Document of The World Bank 1 2 V FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No. P-3731-TA REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT OF SDR 9.9 MILLION TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR A FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT AUGUST 16, 1984 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit = Tanzania shilling (TSh) TSh 1.00 = US$ 0.082 US$ 1.00 TSh 17.00 1 US$ 1.00 = SDR .986845 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BFU Budget and Finance Unit, Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development FAO - Food and Agriculture Organization GDP - Gross Domestic Product GNP Gross National Product ICB - International Competitive Bidding LCB - Local Competitive Bidding MDB - Marketing Development Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development MOA - Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development NMC - National Milling Corporation PPMB - Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau, Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development FISCAL YEAR Government - July 1 to June 30 1/ As the Tanzania shilling is officially valued in relation to a basket of the currencies of Tanzania's trading partners, the US dollar/ Tanzania shilling exchange rate is subject to change. A rate of US$ 1.00 = TSh 12.20, which was the level set in June 1983, was used for appraisal of this project. Although the exchange rate was adjusted in June 1984 to US$1.00-TSh 17.00, there essentially is no impact on the project cost because most expenditures will be in foreign exchange. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Credit and Project Summary Borrower: United Republic of Tanzania Amount: SDR 9.9 million (US$ 10.0 million equivalent) Terms: Standard Project Objectives and Description: The Project would finance technical assistance requirements in the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB), the Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau (PPMB) and the Research Department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development. It also would finance special studies on the effectiveness of technical assistance to agriculture and on the use of skilled Tanzanian manpower and on the design of a strategy for training and infrastructure development for the Sokoine University of Agriculture. The technical assistance would assist the Government in its program to review and revise policies and institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector by providing the capacity to analyze policy alternatives and to monitor and supervise parastatal performance. It also would begin to coordinate the fragmented agricultural research system. Risks: There is a risk of delayed implementation due to late recruitment of technical assistance personnel. However, this risk would be reduced by prior agree- ment on terms of reference and the use of the Food and Agriculture Association to continue implementing the MDB and PPMB components. Estimated Project Costs: Local Foreign Total 1/ ----------USATmilion…--- MDB 0.44 3.13 3.57 PPMB 0.82 4.51 5.33 Research 0.40 1.43 1.83 Base Cost 1.66 9.J7 Contingencies: Price 0.22 0.94 1.16 Physical 0.03 0.02 0.05 Total Financing Required 1.91 10.03 11.94 1/ Net of taxeq and duties. This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. - ii - Financing Plan: % of Total Local Foreign Total Financing ----US$ million----------------- II)A Credit - 10.00 10.00 84 Goverr,ment of Tanzania 1.91 0.03 1.94 16 Total 1.91 10.03 11.94 100 Estimated I)isbursements: IDA Fiscal Year 1985 1986 1987 1988 ---------------US$ millioin---------------- AInnual 1.9 4.0 3.3 0.8 Cumulative 1.9 5.9 9.2 10.0 Economic Rate of Return: Not applicable St;aff Appraisal Report; No separate staff Appraisal Report has been prepared for this project. Map: I:BRD 2802R3 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE PRESIDENT TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS ON A PROPOSED CREDIT TO THE UNITED REPUBLIC OF TANZANIA FOR A FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT 1. I submit the following report and recommendation on a proposed credit to the United Republic of Tanzania of SDR 9.9 million (US$10.0 million equivalent) on standard IDA terms to help finance a Fourth Technical Assistance Project. PART I - THE ECONOMY 2. An economic memorandum on Tanzania (Report No. 5019-TA), based on the work of an economic mission which visited the country in September/ October 1983, was issued in August 1984. A summary of social and ecohomic data is in Annex I. Background 3. At Independence in 1961, Tanzania was one of the poorest countries in the world. Almost solely dependent on subsistence agriculture and a few estate crops, the country had a very modest industrial base, which accounted for less than 5% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), and a very small number of educated and trained personnel. For the first six years after Independence, the Government's development objectives resembled those of many other less developed countries, stressing growth in per capita income and national self-sufficiency in skilled manpower, based on market forces and capital intensive agricultural projects. This approach had a number of drawbacks, such as high investment costs in the agricultural sector. It led, in the Government's view, to unacceptable economic and social conditions, such as widening income differentials and unequal opportunities for advancement in the rural areas. In response to this situation, the national development strategy was reassessed in 1967. The new priorities, enunciated in the Arusha Declaration and related policy statements, were directed toward establishing a socialist society, with emphasis on broad-based rural development, self-reliance in development efforts, and mass education. To accomplish these ends, the State, with guidance from the Party, was expected to play the leading role, especially in the reform and creation of appropriate institutions. This led in the late 1960s to the nationalization of large-scale industry, commerce and finance, the creation of numerous parastatal bodies, the formation of ujamaa (cooperative) villages, the decentralization of government (1972), and the mass campaign of villagization (1974-76). 4. Despite some disruption arising from these major institutional chaniges during the period, Tanzania managed to show improvements both in sDcial welfare and ini macroeconomic performance. Since independence, primary school enrollmnent inicreased by more thani 50%, life expectancy rose by almost 5 years, and access to safe water increased in both the rural and u:ban areas. GDP grew by 4.4% per annum from 1966 to 1973, investment averaged 24% of GDP from 1970 to 1973, and domestic resource mobilization improved with recurrent revenues risirng as a proportion of GDP from 15% in 1967/68 to 19% in the mid-1970s. However, the productive sectors grew slowly and the rate of return on inew i nvestments (which were concentrated on the industry and transport sectors) was poor. Perhaps the principal disappointment was in agriculture, the dominant sector of the economy, which grew by only 2.3% per annum from 1966 to 1973. Growth was also uneven among regions and precluded any narrowing of rural-urban income differentials. Tanzania made rapid progress toward the Africanization of key posts in the ecoinomy, but large gaps in manpower requirements remained. Deperndence on foreign aid to finance both domestic investment and the widening balance of payments gap also increased. By 1973, the issues that were to be so important for Tanzaniia throughout the later 1970s and early 1980s were becoming clear. How quickly could a country with limmited trained personInel develop a strong and efficient centrally acdm.nistered econlomy? How lonig could the country afford the costs, in terms of efficiency and incentives, often resulting from the Government's emphasis on equity? What could be dorne to improve the growth rate of the monetized, productive sectors? 5. The oil price increases and world recession of 1973-74 coincided with two years of below average rainfall in Tanzania, which had a detrimental effect on agricultural production. Agricultural productioil also was affected by disruptive changes in the rural areas at this time (cecentralization and villagizationl), aind foodgrain productionl was reduced. The Governmeint was forced into the world market, making large purchases of foodgrains for cash. Export crop production also fell during this period and the barter terms of trade dropped by about one-third during th.ese two years. As a result, the current account deficit rose from US$118 million in 1973 to around US$340 million in both 1974 and 1975. Domestic- ally, the recurrent budget fell into deficit and Government bank borrowing rose from TSh 416 million in 1973/74 to TSh 1,061 million in 1975/76. 6. The Government prepared a program to deal with at least the short-term effects of the crisis and received some assistance from the IMF and a program loan from the Bank Group. Under the Government program, import levels were tightly restricted, wages were frozen, government devel- opmenit expenditures were redirected towards The productive sectors, and the Tanzaniani shilling was deva-Lued by 10% against the SDR. Producer prices for food crops were substan-tially increased and, at the same time, the National Milling Corporation (NMC) was instructed to purchase a number of drought-resistant crops suchI as cassava, sorghum, and pigeon peas in addi- tioin to the usual foodgrains like maize. While these steps were taken to inicrease food production, they also discouraged the production of export crops, weakened the financial position of NMC, and required the banking system to extend large amourLts of credit to NMC. Aside from the devalua- - 3 - tion, little scope was given to market forces ar.d Tanzania made no basic changes in its system of administered prices and goverament controls. The basic weaknesses of the economy persisted -- declining export volumes, limited trained manpower, disappointirng growth in the monetized and produc- tive sectors, and poor maintenance of existing capital stock and infra- structure, especially in agriculture and transport. 7. Nonetheless, the Government program, boosted greatly by the coffee boom of 1977, additional foreign assistance, and reasonable weather for agriculture, was able to keep the economy in balance until 1978. During 1978, the overly stringent import conitrols were relaxed at the same time as the terms of trade began to deteriorate again. The balance of payments went into deficit and foreign reserves were drawn down. Then, in October 1978, the country was invaded by forces from Uganda. The resulting war, the oil price increases of 1979, and the flooding and drought in different parts of Tanzania led to a worsening balance of payments deficit. The Government built up major arrears on its import payments for the first time since Independence. The domestic budget fell heavily into deficit as expenditures (led by defense) rose by 50% and revenues improved by only 10% from 1977/78 to 1978/79. As a result, Government borrowing from the banking system increased from TSh 600 millioni in 1977/78 to more than TSh 3,000 million irn 1978/79. Such borrowing was the major factor in money supply growth, which exceeded 53% in this period. 8. The economy became troubled by major problems of falling production in agriculture and indlustry and declining factor productivity. In the mid 1970s, average GDP and per capita income growth rates were similar to those of other Sub-Saharan African countries. The average GDP grew by 5.2% per annum between 1970 and 1978. With population growing at 3.3% annually, per capita GDP increased at an average rate of about 2% annually. Between 1978 and 1980, growth in aggregate output slowed to 3.3% per annum. In 1981,falling agricultural ard industrial production caused GDP to decline by 1.7%; the rate of decline accelerated to 3.2% in 1982. Output in subsistence agriculture and manufacturing, which had experienced high growth rates of 6% to 7% per annum before 1978, fell by 8% and 16.6% per annum respectively over the next four years, while output in the services sector continued to grow steadily. The services sector, which accounted for only 9% of value added in 1966, now accounts for more than 25%. Output in the services sector reflects remuneration rather than output, and trends in subsistence production are at best guess-estimates with potentially large margins of error. For these reasons, trends in the rate of growth of GDP are in some doubt, but the shift away from a monetary to ani informal economy is confirmed by the declinie in the share of output marketed through official channels. 9. Although Tanzania has sustained a high investment ratio, this has Tiot been matched by a similar success in the mobilization of domestic saviings or in the return on investmernts. Up to the mid-1970s, foreign savings had financed 20-40% of domestic investment. However, the depen- deInce oIn foreign savings rose sharply to more than 60% of domestic invest- ment during the crisis years of 1974-75 and again from 1978. The major shortfalls in domestic savings have occurred in the Government sector, where they have actually been negative in some years since 1975. - 4 - 10. Agriculture remains the most important sector in Tanzania, accounting for 83% of total employment, 45% of GDP, and 80% of exports. The long-term trend growth rate of agricultural production has hardly kept pace with population growth and apparently has fallen in more recent years as the initial expansion of export crop production (through the mid-1960s) has been reversed. This poor performance cannot be adequately explained by the limitations of the natural environment. Although the importance of rural development has continuously been highlighted in Government state- meats, including the Arusha Declaration and successive plans, this has not always been reflected in the! allocation of resources to the agricultural seztor or in policy formulation and implementation. The general direction of the Government's post-Arusha agriculture strategy has also tended to emphasize the transformation of the institutional structure of rural devel- opment (through the formation of villages and increasing public involvement in the sector) over measures designed to improve agricultural production directly. Many of these institutional changes were introduced too rapidly, without careful planning or sufficient recognition that by themselves they could not compensate for inadequate incentives and shortages of skilled manpower and managers. More recently there has been a greater awareness of the role of incentives, and recent price adjustments attest to the Government's willingness to use incentives to influence the pattern of agricultural production. Available manpower, however, is still stretched rather thinly throughout the sector, mainly because of the predominant role assigned to the public sector. This has resulted in weakened capacity for po:Licy planning and implementation, especially in the areas of research and extension, and deficient distribution of fertilizers and other on-farm supplies and equipment. Another factor underlying the poor performance of agriculture has been the deterioration of transport services. Road, rail, an(1 water services have declined owing to a lack of spare parts, poor mai,-ntenance, and inadequate planning and management. The Current Balance of Payments Crisis and Medium Term Prospects 11. The slow growth in agricultural production, transport bottle- necks, and external shocks described above have all contributed to the severe deterioration in the balance of payments since 1979. By 1982, export volumes had fallen to a level one-third below the peaks of the mid-1960s and early 1970s. Furthermore, the terms of trade have declined by 40% since the coffee boom of 1977 due to a sharp increase in import costs, especially for petroleum, at a time when the overall level of export prices has been rising very slowly. Owing to these adverse developments, the purchasing power of Tanzania's exports in 1982 was more than one-third lower than in 1977 and only one-half of the 1966 level. The basic adjustment to the high current account deficits following the second oil shock was through a cutback in imports. By 1982, import volumes were 32% below the level in 1978 and 24% below the level prevailing in the early 1970's. Aid inflows have been maintained, but they increasingly have been tied to specific projects. Currently, food, oil and debt service account for almost all of export earnings resulting in a severe shortage of foreign - 5 - exchange for many categories of imports for which aid resources are not available. As a result, Tanzania has built up almost US$400 million of import arrears, and has drawn down all of its reserves. 12. Given the poor prospects for international commodity prices as well as the limited scope for further external aid, there is little immediate prospect for an improvement in the balance of payments. This continuing balance of payments constraint is inevitably having a debilitating effect on the econorny, with lower imports reducing production and maintenance of existing assets, resulting in further falls in exports and available foreign exchange. This vicious circle will be difficult to break unless there is a substantial injection of foreign exchange and major improvements in producer incentives, parastatal operations, import alloca- tions, promotion of non-traditional exports, and overall government planning and budgeting. 13. In spite of intensive discussions with the Government in 1980 and 1981, it was difficult to focus on specific corrective measures needed for structural adjustment. In the absence of a comprehensive reform program, an Export Rehabilitation Program Credit (Credit 1133-TA) in the amount of US$50 million was negotiated in March 1981 to support a limited but sharply defined set of measures intended to assist the Government in arresting the decline in earnings from the country's major export crops. During negotiations of this Program Credit, agreement was also reached on a Memorandum of Understanding on Follow-Up Measures. These included more restraint and selectivity in the public investment program, more emphasis in the recurrent budget on the operations and maintenance needs of the economy, improved foreign exchange budgeting, reexamination of the roles (particularly purchasing mandates) of the State-owned crop authorities, introduction of more payment-by-results schemes in industry, and review of subsidy and cost recovery arrangements in the public sector. A special agricultural account was established to channel imports into agriculture with suprisingly little friction among the institutions concerned, although the Government was not able to meet its own obligation to contribute US$50 million to the account. The Government also agreed that an independent Advisory Group would be established to assist in preparing a comprehensive program of economic rehabilitation and recovery. 14. The Advisory Group began work in November 1981 and completed its Report in April 1982. A large number of its recommendations were adopted by the Government and incorporated into a Structural Adjustment Program, which was issued in July 1982. This Program includes a series of important initiatives and proposals. The development budget was substantially cut back in 1982/83 for the second year in a row to release resources for the operations and maintenance needs of the economy. Agricultural producer prices were adjusted in 1983/84 and in 1984/85, which initially maintained them broadly constant in real terms and more recently increased them in real terms. The Government also announced its intention to relax -6- restrictions on interregional trade. It also opened up the marketing of somae crops (mainly minor grains such as millet) to anyone interested in coTnduacting such trade. 15. In the 1984/85 budget submitted to Parliament on June 14, 1984, the Government announced a series of new measures. The most recent measures include a major exchange rate adjustment (36%), the second in two years, an increase in agricultural producer prices of between 40% and 60%, and an initiation of a program to improve the efficiency and productivity of agricultural parastatals. Preliminary analysis shows that these pricing changes are sufficient to allow agricultural parastatals as a group to break even while resulting in an increase of 5% in real incomes of export crop producers. There is a serious attempt to make the NMC, the parastatal responsible for grain marketing, financially viable through an increase in the consumer price for maize and a decontrol of the price of maize flour (sembe). These measures together should eliminate the need for budgetary transfers to the parastatals, which had amounted to nearly 11% of total recurrent expenditures in 1982/83. The measures also include politically sersitive actions such as thes removal of subsidies on fertilizer and insecticides and the introduction of fees for secondary schools to cover a part of the costs. 16. The 1984/85 budget is thus bold in its attempts to reverse previous economic policies. However, the success of the budget in meeting its financial targets will, t-o a large extent, be contingent on availability of additional external assistance. Similarly, the supply response in agriculture to the improved incentives is likely to be weak in the absence of an increase inI import capability that could finance incentive goods and agricultural inputs. 17. Tanzania has not had access to IMF facilities since December 1980, when the Government failed to meet performance targets under a previous Standby. Despite four rounds of discussions (in May, June, August, and October 1982), no agreement could be reached on a reform program. Following the announcement of devaluation and other new measures on June 14, 1984 (para. 15), the Government and the IMF have resumed discussions. Senior officials of the Ministry of Finance visited Washington in early July to elaborate upon the basis for the new measures. An IMF mission is scheduled to visit Tanzania in early September to discuss the outline of a possible IMF program. 18. Even with a much imiproved export performance, Tanzania will continue to face a very difficult balance of payments situation, especially over the next three to five years. A halt in the decline in per capita GDP wilL require increasing amounts of aid in real terms and a careful review of import requirements, especially those for low-priority projects with long gestation periods and high foreign exchange costs. Otherwise the prospects would be for generally stagnant economic activity over the 1980s as a whole, with a substantial decline in per capita incomes. To avoid this situation, continued emphasis will be needed on export performance and - 7 - concerted effort will be required to improve the level of capacity utiliza- tion and efficiency in the economy. Furthermore, this must be done without jeopardizing vital food production. 19. Although it may be possible to finance a small portion of the current account gap through commercial borrowings, the scope for this is clearly limited; in addition to the difficulties of raising commercial credit during a period of balance of payments problems, Tanzania simply cannot afford the heavy burden of debt service payments. Therefore, the bulk of the financing requirements will have to be met by additional foreign assistance. Possible sources for this assistance include deferred payment arrangements and other concessional financing from oil-supplying countries, additional new commitments from traditional bilateral and multilateral sources, and continued movement toward non-project assistance. External Debt 20. Owing to the very concessional terms on which past aid has been given to Tanzania and the Government's previous reluctance to use higher cost commercial loans and suppliers' credits, the country's overall debt service ratios have historically been less than 10%. In recent years, there has been somewhat greater reliance on non-concessional borrowing. This borrowing, combined with falling exports, has resulted in an increase in the debt service ratio, which was estimated in 1982 to have been about 20%. The Bank Group is assisting the Government in carrying out a complete review of its external debt and improving its debt management system. This effort, which is still underway, has revealed that the reports on publicly guaranteed debt are incomplete and projected debt service payments may rise sharply as a number of old loans begin to fall due and coverage of the debt information improves. Unless Tanzania's poor export performance is re- versed, the debt service ratio over the next several years may be signifi- cantly higher than indicated above. Based on existing data, the Bank Group held 38% of Tanzania's external debt outstanding and disbursed in 1982 (IBRD 13%) and obligations to the Bank Group accounted for 14% of total debt service. PART II - BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN TANZANIA 21. Tanzania joined the Bank, the Association, and the International Finance Corporation in 1962. Beginning with an IDA credit for education in 1963, 57 IDA credits and 19 Bank loans, two of these on Third Window terms, amounting to US$1,106.5 million have so far been approved for Tanzania. In addition, Tanzania has been a beneficiary of 10 loans totalling US$244.8 million which were extended for the development of the common services and development bank operated regionally by Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda through their association in the East African Community. IFC investments in Tanzania, totalling US$4.7 million, were made to the Kilombero Sugar Company in 1960 and 1964. This Company encountered financial difficulties and in 1969, IFC and other investors sold their interest in the Company to - 8 - the Government. Another IFC investment of US$1.7 million in soap marnufacturing in Mbeya was approved by the Executive Directors in June 1978 and1 an investment of US$1.5 million in metal product manufacturing was approved in May 1979. Annex II contains summary statements of Bank loans, IDA credits, IFC investments to Tanzania, and the East African Community organizatiorns as of March 31, 1984. 22. Bank Group lending in Tanzania has been centered on: (i) agri- cuLture; (ii) transport and communications; (iii) industry; and (iv) educa- tion and manpower development. Since FY81, new Bank Group lending has been focussed primarily on the rehabilitation and use of existing productive facilities and the introduction of infrastructure and services (such as power generation and education facilities) of long term use to the economy. Projects have been designed to minimize new demands on the Government's recurrent, development, and foreign exchange budgets; have been centered on already experienced or financially healthy institutions; and have been logistically insulated, as far as possible, from general supply difficulties in the economy. They have included considerable tech- nical assistance and training for better maintenanice and use of existing capital facilities and more effective resource allocation in the economy. Lending in FY82 through FY84 along these lines included a second petroleum exploration project, a third technical assistance project (focussed on key manpower gaps in the agricultural sector), a rehabilitation project for the Dar-es-Salaam sewerage system, a coal enginieering project, and a hydro- electric power project. 23., A small number of other projects may be proposed in the agri- cuLtural, energy, and transport sectors during the next three years. In addition to the proposed fourth technical assistance project, a rehabilita- tion program for the port of Dar-es-Salaam has been appraised. A sixth highway project, involving mainly maintenance and reconstruction (particularly sections of the Tanzania-Zambia highway), and an agriculture rehabilitatioin project are also under preparation. However, the design and implementation of viable projects in the productive sectors of the economy, especially agriculture and industry, will depend on Tanzania's ability to forrmulate and implement a wide ranging economic adjustment program. 24. In addition to firnancing specific projects, the Bank Group has provided non-project assistance oIn three occasions in support of Government efforts to deal with its balance of payments difficulties. The first such Credit was made in 1974, the second in 1977, and the most recent, an Export Rehabilitation Program Credit (No. 1133-TA), in April 1931. 25. Project implementation in Tanzania has been adversely affected during the last five years by the disruptions of the Uganda War and the country's extreme foreign exchange difficulties, which have resulted in shortages of fuel and building materials, even when budgetary allocations for such purchases have been adequate. External financing agencies have been increasing the share of direct and indirect foreign exchange costs covered by project budgets; however, it is imipossible to cushion projects cornpletely, particularly in remote areas, from the ramifications of the - 9 - economic crisis. Bank Group disbursements grew from US$58.5 million in FY78 to US$115.9 million in FY82 and then declined to US$71.2 million in FY84. A comparison with other portfolios in the Eastern Africa Region indicates that Tanzanian disbursements have been about average for the Region, ranging as a proportion of outstanding commitments from 25.5% in FY78 to 21.4% in FY84 (compared with 24.5% and 23.0% in the same years for the Region as a whole). 26. Supervision missions have been concerned with adapting project implementation to difficult factors facing the country or individual sectors, which were not anticipated or have proved worse than expected at appraisal. A major Country Implementation Review was held in Dar-es-Salaam in October 1982 during which Government officials and Bank Group staff agreed to recommend the restructuring or discontinuation of several projects experiencing persistent implementation problems. Intensive supervision and, in the case of the Mufindi Pulp and Paper Project (Credit 1370-TA), timely assistance from co-financiers have already had some remedial results. Even in the agricultural sector, where constraints on implementation have been most severe, there have been improvements in some projects. However, considerable work remains to be done in improving project implementation and disbursements. The Country Implementation Review, scheduled for May 1984, had to be deferred because of changes in the Government, but discussions were held on further rationalization of the project portfolio. The next Review is planned for November-December 1984. PART III - THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR Sector Background 27. Agriculture is the largest single sector of the Tanzanian economy, providing 40-45% of Gross National Product (GNP) and 80-85% of both exports and of employment. Smallholder production, involving about 13 million people settled in 8,000 villages, dominates the sector. Private estate production of tea and sisaL is important, while public estates contribute significantly to rice, wheat, sisal and tea production and dominate sugar production. 28, Tanzanian agriculture has been influenced by several factors. Some agricultural areas have relatively low rainfall and are subject to drought. However, as overall population density is low (19 inhabitants per sq km), the -utilization of good agricultural land is low even in areas of reliable rainfall (about 20% of cultivatable land is farmed). In the decades following Independence, smallholder export crops expanded rapidly as the volume of marketed coffee, cotton, cashew nuts and tobacco doubled between 1960/61 and 1966/67; and between 1966/67 and 1973/74 cashew nuts and tobacco marketings doubled again. Self-sufficiency in foodgrain production was maintained through the 1960s. Significant tractorized farming emerged in this period in the northern and the Mbeya-Iringa regions of the country. In 1971/72, the tractor fleet was estimated at 17,000 units, primarily in private hands. But the fleet has dwindled to some - 10 - 5,000 units since new tractors were allocated to villages and the public sector and spares were not imported in sufficient quantity to maintain existing tractors. Oxen are also used but, in part due to the tsetse fly, the predominant method of soil cultivation continues to be the hoe. 29. Severe and rapid institutional change occurred in the 1970s, including the collection into villages of the previously dispersed population, the removal of local control followed by the dissolution of cooperative societies, and the closing of private retail shops. These changes effectively: (i) altered the pattern of land ownership and use, (ii) neutralized the input and consumer goods distribution system, and (iii) closed down established crop marketing channels. In addition, many private estates were either abandoned or taken over by the State. These changes contributed to the end of the previous period of rapidly expanding agricultural production. 30. These changes hacl a detrimental effect on agriculture when key agricultural staff were drafted to village manager positions or shifted to rural development activities under the control of the Prime Minister's OEfice (PMO). Other policy deficiencies also contributed to the decline in growth. The agricultural sector was not allocated sufficient foreign e.xchange to cover the imported inputs needed to maintain production and agricultural producer prices, well below border prices, were inadequate to provide production incentives. In addition to these domestic policies, Tanzanian agriculture was further buffetted by exogenous factors such as the Ugandan War, the 1973/74 drought, declining real export prices, and recently, the infestation of the Larger Grain Borer into farm level grain stocks. All of these phenomena contributed to the general reduction in marketed agricultural production during the last decade. Tea was the only commodity which experienced consistent production and export increases. The Agricultural Sector Report (see para. 16) described the relative iraportance of these different factors, and how they contributed to the "multiple binding constraints facing the smallholder. 3.. The decline in the volume of agricultural exports was accompanied by a similar decline in real prices. For most agricultural exports, real prices (deflated by the index of manufactured exports) peaked in 1974 (in 1978 for beverage crops). Since then, they declinied 25% to 75% from their peak. The declines in export volume and real prices have been catastrophic for the Tanzanian balance of payments, to the extent that over half of Tanzania's inputs are nIow financed from aid or suppliers credits. 32. The above problems should not detract from the fact that Tanzania has abundant productive land producing a diverse set of export crops and that: in the initial years of Independence the country achieved production growth rates for six of its seven major export crops in excess of those achieved for food crops during the height (1965-1970) of the Green Revolution in Asia (a benchmnark for agricultural growth). Between 1961 (the year of Tanzania's Independence) and 1966, the production of tea, tobacco, cotton, coffee, pyretheum and cashew nuts grew at annual rates ranging from 8% for tea to 23% for cashew nuts. (In contrast, rice production in the Green Revolution adopting countries grew at only 5%, 6%, - 11 - 8% and 11% annually between 1965 and 1970 in the Philippines, India, Indonesia and Pakistan respectively.) Clearly Tanzania has the agronomic potential to reverse the current decline in exports (paras. 30 and 31) if a conducive policy environment exists. 33. The Government recently recognized several policy issues related to the agricultural sector and has implemented related policy decisions. These decisions include: (i) reduction of barriers to internal grain trade; (ii) reintroduction of Agricultural Marketing Cooperatives; (iii) reduction in NMC's monopoly; (iv) increases in agricultural prices; (v) partial abandonment of panterritorial pricing; (vi) limitation of parastatal overdrafts; (vii) establishment of agricultural priorities for transport facilities and spares; and (viii) introduction of export earnings retention accounts. In addition, the Government has announced its intention that retail prices on most products should allow full cost recovery; only maize flour and cassava flour will be subsidized, and at levels to allow NMC to cover its full costs. It also has decided that trade in grain should be allowed to operate unhindered (para. 35). Marketing and Pricing Policy 34. Government policy has clearly promoted a state monopoly in input supply and output marketing. The only official exception to this policy has been the marketing of perishable horticultural products, where private traders are allowed to operate openly and freely. However, a more significant but unintentional exception has been in the marketing of food- grains where private trade, although illegal, operates openly at the retail level, much of it in municipally licensed and regulated markets. Indeed municipalities have periodically imposed their own retail price control, often in multiples of the official retail price for NMC rice and maize meal. The Governrment's attitude to this open but illegal marketing has been ambivalent. Vigorous attempts to suppress the trade have been periodically made, including road barriers and arbitrary confiscation or taxing of grain shipments. But when food shortages have become critical, all barriers have been removed and the illegal trade in foodgrain has been allowed to meet the emergency. 35. In an attempt to improve the present inefficiencies in production and marketing of agricultural commodities, the Government is in the process of reintroducing cooperatives. These cooperatives will take over from parastatals the responsibility for and the costs of primary crop procurement. The Government expects cooperatives to have a local monopsony of grain destined for NMC. Acting alone, the cooperatives would not provide the multiple channel marketing system necessary to improve public sector efficiency. Thus, the Government recently decided to issue permits to transport grains without restrictions. This is seen as crucial to the reduction in the role of the NMC and to the improvement of grain supply to urban consumers. - 12 - 36. The existence of the illegal or "parallel" market and the prices paid has been documented by the Marketing Development Bureau (MDB). The MDB is located in the Planning Division of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livrestock Development (MOA) and is the major unit respoinsible for agricultural policy analysis. Currently, it monitors prices in municipal markets and publishes a Monthly Marketing Bulletin of prevailing prices. Farm level prices have been collected for twc years as part of the monitoring and evaluation system of the Mwanza/Shinyanga Rural Development Project supported by the Association (Credit 803-TA). These price reports show that parallel market prices range from 200% to 1,000% of official NMC retail prices. 37, Official producer prices for grains and export crops are initially recommended by MDB, on the basis of a far ranging review of world prices, production costs, possible cross-elasticities, effects on consumers and consumer prices, parastatal losses, etc. These recommendations are transmitted through the MOA to an inter-Ministerial Committee and eventually to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet, which actually sets the prices. Current attempts to rationalize official prices, without actually meeting prices on the parallel market, have had limited success. The MDB has documented the price differences and has demonstrated the tradie-offs between different levels of producer prices, parastatal losses and exchange rates. This work has contributed to Goverrnment decisions to increase the real price of food crops in 1983/84 and 1984/85 (by 5% and 40% respectively), to increase the real price of export crops in 1984/85 (by 5%'), and to devalue the shilliing in June 1983 (by 25%). The recent (July 1984) budget achieved a major rationalizatioin of prices with Government assuming responsibility for TSh 2.5 billion of long term parastatal debt, rernoval of food and input subsidies, a modest increase in the basic wage, and a devaluation of 36% which will allow the agricultural parastatals as a whole to break-even. MDB contributed significantly to advising the Government as to the effects and required magnitude of these price changes. Parastatal Performance 38. The Government exercises monopoly conitrol over input supply and product marketing through a series of state owned companies, or parastatals. The policy framework within which these organizations operate, coupled with inappropriate operational decisions, have contributed to their inefficiency. The parastatals are further handicapped by inadequate capitalization. They frequently were established at short notice to replace or assume the functions of existing institutions. Some experienced major changes in operational scope. Normally, parastatals are subject to tightly regulated salary structures and employment practices, wit:h top management appointments as part of the patronage system. Until recently, parastatals have enjoyed unrestricted overdraft limits with the (parastatal) National Bank of Commerce. The result was a rapid increase in parastatal overdrafts from TSh 2.1 billion in 1978 (June 30) to TSh 4.6 bi;lion in 1981 (June 30). The very substantial expansion in the money supply needed to fund these overdrafts has been a major contributing factor to inflation. - 13 - 39. By Act of Parliament, the parastatals are required to follow "good commercial practice" and, at a minimum, to recover cost. Although not always reflected in the prices at which the parastatals are required to trade, there is now a strong Government effort to restore their financial viability. In the last four years, the Project Preparation and Monitoring Bureau (PPMB), with support from the Association under the Grain Storage and Milling Project (Credit 1015--TA), has set up a system to monitor the financial performance of the agricultural parastatals. The PPMB is located in the Planning Division of the MOA and has the major responsibility for financial and management monitoring of agricultural parastatals. The MOA has supported this monitoring system by holding up the disbursement of Government subsidies and budgetary allocations pending completion of accounting and other information needed for the PPMB monitoring system. Prior to PPMB's involvement there was little effort to control parastatal expenditures which were financed through bank overdraft facilities (para. 38). However, the monitoring effort has generated financial management information enabling the managers to exercise better financial control. In 1983 the total of nominal overdrafts by parastatals experienced its first decline. 40. In 1983, the Government implemented a Commission on Cost Cutting in the Parastatals. PPMB was again very valuable in generating the objective data and studies used by the Commission. Because of the efforts of the PPMB, more complete information was available to the Commission on the finances of the agricultural parastatals than for many other sectors. Support Services 41. Research. Donors have actively supported research through the Uyole Agricultural Research Center in the southern highlands and a small maize breeding program. But beyond this, donor assistance for research has been intermittent. A research project was proposed for appraisal by the Association in 1980 but withdrawn from the lending program following a Government decision to organize separate livestock and cropping parastatals to conduct research. Five separate institutions currently have responsibility for research, none of which are institutionally linked with extension. The research system has been neglected and has deteriorated for the past decade as Government research allocations have not kept pace with inflation and the limited number of research staff have not been adequately trained. There are now signs that the Government shares the Association's concern that the fragmented agricultural research (livestock and crop) should be better coordinated and funded from a single budget. The decision to establish an agricultural university with research linkages modelled on the U.S. Land Grant College or an Indian Agricultural University (para. 43) is indicative of this concern. In addition, the Government has assembled a Task Force under the direction of the Director of Research, MOA, to study the reorganization and consolita-tion of the research system. Two research specialists from PPMB are assisting the Task Force, and the Director of Research has requested the Association to participate in a technical review of the Task Force report, which was recently completed. This could lead to the preparation of a project suitable for Bank-Group financing. - 14 - 42. Extension, like research, has suffered from insufficient operating funds with the result that exteinsion visits have been curtailed. However, institutional deficiencies have been the primary problems in extension. The 1972 decentralization policy placed MOA field staff under the regional administration of the PMO and reduced communications with the MOA, exacerbating the weak linkage between research and extension. The extension funiction was further dispersed in 1976 when newly created crop authorities assumed some extension activities. The Government has now ackn.owledged that extension is ineffective and proposes to reorganize and itntegrate extension under the MOA. As a first step, the administrative control of field staff has been returned from PMO to the Extenision Department of the MOA. However much remains to be done in determining the proper management of extension and in resolving the role of the export parastatals in promotion of the growth of their crops. 43. University Training. The Government recently decided to upgrade the Faculty of Agriculture at Morogoro into an agricultural university (Sokoine University of Agriculture), with major links to research and extension. This decision became effective on July 1, 1984. The Government intends to develop the university on the model of a U.S. Land Grant College or an Indian Agricultural University. This development is expected to provide a larger output of sk:Llled manpower and produce graduates more suited to the staffing needs of the MOA in research, senior extension, planning and parastatal management positions and the needs of the agricultural sector generally. A major problem will be the speed at which the Faculty can be transformed into a Universitiy while balancing cost, quality of instruction, studenit supply, and graduate demand. Assistance is needed to design a strategy for developing the agricultural university. University and MOA interaction is a key to an eventual phase out of the need for technical assistance, and the reconstruction of a unified research and extension system to serve the agricultural sector. 44. Input distribution has suffered from inadequate allocations of foreign exchange and a policy of "confiniement", which prohibits private companies from importing agricultural inputs and individuals from distri- buting inputs from regional centers to villages. A study in 1980/81 by MDB demonstrated that from 11% (cashew nuts) to 50% (sisal) of export revenues needed to be spent on inputs, spares, fuel aind replacements to maintain production. Based partially on this analysis, in December 1981 the Association supported the Export Rehabilitation Program (US$50 million under Credit 1133-TA) for the import of agricultural inputs. The Goverinment agreed, in applying for this credit, to reserve 15% of agricultural export earnings for the import of agricultural inputs. This has not occurred due to the pressure of other demands on the foreign exchange available to the Bank of Tanzania. However, as a result of discussions with the Bank Group, the Government has recently recognized the foreign exchange problem and has allowed a number of agricultural exporters to open Export Income Retention Accounts in foreign exchange covering 10% of their export revenues. Beneficiaries under this scheme have been: private sisal and tea estates and parastatals in'cluding Tanzania Tea, Sisal and Cotton Authorities and the Sugar Development Corporation, all of whica need imported inputs to maintain product-on, processing and exports. - 15 - These Accounts are a significant rnove toward proper recognition of the foreign exchange needs of agriculture. Previous Bank Group Assistance to Agriculture 45. From Independence through the 1970s, the Bank Group actively supported agricultural processing and integrated rural development through its lending program. Assistance was provided for 18 agricultural and 3 rural development projects consisting of US$240 million in IDA credits and US$37 million in IBRD loans. By the end of 1980, it was apparent that: (i) production was falling well short of projections based on the 1965-75 period (on which several processing projects had relied), and (ii) project implementation problems were endemic to the agricultural sector, rather than solvable in a project context. Accordingly, the Bank Group stopped agricultural project lending per se pending a careful reassessment of the sector problems. Lending subsequent to 1980 was for activities peripheral to crop and livestock agriculture and consisted of the Sao Hill Forestry Project (US$12 million under Credit 1229-TA), the Export Rehabilitation Program (US$50 million under Credit 1133-TA), and the Third Technical Assistance Project (US$12 million under Credit 1206-TA). 46. The deterioration in the policy, institutional, and economic environment has so adversely affected project implementation that projects with recent closing dates have not been extended because the resources available within the economy for project implementation were considered inadequate. An exception has been the Rural Development Bank Project (US$10 million under Credit 987-TA), which was extended for one year, after cancellation of US$4 million. The problems of inadequate finance and managerial deficiencies have been ubiquitous, permeating all agricultural projects. The lack of trained technical staff and the lack of materials (fertilizer, construction materials, etc.) have also been frequent problems. Disbursements have lagged and significant sums have been cancelled upon closing the projects. The agricultural portfolio is considerably reduced as a result of the four-year lending hiatus and only eight projects are currently under execution (including the forestry project), five of which have major problems. Six of the projects are in the process of consolidation or redesign, which will reduce recurrent costs and in some instances reduce investment as well. Seven of ten recently completed projects had major overall problems at the time of completion. 47. Most agricultural projects financed by the Association have provided for both short term consultancies and long term technical assistance staff, principally financial controllers. Although recruitment has often been delayed, the technical assistance components have been implemented successfully and the performance of consultants has been satisfactory. Technical assistance for institutional development has been provided under three projects, two of which, the National Maize Project (Credit 606-TA) and the Grain Storage and Milling Project (Credit 1015-TA), provided technical assistance to MDB and PPMB, administered by FAO. These two Tanzanian institutions have been very successful in institutional development due, in large part, to both Government and Association - 16 - commitment to the concept and objectives of the institutions and provision of support. Supervision by the Association has been intensive. The Third Technical Assistance Project (Credit 1206-TA) was designed to provide financial and engineering expertise to the agricultural parastatals and to further strengthen the MOA's capacity to supervise them. Project implementation has been considerably delayed - due primarily to the inadequate implementation capacity of the Government and in part to the four and one half months suspension in 1982 of disbursements to Tanzania. During the period of suspension, Government-FAO discussions on an implementation agreement were interrupted. FAO initiated recruitment of the technical assistance staff only after the agreement was signed in January 1983. The need to negotiate proper terms of reference with the parastatals prior to staff recruitment also contributed to delayed implementation. The MOA has provided office space, support staff and accommodation for the Project. It also has brought pressure to bear on its parastatals to provide suitable terms of reference and has repeatedly intervened with the Ministry of Manpower to obtain clearances for technical assistance staff. Individual terms of reference have now been developed and candidates have been nominated for 85% of the technical assistance posts, although not all candidates are in place. Similar difficulties are not anticipated for the present project because it provides continuing support for ongoing institul:ions with fully agreed terms of reference. For the same reasons, this project will not overburden the capacity of the MOA tc effectively utilize the itechnical assistance staff. Policy Review and Bank Groul? Strategy 48. Shortly after the Bank Group's reassessment of the agricultural sector (the previously mentioned Tanzania Agricultural Sector Report), the Government conducted its own1 review of the sector, which resulted in "The Tanzanian Agricultural Policy". This review was later revised for adoption as a Government White Paper, 'Agricultural Policy of Tanzania". There was substantial agreement between the Bank Group and the Government papers on the nature and seriousness of the problems of the agricultural sector. However, the Bank Group placed priority on resolving marketing problems and inadequate resources for the sector; whereas the White Paper focused on the weaknesses of policy implemoentation and faulty allocation of the limited resources available to the sector, Thus a near consensus on identification of the problems still left room for considerable divergence of views as to the appropriate action program. Both the Bank Group and the Government relied heavily on factual studies carried out by the two bureaus within the MCA, the MDB and the PPMB, which were supported by the Bank Group. 49. Following intensive discussions of the sector report with the Government in March 1983, it became clear that a major and explicit reversal of the Government agricultural policy was unlikely. But there appeared to be scope for pragmatic policy changes designed to cope with particular practical problems of implementation. In these circumstances, the Bank Group developed a two pronged approach to further agricultural dialogue and lending. On tlhe one hand, it would support institutional development within the MOA, such as that for PPMB and MDB, which would both - 17 - strengthen the institutional capacity to implement development policies and produce the objective factual studies necessary for further dialogue. On the other hand, it would consider lending for specific projects when the policy climate was satisfactory. Clearly, the necessary policy changes would vary according to sub-sectors; for example, a revised research policy on structure and extension linkages would be needed to support a researeh project. The institutional support is thus seen as a necessary condition for a factually based policy dialogue and the policy adjustments required to make physical investment productive. 50. It remains unclear whether the Government can sustain a minimum policy enivironment necessary for reasonable assurance that crop rehabilita- tion projects could lead to self-sustaining improvement. However, with or without active rehabilitation lending in the immediate future, the support of MDB and PPMB and hence the MOA's capacity to analyze economic develop- ments and documenit the likely costs of alternative policy responses is crucial to the Government's eventual ability to develop a realistic recovery strategy. The Need for Further Technical Assistance 51. Notwithstanding the recently announced policy initiatives, stimulated by studies conducted by MDB and PPMB with technical assistance support (para. 33), development of the agricultural sector will continue to be constrained as a result of the shortage in agricultural manpower. An agricultural sector manpower study was carried out in 1979 with bilateral financing. It assessed demand in terms of ideal staffing and evaluated supply in terms of existing staff in established posts and projected incremental supply given the prevailing trends. The study had two major omissions; it did not address the issues of Tanzanian manpower trained but lost to the public sector nor did it address the issues of demand affordability and priorities. Consequently, the study has Inot been an effective operational document for the Planning Division of the MOA. Uinderlying the manpower shortage problem has been Government's failure to acknowledge the existence of the supply-demand gap, thereby preventing any remedial action. Manpower remains a resource constraint despite external support; partially because of a limited supply of nationals with the pre-qualifications for the training offered, partially due to overly optimistic estimates of the time requirements needed for on-the-job traininlg, partially due to the misallocation of available skilled staff and partially due to the inability of the university and other training institutions to turn out adequate numbers of skilled manpower. Some 37% of the professional positions in the central MOA remain unifilled and the deficit is likely to increase through 1986. There seems to be an increased awareness of the need for professional manpower because in 1983 the number of students allocated to the Faculty of Agriculture was above its servicing capacity. 52. A great deal of technical assistance will be necessary to implement any agricultural strategy, part of which could be obtained from Tanzania's private sector. But there is a clear need for substantial external technical assistance in support of broader Government functioas in - 18 - the MOA, in agricultural research institutions and in manpower development. The Agricultural Sector Report specifically noted that technical assistance is needed to prevent the further deterioration and loss of research information while agricultural research is being reorganized and that subsequent to reorganization Tanzania would have to rely on technical assistance to staff the research system for at least a decade. Technical assistance is provided in most donor-assisted projects. The overall amount of technical assistance is known to be large. But due to the diversity of donors involved, no overall picture of either total technical assistance provided or needed is available. In the long term, there is a need to phase out technical assistance for agricultural development, both because the cost is high (about US$100,000 per person per year), and because the Government's policy of self-reliance implies that key posts will eventually be held by qualified Tanzanians. A global picture of the extent of this technical assistance, together with irLformation on the availability of appropriately trained and experienced Tanzanians and the capacity of Tanzania to provide an increasing share of the needed trained agricultural manpower, are required. The training aspects of the project (paras. 59 and 62) would contribute to the replacement of technical assistance to MDB and PPMB. However, to analyze broader policy options and effectively monitor parastatal management performance, further technical assistance, on a much reduced scale, will be required until 1990 for MDB and perhaps longer for PPMB. 53. As brought out above (paras. 36-40, 44 and 49) the factual studies carried out with technical assistance support by MDB and PPMB have been basic to Association-Government dialogue on improvements in the policy framework and in the associated management of the agricultural sector. While the routine aspects of price policy and project monitoring could continue without further external support, work on monitoring of parallel market prices, import needs of agriculture, parastatal cost structures, reform of the research systesm, input supply and distribution, etc., would not be forthcoming. Withouit this work agricultural policy discussions would be less substantial. PART IV - THE PROJECT Background 54. It was recognized at the time of presentation of the Grain Storage and Milling Project to the Executive Directors in 1980 that the funding for the MDB and PPMB included in that project would have to be extended, as proposed under the present project. The need for the research component of the proposed project was identified during sector dialogue with the Government. The M()A prepared the MDB and PPMB components and, with assistance from the Association, the research component. The Government asked the Association to appraise the project in October 1983. An appraisal mission visitecl Tanzania in October 1983; a brief post appraisal mission followed in February 1984. Negotiations were held August 3 to August 6, 1984 in Washington. Mr. C.Y. Mpupua, Deputy Principal Secretary, MOA, led the Government delegation. A Credit and PrDject Summary is provided at the beginning of this report, and a Suoplementary Project Data 'Sheet is attached as Annex III. - 19 - Project Objectives and Description 55. The proposed project would strengthen the MOA's capacity to provide the analytical foundations (i) to improve agricultural pricinig policy, (ii) to moinitor project and parastatal performance in the agricultural sector, and (iii) to improve agricultural research. In addition it would improve technical crop recommendations through cataloging and updating of agricultural research data already generated by the major research stations. The project would assist the Government to design and implement its program to review and revise policies and institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector by extending financing for MDB (the major policy analysis body) and PPMB (the financial monitoring institution) and to begin to coordinate the fragmented agricultural research system. 56. Specific components of the proposed project for the MOA are: (i) Assistance to the Planning Division, MDB: (a) five advisers for long term coasultancies of thirty staff months and short term consultancies totaling seven staff moniths; (b) ten staff years of overseas fellowship training; (c) vehicles and equipment; and (d) support staff and operating assistance. (ii) Assistance to the Planning Division, PPMB: (a) eleven advisers for long term consultancies of 252 staff months and short term consultancies of seven staff months; (b) nine staff years of overseas fellowship training and 50 staff months of local training; (c) vehicles and equipment; (d) support staff anid operating assistance; and (e) special studies on the effectiveness of technical assistance and the use of skilled Tanzaniani agricultural manpower, and on the design of a strategy for training and infrastructure development at the Sokoine University of Agriculture, and (iii) AssistaiLce to the Department of Research: (a) five lonig terra advisers for 30 staff months; - 20 - (b) vehicles and equipment; and (c) support staff and operating assistance. Detailed Features 57. Assistance to MDB. The technical assistance staff, consisting of a team leader (national), four marketing economists and one production economist would work with the eight counterparts now in post, and assist in training incremental staff to be recruited. The MOA has budgeted a net addition of two professional staff per year over each of the next three years. The technical assistance staff would continue to assist in expanding MDB's capacity to analyze more complex pricing strategies and marketing structures. The assistance also would enable MDB to assume a more substantive policy role on the reintroduction of cooperatives and the reversion of crop authorities to market board status. The project would support the continuation of comprehensive annual price reviews of agricultural products and of agriculturally derived products, and analysis of the budgetary and foreign exchange implications on parastatals and Government. Market research would be improved, more market information would be compiled, and the role of unofficial markets and new official marketing institutions would be more fully analyzed. Also, work would be expanded into the area of farm management/production economics in an effort to identify factors responsible for quantity and quality decline in agricultural production. 58. The analytical work on prices and sub-sector modeling has increased, with more work being performed on micro-computers. Currently only three Tanzania staff have full competentence in micro-computer use and two have basic familiarity. Therefore, micro-computer training will assume a high priority for the existing MDB staff and for staff who have transferred to parastatals. The project would finance one year overseas fellowships for 10 MDB staff, as needed, in agricultural economics, production economics, agricultural marketing, and price analysis (para. 69). 59. While MDB has had a very good in-house training program for its own staff, it has had a much broader de facto training role. The transfer of well trained staff to other agricultural and parastatal institutions has retarded the development of MDB but has benef-Ltted the sector at large. To stem the demand for MDB staff, the bureau wou:Ld undertake a larger training role for personnel in the Ministries of Planning and Economic Affairs, Finance, and Agriculture and Livestock Development, agricultural parastatals and cooperatives. The training would include basic policy analyses of pricing and marketing issues. 60. The project also would finance support staff, vehicles (five 4-wheel drive vehicles and four standard drive cars), equipment (micro-computers, word processors - to interface with the micro-computers in the preparation of statistical reports and facilitate timely revision of reports, particularly those directed to the Economic Committee of the Cabinet - a photocopier, and calculators), supplies, vehicle operating costs, and travel allowances. - 21 - 61. Assistance to PPMB. Technical assistance to PPMB would consist of the following professional staff: agricultural economist/chief technical adviser, two planning economists, project operations analyst, agronomist, agricultural engineer, irrigation drainage engineer, financial coordinator, cost accountant, management accountant, and management analyst. In addition, five U.N. volunteers would be recruited to provide semi- professional assistance and incremental support staff would also be financed. Government has created 16 counterpart posts of which 10 are filled, and has budgeted for the creation of 11 additional counterpart posts over the project period. A Tanzanian director/team leader has been identified and is expected to be appointed during FY84/85. 62. Under the project, PPMB's Project Preparation Unit would establish an inventory of all agricultural project proposals and, in collaboration with the central planning authorities, prepare a standardized set of appraisal criteria, determine priorities for preparation of new projects and revision of on-going projects, and provide technical support and training in project preparation for parastatal staff. The Monitoring Unit would ex?and and reorient its technical and financial monitoring activities toward restructuring or eliminating projects from the development budget, as warranted. The previously implemented financial reporting format (for parastatals) would be supplemented by in-depth project reviews, focusing on systems to provide timely management information. The Budget and Finance Unit (BFU) would focus on the financial restructuring of the agricultural parastatals, the divestiture of some marketing functions and the design/implementation of budget control and management systems. Sectoral planning would be strengthened and analyses of annual budget proposals would be emphasized. A training program on parastatal accounting and reporting procedures would be implemented and, in cooperation with MDB, the unit would provide training in monitoring financial and management performance for agricultural parastatals and cooperatives. Overall training support for PPMB staff would include nine years of fellowship training abroad in agricultural economics, financial analysis, management accounting and financial management and 50 staff months of in-service training, in project preparation, budgeting, accounting, etc. (para. 69). 63. The project would provide for vehicles (six 4-wheel drive vehicles, eight standard drive cars and two mini buses), equipment (micro-computer, a word processor to facilitate preparation of reports for the Cabinet, typewriters to make up for current shortage and to support increased staff, and calculators), furniture, supplies, vehicle operating costs, and travel allowances. 64. In view of Tanzania's extensive use of technical assistance, two special studies are included in the project: (i) the effectiveness of technical assistance and the use of skilled Tanzanian agricultural manpower; and (ii) the design of a strategy for training and infrastructure development of the Sokoine University of Agriculture (para. 43). The technical assistance study would address supply of and demand for high level manpower trained at the tertiary level, i.e. the level of most technical assistance staff. Components on the attrition and possible - 22 - recovery of public sector manpower, affordable demand (rather than ideal staff levels) and technical ass2istance replacement priorities would be included. Terms of reference for the study were discussed and agreed at negotiations. They are shown in Annex IV. This study would be undertaken by PPMB and finaniced by the Government as part of its contributionl to the project. The results of the study would be submitted to the Association by October 1, 1985 (Section 3.05 of the Development Credit Agreement). The Governiment would employ a consultant to work with the MOA, University, and other institutions to design terms of reference for production of a strategy for developing university level agricultural training and the associated infrastructure. The resulting terms of reference would be discussed and agreed with the Association. The Government would, by April 1, 1985, employ suitably qualified consultants, in accordance with the Bank Group guidelinies, to conduct the study in consultation with appropriate University Committees, MOA and the Ministry of Education, and by October 1, 1985 submit the study results to the Association for review and discussion. (Sections 3.02 and 3.06 of the Development Credit Agreement). While the training elements of this project address the development of skilled Tanzanian manpower for agricultural planning, the phasing out of technical assistance to the agricultural sector as a whole is a much broader issue. These studies would set the stage for developing a phase out strategy (para. 52). 65. Assistance to the Research Department. The project would provide technical assistance in the form of five zonal agronomists, who would be posted to the principal research station in five ecological zones and be responsible to the Director cf Research. The technical assistance staff would redress the fragmentation issue (para. 43) by providing needed technical advice in research orientation as well as by introducing needed continuity to research coordination and by reestablishing an externsion liaison. The fundamental task of the agronomists would include, inter alia, to: (i) review the zonal research recorcds and catalog the existing research data; (ii) in consultation with extension specialists, summarize the data into crop and area specific recommendations for extension service use; and (iii) provide technzcal guidance on problem-oriented research. They would be recruited and employed through an implementation agency, to be agreed with the Association. The project would finance 4-wheel drive transport and vehicle operating funds for the zonal agronomists. The Government would provide housing, support staff, office accommodation, and off-.ce and field equipment. Project Costs and Financing 66. Total project costs, net of taxes and duties, are estimated at US$L1.,.94 million of which US$10.03 million, or 84%, would be foreign exchange costs and US$1.91 million, or 16%, local costs. These costs were est.mated at 1984/85 prices and include physical contingencies for furniture and equipment of 10% for both local and foreign components. Price contlingencies for local components were estimated at 12% annually and for foreign components were estimated at 8.5% in 1985/86 and 9.0% thereafter. After the initial six month period January-June 1985, the project years would be coinsistent with the Government's fiscal year commencing July 1. - 23 - The project costs and contingency projections were adjusted to conform with this timing. These costs are based on recent consultants' contracts for similar work in Tanzania. The summarized project cost estimates are contained in Annex V. 67. The proposed IDA Credit of SDR 9.9 million (US$10.0 million equivalent) would finance over 99% of the foreign exchange component of the project. The Government's contribution to the project would be mainly in kind and personnel office space and housing, support and counterpart staff, office and field supplies and general operating support. The Government also would finance the technical assistance study. Implementation and Monitoring 68. The project would be managed and implemented by the MOA over a period of 30 months. The Director of Planning of the MOA would be responsible for implementing the MDB and PPMB components. However, FAO would continue as the implementation agency for these bureaus as requested by Government. The Director of Planning also would be responsible for the studies on the design of a training strategy at the Sokoine University of Agriculture and on the effectiveness and use of technical assistance. Implementation of the research component would be the responsibility of the Director of Research of the MOA. Individual technical assistance assignments would be undertaken in accordance with terms of reference contained in Annex VI. The studies; of university training and technical assistance would be implemented by PPMB and conducted under terms of reference agreed with the Association. 69. Annual work plans for the three institutions would be prepared and submitted to the Association for review prior to each project year. Semi-annual progress reports would be submitted describing, inter alia, the work accomplished, any significant deviation from the work plan and training undertaken. Also, project activities would be reviewed annually by representatives of the FAO, the MOA, and the Association. The MDB and PPMB would develop staff training programs which would be incorporated into the annual work plans. The training programs would describe the skill levels of existing staff and the proposed staffing pattern, with skill levels, at the termination of the project, and would be revised annually to adjust to unexpected attrition. The training programs would include a postgraduate training schedule identifying the staff to be awarded fellowships and defining the disciplines for study. They also would include an annual schedule of short courses (budgeting, project preparation, financial reports, etc.) and the participating staff. In addition, on-the-job training schedules identifying staff participants and supervisors, topics and duration would be indicated. The Association would supervise the project intensively, as it has for previous support to MDB and PPMB. - 24 - Procurement and Disbursement 70. Procurement arrangements are summarized in the table below: Procurement Method International Local Competitive Competitive Total Project Element Bidding(ICB) Bidding(LCB) Other N.A. Cost (US$ thousands) Technical assistance staff and FAO overheads/adminis- t:ration 6,923 6,923 (6,923) (6,923) Fellowships and -- -- 780 -- 780 Training (780) (780) Vehicles 435 -- -- -- 435 (435) (435) Ecuipment, Furniture and Materials -- 140 385 -- 525 (140) (106) (246) Special Studies __ -- 618 -- 618 (276) (276) Operating Expenses -- -- -- 2,658 2,658 (1,340) (1,340) TOTAL 435 140 8,706 2,658 11,939 (435) (140) (8,085) (1,340) (10,000) Ncte: F'igures in parentheses are the respective amounts financed by the Association. 71. The Government has requested and the Association has agreed that FAO would undertake recruitment of the specialist staff for MDB and PPMB. Technical assistance staff (US$6,923,000) hired under the project would be emiployed in accordance with the Bank Group's guidelines on the use of consultants. Training (US$780,000) would be at selected overseas and local institutions which meet the training requirements. Procurement of vehicles (US$435,000) would be grouped whenever possible, and orders of US$100,000 or more would be subject to international competitive bidding according to Bank. Group guidelines. Equ:ipment and furniture amounting to US$140,000 is expected to be purchased in lots of less than US$100,000 but more than US$10,000 through LCB. Add:Ltional equipment, furniture and materials purchases estimated to cost US$385,000 would be procured in lots of - 25 - US$10,000 or less through local shopping procedures acceptable to the Bank Group and through Government stores. The special studies (US$618,000) would be undertaken by MOA staff with consultancy staff selected in accordance with Bank Group guidelines. Incremental operating expenses of US$2,658,000 include: US$790,000 for professional and support staff (Tanzanian); US$427,000 for local travel; US$506,000 for vehicle operation and maintenance; US$612,000 for supplies; and US$323,000 for local support cost for research (housing, offices, etc.) for which procurement options do not apply but are subject to review by the Association. 72. Proceeds of the credit would be disbursed on the following basis: (i) 100% of total expenditures on techn4.cal assistance staff and FAO overhead/administrative costs; (ii) 100% of total expenditures on fellowships and training; (iii) 100% of foreign expenditures and 50% of local expenditures on vehicles, equipment, furniture, and materials; (iv) 100% of foreign expenditures for special studies; (v) total expenditures for operating expenses would be reimbursed on a declining scale of: 90% up to the time the aggregate amount of disbursements reaches US$360,000; 70% thereafter up to the time such aggre- gate amount reaches US$990,000; and 35% thereafter up to the time such aggregate amount reaches US$1,340,000. This would provide an average disbursement of approx- imately 60%. However, local support costs (housing, offices, etc.) for the research component would be excluded from reimbursement as they would be fully covered by the Government. Disbursements against equipment and operating expenses would be made on the basis of statements of expenditure. An estimated schedule of disbursements is contained in Annex VII. 73. Agreement was obtained at negotiations that except for salaries of local personnel, no taxes or duties would be levied on salaries or personal effects as defined by the law of the borrower. Accounts and Audits 74. The MOA would establish and maintain three separate accounts adequate to record and monitor the progress of each of the three major - 26 - project components.l/ The statement of accounts would be audited by independent auditors acceptable to the Association and submitted to the Association not later than six months after the end of each fiscal year (Section 4.01 (c) of the Development Credit Agreement). Special attention would be paid to statements of expenditure. Not later than six months after the closing date of completion of disbursements, the Government would prepare and submit to the Association a fulL report on the execution of the project. Benefits and Risks 75. The proposed projject would provide support for the Government's program to review and revise policies and institutional arrangements in the agricultural sector by assisting MDB in the improvement and expansion of pricing and marketing policy analyses and by strengthening PPMB's analytical and training capacity in parastatal financial management and reconstruction. The work cif MDB and PPMB would continue to provide donors and Government with studies and information for policy discussions and decisions. Specific aspects of their work, such as MDB's work on multi-channel market structures and on the declining quality of agricultural commodities and PPMB's work on parastatal and cooperative finances and management, would provide the basis for any future project on crop rehabilitation or crop processing. Similarly, the preservation of research information and extension package development would benefit any future lending for research and/or extension. The special studies would form the basis of a strategy for reducing external technical assistance and more effectively using and developing national expertise. 76. The project benefits can best be appreciated by considering the "without project" scenario. In this case, the annual review of official prices and reporting of informal market prices would continue, since this activity has been largely transferred to Tanzanian staff. Similarly, the monitoring of parastatal expenditures would be little affected. However, what would suffer are the innovative aspects of generating management information systems for parastatals, analyzing alternative market st:ructures and marketing institutions, assisting Government to define and identify investment priorities and agricultural policy analysis. Considerable progress has been achieved in training staff for the MDB and PPMB, but because of high demand for skilled technicians and attrition, crucial gaps remain. The training efforts of the project would contribute substantially to reducing the manpower gaps. Without the project, the Government would find further policy reform difficult as it would not have the capacity to generate the necessary information to support new policy decisions. The Association's capacity to contribute to the development of alternative policy ideas would also be severely affected by the loss of new descriptive data on the performance of the sector. 1/ A single account is normally maintained for a technical assistance project, but as this project contains three distinct components, three separate accounts are proposed. - 27 - 77. The major risk inherent in all technical assistance projects is delay in implementation due to late recruitment of personnel. To minimize this risk, the terms of reference for the long-term technical assistance staff would be agreed at negotiations. Similarly, terms of reference for the study on technical assistance would be agreed at negotiations. As Government has asked FAO to continue implementation of the MDB and PPMB components, and the Association has agreed there is little risk that the long-term technical assistance staff would fail to be integrated as counterpart staff are in place and FAO has a successful history of integrating technical assistance staff into MDB and PPMB. There is a greater risk of delay in recruiting technical assistance staff for the research component as it is a new initiative rather than an extension of an ongoing operation. To obviate this risk the cost estimate for this component incorporates contingencies based on the assumption that 36 months would be required to implement the 30-month project. The risk of integrating short-term consultants and implementing their recommendations into policy initiatives remains. To reduce this risk, counterpart staff would be assigned to work with the consultants. PART V. LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND AUTHORITY 78. The draft Development Credit Agreement between the United Republic of Tanzania and the Association and the Report of the Committee provided for in Article V, Section 1(d) of the Articles of Agreement of the Association are being distributed to the Executive Directors separately. 79. Special conditions of the project are listed in Section III of Annex III to this report. 80. I am satisfied that the proposed credit would comply with the Articles of Agreement of the Association. PART VI. RECOMMENDATION 81. I recommend that the Executive Directors approve the proposed credit. A.W. Clausen President Attachments Washington, D.C. August 16, 1984 -28- ANNEX I Page 1 of 6 T A B L E 3A PAGE 1 TANZANIA, UNITED REP. OF- SOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SHEET TANZANIA, UNITED REP. OF REFERENCE GROUPS (WE D AVERAGES) /a MOST (MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) /b RECENT LOW INCOME AFRICA MIDDLE INCOME 196L/b 197/Ib ESTIMATE/b SOUTH OF SAHARA AFRICA S. OF SAHARA AREA (THOUSAND SQ. PK) TOTAL 945.1 945.1 945.1 AGRICULTURAL 381.1 398.2 401.9 GNP PER CAPITA (US$) 70.0 120.0 280.0 /c 249.1 1112.9 ENERGY CONSUMPTION PER CAPITA (KILOGRAMS OF OIL EQUIVALENT) 17.0 50.0 50.0 62.8 529.0 POPULATION AND VITAL STATISTICS POPULATION,MID-YEAR (THOUSANDS) 10201.0 13300.0 19763.0 URBAN POPULATION (% OF TOTAL) 4.8 6.9 12.9 19.2 29.7 POPULATION PROJECTIONS POPULATION IN YEAR 2000 (M1LL) 36.4 STATIONARY POPULATION (MILL) 117.0 POPULATION MOMENTUM 2.0 POPULATION DENSITY PFR SQ. ElM. 10.8 14.1 20.2 32.5 55.8 PER SQ. KM. AGRI. LAND 26.8 33.4 47.6 119.2 111.5 POPULATION AGE STRUCŁURE (5) 0-14 YRS 42.7 44.4 46.2 45.6 45.4 15-64 YRS 54.3 52.5 50.8 51.5 51.7 65 AND ABOVE 3.0 3.1 3.0 2.9 2.9 POPULATION GROWTH RATE (X) TOTAL 2. 2 2.7 3.3 2.8 2.8 URBAS 5.O 6.3 8.5 6.2 5.2 CRUDE BIRTH RATE (PER THOUS) 46.f, 46.8 46.9 48.6 47.0 CRUDE DEATH RATE (PER THOUS) 22.4 18.6 14.8 17.7 15.2 GR1SS REPRODUCTION RATE 3.C 3.1 3.2 3.2 3.2 FAMILY PLANNING ACCEPTORS, ANNUAL (THOUS) .. .. 93.6 /d USERS (X OF MARRIED WOMEN) .. .. .. FOOD AND NUTRITION INDEX OF FOOD PROD. PER CAPITA (1969-71-100) 95.0 104.0 88.0 85.8 91.6 PER CAPITA SUPPLY OF CALORIES (% OF REQUIREMENTS) 90.0 91.0 83.0 86.4 98.2 PROTEINS (GRAMS PER DAY) 46.0 49.0 46.0 49.9 56.7 OF WHICH ANIMAL AND PULSE 18.0 21.0 20.0 /e 18.3 17.0 CHILD (AGES 1-4) DEATH RATE 31.0 24.0 18.4 23.8 18.7 HEALTH LIFE EXPECT. AT BIRTH (YEARS) 41.5 46.5 52.0 41.4 51.7 INFANT MORT. RATE (PER THOUS) 144.0 122.0 98.0 117.5 102.7 ACCESS TO SAFE WATER (%POP) TOTAL .. 13.0 39.0 /f 21.8 35.6 UIRBAN .. 61.0 88.0 /5 61.5 54.1 RURAL 9.0 36.0 /f 14.2 27.3 ACCESS TO EXCRETA DISPOSAL (X OF POPULATION) TOTAL .. .. 17.0 /f 32.0 URBAN .. .. 88.0 /f 69.2 RURAL .. .. 14.0 |f 24.8 POPULATION PER PHYSICIAN 18220.0 22240.0 17560.0 /e 27477.8 11948.3 POP. PER NURSING PERSON 11890.0/QL 7160.0 2980.0 /e 3396.2 2248.9 POP. PER HOSPITAL BED TOTAL 600.0 ,g 720.0 500.0 /e 1089.0 986.9 URBAN 60.0 Ij 60.0 80.0 /V 395.2 368.7 RURAL 1530.0 .. 1190.0 1W 3094.0 4012.1 ADMISSIONS PER HOSPITAL BED .. .. HOU1SING AVERAGE SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD TOTAL .. 4.4 /i URBAN 3.1 Ij 3.2 /l . RURAL ,, 4.5 / 5.3 /f AVERAGE NO. OF PERSONS/ROOM TOTAL .. .. URBAN 1.8 Ij .. .. . RURAL .. .. ACCESS TO ELECT. (X OF DWELLINGS) TOTAL .. .. URBAN .. .. RURAL .. .. -- 29 - ANNEX I Page 2 of 6 T A B L E 3A Page 2 TANZANIA, UNITED REP. OF- SOCIAL INDICATORS DATA SKEET TANZANIA, UNITED REP. OF REFERENCE GROUPS (WEIGHTED AVERAGES) /a MOST (MOST RECENT ESTIMATE) /b RECENT LOW INCOME AFRICA MIDDLE INCOME 1960/b 1970/b ESTIMATE/b SOUTH OF SAHARA AFRICA S. OF SAHARA EDUCATION ADJUSTED ENROLLMENT RATIOS PRIMARY; TOTAL 25.0 39.0 102.0 69.2 91.0 MALE 33.0 47.0 107.0 78.8 90.5 FEMALE 18.0 31.0 98.0 8.3 14.8 SECONDARY: TOTAL 2.0 3.0 3.0 13.1 17.4 MALE 2.0 4.0 4.0 17.6 23.7 FEMALE 1.0 2.0 2.0 8.3 14.8 VOCATIONAL (1 OF SECONDARY) 22.6 .. 1.8 7.2 5.3 PUPIL-TEACHER RATIO PRIMARY 45.0 46.0 43.0 46.1 38.6 SECONDARY 20.0 18.0 19.0 25.9 24.3 ADULT LITERACY RATE (1) 9.5 /g 28.1 /i 79.0 44.3 35.6 CONSUMPTION PASSENGER CARS/THOUSAND POP 2.4 2.5 2.6 /e 3.8 20.7 RADIO RECEIVERS/THOUSAND POP 2.0 11.3 27.0 41.9 100.8 TV RECEIVERS/THOUSAND POP .. 0.3 0.4 2.0 18.5 NEWSPAPER ("DAILY GENERAL INTEREST") CIRCULATION PER THOUSAND POPULATION 2.5 4.7 10.5 /k 5.4 17.2 CINEMA ANNUAL ATTENDANCE/CAPITA 0.5 .. 0.2 le 1.4 0.3 LABOR FORCE TOTAL LABOR FORCE (THOUS) 4735.0 5842.0 8004.0 FEMALE (PERCENT) 37.2 36.7 36.1 36.5 33.8 AGRICULTURE (PERCENT) 89.0 86.0 83.0 77.4 57.1 INDUSTRY (PERCENT) 4.0 5.0 6.0 9.8 17.4 PARTICIPATION RATE (PERCENT) TOTAL 46.4 43.9 40.5 41.0 36.3 MALE 59.1 56.3 52.7 52.1 47.6 FEMALE 34.0 31.8 28.7 30.2 25.1 ECONOMIC DEPENDENCY RATIO 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 INCOME DISTRIBUTION PERCENT OF PRIVATE INCOME RECEIVED BY HIGHEST 5% OF HOUSEHOLDS .. 24.7 HIGHEST 20% OF HOUSEHOLDS .. 50.4 LOWEST 20% OF HOUSEHOLDS .. 5.8 LOWEST 40% OF HOUSEHOLDS .. 16.0 POVERTY TARGET GROUPS ESTIMATED ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US$ PER CAPITA) URBAN .. .. 147.0 /1 168.3 525.3 RURAL .. .. 109.0 /T 90.8 249.0 ESTIMATED RELATIVE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (US$ PER CAPITA) URBAN .. .. 125.0 /1 107.7 477.4 RURAL .. .. 74.0 /i 65.0 186.0 ESTIMATED POP. BELOW ABSOLUTE POVERTY INCOME LEVEL (I) URBAN .. .. 10.0 1l 34.7 RURAL .. .. 60.0 /1 65.4 NOT AVAILABLE NOT APPLICABLE N O T E S /a The group averages for each indicator are population-weighted arithmetic means. Coverage of countries among the indicators depends on availability of data and is not uniform. /b Unless otherwise noted, "Data for 1960" refer to any year between 1959 and 1961; "Data for 1970" between 1969 and 1971; and data for "Most Recent Estimate" between 1980 and 1982. /c Mainland Tanzania only; /d 1976; /e 1977; /f 1975; /g 1962; /h Registered, not all practicing in the country; /1i 1967; /5 1958; /k 1979; /1 1978. JUNE, 1984 - 30- ANNEX I ____________________________ ~~~~ ~~ ~~Page 3 of 6 toos tthootto.Ott ae laet ft. cotocagsttslosPottOtOt al t.toolcalsat, talabs,II tood totOs ta 91stottc... 00....teot....ll ~.ott htaaaotOt. aC o toodtlta dtlltoo tt otctt ctObyIdftst tootca tt otatolt 01 tea 0* dtaat, ttt -lat."sOoSt teeclbt odet oOeogoood Otttttataot. ao asct.tsaottao soo. dffseo-s te s-o -h ISott-tta-.S 00s osttoocattoooattl.100550 DItttoI ...t...... toootooilaoo.to oooott.sa9a t5oaattq 'oo--050' -- ttatcof O t.ojsttotty eatsOtt'Iag loo 11fsttttt I-o -hs. 159.4 bc. ot tic o 10.Ps. at-so scoto lottaotc,ot .ffOlOO.a1 Otttttsteo. gcot0.oeft.atatcesate otolatit atattd sttfesotasats t aactodoacoaooscoat tly tat eIocot f th coottot I T-1.0faItt t htlotao.fo.OI oo-atge- o too- ola 9aaot th IOteot apoa tooololly OIoa o I ttta et. ooto etactod ctlattOsoeaasofoottttatttaottt. htasottsaasoloaatlboo.soogtatloaf oe odcsot -t laaoottocoto- ftt. 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Octate 010* e toocehtd loetac. oat tosetoldl ttal. otct, atoott coho oeostoc ttootooftotl)- tto o ott- -t0. oteto hotodtoot fa oo ftdedae-h ht I0qst Ittoo -- ooto.oohssts.a tot taaa911,0 lo o oetetots> t9tdo00lteSaIo sfcoO Itoel a-tCtotltS O1-00 o 9- at h Oooo,todI Ott at-- tls -tttSI. ttttlsttootoottct.ote tott,saoosbsot oeteots Ootooo-total cotat. atoooaltootttso.tsta ttcoalto lteao.OtO.toctOottolc Stt tllIolt-Io taotlO feet eoc oloos,oloa coltoootlc totl woolto g tdtocO ol otaloao atilt olItt, .....s c oell0 ac05ct- .eeo octot 0 .Ocolettloo- tteoocttooit attcOtetOOt cttol tta )etloeooiodittsttetaoc o 01thtocotictatt totttoctttotaooolctlott leoo.o o ta ltts tosl octt oOtool 10 Itocte teocl sot cost ItOOlt II" Y; 1 clo t-lat tosct.to toloIttio a od oooooo T-09100 "o tr ttof cllltst etlt ttl c tooloc.tto.tlstOtcb.0Oec St______ otclootoacoto-otl -lottoO-tcootlalatfal Otto Oatt.o ots~o0ccottotootol.atlt-t- Seolo otioyctlct'tloes t o tF toc t... osef ttoo woe soltstctsy totloo so tloa-tc -eo tttlat coleo ocoalt --lts-- lbloloc th octt~ ttoodicoceo.i . c ottotoot -c te ltttI.ta -ettoo-ot otalaf c ltt-tIooao ooat ltott o Sf ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ oottslt ococloo-toottls-stttolt ltOOt tot Itocto IOoattlococ tcola lttOt a sltol010tttaa otI t.. t ..lo octoo oecfoo cttod tstootO.Ocltto tcttttoltttafooliltotteOttOtttlotoooitoolosecotcloto0SIlttttel-toot - fIt otloooot- aoottct-Otttaltf.otoottt otto tttI ......ot t, Ctttc tllo oo.t0 0 o tetoth 10tOtttlo tOseIfat.oocotc"tIll,e otttol co 1 o. Iaoo0ao occctdoao Io c toeI.- Oe-o T acoOt--too t attI,tt Osltttl 0120 coaooo 0otolt o t 'o o tcottto ai oic cc ttlcoclso ttot o tocet -Otflmo olooattcetltat tooltoot o oh ttotoloo oot oto:. tit ltoolootOlool Itosolal,oc toto 0ctttoatttotcot ttoSsoolotott.ltostotoltsottIoso. tcOtototaeatteo feotofcttoco 0001 ItO, 10I oOOt Ito - 31 - ANNEX I Page 4 of 6 Population : 19.7 million (mid-1982) GNP Per Capita: US$260 (1982) TAIANIA - EOIIC INICATS a/ Amount Anmial Real Growth Rates (Z) Indicator (million US$ at current prices) Actual Projection 1982 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 19833'/ 1984 1985 NKAIGNAL AXXDLS Gross dosstic productd/ 5097.0 7.9 6.6 2.6 3.5 2.6 -0.7 -3.2 -0.5 2.8 3.1 Agriculture 2334.4 4.9 8.8 5.4 0.7 4.7 -8.2 -&7 -1.0 4.0 4.0 Industry 677.2 9.7 6.5 -4.1 13.9 -9.1 -10.9 -13.2 -3.0 2.0 2.5 Services 1515.6 7.0 7.6 2.2 2.6 6.1 6.4 3.1 -0.0 2.0 2.5 Casumption 4673.0 1.0 13.0 10.1 -7.9 6.8 -7.3 -2.0 1.1 5.1 2.8 Gross investnent 1024.3 12.5 1.2 9.2 20.2 -13.6 11.0 -4.6 -11.1 -0.3 -2.0 Exports of GNFS 556.5 3.9 -20.7 -6.3 12.2 0.6 12.5 -21.9 7.5 -9.7 4.3 lmports of GNFS 1157.5 -12.9 0.3 31.5 -17.4 -0.4 -7.0 -15.2 0.2 -1.4 -2.9 Gross domestic savings 423.3 136.3 -4.8 -60.8 139.6 -29.0 43.7 -13.4 -8.1 -0.3 7.8 PRICS GF deflator (1978 100) 77.7 92.() 100.0 105.5 114.0 128.2 140.3 144.8 158.5 173.6 Exchange rate (T.Sh. per US$) 8.4 8.3 7.7 8.3 8.2 8.3 9.3 11.3 17.0 17.0 Share of GDP at Market Prices (%) Average Anual Increase (.) (at current prices) (at constant 1978 prices) 1970 1975 1982 1985 1990 1970-75 1975-682 1982-85 1985-90 Gross domestic productd/ 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 4.7 2.8 1.9 3.7 Agriculture 36.9 36.9 45.8 46.4 47.5 2.1 1.5 2.5 4.4 Ixhustry 15.5 14.5 13.3 4.2 4.2 3.7 -1.1 0.6 3.4 Services 37.2 38.0 29.7 38.1 37.2 6.5 4.8 1.5 3.4 CoLeuqption 79.7 91.4 91.7 84.1 81.2 7.2 1.9 3.2 3.1 Gross investsant 22.5 21.1 20.1 18.4 17.5 0.1 4.8 -4.2 2.5 E;xprts QFS 26.1 19.8 10.9 14.2 17.0 -4.6 -2.2 -0.7 7.9 laports GNFS 28.1 32.3 22.7 16.7 15.8 0.4 -2.3 -1.4 2.6 Gross domstic savings 20.5 8.6 8.3 12.0 14.4 -15.4 4.4 -0.4 7.7 As % of GDP FY71 FY78 FY83 PUBLIC FlAl Current revem 17.8 19.3 21.6 GLirrert experditures 16.3 18.3 28.6 Surplus (+) or deficit (-) 1.5 1.0 -7.0 Capital experditures 7.8 9.8 16.0 Foreigs financirg 2.9 2.1 8.6 1970-75 1975-82 1982-85 1985-90 UIER IDICA3TCS GNP growth rate (%) 4.7 2.8 1.8 3.8 GNP per capita groath rate (%) 1.4 -0.5 -0,3C/ 0.6 ICOR 3.6 8.4 11.4 4.7 Marginal savings rate -0.4 0.4 -0.2 0.3 lIaort elasticity 0.08 -0.82 -0.7 0.7 a/ Mainan only. Preliminary estimate. t 1983-85 At market price; canponents are expressed at factor cost. - 32 - ANNEX I Page 5 of 6 Population: 19.7 million (misd-1982) (NP Per Capita: US$260 (1982) TA1mZ.ANlA - ECIENAL TRAIE a/ Amounit Amaial Real Grawth Rates (%) Indicator (million US$ at (at cosutant 1978 prices) current prices) Actual Projection 1982 1976 1977 1978 1979 198D 1981 1982 1983iE 1984 1985 EX[ElL IAEE Mercbandise exports 444.1 7.7 -21.7 -3.5 14.5 -1.8 10.1 -16.6 8.8 -9.8 5.1 Major primary products 357.8 9.4 -20.0 -9.8 2.8 -8.5 42.2 -20.0 8.0 -10.2 7.6 Others 86.3 2.9 -26.6 16.4 43.3 9.9 -37.0 -9.8 13.4 -8.7 -1.3 Merebandise im,orts 1109.6 -16.7 2.1 32.6 -17.0 -2.3 -5.2 -10.0 -2.2 -1.8 -3.4 Foodgrains 104.1 -46.5 -31.9 -0.6 -48.2 286.3 -29.2 -14.4 -7.9 -33.7 -50.0 Petroleun 249.7 21.4 -20.5 4.1 -18.6 27.1 -15.5 -18.7 13.7 1.2 0.0 Machinery and equipment 394.2 -14.5 24.9 52.1 -7.8 -25.5 14.8 -20.3 -6.6 0.0 -2.4 Others 361.6 -17.0 3.8 20.1 -22.4 -7.7 -13.1 9.9 -0.7 4.0 2.6 PRICS Export price index 111.0 84.5 114.6 100.0 107.3 114.2 105.7 111.0 134.4 98.3 108.8 Import price index 174.0 82.3 92.9 100.0 124.6 144.1 143.6 174.0 175.1 155.6 164.4 Terms cf trade index 63.8 102.7 123.4 100.0 86.1 79.3 73.6 63.8 76.8 63.1 66.2 Composition of Merchandise Trade (Z) Average Amual Increase (Z) (at current prices) (at conatant 1978 prices) 1970 1975 1982 1985 1990 1970-75 1975-82 1982-85 1985-90 Exports 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 -4.2 -1.5 2.1 8.2 Major pri3sry products 59.2 66.3 69.0 73.2 71.6 -1.0 -2.2 1.4 7.5 Others 40.8 33.7 31.0 26.8 28.4 -10.5 -0.4 0.4 10.2 Irorts 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 1.9 -1.8 -0.3 2.8 Foodgrairs 7.7 17.7 9.4 3.5 1.6 23.4 -5.3 -23.4 -9.4 Petroleum 3.1 8.0 12.0 12.4 11.1 -4.0 -4.6 0.3 0.1 Madcinery and equipment 35.2 31.1 35.5 42.4 43.1 -1.1 2.7 0.7 2.3 Others 54.0 43.2 43.1 41.6 44.3 0.9 -3.7 3.3 3.6 Share of Trade with Share of Trade with Share of Trade with Industrial Countries (%) Developirg Countries (Z) Capital Surplus Oil Exporters (X) 1970 1975 1982 1970 1975 1982 1970 1975 1982 DIRECIOCN OF TRADE Exports 54.0 47.4 56.0 40.0 48.9 37.4 0.6 3.6 1.0 importa 57.9 58.0 68.2 27.3 34.8 23.2 1.2 6.2 3.9 a/ Data are for all Tanzania (Mainland and Zanzibar) -1 Estinate - 33 - ANNEX I Page 6 of 6 TAtIA - hAIAW OF PAYM1S, EXEUAL CAPITAL AND IEBT (million tS$ at current prices) Actual Projectizn Indicator 1970 1975 1978 1980 1981 1982 1983.a/ 1984 1985 1990 BAIAN OF PAYMEN Export of aods ard services 346 518 632 755 774 559 606 629 725 1405 of which: Merchandise f.o.b. 252 376 480 576 580 444 477 501 583 1146 Imports of gWods ard services 375 840 1269 1412 1301 1186 1237 1276 1313 1917 of which: Merchandise c.i.f. 318 770 1144 1252 1175 1110 1159 1183 1207 1743 Net transfersb/ 6 -10 19 19 23 20 21 22 23 30 Current acCODt balance -24 -332 -618 -638 -503 -607 -610 -625 -565 -482 Official grant receipts 7 112 146 109 204 95 145 163 150 170 M & LT loans (net) 73 171 136 132 214 120 312 287 305 322 Official 72 171 144 127 213 119 284 270 29 322 Private 2 - -8 4 1 1 28 17 15 - Other capitslc/ -9 66 -46 399 94 341 213 235 170 30 harnge in reserves = increase)d/ -47 -17 290 -2 -9 51 -60 -60 -60 -40 International reservesd/ 99 130 46 98 107 44 104 164 224 444 Reserves as mDnths importsdf 3.7 2.0 0.5 0.9 1.1 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.8 EXIEKNAL CAPITAL AND IEBT Gross disbursaemnts 60 344 317 297 429 350 Official grants 6 112 146 109 204 95 Cncasaional loars 40 191 106 110 227 187 TAC'/ 20 88 64 20 69 53 opf: - - - 3 17 2 Mk 9 20 24 35 84 65 Other 11 83 18 52 57 67 Nxrcacessional loam 14 41 65 78 43 68 Official export credits - 1 45 27 11 29 IBRD 5 40 17 22 17 10 Other maltilateral - - - - 4 6 Private 9 - 3 29 11 23 External Debt Debt outstandirg and disbursed 323 798 1141 1338 1497 1618 Official 193 747 1098 12M1 1410 1537 Private 129 51 43 77 86 81 ULdisbursed debt 408 419 546 919 928 1012 Debt service Total service pyments 26 29 38 52 54 113 Interest 10 11 18 31 27 38 Payments as % exports 7.5 5.9 6.1 7.2 7.0 20.2 Average interest rate on new loars (x) 1.6 3.0 2.6 2.3 2.4 4.0 Official 1.5 3.0 2.6 1.8 2.4 2.5 Private 7.0 - - 9.4 - 7.6 Average mturity of new loans (years) 38.8 32.6 35.4 28.7 32.1 30.7 Official 39.7 32.6 35.4 29.9 32.1 35.5 Private 7.2 - - 10.9 - 18.6 As % of Debt Outstandirg at End of 1982 Maturity structure of debt outstardirg Maturities dte within 5 years 47.2 Maturities due within 10 years 46.6 Interest structure of debt outstardirg Interest due within first year 2.8 a/ Fatimate D/ ECludirg official grant receipts. C hcui suppliers credit, use of the IF credit, World Bark and OPEC prcgram loars, IMF 1rust furd, errors and od.asios and build up of arrears. _ d/ Without IMF credit. -34- ANNEX II Page 1 of 3 THE STATUS OF BANK GROUP OPERATIONS IN TANZANIA A. STATEMENT OF BANK LOANS AND IDA CREDITS TO TANZANIA AS OF MARCH 31, 1984 (US$ million) Amount less cancellation No. Year Borrower Purpose Bank i/ TW IDA '/ Undisbursed Eleven loans, one Third Window loan, and thirty credits fully disbursed. 156.37 29.99 290.06 1128-TA 1975 Tanzania Mwanza Textile 2/ 15.00 0.53 607-TA 1976 Tanzania Fifth Education 11.00 3.94 1385T-TA 1977 Tanzania Morogoro Industrial Complex 11.50 0.92 1386-TA 1977 Tanzania Morogoro Industrial Complex 11.50 0.48 703-TA 1977 Tanzania Rural Development (Tabora) 7.20 3.02 732-TA 1977 Tanzania Second Sites and Services 12.00 3.18 743-TA 1977 Tanzania TruckLng 15.00 2.40 801-TA 1978 Tanzania Second Cashewnut 27.50 6.66 803-TA 1978 Tanzania Rural Dev. (Mwanza/Shinyanga) 12.00 4.22 1607-TA 1978 Tanzania Morogoro Textile 25.00 21.01 833-TA 1978 Tanzania Morogoro Textile 20.00 0.56 860-TA 1979 Tanzania Tourism Rehabilitation 14.00 7.74 861-TA 1979 Tanzania Sixth Education 12.00 9.00 1650-TA 1979 Tanzania Mufinli Pulp and Paper 30.00 14.69 976-TA 1979 Tanzania Fifth Highway 20.50 5.98 1745-TA 1979 TDFL Tanganyika Dev. Fin. Co., Ltd. 11.00 1.33 1750-TA 1979 TIB Tanzania Investment Bank 25.00 6.35 387-TA 1980 Tanzania TanzarLia Rural Dev. Bank 10.00 9.29 1007-TA 1980 Tanzania Pyrethrum 10.00 6.50 1015-TA 1980 Tanzania Grain Storage and Milling 43.00 37.03 1037-TA 1980 Tanzania Smallholder Tea 14.00 11.07 1056-TA 1981 Tanzania Seventh Education 25.00 23.63 1060-TA 1981 Tanzania Technical Assistance II 3/ 11.00 6.78 1070-TA 1981 Tanzania Coconut Pilot 3/ 6.60 4.29 l.33-TA 1981 Tanzania Export Rehabilitation Program 3/ 47.10 4.37 l173-TA 1982 Tanzania Telecommunications I 3/ 25.30 13.18 1199-TA 1982 Tanzania Songo-Songo Petroleum II 3/ 20.30 0.51 1206-TA 1982 Tanzania Technical Assistance III 1/ 12.00 8.59 1229-TA 1982 Tanzania Sao Hill Forestry-Phase II 3/ 12.00 9.37 1271-TA 1982 Tanzania Urban Water Supply (Suppl.)_/4/ 4.00 0.94 1312-TA 1983 Tanzania Dar es Salaam Sewerage and 22.50 19.85 Sanitation 3/4/ 1370-TA 1983 Tanzania Mufindi Pulp and Paper MilL 18.00 17.50 Tech. Asst. & Energy Conv.3 1371-TA 1983 Tanzania Coal Engineering 3/4/ 6.30 6.30 1405-TA 1984 Tanzania Mtera Hydroelectric Power 3/4/ 35.00 35.00 Total 273.87 41.49 763.36 of which has been repaid 45.62 - 12.45 Total now outstanding 228.25 41.49 750.91 Amount sold .09 of which has been repaid .09 Total now held by Bank and IDA 1/ 228.25 41.49 750.91 Total undisbursed 44.39 0.92 260.90 306.21 1/ Net of exchange adjustments. 2/ Since these projects have recently been completed, loan/credit accounts will soon be closed. 3/ Sixth replenishment; approximatte US$ equivalent of SDR's. 4/ Not yet effective. - 35 - ANNEX II Page 2 of 3 B. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF BANK LOANS FOR COMMON SERVICES GUARANTEED BY KENYA, TANZANIA AND UGANDA AS OF MARCH 31, 1984 (US$ million) Loan Amount (less cancellations) No. Year Borrower Purpcse Bank 1/ Undisbursed Ten loans fully disbursed 228.93 1204-EA 1976 EADB Development Finance 14.10 0.03 Total 243.03 0.03 of which has been repaid 91.63 Total now outstanding 151.40 Amount sold 24.36 of which has been repaid 24.36 0.00 Total now held by Bank 151.40 Total undisbursed 0.03 0.03 / Net of exchange adjustments. - 36- ANNEX II Page 3 of 3 C. STATEMENT OF IFC INVESTMENT IN TANZANIA AS OF MARCH 31, 1984 Fiscal Amount in US$ Million Year Obligor Type of Business Loan Equity Total 1960 & Kilombero Sugar Food Processing 3.96 0.70 4.66 1964 Company 1978 Highland Soap and Soap Manufacture 1.38 0.36 1.74 Allied Products Limited 1979 Metal Products Household Utensils 1.33 0.18 1.51 Total gross commitments 6.67 1.24 7.91 Less cancellations, terminations, repayments and sales 4.17 0.69 4.86 Total commitments, now held by IFC 2.50 0.55 3.05 Total undisbursed. 0.06 - 0.06 - 37 - ANNEX III TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Supplementary Project Data Sheet Section I: Timetable of Key Events (a) Time taken by the country to prepare the project: 2 months (b) Agency which prepared project: MOA with assistance from the Association (c) Date of first presentation to the Association and date of first mission to consider the project: June 1983 (d) Date of departure of Appraisal Mission: October 1983 (e) Date of departure of Post Appraisal Mission: February 1984 (f) Date of completion of negotiations: August 1984 (g) Planned date of effectiveness: December 1984 Section II: Special Association Implementation Action None Section III: Special Conditions of the Project (a) The Government would, by October 1, 1985, submit to the Association the results of the study on the effectiveness of technical assistance and the use of skilled Tanzanian agricultural manpower, (para. 64 and Section 3.05 of the Development Credit Agreement). (b) The Government would: (i) by April 1, 1985, commence a study to design a strategy for training and infrastructural development at the Sokoine University of Agriculture,and (ii) by October 1, 1985 submit the study results to the Association (para. 64 and Sections 3.02 and 3.06 of the Development Credit Agreement). (c) The Government would ensure that the project accounts are audited by independent auditors not later than six months after the end of each fiscal year (para. 74 and Section 4.01 (c) of the Development Credit Agreement). -38 - ANNEX IV Page 1 of 3 TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Terms of Reference for Study of Technical Assistance and Skilled Agricultural Manpower 1. Scope of Study: The study concerns university graduates used and needed by the agricultural sector from independence to the year 2000; together with agricultural graduates used in any sector, (i.e., accountants, economists and pure scientists used in the agricultural sector are to be included, as are agricultural graduates used in teaching, diplomatic service, etc.) including effectiveness of technical assistance personnel employed in the agricultural sector. 2. Date Sources: The major data sources are expected to be (i) the Ministry of Manpower Development and Labour, (ii) the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, (iii) the Prime Minister's Office, (iv) the Sokoine University of Agriculture and (v) the agricultural parastatals. Some primary data collection on career structure, utilized skills and job content will also be necessary. Some useful data is available in the USAID, Tanzanian Agricultural Sector Study, Vol. 1, 1980. 3. Terms of Reference: The study will involve the following major aspects: (i) Use of Trained Manpower by Employers Provide a table of skills used by employers over time. This will include filled and vacant positions and whether incumbents were local or expatriate, and how well qualified. The time period concerned will be from independence to the present. (ii) Career Profiles of Trained Manpower Provide a table of skills of trained manpower by employer over time. This will show how graduates have been used, how many have gone onto higher degrees, and how many have "leaked" into administration, politics, private sector and/or overseas employment. Again the time period should be from independence to the present. (iii) Skills Provided by Technical Assistance Provide an analysis of skills provided by technical assistance, over time, how financed, cost, and whether the positions filled were structured or supernumerary. Again the tme period should be from independence to the present. - 39 - ANNEX IV Page 2 of 3 (iv) Projected Skill Requirements Projections of skill requirements by employer from the present until 2000 on three assumptions: (a) No change in staffing, (b) Total staff the same, but employer allowed to change the skill mix, and (c) A 3% growth in staff p.a. (v) Projected Supply/Demand Balance Utilizing the career profile data assembled in (ii) above, and expected university output, projections of supply/demand in balance to the year 2000 will be made on the assumption (a) that technical assistance continues to be available at present levels, and (b) that technical assistance is phased out by 2000. (vi) Sample Survey of Satisfaction with Technical Assistance For a 10% sample of existing technical assistance the relevant employer will be asked to evaluate performance and contribution in terms of the following characteristics. (a) type of position or job (b) technical competence and experience (c) ability to establish good working relationships (d) understands/appreciates the politics of development (e) previous experience (f) ability to work in a team (g) adapts expertise to local situation (h) listens/responds to local colleagues (i) degree of specification in TOR (j) borrowers perception of the necessity of TA (k) was the TA at the insistence of a donor agency (1) did project/program have a local manager (m) availability of counterparts (n) were counterparts appropriate for the position (o) priority of the position Survey results will be confidential and will only be reported on a pooled basis. (vii) Interpretive Analysis An interpretive analysis of the above data will be written to highlight any skills in particularly short (or over) supply, to show the value of technical assistance over time and any changes in its composition, and to assess the practicality of dispensing with technical assistance by, say, the year 2000, or earlier. And to include specific recommendations to accelerate the use of local expertise. - 40 - ANNEX IV Page 3 of 3 4. Staffing: Leadership of the study will be the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Development, but consideration could be given to letting a contract to Sokoine University of Agriculture, or Institute of Development Management, Mzumbe, or the Economic Research Eureau, or ESAMI, or NIP to carry out the major data assembly tasks. At least one PPMB staff member should be assigned to the study on a full-time basis. - 41 - ANNEX V Page 1 of 9 TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Total Project Costs FE Local Foreign Total -------US$ '000 … _- __ Base Costs MDB 443.7 3,127.9 3,571.6 88 PPMB 822.9 4,510.0 5,332.9 85 Research 394.7 1,430.3 1,825.0 78 Base Cost 1,661.3 9,068.2 10,729.5 85 Contingencies Price 223.1 938.0 1,161.1 81 Physical 24.0 24.6 48.6 51 GRAND TOTAL 1,908.4 10,030.8 11,939.2 84 March 12, 1984 MDB Program Support Base Costs by Project Year (US$ '000) PY1 PY2 PY3 FE Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Total % Team Leader & Experts 272.5 545.0 545.0 1,362.5 100 Consultants/Contractual Services 39.0 69.0 61.0 169.0 100 Local Professional Staff 12.3 29.5 34.4 76.2 0 Support Staff 6.3 34.0 12.5 68.0 12.6 68.0 201.4 82 Travel 29.2 59.8 62.7 151.7 100 1 Vehicles 28.0 48.0 34.0 110.0 100 Other Equipment 32.8 35.0 65.6 65.0 65.6 60.0 324.0 49 Fellowship/Training 81.8 160.5 148.1 390.4 100 Vehicle 0 & M 9.8 18.6 19.6 35.1 23.8 30.9 137.8 61 Supplies/General 20.5 42.0 45.1 63.8 53.3 64.1 288.8 59 Overhead (13%) 75.4 144.8 139.6 359.8 100 TOTAL 71.7 665.5 172.3 1,259.0 189.7 1,213.4 3,571.6 88 ' M 0 March 12, 1984 MDB Program Support Total Base Costs TSh '000-- -------US$ '000 - FE Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total % Team Leader & Experts 16,622.5 16,622.5 1,362.5 1,362.5 100 Consultants/Contractual Services 2,061.8 2,061.8 169.0 169.0 100 Local Professional Staff 930.0 930.0 76.2 76.2 0 Support Staff 383.1 2,074.0 2,457.1 31.4 170.0 201.4 84 Travel 1,850.7 1,850.7 151.7 151.7 100 Vehicles 1,342.0 1,342.0 110.0 110.0 100 Other Equipment 2,000.8 1,952.0 3,952.8 164.0 160.0 324.0 49 Fellowships/Training 4,762.9 4,762.9 390.4 390.4 100 Vehicles 0 & M 649.0 1,032.1 1,681.1 53.2 84.6 137.8 61 Supplies/General 1,450.6 2,072.8 3,523.4 118.9 169.9 288.8 59 Overhead (13%) 4,389.6 4,389.6 359.8 359.8 100 TOTAL 5,413.5 38,160.4 43,573.9 443.7 3,127.9 3,571.6 88 0 March 12, 1984 PPMB Program Support Base Costs by Project Year (US$ '000) PYl PY2 PY3 FE Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Total % Experts 459.0 943.5 841.5 2,244.0 100 Consultants & Contractual Services 56.0 40.0 50.0 146.0 100 Local Professional Staff 40.2 80.4 80.4 201.0 0 Support Staff 7.4 32.0 14.9 64.0 14.9 25.8 159.0 77 U.N. Volunteers 36.5 73.0 73.0 182.5 100 Travel 8.6 40.5 17.2 84.0 17.2 82.8 250.3 83 Vehicles 63.7 70.4 79.1 213.2 100 Equipment 12.2 30.9 24.5 7.0 24.5 1.0 100.1 38 Fellowships 62.8 125.6 125.6 314.0 100 Supplies/General 21.1 22.5 42.2 45.0 42.2 45.0 218.0 52 Vehicles 0 & M 15.0 32.2 30.0 64.4 30.0 64.4 236.0 68 Special Studies 275.0 225.0 25.0 25.0 - - 550.0 45 Overhead (13%) 137.9 200.4 180.5 518.8 100 or z TOTAL 379.5 1,199.0 234.2 1,742.3 209.2 1,568.7 5,332.9 85 4 I-h March 12, 1984 PPMB Program Support Total Base Costs - ---TSh '000 ---------- ---------US$ '000 --------- FE Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total % Experts 27,376.8 27,376.8 2,244.0 2,244.0 100 Consultants/Constractual Services 1,781.2 1,781.2 146.0 146.0 100 Local Professional Staff 2,452.2 2,452.2 201.0 201.0 0 Support Staff 453.8 1,486.0 1,939.8 37.2 121.8 159.0 77 U.N. Volunteers 2,226.5 2,226.5 182.5 182.5 100 Lin Travel 524.6 2,529.1 3,053.7 43.0 207.3 250.3 83 Vehicles 2,601.0 2,601.0 213.2 213.2 100 Equipment 746.6 474.6 1,221.2 61.2 38.9 100.1 38 Fellowships 3,830.8 3,830.8 314.0 314.0 100 Supplies/General 1,287.1 1,372.5 2,659.6 105.5 112.5 218.0 52 Vehicles 0 & M 915.0 1,964.2 2,879.2 75.0 161.0 236.0 68 Special Studies 3,660.0 3,050.0 6,710.0 300.0 250.0 550.0 45 0 Overhead (13%) 6,319.6 6,319.6 518.0 518.0 100 TOTAL 10,039.3 55,012.3 65,051.6 822.9 4,510.0 5,332.9 85 March 12, 1984 Research Support Base Costs by Project Year (US$ '000) PYI PY2 PY3 PY4 FE Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Total Z International Experts 153.0 510.0 510.0 102.0 1,275.0 100 Support Staff 5.0 25.0 25.0 5.0 60.0 0 Local Support Costs (Housing, Offices etc6) 33.0 110.0 120.0 22.0 285.0 0 Vehicles 70.0 70.0 100 Vehicles 0 & M 3.0 9.5 12.1 18.9 12.1 18.9 6.0 9.5 90.0 63 > Supplies/Operating Costs 1.5 4.5 6.0 9.0 6.0 9.0 3.0 6.0 45.0 63 TOTAL 42.5 237.0 153.1 537.9 163.1 537.9 36.0 117.5 19825=0 78 0' F-h M March 12, 1984 Research Support Total Base Costs -…-TSh '000-------- -…-US$ '000--- FE Local Foreign Total Local Foreign Total X International Experts 15,555.0 15,555.0 1,275.0 1,275.0 100 Support Staff 732.0 732.0 60.0 60.0 0 Local Support Costs (Housing, Offices etc.) 3,477.0 3,477.0 285.0 0 285.0 0 Vehicles 854.0 854.0 70.0 70.0 100 Vehicles 0 & M 405.0 693.0 1,098.0 33.2 56.8 90.0 63 Supplies/Operating Costs 201.3 347.7 549.0 16.5 28.5 45.0 63 TOTAL 4,815.3 17,449.7 22,265.0 394.7 1,430.3 1,825.0 78 Ith M 1Z (D.. 0 March 12, 1984 Summary by Year and Price Contingencies (US$ '000) PY1 PY2 PY3 PY4 Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Local Foreign Total MDB 71.7 665.5 172.3 1,259.0 189.7 1,213.4 3,571.6 PPMB 379.5 1,199.0 234.2 1,742.3 209.2 1,568.7 5,332.9 Research 42.5 237.0 153.1 537.9 163.1 537.9 36 117.5 1,825.0 SUB TOTAL 493.7 2,101.5 559.6 3,539.2 562.0 3,320.0 36 117.5 10,729.5 Price Contingency 1/ 67.1 300.8 143.0 606.4 13 30.8 1,161.1 TOTAL 493.7 2,101.5 626.7 3,840.0 705.0 3,926.4 49 148.3 1,1890.6 1/ Local costs at 12% annually. Foreign exchange costs at 8.5% in PY2 and 9% thereafter. March 12, 1984 0 h -49 - ANNEX V Page 9 of 9 Physical Contingency Estimates Local Foreign Total ---------US$ 1,000 … Furniture and Equipment MDB 164.0 185.0 349.0 PPMB 61.2 38.9 100.1 Research 15.0 22.5 37.5 SUB TOTAL 240.2 246.4 486.6 Physical Contingencies 1, 24.0 24.6 48.6 1/ 10% local and foreign. March 12, 1984 -50 - ANNEX VI Page 1 of 18 TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultants for MDB Project Coordinator/Team Leader Would be responsible for the overall supervision and day-to-day rnanagement of the project, for coordinating the activities of all Tanzanian and expatriate staff attached to the Project, for the procurement, use and maintenance of all Project equipment and supplies financed from both Government and Project funds, and for maintaining liaison with the MOA and other Government Ministries and institutions. In particular, would be responsible for: (a) preparing, in conjuction with the MOA, the Bank Group and FAO, an annual work plan including its implemention after approval by all parties concerned; (b) preparing and submitting of semi-annual Project Progress Reports; (c) developing and implementing a training program for Tanzanian staff. - 51 - ANNEX VI Page I-of 18 lerms of Reference for Long Term Conisultanits for M1DB Marketing Economist (Price Policy Analysis) Under the general direction of the Tanzanian Project Coordinator, would assume overall responsibility for the preparation of the Annual Price Review. This would involve coordinating the inputs of the entire professional staff of the project. Price policy analysis techniques employed during Project should be further developed. Particular focus here should be on:- (a) development of an overall agricultural price policy model; (b) development of individual commodity models to examine the effects of different levels of producer price on quantity purchased, parastatal costs (particularly fixed costs per unit purchased), parastatal losses, and export earnings/import savings; (c) identification of regional price differentials to reflect marketing costs (this will be of considerable importance early in the life of the project with the reintroduction of cooperative marketing); (d) analysis of net foreign exchange generation/saving capacity of major commodities (this is important not only as a key factor influenctng producer price recommendations but also to assist in the rational allocation of foreign exchange to the agricultural sector); (e) improvement of pricing for domestically consumed products (grains,oilseeds, and sugar together with those products for which a ready export market exists but which are also the raw materials for domestically produced textiles, gunny bags, cigarettes, instant coffee etc); (f) analysis of prices for agricultural inputs subsidised by Government (e.g. fertilizer); (g) analysis of world market price for commodities relevant to Tanzania. In addition, would carry out other studies relating to any aspect of pricing and marketing policy as required. Training of counterpart staff and participation in MDB-organized training courses/workshops would be a major activity. - 52 - ANNEX VI Page 3 of 18 Terms of Refereiice for Long Term Consultants for MvWB Marketing Economist (Market Information) Working with two counterparts, the major responsibility would be to collect, analyse, and disseminate information on the staple food marketing system. This refers to both the formal sector, including parastatals and cooperatives, and also the informal marketing system. In particular, the group would: (a) maintain a nationwide reporting system for agricultural prices including training seminars and site visits. The group will increase the acczuracy and scope of information, particularly accuracy of measurement, and decrease the time required for transferal of data to Dar es Salaam; (b) maintain a micro-computer data base of regional prices, volumes, and transfers on the official market, and prices and trade patterns on the unofficial market; (c) publish once each month the Monthly Market Bulletin, containing deta.iled retail price reports for food commodities with appropriate time series. Efforts should be made to develop appropriate indexes of food costs by region, based on local consumption patterns; (d) conduct studies and analysis in order to advise on the appropriate role of central government in the food marketing system, relative to the coops and other channels. This will include analysis of buffer stock management, priority regions for procurement and for sales, and appropriate policy instruments for achieving target procurement levels; (e) contribute substantially to the annual price review for food crops. On-the-job training of counterpart staff and participation in MDB- organized training courses/workshops would be important components of the job. -53 - ANNEX VI Page 4 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultants for MDB Marketing Economist (Training) The major responsibility of this position would be to organize and carry out the series of training and information seminars that will be developed as an extended facet of MDB's activities. Seminars would be arranged to meet the needs of several levels of Tanzania's relevant managers and administrators. These include: (a) executive level seminars for agricultural parastatal managers describing current marketing techniques prevailing in associated international industries by a mixture of FAO experts, local experts and participants in international trade; (b) seminars for middle level public servants in the Ministries comprising the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Agricultural Pricing (Ministry of Development and Planning, Treasury, MOA, etc.) designed to further promote an awareness of positive pricing strategies; (c) mid-level seminars and workshops for management information, efficiency and productivity needs; (d) production level training sessions for various groups, e.g. cooperatives, private businesses and CCM (Chama cha Mapinduzi - the Party) groups, on local marketing procedures, organizational practice and financial management methods. There would necessarily be a great deal of liaising with the other groups participating in such training activities; i.e. local organizations such as Institute for Finance Management (IFM), National Institute for Productivity (NIP) and the University of Dar es Salaam; other FAO projects working in this field including PPMB; short term FAO or other consultants; and any other international aid group that may wish to contribute knowledgeable personnel to a particular seminar series. A secondary, but none-the-less highly important activity, would be in the field of staff development: for MDB Tanzanian professional personnel. The primary focus would be to plan on-the-job and postgraduate training programs for all new entrants to MDB, but staff who had been with the bureau for long periods could also take advantage of counselling. - 54 - ANNEX VI Page 5 of 18 Terms of Reference for Loing Term Consultants for MDB Marketing Economist (Operations) Major responsibility would be to advise on technical aspects of marketing, both domestic and international. Also important would be the procurement of data from cooperatives, parastatals and other marketing institutions for inclusion in the agricultural price analysis carried out in MD)B. Specific areas where marketing advice could be required include: (a) operation of primary cooperative societies; (b) operation of cooperative unions; (c) determination of cooperative/parastatal interface; (d) review of the implications of legislation under which marketing institutions, particularly MOA parastatals, operate. (e) assistance in the establishment of more appropriate grading standards for produce at all levels, particularly primary procurement; (f) monitoring of developments in international marketing and trade relevant to Tanzanian institutions marketing agricultural products; (g) on-the-job trairnin,g of counterparts and assistance with MDB-organized training courses/workshops. - 55 - ANNEX VI Page 6 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultants for MDB Production Economist In close collaboration with counterpart staff, the Production Economist would be responsible for further improving the quality and usefulness of crop cost of production data used in the Price Review. Specific focus would be on: (a) obtaining data on estimates of zonal (as opposed to national) cost of production, a considerable amount of which has become available in the past two years from the various Iategrated Rural Development Projects in Tanzania; (b) investigating seasonal smallholder labor input requirements (in the past annual requirements have mainly been considered); (c) improving the consistency of smallholder returns to labor estimates between different Tanzanian crops. At present, a meaningful comparison between net returns to labour for annual and perennial crops is difficult to make; (d) further developing the use of micro-computers in the analysis of Tanzanian cost of production data; (e) training of at least two new counterpart Production Economists to form the basis of a Production Economics Unit in the Planning Division of MOA, and participation in MDB-organized training courses/workshops. - 56 - ANNEX VI Page 7 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term C_onsultancy Staff for PPMB Agricultural Economist- Chief Technical Adviser (CTA) In close cooperation with the PPMB Director, the CTA would: (a) coordinate the plan of work and the activites of all the members of the FAO Team to ensure achievement of the immediate objectives of the Project; (b) participate irn the identification, preparation and appraisal of agricultural projects; (c) participate in the establishment and implementation of a fully functional monitoring and evaluation system of projects, parastatal agencies and cooperative societies; (d) coordinate the preparation and issue the periodic management reports for use by the Minister, the Principal Secretary and the Director of the various Divisions in the MOA; (e) assist in liaising with the various missions visiting Tanzania, particularly the missions of the Bank Group, the FAO Investment Centre, IFAD and other UN agencies, in the identification, preparation, appraisal, monitoring and evaluatioin of agricultural projects; (f) assist in the follow-up of the recommendations of such missions; (g) develop and implement a training and fellowship program for the national officers of the PPMB; (h) coordinate the organization of short courses (4 to 6 weeks) in project preparation, monitoring and evaluation for the staff of the MOA, its Parastatal Agencies and the Regional Administrations; (i) carry out the general administrative and control functions relating to thie FAO inputs in the project: staff, project budget, imprest account, equipment, training, and other assignments as designated by the PPMB Director. At the end of the assignment, make the necessary arrangements for a proper hand-over of functions to the PPMB Director. - 57 - ANNEX VI Page 8 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Planning Economist I Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director, the Planning Economist would assume the function of principal adviser to the Project Preparation Unit and assist the Chief of the Unit in its managements More specifically, duties would include: (a) guidance in formulating agricultural project proposals to meet the requirements of various financing agencies; (b) assistance in the establishment and up-dating of the inventory of new project proposals in the agricultural sector; (c) assistance in preparing agricultural investment projects, based on well-identified priorities and national needs, for external and internal ftnancing; (d) assistance in coordinating the preparation of agricultural investment projects; (e) assistance in appraising project proposals prepared by the different agencies of the MOA; (f) liaison and cooperation with the visiting missions of the various national and international financing and technical agencies in the identification, preparation and appraisal of new agricultural projects and in the review and revisions of on-going projects; (g) assistance in conducting on-going and ex-post evaluation of agricultural investment projects; (h) on-the-job and formal training to Tanzanian staff in project preparation, appraisal and evaluation; (i) preparation of course materials and case studies for short- term seminars/workshcps on project preparation and related subjects; (j) any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 58 - ANNEX VI Page 9 of 18 Terms; of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Planning Economist II Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director and in close collaboration with the Planning Economist I, the Economist would: (a) assist in preparing agricultural investment projects, based on well-identified priorities and national needs, for external and internal financing; (b) assist in appraising project proposals prepared by the different agencies of the MOA; (c) prepare and up-date information, on the costs of items commonly used in the agricultural sector and in agricultural projects; (d) provide on-the-job training to the Tanzanian counterpart staff in project preparation, appraisal and evaluation; (e) prepare course materials and case studies for short-term seminars/workshops on project preparation and related subjects; (f) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 59 - ANNEX VI Page 10 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Project Operations Analyst Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director, the Project Operations Analyst would assume the function of principal adviser to the Project Monitoring Unit and assist the Chief in its management. More specifically, duties would include: (a) assistance in maintaining and up-dating the inventory of all agricultural development projects to be monitored by the MOA; (b) assistance in the design of proper project and technical monitoring systems; (c) assistance in the on-going and ex-post evaluation agricultural development programs and projects assistance in their regular monitoring; (d) assistance in the organization and carrying out of in-depth evaluation of major agricultural development projects focusing on the establishment of management information systems; (e) assistance in liaising and cooperating with visiting missions of financial and technical assistance agencies in the supervision, monito-ring and evaluation of agricultural development projects and in the effective follow-up of the accepted recommendations of such missions; (f) assistance to projeat managers in ensuring effective and efficient implementation of agricultural development projects; (g) assistance to MOA Departments and related agencies in setting up of Project Monitoring and Evaluation teams and training the staff on such teams; (h) assistance in the preparation of the annual development budget proposals for the MOA and related agencies, their action plans and implementation progress reports; (i) training Tanzanian officers in all the above activities both by working with national officers and by participating in more formal training courses; (j) any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 60 - ANNEX VI Page 11 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Agronomist The Agronomist would be attached to the Project Monitoring Unit. Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director and in close collaboration with the Project Operations Analyst, the Agronomist would: (a) assist in monitoring the progress of on-going agricultural development programmes and projects, with particular reference to their agronomic aspects; (b) set up a system of technical information on current and approved cultivation practices in Tanzania; (c) assist in monitoring the performance of the national agricultural research organizations; (d) participate in ongoing and ex-post evaluation of agricultural development programs and projects; (e) assist in planning, coordinating and supervising the collection of agronomic data in designated project areas, both for project preparation and project monitoring and evaluation; (f) undertake analys.is and advise on the agronomic aspects of project preparation work; (g) assess the suitability of identified project areas for cultivation of crops, prepare crop calendars, specify requirements of water, labour and other farm inputs for different crops, both irrigated and rainfed; assist in preparing farm budgets and in other agroeconomic analysis for project preparation; (h) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 61 - ANNEX VI Page 12 of 18 Terms of Referenice for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Agricultural Engineer The Engineer would be attached to the Project Monitoring Unit. Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director and in close collabora- tion with the Project Operations Analyst, the Engineer would: (a) assist in monitoring the progress of ongoing agricultural development programs and projects, with particular reference to the engineering and mechanization aspects of the project's activities: (b) set up a system of technical information and specifications for agricultural machinery and processing plants for use in project monitoring and preparation; (c) participate in ongoing and ex-post evaluation of agricultural development programs and projects; (d) assist in planning, coordinating, carrying out and supervising collection of technical data on the effectiveness and efficiency of use of various equipment and machines, in particular agricultural machinery by MOA and related agencies' agricultural development projects; (e) undertake analysis and advise on the agricultural engineering aspects of project preparation work; (f) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 62 - ANNEX VI Page 13 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Cornsultancy Staff for PPMB Irrigation and Drainage Engineer hre Engineer would be attached to the Project Monitoring Unit. Undler the general supervisicin of the PPMB Director and in close collaboration with the Project Operations Analyst, the Engineer would: (a) provide assistance in monitoring implementation of ongoing irrigation projects; (b) assist in preparing in-depth evaluation of selected, representative irrigation projects and schemes with a view to determining the factors leading to their success or failure and proposals for remedial action where required with due consideration of their economic impact; (c) undertake analysis and advise on the water engineering aspects for the preparation and redesign of irrigation and drainage projects; (d) assist in coordinating, carrying out and supervising collection of engineering data, in particular topographical surveys and other site investigations, in designated project areas; (e) assist in preparing designs and cost estimates up to pre- feasibility level for each project, including the preparation of implementation schedules and details of plant and equipment, manpower and operation costs requirements; (f) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of tie project. - 63 - ANNEX VI Page 14 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Financial Coordinator Under the general supervisiLon of the PPMB Director, the Coordinator would assume the function of principal adviser to the BFU and assist the Chief of the Unit in its management. More specifically, the Coordinator's duties would include: (a) assistance in reviewing, refining and implementing the MOA's Management Information and Reporting System with a view to exercising tight control on the cash flows, costs and revenues of its parastatals and related institutions. This will include: - development and introduction of improved systems of accounts, stock recording and financial control, - development and introduction of improved systems for setting cost and work norms, cost allocation and cost control, - gradual unification of methods of bookkeeping, codes of financial accounts, preparation of prime entry books and other financial and cost statements in all the MOA parastatals, - eventual mechanization of accounts, - setting up a data bank on the finances and operation of MOA's projects and parastatals; (b) assistance in reviewing the parastatal plans and budgets, periodic financial and budgetary control statements and audit reports and making recommendations for improvement; (c) assistance in carrying out in-depth studies relating to specific high priority financial and management problems indicated by the parastatal monitoring activities; (d) day-to-day supervision and coordination of the work of the financial accountants on the project and of the UN Volunteers (Accounts); (e) coordination of the inputs of the members of the project team in the areas of financial analysis and management for incorporation in the parastatal and project monitoring reports; (f) liaison with the other agencies of the Government of Tanzania, the Bank Group and other donor agencies on matters relating to the accounts and finanzial management of the MOA's parastatals and related institutions; (g) any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of project. - 64 - ANNEX VI Page 15 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Cost and Management Accountant The Accountant would be assigned to the BFU. Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director and in close collaboration with the Chief of the BFU and the Financial Coordinator, the Accountant would: (a) assist in reviewing the recommending improvements in the Management Information and Reporting Systems for the MOA's parastatals and related institutions; (b) assist in setting up norms of costs and work and standardizing the costing, cost allocation and cost control systems, so as to improve the efficiency of use of resources and facilities; (c) assist in analyzing the organizational and management structure of parastatals in order to introduce an efficient relationship between size/structure kind/volume of activities and outputs and use of resources (including manpower); (d) assist in analyzing the sources of revenue, particularly sales revenue, and suggest in consultation with the MDB, more effective policies and approaches for marketing management; (e) assist in reviewing the parastatal and project budgets, periodic financial and budgetary control statements and audit report and making recommendations for improvement; (f) assist in initiating follow-up action on these recommendations: (g) assist in the preparation of periodic financial, budgetary control and monitoring reports for top officials of the MOA and its parastatals and related institutions; (h) be responsible for developing and implementing the Unit's training program, both on-the-job and workshops/seminars.; (i) assist in setting up a data bank on MOA's parastatals and projects; (j) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 65 - ANNEX VI Page 16 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Management Accountant The Accountant would be assigned to the BFU. Under the general supervision of the PPMB Director and in close collaboration with the Chief, BFU and the Financial Coordinator, the Accountant would: (a) contribute to the improvement of the Management Information and Reporting System for MOA's parastatals and other related institutions, including the development and introduction of improved systems of accounts, stock recording, financial control, and cost allocations and control, unification of bookkeeping methods, mechanization of accounts, and establishment of a data bank on the finances and operation of MOA's parastatals and other related institutions; (b) assist in reviewing the parastatal plans and budgets, periodic financial and budgetary control statements and audit reports, and making recommendations for improvements; (c) assist in carrying out in-depth studies on specific financial and management problems emerging from the monitoring of para- statals; (d) contribute to the elaboration of parastatal and project monitoring reports; (e) provide on-the-job and structured training to staff in various topics in accounting, financial analysis and cost control; (f) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 66 - ANNEX VI Page 17 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultancy Staff for PPMB Management Analyst The Analyst would be assigned to the BFU. Under the general supervision of the PPMB Dirsector and in close collaboration with the Chief, BFU and the Financial Coordinator, the Analyst would: (a) advise on application of management accounting principles to marketing institutions and parastatals; (b) assist in analyzing the management systems of the MOA parastatals and related institutions and make recommendations for their improvement; (c) assist in reviewing parastatal institutional structures to identify management and organizational problems and recommend corrective measures; (d) assist in the monthly monitoring of parastatal bank overdrafts, including income and expenditure analyses; (e) assist in reviewing the parastatal budgets, periodic financial and budgetary control statements and audit reports and making recommendations for improvements; (f) assist in carrying out in-depth studies relating to specific high priority financial and management problems indicated by the parastatal monitoring activities; (g) provide on-the-job training to counterparts and participate in short courses and seminars, as required; (h) carry out any other assignments given by the PPMB Director with a view to achieving the immediate and long-term objectives of the project. - 67 - ANNEX VI Page 18 of 18 Terms of Reference for Long Term Consultants for Research Zonal Agronomists (i) Qualifications The Agronomists should have professional qualifications in agriculture with substantial experience in tropical agricultural research. The Agronomists should also have had some experience in agricultural extension and rural development, preferably in East Africa. (ii) Reporting and Liaison The Agronomists would be posted to the MOA and would be responsible to the Director of Agricultural Research. They would also liaise with appropriate staff of the Department of Extension. (iii) Responsibilities (a) examine, abstract and summarize existing research records of the research stations in the zone, with initial emphasis on the major crops currently being grown in the zone; (b) after discussion with appropriate research and extension staff, present such data in a form that can be utilized by agricultural development and extension personnel; (c) with zonal extension staff, review existing extension recommendations in the light of available data, in order to develop economic and financially attractive recommendations for the different crops and agro-ecological areas; (d) discuss current farming problems with agricultural field staff and provide appropriate feedback to research personnel; (e) assist extension personnel with the design of relevant demoinstrations and with the execution of crop cutting experiments or yield trials; (f) assist the Directors of the Research Stations with the organizatioin of appropriate field days and workshops; and (g) assist the Research Task Force with the preparation of its research proposals in detail for the short-term and its outline for the medium-term. - 68 - ANNEX VII TANZANIA FOURTH TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE ESTIMATED SCHEDULE OF DISBURSEMENT IDA Quarter Quarterly Cumulative Fiscal Year Ending Disbursements Disbursements 1484/85 March 31, 1985 900 900 June 30, 1985 1,000 1,900 1985/86 September 30, 1985 1,100 3,000 December 31, 1985 1,100 4,100 March 31, 1986 900 5,000 June 30, 1986 900 5,900 1986/87 September 30, 1986 900 6,800 December 31, 1986 1,000 7,800 March 31, 1987 800 8,600 June 30, 1987 600 9,200 1987/88 September 30., 1987 400 9,600 December 31, 1987 200 9,800 March 31, 1988 100 9,900 June 30, 1988 100 10,000 I --- ________________________________________-______-_B 18RD 2802R3 Vr - Yi---~ 83JTA Kt E TANZANIA SEP3eRM V I C TOPRI A KE NY A 'k-DJ _CE * \ < - Or \ Malyc r Od-a -yc g Monoi Moshi S~~ ~ ~~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ AFRICA ' X < / l IA -/ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 4 p_'t\ 'cc X4<-X ( ( 0'''t,! 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