DRDOS I n t e r n a ~ i o n a lBar.'< f o r Rec3nstruction and LIevelopo;e4r: Development Research Center Discussion Papers No. 5 POLICY ISSTRUMENTS L U D PLA??TNlNGMODELS FOR INCOME DlSTRIBUTlON Montek S. Ahluwalia and J o r g e Cauas KOTE: Discussion Papers are preliminary m a t e r i a l s c i r c u l a t e d t o st ir.1~1'i L C d i s c u s s i . ~ .and c r i t i c a l c o m e n t ~ . References i n p u b l i z a t i o n t o 1);s- cussion Papers should be cleared w i t h t h e a u t h o r ( s ) t~ protecr t t ~ t . t e n t a t i v e c h a r a c t e r of t h e s e papers. December, 1973 raft Kot t o be quoted Comments welcomed POLICY INSTdUMENTS AND PLANNING MODELS FOR INCOME DISTRIBUTION Montek S. Ahluwalia and Jorge Cauas* I. 1ntroducti.on 11. Available Instruments of Policy 111. Broad Strategic Choices I V . Available Planning Models V. Conclusions *This paper was presented a t a joint I n s t i t u t e of ~ e v e l o ~ m eStudies a (Sussex) - Development Research Center (IBRD) Workshop convened a t the Rockefeller Foundation Conference Centre i n Bellagio, I t a l y , i n Aprii 1973. POLICY INSTRUME?STS All3 ?LPJI(?IJING MODELS FOR IXCGME D I S T R I B U T I O X W e S e g b w i t h t h e recognition t h a t t h e p r o f e s s i o n at l a r g e ha- i n recent y e a r s displayed i n c r e a s i n g s c e p t i c i s m about t h e v a l u e ( o r Imre s t r i c t l y "ilsefulness") o f planning m d e l s i n general. The reasons f o r t h i s s c e p t i c i s m a r e too w e l l known t o b e a r d e t a i l e d review b u t it is worth n o t i n g t h a t t h e schism is n o t l i k e l y t o disappear i n t h e n e a r f u t u r e . l'he sceptics base t h e i r case on two propositions. (i)istingrealityespeciallyateconomy-widelevelsisfartoo m complex t o b e captured i n t h e s t y l i z e d a l g e b r a i c fonr,ula- t i o n s o f economic models. ( i i ) The a v a i l a b l e s t a t i s t i c a l i n f o r m t i o n i n mst cases is too poor even f o r t h e demnds o f e x i s t i n g "simple" models l e t a l o n e anything more a n b i t i o u s . ,do - ;opositions trikcr. topether ?;educe a natural %zip-issesince any attempt t o develop m r e general models must n e c e s s a r i l y p l a c e even g r e a t e r st rain on the s s a t i st i c a l inf;astructure. This e s tab1.ishes an immediate d i s t i n c t i o n between academic nctvances i n c o n c e p t u a l i z a t i o n , b!~ich w i l l - - l r ~ c v i t a b l ybc.$n t h e dircct.ion of mre s o p h i s t i c a t e d models of t h e general L ~ q c i l i b r i u mtDe and t h e o p e r a t i o n a l usefulness of tl-~eseadvances i n e 11 providing t o o l s f o r p r a c t i c a l planners.- These p r o b l e m would be s e r i o u s enough i f w e were i n t e r e s t c z only in the t r a d i t i o n a l questions of economic p o l i c y such a s output grohyh, -L/ This d i s t i n c t i o n is n o t of course c l e a r c u t . P l a n ~ i n go f 5 i c e s may b e L ; be i n t e r e s t e d i n very g e n e r a l modeis t h a t s t y l i s e broad "growth stratcG;e:, . I 1 b u t what is lacking i n economic planning is t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of o p e r a ~ i c n - a Lly u s e f u l models t o actermirle speci t i c p o l i c y choices. - 7 , - - --.---- CL--,aLilL.-~rt: i&;s~;z3e, C ; I - = - ~ ~~~-;Iu;ic;? ~rcsie-aLeads LO che obvious c r i t i c i s n -.-L; i.:c &re rryi-g to KL- before we h ~ v elczrned t o walk. Tne 2olnt of - . r : ~ s crlziziszi is rist: t o ceny the iesira3FlIqr or' cqer5ir&ntin&.zit5 rl..r;c;va;isre pzototype m d e l s wTlic6 try tl; encogenize income 6-istzibction. -?,;e'.-.er LC Is r o r e c s : g i z e t h a t t h e a p - , l ~ c a b i i i ~or' such izodels i n y * ~ - & c c i c aplansinlj e>:&rcises In the ncs-: k t - u r e is bo-dnd t o be f a i r l y l7Ln;;ed. l ;,lcrtrecl It ;s,y e-flex 542 arz~edthar it is ccm~crprod;ictive. Try-xg ro m: ,eiore we :lave learned co walk zry he cctireiy cormendable i n the L.tceres; of long tern stfile.tic devclopnent, h l ~ tI n che interim it is probably nor. the b2st way of gert:ng fron 11 ro 131 i i e -ryri.y; ;lui?o,.ie oE this pnpcr is :o suggest a framework f o r , - . r t . . , / . i : unLirlg 2hs ?OCL.:i ;:i;.:. IIPELUI::C.'~S r l ;::e ;i\'3$1 : j b l ~ :and p r ~ s y f c t*,,:. ? .i~:~-;nir,g ~ ~ o idn ~proviaing 2 0 i . i ~~;c~L'T.c~ r planners c o n c e r ~ c dwi:'.7 ~ l s ~ f o Li ,r.i-i-l;:~. dLs ; r ;,.,c ~ tc--%0-- . 7 .. I . -L1.C.-.i * > L , ; l ~ c ~ ~ ~ . a=os sz?.e -&LEI r d ~ ~ ? c - ? i ; l boil L-,s tL=.it icsal tharzcteris t5cs and G Z P L E ~i ~ c t o r s . Ccnvestlozai wizcoz scggkscs s e v e r a l ways irLwhL& & o v e r a n t ~ a l i c ycar, ar'fs:t ctese pzr^ie-r;ls by d i r e c t s c r i m . - % 7 ~ 0 ? r ~ . i ~ i ~ n .- - -21 ~ i c > z rcoliecci-;lzzt;on o r r e i l s t r i b u ~ i o r ,U; assets Is --. Lc.C;ia~ - - -- ;a;lcy a;te,-;la~"ivc. it S a ia-zilia~reeczzx!ndation in agriculture (lasd re2om) but iz 2s also v i a b l e ic i n l u s t r y zl~hougfiin the i a t t e r "radist~;- - - 2atlon" is i a r l i y i e + s ; j ~ e ,x~d the choice is niorc liirely ro be x a i i o n a i i z a ~ i o nOT " s o c . ~ ~ i i z a t i ~(the Yugosliiv pattern) o f capiral. n " Less r a a i c i l z a s u r e s with ;; ;cr,ger time pattern f o r effective- ness are property ta:es and inherit?~.-rtetzxes, both of which a r e nlininalljr effective i n nost countzies. Even less T C Z ~ C ~ a; r e measures designed to i,iri,rove the d i s t r i 3 u t i o n of skills (and consequeiltly earr,ing pacer) i n the 7 o p l a i i o n by expanding education and training progranls. ?his I s a far;il$zr cornerstone of e q l o ~ p n prot-otixg ;Jrograix, and one t h a t w e w i l l un- t cocbtediy hear about 511 any discussion cn f n c m distribution. (53%) D L s y r s h LC :;I! ~ 1 r . e2 e 4 - -+-.! -r~~~.ztior.: sig..ificzzce a t ecrllirr szzges -.,-Lere b.?ien%s;dtion p r o 3 i m a r e pz-rcL- -- cuiariy izqoriazt. a suz5 s;rcu=star.ces c a evzsiaz a o c g high iilcozz groups ;ley hzve t o 3e a c c q c e l zs an " i r L s t l t x t ~ c n econscrain~". Zie l =race-o,f - s u a l l y s s o c l a z e L wzti. -&ls policy -relates LO "' lncentlves" - Iy 32 aclvsrsely ~-fscr,e6 s u c c ~ s s ~ %tax policy ZFsures. by i Scce ,:?at I 5 :he e c o n o q is c ~ c s e df o r f a c t o r mvesents (an iixporced a s - ~ i i o n ) the incentives q w s t i o n relaces e s s e n t i a l l y t o t h e work- leisure choice and this m y nor b e very ser;ou i f t z x lceasures and iriplenentaticn z b i l i r y a r e u n i f o n f o r a l l categories of econouiic a c t i v i t y . Zi;practice i q l e n e n t a t i o n capability in different sectors is widely different and this i n p l i e s t h a t increased reliance on tax nieasures inevitably introduces i n t e r s e c t o r a l distortions which nay be serio-iis. X?e c i a s s i c example of t h i s probleui is the s i t u a t i o n where the only ins tit.^- t i o n a l l y feasible tax n2zs-ares amunt co t z e s on e q o r t s or iinporrs. (CV) C ~ i x o L i i y? r i c e r)eterizinclt5cii: ?-. :nc whoie razz oi c;o;r;cstic tsxes and su'3sidies oa ?roluctlc\r/ c m . s ~ ? : i o n and t a r i f f s on iz.,joztea g o ~ d snsy b e c l a s s e i as p r i c ~;i,~cr- ventions in the c o m d i t y -;arkets together with the p r a l l e l s e t of L , t quantitative r e s t r i c t i o n s wnich can be treated as discontinuous ?rice - interveation. Thcse taxes and quantitative restrictions h,ive both In I I- mcone" e f f e c t (reductian o r tncrease o>z:cai i i ; ~ u ; i ~ s ~j s :rcla: LV\: ?:-cr- ':x-,;rdc: xza-s" u;-.icr! are ?robably l e s s efflcierit than direcr: i z c t o r price ?ub;rc z ~ ~ e r , c i r u zis t h e collective 2 o t e n t i a l 5 g n s f i t r s s u l t i n g e . . ::,,3direct a-lc Lnclr~c:i&:er-diiure s teas f r o s rwo c o n s i l e r ~ c i o:~ s (aj It -is a very large znd i~susiljrgwoking pro;,artion of G3P coapared t o ti-.e snare o l 1me: income grox?s in t o t i i incoze. T n c s , whereas p b l i c e w e n d i t u r e ray accouat f o r 1'1 to 25 ;ercent of GD?, the sharz of income accrui:lg .io t h e l o v . 2 r f 3 7ercc.n: i n GDI' i:.a;r =Inry 5ctwee:l 8 dnd i 5 -isprov,:ns::.: i:. i:h(i.-:clf.al-i: ie':ei of :his grou;, can 'je L! . I ircplications. In a si-cuatfon where public resource mobilisation is zn importsnt constrzint, t h i s poses an obrious problem oi' choice betxeen the two categories aid also of course within t h e two categories. Given this wide v a r i e t y of areas of intervention, t h e problem facing the p r a c t l c a l pl.anner is t o devise a framework i n which the r,et effects and r e l a t i v e merits (including complementarities ma contrzc5ictlons) of intervening a t particular points can be evaluated. The purely " t ~ c h - n i c a l response" to t h i s is t o build bigger and b e t t e r models which attempt t o endogenise a s far a s possible a l l relevant inter-act,ions i n the ecozomjr. L/ 3 ~ c ha model would obvious1.y enable us t o experinent xit.h the e f f e c t s of ELI- ternative policy ins.yrwnents on income distribution b u t as we have stated before t'kis "ideal" is uqattainsble f o r some time t o cGme (certain1.y f o r the v a s t majority of unierdeveloped countries). In practice we hsve a r a g e or' l e s s powerL%l anal.ytica1 tools which help t o quzntify ~ s r t i c u l a r choices but not i n any a l l inclusive frame-mrk. In such a wcrla a s t r ~ t e g y for income distribution involves two kin& od decisions. i Chocsing broad areas 0;'intervention as aiscussed above izrgcl;. Gn a non-formal consicerations b Using available p l a n i n g models t o illuminate particular trzde- 4 o f f s and policy alternatives within the very broaa strategy Informally defined in the next two sections we discuss brie?ly soce of the rroblens anc ~ossi'r11it~4,zs i n both f i e l d s . - 1/ See for c x q l e the Faper Jn "Ir,corporatin,; I 2 c i a i anc Politics1- V ~ r i a b l e si n t o Zquit:~Grier.ted "uveelpment Plardning" , for sl oisccsslx-. of such " a l l Inciuslve" mocelling. -I.L. 3r3td S-,ratez.c Cho5ccs --"F In L i s section, ws will 6iscucuss S C Z ~ 0; the c c n s i d e r a t i c ~ s sr,at a r e r e i e v m t I n c'r.ocsiag a "s7,rhtegy of incoze cistribution'!, i.e., ckooslr?; mong the varioxs kreas or' interveniion l i s t e c LDOVP,.In che zbsence or' a f0'onr;ilcodel t?.ese choices nust be made or, zn in;'omal 5 z s 5 z . LY t k 3 s contw-r, iz i s use-'*; >G distinguish betk-een two polar q p s i t e s k~-I zem.s or' policy approach. The two approa&es follow from t h e two key cc:.;- -,,on.~r.=rof the aeterminaticn of "income distribution" i n tne ecor,o:mic .,- s.,.ster. Yne Yirst ol" chese i s t h e eetermination 02 factor rexards ma emplo-ment levels Tor factors. Tqiz is wnat economic theory c a l l s the ciistri'bution c;" 1r.ccne (into i;r~tors i ? x e s ) a d l n the neo- classical irancwrk it wcuia kc: affected S;r the whoie r a g e of 2olicies d i s c ~ s s e ai n ?I ( i ) a , l i i (v) aScve. Tne second l i n k i n the cnain is ~ i distribution of ificcme e u n l n g ~ e csset:; ar,d factors over the ~ ~ : ; i a t i cwhich deternines the s i z e oi' 5 s - n tribution of iricone. We szy c h a r ~ c t e r i s eincome a i st r ~ \ u t l o nstrategies a s aimel? e l t n e r a t a l t e r j n g tilt. ais tribution or' assets c r zf affecting esAT.ln~sand emplojment levels. (1) .;:;set &cii:,ri?il tlo3 : Yr.e k ~ 1 c . dStyate?.:~ isset, redstri'cxtlcri i n t n e wiccst sense includes not or,l:y ex- , * f . .-.- ..;I-3 atlcr, 2s.:: r.'_-.-r:- r,S cc?:e,: w- a;. redistribution, but also the p:roirision ,.: - . . ..,.,, :;:ne:rcs i s XIcS-;;~,;c exr~rple.) * I - L m rT lne g r e a t &ppe;l 0:' this ap?ror^cr! is thnt/seyz;.ztes tnk questior. narkec". Given a s e t of e f f i c i e n c y p r i c e s i n t h e f a c t o r market, any given p a t t e r n of personal incone d i s t r i b u t i o n can b e achieved by a l t e r i n g 11 the p a t t e r n of d i s t r i b u t i o n of income earning f a c t o r s and assets- . Obviously ti-.e change i n 'ncone d i s t r i b u t i o n s o induced w i l l feed back on e f f i c i e n c y p r i c e s i n a manner which may o r may n o t r e i n f o r c e t h e e f f e c t s of t h e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n b u t it is reasonable t o suppose t h a t t h e s e e f f e c t s w i l l be e i t h e r r e i c f o r c i n g o r merely secondary2L. The prob1err.s involved i n t h i s s t r a t e z y a r e mainly t h e " p o l i t i c a l " and"insticutiona1" c o n s t r a i n t s on a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n . W e w i l l not d i s c u s s t h e p l o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s h e r e on t h e grounds t h a t a q u a n t i t a t i v e l y equivalent e f f e c t i v e r e d i s t r i b u t i o n w i l l f a c e t h e same p o l i t i c a l c o n s t r a i n t s whether implemented through a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n o r o t h e r m2ans. The institutional! c o n s ~ r a i r i : ~ " a r e more important because they a r e s u b j e c t t o p o l i c y a c t i o n within t h e realm By "institu:ional c o n s t r a i n t s " , we mean c o n s t r a i n t s on the earning a b i l i t y of t h e r e d i s t r i b u t e d a s s e t . It is obvious that redistri- ~ u t i n gassczts is n o t enougll i f the earning a b i l i t y of the asset, is S q a L r e d . Thus land reform may b e k e i f e c t i v e a s an instrument o'f income d i s t r i b u t i o n - if other distortions i n the system prcvenL small holder from bc!ing productive. - r ' -11 Note thrEf educat~onalpolicies aimed a t dynanrLc redistribut:ion of s k i l l s a r e q t r e a l l y r a d i c a l i n t h i s sense. The r e d i s t r i b u t i o n x i m d nc is essentialry relative since the total supply of skilled l&or is expected t o expand. The "incot.e d i s t r i b u t i o n " e f f e c t depends t I ~ c r e f o r eon whether wages a r e maintained supply of s k i l l e d labours expands which is c s ~ ~ i ~ t l ~ l i a problem of h n c t i o n a l incorrc determination . These p r o b l e m are i ~ . ~ o r : u n t however i n providing s o c i a l mobility i . e . e q u a l i s i n g access t o enployneat of p a r t i c u l a r wage categories. -2 / A good d e a l of s p e c u l a t i o n and some empirical evidence e x i s t on t5c g r e ~ - ~ e r labour i n t e n s i t y of lower i n c o m consungtion. 'Ihere is a l s o evidence zlriat these feedbacks a r e r e l a t i v e l y small i n q u a n t i t a t i v e t e r n . h whole range o i i n s t i t u t i c a a l c o n s t r a i n t s are relevant i n t h i s contact- education and skill. level of tenant b e ~ e f i c i a r i e sand provision of conplemer,i~l>ri n p u t s such as seeds, f e r ~ i l i z e r ,c r e d i t n a r k e t i n g fa c i l i - t i e s, e t c . . It 1; S~.?ortant t o r e a l i s e t!at t h e c o s t s i~terms of " output trade- offs" of pursuing an a s s e t d i s t r i b a t i o n o r i e n t e d s t r a t e g y depend c r i t i c a l l y upon t h e ass--:ion of t h e " earning a . b i l i ~ r ' l o f t h e r e d i s t i r i b u ~ e d asset i n an optimal i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework. Undoubtedly, t h e c o s t of e s t a b l i s h i n g t h e s e i n s t i t u t i o n s ( 0.- r e f u r b i s h i n g t h e o l d ones) is a p a r t of t h e " trade- off" b u t t h e ? r o b l a i n most c o u n t r i e s is t h a t t h e need f o r the new optimal i n s t i t u t i o n a l framework is n o t always r e a l i s e d . This r c s l i s a t i on is growing i i ~ rural- de-elopmen'c p r o g r a m b u t i t is n o t a t a l l evident in p o l i c y f o n i l i a t i o n f o r t h e p u b l i c s e c t o r . Sationa1isat:ion of industry as we h a - e seen is a "feasi31e1' a s s e t calle.ctivisation po:licy with income d i s t r i b u t i o n b e n e f i t s b u t h a r d l y any attempt is made t o ensure that these c o l l e c t i v i s e d a s s e t s remain productive on any economic (noit f i n a n c i a l ) considcraticins . Unfortunately t h e s e "non-essen t i a l " trade.* f f s arc Ercquently perpetdated owing t o a r e g r e t t a b l e s u s p i c i a n of "cfficLency" concepts mong r a d i c a l rsfom:&rs a t l e a s t i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of r a t i ~ c a , - 'ti:ese. pr?!j'ic:.ti .:L.,IPS L. t.ilat a c r i t i c a l r o l e f o r planning mo~dels - . . i I.1: e~AfsluizCirig asse'; ar &c,:? r;rr~tt:&.les '& io iderrify rile in:;tit.utionnl - *P::i1 nee!-., ,: E ; J , ~ ~ r e d i s t r i b u t i ~ n . iSodels w;-,z.;,: t o i a c z t i i y key i n s t i t ~ ~ i n r ~ n l I! I dcveloy,mcnts which z r e ~zr;?!en'cnt~ryto a s s e f T-cii.5~ :;3utlon and t o izeiltify a l t e r n a t i v e "learnin;: p r o c e ~ s c s "1.:: ciciiieving c f i l c i e n c y ir, he cew s e t up, fail fn an ir;por;ant sense t3 i d e n t i f y the r e a l p r o b i c m with such a h i l - ; l Z + p . -suaily p o h t t o observed res3Ats w i t h o ~ ta t t e q t i n g to &.fine sl::zr- natives which were r'easible hut have been .Ip.ored. ?ro;lonents of asset r e d i s t ~ i b c t i o nigrLore " i c a r n i ~ gcoststt t h e need f o r coqlecentary inputs. A ?~ograsair.gapproach t o naticna2-&-kg iil-try f o r exarrple a i g h t show a steeply r f s i i i ~s'naicw price. on skTiled s a l a r i e d ILacagaent u we noye fron the ?rivsra 20 tke public seccor with s m loss of "private seczor mwagers". iri this m i ~ i r o m e n tTigici wage policies which l i m i t access t o managers mounts t o incurring unnecessary s o c i a l costs. It should be emphasized that the key problem in the area Is n o t s o much techniques f o r h a ~ d l i n gthese problem but rather inf ornation on what kin&- of i n s r i t u t i o n a l systems are needed, L.e., research on the production h ' c t i o n . Tnis conclusion is very similar t o the general agreement on the need f o r research on a v a i l a b i l i t y of "internediate technology" before incorporating c a p i t a l labour s & s t i t u t i o n i n t o planrling C L L ~ S . The neo- classical alt&rnarive to asset redistribution is to try and operate on the levels of r e a l rewards and employment levels. The success of such policies depends c r i t i c a l l y upon the feasib:ility * 'i of altering x ~ r k e :cquilibriurs s u f f i c i e n t i y to achisve the desirl-a re- The le a s i b i l i ty of L-,?L;iires: approach depznds crr ~ i z l i y .,,on ,- the f l e x i b i l i t y of t h e eco?.~=y 2s deremined by benaviourai and b a h a v i o ~ r a lcharacceris t i c s de:ex5~ r L c e ar-d incoze elastlcS z l e s of cons7aer dezznd whiie technologicai ch:racteristics deternine faccor s c b s i i t u t i o n p o s s i b i i i t l e s . The scg?e f o r a i t e r i n g t h e f i n a l equili- b r i m of t n e economy chrough p r i c e iatervention depends on these parameters. This is e s s e n t i a l l y an e ~ p i r i c a lquescion and one f o r which no s i n p l ~ e znswer can be provided. Frequently while policy makers deuiand evijence economists c a do l i t t l e m r e tha7 ask f o r a c t s of f a i t h . We s5ouid recogcize however t h a t neat neo- classical r e s u l t s based on factor p r i c e intervention o r r e l a t i v e output ? r i c e intervention w i l l c o t carry much weight unless we can be s u r e of t5z s i z e of the various e l a s t i c i t i e s ii~volved. It is cold comfort t o -know that " the direction of change" w i l l be r i g h t i f w e cannot be very confident about the zmounts involved. Sate t h a t t h i s problem has a l s o bedevilled analytichl work on eaployment I ?ror,otion . w e p t t h a t lt is nore serious when the objective is income cist.ribution thsn when i t A Le;;a>ia:-~ent. This is because high e l a s t . i c i t i c s of s u b s t i t u ~ i o nbeween c s p i t ~ l2;- LaScar a r e a f t e r ali only a mixed - bLes.,~:-,< i f increaJec rizplo;r;,en~ AS a-ly ~ L , - L I C Yac~ ~ t h e c o s t cf lcwer w i n t h i s cor-:ex~, i: is XO~L?, c o t i n g chat e x ~ e r i z e n c swLc:; ? l a i - ~ i nuio2rls incorporazli.g r ~ a s o n s b i epsrenecers f o r de-iiicd ar-c Tro- ~ l u c t i o n f l e x l j i l i t y co c o t SuggeSK t h e r r e l a t i v e p r i c e intervenclon offer; auch hope f o r a l t e r l G g t h e c i s t r i b u c i o n of incoze e i t h e r v i a d e ~ z n d cnznges feeding back on procuction o r even v i a d i r e c t substitution 52tween c a p i t a l and labour. Thus Chenery end Raducnel i n experrlzenring --, 1/ w i t h such a nodel cor.clude: "In the f i r s t place the possibilities for indirect f a c t o r s u b s t i t u t i o n v i a dertand and t r a d e nay a o t be e x t e c s i v e enough t o accoinmodate very wide v a r i a t i o n s i n f a c t o r proportions. Secondly, t h e f e a s i b l e rsnge of v a r i a t i o n is made considerably narrower when w e consider tfie implications of t h e e q u i l i b r i w n f a c t o r p r i c e s f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of income between c a p i t a l and labour." These r e s u l c s lead t o highly p e s s i m i s t i c conclusions on t h e scope f o r promoting income d i s t r i b u t i o n v i a market i n t e r v e n t i o n . I f w e a r e t o b e l i m i t e d t o d i r e c t f a c t a r s u b s t i t u t i o n , labour s u b s i d i e s o r s i s i l a r ,--lea ifitervention w i l l have t o be confincd t o those s e c t o r s with e i a s E i c i t i e s of s u b s t i t u t i o n g r e a t e r than one. Undoubtedly t h e experi- nen t a l i x d r c i s e described above inay i o s e considerable f l e x i b i l i t y through P.* aggregation but n e v e r t h e l e s s the r e s u l t s a r e samewhat sobering. The above characeerisation of a s s e t r e d i s t r i b u t i o n and x a r k e t - i2tervri;tion p o l i c i e s as p c l ~ ro ? ? o s i t s s docs n o t of course imply ;hat *- ..P- LTL CCO.-IG;~~ w i d e c';,oicz ~ u s :'se ;n;ie fa: one or t h e other a;>?roac;,. A X f ~ c we woiiic ex2ect t ;~I,I: cne o r rhe o:ur r i p p ~ 3 a ~ a?i, g ' f i ~5~ :;o:L: ~ ~ i . t i - 3 1 L - - 1/ "Substicction i n . ?lar,r,ing ~ o d c l s " ,Xollis 2 . Ci-,enery and '~'il;.;r:. 2. ~ ; ~ d ~L. L~iales :Lr;~ l:level::?zeac ~. t. ~ , IJia::n.i?& ed. ri. 3. Ckenery, Ilar-br6-i?. . - L,+ - Gnivcrsi ty Press, L 371. f c r ,ar:icc;ar i r o c c c ~ i ~secLsr= depxdlng u p m vzrious c k a r z c t e r i s i i c s n - cne produciiox scrccrure of the ssccor and rhe degree c r f a c t o r sujsz%rczability which d e i e m i n e s f l d x i b i l i t y the t i s c z i j u i l v e = t z r a c t e r of rke s e c r o r incicding existing ?zrterns of a s s e t cor.centracioa (particularly iaportanr in ihe casz of 1&?6 i n agriculture o r n a t u r a l resources i n s i n i n g a d extraczive resources) relationship of t h e sector ro t h e procuction equilibrium of t h e rest of the zconomy. Output losses following from d i s t r i b u t i o n a l policies may be p a r t i c u l a r l y serious f o r "key sectors" where the ecoaony caanot adjust easily in response t o such losses. (Exports a r e an example). As these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s vary substantialiy across countries we would expect the aptimun s e t of d i s t r i b u t i o n policies to vary accordingly and finding t h e optimum s e t is a z a j o r ?l&i;,iag probiem. I n the absence of f o r m 1 zodels these choices rill obviously be made on t h e b a s i s of informai I t evaiuation strongly coilditlonel bjr socio-poi.itica1, h i s t o r i c a l , idco- fl A v a i l ~ b 1 e?l&':-i:~O " ~ Z ~ S In ths ~ r e c s l i - gsecrLx.s de i-.zve ontlined che kind oC ~ o l i c y ~ 3 ~ o i c ems G s c r a c e g i c a i c e r . ~ z t i v e s tnzz nsed LO b e incor2orared inzo ?;arming xodels. 6 e hzva E S S ~ Z ~ thraajhouc c h ~ t C ~ C" ideal ?l&nnkg nodel" I n c o i ? o r r t i n g a l l cksse c3oices is r,ot a t p r e s e n t a p r a c t i c a l r e a l i t y . nexr arep i s LO c c c s i i a r how f a r zvaLlable planning a o d e l s i i l m i n a ~ e m. ? a r t i c u l a r c k o i i e s r e l e v ~ c ct o Lacore J i s ~ r i b u t i o no b j e c t i v e s . i n z h i s s e c t i o n w e w i l l d e z l j r i e f l y wich two f d i i a r ty?es of models--in?ut-output nodels and l i n e a r p r o g r a m i n g ~ o d c l s . ( i ) In~uz-CutpccHodels -, Usefulness or' Consistency Planning The l i n i c a c i o n s of t h e s e u.odels a r c w e l l known. For onr purposes they a r i s e from (a) exogenously gLven t e c h n i c a l c o e f f i c i e n t s which niake t h e treatment of e n 2 l o p e n t g e n e r a t i o a highiy d e t e r m i n i s t i c given p a t t e r n s of f i n a l demand and (b) t h e absence of a Lizk between f a c t o r p r i c e s and personal incoae d i s t r i b u t i o n and thence LO incoze-wise disaggregated consumption demand patterns. Various a t t e q t s have 3een made t o extend t h e g e n e r a l i t y of t h e s e aodels on both couacs b u ~t h e s e have n o t s o f a r been r e f l e c t e d i n / - - -.., .,--....- . ....\;5~.g2. -1 111 i i i c ~.,ock ux=znsions a r e q u i t e f e a s i b l e i n n,;ny c o u n t r i e s and would enable t h e s e nodels t o b e used f o r s e v e r a l types * 0; l ' c ~ n ~ i s t e n cexercises1' i n evaluating t i e imp!.ications y of a l t e r n a t i v e d i s - t r i b u t i o n a l strategi.es . - '2 - -- ~ n nost obvious iy?es of q~2s:ions tharr can%e examined throug:. e -3 I - in;wC-oiit?iit ~o:~.si.,~~;.cyzcdei; a r e ~ t "resource-usc"~a?lications ofe - m -.,--...* - 1 / 1;or ;:2c ~~~~---,~--;,~i~~, ~f ~~~i;~~-i~~>-.~y s l < ~ ~ = i ~-y~. t L-.,yLiL-"LLr,uL. .c:*?-..cry . . . .. ~ i ~-..= lrL & L 0 - - . A , . - , ~ 3 . ~ i t . 3:. ..." desina c i e r c i.rc sc'i-rral - 7 , i.,,2a~-s se.2 ~ c : :itzcxct.l 5 S I C; ~ ac te-apts a: cerivi:;;: i- ----., . A- I . ~ ~ . L . . L c. ~ s ; T ~. -D L ~ ; ~ . jjr . . - , ii:coae c i . 2 ~ 5from VS;UL a a.s ~ ~S;:G . : w ~ g c - e ~ ~ ? i ~ y ~ e n :la.:;. S2c f o r exrizipie -3. !refit incone) by s e c t o z over ;he population on the b a s i s of . survey d a t a on a s s e t an4 labour s k i l l d i s t i r b u t i o n . (This s t a t i s t i c a l y?- I l a t i o n s h i p nay be assumed t o b e given i n t h e s h o r t period.) The b a s i c ;:roblem -- I/ S e c t o r a l excess dsinands w i l l s p i l l o v e r i n t o t h e i3al:~nce of Payments while s e c f o r a l excess s u p p l i e s nay n o t be exportable. 7k.c absence of ?rites obviousby ceprivcs the model of any flexijility :his r e s p e c t . II -2 / The I ~ c i z ne x e ~ c i s edces n o t cndo2cns-~slygenertil6 iacoc.c dis;rib~t:o>. hcwevcr s o t h a t cazge: cor,sm;,';ion chaages i;i.ply specific s o v l a ~ srazes by ?ar:icular c l a s s ~ j . TP.e :L<;UL-C ;O incor?crzce i n c o ~ ~ge:.cra=is~~cx;3i:<:lL1AY e L c~:,viousiy r,xkes this e;cerc:sc n; . i n i t ~ dvel- .~3rij--~d far L?.C 3iLlagi.s :endir~re?olicy provides zn op?ortunity t o coiiibine Soch approaci-es .znL also u d e r t a k e "marginal consun?tion traasf ers." ( i i ; Both a s s e t redistribution and ~ a r k e tintervention have t h e i r i i m i t a t i o n s and associated costs. The s u i t a b i l i t y of one ~ p p r o a c h o r the other w i l l depend upon other "stru.:tural factors'' ( i i i ) So econoriy wide planning madel exists which w i l l s u f f i c i e n t l y quantify the e f f e c t s of a l l the various policy alternatives. Certainly these alternatives cannot be c a s t i n t o an optimising framework f o r planning purposes. - (iv) Some p a r t i a l o r "consistency" type exercises csn be conducted--- using available planning.models of the input- output type and a l s o ". .. ' L.?. models. A major problem with these exercises is that :hey do not focus on the key i s s u e of how t o change incone d i s t r i b u t i o n , except f o r some f a i r l y star,dard *escrip tions, e. g., emphasising "labour intensive sectors or undertaking land reform. - - These conclusions &oulc not be classed as "pessinis tic." Thcy .* ~ l r esinply a r e f l e c t i o n of he entirely plausible p r o p o s i ~ i o nthzt we 'krAow - L * * b r c l a ~ i v c l yl i t t l e &bout t h e 9 r u e long t e r n strx.:turai f l e x i b i l i t y of the e ecoaon:gr i n gsneracing a i c ~ r a a t i v cincoce dis2ributioa pztterns.