the results framework could be further improved during implementation and took advantage of the Project Restructuring approved in May 30, 2016, to revise some PDO and intermediate results indicators’ targets. 12 43. M&E Utilization. The data was collected as established in the results framework utilizing the M&E tools developed by the PMT. These data fed the progress reports delivered by the PMT on a quarterly basis. The information gathered through the recollection of the data was not utilized for any future purposes due to the country’s extant instability. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance 44. Environmental and Social Safeguards. The project was classified as Category B, given that it was intended to support the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing roads thus environmental and social impacts were expected to be limited. During project preparation, MRB prepared an Environmental and Social Screening and Assessment Framework (ESSAF) for the transport sector, which was an update of the 2008 sector specific Environmental and Social Management Framework developed for Sudan, before independence. Bank safeguard policies triggered by this project, included: OP/BP Environmental Assessment (4.01), Indigenous Peoples (4.10), Physical Cultural Resources (4.11) and Involuntary Resettlement (4.12). The specific considerations of each policy were addressed prior to the execution of the works. 45. The PMT, through the Environmental and Social Management Unit (ESMU), was responsible for the coordination of the carrying out the ESSAF update, preparation of the required site specific Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIA) / Environmental and Social Management Plan (ESMP), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and Indigenous Peoples Plans (IPPs) for the works subprojects and monitoring the implementation of mitigation measures. The SSRRP financed the hiring of Environmental and Social Experts to monitor and ensure that these policies were followed as stated in the ESSAF. Since most of the road works were confined within the existing right of way, most of these requirements were found not applicable. No significant resettlement was observed in the project. The final ESIA and ESMP were cleared by the Bank on March 11, 2014, and publicly disclosed in South Sudan on March 21, 2014, and in the Bank Info shop on March 24, 2014. No major environmental or social safeguards issues identified under the project. 46. Environmental and Social Audit. An Environmental and Social Audit was carried out after project closure and completed in March 2017. The Audit concluded that the overall environmental and social safeguards performance was satisfactory. Key Institutional Safeguards Capacity existed at the PMT, Contractors and Supervising Consultants, thus the provision of safeguards training was found successful. Labor-based works were supervised by the ESMU/MRB, which is deemed acceptable, since these were used for capacity development of Government Staff and the Local Contractors. Adequate stakeholder consultations were undertaken by the project during preparation and 13 implementation, which facilitated project ownership (especially of labor-based works) and enabled works to progress quite well amidst the challenging working environment. 47. Procurement. At appraisal, the procurement capacity assessment of the MRB concluded that the risk level was high, mainly for reasons related to the country’s fragile environment. The recommended prior review thresholds for the project were set low for works, goods and consultancy services. All Terms of Reference (TORs) and direct- contracting/single-source selection were subject to prior review by the Bank, regardless of the contract amount. The PMT was responsible for the procurement and administration of all contracts under the SSRRP. The EPP and Project Implementation Manual (PIM) were clear on the procurement processes, notifications and the coordination for procurement of large ticket items. The PMT initially developed a one-year procurement plan, which was regularly updated as per EPP and PIM guidelines to meet the project demand. 48. The PMT involved key stakeholders including top management of MRB at early stages of procurement processes. The Procurement Committee was not established as required in the project organizational chart in the EPP, but used an evaluation committee whose report was endorsed and approved by the Undersecretary of the MRB. Once the armed crisis erupted in 2013, the Bank resolved to maintain all procurement activities prior review. At MTR, delays in the execution of the procurement plan were identified. Although the project provided a procurement specialist to support the PMT, the procurement officers and support staff at PMT were not adequately equipped with certified skills in procurement. This situation was addressed by providing training and technical procurement support to the PMT. Thereafter, the implementation of the procurement plan peaked and procurement performance was rated Satisfactory. 49. Financial Management. At appraisal, a Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability Assessment was carried out and concluded that the risk level was moderate. To ensure adherence of project implementation activities, including procurement, payments to contractors, financial records to fiduciary principles and procedures of the Bank, the PMT, was to hire an independent firm (Audit Agent-AA) to conduct financial auditing. The PIM and EPP had explicit procedures on the planning and budgeting processes and disbursement of funds. The Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) was not established under in Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MoFEP), as required in the EPP. Instead, the project provided TA to the PMT through the hiring of a qualified and experienced Financial Management Specialist, which was supported by a dedicated project accountant. 50. In general, the PMT established adequate financial management processes and records management systems based on government financial regulations/treasury accounting instructions. National level financial management activities were satisfactory and counted with qualified staff. The form and content of the quarterly accountability reports for sub-projects and monthly accountability report for sectors and contractors were 14 satisfactory. Quarterly Interim Financial Reports (IFR) were timely submitted to the Bank. The level of disbursements under the project was considered Satisfactory ahead of closure. The National Audit Chamber conducted the audit of the project financial statements for Fiscal Year (FY) 2016 and expressed unqualified opinion with no major issues noted. 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 51. Sustainability of the road network remains a concern as the Country’s Strategy for Road Maintenance, prepared under the project, has not obtained all the required levels of approval, and has not been adopted yet. The preparation of the strategy was completed in June 2016 and submitted by the MRB to the Cabinet for onward submission to the Parliament. As of April 2017 approval from the Cabinet was still pending. After project closing, MRB/PMT drafted two legislation bills; one that covers the financial options for maintenance and the other that covers road traffic and safety. These bills are expected to be presented to stakeholders, which include the physical infrastructure committee, aiming at an onward submission to the parliament by June 30, 2017. Without the establishment of a stable and sustainable road maintenance financing scheme, as well as the certainty of GRSS’s future budgetary capacity to allocate funds for road maintenance, the resources for these kinds of interventions will continue to compete with other government priorities, consequently leaving the previous and recent road investments to deter. The Bank is awaiting for the country conditions to become more stable and safe to seek financing to scale up the results from the SSRRP. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Rating: High 52. The relevance of the PDO is considered high. The PDO has remained aligned with the country’s goal to reconstruct and build the new nation, consistent with the SSDP (2011- 2013). The PDO of this project was and continues to be particularly aligned with the second core block of the SSDP, as well as with the infrastructure and agriculture needs assessment carried out as part of it, which called for urgent actions to address the infrastructure deficit and confirmed the need to focus on improving access to the rural areas and facilitate the growth of the agriculture sector. In addition, the SSRRP continues to be consistent with the 2011 World Development Report9 recommendations to invest in transport infrastructure, access to finance, support for community-based employment and local business development. Finally, the PDO remains relevant to the South Sudan Vision 2040, 9 World Development Report, Conflict, Security and Development, May 26, 2011. 15 "Towards Freedom, Equality, Justice, Peace and Prosperity for All", particularly regarding the pillar of building a prosperous, productive and innovative nation. 53. The Relevance of project design is considered high. Besides being in line with the country’s priorities at the time of appraisal, the project components were directly linked to the PDO and intermediate outcome indicators. The financing instrument was an emergency grant from the SSTTF, which was created to provide bridge financing in the period between the GRSS’s independence until such time when the country became a member of the Bank, which is found appropriate given the emergency nature of this project. Project design reflected proper diagnosis of a development priorities that remain relevant. The SSRRP was designed as an integral part of agricultural development initiatives in South Sudan, hence the main interventions under this project targeted high agriculture potential areas. The implementation arrangements were adopted using the same institutional setup up as in preceding transport projects, which proved to be effective, highly relevant and ensured the continuity. In addition, the Bank took into account the unstable circumstances of the country and the low capacity of the Implementing Agency and ensured to include the constant provision of TA throughout project implementation. This action was highly relevant as it enabled project implementation. 54. The project design included relevant global crosscutting priorities such as road safety, by incorporating the preparation of a road safety program, and combating HIV/AIDS through the incorporating the requirement to provide HIV/AIDS services and carry out awareness campaigns throughout the execution of road works. Road safety management is relevant to the UN Decade of Action for Road Safety Improvement. Combating HIV/AIDS through creating awareness and public campaigns are also indeed relevant to the Millennium Development Goals (MDG). 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives Rating: High 55. The project’s development objective has been substantially achieved, despite the implementation challenges that arouse due to the armed political crisis from December 2013. Overall, the project benefited more than 91,000 rural people of which 48 percent are female (direct beneficiaries) living within the area of influence of the road corridors, providing access for local populations to markets and services and bettering transit conditions as well as the reliability of the maintained road network. Over 43,000 people, which represent about 11 percent of the rural population in the project area of influence, have access to an all season road. The improvement of the road sections has generated travel time savings, as the average travel time upon completion about one minute per kilometer compared to the three minutes per kilometer at the beginning of the interventions. The project also generated savings to agricultural producers stemming from the connection provided to 39 agricultural production centers to all season roads. 16 56. Furthermore, 175km of roads were rehabilitated, being completed to gravel wearing course, and maintenance was provided to 290km of roads (mechanical and labor based maintenance contracts combined), achieving the established target. The rehabilitation and maintenance contracts provided employment opportunities to about 205 and 396 people respectively. By MTR, a growing shared vision and positive attitude had arisen among the benefitted population because of the road works carried out in the states and counties. According to interviews with communities living alongside the Yei – Lasu and Magwi – Lobone road sections, people observed greater demand for agricultural products since the road works started, resulting in increased prices in their local markets. In addition, an increase in vehicles using the roads for trade at the local markets was observed, especially on the Yei-Lasu road section. 57. Enhancing the capacity of participating states and relevant national government institutions to manage rural transport infrastructure was established as a means to achieve the PDO. The SSRRP significantly contributed to the otherwise low institutional capacity building of the MRB and State Ministries of Physical Infrastructure (SMoPI). The MRB and PMT continued to amass experience in the procurement, contract management, FM, as well as environmental and social management of road rehabilitation and maintenance contracts. The project financed the provision of training on M&E, FM, project management and multi-criteria decision planning and analysis tools to a total of 110 technical staff from the MRB and SMoPI. A detailed implementation overview of the activities under the three project components is presented in Annex 2. 3.3 Efficiency Rating: Modest 58. Major benefits of the population stemmed from the road upgrading and rehabilitation as well as maintenance and spot improvement components (components 1 and 2). At appraisal, the economic viability of the project roads was determined using a hybrid of conventional cost benefit analysis, multi-criteria analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. The cost benefit analysis and multi- criteria analysis were carried out on a list of priority roads using Road Economic Decision (RED) model. The economic evaluation was made by comparing the "with" and "without" project cases for two sets of alternatives each, for rural road rehabilitation and upgrading (Construction) and two traffic growth scenarios, using average annual growth rates of three and five percent respectively. 59. The costs were discounted at a 12 percent rate, the net present value (NPV) ranged from US$17,639 to US$121,400 for rehabilitation, upgrading interventions, while the NPV at the same discount rate, reflected a lowest of US$10,430 to a highest of US$7.7 million for spot improvement and maintenance. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) ranged 17 between 19 percent and 87 percent for rehabilitation and upgrading works and between 37 percent and 78 percent for spot improvement and maintenance works. 60. Despite successful achievement of the PDO, the project was not free from shortcomings. The project experienced cost overruns as works contracts were awarded up to 43 percent above the initial cost estimates, mainly because the works were designed in 2011 and procured in 2013, the condition of the roads had deteriorated and some of them did not have the length stated in the project documents. The limited amount of local construction companies also contributed to the increased works costs. Therefore, construction costs were found to be higher than initially anticipated and contractors charged more to cover both personnel and equipment insurance. Details of the works contracts are provided in Annex 3 (Economic and Financial Analysis). 61. The ex-post economic evaluation followed the same approach as the ex-ante economic analysis, using the RED model, a 12 percent discount rate and a 20-year evaluation period. The net present value (NPV) ranged from US$4.14 million to US$8.11 million for rehabilitation, upgrading interventions, while the NPV at the same discount rate, reflected a lowest of US$0.38 million to a highest of US$20.89 million for spot improvement and maintenance. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) ranged between 17 percent and 30 percent for rehabilitation and upgrading works and between 15 percent and 60 percent for spot improvement and maintenance works. Despite the significant increase in costs of the interventions, the results demonstrated that the project remains economically feasible. 62. It is worthy of noting that, neither the ex-ante nor ex-post economic evaluation take into consideration the savings from the reduction in road traffic fatalities and benefits to the pedestrians and non-motorized traffic which could be more significant and demonstrate the greater efficiency of the project. 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 63. The relevance of the project objectives is rated high, the achievement of the PDO high and the efficiency modest, the overall outcome rating is Moderately Satisfactory. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 64. Poverty Impacts. The implementation of the project greatly supported poverty reduction by providing reliable all season road connectivity to agricultural services and markets, as well as creating job opportunities. Road connectivity significantly enhanced the local economy as it reduced transportation time and cost, enabled an increase in the 18 demand for agricultural commodities and trade activities, which resulted in the emergence and development of small local markets and the establishment of businesses. Farmers were able to sell their produce to businessmen which raised their income levels. Similarly, employment-intensive construction and maintenance offered the opportunity for the absorption of low and semiskilled individuals, bringing normally employment- marginalized groups, both male and female, into the employment fold. Particularly, the labor intensive maintenance and spot improvement works used local community labor, and was very successful in generating short-term employment, boosting technical and entrepreneurial skills, and engendering a sense of community ownership of the roads. 65. Prior to the eruption of the last crisis in July 2016, a reduction in transport costs had been reported in various areas intervened by the Project, particularly in the Yei-New Lasu road section. For instance, transport costs from Yei to Mitika market was 40 SSP before road works begun and later reduced to 25 SSP (about 37.5% reduction). An increase in the production and prices of agricultural products had also been reported. the Yei-New Lasu road section is strategic for the enhancement of agricultural activity, as it goes through and connects some of the most productive areas of the country with the Democratic Republic of Congo. The price of a bucket of maize before road construction was 8 SSP and was reported at 15 SSP before the crisis erupted. Chicken was 15 SSP compared to 40 SSP in Mitika Market. Even though there is no data available on the impact of these production and price increases in poverty, these typically correlate with the improvement of the livelihood of beneficiary communities. 66. Thanks to the provision of access to agricultural services at the agricultural cooperative centers as well as to warehouses for storage, farmers throughout Project beneficiary communities received training and guidance on preparing land for cultivation, farming techniques and preserving their harvest in the store. Farmers had expanded their cultivations and increased produce volumes 10 , given that they can easily obtain trader commodities and safely store their produce to sell and/or consume at the right time. 67. Gender Aspects. Employment opportunities were provided to women in labor- based road maintenance contracts. They carried out activities such as clearing and grubbing, as well as the removal of roots from the graded sub-base. Women were also hired as cooks and cleaners for the contractors’ camps. On average each contract length of 25 km employed about 60 unskilled labor, of which about 40% were women. The project directly benefited more than 91,000 people of which 48 percent are female living within the area of influence of the road corridors. In regard to institutional strengthening, 15 out of the total 110 MRB and SMoPI staff who received training, were female. Pregnant women have particularly benefitted from the implementation of this project, as they now count with a much faster and reliable access to hospitals, to give birth as well as to receive 10 According to interviews conducted by the MRB with beneficiary population towards project completion. 19 better pre and post-partum treatment. Prior to the project, pregnant women often died on their way to the hospital. 68. Social Development. The SSRRP provided improved access to health centers, schools, markets, and enabled the development of business activities along the corridors. The project also enabled the Government better reach people to deliver services such as medical supply. Road workers and road side communities also benefited from anti Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immune-deficiency Syndrome (HIV/AIDS) services and awareness campaigns carried out since the contracts were awarded. Training was provided to assigned peer trainers (selected from the communities and the contractors). Such peer trainers would quarterly visit the communities to provide them with HIV/AIDS awareness and training. 69. Grievance Redress Mechanism (GRM). The project developed a GRM to manage community expectations and anxiety. Community Grievance Committees (CGCs) were established consisting of nine (9) members. These CGCs were trained in elementary conflict management skills under the project to help handle community problems arising from the road works. CGCs were industrious in supporting the contractor in the identification of borrow pits, provision of land for works camps and general custody of the site equipment. The GRM monitoring tool created by the PMT was utilized throughout project implementation, to record the complaints as well as the actions and timeline taken to resolve them. The issues recorded were resolved within a weeks’ time. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 70. The project has significantly contributed to the institutional strengthening of the transport sector in GRSS. 110 technical staff from the MRB and SMoPI were trained and acquired experience in various areas including procurement, contract management, FM, as well as environmental and social management, project management and multi-criteria decision planning and analysis tools. TA services were also provided to the MRB in the areas of procurement, FM, M&E, Environmental and Social Safeguards. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not applicable. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Rating: High 71. The risk to development outcome is rated high. The project was implemented in a fragile newly independent country within a post conflict environment. Despite the experience that MRB/PMT had acquired through the implementation of two previous transport projects, it continued to have capacity constraints at project preparation. These 20 constraints were tackled during implementation by providing training as well as TA to support the implementing agency through the hiring of safeguards, financial management, procurement, and M&E specialists, which undoubtedly contributed to the successful achievement of the PDO. Notwithstanding the government’s full commitment to the project during its life cycle, sustainability remains a challenge. The crises that erupted in 2013 and in 2016 caused severe fiscal constraints and an unstable political environment, hence the uncertainty of GRSS’s future budgetary capacity to allocate funds for road maintenance or the continuity of institutional strengthening activities. 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Satisfactory 72. The project design was highly relevant to the development priorities of South Sudan. The SSRP was jointly designed by GRSS and development partners to develop the feeder roads network to enable the new nation to continue its rebuilding process. The project benefited from experience and lessons learned from previous transport projects. Given that providing access to the rural areas of South Sudan was among the top priorities of the GRSS, the rehabilitation and maintenance of roads in high agriculture production areas was key at the time of project preparation. The project was also designed based on the government’s recovery and reconstruction strategies proposed by the SSDP, the donor strategy to develop the feeder roads network of the country, and the South Sudan Vision 2040. In this respect, there was a strong Bank effort to coordinate its interventions in the transport sector with ongoing efforts from other international financial organizations, particularly the USAID, Netherlands, UNOPS, the EU and DfID, in order to improve the conditions of important key road sections located in high agriculture productive zones. 73. The project design adequately provided arrangements for ensuring fiduciary compliance of the project during implementation. A fiduciary framework was put in place under the SSTTP similar to the one established under the previous MDTF-SS for all its projects. This ensured that the project financial and procurement systems continued to be adequate to manage the project funds and meeting Bank guidelines. Furthermore, the project also provided for monitoring and evaluation arrangements to ensure focus on outputs and results. The Bank carried out an efficient risk assessment and identified adequate mitigations measures at entry. This included institutional strengthening for the Borrower Government Agencies as well as the provision of continuous capacity building and TA support to the implementing agency, which was a continuation of the program carried out under the previous road improvement projects. Due to the Country’s positive and forward-looking scenario at project preparation, including the strength of the SSP at 21 the time, the design didn’t identify mitigation measures in case of a future crisis, taking into consideration the post-conflict environment situation. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Satisfactory 74. The Bank provided constant hands-on support to the PMT to ensure adequate project implementation. As designed at project preparation the support was provided through the carrying out of training, workshops and technical assistance by hiring safeguards, financial management, procurement, and M&E specialists. The Bank task team provided significant support to the project in the execution all the components including cross cutting issues such as HIV/AIDS awareness and implementation of Road Safety measures. The Bank team carried out at least two implementation support missions per year, in which it directly met with the PMT staff members and other government institutions’ staff, providing technical advice and sharing knowledge. When needed, the Bank deployed specialists, particularly in the procurement, environmental, and social areas. Aide-memoires were prepared for each of these missions which provided highlights on key issues and follow-up actions to both the client and the Bank’s management. In times of eminent crisis, the Bank team would carry out reverse implementation support missions in Nairobi where the South Sudan Country Office was relocated. 75. The Bank task team assessed project implementation and the achievement of the key targets through a MTR in November 2014. Encouraged by the results of this assessment, the Bank task team was proactive in undertaking a project restructuring and AF to respond to the impacts of the first crisis of 2013. Unfortunately, the Bank could not move forward with the latter due to the unavailability of IDA funds and the subsequent worsening of the country’s situation. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Satisfactory 76. Given the quality services and support provided by the Bank task team at both entry and supervision of the project, the overall performance rating for the Bank is assessed as ‘Satisfactory’. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Satisfactory 77. The government was committed to implementing strategies with the aim to build the new nation recovering from years of protracted civil war. The SSDP was at final draft 22 stage at project preparation and sought to eliminate food insecurity, sporadic insecurity threats and improve rural livelihood through, among others, providing access to the rural areas of South Sudan. For these purposes, the GRSS reached out various traditional and non-traditional donors within and outside of South Sudan around the Globe. The GRSS was fully devoted to the project and actively participated in its preparation in a participatory and consultative manner with active involvement of the country’s Feeder Roads Committee (FRC), co-chaired by the MAF and the MRB, which is mandated to coordinate feeder roads development. 78. The Aid Coordination Unit (ACU) within the MoFEP did its best efforts to keep the project up float, even when the crisis was at its worst, as it efficiently moved forward all the formal requests from the PMT to the Bank, such as the request for Additional Financing and project closing extension. (b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Satisfactory 79. Despite the limited capacity in terms of managerial and technical skills, MRB was committed to the implementation of project activities. The first year of Project implementation was slow due to a delay in contracting specialists to support the PMT and contracting works, which resulted in low disbursements. Fortunately, these delays were quickly resolved and overall implementation progress improved. 80. Despite the challenges of a young project implementation agency, the lack of access, insecurity and fragile economy and, the works contracts and institutional strengthening activities were implemented with satisfactory results and Project Development Objectives were met. However, PMT showed throughout project implementation that it needed to strengthen its management role and coordination of activities at both state and county levels. The PMT successfully overcame these challenges thanks to the continuous provision of capacity building and support of specialists financed by the project. Moreover, both the MRB and PMT actively guided and supported the works contractors and supervision consultants to ensure that project momentum was kept in spite of the armed crises that arose, ensuring the safety of all the parties involved. Significant implementation efforts were undertaken by all involved to get the project deliver most of its objectives. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Satisfactory 81. The overall performance of the Borrower is rated as ‘Satisfactory’ based on the successful implementation of the project. 23 6. Lessons Learned 82. Denominating works contracts in USD or in an equivalent stable currency, as well as including price variation clauses in the contracts, may mitigate risks associated with the devaluation of local currency in fragile environments. Inflation and depreciation in the value of local currency may cause significant fluctuations in the prices of goods and services needed as input to execute the works. The performance of works could be negatively impacted if no contractual provision is made for price escalations resulting from such fluctuations, potentially causing delays and claims. This was the case in the implementation of the SSRRP, as described in paragraph 37. Anticipating rapid price fluctuations and foreseeing appropriate responses to the potential occurrence of a currency crisis is key to prevent the disruption of the execution of works as well as to minimize the Client’s exposure to a funding shortfall. 83. Different and innovative options should be sought to ensure the continuous monitoring of the execution of works in the face of insecurity. In a fragile and conflict environment, project sites may often become inaccessible, impeding independent or direct supervision of works, including the verification of expected outputs for payment. The delay in such payments may result in contractual claims. As a mitigation measure, the team could consider involving a third party monitoring agent or United Nations Agencies to supervise the implementation of project activities in insecure locations. Furthermore, the team should study the possibility of using high resolution satellite data to remotely monitor works progress. 84. The use of third party audits is very useful to assess project performance and provide areas of improvement in the implementation of transport projects, particularly in a fragile and conflict environment. The SSRRP financed the carrying out of technical, financial as well as social and environmental audits, which were conducted towards project completion. These audits provided independent and objective assessments to confirm compliance with Bank guidelines, evaluate project performance, raise issues that needed to be addressed by the implementing agency to ensure successful project completion as well as recommendations on how to address them. Findings from the audits provided important key recommendations for future transport projects, especially regarding institutional support to MRB, improvements for works contracts and consultancy supervision firms. Particular areas highlighted for continuous support include FM, procurement and contract management as well as environmental and social management, to improve the capacity and operational efficiency in project implementation. Capacity- building and institution-strengthening activities addressing these areas should form an important component in future projects. 85. The hiring of local contractors ensured the completion of works in the midst of the crises. The Bank, through the implementation of the previous SSRMP, provided support to train and enhance the capacity of local contractors to carry out maintenance works. The labor based maintenance contracts under the SSRRP were executed by local contractors who had participated in trainings supported by the previous project. Overall, such contractors showed to perform well and counted with good guidance from the PMT 24 as well as supervisors. When both crises erupted, the local contractors consistently remained on site, as they lived in the area and felt ownership of the roads that would benefit their communities. It is key to continue building local capacity, targeting small contractors and observing how they grow. Similarly, feeder roads projects implemented in fragile and conflict environments should evaluate the possibility of slicing the procurement of goods, to ensure that these are supplied locally despite the emergence of a crisis. 86. The inclusion of community-led development activities has proven to ensure the population’s acceptance and engagement to the project as well as to boost the impact in poverty. The SSRRP included a provision for community-led development activities in each works contract, such as construction of markets, storage facilities and schools. This measure enhanced the project’s impact on poverty, as it enabled sharing the benefits more effectively with the poorer population along the corridors, which made the project more acceptable. The community was empowered by participating in decision making activities as well as by receiving training and guidance on efficient agriculture techniques and business development, resulting in an overall increase in agricultural production volumes and improvement of livelihoods. Investments in such ancillary activities should form an integral part of the design of projects in order to enhance the development impact on local population. 87. The provision of institutional strengthening support to government institutions should be carried out in a manner that ensures sustainable skill and knowledge transfer. The Bank, throughout its continuous engagement with South Sudan, has provided hands- on support to beneficiary institutions, particularly to the PMT, through TA by hiring expert consultants specialized in different areas required for successful project implementation (FM, Procurement, M&E, Safeguards). This support has included the carrying out of training and workshops aiming at achieving skills and knowledge transfer to government employees over time. However, the knowledge transfer arrangements have not been sufficiently effective, resulting in over-reliance on consultants. It is also worthy of noting that the Government has not had the capacity to absorb the consultants after the Project closing, which has impeded retaining technical assets that could continue providing institutional support as well as knowledge transfer. To address this issue, the terms of reference for the consultants should be designed in such a way that knowledge transfer milestones are deliverables linked to payment. For instance, one of the deliverables could be that by the end of the first quarter, the government employee attached to the FM consultant should be able to independently prepare and submit quarterly IFRs. Other regular training and capacity support programs for Government employees should also be explored. 88. GRM establishment in development projects. The development of a GRM in the SSRRP proved very vital as it did not only facilitate conflict resolution/management, but also enabled communities living along the roads to take ownership of the project. It served as a means to engage with citizens and facilitated the identification of sites for materials and work camps for the contractors, as well as hiring of workers from communities along the roads. A similar approach is highly recommended under the South Sudan Eastern Africa Regional Transport Trade and Development Facilitation Project (SS-EARTTDFP) 25 for upgrading of the Juba-Nadapal road to paved standards under financing from the World Bank, China EXIM Bank and the African Development Bank. 89. Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU). The MDTF-SS had established a centralized PFMU with the responsibility to ensure a reliable and robust accounting system. However, it was disbanded following the closure of the MDTF-SS. Although the Bank had initiated the concept of a mini-PFMU for the three SSTTF projects (other two being Health and Private Sector Development), its establishment did not move forward. This resulted in the hiring of individual financial management specialists by each project, which costed more. Given the capacity constraints in the country, a centralized PFMU should be established for all projects under Bank financing, given the positive experience under the MDTF-SS. 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies: None (b) Cofinanciers: None (c) Other partners and stakeholders: None 26 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Actual/Latest Appraisal Percentage Estimate Components Estimate (USD of (USD Millions) Appraisal millions) Component 1 - Upgrading and 22.50 22.58 100.36 Rehabilitation of Selected Rural Roads Component 2 - Maintenance and Spot 12.00 11.89 99.08 Improvement of Selected Rural Roads Component 3 - Institutional Development for Rural Infrastructure 3.50 3.09 88.29 Management Total Baseline Cost 38.00 37.56 Contingencies 0.00 0.00 Total Project costs 38.00 37.56 98.84 Financing Actual/Latest Appraisal Percentage Type of Estimate Source of Funds Estimate (USD of Cofinancing (USD millions) Appraisal millions) Counterpart-GRSS 0.00 0.00 0.00 South Sudan Transition Trust Grant 38.00 37.56 98.84 Fund (SSTTF) Total 38.00 37.56 98.84 27 Annex 2. Outputs by Component Table 2.1 Outputs by Component Component 1 - Upgrading and Rehabilitation of Selected Rural Roads: This component financed the upgrading and/or rehabilitation of selected rural roads opening up high agricultural potential areas. Activities Outputs Achieved Remarks Activities included: Outputs achieved: The target was increased from 150 Km to 175 Km at Project (i) rehabilitation of about 175Km of rural roads Restructuring because the actual 150 km of roads targeting opening up high road lengths were verified and areas identified by the agriculture potential updated during project agriculture sector for areas were upgraded implementation. having high productivity and/or rehabilitated. for production of cereals, The appropriate safeguards much needed to ensure Supervision services instruments were prepared. food security; were contracted and successfully carried At restructuring, the upgrading (ii) out. and rehabilitation of the Tali- rehabilitation/upgrading of Yirol road (55Km) was dropped selected rural roads; 205 jobs were as a result of the funding generated under shortfall. Nevertheless, the (iii) provision of rehabilitation project was able to rehabilitate supervision services; contracts. more roads than the initially anticipated as the lengths of the (iv) updating the draft remaining two road sections Environment and Social under rehabilitation contracts Screening and Assessment [Magwi-Labone (89km) and Framework (ESSAF) for Amadi-Tali (86km)] were the transport sector; and verified prior to the interventions, and totaled (v) preparing Environment 175km and Social Impact Assessments/ Management Plans (ESIAs/ESMPs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and Indigenous Peoples Plans (IPPs) as required for roads to be rehabilitated and maintained under the project. Component 2 - Maintenance and Spot Improvement of Selected Rural Roads: This component financed the maintenance and spot improvement of about 300 km of rural roads deteriorated due to lack of maintenance during the civil war period. 28 This component was Outputs achieved: At appraisal, the total road intended to be executed by length to be maintained was both mechanized and labor 290Km of rural roads estimated at 300 Km. During based contractors and was received maintenance project implementation, the road split into four sub and spot improvements lengths were confirmed for each components: (100Km under section and totaled 290Km. The mechanized target value was updated at (i) mechanized maintenance contracts Project Restructuring. maintenance and spot and 190Km under improvement of about 180 labor-based At restructuring, the kilometers of select rural maintenance maintenance and spot roads; contracts). improvement of the Rasolo- Maridi (71km) road section was (ii) supervision of Spot improvement and dropped and replaced due to the maintenance and spot maintenance contracts heavy deterioration and thick improvement works for generated a total of 402 forest cover, thus the budget mechanized maintenance employment originally assigned for contracts; opportunities (290 maintenance contracts was not under labor-based adequate. This section was (iii) labor intensive maintenance contracts replaced by the Magwi-Aru maintenance and spot and 112 under (55km) road section. improvement of about 120 mechanized kilometers of select rural maintenance contracts) roads; and The supervision of the (iv) supervision of mechanized road maintenance and spot maintenance works improvement works for was included through labor based maintenance an amendment in the contracts. Supervision contract for the rehabilitation works. Supervision services were provided to labor based works (about 2-3 supervisors for each contract). Component 3 - Institutional Development for Rural Infrastructure Management: This component supported institutional development initiatives at pilot states and national levels to enhance the capacity for rural infrastructure management. This component consisted Outputs achieved: At appraisal, the aim was to of three sub-components: prepare Business Plans for each A total of 51 staff pilot state. During project Sub-Component One: officials from the States implementation, the preparation strengthening of the have been trained in of these business plans was 29 capacity of Pilot States, in procurement, contract delayed due to lack of capacity particular their ministries management and at the state level. Therefore, the responsible for physical financial management client and Bank team agreed on infrastructure, to manage matters. the preparation of one Business rural infrastructure - Plan applicable for every state. encapsulating: One Business Plan was The target was updated at prepared applicable for project restructuring. (i) handling procurement, every state, thanks to a contract management and TA carried out by The Studies to support the financial management UNOPS. Establishment of a Road matters, and Maintenance Fund and a Road A total of 59 staff from Safety Program were bundled in (ii) preparation of business MRB were trained in the TA carried out by UNOPS plans - through provision areas such as: Project and were finalized in June 2016. of goods, technical Management, Multi- assistance, services and Criteria Decision The TA to support the Workshops and Training Analysis, Senior Roads establishment of a Planning required for the purpose. Executive Program, Department for MRB was Procurement, M&E, dropped at Project Restructuring Sub Component Two: etc. due to funding shortfall. The (i) TA to support intention was to retake this establishment of a The Road Sector initiative after obtaining the AF Planning Department for Development Program that was also dropped. MRB; was prepared through TA provided by The procurement of desktops (ii) TA to support the UNOPS and financed and installation of NAVISION preparation of Roads by the Project. This Accounting System was Sector Development activity was completed dropped during restructuring. Program; in June 2016 and submitted by the MRB (iii) support to to the Cabinet for establishment of a Road onward submission to Maintenance Fund; and the Parliament in November 2016. As of (iv) road safety programs April 2017 approval and strategic studies from the Cabinet was emerging during still pending. implementation; The project provided Sub- Component Three: constant hands-on carrying out of project support to the PMT to coordination and ensure adequate project management through implementation. As provision of goods, designed at project technical assistance, preparation the support services, Workshops and was provided through 30 Training and Operating the carrying out of Costs required for the trainings (procurement, purpose, including: M&E, contract management), (i) training to the Project workshops and Management Team (PMT), technical assistance by states and Ministry of hiring safeguards, Environment staff; financial management, procurement, and M&E (ii) technical assistants specialists. (TAs) to the PMT; Technical, social and (iii) provision of technical, financial audit was social and financial audit carried out and firm (Audit Agent -AA); financed by the project. (iv) procurement of The training of staff in desktops and installation of the ministry was NAVISION Accounting completed. System including training of staff in the ministry; and (v) operational costs for the PMT. Table 2.2 Monitoring Tools developed and utilized by the PMT M&E tool Description Key Milestone Tracking Matrix This tool enabled looking at the whole project and dissecting the main activities, targets, as established in the Results Framework, and timelines. Contract and Financial Monitoring Tool This tool enabled the tracking of contract status, disbursements, pending payments and balances. Procurement Tracking Tool Linked to the procurement plan, this tool showed the status of the procurement processes. It was used to feed the contract and financial monitoring tool. Borrow Pits Management This tool allowed to ensure that the lands were turned back to a reusable state once the works were completed (Contractors’ responsibility). In cases in which the communities requested that the borrow pit is not reinstated for them to use it as a water collection point, the chief of the 31 community was required to sign the form included in the tool to allow this. Waste Management tool Enabled the monitoring of the constructors’ site camps and their management of construction waste. Road safety and accident tool It monitored the compliance with road safety measures included in the works contracts, as well as site safety. It compiled accident data, including road accidents and site accidents due to works (employees). It also helped keep track of actions taken to resolve Grievance Redress Mechanism monitoring There were grievance redress committees tool (communities chief and leaders). The members of the committees were trained on dispute resolution and handling complaints. This tool was used to record the complaints and actions taken to resolve them. The issues were resolved within a weeks’ time. Health Management tool Contractors had clinics stablished in the sites, which also served people in the communities. The tool helped track illnesses, which either got treated there or referred to the nearby health center (depending on the severity). 32 Table 2.3. Provision of Institutional Strengthening through training Training Participants Project Management (Prince 2 tool) 31 total staff from the MRB (including 6 staff from the PMT). Multi-Criteria Decision Analysis (MCDA 11 staff (including 5 from SSRA and 2 tool) from the PMT). Senior Roads Executive Training Program 4 staff (2 from MRB and 2 from SSRA). (sector planning, execution, M&E) organized by the University of Birmingham. Procurement 61 staff (6 from PMT and 4 from MRB, and 51 from SMoPI). Advanced M&E results. 1 PMT staff trained. Professional Accounting Certification 2 PMT staff trained to obtain a One from ACCA (Association of Chartered training took place at Nkumba University Certified Accountants). and the other at Multitech Business School, both in Uganda. 33 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis (including assumptions in the analysis) At appraisal, the economic analysis for the original project included both works components 1) Road Upgrading and Rehabilitation and 2) Maintenance and Spot Improvement, which accounted for 91% percent of the Project’s investment. For both components, the economic viability of the project roads was determined using a hybrid of conventional cost benefit analysis, multi-criteria analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. The cost benefit analysis and multi- criteria analysis were carried out on a list of priority roads using Road Economic Decision (RED) model. The economic evaluation was made by comparing the "with" and "without" project cases for two sets of alternatives each, for rural road rehabilitation and upgrading (Construction) and two traffic growth scenarios, using average annual growth rates of three and five percent respectively. The costs were discounted at a 12 percent rate, the net present value (NPV) ranged from US$17,639 to US$121,400 for rehabilitation, upgrading interventions, while the NPV at the same discount rate, reflected a lowest of US$10,430 to a highest of US$7.7 million for spot improvement and maintenance. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) ranged between 19 percent and 87 percent for rehabilitation and upgrading works and between 37 percent and 78 percent for spot improvement and maintenance works. Despite successful achievement of the PDO, the project was not free from shortcomings. The project experienced cost overruns as works contracts were awarded up to 43 percent above the initial cost estimates, mainly because the works were designed in 2011 and procured in 2013, the condition of the roads had deteriorated and some of them did not have the length stated in the project documents. The limited amount of local construction companies also contributed to the increased works costs. Therefore, construction costs were found to be higher than initially anticipated and contractors charged more to cover both personnel and equipment insurance. Table 3.1 Road interventions Before and After Actua l Road Proposed intervention Component Lengt Actual intervention Section at Appraisal h (Km) Magwi - Component Labone 1- Rehabilitation/Upgradi (thru' Upgrading Rehabilitation/Upgradi ng Construction: Earth Parajok) 89 and ng Construction road to gravel wearing Road (89 Rehabilitati course Kms) Lot on of 1 34 Selected Amadi - Rehabilitation/Upgradi Rural Roads Tali Road Rehabilitation/Upgradi ng Construction: Earth 86 (86 Km) ng Construction road to gravel wearing Lot 2 course Tali - Yirol Rehabilitation/Upgradi (Awerial) 0 None ng Construction (52 Km) - Lot 3 Yei - New Lasu Spot Spot Road (45 Improvement/Maintena 45 Improvement/Maintena Km) Lot nce (Mechanized): nce (Mechanized) 1- earth road to sub-base Kirinyag ga Ras Olo - Maridi Spot Road 0 Improvement/Maintena None (71.4 nce (Mechanized) Kms) Lot 2 Maridi - Spot Component Kozi Spot Improvement/Maintena 2- Road 40 Improvement/Maintena nce (labor-based): earth Maintenanc (30Kms) nce (Mechanized) road to earth with spot e and Spot Lot 1 graveling Improveme Maridi - Spot nt of Kozi Spot Improvement/Maintena Selected Road 40 Improvement/Maintena nce (labor-based): earth Rural Roads (30Kms) nce (Mechanized) road to earth with spot Lot 2 graveling Spot Morobo - Spot Improvement/Maintena Panyume 25 Improvement/Maintena nce (labor-based): earth (18 Kms) nce (labor-based) road to earth with spot Lot 1 graveling Spot Panyume Spot Improvement/Maintena - Yaribe 25 Improvement/Maintena nce (labor-based): (20Kms) nce (labor-based) earth road to earth with Lot 2 spot graveling Spot Spot Yaribe - 30 Improvement/Maintena Improvement/Maintena Gimunu nce (labor-based) nce (labor-based): 35 (30Kms) earth road to earth with Lot 3 spot graveling Panyume Spot - Kachu- Spot Improvement/Maintena Limbe 30 Improvement/Maintena nce (labor-based): earth (40Kms) nce (labor-based) road to earth with spot Lot 4 graveling Spot Aru Spot Improvement/Maintena Junction - 55 Improvement/Maintena nce (Mechanized): Magwi nce (labor-based) earth road to sub-base Table 3.2 Estimated versus Actual costs of the interventions Estimated Cost at Original Actual Appraisal or Actual Costs Component Road Section Length Length prior to the (US$M) (Km) (Km) intervention (US$M) Magwi - Labone (thru' Parajok) Road 70.3 89 8.00 13.96 Component 1 (89 Kms) Lot - Upgrading 1 and Amadi - Tali Rehabilitation Road (86 Km) 50 86 5.75 6.19 of Selected Lot 2 Rural Roads Tali - Yirol (Awerial) (52 51.6 0 6.00 0 Km) - Lot 3 Yei - New Component 2 Lasu Road (45 - 45 45 4.00 4.13 Km) Lot 1 - Maintenance Kirinyagga and Spot Ras Olo - Improvement Maridi Road of Selected 71.4 0 2.16 0 (71.4 Kms) Rural Roads Lot 2 36 Maridi - Kozi Road (30Kms) 40 0.93 1.52 Lot 1 60 Maridi - Kozi Road (30Kms) 40 0.93 1.66 Lot 2 Morobo - Panyume (18 25 0.48 0.53 Kms) Lot 1 Panyume - Yaribe 25 0.5 0.5 (20Kms) Lot 30 2 Yaribe - Gimunu 30 0.6 0.65 (30Kms) Lot 3 Panyume - Kachu-Limbe 0 30 0.74 0.82 (40Kms) Lot 4 Aru Junction - 0 55 2.04 Magwi Table 3.3 Payment currency arrangements for works contracts Road Section Length Type of Intervention Contract (Km) Payment Currency Magwi - Labone 89 Rehabilitation/Upgrading Construction 60% USD, 40% SSP Amadi -Tali 86 Rehabilitation/Upgrading Construction 100% SSP Yei – New Lasu 45 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance 100% (mechanized) USD Maridi- Kozi (Lot 40 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP 1) based) Maridi- Kozi (Lot 40 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP 2) based) Morobo- Panyume 25 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP based) 37 Panyume - Yaribe 25 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP based) Yaribe - Gimunu 30 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP based) Panyume – Kachu- 30 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP Limbe based) Aru Junction - 55 Spot Improvement/ Maintenance (Labor- 100% SSP Magwi based) Main Assumptions and Methodology The ex-post economic evaluation followed the same approach as the ex-ante economic analysis, assessing road users’ benefits and actual costs of the investments, using the RED model. The costs were discounted at a 12 percent rate, through a 20-year evaluation period. The main benefits stemming from the investments that were quantified for this analysis are the savings for road users on passenger/freight travel time and the reduction of vehicle operating costs. Traffic Volume Due to the fragile situation of the Country near project completion as a result of the armed crisis, no count survey data was collected. Therefore, the analysis followed the same assumptions utilized for the ex-ante evaluation: 5 percent average annual traffic growth for the Upgrading and Rehabilitation interventions and 3 percent average annual traffic growth for the Maintenance and Spot Improvement interventions. Table 3.4 Before and After Average Annual Daily Traffic (AADT) AADT at Appraisal Actual AADT at (2010) or prior to the completion (2016) Component Road Section interventions (2012) (Veh/day) (Veh/day) Non Non Motorized Motorized Motorized Motorized Magwi - Labone Component 1 (thru' Parajok) - Upgrading 373 11 485 16 Road (89 Kms) and Lot 1 Rehabilitation Amadi - Tali of Selected Road (86 Km) 72 10 91 14 Rural Roads Lot 2 Component 2 Yei - New Lasu - Road (45 Km) 3,091 53 3,880 106* Maintenance Lot 1 - and Spot Kirinyagga 38 Improvement Maridi - Kozi of Selected Road (30Kms) 85 4 107 5 Rural Roads Lot 1 Maridi - Kozi Road (30Kms) 85 4 107 5 Lot 2 Morobo - Panyume (18 463 - 2,377 5 Kms) Lot 1 Panyume - Yaribe (20Kms) 600 37 752 45 Lot 2 Yaribe - Gimunu 834 30 1,045 36 (30Kms) Lot 3 Panyume - Kachu-Limbe 600 37 752 45 (40Kms) Lot 4 Aru Junction - 787 10 986 12 Magwi * The Motorized traffic growth for this section was obtained from local authorities through an interview carried out on National TV. Authorities mentioned that the motorized traffic had doubled. Speed utilized as proxy for road roughness The RED model offers the option to enter the speed a reference vehicle to characterize the condition of a given road because the road roughness of unpaved roads is difficult to measure or estimate due to its variability over seasons, path along the route and maintenance activities. The speeds were obtained from the travel time measurements carried out along each road section after the completion of the works. Table 3.5 Before and after Speeds Speed at Actual Appraisal or Speed at Component Road Section Length before Completion (Km) interventions (Km/hr) (Km/hr) Magwi - Labone Component 1 (thru' Parajok) - Upgrading 89 29.67 89.00 Road (89 Kms) and Lot 1 Rehabilitation Amadi - Tali of Selected Road (86 Km) 86 28.67 86.00 Rural Roads Lot 2 39 Yei - New Lasu Road (45 Km) 45 11.25 60.00 Lot 1 - Kirinyagga Maridi - Kozi Road (30Kms) 40 10.00 60.00 Lot 1 Maridi - Kozi Component 2 Road (30Kms) 40 10.00 60.00 - Lot 2 Maintenance Morobo - and Spot Panyume (18 25 25.00 60.00 Improvement Kms) Lot 1 of Selected Panyume - Rural Roads Yaribe (20Kms) 25 30.00 60.00 Lot 2 Yaribe - Gimunu 30 25.00 60.00 (30Kms) Lot 3 Panyume - Kachu-Limbe 30 30.00 60.00 (40Kms) Lot 4 Aru Junction - 55 Magwi 27.50 60.00 Population Served The last census carried out in South Sudan was in 2008. According to the South Sudan Bureau of National Statistics, the population grew by a yearly average of 3.84 percent from 2008 to 2015, and estimated a yearly average growth of 3.77 percent from 2016 to 2020. The analysis followed these trends to determine the actual population growth. Table 3.6 Population Growth Population Actual at Appraisal Actual Component Road Section Length or prior to Population (Km) the interventions Component 1 Magwi - Labone (thru' - Upgrading Parajok) Road (89 89 19,600 23,648 and Kms) Lot 1 Rehabilitation Amadi - Tali Road (86 of Selected 86 6,500 7,843 Km) Lot 2 Rural Roads 40 Yei - New Lasu Road (45 Km) Lot 1 - 45 9,000 10,860 Kirinyagga Maridi - Kozi Road 40 2,100 2,554 (30Kms) Lot 1 Component 2 Maridi - Kozi Road 40 2,100 2,554 - (30Kms) Lot 2 Maintenance Morobo -Panyume (18 25 3,766 11,174 and Spot Kms) Lot 1 Improvement Panyume - Yaribe of Selected 25 2,317 2,796 (20Kms) Lot 2 Rural Roads Yaribe - Gimunu 30 3,178 3,835 (30Kms) Lot 3 Panyume - Kachu- 30 2,317 2,796 Limbe (40Kms) Lot 4 Aru Junction - Magwi 55 4,732.00 2,796 Summary of Ex-Post Economic Evaluation The Net Present Value (NPV) of the works ranged from US$4.14 million to US$8.11 million for rehabilitation, upgrading interventions, while the NPV at the same discount rate, reflected a lowest of US$0.38 million to a highest of US$20.89 million for spot improvement and maintenance. The Economic Rate of Return (ERR) ranged between 17 percent and 30 percent for rehabilitation and upgrading works and between 15 percent and 60 percent for spot improvement and maintenance works. Despite the significant increase in costs of the interventions, the results demonstrated that the project remains economically feasible. It is worthy of noting that, neither the ex-ante nor ex-post economic evaluation take into consideration the savings from the reduction in road traffic fatalities and benefits to the pedestrians and non-motorized traffic which could be more significant and demonstrate the greater efficiency of the project. Table 3.7. Summary table of the Ex-Post Economic and Financial Evaluation AADT Investment NPV EIRR Road Length Speed Component 2016 (US$M) (US$ M) (%) Section (Km) (Km/hr) (Veh/day) Component 1 Magwi - - Upgrading Labone 89 16 89.00 13.96 and (thru' Rehabilitation Parajok) 4.14 17 41 of Selected Road (89 Rural Roads Kms) Lot 1 Amadi - Tali Road 8.11 30 86 14 86.00 6.19 (86 Km) Lot 2 Yei - New Lasu Road (45 Km) 45 106 60.00 4.13 20.89 60 Lot 1 - Kirinyagga Maridi - Kozi Road 40 5 60.00 1.52 (30Kms) Lot 1 0.82 16% Maridi - Kozi Road 40 5 60.00 1.66 (30Kms) Lot 2 Component 2 Morobo - - Panyume 0.48 15% Maintenance 25 5 60.00 0.53 (18 Kms) and Spot Lot 1 Improvement Panyume - of Selected Yaribe 0.68 31% Rural Roads 25 45 60.00 0.5 (20Kms) Lot 2 Yaribe - Gimunu 0.62 24% 30 36 60.00 0.65 (30Kms) Lot 3 Panyume - Kachu- Limbe 30 45 60.00 0.82 0.64 24% (40Kms) Lot 4 Aru Junction - 55 12 2.04 0.38 15% 60.00 Magwi 42 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Tesfamichael Nahusenay TTL at Mitiku Task Team Leader GTI07 Approval TTL at Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Senior Transport Engineer GTI01 closing ICR Team Emmanuel Taban Highway Engineer GTI01 Leader Sr. Financial Management Adenike Oyeyiola Sherifat Specialist Evarist Baimu Sr. Counsel Yasmin Tayyab Sr. Social Development Specialist Sr. Financial Management Rajiv Sondhi Specialist Bedilu Amare Environment Specialist Abel Lufafa Agricultural Officer Berhane Manna Sr. Agricultural Specialist Teferra Mengesha Transport Economist (Consultant) Alfred Alafi Consultant (Baseline Data) Dennis Kenyi Consultant (Baseline Data) Suzan Piwang Program Assistant AFMJB Nina Jones Program Assistant Wycliffe Okoth Program Assistant Supervision/ICR Tesfamichael Nahusenay TTL at GTI07 Mitiku Approval TTL at Muhammad Zulfiqar Ahmed Team Leader GTI01 closing Pascal Tegwa Procurement Specialist GGO01 Stephen Diero Amayo Financial Management Specialist GGO25 Anton Karel George Baare Safeguards Specialist GSU07 ICR Team Emmanuel Taban Highway Engineer GTI01 Leader Grace Tabu Felix Team Member AFMJB John Bryant Collier Safeguards Specialist GEN01 Ocheng Kenneth Kaunda Team Member GGO01 Odek Virginia Maria Henriquez Consultant GTI04 ICR Author Dorothy M. Akikoli Program Assistant AFMJB 43 Joseph Nyabicha Financial Management Specialist GGO Sr. Financial Management Adenike Oyeyiola Sherifat GGO Specialist Suzan Piwang Program Assistant AFMJB (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending Total: 135,350 Supervision/ICR Total: 673,699 44 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results Not applicable 45 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not applicable 46 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR Borrower’s Comments on the Draft ICR for the South Sudan Rural Roads Project (TF-12347) 1.1 Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.2 Context at Appraisal We agreed with the contents as at the appraisal. At the close of the project, access to many key areas of the country had been opened through rehabilitation and maintenance of the classified road network under the SSRRP covering 465km with financing from the SSTTF. Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved) The PDO as at the appraisal which is equally stated in the GA was to (i) improving access to high agricultural potential areas; and (ii) enhancing the capacity of participating states and relevant national government institutions to manage rural transport infrastructure We agreed with the PDO Indicators a specified in the Emergency Project Paper’s Annex 2 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification We are in agreement with this section Main Beneficiaries, Agreed 1.3 Original Components (as approved) Agreed Revised Components Agreed Other significant changes Agreed Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 1.4 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Agreed 47 Implementation Agreed Major Factors that Affected Project Implementation Agreed. However, the implementation was largely delayed as a result of activities such as environmental and social impact assessment that are normally executed before the effectiveness of the project were pushed to commenced after the effectiveness date. This greatly impacted on the commencement of other activities like procurement of civil works and supervision services Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization Agreed Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Environmental and Social Safeguards Agreed Procurement Agreed Financial Management Agreed Post-completion Operation/Next Phase Agreed Assessment of Outcomes 1.5 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Agreed There was clear linkage between the project components and project development objectives, as such; it has improved the performance of the road transport sector in South Sudan, though the project implementation was impacted greatly by the concern raised in Section 2.2 of our comment to this ICR Achievement of Project Development Objectives Agreed Efficiency Agreed 48 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Agreed Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development Agreed Institutional Change/Strengthening Agreed Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (positive or negative) Not Applicable. Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops Not Applicable. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome Agreed Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 1.6 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Agreed with the Rating The project design put in place adequate since it encourages total stakeholders’ participation, thus the element of ownership was maintained. The capacity of MRB built under SETIDP and SSRMP laid a foundation and supported the quality at entry for implementation of the project. Quality of Supervision Agreed with the rating Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Agreed with the rating due to the level of services and support provided by the Bank at both entry and supervision of the project, particularly during the turbulent times in the project implementation when the country was engulfed with insecurity Borrower Performance 49 (a) Government Performance Agreed Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Agreed Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Agreed Lessons Learned Agreed 50 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not applicable 51 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents  Emergency Project Paper, April 2012.   Aide memoires (AMs): October 2012, January/June/November 2013, April/November 2014, June/December 2015, April/October 2016   Implementation and Status Results Reports (ISRs): November 2012, May 2013, December 2013, June 2014, December 2014, June 2015, December 2015, June 2016, November 2016.   Mid Term Review: November 2014.   Restructuring paper, May 2016.   South Sudan Transition Trust Fund Grant Agreement, May 2012.   Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of Sudan, March 2008.   Interim Strategy Note for the Republic of South Sudan, January 2013.   ICR for the Southern Sudan Roads Maintenance Project, February 2013.   ICR for the Southern Sudan Emergency Transport and Infrastructure Development Project, June 2013   Technical Audit Report, October 2016.   Environmental and Social Audit Report, March 2017.   Concept Note for Additional Financing, October 2014.   South Sudan Development Plan (2011-2013)    52 MAP 53 54