Report No. 4950-TH Thailand Transport Sector Review June 28, 1985 Transportation Division 2 Projects Department East Asia and Pacific Regional Office FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ;;t rc~ - - ;.l . J trt; - - ' '; '~~~~~~~~~~~, - ; - 4i -.~~~~~~~ ~ ~~~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ .-- .. . - -.; ---.: : .. Document of the World Bank This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization. CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS Currency Unit - Thailand Baht (B) B1 = US$ 0.0435 B1 million = US$43,478 US$1 = B 27 FISCAL YEAR October 1 - September 30 WEIGHTS AND MEASURES 1 meter (m) = 3.3 feet (ft.) 1 kilometer (km) = 0.62 miles (mi) 1 square kilometer (sq km) = 0.39 square miles (sq mi) 1 liter (1) = 0.28 US gallons (gal) = 0.22 British gallons (l mp gal) 1 metric ton (n ton) = 1.10 US short ton (sh ton) - 0.98 British long ton (lg ton) = 1 million grams ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS aadt - Annual average daily vehicle traffic ARD - Accelerated Rural Development Department B - Baht BMA - Bangkok Metropolitan Administration BMTA - Bangkok Mass Transit Authority cfs - Container freight station cif - Cost, insurance and freight DOH - Department of Highways dwt - Deadweight tons ETO - Express Transportation Organization FY - Fiscal Year LPG - Liquified petroleum gas LRVC - Long run variable cost MOC - Ministry of Communications MOI - Ministry of Interior MSL - Mean Sea Level NESDB - National Economic and Social Development Board PAT - Port Authority of Thailand PWD - Public Works Department SRT - State Railway of Thailand TEU - Twenty-foot equivalent units TPU - Transport Planning Unit V-km - - Vehicle-km VOC - Vehicle operating costs FOR OMCiAL USE ONLY THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Table of Contents Page No. SUMMARY i. Introduction .............................................. 1 ii. The State of Transportation Development and the Sector's Current Investment Program ..............1................. I iii. Main Issues and Problems Confronting the Sector ........... 4 I. ROADS SUBSECTOR ............................................. 8 A. National and Provincial Roads .......................... 8 National and Provincial Roads System . . 8 Traffic and Transport Industry .. 8 Department of Highways .. 9 Fifth Plan Investments .. 10 Investment Needs and Priorities ...................... 10 Kain Issues .. 11 B. Rural Roads . . ........................................... 12 Rural Roads System .... 12 Traffic ....................... 13 Administration/Institutions .... 13 Study of Rural Roads .... 14 Planning and Engineering of Rural Roads . . 16 Construction .... 16 Maintenance of Rural Roads ......................... 16 This report,prepared by Mr. Lars Nordin (Senior Transport Economist), brings together and updates sector analyses by recent appraisal missions and studies and other sector work carried out over the past few years by Messrs. Robert E. Rafloski, and Albert Weckerle (Senior Transport Economists), Philip Morris (Senior Highway Engineer), Wolfgang P. Hoehenwarter (Financial Analyst), Ernst Frankel (Ports Adviser), Richard Podolske (Urban Planner) and Frank Higginbottom (Consultant/Port Engineer). This document has a reid difrbution ad my be used by recpients on in the perfomance of their official duties. Its ontents may not otherwise be dislosed without Wod Bank authorization. - ii - Page No. II. THE STATE RAILWAY OF THAILAND ............................... 17 A. Organization ................ ..*..0- .6 ...........a...................... 17 B. Management, Staff and Training .. 17 C. Facilities .. 18 D. Traffic and Operations .. 20 E. Tariffs and Costs . . 21 F. Budget and Accounting .................................. . 23 C. Uneconomic Lines and Services .. 23 H. Compensation for Losses .. 24 I. SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan .. 24 J. Financial Performance .......... 25 III. PORTS SUBSECTOR ...... 27 A. The Ports System . ....................................... 27 B. Organization ............................................ 27 C. Existing Facilities .......................................................... 28 D. Traffic and Operations . . . 30 E. Development Strategy . . . 33 F. Finances ................................................ 34 IV. INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL PORTS .............. ........ .. 34 A. Inland Waterways ........................................ 34 B. Coastal Ports .. 37 C. Harbour Department .. 39 D. Issues .........................................Do.................... 40 V. SHIPPING . . .................................................. 41 A. Fleet Composition . ...................................... 41 B. Institutional Issues ........................................................ 42 C. Future Prospects ........................................ 43 D. Findings and Recommendations . . .......................... 43 VI. URBAN TRANSPORT .... 44 A. Overview .. 44 B. Existing Transport Conditions in Bangkok . . 45 C. Proposed Investments in Transport Infrastructure ........ 46 D. Urban Transport Institutions . . 47 E. An Urban Transport Strategy for Bangkok . . 48 - iii- TABLES 1.1 - Department of Highways Roads by Regions in 1984 1.2 - Roads Maintained by the Department of Highways, 1963-84 1.3 - Motor Vehicle Registration 1.4 - Registered Motor Vehicles by Area of Registration (1978) 1.5 - Vehicle-Kilometers on National, Provincial and Rural Roads 1.6 - Department of Highways Five-Year Investment Plan, 1982-86 1.7 - Rural Road Density by Region 2.1 - SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic ('000 tons) 2.2 - SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic (million ton-km) 2.3 - SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic ('000 passengers) 2.4 - SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic (million passenger-km) 2.5 - SRT Traffic Unit Costs and Revenues - FY82 2.6 - Government Compensation for SRT Losses 2.7 - Summary of SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan 2.8 - SRT Income Statement (Commercial and Noncommercial Operations Combined) 3.1 - Import and Export Trade (non-POL) through Bangkok Port System - by Facilities, 1975-84 3.2 - Comparative Statement of Container and Break Bulk Cargoes through Klong Toei Wharf during the Years 1978-90 (January-December) 3.3 - Container Traffic at Bangkok (Klong Toei) 3.4 - PAT Consolidated Income Accounts: 1976-85 3.5 - PAT Consolidated Balance Sheets: 1976-85 4.1 - Inland Waterways Fleet during 1980-82 4.2 - Harbour Department - Budget Appropriations and Actual Budget Expenditures, 1978-84 4.3 - Harbour Department - Revenue Collection, FY79-84 6.1 - Composition and Growth of Motor Vehicle Fleet Registered in Bangkok 6.2 - Estimated Person-Trips by Mode in Primary Travel Direction on Arterial Streets in Central Bangkok 6.3 - Bangkok: Urban Transport Investments, 1980-84 6.4 - Agencies Involved in Urban Transport within Bangkok CHARTS 1. Organization of Department of Highways 2. Accelerated Rural Development Department: ARD Organization Chart 3. Organization Chart of State Railway of Thailand 4. Port Authority of Thailand: Organization Chart 5. Organization of Harbour Department MAPS IBRD 15195R - Second Provincial Roads Project IBRD 13621R2 - Sixth Railway Project (Proposed) IBRD 14856R1 - Bangkok and S2ttahip Ports Project IBRD 14857R - Inland Waterways and Coastal Ports Project THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SUMMARY (i) Introduction 1. The Bank's last Transport Sector survey was completed in 1972 (The Transport Sector of Thailand, September 25, 1972). An informal update was prepared in 1975. Since 1975 there have been six transport loans. 2. The Bank has been involved in all transport modes in Thailand except c;:il aviation and pipelines, and helped finance 19 transportation projects in all. The total amount of loans approved is $601.6 million. The largest reci- pient of loan funds is the Department of Highways with eight loans for a total of $396.6 million. Next in order is the State Railway of Thailand (five loans for $68.7 million), the Port Authority of Thailand (four loans for $67.3 million), the Harbour Department (one for $53 million), and the Ministry of the Interior (one for $16 million for Bangkok traffic improvements). 3. The purpose of this report, which incorporates comments received from the Royal Thai Government, is to document the present situation in the transport sector towards the end of Thailand's Fifth Development Plan 1982-86 and highlight some issues that merit attention in the preparation for the Sixth Development Plan 1987-91. As such, this report is a base document which is expected to be followed by close cooperation between the Government and the Bank with the aim of producing strategy papers for the various modes. The report will also be useful for forthcoming public investments reviews. (ii) The State of Transport Development and the Sector's Current Investment Program 4. Since the mid-1960s, the Thai economy, as a result of a strong show- ing of the agricultural sector, grew at a rapid pace and ganerated a high demand for transport. To accommodate the growing demand, the Government undertook large transport investments (in particular for road infrastructure) and created a policy environment in which, with some exceptions, a competitive transport industry developed. Today, all Changwats (Provinces) are inter- linked with a good interregional and interprovincial communications network, and transport services have penetrated the majority of previously remote rural areas. In comparison with other similarly situated countries, the transport system is, by and large, good. There are, on the whole, no significant physical or administrative impediments to meeting current transport demand. - 2 - 5. The country's transport is multimodal, consisting in order of impor- tance of road, rail, inland water, maritime, air and pipeline transporta- tion. rhe agencies, except for pipelines, are under che Ministry of Communi- cations (MOC). Road transport has become predominant, supported by large infrastructure investments. Railway and water transport have also developed, but at a more modest rate due to more limited investment budgets. In freight transport (excluding urban traffic), roads carried in 1981 about 79% of all ton-km, followed by rail with 10X, coastal shipping 6% and inland water- ways 4%. In passenger transport (again excluding urban traffic) for the same year, the role of road transport was even more pronounced with about 90% of the passengers, against some 10% carried by rail. The share of domestic aviation was negligible. During the 1980s, the transport sector is expected to continue its growth (in terms of ton-km and passenger-km of service) in step or slightly ahead of CDP growth, with road transport at least consoli- dating, if not strengthening, its relative position. Gas pipelines started deliveries in 1982. Due to their possible impact on bulk carriers through fuel substitution in industry, particuLarLy rail, their operations should be closely monitored. TRAFFIC CARRIED BY MODE, 1981 Tons Ton-km Passengers Passenger-km … ---------------…(millions)----------------…-- Road 157.0 22,000.0 2,200.0 88,000.0 Rail 6.1 2,732.0 78.8 9,483.0 Inland waterways 5.4 1,200.0 - - Coastal shipping 3.0 1,800.0 - - Domestic aviation - 1.0 .8 295.0 Total 171.5 27,733.0 2,279.6 97,778.0 Sources: SRT, DECONS, TPU, KAMPSAX 6. The country's various transport modes have developed soundly and impressively over the past quarter century, with appropriate balance among the modes to serve different transport functions. As a proportion of total public investment, the share of transport is likely to decline somewhat from past levels. 7. Roads constitute the largest stock of transport capital and provide much the largest share of both passenger and freight transport. The basic framework of national and provincial roads is in place; for many years future investments will be devoted to upgrading, strengthening and maintaining the existing roads. New construction will be limited to short sections to complete missing links. The rural road network is also well developed (over twice the kilometers of the national and provincial roads combined) but suffers much more seriously from under-maintenance. - 3 - 8. The policy and institutional regime guiding road passenger and freight transport has been generalLy sound, and an efficent, private, highly competitive transport industry provides services at reasonable cosc. There are some exceptions which need attention, notably the Government-owned Express Transportation Organizacion (ETO). 9. The aspect of road transport that requires most attention in the next few years is urban transport in Bangkok. This subsector will require large investments, a determined effort to reduce pollution, continuing efforts to reduce congestion, and improved cost-recovery for the city's buses. Bangkok's transport system requires almost as much investment (in the current plan) as all the country's national, provincial, and rural roads combined. A review of urban transport investments is being undertaken in the Bangkok Regional Development Study, to be completed by the Government by end-1985. 10. Only minor extensions of the railway network are likely in the fore- seeable future, and some unprofitable branch lines deserve abandonment. The economics of main-line electrification is under study, and this could lead to major investments late in the decade. But the dominant problem of the railway is weak finances, reflecting insufficient attention to marketing and Govern- ment reluctance to adjust both freight and passenger tariffs despite rising costs. 11. International and domestic air transport is strategicalLy important for government and business travel but plays a very small role in total domes- tic passenger-kms (1X of passengers and 3% of passenger-km). The main questions affecting this subsector revolye around the timing and design of a new international airport near Bangkok.l 12. Thailand's rivers provide good opportunities for inland waterways transport, which is welL developed but serves fairly narrow corridors (mainly to transport a few buLk agricultural commodities and construction -rterials to Bangkok). Most of the inland ports are private, as are the barges and tow boats that serve them. The Government's main roles are planning, channel maintenance through dredging, and the provision of navigation aids for inland waterways and coastal ports. The main problems are weak cost recovery to pay for government services, staff shortages and inadequate staff training. Coastal shipping, also private, handles slightly more freight than the inland waterways; 60% of its traffic consists of oil products. 13. Thailand is unusuaL in having only a very small - one may say insig- nificant - merchant marine. Almost all the country's substantial voLume of 1/ The airports and aviation subsector is not discussed elsewhere in the report. - 4 - foreign trade is carried in foreign bottoms. The Government may wish to review the economic and financial feasibility of leasing ships to carry a part of its trade. 14. The ports subsector is reasonably well developed, well administered by the Port Authority of Thailand, and fairly well financed from user charges. Surplus port capacity exists on the East Coast, so that current proposals for building new ports raise questions about premature and possibly uneconomic investments. 15. A small pipeline network (almost all of it to move gas) is being constructed, stimulated by the important gas finds in the Culf during the past decade. This network will, for the next few years anyway, be limited to the industrial East Coast and metropolitan Bangkok. 16. The Government's Fifth Development Plan 1982-86 (Page 5) included some B 105.4 billion Investments in Transport, with heavy expenditures for the roads subsector (B 35.0 billion) followed by Bangkok urban transport (B 30.0 billion) and inland waterways and ports (B 19.4 billion). Notable are the allocations for deep-sea port investments representing some B 13.8 billion. Design of a new port at Laem Chabang and the proposed bulk port at Map Ta Pud, near Rayong, is now underway. The rail subsector investment (B 8.8 billion) vas agreed with the Bank during negotiations for the Sixth Railway Project. (iii) Main Issues and Problems Confronting the Sector 17. The main issues and problems concern transport pricing and invest- ment policy: (a) Although retail petroleum fuel prices are, on average, 40% higher than import prices, the retail price of diesel fuel is about 38% less than that of regular gasoline (B 10.80/liter vs B 6.70/liter). The price gap between the two should be reduced to improve the overall efficiency of the transport sector. Based on 1981 diesel fuel consumption figures, each Baht increase in the tax on diesel for transport could increase Government revenues by as much as B 2 billion (US$74 million) p.a. This would also provide added revenues to the Government, possibly for additional outlays on transport infrastructure requirements (such as maintenance of rural roads). (b) Rail tariffs do not cover costs, and the State Railway of Thailand (SRT) is losing money. SRT's depreciation provision is based on historical asset value, as required by law, which understates the cost of operating the railway. (c) The Government, in its effort to develop the Eastern Seaboard, plans to construct deep water ports at Laem Chabang and Map Ta Pud. - 5 - GOVERNMENT FIFTH DEVELOIPMNT PLAN 1982-86 INVESTMZETS IN TRANSPORT An a p-rcent of Nillion Baht grand total Roads Natlonal 7,682 Provincial 12,052 Rural 15.300 Total 35,034 33.2 Railway (Stat: Railway of Thailand) Locomotives and rolling *tock 4,970 Track modernization and rehabiltatlon 1,202 Signaling and telecommunications 1,252 Wbrkshop improvements 197 Capacity increasing track inve.tments 267 Noncomm_rcial Invewtmence 903 Niscellaneoum 53 Total 8,844 8.4 Inland Waterways and Ports Inland waterways improvements 1.163 Coastal ports improvemnts 357 Thai Maritite Navigation Company 1,600 Deep--sea port. Investments Phuket and Songkhla 2,215 Klong Toei and Sattahip 1,034 Laem Chabang 2,065 Mop Ta Pud 8,497 Subtotal 16.931 16.1 Merchant marine promotion 2.500 2.3 Total 19.431 18.4 Civil Aviation Aircraft procurement 3 568 Expansion of Don Muang airport (Bangkok) 2,820 Construction of new International airport at Nong Ngu Hao (Bangkok) 60 Improvement of other airports 2,870 Aircraft maintenance center 1,991 nther investments 788 Total 12,105 11.5 Bangkok Urban Transport /a Rapid transit 20,000 Other 10,000 Total 30,000 28.4 GRAND TOTAL 105.414 100.0 /a Excluding railway investments covered under Railway. Source: NESDB and 1OC. However, two important considerations are: (1) the type of shipping Thailand can attract and utilize, which wilL help determine the draft requirements and hence the amount of dredging required; and (2) the type of port facilities to be built, considering the possible traffic to be handLed at the ports. A review of the port development plans by recognized, independent experts would be useful. (d) The bulk of the rural road system receives little maintenance. Improving the condition of these roads is essential to enable any substantial rural development to occur or for the fledgling agro- processing industries to establish themselves. The estimated cost of maintaining the system is about B 1.2 billion p.a. and, based on past maintenance programs, the benefits would exceed this figure. (e) Investment planning in the transport sector begins with the preparation of subsector programs by the implementing agencies concerned. The individual programs are then consolidated by the Ministry of Communications and submitted to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) for review. NESDB's review focuses on new investments, particularly large ones, and on "problem projects" in the ongoing program. This review process is often prolonged due to inadequate program preparation by impLementing agencies. A lack of uniform criteria across subsectors often results in a variety of objectives, sometimes conflicting with each other, being pursued in the various subsectoral programs. Finally, the consolidated program is presented to the Cabinet for approval, but large projects may also be submitted separately and indepen- dently of the program. The problem project review process is limited in effectiveness by the automatic budget allocation in support of the entire ongoing program. (f) Another issue is the management of public enterprises. Public enterprises with modal responsibilities and those in the urban sector appear to operate under varying sets of criteria with respect to financiaL and tariff policies, investment programming, opera- tional management, and policy coordination. (g) Bangkok Mass Transit Authority's (BMTA's) financial situation and operating efficiency are major issues. BMTA has never had sufficient capitalization nor adequate fare levels to operate as a viable enterprise. The possible privatization of BMTA is an important issue to be addressed. 18. The actions or recommendations contained in this report can be summarized as follows: -7- Roads - strengthen and rehabilitate older paved roads, particularly for heavy export traffic (paras. 1.02 and 1.13) - adjust taxes on trucks upwards (para. 1.15) - increase diesel fuel taxes (paras. 1.15 & 1.16) - maintain or increase average fuel prices in real terms (para. 1.16) - make ETO commercially and financially viable (para. 1.18) - review intercity bus transport industry (para. 1.19) - introduce adequate maintenance on rural roads (para. 1.22) - separate ARD's road works and social programs (para. 1.29) - introduce quantitative evaluations of rural roads (para. 1.34) - let villagers maintain single village access roads (para. 1.36) Railways - redesign Makkasan workshop (para. 2.14) - implement tariff adjustments at regular intervaLs (para. 2.25) - refine costing and accounting systems (para. 2.27) - improve timeliness of the Government's transfer payments to SRT (para. 2.33) - reimburse SRT for losses on social services, etc. (para. 2.42) - strengthen SRT's marketing function (para. 2.44) Ports - replace old dredgers (para. 3.14) - introduce multi-shift operations (para. 3.26) - discontinue stuffing and unstuffing of containers at Klong Toei (para. 3.28) - transfer overflow traffic out of Klong Toei (para. 3.31) - review port development plans along the Eastern Seaboard (para. 3.37) Inland Waterways and Coastal Ports - use push barges to increase capacity (para. 4.08) - enlarge navigation locks at Rama VI dam (para. 4.10) - study ports not yet reviewed and develop dredging program (para. 4.18) - strengthen administration of dredging works (para. 4.22) - train staff (4.25) Shipping - replace obsolete tonnage (para. 5.09) - rationalize the shipping industry and provide technical assistance (paras. 5.11 and 5.14) - expand or lease fleet of dry bulk and containers (paras. 5.13 and 5.16) Urban Transport - increase bus fares and improve bus system operations (paras. 6.06, 6.13(iii) and 6.17) - improve the management of traffic flows (paras. 6.13(i) and 6.14) - comprehensively plan and expand the road building program to complement the existing network (paras. 6.13(ii) and 6.15) - provide (after careful planning) segregated transport infrastructure which gives priority to public transport (para. 6.13(iv) and 6.18) -8- I. ROADS SUBSECTOR A. NATIONAL AND PROVINCIAL ROADS National and Provincial Roads System 1.01 The national and provinciaL roads, both administered by the Department of Highways (DOH) under the Ministry of Communications, total about 45,000 km (Map IBRD 15195R). Rural roads are administered mainly by agencies in the Ministry of Interior and are discussed separately in Section B of this chapter. There are about 15,200 km of national roads and 29,900 km of provin- cial roads (Table L.1). The national (or primary) road system connects the principal towns and regional centers throughouc the country. The provincial (or secondary) road system connects the provincial centers and other major towns with the nationaL roads, and it interconnects the rural roads. Further, many provincial roads provide access to rural areas, along with rural (or tertiary) roads. The North has the greatest length of national and provincial roads, with a share of 29%, followed by the Northwest with 28%, the Central Region with 25Z and the South with 18%. 1.02 Since the early 1960s, the national road system has grown from 9,000 km to 15,200 km in 1984, and the proportion paved has increased from close to 50% co virtually 100% (TabLe 1.2). During the same period, the provincial road Length has grown from 8,000 km to 29,900 km with improved (paved and gravel) roads growing from about 2,000 km to over 19,500 km and unimproved roads from 6,000 km to some 10,000 km. Future investment require- ments are to strengthen and rehabilitate older paved roads, particularly those carrying the heavy export traffic, and to upgrade the unimproved provincial roads, because of their rural access function, to paved or gravel standard. Traffic and Transport Industry 1.03 The country's motor vehicle fleet, including motorcycles, has grown from about 740,000 units in 1970 to about 2,600,000 units by early 1983 (Table 1.3). Excluding motorcycles, the increase was from about 400,000 units to over 1,200,000 units, with an annual growth of 9.6%. Commercial vehicles - buses, trucks and other utility vehicles - account for about two thirds of four-wheel vehicles, with cars making up the remainder. About 80% of the cars and taxis, 70% of the buses, and almost 30% of the trucks were registered in Bangkok in 1978 (Table 1.4). 1.04 Motorized traffic (including motorcycles) on all non-urban roads was in the order of 24 billion vehicle-km in 1978 (Table 1.5). About 50% of this traffic was concentrated in the Central Region within a radius of 150 km from Bangkok, highlighting Bangkok's leading role as the center for Government, commerce, industry and transport. About 19% of the vehicle-km were recorded in the Northeast, 18% in the North, and 12% in the South. Of the non-urban traffic, over 90% is concentrated on the national and provincial roads (about 44,000 km) and the remainder on rural roads (about 106,000 km). The national and provincial roads, however, show great variations in traffic density. About 15Z of the system, including most of the national roads, account for -9- about 55% of traffic, and about 33% of the road length accounts for 75-80% of traffic. On many of the top-Listed 15% of roads, average daily traffic (excluding motorcycles) equals or exceeds 10,000 vehicles. 1.05 The trucking industry is one of the most important and possibly the largest industry in Thailand. It employs directly an estimated 500,000 people, has a capital asset value of some B 70 billion and annual operating costs of about B 29 billion and its turnover in freight revenue is estimated at some B 45 billion p.a. The total number of freight vehicles operating in the country is over 230,000 light trucks and 100,000 heavy trucks. By some estimates, over 50% of the heavy trucks are for hire. Most trucking firms have only one (heavy) truck, managed by the owner-operator. A few firms have several hundred trucks, including the Government-owned Express Transportation Organization (ETO). While essentially free of economic regulation, periodic and regular pressure is being applied for more regulation. Some of the initiatives are more or less disguised attempts at protecting competitors from the rigors of the free transport market. Other regulatory issues are the overloading of trucks, regulations on vehicle specifications and road user charges for trucks. Overloading of trucks is a fairly common occurrence, with implications for road safety and maintenance. The Highway Police Division in the Police Department is charged with traffic law enforcement on national and provincial roads. Since 1981, it has taken over from DOH the management of the ten permanent truck weighing stations in the country, and is increasingly cracking down on overloading violations. These and other trucking issues are being analyzed under the ongoing Trucking Industry Study (Loan 2035-TH). Department of Highways 1.06 The Department of Highways (DOH) in the Ministry of Communications (MOC) is responsible for administration, planning, construction and mainte- nance of national and provincial roads. DOH is weLl organized and well operated, and functions as a modern agency with considerable autonomy. DOH has an adequate organization to perform its functions. The present organi- zation was set up in the mid-sixties, with some modifications introduced in the mid-seventies, as a result of a Highway Maintenance Study financed under the Fifth Highway Project, to give greater emphasis to road maintenance. 1.07 DOH has a competent staff of 16,000-17,000. Local and overseas formal training programs assure high professional standards. Further, there are programs for on-the-job training, including several DOH construction units set up with bilateral funding. 1.08 Most of DOH road construction, about 90%, is undertaken by con- tract. The remainder is by force account by the construction units referred to above. The Thai construction industry has fully matured in the past 15 years and, in more recent years, Thai firms have won most of the contracts against competition by foreign firms. 1.09 DOH's institutional competence expresses itself also in its interest to improve its maintenance performance. In 1978 the Highway Maintenance Study referred to above estimated yearly budgets for routine and periodic - 10 - maintenance of national and provinciaL roads and recommended the purchasing of equipment and the creation of an internal equipment hiring system. Under the Sixth Highway Project, technical assistance was provided to DOH for the creation of the internal hiring system for road maintenance equipment. Also under the Provincial Roads Project, DOH is introducing the first stages of a pavement management system to ensure that a systematic condition assessment of the network is done and that more realistic maintenance and rehabilitation budgets are prepared. Until recentLy road maintenance budgets covered only 70-80% of estimated requirements. However, in 1983 and 1984 the coverage increased to about 90%. Fifth Plan Investments 1.10 The current road subsector plan (FY82-86) for national and provin- ciaL roads calls for total investments of about B 23 billion, of which about B 9 billion (40%) is earmarked for national roads and about B 14 billion (60%) for provincial roads (Table 1.6). For comparison, the plan for rural roads is in the order of B 15 billion, and the overall transport pLan (exclusive of Bangkok rapid transit and bus transport) is about B 75 billion. 1.11 Because many provincial roads serve as rural access roads, the trend, established in the previous Plan, toward increased provincial roads expenditures, is continued in FY82-86. The relative size of the DOH road plan is fully justified, given the dominance of road transport. About 50% of the current plan investments for national roads are aimed at strengthening and rehabilitating existing roads with high traffic volumes. In the case of provincial roads, the focus is on bettering about 6,000 km of unimproved roads to engineered standards. Investment Needs and Priorities 1.12 Investment needs and priorities for national and provincial roads during the eighties were periodically reviewed in recent years, with the most detailed review undertaken under the "Screening Study" for these roads financed under the Sixth Highway Project (Loan 1510-TH). In summary, the conclusions are as follows: (a) except for very specific localized cases, the network of national and provincial roads is adequate in extent and area coverage; however, some paved road sections need more capacity, due to traffic growth; and a great part of the so-called unimproved provincial roads requires upgrading to engineered standards, including, in many cases, conversion to paved surfaces; and (b) older paved national roads, particularly those carrying high volumes of heavy truck traffic, increasingly require strengthening and rehabilitation. 1.13 The present Plan for national and provincial roads provides a reasonable balance between the above investment categories in FY82-86. However, in the next Plan period road strengthening/rehabilitation should become more dominant. Virtually all of these investments are economically - 11 - well justified and fit into the Covernment's strategy of rural development, support to the agricultural and related sectors, and preservation of existing infrastructure. Main Issues 1.14 The main issues in the roads subsactor are the policies directed at the performance of the road transport industry (defined in the wider sense of all users of road infrastructure) and its relationship with competing trans- port modes. A discussion of these issues follows. 1.15 Road User Taxation. The 1982 report by TPU/BCEOM, Taxation of Road Users, provides a comprehensive discussion of taxation issues, including recommendations for future policies. The report notes that in FY75-80, aggregate receipts from road user charges on national and provincial roads were close to 70% of aLl expenditures, and about 2002 of aggregate marginal infrastructure costs. As these cost coverages were achieved during a period of rapid network expansion, which will not be repeated in the coming years, it is likely cost coverage would be even higher in the future. The only major flaw in the taxation picture is the under-coverage of infrastructure costs caused by heavy trucks (6- and 10-wheelers). An upward adjustment of taxes on trucks is therefore called for. Measures to increase road user charges on heavy trucks should include the consideration of an increase in diesel fuel taxes (para. 1.16). Each one Baht increase in the diesel tax would amount to about B 2 billion p.a. in revenues. This would be the least costly and administratively the easiest tax since it could be collected at the refinery. The amount of taxes required to cover marginal costs for heavy trucks would increase trucking cost 2.5X to 5%. The Ministry of Communications is pursuing the course of raising the truck license fee, which is in their purview, to cover the costs. (The fee would amount to about B 11,000 p.a. for each heavy truck.) 1.16 Fuel Efficiency. Fuel efficiency and conservation occupy a prominent place in the FY82-86 Plan. A major Plan objective is to allow no growth in oil imports after the end of the Plan period. Since the transport sector is a major consumer of oil products (402), conservation efforts within the sector are important. Most of the sector's fuel consumption takes place in the road subsector, suggesting the need for tighter control of fuel con- sumption in road transport. The problem is aggravated by the substantial price differential between regular gasoline (B 10.80/liter) on the one side, and diesel fuel (B 6.70/liter) and LPG (B 5.39/liter) on the other. This price differential should be reduced. In another 1982 TPU/BCEOM study (Study of Energy Policies for the Transportation Sector, 1982), the question of fuel consumption in the road subsector was explored, and MOC is in the process of formulating a program for making road transport more fuel efficient. Among the measures likely to be proposed are improved road traffic flows, driver education, phasing-out of obsolete vehicles, vehicle speed control, increases in average vehicle payloads and flattening of traffic peaks (during congestion). However, one of the most effective measures with immediate results would be to keep average fuel prices up in real terms, if not increasing them in relation to border prices. For essentially non-economic reasons, the Government has refrained from such a fuel pricing policy, with consequent adverse effects on the balance of payments. - 12 - 1.17 Road-Rail Competition. For a variety of reasons, not the Least being the size and vocal strength of the State Railway (SRT) workforce, the Government is locked into an uncomfortable railway situation. With rail tariffs below costs, SRT is incurring increasing annual losses, both on the main line network and on branch lines and Bangkok commuter services. On various occasions in the past, there have been calls for regulatory restric- tion on the road transport industry to protect the raiLway. There is also the continuous problem of apportioning Government funds between the two modes on the basis of inconsistently applied investment criteria. The most and economically efficient way of dealing with these issues is to transform SRT's main line operations into a commercially oriented activity (para. 2.43). 1.18 Economic Regulation. Economic regulation, existing and potential, is often an impediment to the efficiency of road transport. Generally, trucking operates free of economic restrictions, markets are open and services and rates are determined under market conditions. However, regulatory inroads have been made by ETO, which has trucking monopolies for: (i) transport of freight landed at Klong Toey; (ii) a number of Government specified commodi- ties; and (iii) transit traffic to and from Laos (as well as Kampuchea). ETO is a frequently criticized enterprise which, despite generally acknowledged poor performance (in cost and services), has succeeded in expanding over the years. The size of ETO's workforce (over 4,000 staff) has become its protec- tive shield. The only economically efficient method to deal with ETO is to require that its operations be commercially and financially viable. 1.19 Intercity bus transport is aLso regulated. The Government-owned Transport Co. has exclusive traffic rights between cities, which it has built into a franchise system with participation by the private sector. On the face of it, the franchise system appears to provide low-cost and low-fare transport of good quality. However, the system also limits the number of buses per route and, hence, supply does not appear to adequately address passenger demand as evidenced by illegal services provided on certain routes. A review of the intercity bus transport industry's regulatory aspects will be under- taken under the Second Provincial Roads Project. B. RURAL ROADS Rural Road System 1.20 Rural roads may be defined as all roads outside of cities and municipalities, excluding the approximately 14,000 km of national highways and 28,000 km of provincial roads, both under the jurisdiction of the Department of Highways (DOH) of the Ministry of Communications. About 70X of rural roads are gravel topped, the remainder earth. These roads connect villages and rural populations with the provincial and national road systems and with each other. 1.21 The rural road system is very large, about 106,000 km. Some 96,000 km are nominally under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Interior - 13 - (MOI) through its various line agencies and its provinces (changwats) and their subdivisions. The remaining 10,000 km are special purpose roads, built by specialized agencies, chiefly the Royal Irrigation Department (RID) and the Royal Forestry Department in the Ministry of Agriculture, and the Mobile Development Units of the Ministry of Defense. It is generally agreed that such special purpose roads should continue to be constructed, and maintained, by the specialized agencies concerned since the roads are an integral part of their development projects. However, in the later stages of development, with the growth of new villages or towns, such roads are usually eventually incor- porated into the provincial road system of DOH, or are handed over as rural roads to the local government units according to their appropriate classifica- tion. The distribution of rural roads is, approximately: Northeast 44%, North 22Z, Central 21Z, and South 13%. 1.22 The rural road system is very extensive with an average density of about 1 km per 5 sq km and few new roads are needed (Table 1.7). However, the roads are of low standard, averaging about 4.5 m width, with generally less than 30 aadt. In the dry season about two thirds of the roads are usually in fair condition, and one-third poor. During the rainy season, however, many roads become impassable. Improvement of rural roads to engineered standards has so far been largely limited to some regional development projects, princi- pally in the Northeast. Low cost works have been undertaken on a large proportion of the rural roads, chiefly under employment generation and village development programs. The bulk of the roads receive Little maintenance. Improving the condition of these roads is essential to enable any substantial rural development, such as agro-processing and small industry relocation, to proceed. While a sustained long-term program should be undertaken to recon- struct the roads to higher standards, in accordance with economic priorities and the growth of traffic, a significant improvement in the condition of the bulk of the roads can be achieved by introducing adequate maintenance. For this a strong institutional framework is needed, which does not exist at present. Traffic 1.23 Virtually all the ruraL roads carry some motorized traffic, generally below 30 aadt. Animal-drawn vehicles do not form a significant part of the traffic. Although the rural road system amounts to about 70% of all non-urban roads, it carries only about 7% of all road traffic (veh-km), excluding urban traffic. Nevertheless, rural roads perform a vital function in providing transport for the rural population. The predominant vehicles using rural roads, apart from motor-cycles, are farm trucks (a simple four- wheel chassis with an open body and a one or two cylinder engine), farm tractors/trailors, pick-up trucks (often with bodies converted to carry pas- sengers and freight), and jeeps. Other than vehicles for government administration, nearly all the vehicles are privately owned, some by small firms, but mostly by owner/operators. Administration/Institutions 1.24 The institutional framework for dealing with rural roads is presently unsatisfactory. According to the Announcement of the Revolutionary - 14 - Council No. 295 (1972) on roads, rural roads are the responsibility of the 73 provinces (changwats) and the Governors of the provinces are responsible for registering them within the road system. However, in practice this registra- tion process has not been followed and a large proportion of the roads are not formally under the jurisdiction of any agency. Much of the rural road network does not receive maintenance on a regular basis. 1.25 The changwats and their districts (amphors) and subdistricts (tambons) have little or no technical expertise, and few resources for carry- ing out works. The MOI has a number of departments and offices which provide assistance to changwats for various functions. The chief ones for roads and other public works are the Office of Accelerated Rural DeveLopment (ARD) and the Public Works Department (PWD). However, their functions overlap to a considerable extent. In particular, for roads, both give assistance to a number of changwats, sometimes to the same changwats. ARD is the larger organization. It has six regional centers and gives direct assistance in varying degrees through its staff stationed in 57 of the 73 changwats. In some changwats, especialLy in the Northeast, where it started operations nearly 20 years ago, ARD has considerable staff and often considerable equip- ment, although much of the latter is beyond their useful Life. In some eastern and southern changwats it has only one or two staff and no equipment. However, ARD is gradually increasing the staff and equipment inputs to these changwats. PWD has operations in 31 changwats, a number of them overlapping with ARD activities, but PWD staff is generally on a smaller scale. A number of changwats receive assistance from neither ARD nor PWD. Apart from rural roads, ARD and PWD are concerned with other works functions in rural areas, chiefly water supply. ARD is also concerned, to a limited extent, with small irrigation projects. In addition, ARD has a number of "social" activities which overlap with the functions of the Community Development Department (CDD) which is also under MOI. 1.26 The Government has financed a number of programs aimed at improving living conditions in the rural areas since about the mid-i960s. Largely, these funds have been channeled through the changwats and the tambons, partic- ularly for unemployment relief, for example following a period of drought. Expenditures have fluctuated widely, but in some years have exceeded US$100 million. A large part of these "relief" funds have been used to effect low-standard improvements over a considerabLe proportion of the rural roads. In addition, the Government, through ARD and, to a lesser extent PWD, has improved a limited number of rural roads to higher standards, largely to help the poorer areas, especially in the Northeast. Again, expenditures have fluctuated, but in recent years have been of the order of US$15-25 million for ARD and US$5-8 million p.a. for PWD. Study of Rural Roads 1.27 With a view to tackling the rural road problem on a national scale, the Government and the Bank included a Study of Rural Roads in the Sixth Highway Project (Loan 1519-TH) of March 1978. This study was carried out by a joint venture of two foreign and two Thai consulting firms under a steering committee convened and chaired by NESDB and composed of officials from MOC, MOI and other concerned agencies. It was started in September 1980 and - 15 - completed in mid-1982. It was in two main parts: (a) Organization and Maintenance Study: aimed at recommendations for changes to be made for insti- tutions concerned with rural roads, and particularly for setting up an adequate road maintenance organization; and (b) Rural Road Development Study: aimed at preparing an outline Long-range perspective program for improving rural roads, based on a screening study of the entire network, followed by preparation of a five-year program for priority roads. 1.28 In regard to Organization and Maintenance, the study found that in general there is a sufficient number of staff in the various departments of MOI already engaged in roadworks, to handle responsibilities for rura! roads. However, to be effective, a reorganization is required to clarify responsibilities and to reassign the staff in accordance with needs. The study was primarily concerned with roads, which constitute by far the largest works activity of the institutions involved, although it also considered the requirements of other works activities in any reorganization. 1.29 The consultants put forward three alternative proposals for reallocating responsibilities and reorganizing the departments/offices of the MOI and for deployment of their staff to assist the changwats. The alterna- tive which was favored by the high level Committee for Governmental and Administrative Reform chaired by the Deputy Prime Minister was to combine the works functions, including rural roads, of both ARD and PWD in one "Rural Works Department". ARD's social programs would probably be transferred to the Community Development Department. The proposals are being considered by the Government, but no decision has yet been made. 1.30 In any event, the consultants' proposals were essentially that one department of MOI be given responsibility, and the available resources, for discharging MOI's responsibilities for rural roads. It would itself generally carry out programs of rural road construction and major improvements, through its regional offices, by contract. In addition, it would redeploy much of the available technical staff and equipment, to assist the changwats in carrying out maintenance of rural roads. The consultants' proposal was to set up the organization, particularly for maintenance of rural roads, initially in pilot areas, consisting of groups of changwats. The system would be extended to the remainder of the country in stages, taking into account the experience gained in the pilot project. The proposals also included the training of staff. 1.31 The study included the preparation, for the first time, of an inventory of rural roads. This found a total of about 106,000 km, including about 10,000 km of special purpose roads (para. 1.21) and about 10,000 km of village access roads less than 4 km long. The total length and density of the network is much greater than had previously been thought. They are nearly all of low standard, with an average width of about 4.5 m, but some as narrow as about 3 m and others as wide as 6 m. They are mostly poorly drained, with few culverts and with temporary bridges. However, past Government programs have resulted in about 70% of the total length receiving at least a thin gravel surfacing. The roads are normally passable in the dry season, but the rainy season causes a large number to become impassable, because of poor drainage, failure to maintain the surface shape, and lack of gravel on the remaining 30% of the roads. - 16 - 1.32 Based on the inventory, the consultants outlined and evaluated a maintenance and upgrading program to bring the condition of the roads up to a satisfactory level, over a period of five years, and to keep them in that state. At 1981 prices, the annual budgetary requirement would be about US$50 million equivalent. This would not include the approximately 10,000 km of special purpose roads which, it is assumed, will continue to be maintained by their parent agencies, with their own budgetary funds. Nor does it include the approximately 10,000 km of village access roads linking single villages to the general rural road network; these should be the responsibility of the villages. 1.33 The Rural Road Development part of the study was a screening of the entire rural road network followed by simplified feasibility studies of a selected 5,000 km completed early 1982. Of these, 3,700 km were found to be feasible. The 5,000 km were selected from roads proposed by ARD and PWD and subjected to screening indicating that they had an adequate economic rate of return based on reduction in transport costs and on developmental benefits but weighted by region to give the overall balance required by the Government: Northeast 50%, North 25%, South 10%; and Central 15Z. Planning and Engineering of Rural Roads 1.34 The ARD and PWD carry out planning and engineering for most of those rural road improvements which involve substantial amounts of work. Minor roadworks are arranged by the changwats, often with some assistance from central government staff, particularly PWD. Efforts have been made to involve changwats in rural road planning, but success has been limited by the chang- wats' capabilities. The projects have usually been chosen on very general economic, administrative, security, and political considerations, with only limited quantitative evaluations carried out. However, proposals for developing planning capabilities for rural roads, and for an initial development program, have been prepared through the Study of Rural Roads. Local firms of consultants are available to suppLement the capacities of ARD and PWD staff for carrying out design and supervision of works. Construction 1.35 Rural road construction, or major improvement, has usually been undertaken by ARD (mainly by force account) and PWD (mainly by contract). However, some smaller projects and lower standard improvements have been undertaken by the changwats, districts and groups of villages, under the various government projects. Maintenance of Rural Roads 1.36 The bulk of the rural road system receives no regular maintenance. The specialized agencies maintain the approximately 10,000 km under their own control. In addition, ARD maintains about 18,000 km of roads built by itself to its own standards; it does not provide assistance to the changwats for maintenance. The remaining approximately 80,000 km of rural roads have very little maintenance, and are consequently in poor condition. About 10,000 km are short (less than 4 km) access roads to single villages, and the - 17 - consultants propose that these be left to the villagers themselves to main- tain. The remaining approximately 70,000 km would be the responsibility of the changwats. These roads should be the responsibility of the proposed maintenance organization, based on the changwats, but with technicaL staff and equipment supplied by a central government de-iartment. Most of the routine maintenance would be carried out by force account, but work exceeding ARD capacity would be contracted out. Thailand has a weLl-developed contracting industry, including many small local contractors who could carry out the works efficiently. 1.37 The rural roads study shows that maintenance has the highest priority for improving the condition of the rural roads system. The consul- tants estimate the capital cost (at 1981 prices) of setting up a maintenance organization at about US$50 million and a recurrent cost of about US$50 mil- lion per year to maintain the system to a reasonable standard. II. THE STATE RAILWAY OF THAILAND A. ORGANIZATION 2.01 The State Railway of Thailand (SRT) was established as an indepen- dent legal entity under the State Railway of Thailand Act of 1951. Two amending acts of 1959 and 1966 introduced minor modifications to the 1951 Act. The amendments give overall supervisory powers to the Ministry of Communications, incLuding veto power over any action by SRT which is deemed inconsistent with Government policies. A Board of Commissioners, consisting of a chairman and four to six members, who are appointed by the Council of Ministers, formulates policy and supervises SRT. The Council of Ministers approves the capital budget, the borrowing of money, and changes in standard passenger fares and freight charges. Abandonment of lines and services also needs the Council's approval. 2.02 The Board appoints, with the approval of the Council of Ministers, a General Manager who is responsible for the management and administration of SRT and serves as an ex-officio Board member. SRT's organizational arrangements are satisfactory. B. MANAGEMENT, STAFF AND TRAINING 2.03 SRT operations are well managed. Officers are competent and staff discipline is good. The total number of staff has declined by some 9% since 1982 to about 27,800 by the end of FY84. About 4% are temporary employees. Productivity per employee is high: it increased from 286,0ao traffic units in FY77 to about 444,000 in FY84. 2.04 SRT staff training facilities, located at the Railway Training Center in Bangkok, are adequate. For training in specialized fields, SRT sends its staff to local and foreign universities and other training insti- tutions. Training needs currently exist in costing, marketing and planning, as well as in operation and maintenance of signalling equipment and permanent way maintenance equipment. - 18 - 2.05 Labor-management relations are good. SRT salaries, which have kept pace with the consumer price index since 1972, are generally higher than those for corresponding grades in Government service, but lower than those in private industry. C. FACILITIES Permanent Way 2.06 The rail network consists of about 3,800 route-km of meter gauge lines, of which 90 km are double-track and the remainder single-track (Map 13621 R2). Three main lines (3,046 km) radiate from Bangkok: the Northern Line to Cniang Mai (751 km, of which 90 km is double-track); the Northeastern Line system to Nong Khai on the Laotian border and to Ubon Ratchatani (total length 1,093 km); and the Southern Line to the Malaysian border at Padang Besar and at Sungai Kolok (total length 1,202 km). In addi- tion, there are nine branch lines (total length 749 km), including the Eastern Line to Aranyaprathet on the border of Kampuchea. One branch line, the Maeklong Line (65 km), serving an area west of Bangkok (running from Thonburi to Samut Sakhon) is separated from the main network. 2.07 A line capacity study under bilateral (Japanese) financing is presently being undertaken to assess SRT's overall transport capacity and the feasibility of doubling sections of the Northern and Eastern Lines. A new 130 km single-track line connecting Chachoengsao, a station about 60 km from Bangkok on the Eastern Line, to the deep-sea port at Sattahip has been constructed. It was partially opened to traffic early 1985 but full operation is not expected until 1986 after signalling has been completed. As part of the planned Eastern Seaboard industrial development, two new single-track lines are under consideration: an extension of the Sattahip line to Rayong (about 40 km); and a line (about 80 kn) connecting the Eastern Line with Ban Phachi or Kaeng Khoi on the Northeastern Line to provide a shorter connection between Sattahip/Rayong ant. the Northeast. 2.08 Except for the Sila At-Chiang Mai section (263 km) of the Northern Line and the Kaeng Koi-Nakhorn Ratchasima section (139 km) of the Northeastern Line, where the maximum gradient is 2.6% and 2.4% and the minimum curve radius 180 m and 200 m respectively, the main lines of SRT have gradients less than 1.2% (for most sections less than 1.0%) and curve radii exceeding 300 m (for most sections exceeding 400 m). Curves represent about 11% of total track length. 2.09 There are about 2,430 m of tunnels and about 2,600 bridges, of which about 466 are wooden structures. Of the total 3,890 km of track, about 795 km are laid with 80 lb/yd rails, about 2,580 km with 70-75 lb/yd rails and about 515 km with 50-60 lb/yd rails. About 82% of the track on the main lines has continuous welded rails. About 86% of the sleepers are wooden, while 14% are two-block and mono-block concrete sleepers. The ballast consists of crushed stone. Maximum axle-load allowed on the network is 15 tons, and maximum speed is 80 km/hr. However, there are a number of permanent speed restrictions on approaches to weak bridges and sharp curves. The roadbed is generally stable, and track maintenance and riding quality are good. The bridge and track - 19 - improvement program for FY82-86 includes replacing about 310 wooden and steeL bridges with new structures, replacing about 572,000 wooden sleepers with concrete sleepers, and welding about 12,000 rail joints. Signalling 2.10 The signaling system is generally poor. SRT's signaling technology ranges from reasonably modern color light signals and a full interlocking and tokenless block system in the Bangkok area to primitive hand-operated keylocked points, with no signals in some parts of the network. Improvement works about to begin with bilateral Japanese financing. Telecommunications 2.11 The SRT telecommunication system consists mainly of 12-channeL carrier telephones and teleprinters, all recently instalLed, and an old train operating control telephone system. SRT intends to replace the old, outmoded telephone system during the next five years with bilateral financing. Motive Power and Rolling Stock 2.12 SRT has a reasonably modern fleet of locomotives and wagons. The fleet consist of 272 diesel locomotives (232 main line, 40 shunters), 8 steam locomotives in emergency reserve, 128 railcars (79 powered, 49 trailers), 1,115 passenger cars, bogie cars and 9,170 freight cars (3,034 bogie cars, 6,136 four-wheelers). Twenty obsolete diesel locomotives, supplied in 1958- 62, will be scrapped in FY83-86. Also scrapped will be 50 passenger cars (about 30-40 years old), 200 oil cank bogie cars (about 30-40 years old) and about 1,000 two-axle freight cars (about 40 years oLd). About 135 flat cars are being equipped with oil tanks. Workshops 2.13 SRT's mechanical workshop facilities include a central workshop at Makkasan near Bangkok, three regional workshops and seven main depots. Makkasan handles major overhauls of locomotives and rolling stock, as well as the manufacture of passenger and freight cars. Its buildings and equipment were improved in FY77-81, but the capacity for manufacturing and maintenance is still inadequate. In order to improve maintenance, manufacturing is being discontinued in the present workshop and improvements in the maintenance shops are being planned. 2.14 Overflow major overhaul from the Makkasan workshop as well as some unscheduled repair works are carried out in the three regional workshops at Uttaradit, Nakhon Ratchasima and Thung Song. DaiLy servicing of locomotives is done in the seven main depots at Bang Sue, Thon Buri, Lampang, Uttaradit, Hat Yai, Thung Song, and Nakhon Ratchasima. In the long run, the only viable solution to improvements of the Makkasan workshop appears to be to redesign the facility and move it out of Bangkok. The value of the present real estate may well pay for this change. - 20 - Other Facilities 2.15 Yards and stations are adequate for the traffic, except that the Bang Sue yard and about fifteen smaller yards need expansion. To meet the increase in the Bangkok metropolitan commuter traffic, plans are under consideration for constructing a new passenger station about 9 km north of the existing Bangkok station. The buildings, stations, offices and general plant of SRT are adequate and well maintained. D. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS Past Freight Traffic 2.16 Between FY75 and FY80 freight traffic grew at an average annual rate of 5.6% in terms of tons (from 4.8 million tons to 6.3 million tons) and at 4.6Z annually in terms of ton-kun (from 2.35 billion ton-km Lo 2.94 billion ton-km), Tables 2.1-2.2. An average increase in freight tariffs of 73Z in June 1981, coupled with a general economic slow-down, led to a decline in freight traffic to 6.1 million tons (2.73 billion ton-km) in FY81 and continuing to 5.3 million tons (2.50 billion ton km) by FY83 although substantial rebates were offered. The financial results were thus only marginally positive. In FY84, freight traffic again increased by 6.0% in terms of cons and 8.0% in terms of ton-km over FY83. 2.17 The main commodities carried by SRT are bulk commodities - petroleum products, cement, rice and maize, other agricultural products, gypsum, and lumber and Logs. The length of haul is about 480 km. Past Passenger Traffic 2.18 Between FY75 and FY81 passenger traffic grew at an average rate of 4.2% annually in numbers of passengers, from 61.6 million in FY75 to 78.8 million in FY81., and at 9.1% annually in terms of passenger-km, from 5.6 billion to 9.5 billion (Tables 2.3 and 2.4). The stronger growth in passenger-km reflects the fact that the average length of journeys increased from about 92 km in FY75 to more than 120 km in FY82. The number of commuters (and pass-km) in the Bangkok metropolitan area is estimated to have grown at 12.5% a year in FY75-81, while other passenger traffic grew at 2Z a year in numbers and 9Z in pass-km. A 35% increase in average fares in June 1981, coupled with reduced growth in personal income, slowed down the passenger traffic growth in FY82 to 2.0Z. Operations 2.19 Operating efficiency is in general good, although the utilization of freight cars declined with the drop in traffic. Some efficiency indicators are given below: -21 - Index FY84 FY77 FY84 (FY77 = 100) Traffic units per employee ('000) 286 444 155 Availability (X) Diesel line locomotives 80.8 85.5 106 Passenger cars /a 86.2 88.9 103 Freight cars /a 85.6 90.6 106 Traffic units per available line locomotive (million) 50.7 63.5 125 Average number of passengers per passenger train 336 475 141 Passenger-km per available passenger car ('000) /b 5,959 10,718 180 Average freight net ton-km per freight train-km 300 353 118 Net ton-km per available freight car (bogie car equivalent) ('000) 661 538 81 /a Excluding cars for work trains. 7- Including railcars. Source: SRT E. TARIFFS AND COSTS Tariffs 2.20 SRT passenger fares and freight rates are uniform throughout the system and are tapered. Passenger fares are divided into three classes: First, Second and Third. Considerable discounts are given to commuters, war veterans, and students. Public freight tariffs are grouped into four classes, with petroleum tariffs being separately quoted for the petroleum companies. Freight Class 1 covers dangerous goods and Class 2 covers less-than carload traffic. The major commodity in Class 3 is logs/lumber, with all other commodities, except petroleum, in Class 4. Traffic moving i; "special" unit trains is charged at negotiated rates, which are lower than published rates; such traffic constitutes about one half of SRT's freight traffic. 2.21 All changes in standard rates and fares require the approval of SRT's Board of Commirsioners, the Minister of Communications, various Govern- ment agencies and the Cabinet. After a period of twenty years of unchanged tariffs, substantial increases in standard rates were made in November 1975. The standard rates again remained unchanged until June 1981, when further substantial increases in passenger fares and freight rates were introduced. Under the State Railway of Thailand Act of 1976, SRT nominally has the freedom to set tariffs up to a level of 25X above, and 50% below, standard rates. in practice, all rate changes require the approval of the Minister of Communic.%- tions. The most recent 7.1% increase for passenger in June 1983, was even submitted by the Minister to the Cabinet prior to implementation. Another 5.8% increase is expected shortly. - 22 - 2.22 The tariffs introduced in June 1981 raised standard first class passenger fares by 55%, second class by 44%, and the dominant third class fares by 32%. The average increase weighted by traffic volumes (pass-km) was 35%. In freight traffic, the standard rates for Classes 3 and 4 were raised on average 50-150% and 40-200Z, with the increases being higher with distance. The rates for petroleum were increased by about 13%. Rates for special trains were also renegotiated. The resulting effective rate increase for freight traffic, weighted by traffic volumes (ton-kim), was 73% on the average. Subsequent to the formal rate increases, however, a variety of rebates in the range of 5-29% were granted to counter the resulting decline in freight traffic. Some concessions were made in passenger fares also. As a result, the effective increase was 31% in passenger fares and 59% in freight rates. The June 1983 rate increase was 7.1% for passenger tariffs only. Costs 2.23 The Fifth Railway Project required SRT to revalue its assets by Harch 31, 1980. Although a revaluation of assets was done, the resultant adjustment to the depreciation charges was not carried out. As a result, SRT's cost calculations substantially understate its operating costs. For the future, SRT should revalue its assets periodically, say, every 5 years. The resultant depreciation charges should then be included in cost calculations for tariff purposes. 2.24 In FY1980, average revenues were B 0.149 per passenger-km and B 0.262 per ton-km. These compare with long-run variable costs (LRVC) of B 0.145 per passenger-km and B 0.291 per ton-km. Thus, by SRT's own calcula- tions, which are based on unrevalued assets, freight was carried substantially below LRVC, while passengers were carried marginally above LRVC, but at a margin insufficient to contribute much towards fixed costs. 2.25 The June 1981 tariff increase improved the relationship between revenues and costs, and many of the traffic items now produce revenues mar- ginally above LRVC based on unrevalued assets (Table 2.5). However, these revenues are still below those required to cover fixed costs. Using values for depreciation that reflect estimated current costs of assets, in line with the financial projections, gives the following results (for 1982): Estimated Long-run average variable cost Full cost revenue SRT Restated/a SRT Restated/a Passengers (per pass-kim) B 0.202 0.191 0.218 0.255 0.298 Freight (per ton-km) B 0.412 0.455 0.524 0.594 0.710 /a Based on revalued assests. Source: SRT - 23 - Again, on a revalued basis, revenues fall short of LRVC. To narrow this gap between revenues and costs, further tariff increases that more than cover the increases in costs are necessary at regular intervals for the next few years. F. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING Budgets 2.26 SRT prepares detailed annual capital and operating budgets which require the approval of its Board of Commissioners. The capital budget needs the approval of the Council of Ministers also. SRT has flexibility in reallo- cating funds in the operating budget, but only limited flexibility regarding the approved capital budget. NESDB exercises control over expenditures under the capital budget. Accounting 2.27 SRT has a commercial accounting system, which is almost fully computerized. A traffic costing system was introduced by consultants financed under the Fourth Railway Project. However, these systems are not detailed enough to enable SRT to develop separate accounts for the branch lines and the Bangkok metropolitan commuter traffic in order to estimate the tariffs, required to cover at least LRVC for those operations. The costing and accounting systems, therefore, need refinement. 2.28 SRT prepares final annuaL accounts within about three months of the fiscal year-end. For upper management review and action, SRT also prepares a monthly, so-called "quick report" of traffic and financial performance, within 3-4 weeks from the end of each month. G. UNECONOMIC LINES AND SERVICES 2.29 In contrast to the three main lines, which in principle could be profitable, SRT does not expect to operate at a profit the eight remaining branch lines (Hat Yai-Songkhla has been closed) and the Bangkok metropolitan commuter services. One line, Ban Dara-Sawankhalok, will be closed as soon as a parallel road under construction is completed. The branch lines were identified as unprofitable and requiring special Government compensation for losses some years ago, and a covenant to this effect is incorporated in the Guarantee Agreement for the Fifth Railway Project (Loan 1662-TH). SRT has since submitted proposals to the Cabinet to discontinue operations on the branch lines Nong Pla Duk-Suphan Buri, Nong Pla Duk-Nam Tok and Wongwien Yai- Maeklong. SRT has also proposed that the Government reimburse operating losses on the branch lines Bangkok-Aranyaprathet, Thung Po-Khiri Ratthanikhom, Thung Song-Kan Tang and Klao Chum Thong-Nakhon Si Thammarat. The Bangkok metropolitan commuter services were identified as unprofitable in the course of preparation of this project. Branch lines are beiLg operated for reasons of security and to foster regional/local deveLopment. The Bangkok commuter services are being provided, at subsidized rates, for reasons of urban social welfare. 2.30 Total recorded branch line traffic in FY80, excluding one line (Maeklong) for which statistics were not available, was 803 million pass-km - 24 - and 338 million ton-km, against an SRT total of 8,861 million pass-km and 2,942 million ton-km. The branch line losses in that same year are estimated at over B 120 million or about 40% of the total loss. 2.31 The Bangkok metropolitan commuter traffic was of the order of 15-16 million commuters (650-700 million pass-km) in FY80, one-third by ordinary trains and two-thirds by diesel rail cars. The estimated operating loss was about B 35 million. H. COMPENSATION FOR LOSSES 2.32 Article 43 of the State Railway Act of 1951 requires the Goverrnent to compensate SRT for overall deficits incurred in any fiscal year. Further, Sections 3.02(a) and 3.04 of the Guarantee Agreement for Loan L662-TH require the Government to take satisfactory measures to ensure adequate and prompt compensation for branch line losses and overall deficits. Compensation from the Government for the overall losses incurred by SRT over the period FY74-76 was paid in installments over the period FY76-80. In FY77, SRT made an overall profit; therefore, only compensation for the loss on branch. lines for that year was payable; B 50 million was paid toward this only in FY80. Compensation for losses in FY78, FY79 and FY80 was paid in FY81, FY82 and FY83 (Table 2.6). 2.33 Total compensation for the years FY81, FY82, FY83 and FY84, remaining to be paid, amounts to about B 1,300 million. The delays in compensation payments result from the time neededed to complete the required formalities. The Government budget for the upcoming year is preDared during the first part of the current fiscal year. By the time it is completed, SRT's financial statements for the previous year are yet to be certified by the Office of the Auditor General. The Bureau of the Budget requires this certi- fication in order to make provision for the payment in the budget. Conse- quently SRT's losses are provided for in the Government's budget with an average payment delay of 30 months. 2.34 In the past, early reimbursement of losses was of no particular urgency: SRT knew it would be compensated eventually, and the cost to the Government, i.e. the finance charges related to the additional borrowings required by SRT, was both modest (as long as interest rates were low) and hidden (as it was included in the deficit of subsequent years). In the future, if in line with the Government's objective of making State enterprises financially less dependent on subsidies, SRT no longer receives loss compensa- tion for its main-line operations, but only for its "noncommercial" operations (uneconomic Lines and services), it will have to bear the interest cost of carrying accumulated past losses caused by delays in payment of compensation. I. SRT FY82-86 INVESTMENT PLAN 2.35 SRT's FY82-86 Investment Plan (Table 2.7) was initially prepared by SRT on the basis of a tentative railway traffic growth target in FY82-86 of about 10% p.a. set by the Government in its general approach to the 1982-86 Plan. Subsequently, the investments were reduced in accordance with more realistic traffic forecasts (of 4-5% annual growth) and in conjunction with explicit targets for improvement of SRT's future operational performance. The motive power and rolling stock required to meet the traffic growth in FY87-88 are also included in the plan. - 25 - 2.36 SRT's proposed investments have been carefully scrutinized and represent a prudent program for making the railway more efficient, replacing aging assets and putting SRT on a continued expansion course. About 70Z of the investments under the Plan are for additional transport capacity to serve new traffic. The overall size of the Plan, incLuding contingencies, is B 8,844 million equivalent, of which about B 1,500 million (17%) is expected to be carried o:er to 1987/88. J. FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 2.37 The major problem facing SRT is that costs are higher than revenues. Presently revenues are not enough to meet cash operating expenses (i.e. salaries and wages, fuel, materials and other) and interest on debt, nor do they provide adequately for depreciation. This situation developed in the late 1970s, and has deteriorated further. The reasons for this are primarily the political/social ramifications of tariff changes, as operationally SRT's performance has been generally good. The following describes briefly how this situation has developed, and discusses SRT's prospects for a reversal of this trend in the future. Past Performance 2.38 SRT's financial performance (Table 2.8) has deteriorated steadily over the last several years, the major reasons for this being: (a) Large increases in labor costs even -hough staff numbers remained reLatively stable (average increase Ln compensation per em oyee for the years FY77 to FY82 was about 4.7% p.a. in real terms);- (b) more than doubling of fuel costs in FY80, and further increase of more than 20% in FY81; (c) tariff increases by the Government approved only in June 1981, which, although large, covered only part of the increase in costs since the previous tariff increases in 1975 and (d) delays in receiving Government compensation for losses. The tariff increase of June 1981 was high enough to reverse the trend slightly and produce a somewhat better financial result in FY82 than in FY81, despite a loss in traffic and further cost increases during FY82. 2.39 The successive operating Losses from FY79 on have contributed to a severe cash drain on SRT. This cash drain was further aggravated by the Government's delays in compensating SRT for the losses of previous years, and in its failure to provide SRT with sufficient funds (as required under Loan 1662-TH) to enable SRT to maintain cash of at least one month's working expenses plus debt-service requirements. Cash requirements are met by heavy reliance on overdrafts. 1/ From 1977 to 1982 the Consumer Price Index went up 71% and labor costs went up 106%. - 26 - Present Situation 2.40 In light of the budgetary difficulties faced by Thailand, the Government (Cabinet) in 1982 formulated a policy of reducing subsidies for State Enterprises by allowing, in principle, those which faced financial difficulties, to raise prices of their goods and services, provided that they upgrade their services at the same time. However, the small size of the June 1983 passenger tariff increase made up only a small part of the past increases in costs, thereby delaying the possibility of SRT achieving financial viability several more years. Another 7% increase is planned but has not yet been implemented. 2.41 To reduce the losses, SRT has embarked on a program to improve efficiency in train operations, maintenance, fuel consumption, braking and signalling systems and to contract out the operation of its dining cars and to sell its hotels. Other schemes have been mentioned in the press such as leasing SRT land in Bangkok for commercial development. These measures are commendable, but not sufficient to close the growing gap between expenses and revenues. 2.42 Some 15Z of the services of SRT are operated for social, security and other reasons and can be expected to create losses indefinitely which should be covered by the Government. The objective here is to contain the losses, or even reduce them, through efficiency measures and changes in the level of services (e.g. selective closings). The other services of SRT, the "Commerical Operations" comprising the three main lines, could be expected to produce a surplus if operated along commercial principles. It was the prin- cipal objective of the proposed Sixth Railway Project and its Plan of Action, to move the commercial operations of SRT towards financial viability by the late 1980s. The Plan of Action required substantial average tariff increases for the commer_.;ial operations (of about 20Z for passengers and about 10% for freight by October 1983) followed by further tariff increases of about 3.5? per annum in real terms. The actual tariff increases so far have been substantially lower. Prospects for Future 2.43 SRT's financial projections for the coming years, indicate that no improvement can be anticipated in the immediate future. If the situation deteriorates further, it would be even more difficult to initiate measures to reverse the trend. Even larger tariff increases would be required, and the recovery period would be prolonged substantially. Hundreds of millions of Baht would be added to the annual deficits with the cumulative effect well in the billions. Costs will then have outgrown revenues to such an extent that a policy of financial viability will no longer be practicable as it could force the railway out of existence. 2.44 To "break even" total revenues must grow faster than total expenses over the coming years, which can be achieved through a combination of marketing efforts, tariff increases, cost containment and efficiency measures, accompanied by improvement in service. A Bank mission in February 1985 specifically addressed these matters and recommended a number of actions to achieve these aims. 2.45 The Government and SRT appear to be at a point of historic significance: the Government still has the option of moving SRT towards - 27 - financially viable operations. However, if this process is not started soon, this option may cease to exist. Then it is unlikely that SRT will be able to reverse the trend of financial deterioration, and the Government will be faced with the need for ever-increasing subsidies indefinitely. III. PORTS SUBSECTOR A. THE PORTS SYSTEM 3.01 Thailand's seaborne dry cargo trade comprises: (a) conventional break bulk and containerized imports and exports shipped through the Bangkok Port; and (b) agricultural exports handled through Bangkok or, when exported in bulk, through Mah Boon Krong and the deep sea anchorage at Ko-Sichang, both on the Eastern Seaboard. Petroleum products are handled through Sri Racha, also on the Eastern Seaboard. 3.02 Plans for the deveLopment of a second deepwater port, within reason- able distance of Bangkok, have been under consideration for some time and were finally narrowed down to a choice between a site at Laem Chabang and the existing port at Sattahip. Sattahip was built in 1966 as a military port under the control of the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) to handle traffic associated with the Viet-Nam conflict, and was handed over to civil control in late 1979. 3.03 Two other ports in Southern Thailand, Phuket (West Coast) and Songkhla (East Coast) are being developed, under financing by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), as deep-sea ports to serve overseas traffic from the southern region. 3.04 The Bangkok Port comprises private and public wharves and is spread along some 40 km of the river Chao Phya upstream from its mouth. The main wharves, operated by the Port Authority of Thailand (PAT), are located about 27 km up-river at Klong Toei. The Bangkok port system includes, in addition to Bangkok port, the Sattahip Commercial Port, the deepwater anchorage at Ko Sichang and the jetty close to Sri Racha (Mah Boon Krong) used for bulk cassava exports in deep draft ships. B. ORGANIZATION 3.05 The Port Authority of Thailand (PAT) was established as an auton- omous organization in 1951, aided by Loan 37-TH. It is responsible for managing and operating the general cargo wharves at Klong Toei, and for the dredging and maintenance of the navigation channel in the Chao Phya river within the port limits, including the Bar Channel at the river mouth. PAT has also been given the responsibility for operating Sattahip as a civilian port. 3.06 PAT is directly responsible to the Ministries of Communications and Finance. It is managed by a Board of Commissioners consisting of a Chairman, the Director General, and nine members. The Director General, assisted by three Deputy Directors and the chiefs of the various service and operational departments, is responsible for day to day operations. The major departments include Technical Office, Port Operations (Port of Bangkok and Sattahip - 28 - Commercial Port), Engineering, Marine, Personnel, and Comptrollers. Total permanent staff is about 5,950; PAT also employs about 100 temporary staff. 3.07 PAT has comprehensive responsibilities for handling break bulk general cargo at Klang Toei after it is landed on the berths. Its functions for container operations are limited to provision of the container yard for storage of containers and delivery to consignees. Stevedoring, i.e., the transfer of goods from the ships' hold to the berth, is mostly undertaken by the stevedoring companies or shipping companies. 3.08 Except for some operating problems, discussed later, the management of the ports of Klong Toei and Sattahip is generally satisfactory. PAT's main weaknesses are slowness in achieving egreed objectives and a tendency to prefer the "status-quo". Both Klong Toei and Sattahip have separate managers and staff reporting to the Director General of PAT, and separate accounts are kept which are consolidated into overall PAT accounts on an annual basis. 3.09 The Customs Department of the Ministry of Finance has a major function in Thailand ports, as elsewhere. Relations between PAT and customs are good but there are some difficulties in disposing of goods which have been in storage an excessive time and remain unclaimed. The Customs Department currently has the responsibility for such disposal, but much cargo continues in storage after the auction of unclaimed cargo, and PAT is not able to dispose of these. The Government has undertaken to remedy this situatiop during the present project (the Bangkok-Sattahip Ports Project, Loan 1918-TH). C. EXISTING FACILITIES Port of Bangkok 3.10 The port of Bangkok comprises wharves, warehouses and mid-stream berths stretching for some 40 km along the Chao Phya river from its mouth. These facilities are mostly privately owned and operated except for PAT's wharves at Klong Toei and are largely used for export of agricultural pro- ducts; imports must, by law, be handled over PAT's facilities at Klong Toei. 3.11 The maximum draft of ships which can use the port is limited by the available depth of 8.5 21 below Mean Sea Level (MSL) at 7 entrance channel (10,000 to 12,000 dwt - general cargo and 400/500 TEU - container ships). The navigational channel has varying depths between 8.5 m and 11.5 m below MSL and permits passage of ships up to 172 m (565 ft) length. The tidal range in the port basin is 1.37 m. Deep water exporting facilities are available in the Gulf of Thailand at Mah Boon Krong on the Eastern Seaboard and the anchorage at Ko Sichang island opposite Mah Boon Krong. The capacity of the river navigation channel needs to be assessed in view of the increasing number of ships calling; this is to be done under the Bangkok Sattahip Ports Project. 2/ Deadweight tons. 3/ Twenty-foot equivalent unit. - 29 - 3.12 The privately operated wharves at Bangkok include 82 public and private wharves, landing places and finger piers and 21 mid-stream anchorages and moorings (13 existing and 8 under construction) at different locations along a considerable length of the river. 3.13 PAT's facilities, the Klong Toei wharves, comprise at present: (a) ten conventional (break-bulk) general cargo berths on the West Quay with a total length of 1,660 m and a dredged depth of 11.0 m below MSL backed up by transit sheds, port warehouse space, and open storage; which is generally adequate if excessive length of storage is avoided; (b) six berths for container ships on the East Quay totalling 1,240 m with 11.0 m depth below MSL and two berths for lighters totalling 288 m with 6.5 m depth below MSL; two container berths, were originally designed for break-bulk cargo and are backed up by transit sheds which are currently being used as container freight stations (cfs); the remaining four are backed up by a container yard; and (c) thirty-six dolphin berths located midstream opposite the Klong Toei berths, which are mostly used for export cargo loaded from barges; however, when there is congestion in the port, the Customs Department also permits homogenous non-break bulk imports to be discharged to barges at the dolphin berths for subsequent landing at private facilities. 3.14 Adequate mechanical equipment is available for conventional cargo handling, but the container yard equipment needs to be augmented. Floating craft are adequate for operations, however, the dredgers are old and inefficient, and should be replaced. Maintenance of the existing facilities is good. Roll-on roll-off facilities could be readily provided if such traffic developed. 3.15 Road access to Klong Toei berths, improved under Loan 37-TH, is satisfactory, and there is a good rail connection to the East Quay. 3.16 As previously noted, PAT is responsible for all operations involved in handling break bulk general cargo handled over the Klong Toei West Quay berths; however, when the ships are tied up alongside, cargo is discharged both on to the berth and overside to barges; that proportion landed to barges is landed ex-barge at private facilities and warehouses. The Port of Sattahip 3.17 Sattahip harbor is located in a large bay on the eastern side of the Gulf of Thailand and at the southern end of Thailand's Eastern Seaboard. It is protected from the open sea by a breakwater some 1,000 m long. The dredged entrance channel is about 150 m wide and has an available depth of 11 m below Mean Lower Low Water (MLLW). There has been very little silting in the channel or harbor, but tugs are necessary, due to a cross current of about 1 knot in the entrance channel at some stages of the tide. Tidal range is about 1.28 m. - 30 - 3.18 To form the required berths within the harbor, land has been re- claimed behind quay walls constructed of concrete caissons built out from the original shore line. There are three 182 m long berths on the west face (berths 1-3 inclusive), each of which has a transit shed, and two 175 m long berths on the north face (berths 4 and 5), which have no transit shed. There are no berths on the south face which fronts the entrance channel and is open to wave action during south westerly weather conditions. The present depth alongside the berths is 9.3 m below MLLW. The dredged fairway fronting the western berths is adequate for safe ship handling but that for the northern berths requires improvement. Minor improvements, including fender renewal, provision for railway tracks and a container yard within the port, are provided for in the Bangkok-Sattahip Port Project. 3.19 Over 60 ha of open storage is available, but the pavement is inadequate, and both new paving and renewal of the existing paving is required. For the current traffic, sufficient mechanical handling equipment, trailers and small craft are available. Except for the three transit sheds, there is little covered storage space available. There is, however, a good mechanical workshop. Ancillary works and services are satisfactory. Adequate space is available for future development inside the bay and the existing breakwater. 3.20 The Government has constructed a railway line to Sattahip. The new line joins the existing eastern line from Bangkok at Chachoengsao. The immediate road access to the port is adequate, and there are a number of alternative roads between Bangkok and Sattahip which are also adequate. D. TRAFFIC AND OPERATIONS Traffic 3.21 Import and export trade through the Bangkok Port System (Table 3.1) excluding petroleum products has increased from 15.0 million tons in 1976 to 26.3 million tons in 1984. The breakdown is as follows: Imports Exports Total … ---------(in million tons)----- 1976 3.96 11.02 14.98 1978 5.48 13.03 18.51 1982 5.67 19.50 25.17 1983 7.39 15.27 22.66 1984 6.86 19.41 26.26 Source: PAT The fluctuations in exports are caused largely by bulk agricultural products. 3.22 Comparative figures for container and break-bulk cargo through PAT's installations at Klong Toei (Table 3.2) are suamarized below: - 31 - Container Conventional All Imports Exports Total Imports Exports Total Traffic ------ (In million tons) - ---------… 1978 0.58 0.47 1.05 2.81 0.26 3.07 4.12 1982 1.11 1.16 2.27 2.27 0.28 2.55 4.82 1983 1.49 1.33 2.82 2.87 0.25 3.12 5.94 1984 1.54 1.82 3.36 2.61 0.15 2.76 6.12 1985 /a 1.72 2.04 3.76 2.53 - 2.53 6.29 1990 _a 2.77 3.28 6.05 2.17 - 2.17 8.22 /a Forecast Source: PAT The only containerized traffic handled through Bangkok port is that over PAT's Klong Toei wharves shown above. 3.23 Traffic at Sattahip in 1982 (Table 3.1) was 44,786 tons of imports and 263,413 tons of exports, totalling 308,199 tons. There was no container traffic. The 1985 forecast is for 435,000 tons of total traffic, which again does not include any containerized traffic, but it may be necessary to divert some containerized traffic from Klong Toei. 3.24 Shipping at PAT's Klong Toei wharves in 1982 amounted to 1,747 ships. A breakdown by type of ships - conventional break bulk, container, and combination vessels - is not currently reported, but a ship classification system is being considered in the current tariff review financed under the ongoing project. Break Bulk Cargo Operations 3.25 PAT's cargo handling operations for break bulk cargo at Klong Toei are in general satisfactory, although the handling rate in 1982, 11.1 tons per net gang hour for goods handled over the West Quays, could be improved. Goods unloaded at the West Quay and handled overside to barges and subsequently landed ex-barge through private wharves and warehouses on the river was discharged at a much better rate of 24.9 tons per net gang hour in 1982. 3.26 Efforts have been made over the years to introduce a multi-shift system for cargo handling operations; but these have been resisted by PAT and the Government, and it is unlikely such a system wilL be introduced in the foreseeable future. Not only do the current arrangements result in excessive working hours to the point of inefficiency, but also in high overtime payments for this inefficiency. A study was made by consultants (WD Scott Pty., Australia) under Loan 702-TH which strongly recommended a change from the present system to a multi-shift system. - 32 - 3.27 PAT's main operational problems are (i) the large quantities of goods in storage for excessive periods; (ii) inability to move these goods into bonded warehouses (outside the port); and (iii) inability to dispose of cargo which has not been claimed by the consignee or sold at the auctions for unclaimed cargo. PAT has undertaken to remedy this situation with the Customs Department. Container Handling 3.28 Each of the ten shipping companies represented in the port handles its own import and export containers in the space allotted. Most containers are unstuffed in the container yard, where export containers are also being stuffed. The situation is further aggravated by the fact that empty con- tainers, which are a high proportion of the total TEU in the yard, are stacked in the same area. 3.29 To streamline container operations, improve handling rate and increase traffic handled, the container yard responsibilities were redefined under the present project and new container freight stations were constructed by PAT using its own funds. The container yard was also increased in size by some 30,000 sq m and the charge for empty container storage has been increased. A container operations specialist provided by UN is also working with PAT to improve the existing system and it is expected PAT's participation in container handling will increase. Traffic Capacity at KLong Toei and Proposed Diversion of Container Traffic to Sattahip 3.30 At the time of appraisal of the ongoing port project (February 1980), conventional break bulk ships were limited to the West Quay berths and were experiencing excessive waiting time. The traffic forecast also anticipa- ted continuing growth of break bulk cargoes. It was accordingly agreed that the six East Quay container berths which were not being fully utilized would be allocated for use by break bulk vessels as might be necessary to ensure that annual waiting time for all berths at Klong Toei did not exceed 1,000 days per annum. Any container capacity lost by using East Quay berths for conventional ships would be accommodated by transferring container ships to Sattahip and moving the containers offloaded there to the proposed Bank financed inland container freight station at Bang Sue by rail. 3.31 In practice, container traffic has developed faster and conventional cargo slower than expected (Table 3.2). The need to convert container berths to conventional break bulk cargo usage has not therefore arisen, and the six berths continue to be availabLe for container traffic at Klong Toei. With an estimated capacity of some 3.0 million tons (300,000 TEU), the need to transfer overflow traffic out of Klong Toei is now imminent (TabLe 3.3). 3.32 The size and scope of the inland container freight station proposed at Bang Sue for handling container traffic brought from Sattahip by rail, has been reviewed and reduced in scope. This follows che Government's decision to limit development of Sattahip to handle only the overflow traffic from Bangkok until Laem Chabang is available about 1990. - 33 - E. DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 3.33 The Government has been considering development of a new port at Laem Chabang on the Eastern Seaboard since about 1972. The Bank has advised against such development on the ground that development at Sattahip was more economic and also on environmental grounds given the closeness of Laem Chabang to the resort town of Pattaya. 3.34 The Bank and the Government agreed in 1979 that Sattahip should as a first stage be developed to handle traffic to 1990/95. Further development to handle traffic to the year 2000 and beyond was to be studied. The resulting project financed by Loan 1918-TH was appraised in February 1980 and signed in December 1980. The study for Sattahip development for traffic to the year 2000 was financed by the Australian Government and undertaken by consultants, Maunsell and Partners (Australia) in association with Sindu Pulsirivong and Partners (Thailand). It was completed in 1982 and indicated that Sattahip could be economically developed to handle bulk and container traffic to the year 2000 with break bulk traffic continuing to be handled at Klong Toei. 3.35 The Government determined, however, on the basis of an internal study, that Laem Chabang would be the best location for additional major port facilities to handle future container and conventional cargo traffic. The Covernment also decided that Sattahip would in the long run be dedicated solely to bulk handling of material for the proposed Eastern Seaboard industrial development in the Rayong area. 3.36 Subsequently, following advice from a specialist port mission financed by the Japanese Government,a bulk port for the Eastern Seaboard Industrial Estate at Map Ta Pud near Rayong was brought into consideration. The present proposals under consideration by the Government are: (a) to proceed with provision of a breakwater, one break bulk berth and three container berths with back-up facilities at Laem Chabang; (b) to proceed with provision of a dredged channel, breakwater and two bulk berths at Map Ta Pud; and (c) to proceed with development of Sattahip only to the first stage required to handle overflow container traffic from Klong Toei until Laem Chabang is available (1990-1995). 3.37 In this context, two important considerations are: (1) the type of shipping Thailand can attract and utilize which will help determine the draft requirements and hence the amount of dredging required (a high cost initially and possibly for maintenance); and (2) the type of port facilities to be built, considering the possible traffic to be handled at the ports. A review of the port development plans by recognized, independent experts would be useful. - 34 - F. FINANCES 3.38 PAT's consolidated income accounts and balance sheets for 1976-84 (Table 3.4 and 3.5) show profitable operations with annual surpluses around B 200 million except for 1982 which registered an operating deficit of B 21 million due to a decline in total traffic over Klong Toei wharves in 1982 compared to 1981. The net income position in 1984 indicates a surplus of B 364 million. 3.39 The principal ratios for 1981 through 1984 are: 1981 1982 1983 1984 Operating 84 102 81 74 Times interest earned 10.7 -1.3x 17.6x 30.3x Current 3.9x 2.2x 3.1x 4.3x Debt/equity 7/93 6/94 5/95 4/96 IV. INLAND WATERWAYS AND COASTAL PORTS A. INLAND WATERWAYS Inland Waterways System 4.01 Thailand has a well-developed inland waterways system which covers well over one-third of the country and extends over some 1,600 km of navigable waterways. Most of this length is in the northern corridor between Bangkok and Uttaradit along the rivers Chao Phrya and Nan, and the remainder along the Mekong river on the Thai-Laotian border. The principal navigable rivers are: (a) the North Chao Phrya River System comprising the Chao Phya River from the Chao Phrya dam (at Chainat) and its two main tributaries the Nan and Ping rivers. From the dam to the northernmost part (Uttaradit) on the Nan is about 450 km and to Kamphaeng Phet on the Ping about 265 km; (b) the lower Chao Phrya from the Gulf of Thailand to the Chao Phya Dam (280 km); (c) the Supha Tha Chin/Noi Rivers (about 150 km each); (d) the Pasak River from Ayutthya to the Rama VI Dam (about 45 km); (e) the Mae Klong River System from Samut Prakan on the Chao Phya to the Tha Chin River on to the Mae Klong River up to Kanchanaburi (about 250 km); and (f) the Bang Pakong River from the Gulf of Thailand to Chachoeng Sao (about 35 km). This river is of minor importance for inland river traffic except for lighterage operation at the estuary. This traffic is regulated under the Bangkok Port System. - 35 - 4.02 River levels, flows and navigation are influenced by the season. With the arrival of the monsoon in May, water levels rise until they peak in August, thereafter declining since December, followed by the dry season from January to May when water levels are low. These influences are to some extent modified by a system of irrigation canals and single or multipurpose dams. Nevertheless there are navigation problems in the dry season. The dams of primary interest to navigation in the Northern Corridor are the multipurpose Sirikit dam on the Nan river about 60 km north of the diversion dam near Chainat and the Rama VI diversion dam at Tha Reua. The multipurpose dams are used for electricity generation, and all dams serve irrigation. Other water management considerations are domestic and industrial water supply and water salinity control in the lower Chao Phya, which is affected by ocean tides. 4.03 The principal navigation problems arising from the low water levels in the dry season exist on a stretch of the Nan south of Taphan Hin, a stretch of the upper Chao Phya between Nakhon Sawan and Phayuha Khiri and a stretch on the lower Chao Phya between Chainat and Angthong. During some 50 days of this period, available water depths in the first two sections falls to about 1.5 m, forcing barges to reduce payloads. On the Last section, water depths can be as low as 0.9 m, effectively preventing navigation. When the lower Chao Phya between Chainat and Angthong is closed for navigation, barges detour on a bypass consisting of sections of the Noi and Tha Chin rivers, but these routes with a total of ten locks are narrow, winding, slow and costly. Further, the locks permit the passage of only traditional wooden barges (50-80 tons dead- weight). Deepening of all critical Chao Phya and Nan river sections up to Taphan Hin to a minimum water depth of 1.7 m, which involves dredging to 2.2 m depth to aLlow for clearance and some siltation between maintenance dredging operations, is being carried out under the ongoing Inland Waterways and Coastal Ports Project (Loan 1889-TH). 4.04 More than 100 terminals and a number of minor loading pcints are located along the waterways. Their density is highest near population centers and in the rice-exporting areas. All are privately owned and opt..ated and most handle onLy one commodity. Terminals on the lower and upper Chao Phya and Nan are relatively primitive. Some have a floating raft to bring the barge alongside, others not. Some mechanical equipment is being used, primarily for handling of sand and cement, and a few rice terminals are equipped with Loading chutes. Otherwise loading or unloading is ':ith baskets and bags by hand. In the rice and maize-exporting areas, a considerable number of rice mills and covered storage facilities are located o.. the river- banks. Two of the larger existing loading points on the Chao Phya-Nan rivers are Nakhon Sawan and Taphan Hin. Their present capacity is, however, inade- quate to handle expected traffic increases resulting from improvement of the waterways, and new constrution is being carried out under the ongoing project. Traffic 4.05 The river-influence areas are important agricultural production zones; they also have large mineral deposits. Some 5.4 million tons of traffic were generated in 1981 over the several systems as follows: - 36 - Inland System (Tons) North Chao Phya 1,000,000 Lower Chao Phya 1,800,000 Tha Chin/Noi 30,000 Pasak 2,300,000 Mae Klong 260,000 5,390,000 Source: DECONS 4.06 In order of tonnage, the major commodities carried by river transport are sand, maize, rice, cement, gravel, tapioca pellets, and minerals. Potash and soda ash are potential large users of river tranport followed by fluorite and lead ore. Most of the sand and rice carried by the waterways now comes from the North Chao Phya River System, maize comes mainly from this area and the Pasak and cement from the Pasak. The lower Chao Phya handles sand, rice and tapioca pellets. 4.07 At present, inland waterways handle a relatively small share of the bulk commodities suitable for barge transport, largely due to lack of invest- ment in both barges and waterways. Although speed is not essential for the majority of the commodities being transported, timing is of importance in the present marketing system for several export commodities, e.g. rice, maize and tapioca. Therefore reliability is important and the ongoing project will help assure more reLiable transport on the North Chao Phya and Nan Rivers by reduc- ing the number of shoal areas the barges must cross. Waterways Transport Industry 4.08 Thailand's inland waterways transport industry is highly competitive and free from regulation. The barge fleet consists of some 4,500 units with individual capacities of 40 to over 300 dwt plus 3,000-3,500 smaller units (Table 4.1). About 3,300 of the 4,500 barges are of traditional design, made of wood and with a capacity of below 100 dwt each. Construction of wooden barges has all but been discontinued. The total capacity of the 4,500-unit fleet is 450,000 dwt, which handles 8.6 million tons anually. All barges are moved by towboats using the pull-towing astern method which requires the following barges to have crew for steering and stopping the convoy. If the barges were pushed, a barge train could consist of more than ten units and improve transport efficiency appreciably. Development of more efficient barge designs and methods of operation are part of the ongoing project. A require- ment for some new barge types will be the capability to sail on the open waters of the Gulf of Thailand on journeys between upcountry and Ko Sichang, Mah Boon Krong and Sattahip loading terminals/anchorages in the Gulf of Thailand for agricultural exports. 4.09 The inland waterways fleet of barges and towboats is in private hands except for a few units owned and operated by the Government-owned Express Transport Organization (ETO). The traditional wooden barges are gen- erally operated by the owners who live on them with their families. Most of - 37 - these boats are engaged in rice transport. A few owner-operators have been able to enter the transport markets for sand, cement and maize, but these trades are dominated by companies with modern steel barges. Several of these transport firms own between 50 and 100 steel barges and towboats. DeveLopment Planning 4.10 There is a limited capacity for planning in the Harbour Depart- ment. Recognizing this, the Government has requested financing for developing this capability (para. 4.21). Feasibility studies are done by consultants and, currently under study are the Pasak River (Rama VI Dam to Amphur Kaeng Koi-45 km) and Klong (canal) Sanpasamit, Klong Tachin and Mae Klong River to Kanchanaburi (30, 30, 140 km respectively). The questions being addressed are the navigation potential of these river systems and the improvements required. The Pasak needs to have the navigation locks at the Rama VI Dam enlarged to permit the current larger barges to pass and the removal of some shoals. The Mae Klong system will require dredging and embankment works. A prefeasibility study (1982) estimated the cost of these works in the order of US$20.0 million. B. COASTAL PORTS Inventory 4.11 In addition to its two existing deepsea ports (Bangkok and Sattahip) and two new ones (Songkhla and Phuket) under construction, Thailand has some 30 shallow draft "coastal" ports. Coastal ports vary greatly in size and consist in some cases of little more than wooden wharves or jetties for landing fish and small volumes of cargo. Some coastal ports serve only local needs, while others are of regional importance. While virtually all were developed by private initiative at a time when Land transport was difficult, costly or unavailable, many retain their importance for regional develop- ment. The majority of coastal ports are located on the east and west coasts of the southern peninsula and the remainder on the northern fringe of the Gulf of Thailand from west of Bangkok eastwards to the Cambodian border (Map No. 14856R1). 4.12 Most coastal ports are riverine and subject to severe draft restrictions at the channel entrance; many have a channel depth of only 0.5 rm or less below MSL. The more exposed east-coast ports on the southern peninsula also face operational restrictions due to the north-east monsoon. Because of the shallow entrance channels, lighterage is required for a sub- stantial part of the export and some of the domestic trade, and the movement of small cargo and larger fishing vessels in and out of the ports is generally limited to high tide. Continuous siltation from riverborne and littoral sources aggravates these problems and necessitates frequent channel dredging. Administration 4.13 Most coastal ports are privately owned and operated. In some cases, municipalities and provincial governments manage wharves and jetties, and the Fish Marketing Organization (FMO), a Government organization, has constructed fishing wharves in more than ten locations as well as a number of cold storage plants. Land title for ports managed by municipal and provincial governments - 38 - is retained by the Ministry of Finance. When there is a dispute over payment for the rental of the port, the Harbour Department will manage the w;arves and jetties. The Department's role is normally limited to maintenance or improve- ment dredging of navigation channels. The Customs Department maintains customs posts in a number of the coastal ports. Traffic 4.14 Ships' manifests, surrendered to the Customs Department when ships enter or leave a port, are the-primary cargo data source for estimating coastal traffic. Traffic statistics for 1981 covering some 20 porte account- ing for 75% to 80% of total estimated traffic show a domestic cargo of about 1.2 million tons and foreign cargo of about 1.1 million ton. Fish Landings at coastal ports were estimated at about 1.8 million tons in 1981. Total comr- bined volumes of domestic cargo and fish are thus in the neighborhood of 3 million tons annually. 4.15 Some 60% of the cargo at the coastal ports in FY81, consisted of bulk petroleum products. Transport of petroleum products to southern Thailand's depots is almost exclusively by sea, and distribution from the depots to market is by road. Domestic dry cargo consists of a variety of consumer goods, fertilizers, cement and other construction materials, most of them originating from the Bangkok area, and of primary products such as timber, fish meal and palm oil with Bangkok generally being the transit or final destination. Rice in bulk is carried by rail and not sea because of Government regulations designed to prevent smuggling. 4.16 Competition with land traffic, poor port facilities and shallow draft, complicated documentation, inefficient institutional procedures, few investment incentives and an attitude of benign neglect, are all contributing to the decline of coastal shipping. Possible changes in the Government's policies intended to stimulate coastal shipping have been investigated under a study on coastal shipping being carried out by the Japanese International Cooperation Agency. Institutional and operational improvements for the Harbour Department are being provided for under the Bank's ongoing project, and these will provide more frequent and efficient channel dredging which will be a further stimulant for the coastal shipping sector. Coastal Fleet 4.17 Only one common carrier, Harinsu Transport Company, Ltd., maintains regular domestic coastal shipping services but only to Songkhla. The company has a fleet of 12 vessels of 100-250 net tons. Three other small companies, with eight vessels, operate weekly non-scheduled services serving Bangkok, Songkhla, Ko Somni, Pak Panang and Tha Thong. All carriers are privately owned and operated and all but two of the 18 vessels are wooden. The main coastal traffic, bulk petroleum, is carried by tankers operating out of Sri Racha which are made up of units of 300 to over 2,000 dwt. Of the six east- coast ports on the southern peninsula with oil depots, all but one (Songkhla) require tankers to be well below the 2,000 dwt size te enter fully laden. The Bank is financing a program for port development, including capital and maintenance dredging of entrance channels, which will permit the use of larger vessels and generate substantial economies of scale. - 39 - Development Planning 4.18 The coastal ports and shipping sector has received relatively little Government attention and support. The reasons for this are many, including (a) the predominance of private and local interests in the management and ownership of coastal ports, (b) the fact that the Government's main emphasis has been on land transport, (c) lack of a clear-cut mandate to a particular Government agency for port development, and (d) a Harbour Department which is only gradually acquiring development planning expertise. It is only lately that regional policy considerations and rising energy costs have led the Government to pay more attention to coastal shipping needs and resulted in such studies as those to develop Phuket and Songkhla ports. Also the Coastal Ports Study financed by the Bank has stimulated further interest in the future role of domestic waterborne transport. Future planning requirements falling on the Harbour Department will be (a) the extension of development studies for ports not yet fully reviewed, and (b) the development of a rational program for capital and maintenance dredging of port channels and sections of the inland waterways. The Department's ability to meet these requirements are being improved under the ongoing project and feasibility studies are under way for possible projects, using the previous Bank-financed study as a basis. C. HARBOUR DEPARTMENT Functions and Organization 4.19 The Harbour Department is a part of the Ministry of Communications (HOC). It is responsible for planning, undertaking and controlling main- tenance, improvement, and navigation on inland waterways and coastal ports in Thailand. Its specific responsibilities for inland waterways are regulation and control of navigation, improvement and maintenance of navigation channels, inspection and registration of waterway transport companies and vessels, waterway development planning and licensing of companies for sand dredging in riverbeds. The Department's role with respect to coastal ports is generally limited to maintenance or improvement dredging of navigation channels, which are the principal problems of the coastal ports. Presently it is responsible only for port management and operations of the two inland waterways ports, Nakhon Sawan and Taphan Hin. 4.20 The Department was last reorganized in 1974. It is headed by a Director General and two deputies, one for Administration and one for Technical Matters, and divided into ten Divisions which are subdivided into Sections. The most important divisions are (a) the Technical Divisions, which is in charge of project planning, and (b) the Dredging and Maintenance Division, which is responsible through force account for dredging of naviga- tion channels on the coast and inland waterways. 4.21 The Harbour Department's planning and management of works is weak and operation of the dredgers it controls needs improvement, mainly because of lack of qualified staff. Some expertise in planning has been acquired from participation in the consultants' studies for the ongoing project and from the studies undertaken for the Phuket and Songkhla ports. To strengthen it, tech- nical assistance is being provided to develop a management information system and to train staff in project evaluation. Overseas training in coastal - 40 - engineering dredging techniques, survey engineering and economic planing is also being considered. 4.22 Capital and maintenance dredging of navigation channels is organized around four regional centers, at Songkhla on the east and Kantang on the west coast of the southern peninsula, at Chanta Buri southeast of Bangkok and at Ayutthya on the Chao Phrya river. Despite the fact that dredging is, by far, the Department's most important function on which the largest percentage of its manpower and budget are focused, it is weak in planning, management and execution of such works. Further, control of works is inadequate, with poor measurement and accounting techniques and lack of surveys of completed work. While some measures to alleviate this problem are being taken under the on- going project, lack of qualified staff to be trained is a continuing issue. Staff 4.23 The Department's total approved staff is about 600 officers with civil service status, 830 permanent and 160 temporary subordinate personnel and labor. About 50 officers' posts are vacant because of unattractive public service employment conditions and lack of budget appropriations. The Dredging and Maintenance Division has a total of 570 approved positions of which 10l are unfilled, and the Technical Division has an approved staff strength of 210 with 15Z vacancies. Revenues and Expenditures 4.24 The Harbour Department's budget expenditures in FY84 were about B 236 million (Table 4.2). Between 50% and 60% of expenditures for the years have been for dredging and maintenance and between 20% and 25% were over general administration. Actual expenditures are consistently less than budgeted, ranging from 40X to 89% of total budgeted. Revenues collected by the Harbour Department amounted to B 45 million annually, virtually all from service charges such as vessel licensing and piloting. All revenues are being collected for deposit to the Treasury account. Departmental revenues range from 15% to 25% of expenditures. D. ISSUES 4.25 The main issues are land acquisition and staffing. The Harbour Department does not have right of eminent domain and, when land owners or squatters contest the acquisition, it must institute legal proceedings which are time consuming. In the case of the ongoing project this has taken some three years. The staffing problem stems from the Government's moratorium on new hiring and, to some extent, from the inability of the Department to attract and retain qualified staff in sufficient numbers to carry out the necessary work due to the low salary scales. While not all project delays can be attributed to lack of quaLified staff, much more time is spent reviewing proposals and contracts as well as supervising work than should be the case with adequate numbers of well qualified personnel. - 41 - V. SHIPPING A. FLEET COMPOSITION 5.01 The Thai oceangoing merchant fleet consists of 87 dry cargo vessels with a capacity of 435,341 dwt and 62 tanker vessels with a capacity of 243,236 dwt, for a total fleet of 149 vessels with a combined capacity of 678,577 dwt. The fleet serves domestic (coastal), regional and long distance foreign routes. The largest number of vessels (76) with a combined capacity of 248,000 dwt serve the trade with southeast Asia. Other major servi:es are to Japan, Korea, and Europe. Twenty-eight vessels with a capacity of 65,000 dwt serve the domestic trade exclusively while 2 ships with 9,000 dwt and 22 ships with 175,000 dwt capacity are respectively designated as serving foreign or unspecified trades. 5.02 There are 46 dry general cargo ship owning companies, of which 25 own only one ship each and only 5 companies own more than 3 ships each. Most of the single ship companies own smaller ships and trade in the domestic or ASEAN coastal trades. There are 22 tanker owning companies, with some owning as many as 15 tankers, but there are also 6 tanker companies which own only a single (small) ship and ten of the 62 tankers are gas carriers (LNG or LPG). Only 2 are large 70,200 dwt tankers, owned by Thai Ocean Transportation, which operate worldwide. The others serve essentially domestic coastal trade. 5.03 The average age of the fleet is about 20 years. The age distribu- tion varies little with ship type: the average age of oil tankers is 19 years, of general cargo ships 21 years and of gas carriers 19 years. There are no container or modern Ro-Ro vessels in the fleet. (The average age of the world merchant fleet is less than 11 years.) A large expansion of the Thai fleet took place in 1965-70 with little further investment since then. 5.04 The fleet is not only relatively old, but also lacks the two most important types of ships used in the foreign trade of Thailand, viz container ships and dry bulk carriers. Thailand has moved very cautiously towards containerization and, although a significant proportion of its general cargo in foreign trade is now containerized, few main line services provide direct long distance container ship calls at Thai ports. Some of the smaller Thai vessels have been adapted to container feeder service and operate between Bangkok and Singapore or Hong Kong, where cargo is transferred to or from main line container vessels. But participation of Thai shipping even in feeder services is quite marginal. There is only one 4,000 dwt full container feeder ship in the fleet. Dry bulk cargo, mainly agricultural goods such as tapioca, rice and similar exports, are usually carried by large foreign flag bulk carriers. Ships in the Thai fleet are too small to participate effectively in the bulk trade except in short distance transport of bulk commodities. 5.05 Thailand, a late signatory of the UNCTAD Liner Code of Conduct, with its recomendation for cargo sharing, has yet not ratified this agreement, which came into force on October 6, 1983. At the same time the Thai Govern- ment has continued to introduce various pieces of legislation designed to advance the interests of Thai shipping. Government agencies are encouraged to use the Government-owned forwarding agent and vessels belonging to the Thai Maritime Navigation Co. Ltd., the United Thai Shipping Co. Ltd. and the United Thai Shipping Corporation. The Mercantile Ma'-ine Promotion Act B.E. 2521, - 42 - passed in October 1978, aims at promoting Thai flag vesssels through fiscal and other measures, including cargo preference and the prevention of dumping by foreign flag vessels. It empowers the Government to permit a deduction amounting to not more than 50% of the costs of carriage from the shippers' net income prior to income Lax calculation when using Thai flag vessels for the seaborue transportation of cargoes ordered by government agencies and enter- prises. MOC has issued regulations requiring government agencies, govern- mental organizations, and state enterprises to use Thai ships to transport their imported goods on five routes (Japan, Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Europe). Goods purchased through loans from foreign governments and inter- national financial institutions are exempt from the regulations. To date, -most imports have fallen into the non-reserved category. Most of the legisla- tion deals with liner type shipping, but much of Thailand's foreign trade is in bulk shipping of agricultural exports, and petroleum, cement, etc., imports. As long as Thailand does not acquire reasonable bulk carrying capacity, legislation designed to promote the shipping subsector would be moot. 5.06 The Government recognizes that incentives provided by the Mercantile Marine Promotion Act may not suffice to encourage significant growth of the Thai merchant fleet. Thailand's foreign trade exceeded $15 billion in value in 1981 and has in recent years consistently exceeded 50X of the country's GNP. But only about 5% in volume (and slightly more in value) of Thailand's foreign trade is carried by Thai ships. The cost of foreign trade shipping services is difficult to estimate but should approximate nearly US$1 billion, or about 7% of the value of Thai international trade. 5.07 Privately owned Thai shipping companies appear to be more efficient in their operations and marketing and participate quite effectively in compe- tition with government-owned shipping. However, as already mentioned, owner- ship and management of Thai shipping is highly fragmented. 5.08 While the larger shipping companies serving Japan, Korea and Europe are usually members of the respective conferences serving the trade, most of the smaller companies serving domestic and Asean trades provide nonconference services with less regular scheduling. The 17 tanker operating companies are mainly engaged in contract or charter trades for Thai national or private oil companies. B. INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 5.09 The shipping industry is supervised by MOC and the Mercantile Marine Promotion Commission. There is also the Thai Shipping Association to which most owners and operators belong, and which represents the industry in discus- sions with the Government. The primary concern of the Government and industry is the size and age of the existing fleet and the possibility of fleet expansion and renewal. The industry needs to replace obsolete tonnage and expand the fleet if it is to carry a larger share of Thai foreign trade. 5.10 The Goveranent has indicated that it would encourage the strength- ening of both the Government and privately owned sectors of the shipping industry. It is looking at alternative approaches to shipping financing and larger participation in both long distance liner and bulk trade. - 43 - 5.11 Thai shipping companies are short of experienced managers. Mc t of them, in particular the smaller ones are managed by investors and not by experienced shipping managers. A rationalization of the industry into fewer larger companies, similar to the approach used in Korea recently, could offer an attractive solution. The main problem is the lack of financial strength and inability to raise money for ship acquisition. 5.12 Thai shipping would probably be adequately served by acquisition of young second hand ships which can be procured at low cost. For example, a 5-year third generation container ship, or a 60,000 ton dry bulk carrier in good condition can be purchased at 40-50X of the price of a new ship. The problem is that supplier and foreign Government credit is usually not avail- able for such transactions, and the seller (sometimes a bank) will normally require cash payment. Commercial banks have recently become disinterested in ship financing and particularly lending for the purchase of second hand ships. The exception may be purchase of a vessel acquired by a bank in a foreclosure proceeding. C. FUTURE PROSPECTS 5.13 The main trades in which the Thai merchant fleet has opportunities for expansion are the Thai dry bulk cargo trades in which it participates very little, the container feeder service trade to Singapore, Hong Kong and other large container transhipment centers, and the overseas long distance container trade to selected destinations such as Japan/Korea/Taiwan/China/Northwest Europe and the US West Coast. Expansion into the dry bulk and container feeder service trades should form the first phase of fleet expansion, which should occur only after (voluntary) rationalization of the Thai shipping industry. Expansion into long distance full container service should consti- tute a second phase of fleet expansion and should occur after rationalized companies have been able to establish firm relationships with large foreign container operating companies and have been admitted to or are at least acceptable to the relevant liner conferences. 5.14 It is important to develop incentives for fleet rationalization. Technical assistance should include development of a formal program for fleet ratiopalization, marketing studies, and development of financing plans. It should also include training of shipping managers, ship operating crew, terminal operators, and marketing and booking staff. D. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 5.15 The Thai shipping industry is too fragmented to permit effective expansion and modernization. It is largely composed of old, small and inefficient vessels competing with modern foreign vessels. Thailand spends a large amount of foreign exchange for shipping services rendered by foreign shipping. 5.16 Coastal shipping capacity is adequate, and additional requirements for coastal shipping capacity can readily be provided by transfer of ocean going vessels as these are replaced by larger modern vessels. The most - 44 - important need is to acquire a reasonable number of dry bulk carriers and small full container (and possibly RoRo) vessels to establish effective Thai feeder services, followed by the purchase of larger full container vessels designed to serve a limited number of high-density container shipping trades. Decisions on these should, of course, be taken after careful evaluation of the economic and financial viability of specific investment proposals. Alternatively, the Government could consider leasing ships to carry a part of its foreign trade. 5.17 To accomplish this, a formal plan or program for fleet rationalization is required and should be developed in parallel with the -provision of technical assistance to the industry. VI. URBAN TRANSPORT 1 A. OVERVIEW Urbanization in Thailand 6.01 One out of six of Thailand's 48 million people (1980 .opulation) live in urban areas. In relation to most other East Asian count-ies, this is a low level of urbanization. However, the annual rate of population growth in urban areas has been about 5.3% between 1970-80, approximately twice the national rate, reflecting increasing migration from rural areas to the cities. Bangkok dominates the urban scene with well over half of the nation's urban population - 4.7 million out of 8.4 million. The next largest city, Chiang Mai, has a population of only 160,000, which is less than Bangkok's Annual growth. There are only 11 cities (including Bangkok) with populations exceeding 50,000. Still, by the end of the century, the country's urban popu- lation is expected to more than double to about 17-20 million, and the greater Bangkok metropolitan area is expected to approach or exceed 10 million. Vehicle Ownership and Use 6.02 Bangkok dominates the urban transport subsector to an even greater extent. With a population of only 10% of the national total, motor vehicle registrations in Bangkok account for about 39% of the national total (exclud- ing 2-wheelers). About 80Z of cars and taxis and 70% of buses are registered in Bangkok. Moreover, motor vehicle registrations in Bangkok have grown 13% per annum over the past five years (1978-83), or 9% p.a. excluding motor- cycles. This annual growth rate has resulted in a doubling of the motor vehicle fleet from about 500,000 in 1978 to over 1,000,000 by the end of 1984. Currently 4,000 motorized vehicles with 3 or more wheels and about 4,000 motorcycles are added every month to Bangkok's motor vehicle 1/ The Bank has so far made only one loan for urban transport - the Bangkok Traffic Management Project (Loan 1638-TH) for US$16.0 million, which became effective in 1979. A Regional Cities Project was appraised in October 1983. - 45 - population. As a result, over half of all vehicle-km of traffic in the country is concentrated in the Central Region within a radius of 150 km of Bangkok. B. EXISTING TRANSPORT CONDITIONS IN BANGKOK 6.03 Bangkok's traffic conditions are among the worst in Asia, and in recent years have been steadily deteriorating. Severe congestion is the principal symptom, with long journey times, high fuel consumption, and high level of pollution. Rapid growth of the human and vehicle populations, divided responsibility among separate agencies with no coordinating authority, and inadequate investments have contributed to the growing seriousnes- of the situation oveP the past 10-15 years. Recent developments indicate that more effective attention may soon be given to these problems. Road System 6.04 Bangkok's transport infrastructure is characterized by a very low proportion of space devoted to roadways (not more than 10% in the inner core) and a road network dependent on a limited number of major roads with only a few connecting links, particularly outside the grid network in the central area of the city. The remaining road network, consisting of a discontinuous jumble of minor streets, or "sois", is typically narrow and winding, and has poor system continuity. The problem is being compounded as the city grows outward, with private land developers providing subdivision roads without relationship to an overall arterial road network. The result is a configu- ration of road space that is unable to cope with existing transport demands, let alone projected or latent transport growth. As the motor vehicle fleet is expanding at about 9% annually, the comparatively modest road building and traffic management measures that have been introduced have not been able to keep pace with needs. Travel speeds have accordingly declined and will decline further until a point is reached where certain trips are deferred or altogether cancelled as the cost of travel becomes too high. There is some evidence that this point may already have been reached as typical car speeds are only 12 km/h and bus speeds 9 km/h during the heaviest travel hours in the central area of the city. Furthermore, congestion has reached such high levels that no "peak hours" are discernible as heavy traffic spreads through- out most of the working day. Further evidence of the deteriorating situation is the progressive spreading of acute congestion outward from the city center as motor vehicle ownership increases. Associated with the considerable traf- fic congestion are high levels of air and noise pollution and poor environ- mental and safety conditions for pedestrians. Existing Public Transport System 6.05 Within Bangkok about 60% of person-trips on arterial streets are carried by buses and minibuses which constitute only 6Z of the stream of passenger vehicles. In contrast, private cars, which comprise over half of the traffic stream, carry only one-fourth of all person-trips. A dominant proportion of public transport services in Bangkok are provided by BMTA, a 5,000-bus. 24,000-employee operation, which is among the largest urban bus companies in the world. BMTA carries about 3.8 million passengers daily with operations on 135 routes (of which 17 have air-conditioned buses). About 20% - 46 - of public transit trips are provided by minibuses, both Legally registered and illegally. Relatively minor amounts of intra-urban public transit services are provided by taxis, the State Railway of Thailand and ferries across and along the Chac Phrya River. Outside Bangkok, in the regional cities, public transit services are provided by private operators, most typically by several operators in each city plying routes with minibuses and 3-wheeled vehicles called "samlors". 6.06 Since its inception in 1976, when it was formed from the consolida- tion of 24 private companies, BMTA has been severely under-capitalized, not been given a suitable fare structure for profitable operation, and has lacked suitable management control over its operations. In spite of a B 2.2 billion Government grant in 1983, BMTA is clyrying a debt of over B 1 billion (mid- 1983) and losing B 2 million daily.- The fare structure of 1.5 Baht for trips up to 10 km is too low to ensure cost recovery even if BMTA operations were substantially improved. Attempts to raise the basic fare from 1.5 to 2.0 Baht were made3 n 1982, but pressure from the public resulted in fares being kept at B 1.5. The fare was finally raised, on February 15, 1985, to a flat rate o B 2.0 for non-airconditioned service. The fare should be at least B 2.5 to allow BMTA to break even after allowing for depreciation and debt service. Air-conditioned service at a base fare of B 5.0 is also losing money. Furthermore, while the city has grown, public transit service has not kept pace: the number of BMTA buses in daily operation has not increased since 1978 (while overall motor vehicle registrations have doubled). 6.07 In addition to its financial problems, BMTA has other pressing problems including: (a) a shortage of suitably qualified and experienced personnel at the managerial level; (b) an inadequate management information system; (c) a rapidly aging BMTA-owned bus fleet and expensive leasing and maintenance contracts for the remainder of the fleet under BMTA management; and (d) inadequately structured bus routes (with considerable overlap). C. PROPOSED INVESTMENTS IN TRANSPORT INFRASTRUCTURE 6.08 In view of the severe urban transportation problems facing Bangkok, a number of investment proposals are being considered by public authorities. Among these are: 2/ Total grants and subsidies to BMTA amounted to one-third of all urban transport oriented public investments in Bangkok during the five-year 1980-84 period. 31 The fare was successfully raised from B 0.75 to B 1.50 in 1978. - 47 - (a) a 50 km elevated mass transit system; (b) a second phase toll road system (to be added to the existing 20 km, system); (c) elevating approximately 13 km of the existing national rail system to facilitate passenger and freight service as well as to minimize disruption to the arterial road system; (d) expansion and modernization of the BMTA bus fleet and maintenance facilities; (e) completion of the middle and outer ring road system; and (f) extensions to the primary and secondary arterial road system. The above investments, would amount to about US$2.0 billion in total, or about US$400 per resident of Bangkok, a very high level relative to the Government's fiscal resources. 6.09 The Government has addressed this problem of conflicting urban transportation investment priorities through a consultant-assisted investXelnt review under NESDB management, taking into account financial constraints.- This review will assist the Government in (a) establishing an urban transport investment strategy over the short term and (b) serve as the basis for setting up an interagency steering group for continuing the urban transportation investment and policy dialogue in the metropolitan area. D. URBAN TRANSPORT INSTITUTIONS 6.10 Urban transport problems in Bangkok are exacerbated by a highly fragmented institutional structure, duplication and conflict over functions, insufficient coordination among the concerned agencies, and, in some cases, lack of suitably trained staff. There are approximately 15 agencies concerned with providing urban transport infrastructure and services in Bangkok. The most important are: (1) the Bangkok Metropolitan Administration (BMA) Public Works Department (road construction and maintenance), (2) the Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (bus service), (3) the Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority (tollroad system), (4) the Office of the Committee for Management of Road Traffic (OCMRT) and the BMA Traffic Engineering Division (traffic management), and (5) the Metropolitan Police Command of the National Police (traffic enforcement). The National Highway Department and the National Public Works Department also construct a few major roads and bridges in Bangkok. 6.11 Lack of clarity and cooperation in interagency roles is particularly acute in (a) traffic management, (b) road system development planning, and (c) multi-modal transportation policy/planning/programming. Civilian 4/ Metropolitan Bangkok Short Term Urban Transport Review Project, Halcrow Fox and Associates. - 48 - authorities (OCMRT and BMA's Traffic Engineering Division) and the Police have not fully sorted out their respective roles in traffic management. As a result proposals advanced by one organization are often not accepted by the others. For example, computer controLled traffic signals installed by OCMRT are frequently overridden by traffic police through manual control at intersections. Recently, police proposals for an expansion of the existing one-way street system was resisted by OCMRT. Six agencies have responsibility for planning roads in Bangkok 7ut no single agency has overall (or even coordinative) responsibility.' Consequently, each agency conducts its own road planning on a more or less independent basis. There is no active body undertaking overall multi-modal transport policy/planning/programming. OCMRT has been created to perform this function, but has not yet been fully effective. 6.12 The rapidly growing urban transport problem needs to be met with an action program to develop needed Governmental staff resources. Particularly needed are traffic engineers, transport planners, a core of traffic police with traffic operations training, and bus company managers. E. AN URBAN TRANSPORT STRATEGY FOR BANGKOK 6.13 Past and current analyses of Bangkok's transport problems emphasize the following points: Ci) The greatest opportunities for short-run, low-cost improvement lie in a combination of traffic engineering and demand management measures; (ii) An expanded and comprehensively planned road-building program is needed, especialLy on the developing urban fringe and to fill in the gaps in the existing system; (iii) Improvement of bus system operations is needed for the efficient movement of larger numbers of people. This cannot be achieved without some increase in fares, an expansion and upgrading of the bus fleet, and better overall management. (iv) Given existing congestion levels and projected travel-demand increases, it is necessary to begin providing transport infrastruc- ture which partially or completely segregates public transport traffic from arterial street traffic. This segregated system must be carefully planned and designed to keep costs at reasonable Levels, and should be based on an options analysis of alternative technological solutions (bus, light-rail, and heavy-rail transit). 5/ The six are Department of Town and County Planning, City Planning Depart- ment (in BMA), Department of Highways, Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority, Department of Public Works, and Public Works Department (in BMA). - 49 - Each of these points is discussed briefly below. Traffic Engineering and Demand Management 6.14 While traffic engineering measures such as traffic signalization, median barriers, right turn and bus bays, intersection channelization, on- street parking removal, street signing and marking, and street lighting are incr.rasing vehicle throughput capacity and improving safety conditions on the existing urban road network, these measures will only marginally delay or reduce congestion levels. Traffic demand management measures aimed at increasing people (as opposed to vehicle) throughput on the urban road system would have considerably more impact and could substantially defer the need to make costly road and rail investments. This can be accomplished by encourag- ing public transit usage and discouraging the use of low-occupancy vehicles. Further removal of on-street parking, more aggressive enforcement of parking regulations, increased charges for parking spaces, and more extensive and better enforced bus lanes, are among the techniques which should be tried. Among all proposed demand management measures, charging low occupancy vehicles for entering or using road space in the center of Bangkok would probably have the most significagv impact, but would require substantial political support to be implemented.- Urban Road Nctwork 6.15 Even with considerable advances in the application of traffic engineering and public transit priority measures, Bangkok's annual growth of about 250,000 persons and 100,000 motor vehicles will require substantial investments directed at expanding and upgrading the existing urban road network. In some cases this will require costly rights-of-way acquisition in rapidly urbanizing or urbanized areas. Overall, roadway investments must be made at a higher rate than historical or current levels, both to catch up with past deficiencies in road development and to meet future growth in travel demand. Among the types of road investments needed are (a) substantial increases in the level of expenditures on new roads to serve raoidly developing suburban areas, (b) a substantial increase in existing road rehabilitation and maintenance programs, (c) secondary road development to compliment the existing primary road network, and (d) provision of a series of missing road links to fill gaps in the primary and secondary road systems. The bulk of these investments would logically be the responsibility of BMA, which should also assume a much stronger role in road system planning within the metropolitan area. 6.16 The land acquisition process for acquiring needed right-of-way for expanding the urban road network needs to be streamlined to reduce delays and overall costs associated with road construction. Improved measures must aLso be incorporated into the public regulation of the land development process. Key arteriaL road rights-of-way should be preserved through Government review 6/ This measure is part of the Bangkok Traffic Management Project, but no action has been taken to date. Only Singapore has successfully implemented such a scheme. A trial area road pricing scheme will undergo testing in Hong Kong during 1985. - 50 - of land developer requests, and developers should be required to provide subdivision roads to reasonable standards in support of and in proper relation to the existing and proposed arterial road system. Bus Service 6.17 A key ingredient to any urban transport strategy in Bangkok should be a more convenient and comfortable bus service. While it may be unrealistic to expect that public transit wiLl attract a higher percentage of riders than now, every effort should be made to avoid shifts from bus to less efficient and congestion-inducing private transport (mainly automobiles and motor- cycles). If BMTA remains a publicly owned and operated organization, che Government needs to assign high priority to (1) stabilizing BKTA's financial condition, (2) assisting BMTA in making needed capital investments in its bus fleet and fixed facilities (preferably by allowing fare increases), and (3) assisting BMTA in improving its staffing and managerial situation. However, given the failure to address the numerous problems facing BKTA up to now, there is also a need to re-address the potential role of private transit operators in providing public transit services. Several options should be considered including (a) more extensive franchising of BMTA routes to private operators, (b) private management of (a publicly-owned) BMTA, and (c) provi- sion of higher quality services (such as no-standing and/or air-conditioned services) exclusively by private operators subject to improved public regulation. Segregated Right-of-Way Facilities and Mass Transit System 6.18 Given the severity of existing congestion problems in Bangkok, combined with the substantial estimated population and travel-demand increases, it is necessary to begin providing transport facilities that are capable of moving larger numbers of people at higher speeds. This can only be accomplished by the provision of facilities which partially or completely segregate public transit traffic from existing arterial street traffic. At present a combination of toll roads, expressways, mass rail transit, and elevated SRT rail lines are proposed solutions which, if all were implemented, would severely strain available Government resources. Furthermore, these proposals have not been proposed as an integrated system, nor are they adequately planned with regard to the existing road system and bus network. Prior to proceeding with any of these costly investments, a segregated transport right-of-way and mass transit facilities plan should be developed and approved by Government. As part of developing the plan, mass transit options such as (i) buses on expressways and segregated busways, (ii) light rail transit, (iii) heavy rail transit, and (iv) combinations thereof, should be specifically addressed as recommended in the study mentioned in para. 6.09. This potentially costly investment program should be subjected ti vigorous economic analysis and should be combined with a travel-demand restraint program aimed at constraining the use of low-occupancy vehicles in congested areas (as indicated in para. 6.14) for maximum effectiveness. - 51 - Table 1.1 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Department of Highways Roads by Regions in 1984 (kcm) National highways Provincial roads National and provincial roads Unim- Unim- Paved Gravel Total Paved Gravel proved Total Paved Gravel proved Total North 3,303 17 3,320 4,353 750 4,466 9,569 7,656 767 4.466 12,889 Northeast 4,597 39 4,636 3,885 1,831 2,257 7,973 8,482 1,870 2,257 12,609 Central 4,253 22 4,275 3,605 1,498 1,935 7,038 7,858 1,520 1,935 11,313 Seuth 2,920 8 2,928 2,822 798 1,683 5,303 5,742 806 1,683 8,231 Total 15,073 86 15,159 14,665 4,877 10,341 29,883 29,738 4,963 10,341 45,032 Source: Department of Highways. -ay 1985 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Roads Maintained by the Department of Highways, 1963-84 (km) Provincial roads National highways Nptional highwava Improved roads Unimproved and provincial roads Paved Gravel Total a Paved Gravel Totala roads /b Total Paved Gravel Unimproved Total 1963 4,157 4,917 9,074 203 1,998 2,200 5,800/c 8,000 4,360 6,915 5,800/c 17,074 1964 4,702 4,702 9,404 257 1,957 2,214 n.a. n.a. 4,959 6,659 n.a. n.a. 1965 5,046 4,436 9,482 405 2,389 2,794 n.a. n.a. 5,451 6,825 n.s. n.a. 1966 5,008 4,490 9,498 427 2,569 2,996 n.a. n.a. 5,435 7,059 n.a. n.a. 1967 5,507 4,011 9,518 581 3,311 3,892 n.a. n.a. 6,088 7,322 n.a. n.a. 1968 6,613 3,131 9,744 1,131 4,078 5,209 n.a. n.a. 7,744 7,209 n.a. n.a. 1969 7,822 2,146 9,968 1,281 4,448 5,729 n.a. n.s. 9,103 6,594 n.a. n.a, 1970 8,620 1,781 10,401 1,479 4,413 5,892 n.a. n.a. 10,099 6,194 n.e. n.a. 1971 9,681 1,296 10,977 1,781 4,347 6,128 n.a. n.ea. 11,462 5,643 n.a. n.a. 1972 10,493 1,014 11,507 2,288 3,891 6,179 n.a. n.ea 12,781 4,90 n.a. n.ea. 1973 11,065 1,008 12,073 9,560 4,039 6,599 n.ea. n.ea. 13,625 5,047 n.a. n.a. 1974 11,750 747 12,497 3,025 3,986 7,011 n.a. n.a. 14,775 4,733 n.e. n.a. 1975 11,840 818 12,658 3,396 4,043 7,439 15,447 22,886 15,236 4,861 15,447 35,544 1976 11,968 752 12,720 4,276 4,601 8,877 14,857 23,734 16,244 5,353 14,857 36,454 1977 12,218 722 12,940 4,920 5,022 9,942 14,200 24,142 17,138 5,744 14,200 37,082 1978 12,762 548 13,310 6,210 5,546 11,756 15,220 26,976 18,972 6,094 15,220 40,286 1979 13,613 207 13,820 8,129 5,549 13,678 14,880 28,558 21,742 5,756 14,880 42,378 1980 13,734 160 14,874 8,669 5,587 14,256 14,709 28,965 22,403 5,747 15,689 43,839 1981 14,054 121 14,175 10,661 5,180 15,841 12,819 28,660 24,715 5,301 12,819 42,835 1982 14,249 100 14,349 11,517 5,136 16,653 11,708 28,361 25,766 5,236 11,708 42,710 1983 14,980 92 15,072 13,036 5,040 18,076 10,875 28,951 28,016 5,132 10,875 44,023 1984 15,073 86 15,159 14,665 4,877 19,542 10,341 29,883 29,738 4,963 10,341 45,042 . .~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~- /a Roads which receive the normal allocation of maintenance funds. 0 7T Roads which receive only "minimum maintenance" (that is, only about 25Z of the normal allocation of m maintenance funds and are often not passable in rainy weather) or are under construction or improvement. /c Lengths not available (n.a.) before 1975; length of unimproved (provincial) roads in 1963 believed to have been about 5,800 km. Source: Department of Highways. May 1985 - 53- Table 1.3 TRAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Motor Vehicle Registration /a Other Year Cars Buses Trucks vehicles Subtotal Motorcycles Total Number of lUnits ('000) 1970 222 19 136 23 400 338 738 1971 235 18 147 19 419 364 783 1972 240 20 159 38 457 376 833 1973 251 22 179 27 479 408 887 1974 301 23 232 31 587 459 1,046 1975 290 23 238 31 582 479 1,061 1976 298 20 285 30 633 512 1,145 1977 331 27 345 38 741 648 1,389 1978 362 28 368 33 791 727 1,518 1979 389 30 399 47 865 756 1,621 1980 412 30 468 47 957 907 1,864 1981 45i 64 472 50 1,037 1,141 2,178 Annual Growth Rates (Z) 1972-76 4.9 2.1 14.2 19.0 8.6 7.1 7.9 1977-81 8.6 26.2 10.6 10.8 10.4 17.4 13.7 /a Classification by Police Department (License Division). Source: Police Department. May 1985 - 54 - Table 1.4 THAILAMD TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Registered Motor Vehicles by Area of Registration (1978) (Z) Total Distribution Vehicle type share Bangkok Non-Bangkok Cars and taxis, 4 wheels 19.9 78.2 21.8 Buses Light buses, 4 wheels 6.0 75.7 24.3 Heavy buses, 6 wheels 2.9 47.2 52.8 Subtotal buses 8.9 70.5 29.5 Trucks Light trucks, 4 wheels 48.5 27.0 73.0 Heavy trucks, 6 wheels 12.0 38.7 61.3 Heavy trucks, 10 wheels 7.6 12.5 87.5 Subtotal trucks 68.1 28.1 71.9 Truck tractors } { 38.5 61.5 Farm and construction tractors 1 3.1 { 69.1 30.9 Taxis, 3 wheels } { 71.0 29.0 Subtotal all vehicles, 3 wheels or more 100.0 54.0 46.0 Motorcycles 22.5 77.5 Overall Total 38.9 61.1 Source: Transport Planning Unit (Ministry of Communications) and consultants BCEOM. May 1983 -55 - Table 1.5 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Vehicle-Kilometers on National, Provincial and Rural Roads /a National and provincial roads Rural roads Total Mln v-km X % Mln v-kml % Mn v-km Z Cars and taxis Regular 4,304.5 20.0 23.7 Light commercial ,320.0 6.2 7.3 Buses Light buses 3,281.1 15.3 18.1 Heavy buses 1,481.3 6.9 8.1 Subtotal 10,386.9 48.4 57.2 Trucks Light trucks 2,453.1 11.4 13.5 Heavy trucks 6-wheel 2,453.1 11.4 13.5 > 10-wheel 1,698.3 7.9 9.3 Subtotal 7,794.7 36.3 42.8 Total 18,181.6 84.7 100.0 1,467.0 62.5 197648.6 82.0 (Z) (92.5) (6.5) (100.0) Motorcycles and tricycles 3,296.5 15.3 879.9 37.5 4,176.4 18.0 (%) (78.9) (21.1) (100.0) GRAND TOTAL 21,478.1 100.0 2,346.9 100.0 23,825.0 100.0 (Z) (90.1) (9.9) (100.0) /a Estimate for 1978, excluding city roads. Source: Transport Planning Unit (Ministry of Communications) and consultants BCEOM.- May 1983 Table 1.6 -56 - THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Department of Highways' Five-Year Investment Plan, 1982-86 /a Ongoing New projects projects (1984-86) Total Length Costs Length Costs Length Costs (ka) (B mln) (km) (B mln) (km) (B mln) National Highways Reconstruction/strengthening of paved road 1,188 2,768 1,105 1,728 2,293 4,496 Improvement of congested road 98 1,724 80 628 178 2,352 New construction 234 1,786 52 399 286 2,185 Upgrading to bitumen standard 57 68 - - 57 68 Subtotal 1,577 6,346 1,237 2,755 2,814 9,101 Provincial Roads Upgrading to gravel road standard 64 117 128 108 192 225 Upgrading to bitumen standard 3,902 6,685 2,819 5,359 6,721 12,044 Reconstruction/strengthening of paved road 347 482 263 368 610 850 Improvement of congested road 2 28 8 48 10 76 New construction 29 183 35 332 64 515 Subtotal 4,344 7,495 3,253 6,215 7,597 13,710 Total 5,921 13,841 4,490 8,970 10,411 22,811 la 1985 revision Source: Department of Highways. June 1985 - 57 - Table 1.7 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Rural Road Density by Region) (km of roads per 1,000 sq km) SES 1975/76 Region /a Paved G,ravel Earth Total North-Upper 2.58 45.23 28.90 76.70 North-Lower 1.53 119.07 36.39 156.98 Northeast-Upper 0.63 173.42 32.65 206.67 Northeast-Lower 1.10 122.61 90.63 214.36 Center-West 4.83 103.71 13.68 122.25 Center-Middle 13.91 234.89 53.60 302.31 Center-Fast 1.90 207.12 21.65 230.64 South-Upper 0.78 103.62 52.34 156.70 South-Lower 0.00 137.68 0.22 137.90 (km of roads per 1,000,000 rai of area under holding) North-Upper 47.98 840.66 537.17 1,425.61 North-Lower 8.13 633.78 193.68 835.52 Northeast-Upper 2.90 796.92 150.05 949.71 Northeast-Lower 4.24 471.33 348.42 824.04 Center-West 36.94 793.74 104.73 935.59 Center-Middle 37.06 625.58 142.75 805.12 Center-East 9.40 1,026.94 107.35 1,143.56 South-Upper 4.86 647.36 326.99 978.98 South-Lower 0.00 956.16 1.53 956.68 (km of roads per 1,000 population) North-Upper 51.79 907.40 579.82 1,538.79 North-Lower 24.05 1,874.49 572.82 2,471.16 Northeast-Upper 7.12 1,957.26 368.53 2,332.53 Northeast-Lower 11.42 1,267.66 937.08 2,216.29 Center-West 80.16 1,722.18 227.24 2,029.96 Center-Middle 78.76 1,329.54 303.38 1,771.12 Center-East 24.42 2,667.37 278.84 2,970.28 South-Upper 9.99 1,330.46 672.04 2,012.03 South-Lower 0.00 1,433.16 2.29 1,435.45 /a Socio-Economic Survey, 1975176 classification by the National Statistical Office. Source: Study of Rural Roads: Road Inventory Analysis, Department of Highways, Ministry of Communications, May 1981. - 58 - Table 2.1 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic ('000 tons) Fiscal Petroleum Crude Rice and Con- year products oil Cement maize tainers Others Total Actuals 1975 1,188 - 852 609 - 2,170 4,819 1976 1,203 - 1,026 660 - X,267 5,156 1977 1,324 - 1,456 761 - 2,061 6,142 1978 1,430 - 1,622 468 - 2,641 6,161 1979 1,483 - 1,829 530 - 2,605 6,447 1980 1,376 - 1,614 776 - 2,535 6,301 1981 1,434 - 1,598 716 51 2,322 6,121 1982 1,539 - 1,551 755 36 1,786 5,667 1983 1,450 213 1,462 573 63 1,537 5,298 1984 1,402 695 1,480 676 66 1,299 5,618 Forecast 1985 1,392 1,113 1,409 654 60 1,362 5,990 1986 1,418 1,113 1,565 654 60 1,372 6,182 1987 1,440 1,113 1,616 669 230 1,425 6,493 1988 1,484 1,113 1,630 697 230 1,462 6,616 Source: SRT. May 1985 59 - Table 2.2 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SRT Actual and Projected Freight Traffic (Million ton-km) Fiscal Petroleum Crude Rice and Con- year products oil Cement maize tainers Others Total Actuals 1975 620 - 207 458 - 1O68 2,353 1976 594 - 209 533 - 1,169 2,505 1977 647 - 326 586 - 1,353 2,912 1978 708 - 333 400 - 1,349 2,790 1979 739 - 371 436 - 1,352 2,898 1980 682 - 326 677 - 1,257 2,942 1981 691 - 326 559 37 1,119 2,732 1982 718 - 290 639 24 849 2,520 1983 716 82 279 537 43 843 2,500 1984 718 268 268 628 41 778 2,701 Forecast 1985 717 430 282 606 35 820 2,890 1986 735 430 335 610 35 845 2,990 1987 753 430 335 633 71 881 3,123 1988 772 430 359 660 71 916 3,208 Source: SRT. May 1985 - 60 - Table 2.3 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic ('000 passengers) Express & rapid trains Ordinary trains Bangkok Total- Fiscal Classes Class Sub- Class Class Sub- commuter all year I 6 II III total II III total trains /b trains Actuals /a 1975 - - - - - - - 61,600 1976 - - 55,800 1977 - - - - - - - 58,000 1978 -- - 59,000 1979 - - - - - - - 64,400 1980 1,372 8,131 9,503 311 64,472 64,783/c - 74,286 1981 1,418 9,129 10,547 302 56,975 57,277 11,00 78,824 1982 1,549 8,010 9,559 184 58,288 58,472 12,275 80,306 1983 1,629 8,381 10,010 150 59,054 59,204 12,190 81,404 1984/d 1,680 10,830 12,510 325 57,500 57,825 15,515 85,850 Forecast 1985 1,770 11,410 13,180 335 57,700 58,035 17,535 88,750 1986 1,870 12,020 13,890 345 58,000 58,345 19,565 91,800 1987 1,980 12,730 14,710 355 58,300 58,655 21,535 94,900 1988 2,090 13,450 15,540 365 58,600 58,965 23,695 98,200 /a Details not available for 1975-79. 7i Excludes an estimated 6 million commuters carried by ordinary trains from 1981 on. {c Includes all Bangkok commuter traffic. 7T Estimate. Source: SRT. May 1985 -61 - Table 2.4 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SRT Actual and Projected Passenger Traffic (Million pass-km) Express & rapid trains Ordinary trains Bangkok Total- Fiscal Classes Class Sub- Class Class Sub- commuter all year I & II III totaL II [II total trains /b trains Actuals /a 1975 - 5,640 1976 - - - - - - - 5,352 1977 - - - - - - - 5,649 1978 - - - - - - - 6,039 1979 - - - - - - - 7,029 1980 980 4,198 5,178 107 3,576 3,683/c - 8,861 1981 1,015 4,548 5,563 101 3,332 3,433 487 9,483 1982 1,011 4,221 5,232 47 3,529 3,576 423 9,231 1983 1,022 4,677 5,699 87 3,499 3,586 414 9,699 1984/d 1,140 4,860 6,000 120 3,580 3,700 600 10,300 Forecast 1985 1,230 5,170 6,400 130 3,620 3,750 650 10,800 1986 1,300 5,400 6,700 135 3,765 3,900 700 11,300 1987 1,360 5,660 7,020 140 3,880 4,020 760 11,800 1988 1,440 5,980 7,420 150 4,010 4,160 820 12,400 /a Details not available for 1975-79. 7i Excludes an estimated 250 million pass-km of commuter traffic carried by ordinary trains from 1981 on. tc Includes all Bangkok commuter traffic. 7d Estimate. Source: SRT. May 1985 - 62 - Table 2.5 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW SRT Traffic Unit Costs and Revenues - FY82 /a LRVC Revenue Baht per pass-km Passengers Express 0.24456 0.33161 Rapid .015931 0.20540 Ordinary - Diesel rail cars 0.19216 0.16089 - Others 0.18878 0.15135 Commuter - Diesel rail cars 0.21435 0.15399 - Others 0.18123 0.15677 Mixed trains 0.43326 0.16733 Overall average 0.19096 0.20182 Baht per ton-kmi Freight Cement - bulk /b 0.44451 0.42829 - bagged /E 0.45919 0.45296 Petroleum /b 0.38866 0.40467 Gypsum /b 0.38158 0.40205 Less-than-carload traffic. 2.76777 1.87823 Overall average - all freight /c 0.44519 0.41202 /a SRT system-wide average long-run variable costs (LRVC) and revenues. Depreciation based on historic values of assets. /b Bulk transport in unit trains. 7-T Carload traffic only. Source: SRT. May 1985 - 63 - Table 2.6 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Government Compensation for SRT Losses SRT losses eligible Recieipt of compen- for compensation sation from government Accumulated Main Branch Main Branch arrears of Period lines lines Total lines lines Total compensation - ---------t-(B million) FY74 104.7 N/A 104.7 - - - 104.7 FY75 286.6 " 286.6 - - - 391.3 FY76 170.3 " 170.3 105.0 - 105.0 456.6 Total FY74-76 561.6 561.6 105.0 - 105.0 456.6 FY77 - 71.8 71.8 272.1 - 272.1 256.3 FY78 85.4 54.5 139.9 105.1 - 105.1 291.1 FY79 17.8 79.4 97.2 29.4 - 29.4 358.9 FY80 142.2 116.5 258.7 50.2 50.0 100.2 517.4 Total FY74-80 807.0 322.2 1p129.2 561.8 50.0 611.8 517.4 FY81 204.6 140.4 345.0 85.4 54.5 139.9 722.5 FY82 47.2 174.6 221.8 17.8 79.4 97.2 847.1 FY83 203.9 173.5 382.4 142.2 116.5 258.7 970.8 FY84 145.1 186.2 331.3 - - - 1,302.1 Source: SRT. May 1985 -64 - Table 2.7 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Summary of SRT FY82-86 Investment Plan Foreign Local Foreign Total as Z of - (Baht million ------ total Commercial Investments Motive power & rolling stock 579.6 3,481.5 4.061.1 86 Capacity increasing track investments 178.2 40.3 218.5 18 Track modernization and rehabilitation 325.4 656.9 982.3 67 Signaling & telecommuni- cations 256.7 765.9 1,022.6 75 Workshop improvements 64.4 96.6 161.0 60 Miscellaneous 34.3 8.0 42.3 19 Base Cost (mid-FY83 prices) 1,438.6 5,049.2 6.487.8 78 Physical contingencies 94.8 180.3 275.1 65 Price contingencies 239.5 938.4 1,177.9 80 Total 1,772.9 6,167.9 7,940.8 77 Noncommercial Investments Diesel rail car sets 104.9 699.2 804.1 87 Base Cost (mid-FY83 prices) 104.9 699.2 804.1 87 Prince contingencies 11.4 87.9 99.3 88 Total 116.3 787.1 903.4 88 GRAND TOTAL 1,889.2 6,955.0 8,844.2 79 May 1983 Source: SRT. - 65 - Table 2.8 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECIOR REVIEW SRT - Incone Statement (Commercial and Noncommercial Operations Cosbined) MLL3im BEdt) Actual Projected by SRT FY78 FY79 FY80 FY81 FY82 FY83 Fn84 F85 FY86 1Y87 Operating Revenues Passenger 904.8 1,041.2 1,286.6 1,545.5 1,826.1 1,964.4 2,054.5 2,129.0 2,468.6 2,857.6 Freight 588.9 691.7 813.1 881.2 1,048.4 968.9 1,016.8 1,115.5 1,307.2 1,417.4 Other 122.3 133.8 135.9 161.3 196.9 221.0 253.6 176.5 182.5 195.2 Total Operating Revenues 1,616.0 1,866.7 2,235.6 2.587.9 3,071.1 3.154.3 3,324.9 3,421.0 3,958.3 4,470.2 Operating Expenses Salaries and wages 772.1 1,015.8 1,235.0 1,391.2 1,608.6 1,787.6 1,851.0 2.045.2 2,231.3 2,397.8 Fuel 238.5 289.6 607.3 680.2 714.7 709.1 707.3 690.2 826.9 888.9. Materials and other 325.6 428.4 513.4 726.7 835.1 793.2 789.3 727.0 802.0 868.8 Total Workin Expenses 1,336.2 1,733.8 2,355.7 2,798.1 3,158.4 3,289.9 3,347.C 3,462.4 3,860.2 4,155.5 Depreciationla 169.4 171.1 171.3 202.2 213.4 213.7 267.0 436.2 505.9 551.5 Total Operating Expenses 1,505.6 1,904.9 2,527.0 3,003.3 3,371.8 3,503.6 3,614.6 3,898.6 4,366.1 4,707.0 Net Operating Srpluses (loss) 110.4 (38.2) (291.4) (412.4) (300.7) (349.3) (289.7) (477.6) (407.8) (236.8) Net other revenue 22.9 35.9 86.2 8.5 16.1 20.8 24.4 12.0 12.8 13.7 Interest 75.8 71.1 75.3 76.8 97.4 111.0 202.8 412.4 514.0 562.8 Net Income 57.5 (73.4) (280.5) (480.7) (382.0) (439.5) (468.1) (878.0) (909.0) (785.9) Cash Income (Loss) /b - 226.9 97.7 (109.2) (278.5) (168.6) (225.8) (201.1) (441.8) (403.1) (234.4) Operating ratio (Z) 93 102 113 116 110 111 109 114 IO 105 / Based on historical asset basis. /b Net Income vith depreciation added back. Source: SRT. May 1985 - 66 - Table 3.1 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVI W Import and Export Trade (non-POL) Through Bangkok Port System - By Facilities, 1975-84 ('000 tons) Facilities/traffic 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Klong Toel Imports Containers 2,267 2,981 { 354 581 776 839 1,126 1,107 1,496 1,537 Breakbulk ' { 3.114 2,814 2,953 2,747 2.608 2,271 2,867 2,614 Subtotal 2,267 2,981 3,468 3,395 3,729 3,586 3.734 3,378 4.363 4,151 Exports Containers 89 249 { 223 468 676 895 1,059 1,156 1,330 1,825 Breakbulk ( 146 113 66 21 108 226 235 150 Bulk 57 123 106 142 115 100 64 56 15 - Subtotal 146 372 475 723 857 1,017 1,231 1,438 1,580 1,975 Total 2,413 3,350 3.943 4,117 4,586 4.603 4,965 4,816 5,943 6,126 Sattahip - lnports Containers - - - - - - - - - - Breakbulk - - - - - 331/a 70 45 107 77 Subtotal - _ - _ - 331 70 45 107 77 Exports Containers - - - - Breakbulk - - - - - 171/a 235 263 232 172 Bulk - - - - - - - - - - Subtotal _ _ - _ - - 171 235 263 232 172 Total - - - - - 502 305 308 339 249 Other Facilities Imports TMN wharves 140 150 233 292 275 149 261 140 173 104 Dolphins & anchorage 355 281 442 838 } 2,821 2,097 1,903 2,106 2,744 2,526 Private wharves 326 548 893 964 } Subtotal 821 979 1,568 2,094 3,096 2,246 2,164 2,246 2,917 2,630 Exports /b 8,586 10,647 12,050 12,305 11,584 11,610 13,722 17,797 13,457 17,259 Total 9,407 11,626 13,618 14,399 14,680 13,856 15,886 20,043 16,375 19,889 All Facillties Imports 3,088 3,960 5,036 5,480 6,825 6,163 5,968 5,669 7,387 6,858 Exports 8,732 11,019 12,525 13,028 12,441 12,798 15,188 19,498 15,269 19,406 Total 11,820 14,979 17,561 18,508 19,266 18,961 21,156 25,167 22,656 26,264 /a Pipes and pipe coating material for natural gas development project. 7T Includes exports of tapioca through deep-water anchorage at Ko Sichang and jetty at Mah Boon Krong. Source: PAT. June 1985 - 67 - Table 3.2 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Couparative Statement of Container and Break Bulk Cargoes Through Klong Toei Wharf During the Years 1978-90 (January-December) (Million metric tons) Actual Forecast 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Container Inward 0.58 0.78 0.84 1.12 1.11 1.49 1.54 1.72 1.89 2.08 2.29 2.52 2.77 Outward 0.47 0.68 0.90 1.06 1.16 1.33 1.82 2.04 2.24 2.46 2.71 2.98 3.28 Subtotal 1.05 1.46 1.74 2.18 2.27 2.82 3.36 3.76 4.13 4.54 5.00 5.50 6.05 Break Bulk - Inward 2.81 2.95 2.75 2.61 2.27 2.87 2.61 2.53 2.45 2.38 2.31 2.24 2.17 Outward 0.26 0.18 0.12 0.17 0.28 0.25 0.15 - Subtotal 3.07 3.13 2.87 2.78 2.55 3.12 2.76 2.53 2.45 2.38 2.31 2.24 2.17 Total 4.12 4.59 4.61 4.96 4.82 5.94 6.12 6.29 6.58 6.92 7.31 7.43 8.22 Source: PAT. June 1985 - 68 - Table 3.3 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Container Traffic at Bangkok (Klong Toei) (in thousands) Actual Forcast Port/traffic 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 Inbound Total number of con- tainers 27/a 47/a 61 71 91 102 117 132 146 158 Total number of TEO 38 63 83 96 120 132 152 171 190 205 Tonnage 354 581 776 839 1,126 1,107 1,496 1,537 1,720 1,890 Outbound Total number of con- tainers 24/a 42/a 59 69 92 98 117 131 146 160 Total number of TEU 35 57 81 93 122 128 152 170 190 208 Tonnage 223 468 676 895 1,059 1,156 1,330 1,825 2,040 2,240 Total TED 73 120 164 189 242 260 304 341 380 413 Total tonnage 577 1,049 1,452 1,734 2,185 2?263 2,826 3,362 3,760 4,130 Tons/TEU (Units) 7.9 8.75 8.85 9.17 9.02 8.70 9.30 9.86 9.89 10.00 /a Outbound traffic is underestimated due to statistical method. Sources: PAT. June 1985 - 69 - Table 3.4 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW PAT Consolidated Income Accounts: 1976-85 (Million Baht) Actual Forecast 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Operatlng Revenue Ship handling 61 69 78 70 76 77 79 114 139 134 Cargo handling 281 366 430 547 596 632 574 822 903 900 Storage 145 125 142 210 230 254 251 283 326 316 Other 10 19 14 15 23 27 40 52 74 52 Total Operating Revenue 497 579 664 842 925 990 944 1.271 1,442 1,402 Operating Expenses Salaries and wages 282 300 341 465 520 584 687 739 779 841 Repairs and maintenance 25 27 31 36 38 43 57 57 58 60 Fuels 24 29 27 29 45 66 67 71 65 60 MNlcellaneous 18 15 21 27 58 64 49 62 72 70 Total Working Expenses 349 371 420 557 661 757 880 929 974 1,031 Depreciation 39 40 42 42 62 73 85 96 104 109 Total Operating Expenses 388 411 462 599 723 830 965 1.025 1,078 1,140 Operating surplus (deficit) 109 168 202 243 202 160 (21) 246 364 262 Interest charged 15 15 16 16 15 15 16 14 12 37 Interest earned 21 24 33 40 62 59 51 40 81 75 Net revenue surplus (deficit) 115 177 219 267 249 204 (14) 272 433 300 Payments to Governient and employee bonus 48 56 85 128 118 137 8 186 333 205 Revenue surplus to balance sheet 67 121 134 139 131 67 6 86 100 95 Ratios Operating 78 71 70 71 78 84 102 (1) 83 84 Times interest earned 7.3x 11.2x 12.6x 15.2x 13.4x 10.7x -1.3x 17.6x 30.3z 7.1x Source: PAT. June 1985 70 _ Table 3.5 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW PAT Consolidated Balance Sheets: 1976-85 (Million Baht) Actual Forecast 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 Assets Current Assets Cash & short-term deposits 307 386 520 623 654 457 364 558 742 639 Other 79 74 102 108 135 142 124 160 233 209 Total Current Assets 386 460 622 731 789 599 488 718 975 848 Fixed Assets Gross nondepreciable 54 54 54 54 54 54 59 59 59 59 Cross depreciable 969 971 1,002 1,777 2,164 2,440 2,509 2,754 2,848 2,942 Subtotal 1,023 1,025 1,056 1,831 2,218 2,494 2,568 2.813 2,907 3,061 less accumulated depreciation 417 448 489 525 585 704 735 822 922 1,023 Net fixed assets in operation 606 577 567 1,306 1,633 1,790 1,833 1,991 1,985 1,978 Wbrk in progress /a 708 795 807 117 81 75 154 50 19 86 Total Fixed Assets 1,14 1.372 1,374 1,423 1,714 1,865 1,987 2,041 2,004 2,064 Other Assets 16 22 35 62 125 166 195 205 199 278 Total Assets 1,716 1,854 2,031 2,216 2,628 2,630 2,670 2,964 3,178 3,191 Liabilities & Equity Current liabilities 115 113 130 150 141 150 219 230 226 211 Long-term debt 183 206 212 205 184 176 152 132 105 137 Equity Accounts Capital 322 318 338 348 664 784 902 942 940 941 Retained income 1,096 1,217 1,351 1.513 1,634 1,520 1,397 1,660 1,907 1,902 Total Equity 1,418 1,535 1,689 1,861 2,298 2,304 2,299 2,602 2,847 2,843 Total Liabilities & Equity 1,716 1,854 2,031 2,216 2,628 2,630 2,670 2,964 3,178 3,191 Ratios Current 3.4x 4.1x 4.8x 4.9x 5.5x 3.9x 2.2x 3.1x 4.3x 4.0x Debt/equity 11/89 12/88 11/89 10/90 8/92 7/93 6/94 5/95 4/96 6/94 /a Excess assets held in work-In-progress account until resolution of accounting dispute in 1978. Source: PAT. June 1985 -71- Table 4.1 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Inland Waterways Fleet During 1980-82 1980 1981 1982 Type of vessel/ No. of Total /b No. of Total No. of Total capacity range /a units capacity units capacity units capacity Wooden Barge 40.1- 60.0 dwt 1,814 90,795 1,871 93,343 1,871 93,343 60.1- 80.0 1,188 82,668 1,202 83,602 1,205 83,806 80.1-100.0 287 23,779 289 23,954 291 24,133 100.1-200.0 103 14,913 105 15,165 105 15,165 200.1-400.0 104 22,889 104 22,889 104 22,889 Over 400.0 53 24,409 53 24,409 53 24,409 Subtotal 3,549 259,453 3,624 263,362 3,629 263,745 Steel Barge 100.1-150.0 dwt 89 11,839 96 12,700 100 13,258 150.1-200.0 223 39,473 223 39,473 223 39,473 200.1-300.0 448 100,869 455 102,444 460 103,579 Over 300.0 59 23,541 87 32,865 87 32,865 Subtotal 819 175,722 861 187,482 870 189,175 Total 4,368 435,175 4,485 450,844 4,499 452,920 Tow Boat 50-100 hp 645 53,700 651 54,240 652 54,330 101-200 352 48,240 352 48,240 352 48,240 Over 200 75 21,750 75 21,750 78 22,620 Total 1,072 123,690 1,078 124,230 1,082 125,190 /a Excludes about 3,000-3,500 units with a capacity of below 40 dwt each. /b Capacity measured in dwt for barges and hp for tow boats. Source: Harbour Department. June 1983 -72 - Table 4.2 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Harbour Department Budget Appropriations and Actual Budget Expenditures, 1978-84 (Million baht} 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Budget Appropriations Operating budget 117.57 138.47 124.75 184.33 156.28 205.43 190.23 Capital budget 16.81 37.10 41.12 55.66 173.56 246.07 415.28 Total 134.38 175.57 165.87 239.99 329.94 451.50 605.51 Actual Budget Expenditures Operating budget 99.66 121.00 104.42 144.69 114.15 161.90 82.20 Capital budget 14.19 35.94 39.83 29.39 144.85 180.84 153.60 Total 113.85 156.94 144.25 174.08 259.00 342.74 235.80 Sources: Harbour Department. June 1985 - 73 - Table 4.3 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW larhour Department Revenue Collection, FY79-84 (B000) Revenue items 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 Miscellaneous sales 333 307 330 918 761 2,464 Charges for waterways transportation ser- vices /a 43,495 41,813 41,293 45,805 46,118 48,827 .-iscellaneous service charges 608 835 826 1,523 1,365 1,557 Compensation 724 1,073 1,124 3,913 1,640 4,167 Other revenues 3 18 94 - 76 21 Total 45,165 44 048 43.671 52,159 49,960 57.036 /a Charges for waterways transportation services included: registered, transferred and mortgaged vessels, vessels licensed, vessels and engines surveyed, ship operator examination, pilot services and dredgers licensed. Source: Harbour Department. June 1985 _74 Table 6.1 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Composition and Growth of Motor Vehicle Fleet Registere.3 in Bangkok Percent of motor vehicle fleet Vehicle registered Annual in 1983 General Vehicle (000's) percent Including Not incl. category type 1978 1983 increase motorcycles motorcycles Private Private car 250 415 11% } 15% 44 75 transport Motorcycle 149 391 21% } 42 - Commercial Truck /a 58 115 6% 6% 12 21 Public Taxi 14 14 0% 0% 1 3 transport 3 wheelers 7 7 0% 1 1 Total 505 942 13% 100 - Total W/O Motorcycles 356 551 9% - 100 la Includes vehicles being used as public buses. August 1984 Table 6.2 - 75 - THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Estimated Person-Trips by Mode in Primary Travel Direction on Arterial Streets in Central Bangkok Public or Specific Percentage Estimated private vehicle of Estimated percentage of transportation type vehicles occupancy person trips Private transportation Private car 57.5 1.9 26.1 Motorcycle 23.0 1.3 ' 7.2 Subtotal 80.5 33.3 Public transportation Bus 3.5 60.0/b 50.2 Minibus 2.5 20.0 12.0 Taxi 9.0 1.5 3.3 Samlor 4.5 1.2 1.2 Subtotal 19.5 66.7 Total 100.0 100.0 /a Based on observations at 13 locations generally between 07:30-09:00 and 17:00-17:45, November 1977. All observations made in primary travel direction. /b Seating capacity of bus is 40 passengers; actual average occupancy may have been substantially higher. August 1984 Table 6.3 - 76 - THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Bangkok: Urban Transport Investments, 1980-84 (in millions 1984 Baht) Mode of transport Type of Expenditure Nontoll Toll Public Total roads roads Physical transit expendi- Z by (arte- (express- Agency works subsidies tures agency rials) ways) Bus Rail BETA 0 5,393 5,393 (33.3) - - 5,393 EMA 3,103 0 3,103 (19.2) 3,103 - - - DOH 2,867 0 2,867 (17.7) 2,867 - - - ETA 2,790 0 270 (17.2) - 2,790 - - DPW 1,536 0 1,536 (9.5) 1,536 - - - SRT 157 256 413 (2.6) - - - 413 -,CMRT 84 0 84 (0.5) 84 - - - Total 10.537 5,649 16,186 (100.0) 7,590 2,790 S393 413 Z (65.1) (34.9) (100.0) - (46.9) (17.2) (33.3) (2.6) Source: Metropolitan Bangkok Short Term Urban Transport Review Project, Halcrow Fox and Associates. June 1985 - 77 - Table 6.4 THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Agencies Involved in Urban Transport within Bangkok 1. The Committee for the Management of Road Traffic (CMRT) 2. Office of the Committee for the Management of Road Traffic (OCMRT) 3. National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) 4. Ministry of Interior - Office of Policy and Planning 5. Ministry of Interior - Town and Country Planning 6. Ministry of Interior - Public Works Department 7. Ministry of Interior - Metropolitan Policy Division of the National Police 8. Ministry of Communications - Highway Department 9. Ministry of Communications - Land Transport Office 10. Expressway and Rapid Transit Authority (ERTAT) 11. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - City Planning Division 12. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - Bureau of Public Works 13. Bangkok Metropolitan Administration - Traffic Engineering Division 14. Bangkok Mass Transit Authority (BMTA) 15. State Railway of Thailand 16. Ministry of Finance - Office of Budget Bureau TIATASD o TIANNtA St1O? cr TfI AT I RIoWvAT EM,,x N,,4elC f.c,,IMhE 4..qarvwwt.-c.1 LOC.,CPA fl.I .,A.'P L&AIO.AMO,EI UAY1:A T.A-%l. T.AFltQOEF ~LDa'CVflmoL S. v,14rA1sw o.l,s.o O,vM(lI ..f O-o, M Ajp: o.,VjmV -rvf, CNI"Of WW0 M-0 Ctg CA,flhflrV. SitiW PtCCtNC UR,ICI PWtIMIA? CMOI%A Ap4h rtUTfI wooll OIUL SIAVICI* LA' IVA&UAINM lOWAL YZf-lWYV SNCACY AWIPSIMV UCTIC Oy1It*FIY wtYl mAtUY. EYA AA%CPA%YC M *t.*¶.1fltl,A CA.Y1RATr,, LHOC U,,m, WM" Ml.*L g!"StAC 6SIYLVIOA LACClIIII14. NMLWAY'IG ACYC.t MLAGSAA'.UASYL T.G *LA-W.I*A 1j.k0 t .ctw. woaft %VI LU-1-15% SIMON ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~cUGAYA.,UCT~ HelOm% 0IEEGABICAC ,~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~rto k . | 0,,- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ -O1fu1fb1pV WM_ *zGCtadVbGI~~~L#LA 'SAY1S PM.C £Y'JATvYA, filal hnCHv L l ^Gbu , s c Cdi) tYI tAICAMY I L)S H Pit in..l Pa AtL L I CACCA tltwfllV 4LlGAD ucteL tM~~~~.flh*^ S SPY *YCM. *A%aYYG f lveuvosG ort t AL- LA. LAAAAO. OAAIf A*AiC *dT ,SYB lot r,ulsF tf n C^-AP^ *YY)LVLA ~~~~~ ~ *~~uL, MA, ~~ A .., sped00 ADE1MAS ASIfh Ain 9*T. I1k L"'fANU 'YtinY.inf ALICE~~~V -lwln "*v LIC ".v$ UCTII moo. ~ CWCIAV .,*Yb -lss_ r,v.*Lslc-lt _riW.. _im 'rlowf SA.All C"l; z<0^ss n | GZWs GIKAl *M | | WSli Gl c"IGl { I I I I I~~~~~~~~~~~~~m I outAoLD000A I I I J | | | *c . .unsI~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ItllxC m $1S ;<1 A 3 :91>; 1S1 > SsatLEElw !~~~ ^^s|hweltwt.uAm l tw@ utw"litaW|l[ |8 l8t mHu 5¢ " " 9Office of the Secretary ft W M n * w 9 ~ 4g o9 I Personnel Divislon _ 2 .fgg Sl. f e S ; ; y yFinance dnd Accounts Div. a.¢ £ ^ : p g ^ .. ehi ^Procurement Division _ I g & e e5 n z b ° nTechnical Services Div. gta ^ | w t ° ^ z g (Training' or nm m a v 1 f ° Public In'ormation Div. _ II E I!! Ij n nTResearch and Evaluation Div. rt # fi 0m ^ [ E ¢ r " i ,Planning and Project Div. 4 " nz C B 8 eM " ff e R Rural Youth Division _ 8 a [ t t 8 " ¢ | b b | Occupational and Income n '4 a | o; g 2 o Xa Promotion Division _ - 0 m~~~~~~~~~~~~~ F09 | " F¢¢5 gaAgri. Business Division _ ao Office of the ARD Inspector _ N 8' F.I g n | Internal Audit Unit _ a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~P nnt 14- ~ ~ ~ ~ I 5 C, (A 0iI*. r~~~~~r X 0 n I MIv O 5 ffi 9 ; ; ; ; lx a ~~~~ Engineering and TechnLcal Div g r g H W " 8s a ~ (Maintenance of Civil Works) _ M t v v _ v | _ 8 | ~~~~~~~Survey and Design DLvision _ g o nn n | nn N na Construction and Haintenance is fi| Control Div. (Construction _ t ___________ pof Roads and Bridges) l n 1 P~~~~~~~~~~~~ield Operation Division I g 0" 2 o2 1 Z Z 9 9 o2 1 9 La a n (Construction of Water Resource_. n C3 n a la, " | | u"3 { a f f | 8 ~n | | n |Workshop Division_2 '~aOO C 3 flO U z0 g g | 1 8EquipOment Control DivisionU I B;1 ~~~~~~~~n 1 J C. I FI r il3"t X" l ii ______________ ha aa Tc l DIvI l wn m l l l l CHART 3 - 80 - THAILAND TRANSPORT SECTOR REVIEW Organiation Chart of Stast Railway of Thailand (as of December 30, 1982) Bwowd of Co4fmnmlson.r, l ~~~~~~~~~D"nmnwt At chd Raway Adviwon =raM to tha Gae F~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ I Deputy Gr M nqnrw || DepoutyGwwfUl|| Deput Geral Mage Operatb. Development nd Planning Adminilmation TMarkting Doperun | AdmnI atin - rr_par;on Pu_nil - C nl~~~~~~~Dparen n 140 ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~tral - contrCol Freight -Wrlh and Labor -Goods Enipkrnent _ fOw|_- Public Relations - Hotls _ Ste Bue AIntrno Auditing 4 Dbctsr Coeordiating Buwum- Auditing - Ring Stode Conrutlon LP a Evaluai tn nd _ I P - Locomntlw Reair Coldkntimn Dividonal nd Budgpt - Roigh Swde Repair - Disronmmat Auditing - Producdon ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~Data Proomaaig - hbkknm Workdop _ Railwy Training M- issnrous Auditing Lega Bureau Technical SwAy & Desirs ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~aditiSuee coIW 163Wrl Bnk2Cr _ Cila EnghInwng nowISu_ - qbrtrnc ofBngt &Bilig - Promb & Pbrmln -Tehnkrl Surm zd: u Accoul ndnrlg Sumo Tw eonV 1983 |irdok I~~~~~~~~~~~~ THAlLANI) TRANSPORT SECTOR RE'IIEW ORGANIZATION OF HARBOUR DEPARTMENT HARBOUR DEPARTMENT DIRECT611 GENERIAL DIPUTY DWPUTY DIRECTOR 0EN1RAL DIRECTOR GENERAL L z ~ ~ i i * z . .. .. ...._ _ _ _ ___ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ __..._ _ _ Iship survey j ship Reagistration Suivep- andd~' DMioiw lltnJPiotDIvISIOntwd MO PvodiotIun DMsIen Mvshuit Marine RI.e ab LV~eMIn Centre I Po || c lO hble 1|7 CX~~~~X z t \, ~~~~~~~~DEMOCRATIC KAMPUCHEA .tbt,.) jg' [h o a n' d g er rvy; CX A~~~~~~~~~~~VIET NAM f ; ~~~~~SECOND PROVINCIAL ROADS PROJECT L =3FA E~ ~~~~~AL k S I A _ J t __ n X~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ THALND GUIFA O F 'N A- w_ > ___ ~~~OLES D,m-RA-, RE-_-i _ _ 4 54~~o '4. O~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~EtAOCRAIIC KAMPUCHEEA 0.~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~C THAILAND ~~~~ "~~~~SIXTH RAILWAY PROJECT e5< *~~~~~~~~~~~- *,WnI bO. Tasa ut N,PASS NOLK STATISA SUGLE TRACK ISKWOMNOSt Li ot% Je WMGU TRACK MAN LMIS~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~S IS. ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~~~~~N. .-1 INSAT L lOUNDAS - . S i . SA GULF OF TH r.... 7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~~ . .a.na a. Z- ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ a CIA.-~av -. K: ; 71 / CHINA BURMA~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~A THAILAND ~ I - KHRAM MOC//BANKK A DSTTA H ~IP R @ 2 ..... -g PORTS. PE -L ADIUCCEA BAN tW 0t ( 5 z THAI-AND y M? tx a - - CHANGWAT CENTS A,n d o mn o n '1 Seo MSLES e o .9 . t N 5SAT_T 6 ~ Mr TH'~MA AYIAN BANGKO AND SATTAHIP lUUMblEsEIS~~~ORT PROw,.1>/J ECT 1~~0" CHNGA CETES 10- i - 99*' 1 2 <-,l9 . K- -0 t A _x ' t - llAMA t ( %_KAMPHA~~EN4G PHE1T i\ / THAILAND aK3 37 {F INLAND WATERWAYS AN \ J \\ COASTAL PORTS PROJECT SN) Chao Phrya Waterway 337 _ooft DEPTH OVER 2 METERS Khn 2751\I _ DEPTH LIMIT 1.7 METERS THANI * CHANGWAT CENIERSj / RAILROADS CIU W4 DS\7r RIVERS 83 \\) // 1 51 ~ CHANGWAT BO)UNDARIES 3 s I INTERNATIONAL 3OLONa*RIES -.K .NGu¶- I UH- S UHAN5 HW 1 i - A,. ~1 A ! . 'C~~~~~~~~1 NA'i NVO - *.~~~~ ,~~ KANR.m SAtJ