Document of The World Bank FOR OMCIAL USE ONLY Repwot No. 11515 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) DECEMBER 31, 1992 Agriculture Operations Division South-Central and Indian Ocean Department Africa Regional Office This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. EXCHANGE RATES Rwandese Francs Der USS1.00 1980 - 92.84 1981 - 92.84 1982 - 92.84 1983 - 94.34 1984 - 100.17 1985 - 101.26 1986 - 87.64 1987 - 79.67 1988 - 76.45 1989 - 79.98 1990 - 82.60 1991 - 125.14 UNITS AND MEASURES METRIC SYSTEM ABBREVIATIONS CCDFP Community Development and Training Centers FAO Food and Agricultural Organization GAP Gitarama Agricultural Project ISAR National Agricultural Research Institute IWACU Center for Cooperative Training and Research KORA Local Association of Artisans MINAGRI Ministry of Agriculture T&V Training and Visit System of Extension UNDP United Nations Development Program FISCAL YEAR OF GOVERNMENT January 1 - December 31 FOR OMFICIAL USE ONLY THE WORLD BANK Washington, D.C. 20433 U.S.A. Office of Director-General Operations Evaluation December 31, 1992 MEMORANDUM TO THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTORS AND THE PRESIDENT SUBJECT: Project Completion Report on Rwanda Gitarama Agricultural Production and MINAGRI Institutional Development Project (Credit 1669-RW) Attached is a copy of the report entitled "Project Completion Report on Rwanda Gitarama Agricultural Production and MINAGRI Institutional Development Project (Credit 1669-RW)" prepared by the Africa Regional Office. The Borrower did not contribute comments on Parts I and IH. The T&V extension system was modified during implementation because of scarce extension staff and absence of "whole farm" adapted research results. Instead, project staff took on the task of multiplying and distributing seedlings, the main achievement of the project. No applied research took place and the institution building component of the Ministry of Agriculture was not implemented. The project is rated as unsatisfactory, its sustainability as unlikely and its institutional development as partial. The Project Completion Report is comprehensive and informative, but the reestimated rate of return is not meaningful since it is based on a small sample and on a small share of investment costs of the overall project. The project will be audited once the follow-up project is completed. Attachment This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) Table of Contents PREFACE ..................................................... i EVALUATION SUMMARY ......................................... ii PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE .............. I Project Identity ...................... ....................... I Background ............................................... I Objectives and Description ..................................... I Design ........................... 2 Implementation .......................... 3 Results .................................................. 6 Sustainability .............................................. 7 Performance of the Bank .......................... 7 Performance of the Borrower .................... 8 Performance of Consultants .................... 8 Project Documentation and Data ................... 8 PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE .... ...... 9 PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION .............................. 10 Table 1: Related IDA Credits .................................. 10 Table 2: Project Timetable .................................... 11 Table 3: Implementation Indicators ............................... 12 Table 4: Disbursements ...................................... 13 Table 5: Costs and Financing .................................. 14 Table 6: Covenants of the Credit Agreement ......................... 15 Table 7: Use of Bank Resources ................................ 16 ECONOMIC ANALYSIS .......................................... 17 HIAPS- T!DnTT 1938( T13PTD 1931R1 TP-'PT 10382 This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. i PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTIlTUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) PREFACE This is the Project Completion Report for the Gitarama Agricultural Production and MINAGRI Institutional Development Project, for which Credit 1669-RW in the amount of SDR 11.7 million (US$12.7 million) was approved on March 28, 1986. The credit was declared effective on February 27, 1987, a delay of eight months. The Credit was closed on September 30, 1991, on the originally scheduled date. The last disbursement took place on January 31, 1992; the undisbursed balance of SDR 2.75 million (US$2.99 million) was canceled on March 25, 1992. The Project Completion Report was prepared jointly by the Agriculture Operations Division of the South-Central and Indian Ocean Department of the Africa Regional Office (Preface, Summary, Parts I and III). The Borrower was sent a request to prepare Part II, but no comments were received. Tle preparation of the report is based on the findings of missions that made on-site visits in 1991 and project documentation, in particular the Staff Appraisal Report; Credit Agreement 1669- RW; supervision reports; consultant reports; correspondence between the World Bank and the Borrower; and internal Bank memoranda. ii PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) EVALUATION SUMMARY 1. Background. Rwanda is facing formidable constraints: rapid population increase, declining soil fertility, lack of natural resources and a landlocked location. Agriculture, the main economic activity, employs 80% of the country's manpower and will be the main source of any increase in production, employment or income in the short term. Rwanda's Third Plan (1982-86) sought to focus on agricultural operations. First and foremost, it called for a refocusing of agronomic research on traditional farming systems; strengthening of linkages between research and agricultural extension; and making extension services more rational. 2. Objectives. The project had two main objectives: to test a new agricultural services model in Gitaramna prefecture, as a low-cost and effective alternative to the dispersed regional development projects approach followed so far by Government; and to improve the sectoral planning, monitoring and evaluation capacity of the Ministry of Agriculture. If successful, the project was to establish the basis for a unified national agricultural extension system. The project included four components: the reorganization and strengthening of extension services in Gitarama prefecture; assistance to non- governmental organizations (NGOs) active in the agricultural sector in that area (cooperatives; rural credit; NGOs in the artisanal sector); strengthening the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI); and a study on the development of marshlands in the Nyabarongo and Akanyaru valleys. All of these components were fully or substantially completed, utilizing most of the Credit agreement, with the exception of the MINAGRI strengthening component. 3. Implementation Experience. All of the components, with the exception of the MINAGRI strengthening component, were fully or substantially completed. The agricultural extension system was significantly modified during implementation. On-farm research was carried out but by project staff only as it suffered from insufficient participation from the National Agricultural Research Institute (ISAR). The Nyabarongo Valley Study was completed after a long delay. The MINAGRI Institutional Development component was not implemented due to the Government's refusal to finance Technical Assistance with other than grant money. Grant monies were eventually obtained from UNDP but proved ineffective. 4. Results. Project results have been mixed. While the agricultural extension system in Gitarama prefecture was substantially modified, it did not sufficiently strengthen its operational effectiveness in the desired direction: as linkages with research remained weak, and the training program was only very partially implemented, the top-down approach to extension continued, and extension messages were limited to the propagation of improved seed varieties and the use of inputs, instead of encompassing improved cultivation practices as well. Also, the MINAGRI strengthening component failed as the much delayed UNDP financed technical assistance was unable to achieve lasting results. However, the extension service was able to disseminate improved cassava and sweet potato varieties which were widely adopted by farmers (three times the original estimate of beneficiaries from extension); the incremental production thus achieved using conservative estimates, as measured against the cost of extension, yielded a rate of return of 21 % (against an expected 27 % at appraisal) for this component. The support to non-governmental organizations did yield important and sustainable results, and the marshlands development study (Nyabarongo), despite considerable delays, did come to significant conclusions, the most important ones being that much fewer marshlands were uncultivated than originally thought, and that of the remaining uncultivated marshlands, the development cost would be high. 5. Lessons Leargnd. While the project's overall results have been mixed, it has yielded a wealth of experience and lessons that are now being applied to follow-up operations. The main lessons and conclusions are the following: (a) widespread farmer adoption of just a small number of solid research results can be enough to achieve a large production response. In Gitarama, important production increases were achieved with the introduction of two basic foodcrops, cassava and sweet potatoes. These production increases relieved the famine threat in an area of high population density and impoverished soils; (b) the basis of sustained capacity-building in agricultural extension should rest on thorough understanding of farm practices and of evolving constraints in the cropping season. In this sense, capacity-building requires more support in extension methodology than either the Government or the Bank provided in this project. In particular, training of extension workers, regular farm visits and research-extension linkages should be closely supervised. Partially because of the lessons learned under this project, the support in extension methodology has now become available, and is being provided under the Agricultural Services Project (Cr. 2026-RW); (c) it also became apparent that the extension service in Gitarama prefecture was overmanned and that streamlining of field services, by eliminating duplications and providing better expertise, could result in personnel savings of up to 30%. These lessons are now implemented nationwide in the reorganization of the service under the Agricultural Services Project; (d) the operational deficiencies of the research establishment, which also became more readily apparent under the project, will be addressed through a reorganization of ISAR under a Phase II Agricultural Research project (under preparation); and finally, (e) the project demonstrated that assistance to non-governmental organizations can yield satisfactory results at low cost, and is sustainable beyond project closure. Rural credit was expanded, with good repayment rates; cooperative personnel has been trained; although cooperative activities and cottage food-processing industries remained constrained by the limited increase in commercial production and agricultural income. iv 6. It was the specific objective of this project to test a new model of agricultural extension and, if successful, to apply it nationwide. As it turned out, the new model was not well applied in Gitarama prefecture, but its lessons have been taken to heart and are now successfully applied nationwide. It is therefore our opinion that the impact of the project (although not its execution) has been largely positive and is leading to sustainable results. Moreover, as the extension service was able to achieve a measurable and durable increase in agricultural production in a very difficult environment, we regard the overall results as satisfactory, especially in the wider context. PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) PART I: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BANK'S PERSPECTIVE 1. Project Identitv Name: Gitarama Agricultural Production and MINAGRI Institutional Development Project Credit No.: 1669-RW Regional Office: Africa Country: Rwanda Sector: Agriculture Subsector: Research and Extension 2. Backargund 2.1 Rwanda is facing formidable constraints: rapid population increase, declining soil fertility, lack of natural resources and a landlocked location. Agriculture, the main economic activity, employs 80% of the country's manpower and will be the main source of any increase in production, employment or income in the short term. Rwanda's Third Plan (1982-86) sought to focus on agricultural operations. First and foremost, it called for a refocusing of agronomic research on traditional farming systems; strengthening of linkages between research and agricultural extension; and making extension services more rational. 2.2 The project was designed during a time when the Bank wanted to reform integrated rural development projects, after concluding that their limited impact on agricultural production, high costs and complexity were making them unsustainable. Together with the Agricultural Research Project (Credit 15466-RW), the Gitarama project reflected this change in approach. The Gitarama prefecture was to serve as the site of a pilot agricultural services operation serving more than 700,000 people, i.e. 130,000 farm families, or 12% of the national population, over an area of 2,188 Ikm2 (density of 320 inhabitants/kin), distributed among four subprefectures and 17 communes. 3. Objectives and Description 3.1 Objectives. The project was to test an agricultural services model in the Gitarama prefecture that would be replicable at the national level and increase the income of some 50,000 smallholders, i.e. 40% of the prefecture's population (Table 3, Part IE). The project also included an institutional development component, aimed at strengthening sectoral management by improving financial, monitoring and evaluation systems within the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI). 2 3.2 Description. The Gitarama project included: (1) reorganizing and training agricultural extension personnel, as well as providing logistical support, including equipment and construction; (2) a research/development program to refine on-farm adaptive research recommendations in conjunction with the National Agricultural Research Institute (ISAR); (3) related activities, in particular to support training and research institutions, agricultural credit, supply, processing and marketing; (4) a study on the development of Nyabarongo and Akanyaru Valleys; (5) a program to improve sectoral planning; project preparation, monitorir.g and evaluation; accounting and financial control; and administrative and budgetary management in MINAGRI; and (6) a training program for personnel of MINAGRI. 4. Design 4.1 The project was designed following preparation by a team of expatriate consultants closely involving MINAGRI staff. There was also heavy involvement of Bank personnel (Table 7.A). The Bank was satisfied with the participatory approach used in Gitarama, which was deemed conducive to develop the national capacity for project preparation. 4.2 In 1984, a seminar on agricultural extension had stressed the limited relevance of technical recommendations in relation to smallholder needs. It was found that one of the main causes of the failure of previous projects was the minor role allotted small farmers in project preparation and implementation. The seminar had also criticized the confusion and poor administration resulting from a profusion of integrated rural development projects. The Bank was particularly interested in reforming the integrated rural development system that it had helped introduce (Table 1, Part IHo), but which had not yielded the expected results. 4.3 Based on a general desire to establish a standard agricultural extension system at the national level, the project was to apply the well-known "training and visit' principles (T & V), which involved the optimal deployment of field extension agents to serve the agricultural population in the area (i.e. on average 750 rural families for each of the 171 extension agents). The agents had wide-ranging duties and predetermined itineraries for farm visits. They were to receive training in two-week cycles, and monthly workshops were to be given for the technical specialists. 4.4 The T & V system could be readily incorporated into the local administrative organization; each field extension agent was responsible for a "sector" (some 10 sectors making up a commune); the sectors were divided into five to six cells, consisting of 50 to 200 families and extending over an area that could be covered in one day by an agent, who would visit every two weeks. The agents were to be supervised by communal extension officers. Under the project, they were to provide 3 training for the field agents with occasional support from technicians in operational units. These newly created operational units, corresponding to the subprefectural level of government, were to play an important role in decision-making concerning extension themes, programming of activities and administration of funds. From the start, the subprefectural agricultural personnel were thus strengthened. Though at the prefecture level, the prefectural coordinator maintained authority over the various services of the Ministry, the Gitarama Agricultural Project (GAP) was established as a traditional legal and accounting entity, overseen by a MINAGRI representative (fonctionnaire- dirigeant), in this case the Director of Agricultural Promotion. 4.5 Adaptive research was to be contractually designed and supervised by ISAR and carried out by project agents. Although the conclusion of a contract between ISAR and the GAP was a condition of effectiveness for the Credit, the real effort as regards the design of on-farm research began only after it became effective. 4.6 In order to facilitate the development of improved techniques, input supply to farmers and marketing of their surpluses, the project included related activities managed by the Project Promotion Office and subcontracted to specialized institutions, such as agricultural credit to the Banques Populaires, management training for cooperatives to the Center for Cooperative Training and Research (IWACU), and subsequently to the Gitarama Cooperative Services Center, and promotion of artisanal activities (in particular the manufacture of agricultural tools) to KORA, a local association of artisans. 4.7 The study of the Nyabarongo and Akanyaru Valleys was to assess the development potential of an expanse of marshlands, which the Government saw as one of the last reserves of arable land not yet in use. The cost of the studies was estimated at US$1.2 million. 4.8 The MINAGRI institutional development component was conceived as a complement to the Gitarama agricultural production component, in the sense that it was to enable MINAGRI to supervise and evaluate its projects, services and policies. Thus, through the MINAGRI institutional development component, evaluation of projects such as the Gitarama agricultural component would make it possible to formulate strategies on which national agricultural policies could be based. In addition to Bank financing, the component was to receive United Nations Development Program (UNDP) support in accordance with an agreement signed August 2, 1986 that made the Bank the implementing agency. 5. Implementation 5.1 Agricultural extension. The agricultural extension system, initially planned along T & V lines, was significantly modified during implementation. With the idea of quickly reachbng a large share of the population, project officials made the farmers who were team leaders at the Community Development and Training Centers (Centres Communaux de Developpement et de Formation Permanente - CCDFP) responsible for training their teams of farmers, on the basis of 'development contracts." From the start, the collective contracting system effectively dampened the self-interest and individual freedom of the smallholder farmer. Moreover, the training of extension agents in two- week cycles, and the monthly workshops for technical specialists were gradually abandoned and replaced by training sessions not linked to the regular monitoring of the cropping season. This was caused by a lack of field observations and of practical exercises which kept the information on 4 farming methods and food crops to a superficial level and which, in turn, led to a relative ignorance of farming practices, and made the extension training cycle and monthly workshops void of content. Rather than breaking down the themes to facilitate their spontaneous adoption, albeit partially and gradually, the extension services sought to speed up the adoption of poorly accepted themes by concentrating on a more limited area. Two of the four subprefectures were thus reorganized in 1989 into 'collines-pilotes' and 'cellules-pilotes." For the former, the extension agents concentrated on one "colline-pilote" per year, whereas for the latter, the field agents assisted only some 30 farms. With this system, two or three thousand farmers could benefit from agricultural extension in each operational unit, i.e. about 10,000 prefecture-wide, an objective that was markedly below the 50,000 smallholders initially targeted. Fortunately, however, in response to the threat of famine in 1989, the project achieved one of its key successes by organizing the multiplication and widespread dissemination of improved cassava and sweet potato varieties (beyond the 10,000 farmers benefitting from extension, see para 6.1). 5.2 On-farm Research. Project implementation achieved insufficient participation of ISAR, reflecting over-optimistic expectations on ISAR's output. Because ISAR researchers were few and young, and did not have the ability to rapidly produce practical solutions, the contract between ISAR and the project unit (which provided for ISAR to make three visits per cropping season in the project area-i.e. six per year, to supply genetic material and to train project agents) should have been used mainly to develop researchers' field exposure. In practice, on-farm research was carried out almost unilaterally by the project itself, and as it was not supported from the outside, it eventually ran out of steam. At the start (19861987), the project was able to formulate the details of on-farm research and overcome the inexperience of its agronomist in charge, by recruiting a seasoned expatriate expert for six months. The latter's recommendations for 1987, reflecting a knowledge of farming systems that he deemed insufficient (particularly as regards crop rotation and associations), were limited to varietal trials on two crops, beans and cassava. However, his recommended focus of adaptive research on farm-ng practices and smallholder seed production and distribution systems was increasingly negle..Led for want of professional support. Available techniques (apical cuttings of sweet potatoes, various pruning techniques of coffee trees, seed treatment) therefore remained poorly understood. The expatriate expert also recommended training of project personnel in on-farm research activities, which was neglected. 5.3 The on-farm research activities were therefore characterized by insufficient proximity to the smallholder milieu. Also, the expatriate expert expected the trials in each commune (7,000 farmers) to be done with only 10 farmers, over an area of 1 are (10 m x 10 m). In 1990, those activities primarily involved multi-location varietal improvement, fertilization and demonstration trials (soybeans and pineapple). Instead of testing a large number of inexpensive techniques centered on improving farming practices with the means available, the adaptive research activities remained focused on the distribution of inputs (including genetical plant material), which were often subsidized. 5.4 Related activities. The project's Agricultural Promotion Office subcontracted the bulk of related activities to non-government organizations. These consisted of (i) support to groups and cooperatives; (ii) rural credit; (iii) support for artisanal activities; (iv) dissemination of inputs; and (v) seed production (cuttings and seedlings); as summarized below. (a) A non-governmental organization under contract (Center for Cooperative Training and Research, IWACU) trained the officials of some 15 commercial cooperatives (marketing coffee, beans and sorghum, each in a different commune) in financial 5 management and assisted some six 'intergroupements" (small local smallholder associations) in planning their activities. (b) As regards rural credit, the project provided means to the existing network of Banques Populaires (receiving support from the Swiss Government) to set up a branch in Gitarama and grant pre-harvest credit in the prefecture, a form of consumer credit to ease the cash flow constraints of households during the lean times preceding harvest. This initiative involved some 5,000 smallholder families. The Gitarama Banque Populaire also financed working capital for marketing coffee, sorghum and beans. In contrast, agricultural production credit was relatively limited for lack of demand. (c) Support to artisanal activities was constrained by KORA's implementation capacity, and had to be interrupted in 1989, at which point the Government contracted IWACU, a stronger institution, to research and develop cottage food-processing industries. (d) Input distribution (kitchen garden seed, agricultural tools and equipment, plant treatment products and fertilizer) was assigned to cooperatives and farmer groups and handled through some 30 sales points throughout the prefecture. The Promotion Office served as wholesaler. In 1988, the cooperatives and farmer groups sold US$35,000 in inputs, representing a small share of demand (which could be estimated at equivalent to several dollars per farm household, primarily for tools and kitchen garden seed). The lack of training on the part of sales personnel in using the products, the high cost of certain products in relation to market prices, and the low demand for plant treatment products and fertilizers limited the impact of this activity. (e) Seed production was first handled through three government-operated seed farms (totaling 60 ha), but has been since 1989 subcontracted to smallholders in order to reduce costs and inefficiency. 5.5 Management. Management of the Gitarama component was affected by poor internal control within the Ministry of Agriculture. Absorbed by other responsibilities, thefonctionnaire-dirigeant could not supervise the project properly. However, with expatriate technical assistance, project finances were well managed up to 1990, despite some friction between the prefectural coordinator and thefonctionnaire-dirigeant, the former resenting centralized control of expenditures. In 1990, the audit mission found deficiencies in the accounting records, though of minor significance compared to overall project expenditures. These deficiencies, which had not been resolved by the time of credit closing, led to the replacement of the prefectural coordinator in 1991. 5.6 Study on the development of Nyabarongo Valley. Despite several delays, the study of Nyabarongo and Akanyaru Valleys was completed under the project. It was overseen by the Rural Engineering Department in the Ministry of Agriculture and prepared with the assistance of consultants. Competitive bidding was opened on April 10, 1986 among five consulting firms and the bids submitted on July 22, 1986. The contract, awarded to SOGREAH, a French consulting firm, after a long procedural process, was signed on October 2, 1987. In 1987, the World Bank allocated special resources from its Africa Region Technical Department for supervision of the study, which was submitted to and approved by the Government in 1989. However, the Bank was not satisfied 6 and requested additional information on institutional, land tenure and environmental aspects. After revision, the study was accepted by the Bank in 1991. The main findings of the study were that, contrary to general opinion, few marshlands still existed that had not already been put under cultivation and could profitably be reclaimed. The study only identified some 15,000 ha (or less than 10% of the studied area) for further feasibility study preparation, and even in this area of reclamation, unit costs would be high. As a result, the World Bank indicated in its review of Rwanda's public expenditures, (Report No. 7717-RW of October 19, 1989) that swamp reclamation works were to be considered much less of a priority for Rwanda. 5.7 MINAGRI institutional development. This component was modified during execution. In 1987, the Minister had already requested the World Bank to postpone the component, feeling it was preferable to use available grants (UNDP, bilateral aid) rather than the IDA credit. After considerable delays, the Government and UNDP concluded a new project agreement in 1990, ("Management Support to the Ministry of Agriculture"), making FAO the executing agency and covering accounting, management, monitoring and evaluation, but no longer encompassing sectoral planning, which was to be handled by an ad hoc commission (the National Agriculture Commission). While this commission has produced a commendable report, no in-house strengthening of the monitoring and evaluation capacities of MINAGRI has been achieved. 6. Results 6.1 Agricultural extension and adaptive research. Project results have been mixed. Compared to appraisal expectations, whereby the intensification rate was to reach 25%, i.e. 33,000 farms in year 5 (Appraisal Report, Annex 6), field observations in 1991 did not confirm such a high level, particularly as regards the adoption of improved cultivation practices. However, some specific themes, (rapid multiplication of sweet potato and cassava, erosion control), have been widely disseminated; the 1990 activity report indicates that some 50% of farms had received cassava and sweet potato cuttings. Adoption rates for other themes are summarized in Tables D and E of the Annex and show that in 1990 (year 5 of the project) value added reached 60% of the target of model N2 for small farms and 53% of the target for medium-size farms. Such benefits are sufficient to produce a rate of return of 21 % for the extension component, using conservative estimates as shown in the appended economic analysis, compared to 27% at appraisal. 6.2 In relation to the main objective of the project, which was to establish a viable agricultural extension model, results have been less convincing. Ultimately, the project involved only a small percentage of the 130,000 farmers in the prefecture in 1985 (Table 3); it successfully disseminated only a few themes; it did not sufficiently mobilize research, and it responded insufficiently to farmers' demands, particularly regarding improved farming practices. Because implementation was not systematic or rigorous, the implementation of extension methodology has remained problematic. Against the objectives of increasing the relevance of extension messages and strengthening linkages between research and extension, progress in the organization and management of agricultural extension overall was disappointing. It also became apparent that the extension service in Gitarama prefecture was overmanned and that streamlining of field services, by eliminating duplications and providing better expertise, could result in personnel savings of up to 30%. 6.3 The related activities also had mixed results. Results were positive in the assistance to NGOs whose activities will survive the project (in particular the Banques Populaires and IWACU) and 7 whose specific experience, implementation and coordination capability benefitted from involvement in the project. Rural credit was expanded with good repayment rates. Results are uncertain in the development of farmer associations, failing a substantial increase in commercial production and agricultural income. Finally, the project's assistance to input distribution (kitchen garden seed, tools and chemicals) had a limited impact (para 5.4 (d)). 6.4 Despite its high cost, the Nyabarongo feasibility study was a clear achievement of the project and showed the benefits of good supervision. The study made an important contribution to the formulation of a national swamp reclamation policy, showing the limited potential for reclamation and the high cost of such investment. The least costly option recommended would still cost US$17 million for the reclamation of 8,000 ha, i.e. more than US$2,000 per ha. One of the questions raised by the study was the social equity of the operations which, even on a modest scale and at the rate of 0.25 ha per smallholder, would still have cost US$500 per farmer. 6.5 The tardy and partial execution of the MINAGRI institutional development component undoubtedly hindered supervision of the Gitarama component. Conversely, the mediocre results of the Gitarama component as regards the organization and management of agricultural extension and adaptive research delayed the expected improvement in MINAGRI's institutional ability to influence general growth in agricultural production in Rwanda. 7. Sustainabilitv 7.1 At project completion, its sustainability was uncertain: in spite of the good results achieved with the propagation of cassava and sweet potato varieties, the changes introduced to reinforce the extension service had not really taken hold, thus limiting its ultimate effectiveness close to pre-project levels. Since, however, its lessons have been taken to heart: the Bank agreed to locate an extension specialist in Rwanda to advise the Government on improved extension methodologies and help to set up and implement training programs under the follow-up Agricultural Services project which extends nationwide; and the Government agreed to reorganize the extension service along the lines of the Gitarama model, but covering the entire country, and to improve extension-research linkages under the follow-up Agricultural Research II project. These changes have now been successfully implemented nationwide. The impact of the project (although not its execution) has thus been largely positive and is leading to sustainable results. 8. Performance of the Bank 8.1 Despite continuous supervision (Table 6.B, Part III), the Bank failed to mobilize the necessary combination of expertise in agricultural extension, including at least three elements: (i) a thorough understanding of the management system to be introduced; (ii) the training capability for holding induction seminars; and (iii) solid qualifications in agronomy. Although the third element, agronomic expertise, was indisputably available, the other elements of expertise in agricultural extension were lacking; not one supervision mission included an extension management specialist. Thus, although the first supervision mission highlighted the need to develop low-cost husbandry messages as a priority, the extension services failed to heed this advice, largely because the institutional pressure towards this goal was relaxed. Unfortunately, extension specialists were in short 8 supply in the World Bank. On the other hand, supervision helped produce a good quality product in the Nyabarongo study. 9. Performance of the Borrower 9.1 Inadequate Borrower performance in project execution was attributable to the Borrower's insufficient supervision and practical familiarity with organization and management of agricultural extension. In addition, the delay in executing the institutional development component and the overload of responsibilities on the fonctionnaire-dirigeant hindered administration and made it impossible to resolve the irregularities observed in the 1990 and 1991 audits. Lastly, budget constraints that began with the general economic decline starting in 1989 caused problems for the programming of public expenditures. Estimated project cost (US$10 million over five years), representing about US$15 per year and per farm household, was in excess of the reasonable cost of agricultural extension and adaptive research Oess than US$5). In addition, the establishment of a unified agricultural extension policy was hindered by the large number of projects (over eighty overseen by MINAGRI), which were competing for public funds. This constraint was acknowledged from the start, but the project failed to resolve it by demonstrating an alternative, low-cost and effective extension strategy. 10. Performance of Consultants 10.1 In the context of project design and execution, the performance of consultants was deemed good in the preparation and start-up of the project. In project implementation, consultant performance was constrained by a lack of familiarity with organization principles of agricultural extension. In addition, the financial expert (who developed the system that delivered financial statements within a few days of the end of the fiscal year) also faced external constraints, such as delays in the institutional development component, poor relations between the prefectural coordinator and the fonctionnaire-dirigeant, and a lack of guidelines on the management of agricultural extension. A better administrative environment would have markedly simplified the management and monitoring of project finances. Lastly, the consulting firm responsible for the Nyabarongo study ultimately delivered satisfactory results, but required close supervision. 11. Project Documentation and Data 11.1 Project documentation and data were generally adequate, including the legal agreement and the staff appraisal report which provided the necessary framework for guiding implementation. Most data needed for preparing the PCR were readily available in supervision reports, project activity reports and related documents. 9 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) PART II: PROJECT REVIEW FROM THE BORROWER'S PERSPECTIVE No comments were received. 10 PROJECT COMPLETION REPORT RWANDA GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION AND MINAGRI INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT (CREDIT 1669-RW) PART III: STATISTICAL INFORMATION Table 1: Related IDA Credits Amount of Credit Year Comvletion Proiect (USS million) Obiective aooroved Execution report 1. Mutara I Regional development Completed (Cr.0439-RW) 3.8 1973 in 1979 Available 2. Quinquina Perennial crops Completed (Cr.0656-RW) 1.8 1976 in 1983 Available 3. BGI I Regional development Completed (Cr.0668-RW) 14.0 1976 in 1982 Available 4. GBK (Forestry and live- Forestry/stockraising CoMpleted stock development 1) 1980 in 1987 Available (Cr.1039-RW) 21.0 5. PCCV Regional development Completed Under (Cr.1126-RW) 11.8 1981 in 1988 preparation 6. BGM If RegionaL development (Cr.1283-RW) 15.0 1982 Under way 7. Agricultural research Research (Cr.1546-RW) 11.5 1985 Under way 8. Gitarama Agricultural extension Completed Herewith (Cr.1669-RW) 12.7 and related services 1986 in 1991 9. Integrated forestry II Forestry/stockraising (Cr.1811-RW) 14.1 1987 Under way 10. Agricultural services Agricultural extension (Cr.2026-RW) 19.9 and related services 1989 Under way 11 Table 2: Proiect Timetable Original date Effective date First mention 1980 Appraisal 07/85 PPF (preparation 11/05/85 advance) Negotiations 11/15/85 Approval 03/28/86 Signature 05/23/86 Effectiveness 09/20/86 02/27/87 Completion 12/31/90 09/30/91 Closing 09/30/91 09/30/91 Last disbursement 01/31/92 12 Table 3: Implementation Indicators Indicator Appraisal Actual' Smallholder groups (year 5) 41,000 N.A. (year 15) 49,300 N.A. Intensified farms (year 5) 33,000 N.A. (M) 23% _ Percentage of farms introducing themes 2 Bananas (planting of improved varieties) 7% Cassava, sweet potato (improved cuttings) 50% Beans (improved and treated seed) 4% Erosion control 80% Stockraising 3% worming 20% tick control 2% artificial insemination 10% manure-producing stables 70% Compost pile 1% Fertilizer (distributed by GAP) 5% Insecticides (distributed by GAP) 75% Coffee (mulching, treatments, pruning) _ __ ~/ Source: 1990 Activity Report. 2/ Based on the entire population of the Prefecture, i.e. about 130,000 farm families in 1985 (para 2.2). 13 Table 4: Disbursements A. Cumulative Estimated and Actual Disbursement (in USS'000) Fiscal Appraisal Actual Actual an Year a % of Year________________________________ Appraisal ___________ Gitarama MINAGRI Total 1986 320 150 470 0 0 1987 1,320 475 1,795 1,981 110 1988 3,120 1,025 4,145 4,673 113 1989 5,670 1,725 7,395 7,201 97 1990 8,420 2,175 10,595 9,646 91 1991 10,020 2,450 12,470 11,563 93 1992 10,200 2,500 12,700 11,845 93 Table 4B: Cumulative Disbursements by Cateaory (in '000 SDRs) Appraisal Actual Actual as a Estimate % of __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ _ _ _ _ _ _ Est imate I . CiviL Works 1,560 1.824 117 II. VehicLes and Equipment Gitarama 1,560 1,219 78 I SAR 30 0 0 MINAGRI 650 45 7 III. Consultants' and Experts Services Gi tarama 2,650 1,819 69 ISAR 150 9 6 MINAGRI 280 573 205 IV. Training Gitarm and ISAR 530 605 114 MINAGRI 750 13 2 V. Agricultural Inputs 80 408 510 VI. Operating Costs 519 104 Gi tarama 500 0 0 I SAR 30 VIl. Nyabarongo Study 1,200 1,371 114 VIII.Refunding of Project Preparation Advance 900 498 55 IX. Unallocated 830 0 0 TOTAL 11 700 8,948 3 76 3/ Including currency adjustments in the amount of SDR 44,070.05. 14 Table 5: Costs and Financina (US$ million) Appraisal Implementation Actual as a % of Appraiual IDA Contribution 12.7 11.8 93 UNDP Contribution 3.0 0Q0* 0 Rwandese 7.0 5.0 71 Contribution Total coat 22. 7 16.8 74 * The Minagri institutional development component, which UNDP was to cofinance, was not implemented. Instead, the Goverrnent sought UNDP support for a new free-standing project (para 5.7). 15 Table 6: Covenants of the Credit Agreement Section Covenant Compliance 2.02(b) Special Account Yes 3.01(a) Commitment of the Borrower Strong commitment for Gitareme component until 1989, when budgetary constraints emerged. No commitment on MINAGRI component. 3.01(b) Complience with the Implementation Program set Yes forth in the Credit Agreement 3.01(c) Project Accounts (contribution of the Government) Achieved untiL 1988. As of 1989, budget allocations are Late and insufficient. 3.02 Procurement Yes 3.03 Expansion of the agricultural extension program Yes beyond the first sub-prefecture at the Latest by Deceiber 31, 1988 in consultation with the Bank 3.04 Housing for higher-level staff Not achieved, but this clause does not seem to have taken sufficient account of the national policy on wage supplements. 3.05 Personnel for the MINAGRI institutional MINAGRI component not carried out development component 3.06 MINAGRI component Not carried out 3.08 Receipts from reimbursement of mopeds and Not complied with. In 1990, USSO.3 million was motorcycLes used to finance operating expenses. 3.08[sic:?3.09J Contributions of the communes Yes 3.10 Agreements with the various executing agencies Yes for the related services 4.01(a) Accounting Yes 4.01(a) Audit Yes 4.01(c) Statements of expenditure Yes 5.01 Effectiveness conditions Yes 5.02 Effective date Postponed (see Table 2) Schedule 4A Project officials Complied with for the Giterama component Schedule 4(1) Management committee Yes Part IA Schedule 4(1) Adaptive research: contract with ISAR Yes Part IB Schedule 4(2) MINAGRI component Not carried out Part 11 Schedule 4B Work programs and budgets Yes 16 Table 7: Use of Bank Resources A. In person-weg&Q A. _ ___ Stage in cycle/year 1980 1984 1985 1986 19871 1988 11989 1990 11991 Total Up to and including appraisal 0.3 13.2 87.0 50.0 150.5 From appraisal to approval 28.7 28.7 Supervision From approval to effectiveness of Credit Agreement 2.5 5.0 7.5 after effectiveness _ 14.1 19.7 17.4 26.9 9.8 87.9 TOTAL 0.3 13.2 87.0 81.2 19.1 19.7 17.4 26.9 9.8 274.6 B. Missions Stage of project Mission Field No. Specialization' Rating" Types of cycle dote days people problem Identification 03/84 4 2 Agr/Eco, Fin Preparation 02/85 14 2 Vet, Eco 05/85 30 1 Fin Appraisal 07/85 24 5 Vet, Fin, Eco/Agr r Supervision 09/86 11 2 Eco/Agr, Agr 3/2 12/86 7 2 Eco/Agr, Agr 3/2 N 04/87 2 3 Eco/Agr, Agr, Fin 3/2 N 11/87 14 3 Eco/Agr, Agr 3/2 N 05/88 10 Eco/Agr, Agr 3/2 N SOGREAN 09/88 4 2 Eco/Agr, Irr 2/2 12/89 7 3 Eco/Agr, Irr, Fin 2/2 N (mid-term review) 05/90 20 4 Eco/Agr, Soc, Agr, Fin 2/2 N 03/91 4 1 1 1 1 3/3 F N * Eco/Agr = Agricultural Economist, Vet a Veterinarian, Fin - Financial Analyst, Irr a Irrigation Engineer, Agr = Agronomist, Soc = Sociologist. 4/ The first rating indicates general iwpact on development. The second rating indicates general implementation performnce. The ratings range from 1 (good) to 4 (poor). A rating of 1 indicates that project objectives will be essentially achieved. A rating of 2 indicates that several minor objectives of the project may not be achieved, but the main objectives will be; project justification is not in doubt. A rating of 3 indicates that project objectives will be only partially achieved and that project justification is questionable. A rating of 4 indicates that project objectives will probably not be achieved and that the project no longer seems justified. 5/ N: management; F: financial. 17 APPENDIX ECONOMIC ANALYSIS Modology The ex-post economic evaluation using a somewhat simplified version of the appraisal methodology shows a robust rate of return (21%, see Table A). The simplification consisted in using only the two most representative farm models: N2 and N4. They provide a sufficient approximation of the real situation. Only the without-fertilizer scenario was used because fertilizer had minimal success. Taking account of the experience under the project, Table B shows more cautious assumptions than the Appraisal Report regarding the number of farms under intensification. Their numbers are the same for the fifth year of the project (33,000) but for the first year, they are reduced to one-fifth of that number (by linear interpolation) and they remain constant after the fifth year instead of continuing to increase (reflecting a more realistic assumption of prospects at the completion of the project). Tables D and E show the methodology used to calculate project impact on income from N2 and N4 farms based on the adoption rates shown in Table 3, Part Im of the Project Completion Report. Agricultural extension costs were based on the Appraisal Report, with several adjustments, given in Table C. rID 1938O RWANDA ' GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECT PROJET DE PRODUCTION AGRICOLE DE GITARA UGANDA RAINFALL AND AGRICULTURAL PATTERN , . AND LOCATION OF BANK-FINANCED PROJECTS 1300 A \C§ tM CS,,witoR..tod,lSW,on (10) - Bog.t g lk Ulgon.. goi ..k. RM19 sol0 R. \ rn S i P.. TANZANIA ~~ Bo ~~Gio*o lk. Aligong. Pro.it d S.mi .., do 0#..lpposn.ot R-,.-Ph ... I/ - . - Cf.dFW P-jd.A eA.oNM d. I. CMtftjoo/dt4 doeo= V,fi. d- 1. R duL.c ICu ZAIRE D ) i d L iS 00RP,, d. OiqWNk,.B tNj 2 ; F. SX _____ Mo.tAtionltonled Loton Dnlop.otP.oj.d-Pht,ooog9z_9rLk -- :I5 DPr ill d. D* o~ Ago d. Md- PJNMM d _I* \), S 0 1G..0 Fn... R-oBND R6o.m-'. FO ,oodo. do ._.w' _____ Fnn.-, ond Lsoonk noP1nn Uoos.2 Ppoi < 4fi ' A~~~no~~~Iot.i R.gsoo Snondono. ~~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ KAER Lo,o d.Rg..At.n. o Rmo.. Nt.0.0. Copdo F,n,o .. ldom.O.tLo 1200- lohy.1. o 2' Agricultural Regions Regions Agricoles 2 LAoIo. Roo 3On Soi- 5 Z.-t-Nil. Dsid. Hig."hod Zoo- dH.,,m, Alftitd. do Cr41. Z...-Nile 6 Bo.brsk. Hgho-de d C.otr.1 Plot-. 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T~~~~~~0---- 0 A Z0 f s010512A''L ...0..... f~~-*SM0,=0, I 29040' 29°50' RWANDA 3000' IBR 1938 GITARAMA AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION PROJECT PROJET DE PRODUCTION AGRICOLE DE GITARAMA MAIN ROADS OPERATIONAL UNITS ROUTES PRINCIPALES W UNITES OPERATIONNELLES ,/ ® / @ PREFECTURE BP BANQUES POPULAIRES PREFECTURE PREFECTURE BOUNDARY I \ < -C RIVERS LIMITE DE PREFECTURE / v FLEUVES SUB-PREFECTURE BOUNDARIES LIMITE DE SOUS-PREFECTURE GISENYI - - - - COMMUNE BOUNDARIES LIMITE DE COMMUNE 1-505' 1050' INYAKABANDA / BP /i NYABIKENKE 1 KA YNZI, . RUT OBWE BPE BULINGA BUUNGANDA rO Kibuye {X A/ /<~~B MUSAMBIRA -\ - KIBUYE arm > -, MUSHUBAT , i\ara,' a , NYAMABUYE SX ,- -\ S ~~~~~~ %, ~MUGINA 2°'I O' MUKINGI 2'I-aw 2°10 / \A, MASANGO BP/B K BP NTONGWEMg %, ,J ~~MURAMA KIGOMAT/. 73°0 8.0000000.00,0, 0 BUR.U UGANDAN 2°20' X_ 2°20'- UG , KENYA GIKONGORO .Ja2 \ v To 8ufare ~~~~~~~~ZAIRE *.RWAND.\ | £ CO,p0,80000 008.000,008000 TANZANIA 0,0080,0,0000080000 0000 0 5 10 800 ,n-oooto.~.ooc&o,P,.j.S ... x. K,lometers 00 80~ 0000000 00 80 L T ongony,ko 29 40' 29050' NOVEMBER 1985