SYnthesis REPORT
Water Supply: the transition from
emergency to Development Support
Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa
Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo
Mirindi, Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, Christine Ochieng, Chris
Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and Heather Skilling
February 2017
Authors: Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, The Water Global Practice
Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo Mirindi, The Water Global Practice helps clients develop multisectoral
Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, solutions to improve service delivery and manage water sustainably
Christine Ochieng, Chris Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and through its focus on: (i) Ensuring poor people are included. The Water
Heather Skilling Global Practice aims to help governments ensure basic access to
water and sanitation services particularly for the poorest people. The
Cover Photo: Maada Kpenge Bank also seeks to increasingly ensure its water projects explicitly
factor poverty into project development; (ii) Delivering cutting-edge
knowledge. The World Bank Group is helping governments solve
complex water development challenges through transformational
finance, knowledge and innovation. Working on a global level,
closely integrated with the other 13 Global Practices at the World
Bank Group and the 5 Cross-Cutting Solutions Areas, the Water
Global Practice brings together both the knowledge and operational
service delivery arms of the water family—from irrigation and water
resources management, to water and sanitation service delivery;
and (iii) Securing sustainable financing for the water sector. The
Water Global Practice is currently responsible for the supervision
of a portfolio of approximately US$21 billion in lending through 184
projects and about 200 active Knowledge Products, with the largest
programs currently in Water Supply and Sanitation followed by
Irrigation and Water Resources Management.
Disclaimer
The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed herein
are entirely those of the author and should not be attributed to the
World Bank or its affiliated organizations, or to members of the Board
of Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they
represent. The World Bank does not guarantee the accuracy of the
data included in this work.
Copyright Statement
The material in this work is subject to copyright. Because The World
Bank encourages dissemination of its knowledge, this work may be
reproduced, in whole or in part, for noncommercial purposes as long
as full attribution to the work is given.
© 2017 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/The
World Bank.
Water Supply
The Transition from Emergency
to Development Support:
Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa
Dominick de Waal, Michel Duret, Anita Gaju, Maximilian Hirn, Sam Huston, Nitin Jain, Deo
Mirindi, Ngoni Mudege, Deo-Marcel Niyungeko, Chantal Richey, Christine Ochieng, Chris
Print, Muyatwa Sitali, and Heather Skilling
February 2017
Contents
iv
Acronyms and Abbreviations
AFD Agence Française de Développement (French Development Agency)
AfDB African Development Bank
AMCOW African Ministers’ Council on Water
AWS Autonomous Water Schemes
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement
CPIA Country Policy and Institutional Assessment
DFID Department for International Development
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
ESA External Support Agency
EU European Union
EVD Ebola Virus Disease
FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
FM Financial Management
FY Financial Year
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GoC Government of Congo
GoL Government of Liberia
GoN Government of Nigeria
GoSL Government of Sierra Leone
GoSS Government of South Sudan
GoZ Government of Zimbabwe
GVWC Guma Valley Water Company
HR Human Resources
HWA Hargeisa Water Agency
IDA International Development Association
IMF International Monetary Fund
IO Intermediate Outcomes
ISN Interim Strategic Note
JMP (WHO/UNICEF) Joint Monitoring Programme
JSR Joint Sector Review
km Kilometer
LRRD Linking Relief, Rehabilitation, and Development
LWSC Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation
m3 Cubic Meter
MDG Millennium Development Goal
MDTF Multi-Donor Trust Fund
MoF Ministry of Finance
MoPW Ministry of Public Works
MTEF Medium Term Expenditure Framework
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
NWSHPC National Water, Sanitation and Hygiene Promotion Committee
O&M Operation and Maintenance
v
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Acronyms and Abbreviations
ODA Official Development Assistance
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PFM Public Financial Management
PHWC Port Harcourt Water Corporation
PIU Project Implementation Unit
PSIP Public Sector Investment Program
REGIDESO Regie de Distribution d’eau de la Republique Democratique du Congo
ROC Republic of Congo
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SIP Sector Investment Plan
SLB Service Level Benchmarking
SNDE Societé Nationale de Distribution d’ Eau (ROC)
SPR Sector Performance Report
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
SSP Sector Strategic Plan
SSUWC South Sudan Urban Water Corporation
SUWASA Sustainable Water and Sanitation (USAID project)
SWA Sanitation and Water for All
SWAp Sector-Wide Approach
TA Technical Assistance
UN United Nations
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
USAID U.S. Agency for International Development
WASH Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WB World Bank
WHO World Health Organization
WSP Water and Sanitation Program
vi
Acknowledgments
This report is a synthesis of technical assistance (TA) work The peer reviewers for this work were: Bill Kingdom (Lead
carried out under the project entitled “Delivering Water Water and Sanitation Specialist, Water GP), Vivek Srivastava
Supply and Sanitation in Fragile States: The Transition (Lead Public Sector Development Specialist, Water GP),
from Emergency to Development” (P131964). The work Jurgen Blum (Senior Public Sector Development Specialist,
was funded by donors to the World Bank’s Water and Governance GP), and Nadia Piffaretti (Senior Economist
Sanitation Program. [Fragility, Conflict, and Violence CCSA], Water and
Sanitation Specialist).
This project and the synthesis report was led and written by
Dominick de Waal (Senior Economist). Team members over A special thanks to Bill Kingdom and Heather Skilling
the duration of this technical assistance project included: (Consultant) who provided detailed reviews and invaluable
Michel Duret (Senior WSS Specialist, Water GP), Anita advice on drafts of the report.
Gaju (Consultant), Maximilian Hirn (WSS Specialist,
Water GP), Nitin Jain (Consultant), Deo Mirindi (Senior The team would like to thank Joel Hellman, Jae So, Glenn
WSS Specialist, Water GP), Ngoni Mudege (Senior WSS Pearce Oroz, Bhuvan Bhatnagar, Jamal Sagir, and Jyoti
Specialist, Water GP), Deo-Marcel Niyungeko (Senior Shukla (Director, Water GP), for their managerial support
WSS Specialist, Water GP), Chantal Richey (Consultant), and encouragement over the period of this project.
Christine Ochieng (WSS Specialist, Water GP), Chris Print
(Consultant), and Muyatwa Sitali (Consultant). All team The team is especially grateful to all our government
members led specific elements of the technical assistance counterparts and partners in the Democratic Republic of
across the eight countries and wrote background papers for Congo, Liberia, Nigeria, the Republic of Congo, Sierra
this synthesis report. Leone, Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe, who inspired
us with their persistence and dedication, often in the face of
The team is grateful for feedback and discussion with extremely difficult circumstances.
Christine Wallich (Senior Advisor) and Jean Doyen
(Consultant) who led a learning review for this TA project This report was edited by Anjali SenGupta and type set by
in 2014 which shaped and inspired the team. Eric Lugaka.
vii
Executive Summary
Background affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) to
Conflicts, economic crises, and natural disasters in transition their water sectors from being dominated by
low-income countries not only leave water supply ad hoc emergency interventions to country-led sector
infrastructure damaged but also decimate government development programs. The countries were: Democratic
capacity to deliver basic services. As a result, emergency Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia, Nigeria, Republic
funding is often channeled to humanitarian agencies that of Congo (ROC), Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Sudan,
deliver water and sanitation services directly to affected and Zimbabwe.
populations. Although this provides urgently needed
emergency relief it does not set in place the foundations The large data sets on service delivery, generated through
for government institutions to oversee and sustain services this TA, confirmed that the current approach results
once the crisis has passed. in the vast majority of aid being delivered directly by
international agencies and non-state actors—an approach
This challenge to (re-)establishing sustainable services in that persists for too long after the peak of crises (six to 10
low-income countries affected by fragility, conflict, and years). This bypassing of state delivery mechanisms then
violence (FCV) is described in this report as the ‘capacity locks countries into a humanitarian aid modality that
conundrum’. The conundrum is, essentially, how to build shows few signs of building sector institutions that can take
the capacity of institutions to deliver sustainable water on the delivery of water services or building the capacity
services whilst addressing the short term emergency of of government to oversee service delivery carried out by
providing services to those affected by conflict and crisis. non-state actors. Targeting, quality, and sustainability of
With humanitarian response focused on the latter there infrastructure delivered this way was poor—particularly
is often less attention on addressing the former—yet, in the case of handpumps. Local coping strategies—such
without building that capacity, countries can get locked as hand dug and manually drilled wells—have become
into a pattern of unsustainable short-term service delivery mainstream supply models in countries where groundwater
solutions. was easily accessible, thus marginalizing the potential for
utility service delivery models.
This conundrum, long recognized by both humanitarian
and development actors working in low-income stable This TA explored entry points for rebalancing the direct
countries, is brought into even sharper contrast in FCV provision of services with building the capacity of
affected countries. As progress to deliver improved water governments and service providers to resume their sector roles
and sanitation services is made across more and more in the postcrisis period. The work was aimed at responding to
stable countries, two-thirds of which met the water different country contexts and to help in actively managing
target under the Millennium Development Goals, it the transition toward country-led development programming
has become more obvious that development actors must over time. The TA generated rich case material illustrating
prioritize their efforts to improve service delivery in ways of understanding and approaching development
countries where less progress has been made, especially interventions in both the postcrisis period and in protracted
in FCV affected countries. crisis of FCV affected countries.
This report, and the Technical Assistance (TA) on which it Key Lessons Learned
is based, examines how to tackle the capacity conundrum Two work-streams emerged from the TA: one
by rebalancing the relative effort placed on delivering supporting the sector oversight role of ministries and
water supply directly versus the effort that is placed on the other supporting utility reform. Valuable learning
building the sector institutions that deliver and oversee was drawn from each of these work-streams as well as
water supply services in the medium to long-term. from the interaction between sector oversight and utility
reform. The six key lessons included two general lessons
Over the past five years the World Bank’s Water and on identified trends and incentives as well as two for sector
Sanitation Program (WSP) provided TA to eight FCV oversight and two for utility reform.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary
Lessons 1 and 2: Identifying trends and incentives. Lessons 3 and 4: Building sector oversight. Capacity
Governments of low-income FCV affected countries face of ministries responsible for water was fundamental to
a chaotic mix of alternative service delivery arrangements support the transition from emergency to country-led
(as local coping strategies), dilapidated utilities and development programming.
externally-driven support to water service provision on the
one hand, and rapid population growth and urbanization 3. Primary data collection on service delivery was an
on the other. These general lessons were derived from effective entry point for restoring government into a
the large datasets collected on service delivery in each sector oversight role by enabling ministries responsible
country under this TA. This data provided insights into for water to pinpoint critical sector issues. Through the
the common trends and variations that had shaped the extensive datasets developed under this TA, government
evolution of water supply provision over the previous ministries were able to better identify both sector
decade or more. opportunities (such as service delivery models that were
working well) and sector challenges (such as poor targeting
1. There is a common trend that as time goes by it gets of water points, poor quality well construction, and health
harder, not easier, to rebalance the trade-off between hazards due to inappropriate technology use). Across the
directly delivering water supply infrastructure versus countries WSP worked with, the data and knowledge
building institutions that deliver sustainable water generated through this TA influenced US$323 million of
supply services. This was due both to the build-up donor and government funding (see Appendix C). The
of unmanaged infrastructure delivered by the external data on service delivery were used by governments and
humanitarian response and a proliferation of alternative development partners to better target sector investments
service delivery arrangements that had filled the service and stimulate new investment in service delivery models
delivery void. The latter resulted in the emergence of strong that were shown to work well. Service delivery models
private sector interests which become more entrenched evaluated by WSP, such as sand dams in Somalia and
over time and thus more resistant to the rebuilding of autonomous piped water systems in the DRC, were
government institutions to provide or oversee service adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that on utility
delivery. Together these raised the threshold of capacity billing systems in fragile environments, led to donors and
required to manage and regulate services. governments financing specific upgrades in accounting
and billing systems.
2. Variation in the evolution of service provision across
countries was influenced by political incentives to get 4. Though service delivery data were the basis for
services working, on the one hand, and characteristics renegotiating roles with external responders and
of alternative service delivery arrangements, on the alternative service providers, the difficulty of upholding
other. Though the emergence of alternative service these sector agreements was underestimated. In all
arrangements was common to all the countries supported, countries the data sparked constructive dialogue on better
the extent to which these arrangements subsequently targeting and management of service delivery between
dominated service delivery was inversely related to the government and sector actors. In two countries—Liberia
political incentives to charge for services. Greater political and Zimbabwe—this data has been used by governments to
incentives to charge for utility services—observed where shift the relationship with the multitude of actors operating
subnational authorities were striving to prove themselves in the sector from that of passive recipient towards one in
in the face of weakening central governments—bolstered which sector oversight institutions play a role in defining
utility viability and provided a viable alternative to the where and how services are delivered. However, getting
temporary coping arrangements. In wetter countries, where these agreements—or compacts—to stick was undermined
the economic threshold for tapping into groundwater was by the vested interests of both external responders and the
lower and the political incentive to charge for services was alternative service providers. Agreements were established
lower, the alternative arrangements were able to proliferate and upheld through multistakeholder consultative
and become more entrenched. mechanisms—such as Joint Sector Reviews—that facilitated
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary
the state’s step (back) into a policy making role. These 6. Tackling cost recovery supported performance
compacts with external responders were more likely to improvements and was an entry point for broader
stick where there was international pressure to demonstrate utility reform. Acting on cost recovery led to direct
mutual accountability through the monitoring of aid improvements in revenue trends in utilities in Liberia and
effectiveness—such as through Sanitation and Water for Sierra Leone. In addition to improving operating ratios,
All. More work is needed on exploring agreements with the improved customer information management systems
alternative providers, particularly where the alternative installed helped these utilities cope with the economic
providers have become the dominant service delivery shock resulting from the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD)
model. outbreak—by substituting revenues from businesses that
closed with revenues from the relief operation that opened
Lessons 5 and 6: First steps of utility reform. TA up. Cost recovery also provided an entry point to other
for utility reform was initiated through short-term, reform actions focused on human resources and financial
low-cost actions undertaken to improve the level of management at utilities in Somalia and Nigeria. In Somalia
cost recovery. This included support to upgrading of and Zimbabwe where utilities had a tariff structure that
accounting and billing systems; customer enumeration enabled them to cover operating costs, utilities reinvested
surveys to update customer databases; reducing non- revenues in reducing physical losses and more efficient
revenue water by regularizing illegal connections; and pumps and generators. Not tackling cost recovery early
expanding the revenue base by streamlining approaches in the postcrisis period led to dependency on government
to connecting new customers. These actions were subsidies and, in the extreme case of Port Harcourt, led to
an entry point to broader utility reform actions on near collapse of the utility.
governance and a precursor to infrastructure investment.
Recommendations
5. Utility provision can provide a lower cost service, The above insights, based on the experience and evidence
even in extremely fragile operating environments, that generated in this project led to the following central
can benefit the poor. There was a substantial differential recommendations to governments of countries that are FCV
between utility network tariffs and charges levied by affected, to donors funding service delivery, and international
alternative providers. Charges levied by alternative development agencies operating in these countries.
supplies of water ranged from 2.5 times utility tariffs
in Kinshasa to over 6 times utility tariffs in Hargeisa, These recommendations are based on the realization that
Somaliland. Though data on differential access to utility delaying investment in both sector oversight and utility
supplies by wealthier and poorer households was limited, reform increases the costs of, and reduces the prospects
in urban areas of the DRC piped water on premises (a for, achieving a transition from emergency to country-
proxy for utility supply) was almost exclusively captured led development programming. As time passes the
by the wealthiest households (the top quintile). Virtually combined effect of unmanaged aid and the entrenchment
all other households (in the bottom four quintiles) had of alternative service providers makes it ever more difficult
to fetch water from other sources including: buying from to reestablish arrangements between sector oversight
neighbors with utility connections who sell utility water institutions and the growing number of non-state and
with a mark-up; from utility standposts which charge a informal private suppliers. It also makes it harder to
mark-up for the standpost operator; from alternative reestablish utility service provision.
more expensive sources; or from unimproved sources. The
reasons for the lower cost of utility provision compared Governments in countries that are FCV affected should
with alternative providers needs further research to establish actively encourage utilities to cover their operation and
whether these are genuine economies of scale or explained maintenance costs through consumer tariffs as early as
by differential capital subsidies or deferred maintenances possible and even during subsequent emergencies (for
costs of the various service delivery models. example, EVD).
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary
The demonstrated benefits of setting cost recovery tariffs Governments, international development agencies,
were that utilities used their own revenues to make and donors should agree and regularly review the roles
immediate improvements in performance. It also made and responsibilities of different actors with the aim of
utilities more demand responsive and keen to connect improving aid and development effectiveness.
new customers, as new customers could generate revenues While policies and laws are a key component of defining the
to further build the utility. division of labor between the state and providers, their role
in fragile contexts is limited by the state’s ability to enforce
Utilities that recovered their costs reduced their need for them. Rather, agreements—or compacts—established and
operating subsidies, releasing funds for other purposes upheld through multistakeholder consultative mechanisms
such as improving sector oversight institutions, further can facilitate the state’s step (back) into a policy making
expanding infrastructure or extending access to the poor. role. The formation of these compacts should be at country
level. In the short-term they should aim to improve the
International development agencies should engage targeting, quality, and sustainability of service delivery. In
earlier—in the first years of the postcrisis recovery the medium-term they should support the development of
period—in building both sector oversight capacity and country-led programming. To increase the likelihood that
in reforming utilities. these compacts are upheld, recourse to an internationally
The demonstrated benefits of earlier engagement include agreed set of aid effectiveness standards such as Sanitation
better targeting and accountability of available resources, and Water for All’s Collaborative Behaviors or the New
the possibility of improved utility cost recovery, and the Deal for Engagement in Fragile States may be needed to
opportunity to develop appropriate institutional and incentivize mutual accountability of external actors.
governance structures. This early engagement, whilst
heading off the possibility of alternative providers There is a need to invest more in crafting solutions
becoming a barrier to future utility service provision, to the challenges of managing the transition from
might also allow for engagement with those same providers emergency to development support.
to become a part of the solution to the delivery of services While it is fully recognized that the transition from
in the postcrisis recovery period. emergency to development is neither unidirectional nor
linear, stretching development interventions into the
In rural areas the early engagement can help support the postcrisis recovery phase opens up greater opportunity for
establishment of databases for performance and asset a double dividend: that of improving WASH services and
management, which can be used to better target resources, of state building. This TA has brought to light a number
and to help set up supply chains that will lead to more of challenges for which more analytical work is needed
sustainable service delivery. to provide a better understanding of how to work with
countries and partners as they transition from conflict to
Donors should reassess the balance between investing in stability. What are the most appropriate utility models in this
infrastructure versus investing in capacity building. transition period? How might subsidies be used to benefit
A dollar spent on building sector oversight capacity or the greatest number of people? How can development
utility reform is a dollar lost to infrastructure investment. partners better engage with humanitarian response actors,
But it is clear from this project and the data it has generated and vice versa, to ensure a smoother transition between
that there is a need to invest in the sector management the two types of response? These questions all need more
interventions needed for sustainable service delivery. The thought and will create more opportunities for faster and
rates of nonfunctional systems, the poor construction more cost effective transitions.
quality, the burgeoning low quality local coping strategies—
all point to the efficiency gains that could be achieved by
investing in the capacity necessary to monitor, oversee, and
sustain infrastructure.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Executive Summary
xii
I. Introduction
The current ways of working in fragile states need serious improvement. Despite the significant investment and the
commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005) and the Accra Agenda for Action (2008), results
and value for money have been modest. Transitioning out of fragility is long, political work that requires country
leadership and ownership. Processes of political dialogue have often failed due to lack of trust, inclusiveness, and
leadership. International partners can often bypass national interests and actors, providing aid in overly technocratic
ways that underestimate the importance of harmonising with the national and local context, and support short-term
results at the expense of medium- to long-term sustainable results brought about by building capacity and systems.
A New Deal for engagement in fragile states is necessary.
Opening paragraph of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States
[Signed 2011, Busan, Korea]
The effects of fragility, conflict, and violence have a long-
lasting and deep-rooted ability to undermine a country’s
economic growth and escape from poverty. On average, a
country that experienced major violence over the period
from 1981 to 2005 has a poverty rate 21 percentage points
higher than a country that saw no violence. The cyclical
nature of violence and conflict also has a crippling effect
on growth; countries that have faced civil war require an
average of 14 years of peace to recover to original growth
paths (World Bank, 2011b).
As an increasing number of developing countries sustain
strong economic growth and made good progress towards
Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), international
aid agencies must face up to the greatest remaining
challenge in development: the growing share of poverty
prevalent in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and
violence (FCV). Engagement in fragile contexts carries
significant risk, but failing to engage in these contexts
carries far greater consequences.
Based on existing rates of investment in institution
building and conflict reduction, an estimated half a
billion people in FCV affected countries (6 percent of Spaghetti pipes connecting households in Freetown,
the global population) will remain below the US$1.25 Sierra Leone. (Photo credit: Deo-Marcel Niyungeko.)
poverty line by 2030. Under this scenario, the proportion
Picture on facing page: Liberia: A rusting treatment plant
of the world’s poor living in FCV affected countries will
(tank feeding chlorine into water). (Photo credit: Dominick
rise from 40 percent today to over 60 percent in 2030.
Revell de Waal.)
1
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Introduction
Even under more optimistic scenarios of rapid institution This report first explains a central challenge to this
building and conflict reduction, over 350 million people transition—the capacity conundrum—that is considered
(4 percent of the global population) would remain below a key contributing factor to the growing divide in
this poverty line in these states in 2030 (OECD, 2015b). service delivery performance between low-income FCV
affected countries and other low-income countries. The
Though FCV affected countries have made some progress report then sets out the WSP’s approach to supporting
towards MDGs, it has been much slower than in more the transition towards country-led sector development
other developing countries. Nearly two-thirds of FCV programming by providing tools and methods to
affected countries missed the target of halving poverty by overcome the capacity conundrum.
2015, while only a third of other developing countries
fell short of this target. Despite per capita aid flows to The primary audience of this report are sector practitioners
FCV affected countries doubling since 2000, progress working on improving water supply and sanitation service
on human development targets for education, health as delivery in FCV affected countries whether from within
well as water and sanitation was even slower than progress the government or from external support agencies (ESAs)
on overall poverty reduction in fragile states. Only 28 working with these governments. An important secondary
percent of FCV affected countries met the water supply audience is potential funders of water supply and sanitation
MDG compared to over 60 percent of other developing service delivery responsible for making funding into FCV
counties. A mere 18 percent of FCV affected countries affected countries, be they domestic ministries responsible
met the basic sanitation target compared to a third of for finance or ESAs.
other developing counties. There is a growing water and
sanitation access gap between FCV affected countries and Following this introduction, Chapter 2 presents the endemic
other developing countries that will have to be eliminated challenge: the so-called capacity conundrum. Chapter 3
over the Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) period. summarizes the WSP’s approach taken to the TA including
the rationale for country selection, team composition and
As the opening paragraph of the New Deal for engagement how entry points in each country were defined, and an
in fragile states points out, “The current ways of working in overview of the types of intervention. Based on the large
fragile states need serious improvement.” datasets that were collected, Chapter 4 describes what the
TA revealed about common trends and sources of variation
Over the past five years the World Bank’s Water and in the evolution of service delivery across countries.
Sanitation Program (WSP) provided Technical Assistance Chapter 5 summarizes the outcomes of the TA, drawing
(TA) to eight FCV affected countries in Sub-Saharan out lessons based on the relationship between the way that
Africa (SSA) to better understand the reasons for this the TA was provided and the overall transition progress
growing gap in WASH progress and to work on potential made. Chapter 6 concludes with recommendations to
approaches to narrow the gap. The countries that the WSP governments, donors, and international development
worked in were: Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), agencies working in FCV affected countries. At the end of
Liberia, Nigeria, Republic of Congo (ROC), Sierra Leone, the report there are appendixes for each of the countries
Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. WSP worked in, describing the interventions and their
results (Appendix A).
The development objective of the TA was to support FCV
affected countries to transition their water supply subsector
from being dominated by ad hoc emergency interventions 21% The difference in average poverty rate for a
country that experienced major violence over the
to country-led sector development programs. period from 1981 to 2005, higher than a country
that saw no violence.
2
II. The Challenge in Providing Sustainable Water Supply
Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries
Over the period of designing and delivering this TA, the is a state bureaucracy lacking the capacity to deliver
WSP team has often been asked by both policy makers a peace dividend to citizens that meets basic service
and practitioners working in international development standards and donor accountability requirements. On the
how service delivery in FCV affected countries should be other, there is an opportunity to deliver urgently needed
done differently from that in other low-income countries. services through non-state actors, including the private
While FCV affected countries certainly do face unique sector, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and
policy challenges—such as the urgent need to address United Nations (UN) agencies, but, with the unintended
root causes of conflict—a key reflection based on the consequence of not building capacity of the state
WSP’s experience of providing TA to water and sanitation bureaucracy to organize and oversee service delivery.
service delivery in FCV affected countries is not that
service delivery should be done differently but that it is The UN and humanitarian presence, vital in the early stages
already done differently and this is a binding constraint to of transition to prevent conflict, promote stability and meet
progress in the sector. basic needs, soon faces difficult trade-offs in balancing quick
wins with approaches that build institutions and states.
In the aftermath of prolonged conflicts and the resulting Getting this balance right makes the difference between
protracted crises, governments and their external partners leaving states without the capacity to direct or deliver basic
face the ‘capacity conundrum’. On the one hand, there services versus building a core state capacity that is able to
Box 2.1: THE ROOTS AND LASTING EFFECTS OF THE CAPACITY CONUNDRUM IN LIBERIA
Emerging from years of war, the water sector in Liberia was highly fragmented and lacked cohesive planning
and management systems. Non-state actors provided emergency relief but lacked the overview and reach to
deliver services equitably across the country, or to put in place management processes to sustain interventions.
Ineffective government institutions remained on the sidelines. The dearth of investment in the country’s water
sector institutions was accompanied by, and has contributed to, a deep-seated lack of absorption capacity.
A sector capacity development plan completed in 2012 reported that central government ministries responsible
for water, sanitation, and hygiene services struggled with chronic technical and financial capacity gaps. There
were inadequate staff numbers at the national level to supervise and support subnational staff where there
were shortages at county, district, municipality, and health facility levels without the skills and facilities to
carry out basic core duties such as pump monitoring and maintenance (Government of Liberia 2014). An
institutional audit, in the same year, described Liberia’s national utility as “an organization in crises [sic]”,
“financially insolvent”, “unable to meet basic service deliverables […] with most of its infrastructure left
inoperable or in poor condition”, an organization in “firefighting mode with almost all of its limited capacity
dedicated to dealing with daily emergencies” (GBSI/Government of Liberia 2012).
Almost a decade after the war the prospect of a transition to a country-led development program for the
water sector was even more challenging as bypassing sector institutions had left (a) the government with no
overview of where services had or had not been delivered in rural areas; (b) rural water supply solutions in
urban areas with poor water quality outcomes competing with the demand for LWCS’s services; and (c) the
government with little more capacity to deal with this aid fragmentation.
Source: World Bank data.
3
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Challenge in Providing Sustainable Water Supply
Services in Fragile and Conflict Affected Countries
Figure 2.1: THE NONLINEAR PATH OF LINKING RELIEF, RECOVERY, AND DEVELOPMENT
COUNTRY-LED
WASH
PROGRAM
EXTERNAL
STRESS
Development
Recovery
Relief
Emergency
EXTERNAL SUPPORT
Source: WDR 2011 (World Bank).
organize and oversee non-state actors and to progressively This TA project aimed to support the relief to development
replace humanitarian, oriented with development-oriented, transition. While the long-standing attempts on ‘linking
service delivery capacity. Where non-state actors continue relief, rehabilitation, and development’ (LRRD) have been
to dominate service delivery after the initial humanitarian approached from the perspective of relief actors designing
response period, the state’s role will remain weak and exit strategies, this TA investigated complementary entry
undermines the opportunity to foster a virtuous cycle of points for development actors in FCV affected countries.
country-led service delivery that builds citizens’ confidence Stretching development interventions into the recovery
in state institutions. phase opens up greater opportunity not just for LRRD
but for linking service delivery with state-building through
The consequence for service delivery in particular is that the double dividend of improving water supply services
weak sector institutions persist, holding governments and improving citizen-state relations.
back from taking a lead role in key aspects of sector
oversight including: targeting available resources for new While it is fully recognized that the transition from
services; capitalizing on economies of scale for managing emergency to development is not unidirectional or linear,
existing services, and attracting new investment. This the aim of this project has been to provide practical
leadership weakness has long-term consequences for recommendations on the steps that can be taken to
inclusion and sustainability. make this transition during periods of relative stability.
Though limited, there is also some evidence that these
28% The percentage of FCV affected countries that
met the water supply MDG compared to over 60
steps add to the resilience of service delivery in countries
weathering external shocks, be they climatic, economic
percent of other developing counties, despite
or health related.
per capita aid flows to such countries doubling
since 2000.
4
iii. The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
3.1 Project Objective and Scope well—to contribute to improved citizen-state relations
The WSP worked with eight FCV affected countries through improved state responsiveness to citizens and
in SSA over the period (2011–2015) to facilitate the increased citizen confidence in the state’s capability.
transition towards country-led development programs:
the ROC, the DRC, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Underpinning this objective the project tracked progress
Somalia, South Sudan, and Zimbabwe. In the case of across six intermediate outcomes (IOs) in eight countries,
South Sudan the TA was curtailed due to increase in civil which were:
conflict in late 2013.1 1. Reestablish country leadership in sector coordination
and policy development.
The selected countries reflected four key characteristics 2. Institutionalize rigorous sector monitoring and joint
of the wide range of FCV affected countries in SSA: sector review (JSR) processes.
population size, language, relatively wet versus dry 3. Restore cost recovery in urban utilities, small-towns,
conditions, and proportion of GDP from primary and large rural piped water schemes.
commodity rents. These countries were selected from a 4. Establish an inclusive Sector Investment Plan (SIP)
pool of around 20 FCV affected countries in SSA on the and process that mobilizes infrastructure investment.
World Bank’s harmonized fragile states list and 28 on 5. Increase domestic investment in the sector.
the broader OECD list (see Appendix A). The selection 6. Increase use of country systems by development
included a range in the status, nature, and time since peak partners.
of conflict: protracted on-going violent conflict (DRC,
Somalia, South Sudan); distinct peace settlements within While all IOs were pursued in each country—as they
the past decade (Liberia and Sierra Leone); long-standing were seen as complementary and reinforcing—it was
tensions over resource control (the Niger delta and ROC), anticipated that not all would be achieved in all countries.
and Zimbabwe’s principally economic crisis. All the This reflected that the opportunities available to pursue
countries had an operational program with the World the various IOs was shaped by country context. Though
Bank or had intent to develop an operational program the original scope was water supply and sanitation the
with the Bank.2 greater emphasis on water supply was driven by its (lack
of ) visibility in FCV environments and a precursor to
The development objective of this TA was to support greater engaging on sanitation and hygiene being taken
FCV affected countries to transition their water supply up in subsequent WSP interventions.
and sanitation subsectors from being dominated by
ad hoc emergency interventions to country-led sector 3.2 Team Composition
development programs. In the medium term this objective Extending development programming into countries
aimed to rebuild the institutions that oversee and provide experiencing recurrent or protracted crises requires careful
services. In turn, over the longer term, the objective was analysis and risk-taking. Development agencies initiating
to create the possibility for service delivery—if managed work in FCV environments need their staff to accommodate
new ways of working, heavy on security logistics and light
on sector data and institutional analysis.
1
However, a joint case study with UNICEF has documented the complexities of
improving WASH service delivery duringthe protracted crisis with its overlapping The WSP built up a team of 11 people working on the
and often cyclical phases of emergency, relief, recovery, and occasionally, development
(Mosello, 2015). fragile states business area in SSA: the team included five
2
‘Operational program’ refers to loans or grants financed from IDA or MDTFs. staff members, a secondee from the French Development
5
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
Agency (AFD: Agence Française de Développement), and delivery. In the DRC it was the resilience of so-called
five consultants. There were staff members stationed in- autonomous water schemes (AWS) in rural and peri-urban
country in the ROC, DRC, Nigeria, and Zimbabwe for areas, including some that had existed for over 30
between one to three years covering at least part of the years, supplying over 4 million people. In Somaliland, the
period of this TA (see table 4.1), and a regional team Hargeisa Water Agency (HWA) had non-revenue water
supporting these staff members and delivering TA to the losses of only 20 percent with a 90 percent bill collection
other four countries from a hub in Nairobi. rate, well above the median for Africa, reflecting the high
cost of alternatives and strong social norms for enforcing
The team brought together experience in both humanitarian payment for services.
and development water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH)
service delivery. A series of internal workshops were held In other countries, there were service delivery models
to come to a consensus on the overall approach to the TA that had deteriorated beyond recognition. The teams
that was set out in the project concept note (summarized encountered utilities that had no cost recovery mechanism
below). Training on operating in insecure environments at all, surviving on hand-outs from government and
was provided (SSAFE) and World Bank corporate security serving only the elite and the army; rural water supply
arrangements were used to enable staff to travel in the sectors in which over 50 percent of schemes built were not
field. The team worked with a combination of government functioning five years after construction; routine extraction
staff and firms to implement the activities in each of the of rents from water schemes by predatory politicians; and
selected countries. rural improved sanitation levels below 10 percent. In
some countries a water sector with no lead ministry or
3.3 Defining Entry Points in Each Country senior representation at all, while in others an archaeology
In all the countries, other than the DRC, the WSP had of institutions responsible for water one piled one upon
to initiate and build a relationship with government the next in a vain attempt by those in power to address the
and development partners from scratch. Though the successive failures of predecessor water intuitions.
interventions across all countries were developed with the
same objective—transitioning to country-led development Without exception the sector-enabling environment—laws,
programming and working towards the same six IOs—the policies, definitions of institutional roles and responsibilities—
specific TA interventions were shaped by country context across the eight case studies was in an incoherent state: a
and opportunities. disabling rather than enabling sector environment.
Determining the WSP’s initial intervention in each With such a large number of things needing attention,
country was done through scoping visits which identified what criteria should be used to prioritize TA? Should the
areas of comparative advantage relative to other sector priority be to fix the enabling environment, to reform
players and WSP capabilities. These were matched with the institutional set-up or to work with the institutions
specific requests from government and development in place? Should it be on planning to attract finance for
partners in each country. As the WSP engaged in each infrastructure or actions to sustain existing infrastructure?
country, new information and understanding was
developed which also helped to shape the interventions. A principle for selecting, or rather, not selecting,
The teams maintained a degree of flexibility to allow this interventions, explicitly stated in the concept note was
responsiveness to opportunity. to avoid getting involved in changing the existing
institutional set-up. While the basic characteristics of
In three of the countries, there were unexpectedly strong successful utilities and water sectors in low-income stable
service delivery models that had emerged, or ‘survived’, countries is well documented, there are real limitations
and that could be built on. In Zimbabwe it was municipal in transplanting these institutional models (for example,
water supply models where rate-payers associations a water regulator) into FCV affected countries. These
and unions held local authorities to account for service transplanted institutions can be illusory, appearing to be
6
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
Clear water reservoir at the local water treatment plant in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. (Photo credit: Alexander V. Danilenko.)
present but actually behaving differently or dysfunctional ‘hard-to-get’ basic data on existing water supply
due to both capacity constraints and the political services. This would (a) provide a baseline for
environment—sometimes referred to as ‘isomorphic planning; and (b) reveal the structure and status
mimicry’ (Lant Pritchett, 2010). The team had observed of service delivery (the number and type of
protracted, but fruitless, institutional reorganizations. For service providers) providing ministries with the
example, in Liberia, the reorganization of sector institutions information they would need to orchestrate actors
failed to come to fruition years after inception. Rather, the in the sector—a critical first step in transitioning
approach taken under this TA was to focus on building toward a sector development strategy.
capacity for critical processes and functions of successful (ii) Utility reform, starting with restoring cost
service delivery within the existing institutional set-up: recovery. An assessment of utility billing systems
for example, focusing on service level benchmarking in fragile states, conducted early during this TA,
of providers rather than setting up a regulator (see the highlighted a wide range in the ability of FCV
Zimbabwe case study). affected utilities to collect revenue from customers.
Those utilities able to finance operating costs from
In practice two work-streams emerged, one supporting customer revenues were making better progress on
sector ministries and the other supporting utilities. service improvements. This led to the second entry
(i) Reestablishing sector oversight role, starting with point for this TA, which was to work with utilities
basic data on service delivery. Recognizing that to improve the quality of customer databases and
crises led to mass destruction of infrastructure and billing systems. This would generate vital cash to
that ministries had been bypassed by humanitarian make short-term service delivery improvements
aid processes, often for many years, the first entry leading to a virtuous cycle of improved services
point was supporting sector ministries to generate and higher revenues.
7
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
Longer-term efficiency and effectiveness gains, the knowledge of WASH service delivery generated into
contribution to country-led development programming, World Bank investment operations; and (b) tracking the
and, ultimately the state-building process, was made by uptake of the data by governments and other development
influencing downstream funding to WASH service partners in their investments in WASH (see Appendix
delivery. This was done by (a) actively pursuing C—Influence of Results on Domestic and Donor
opportunities to incorporate the data, information, and Financing).
Box 3.1: DEFINING THE TWO STREAMS OF TA IN LIBERIA BASED ON THE WATER POINT MAPPING
RESULTS
During the humanitarian support phase after the 2003 peace agreement, non-state actors mobilized a nationwide
response and increased the number of improved public water points built per year from around 100 in 2003 to
a peak of 1,435 in 2007 (World Bank, 2011a).
The government was still transitional and had little involvement in either directing or implementing service delivery—
97 percent of water points had been built by non-state actors. There was little attention to building service delivery
models that would endure. As a result, up to a quarter of water points failed within the first year with barely half
still fully functional after five years. In urban areas, where at least half of Liberia’s population is concentrated, 80
percent of households’ access depended on the rapid response handpump driven model of service delivery.
What could be done to build government capacity to lead a sector dialogue and improve the sustainability or
rural services? Why was it that a rural solution had become the dominant form of supply in urban Liberia? With
Monrovia being a hot-spot for cholera, what was the quality of water supplied? These questions led to the two
separate streams of follow-on TA illustrated below.
FIGURE 3.1: WSP ENTRY POINT AND TWO EMERGING STREAMS OF TA IN LIBERIA
WSP entry point Ebola Crisis
Water to Liberia WASH
Point Sector ... leading to
Mapping two streams of TA
2013 2014
Sector Sector
Key sector SWA WASH Sector Sector
documents Strategic Investment
Rebuilding Compact Performance Performance
Plan Plan
GoL’s Report Report
sector
oversight National WASH
Uganda National Water
role Promotion
First Joint Second Third Joint
Key events SWAp SWA Joint Resources &
Committee Sector Joint Sector Sector
Learning Mission Sanitation Board
Set Up Review Review Review
Visit Appointed
Water LWSC
Updating LWSC
Quality Institutional Customer Enumeration
Customer Performance
Improving cost Monitoring Audit Survey
Database Contract
recovery at LWSC to (Monrovia)
reform urban service
delivery Design of
Upgrading Streamlining Regulating
US$10m
Accounting Customer Illegal
World Bank
System Connections Connections
Investment in
LWSC
YEAR
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Source: World Bank data.
8
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
3.4 Overview of the Technical Assistance Renegotiating service delivery roles between
Provided government and external partners: The large datasets,
This section provides a synopsis of the main types of such as those on water point mapping, pinpointed key
TA carried out under each of the two work-streams (i) sector opportunities (service delivery models that worked
reestablishing the sector oversight role; and (ii) utility well) and challenges (poor equity in the distribution of
reform. It illustrates the nature and scale of the WSP’s water points). This evidence was used to renegotiate the
interventions. The interventions across all countries were state oversight role with the multitude of actors operating
developed with the same objective—transitioning to in the sector through multistakeholder consultative
country-led development programming—with the actual mechanisms, such as JSRs, a process actively supported
areas of intervention being shaped by specific context and by the WSP in Liberia, Zimbabwe, and the DRC. In
opportunities in each country. addition to supporting the state’s step back into a policy
making role it encouraged external actors to invest more in
The specific intervention mix by country is presented in building capacity of sector institutions and greater mutual
a summary table 3.1. There are also country appendixes accountability for sector outcomes.
at the end of this report that illustrate more fully how the
interventions were applied in each country, progress against Water resource development potential: In Somalia
the IOs and the degree to which counties have transitioned the State of Puntland and the Somaliland governments
towards country-led development (Appendix A). requested a way of mapping the potential for small dams
(sand and subsurface dams) in ephemeral rivers (wadis)
Work-stream 1: Reestablishing a sector oversight role for multiple use water developments (people, livestock,
Water point mapping: In Liberia, Sierra Leone, and and agriculture). A decision support tool for rapidly
Congo, the WSP worked with the respective government assessing water harvesting potential on a broad spatial
and their development partners on complete nationwide scale was developed. The tool brings together layers of
databases of water points, including their type, location, remote sensing data into a suitability map showing sites
and functionality. These surveys have covered over 30,000 within a defined area of interest, ranked according to
improved water points serving (or not) some 10 million their water harvesting potential. The tool combines ‘use’
people. In Nigeria, the WSP provided TA to a Federal parameters (for example, for sites near livestock routes,
Government-led exercise to update its 2006 national settlements, roads, and so on) with given ‘physical’
inventory using the water point mapping to cover over parameters (precipitation, slope, soil composition, and so
100,000 water points. In the DRC a variation of the on) to determine the most appropriate locations for water
water point survey method was used to map and assess harvesting. The tool was used in determining the locations
investments needs in over 500 autonomous rural and small for the World Bank–financed Water and Agro-Pastoralist
town piped water schemes that serve around 4 million Livelihoods pilot project.
people. The data generated from these surveys were used
to: assess different technologies and models of rural water Impact assessments: The WSP assessed different types
supply; build sector investment plans; and better target of WASH investments for their impact on broader state
donor investments. and peacebuilding outcomes. In Beitbridge, Zimbabwe,
WSP examined the impact of a World Bank project, one
National Sector Investment Planning and Review: The year after the project closed, on both its service delivery
WSP supported partner governments to develop national outcomes and on whether it had strengthened citizen-
sector investment plans and improve sector coordination. state relations—pointing to a possible “double dividend”.
For instance, in Liberia, the WSP has built on the data In Somalia the WSP examined a range of existing water
collected during the water point mapping exercise to help the resource development investments, by various agencies,
government produce its official national Sector Investment to better understand the winners and losers in these
Plan 2012–17, giving Liberia a coherent, comprehensive investments and whether the investments had led to
sector plan for the first time in the postwar period. cooperation or exacerbated conflict over water resources.
9
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
Work-stream 2: Utility reform
Urban water quality surveys: The water point mapping
exercise revealed that a large number of public wells
(1,400) with handpumps were being installed in Liberia’s
capital Monrovia. A water quality survey of 200 randomly
selected water points showed high levels (>80 percent) of
microbiological contamination. This provided empirical
evidence that handpump solutions were failing in urban
areas and that there was a need to work with the utility to
displace wells with piped water supplies. In Port Harcourt,
Nigeria, a similar survey, carried out in the wet and dry
seasons, revealed that 99 percent of households were using
nonutility water sources as their main source of water—a
strategic problem for the reform of the utility.
Assessments of recovering utility billing and accounting
systems: Five assessments of utility accounting and billing
system functionality were carried out for REGIDESO
(DRC), Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC),
Port Harcourt Water Corporation (PHWC, Nigeria),
Guma Valley Water Company (GVWC, Sierra Leone),
and HWA (Somaliland). These are all utilities that have
suffered significant setbacks either due to violent conflict
or prolonged poor governance. The WSP assessments
examined the functionality and underlying data of these
billing systems; identified useful coping strategies and
innovations; and made recommendations for upgrading
systems. In four of the cases the utilities self-funded the
WSP recommendations or worked with development
partners to secure implementation funding.
Customer enumeration surveys: In Liberia (Monrovia A Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist, WSP-Zimbabwe,
and Kakata), Nigeria (Port Harcourt), and Sierra Leone assessing rehabilitation work done to low lift pumps, under the
(Freetown) the WSP supported large-scale customer Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation Project, to
enumeration exercises aimed at cleaning and improving extract surface water from rivers. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.)
the data on tens of thousands of customers in utility billing
systems. This data were used to improve the quality and
reliability of data used in billing systems—contributing to of incentivizing and monitoring investment in utilities.
improvements in revenue collection and supporting resilience In Nigeria utility benchmarking has been incorporated
to the economic downturn experienced during the Ebola into the World Bank’s US$250 million credit (currently
Virus Disease (EVD) crisis in Sierra Leone and Liberia. at negotiation stage) as the principle monitoring
mechanism. In Zimbabwe (which is in arrears with the
Service level benchmarking: In Zimbabwe (32 Bank) the ministry responsible for local government is
municipalities) and Nigeria (36 states) utility building benchmarking into its mechanisms for allocating
benchmarking provided a baseline of utility performance infrastructure grants to municipalities under the Public
against which to structure a regulatory process and a means Sector Investment Program (PSIP).
10
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
TABLE 3.1: OVERVIEW OF WSP’S TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE BY WORK-STREAM
Country WSP Resourcing Technical Assistance by Work-Stream
Staffing Funding Reestablishing Sector Oversight Role Utility Reform
(US$ M)
Congo AFD 0.75 • National map of 1,500 rural points • Assessment of service models for
Brazzaville Secondee reporting location, functionality, urban poorincluding through social
for two technology, and management connections and standposts
years • Facilitated sector institutional assessment
(2012/14) to gauge the level of implementation of the
reform based on the 2003 Water Act
• Facilitated dialogue on development of
national policy
DRC Staff 1.75 • Provincial sector overviews to assess • Assessment of REGIDESO billing
member institutional capacity and development and accounting systems
three prospects at provincial level in Sud Kivu, • National map and assessment of
years Nord Kivu, and Katanga 4,100 REGIDESO standposts and
(2013/15) • National map and assessment of 520 their management
autonomous piped water schemes • Facilitated delegated management
covering 4 million people of 150 standposts by REGIDESO in
• Support to sector coordination and Kinshasa building on study tour to
dialogue on water law Burkina Faso
• Study on improving WASH service delivery
in protracted crises (with UNICEF)
Liberia Staff 2.0 • National map of 10,000 urban and rural • Water quality survey of 200 public
member (o/w 1.0 points reporting location, functionality, water points in Monrovia
three from technology, and management • Assessment of LWSC billing and
years USAID) • Sector investment plan for 2012–17 accounting systems
(2013/15) translating PRSP targets into specific • Support to LWSC enumeration of
project investments over 5,000 customers in Monrovia
• Support to sector coordination and and Kakata as well as pilot
dialogue including joint sector reviews connection program
in 2013, ’14, ’15, and 2013 sector • Prefeasibility study for implementing
performance report an output-based aid approach
• Prefeasibility studies for the development to expand access to piped water
of piped water systems in Monrovia, supply to low-income households in
Gbarnga, Greenville, and Harper Monrovia
Nigeria AFD 0.75 • Support to Government of Nigeria for an • Water quality survey (dry and wet
Secondee update of the 2006 inventory using the season) of household water use in
for one water point mapping method Port Harcourt
year • Customer enumeration survey in
(2014/15) service area targeted by PHWC pilot
rehabilitation
• Assessment of PHWC billing and
accounting systems
• Replacement of PHWC accounting
and billing system (with USAID
SUWASA)
• Introduction of FM and HR policies
and procedures for PHWC
• Urban utility service level
benchmarking in 36 states (funding
of national workshop)
11
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | The Approach Taken to the Technical Assistance
Sierra Regional 0.75 • National map of 28,000 urban and rural • Assessment of GVWC billing and
Leone support points reporting location, functionality, accounting systems
only technology, and management • Replacement of GVWC billing
• Fixing Freetown case study examining system (with DFID)
rationale for a holistic approach to tackling • Support to GVWC enumeration
dilapidated urban services and institutions and management of over 19,500
in postconflict countries household, commercial, and public
customers
Somalia Regional 1.0 • Sector assessment and infrastructure • Assessment of HWA billing and
support policy note to inform the World Bank accounting systems
only Somalia ISN • Assessment and support to the
• Study to assess the potential for corporate governance of HWA
implementing small dams (sand/ including HWA exposure visit to
subsurface dams) across northern Somalia Windhoek, Namibia
• Study of the socioeconomic impacts
(winners and losers) of water resource
developments in northern Somalia
• Preparation of Water and Agro-Pastoralist
Livelihoods pilot project (with State and
Peace-building Fund)
South Regional 0.2 • Assessment of management options for
Sudan support small town systems leading to sector
only regulatory framework
• Study on improving WASH service delivery
in protracted crises (with UNICEF)
Zimbabwe Staff 1.0 • Support to national water policy • Urban utility service level
member • Review of sector coordination and benchmarking in 32 municipal
three regulation assessing whether existing councils over three annual cycles
years institutions were fit for purpose
(2013/15) • Impact Assessment of Beitbridge
Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation
project
Source: World Bank data.
12
IV. What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
The TA itself generated a detailed data picture of service 2016). In South Sudan too, though no primary data was
delivery in each country. Large datasets were collected collected by this project, the joint study with UNICEF on
through water point and scheme mapping, urban water aid effectiveness confirmed that since the conflict resumed
quality surveys, service level benchmarking, assessments in 2013, donors have spent $73.6 million on WASH
of billing systems, customer enumeration surveys, through the Common Humanitarian Fund. Humanitarian
mapping of water resource development potential, and funding in ‘emergency mode’ has remained the main type
socioeconomic and project impact assessments. of assistance delivered to South Sudan (Mosello, 2015).
This data on service delivery was an input to the subsequent Across these countries the bypassing of government was
steps of the TA process for building sector oversight initially justified due the emergency nature of aid. The
capacity and utility reform—the focus of Chapter 5. challenge is that subsequent development aid followed
the established emergency pathway entrenching the
But the data also provided insights into the contextual bypassing of government. Governments in these countries
factors that had shaped the evolution of service delivery have, therefore, had no part in delivering the vast majority
in each country over the previous decade or more. Across of the water points and water supply schemes identified
countries there were both common trends and sources through the mapping processes. The infrastructure,
of variation in these contextual factors that defined both mapped across these countries, was delivered directly
the starting conditions and the parameters of engagement with no strategic sector oversight from the state. It is
throughout the process of delivering transition TA in each also important to stress that this infrastructure was not
country. They described, in other words, the very different built through “parallel structures” to the public service—
scenes on which the TA was acted out. defined as units partially supported by donors to perform
government functions; it was built by organizations
4.1 Common Trends across Countries separate to the public sector and with no accountability
Aid modalities bypassed sector institutions and failed to the public sector in these countries.
to build sector oversight capacity. Across five of the eight
countries (the DRC, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and In contrast, external aid to water supply services in
South Sudan) the starting assumption that aid to water Nigeria and the ROC was not largely humanitarian and
supply is delivered directly by external and non-state actors, constituted only a small proportion of the overall spend
bypassing government, is strongly supported by the large on the WASH sector. In Nigeria official development
primary datasets collected on service delivery through assistance (ODA) is estimated to be 20 percent of the total
this activity. Whether this externally-driven direct service capital spend allocated nationally (AMCOW, 2011). In
delivery is precipitated by humanitarian crisis or through the ROC, ODA to WASH service delivery has averaged
ODA practice, the net result is a missed opportunity under US$5 million a year over the past decade (OECD,
to build country capacity and systems. In Liberia (97 2016) against an estimated government allocation to
percent) and Sierra Leone (86 percent) the vast majority WASH capital expenditure of just under US$50 million a
of all water points had been financed and built by external year (AMCOW, 2011). A common theme, though, is that
and non-state actors. In the DRC, 93 percent of the AWS the majority of funding for water supply infrastructure
were financed and constructed by external and non-state bypasses sector institutions. In Rivers State, Nigeria, two-
actors. In Somalia the data on water point financing are thirds of water points surveyed had been built by donors,
poor; however, for those water points for which there are
data on the source of financing, all are linked to external 3
Personal communication with the Commissioner of the Ministry of Water Resources
and non-state actors (Food and Agriculture Organization, and Rural Development.
13
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
NGOs, philanthropy, and federal funding agencies such In common across all these countries was that aid
as the Niger Delta Development Commission—the latter or domestic financing modalities that bypass sector
in many ways behaves like an external donor.3 Likewise institutions endured long after the end of crises.
in the ROC, much of the capital expenditure for WASH
has been channeled through the “Delegation General des Local coping strategies and external interventions
Grands Travaux” (DGGT), a government entity established marginalized utility supply. The degree to which utilities
by the President in 2002 for large public works, again in FCV affected countries faced massive competition from
bypassing sector ministries.Thus a similar if domestic locally emerging coping strategies was unexpected. Though
capacity conundrum has beset these oil-rich FCV affected competition from alternative nonutility water sources is
countries where nonsector institutions deliver services common in most low income settings, the degree to which
without consultation with sector institutions. coping strategies in FCV affected countries have emerged
and become mainstreamed is extreme—mirroring the
In the last of the eight countries, Zimbabwe, aid bypassing marginalization of mainstream state-led service delivery
the state has been a more recent phenomenon. The vast models.In Port Harcourt, the water quality survey was key
majority of existing infrastructure was either built by the to revealing that 99 percent of households, businesses, and
state, or through aid under the strategic oversight from the government institutions depended on nonutility sources of
state, until the early 2000s—in particular, its municipalities water as their main sources of water for drinking, washing,
and districts. However, since the onset of the economic and cooking. Similarly, significant local coping strategies
crisis in the early 2000s, funding to manage and maintain have become mainstream in Mogadishu, Somalia, where
this existing infrastructure all but evaporated. In addition, private boreholes and networks serve over a million people
since the European Union (EU) placed sanctions on and have entirely substituted for the municipal water
Zimbabwe in 2002 and with the cholera crisis in 2008 supply system—and led to the sabotage of attempts to
very little aid to WASH services has been managed by the revive the municipal water supply. The mainstreaming
Government of Zimbabwe (GoZ) directly. Instead aid,
of alternative sources in urban areas was additionally
initially humanitarian and then development aid, to the
fueled by the fact that adoption is facilitated by simple
water supply services has flowed through multilateral,
technologies, the speed of coverage, the low cost, and,
bilateral and non-state institutions. In contrast to other
depending on the context, the hydrogeology (as explained
countries, Zimbabwe’s capacity for overseeing aid to WASH
in the following subsection).
services is latent rather than absent. For instance, in the
1980s there were well-established systems for managing
inventories of infrastructure at district level known as Externally financed solutions in urban areas also contributed
‘pump record cards’ which were regularly updated. These to the wide-spread availability and adoption of nonutility
systems, however, were subverted by crises and, as pointed sources, often with adverse results for urban consumers.
out in the 2013 review of WASH aid coordination, the In Monrovia, Liberia, hand-dug wells and boreholes with
cluster coordination mechanism for managing emergency handpumps built by non-state actors accounted for a half
aid persisted even six years after the 2008 cholera crisis. of the 1,400 water points installed around the city. While
In 2010, the National Action Committee (NAC) for providing basic services, the sample water points evaluated
Water and Sanitation was made responsible for the overall reported high rates of contamination—57 percent testing
coordination of the water sector, but this has received positive for E. coli and 80 percent for fecal coliform—
limited support from, and limited attendance by, donors. indicating both poor installation methods and that this
From the Ministry of Finance (MoF) perspective, without rural solution is not appropriate in an urban setting.
having an institution that coordinates and prioritizes
investment projects in the water sector as a whole it is
difficult to get an overview of whether Public Sector 700 Number of hand-dug wells and boreholes
with handpumps built by non-state actors in
Investment Program budget allocations and available aid Monrovia, Liberia, accounting for a half of the
have been consistent with policies and priorities for the 1,400 water points installed around the city.
water sector (ECA 2014).
14
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
Water vendors in Yei, South Sudan, distribute water in jerry cans under a small town water project financed by the
German government. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.)
4.2 Sources of Variation across Countries scale that enabled services to be delivered at prices well
The incentive to charge for services was fueled by below alternative solutions (private boreholes or water
political competition but dampened by alternative water tankers—often by multiples). With lower costs per cubic
sources. In implementing the utility reform work-stream, meter, water revenues were seen as a way of directly and
the WSP found that results were strongly influenced by indirectly increasing the tax base. Taxing water sales
the degree to which there was political incentive to charge directly increased the tax base, for instance, 5 percent of
for services. This political incentive, in turn, was stronger the HWA’s sales are remitted to the Somaliland Central
where central crisis led to an upsurge of subnational Bank and water revenues in Zimbabwe account for up
authority. Where crisis had diminished the central state to 50 percent of the municipal revenues. Water services,
through war (Somalia) or hyperinflation (Zimbabwe), particularly in Zimbabwe, were also seen as an indirect
politicians at the subnational level saw opportunity for mechanism to increase and broaden the tax base. Water
water supply as a tangible collective action problem worth could be cut off by municipalities where housing rates
acting on—to demonstrate local competence against were not being paid. Servicing new housing plots with
central impotence. water and sewer connections could raise the auction
price of land and expand the population of houses that
Addressing water supply had potential to bolster both the are ratable. These opportunities together propelled these
legitimacy and the local tax base of emerging subnational emerging regional and local governments to be both
entities. Where the centralized tax system no longer willing to deliver and willing to charge for services (see
functioned there was no possibility for national subsidies case studies on Somalia in Box 4.1, and the notable
to finance utilities. Cost recovery was a prerequisite to exception of South Sudan in Box 4.2).
keep services going. Network supplies had economies of
15
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
BOX 4.1: SOMALI REGIONAL STATES: WILLING TO CHARGE AND PARTIALLY ABLE TO DELIVER WATER
SERVICES
In Somalia the collapse of the central state in the 1990s led to the emergence of regional states, especially
in the north. With the destruction of water systems during the war and the collapse of centralized subsidies
to urban and rural water supply, solving the water supply crisis became a key issue for politicians of regional
states.4 In Somaliland and Puntland the limited aid available was used to restore basic system functionality.
With a very limited tax base there was no option for regional states to subsidize the recurrent costs of utilities.
Cost recovery for operation and maintenance was viewed by politicians as a prerequisite to keep utilities going,
and client power as a means of keeping the provider in check.
Different solutions have emerged as a way to delegate this authority to local utilities. In Puntland the municipalities
of Garowe and Bosaaso have contracted water services to the private sector. In Somaliland there has been
a mixed approach with service delivery variously under municipal management (the main model both pre-
and postindependence), public private partnership (PPP) and corporatization. In Borama, the municipality
transferred responsibility for service delivery to a private operator, the Awdal Utility Company (SHABA), in
October 2003 through a 10-year PPP lease agreement. Household connections have since risen from 130 in
2002 to 5,435 by the end of 2009 with a billing efficiency of close to 100 percent (Print, 2010). In Hargeisa,
where aerial strikes bombed the city and its water transmission lines in the early ’90s, basic system functionality
for 180,000 people was restored with subsequent donor support. Since then the city has grown to around 1
million people. Supported only by tariff—US$1.2 a cubic meter in 2016 reflecting the high operational costs of
pumping water from a well field over 20 km north of the city—the corporatized utility has managed to grow and
sustain a basic level of service to around half a million people through 25,000 household connections and 402
water kiosks with a billing efficiency of close to 100 percent.5
The high cost of alternative water supplies in the northern Somali semi-arid environment—up to US$7 per
m3 from water trucking in the driest times of year—has certainly been a factor contributing to the urgency
with which politicians have sought to enable network solutions. Even with relatively high tariffs these deliver
economies of scale, and so value, for citizens which reflect well on the nascent state authorities by making
these cities and towns more livable.
Source: World Bank data.
By contrast, in countries like Liberia and Sierra Leone jetting and hand auguring to quickly and cheaply install
which have abundant water resources, high rainfall and household or compound wells. While the number of
shallow aquifers water was of a lower political priority people in urban Nigeria served by household connections
than in semi-arid contexts of Somalia and Zimbabwe. For has dropped from 9 million in 1990 to 3 million in 2015,
wealthier households it was relatively simple to privatize the manual drilling service model is largely responsible
a solution to water supply by sinking a well in a back for the increase in coverage of other improved sources
yard. Alternative service delivery models spring up. In in urban areas, jumping from 12 to 68 million people
Nigeria, the booming manual drilling industry uses well over the same period (UNICEF/WHO Joint Monitoring
Program, 2015a).
4
Personal communication: Dr. Edna Adan Ismail, former Foreign Minister of the
autonomous Somaliland (2003 to 2006).
5
All prices for domestic customers are in local currency on a single tariff of 9,975
SLSh per m3. For international customers there is a rising block tariff structure paid in
US$ (0-10 m3@ $2, 10-20 m3@ $4, 20+ m3@ $5).
16
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
Across these case studies the magnitude of utility
competition from alternative sources was related to
hydrogeology and so the potential for alternative sources.
Where hydrogeology was conducive to low-cost alternative
water sources (such as manually drilled wells) a vicious
cycle of expanding alternatives and shrinking utility
services was more likely to occur. Where hydrogeology
did not lend itself to low-cost alternative water sources
(where only deep boreholes or water tucking were the
only alternative option) this vicious cycle of expanding
alternatives and shrinking utility services was less likely
to occur. However, the realization of potential into actual
competition was influenced by utilities’ ability to cover
Hargeisa Water Agency in Somaliland delivers water to public
operational costs from tariffs, underpinned by the political
tap stands for onward sale by water vendors.
(Photo credit: Chantal Richey.)
incentive to charge for water services.
TABLE 4.1: OVERVIEW OF UTILITY DATA DRAWN FROM BILLING SYSTEMS STUDY
Company GVWC LWSC REGIDESO PHWC HWA
City Freetown Monrovia (all urban DRC) Port Harcourt Hargeisa
Country Sierra Leone Liberia DR Congo Nigeria Somaliland
Year of reference 2012 2012 2013 2013 2012
Estimated no. of inhabitants 2013 1,350,000 1,300,000 28,000,000 1,400,000 1,000,000
No. of active customers (water)
Domestic 15,840 3,716 266,500 492 24,000
Non-domestic 2,060 1,600 18,500 400
Total 17,900 5,316 285,000 492 24,400
Inactive customers in the database 7,900 3,684 243,200 2,984 -
Total water produced (mm3/year) 29.2 4.7 273.2 3.2 3.1
Total water billed (mm3/year) n.a. 2 166.9 0 2.5
NRW rate (%) n.a. 58% 39% 100% 19%
Total amount billed (US$/year) 4,200,000 2,258,000 125,683,000 - 3,509,640
Apparent average price (US$/m ) 3
n.a. 1.13 0.75 1.4
Total amount collected (US$/year) 3,100,000 1,666,000 96,315,000 - 3,360,684
Collection rate (%) 74% 74% 77% 96%
Actual operating costs (US$/year) 3,100,000 4,835,061 96,315,000 3,000,000 3,192,650
Number of employees 330 293 4,500 180 329
Number of meters (active) 2,814 4,000 109,725 - 24,400
Source: World Bank data.
17
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | What the Technical Assistance Revealed about
Country Context
Aid, in turn, can either exacerbate or mitigate the operating ratios or billing to collection ratios as was the
problem of utility competition with alternative sources. case at REGIDESO in the DRC.
Humanitarian investment in alternative sources in urban
areas—particularly where these sources do not charge for It is the interaction of these sources of variation—political
water—exacerbated competition with utility supplies. incentives, hydrology, and aid—over time that has led to
Yet, development aid to utilities early after crises was the extraordinarily wide range in utility performance: from
either not forthcoming or did not significantly raise the total dependency on subsidy at the PHWC to the total
self-reliance of cost recovery at the HWA (Table 4.1).
BOX 4.2: SOUTH SUDAN URBAN WATER SUPPLY: WHY DID THE LIBERATION MOVEMENT NOT LEAD TO
BETTER RESULTS?
South Sudan has fluctuated between a state at risk and one that is weak but willing since the 2005 signing of
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that paved the way for establishment of the independent Republic
of South Sudan in 2011. This fluctuation in the state’s incentive to invest in and otherwise develop urban
water supply was a result of the availability of oil revenues to subsidize urban water supply, the inexperience
of the nascent government in undertaking reform, and the overall security challenges which often disrupted
government revenue flows and the interest and will of government and development partners alike.
The post-CPA period offered an opportunity for improved services in Southern Sudan as oil revenues flowed
into the autonomous region and there was a desire to secure the peace and to buy political advantage in the
lead up to the referendum for independence. Lack of institutional strength and low human capacity, in particular,
resulted in the water sector being unable to absorb the wave of donor funding that sought to address the
overwhelming humanitarian needs following the signing of the CPA. Early donor funds focused on emergency
water supply, on a protracted basis (Huston, 2014).
Following the referendum for independence, the urban water sector remained institutionally weak and
continued to struggle with the ‘capacity conundrum’. Uncertain oil revenues and resulting inconsistent
subsidizes for urban water services made public water supply at best unreliable, but more often nonexistent
for urban residents. During this period private sector water providers mushroomed to meet demand in urban
areas with water bottlers, jerry can vendors and water truck haulers serving customers with both treated and
untreated water supply, often at very high prices. The expensive, informal, and unregulated private water
supply was a daily reminder for most urban residents that the new government was unable to provide the
most basic water services.
A political crisis at the highest level of the government broke out into open violence in December 2013, pushing
the country back into conflict. During this period of political crisis and continued low oil revenues, the government
seemed more focused on improving water services and increasing cost recovery in order to keep limited
services operational, to maintain some sense of legitimacy, and to avoid systemic collapse of public water
services. The government was keen to work with donor agencies as international support for the government
diminished with the expansion of tribal violence. The public water supply continues to serve approximately 10
percent of urban residents and is a regular reminder of governance and service failures.
Source: World Bank data.
18
V. Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
This chapter summarizes the achievements recorded 5.1 Relative Influence of TA and Context on IOs
against the IOs for each of the countries. It then reflects Progress against the IOs was the shared and collective
on the relationship between the way that the TA was result of government, external partner, and WSP effort.
provided and the overall transition progress made as well An overview of the status of each IO in each country as
as how the input-to-IO relationship was influenced by the at mid-2016 (the end point of the TA) is set out in the
contextual factors described in the previous chapter. large two-page Table 5.2 at the end of this section. The
spectrum of progress against the IOs to which the WSP
The second half of the chapter critically examines whether made a substantive contribution is also summarized in
the strategic choices made in the approach to the TA were the condensed Table 5.1 below. This shows the relative
valid, drawing out the key lessons for each of the two work- progress made against each IO as well as a crude measure of
streams, that is, (i) reestablishing the sector oversight role; cumulative ‘transition progress’ made in each county (the
and (ii) utility reform. last column). The color coded cells were the IOs to which
the WSP contributed and the white cells show the 2016
status even where no direct WSP contribution was made.
TABLE 5.1: SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ON INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES ACROSS COUNTRIES
Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore Establish Increase Increase use
country rigorous cost an inclusive domestic of country Cumulative
leadership sector recovery sector investment systems by ‘transition
in sector monitoring in urban investment in the development progress’
coordination and joint utilities, plan (SIP) and sector partners across IOs
and policy sector review small- process that by country
development processes towns, mobilizes
and large infrastructure
rural piped investment
water
schemes
DRC 2 1 1 1 5
Liberia 2 3 2 3 1 1 12
Nigeria 1 1 2
ROC 2 1 0 3
Sierra Leone 1 3 4
Somalia 2 3 1 2 2 10
South Sudan 0
Zimbabwe 3 3 2 3 1 2 14
No WSP Substantial
Legend: No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress
intervention progress
Source: World Bank data.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
Before reflecting on the progress made by countries, it is The measure of cumulative transition progress across
useful to note that the differential progress across each of IOs shows the relatively greater progress made in three
the six TA IOs reflects the hierarchy of outcomes illustrated countries (Liberia, Somalia, and Zimbabwe), moderate
in Figure 5.1. Sector monitoring, improving cost recovery progress made in two (the DRC and Sierra Leone) and
in utilities, and investment planning (IOs 2, 3, and 4) limited or no progress made in the other countries.
were precursors to reestablishing country leadership in
sector coordination and policy development (IO 1). In To explain the reasons for this differential progress, the
turn, it was this sector leadership that underpinned the way that three process aspects of the TA interacted with
willingness of ministries of finance to increase domestic contextual factors in each country needs to be understood.
investment (IO 5) and of donors to use country systems These process aspects were: (i) when, relative to the start
(IO 6). Under this TA, greater progress was made on the of the postcrisis period, the WSP engaged in the country;
precursor IOs as these were closely linked to the WSP’s (ii) the intensity of the relationship with sector civil
interventions and less dependent on the interaction of TA servants; and (iii) the degree to which the WSP worked in
with contextual factors. collaboration with other external partners.
Of these process aspects the timing of the TA intervention
relative to the start of the postcrisis was the most critical.
FIGURE 5.1: A HIERARCHY OF OUTCOMES
Though identifying the start of the postcrisis period can be
TOWARDS ESTABLISHING COUNTRY-LED
difficult—particularly where there is not a definitive peace
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMING
settlement—it is possible by tagging the start of postcrisis
period to sector events such as the restarting of utility
operations, the restarting of water point construction or a
specific disease outbreak. The earlier the WSP got involved
Increase domestic Increase use of in a country after these critical sector events the greater
investment in the country systems was the TA’s influence on the transition trajectory of the
sector by development sector. In Zimbabwe, the WSP got involved very soon
partners after the 2008 cholera outbreak and was able to create
strong partnerships with both sector civil servants and
with other external responders (both humanitarian and
Reestablish country
development). By contrast, the WSP only got involved
leadership in sector
in Liberia in 2011 and in Sierra Leone in 2012 nearly a
coordination and
decade after their respective peace settlements. In addition
policy development
to making it more difficult to develop trusted relations with
sector civil servants and break into established networks of
Restore cost Establish external partners, it was observed that as time passes the
Institutionalize
rigorous recovery in an inclusive combined effect of unmanaged aid and the entrenchment
sector urban utilities, sector of alternative service providers makes it ever more difficult
monitoring small towns investment to reestablish arrangements between sector oversight
and joint and large rural plan that institutions and non-state service providers (whether for-
sector review piped water mobilizes profit or not-for profit).
processes schemes infrastructure
investment The intensity of the relationship with sector civil
servants was pivotal in adding value to the TA resources
available. In most of the countries the WSP developed
Source: World Bank data.
strong relations with civil servants adept at shaping and
20
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
Rubbish collection point. Prior to the World Bank-supported Beitbridge Emergency Water Supply and Sanitation project,
the entire town was covered in solid waste. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.)
managing the TA process. Leaders at the GVWC in brokering a multistakeholder agreement with external
Sierra Leone, for example, were very clear about their partners. To get a real transition from emergency to
need to replace their utility billing system and carry out development programming there needed to be mutual
a customer enumeration survey. They quickly took over accountability for sector results—external partners had
the management of the firm hired to carry out the work to be transparent and accountable to government for
and developed new ways of using the data generated, their results and vice versa. As time since the start of
such as using SMS text messages to let customers know the postcrisis period passed and bypassing government
their outstanding balances with the utility. In Somalia, became the norm, the transaction costs of brokering
with virtually no external partners involved in financing these multistakeholder compacts (see section 5.2.1)
government-led service delivery or oversight, sector civil grew. Where, for example, the WSP engaged many years
servants skillfully matched the TA resources for corporate after the start of the postcrisis period, intense work with
governance with their local political connections to put in other external partners was needed to get agreement to
place the board of directors for the HWA. support, not undermine, government oversight in the
sector. This, for example, explains the greater progress
The degree to which the WSP worked in collaboration made in Liberia where the WSP invested a great deal
with other external partners reflected a growing of time and effort in supporting the multistakeholder
realization, over the TA period, that building government compact, compared with Sierra Leone where the WSP
capacity for sector oversight had to be matched with did not have a continuous in-country presence.
21
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
of a protracted crisis but as one of the first external actors
working through government. The progress was also aided
by contextual factors as the respective governments had a
strong political incentive to demonstrate their ability to
deliver service, especially urban water services.
The moderate progress in the DRC, also a protracted
crisis, was held back by there being no clear locus of
government authority in the sector with which to build a
strong relationship, in spite of strong and well established
relations with external partners. This stemmed from
contextual factors including the fragmented nature of the
water sector institutions in government and, until recently,
the lack of decentralization. In Sierra Leone, the progress
made on utility reform driven by the GVWC leadership
contrasted strongly with that made on rural water which
would have required brokering a multistakeholder process
between government and external partners—impossible
due to not having an in-country presence.
In the remaining countries, contextual factors trumped
any influences in the way that TA was delivered, most
obviously in South Sudan where since 2013 the WSP was
unable to operate. In Port Harcourt, Nigeria, the build-up
of alternative sources over time presents the utility with an
almost insurmountable problem and may require devising
a completely different approach to service delivery based
A water pumping station in Somalia.
on regulating alternative sources. In the ROC, a very strong
(Photo credit: Robert Kogi.)
relationship with government needs to be built at the level
of the Presidency to reach agreement on the need for sector
institutions to sustainably manage the infrastructure that
Returning then to the relative transition progress made
is currently being built by external contractors.
across the eight countries the greater progress made in
Zimbabwe, Liberia, and Somalia was for different reasons.
In summary, there is a high dividend to initiating
In Zimbabwe, the good progress was due to early entry
development interventions early in the postcrisis period.
after the 2008 cholera crisis that was able to trigger
Intervening early sets in place the foundations for
positive contextual factors, namely, the latent government
building sector oversight capacity and initiating utility
capacity for sector oversight in an environment where
reform that can help prevent countries getting locked into
municipal revenues from water services bounced back as
unsustainable aid modalities and can stem the proliferation
the country dollarized. By contrast, in Liberia, the late
of alternative water sources. As time passes, the effort and
entry of the WSP led to there being high transaction costs
capacity required to overcome what become operational
to renegotiating the multistakeholder compact to support
norms and vested interests increases. Contextual factors
the transition to development programming and a struggle
change and crystalize around dominant service delivery
to raise utility revenues. In Somalia, the relatively good
modalities. Political incentives to tackle cost recovery wane
progress reflects the situation in the north—Somaliland
and aid modalities get entrenched, making the transition
and Puntland—where the WSP’s entry was in the context
to development programming more difficult.
22
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
TABLE 5.2: SUMMARY OF PROGRESS ON INTERMEDIATE OUTCOMES ACROSS COUNTRIES
Substantial
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress
progress
Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use
country leadership rigorous sector recovery in inclusive sector domestic of country
in sector monitoring and urban utilities, investment investment in systems by
coordination joint sector small-towns, plan (SIP) the sector development
and policy review processes and large rural and process partners
development piped water that mobilizes
schemes infrastructure
investment
DRC Water law ratified Survey and REGIDESO Investment plan Funding to No sector
and promulgated evaluation of is testing for autonomous WASH has budget support
by the President in autonomous delegated piped water not been mechanism.
early 2016 piped water management of schemes prioritized WB investment
schemes initiated standposts but developed but by the managed by
dialogue on no conclusive not for sector as government PIU led by
management and results on a whole Secretary
regulation impact on cost General for
recovery REGIDESO
Liberia WASH Compact A regular Updating of the Detailed Raised level WB investment
signed by the JSR process billing system SIP exists of domestic ($10 million)
President in 2011, supported by an and customer for 2012–17 funding in Monrovia’s
established and a SPR in place led databases mobilized (circa thwarted in urban water
series of guiding by NWSHPC helped increase US$30 million FY14 by lack supply will be
documents and revenue as of 2016) with of absorption managed by
events collection at greater attention capacity PIU embedded
LWSC since the EVD of ministry in LWSC
epidemic responsible
for rural water
supply
Nigeria Dynamic Water quality Assessment Urban water Domestic AfDB and WB
(Rivers State) Commissioner monitoring of systems led supply investment as investment for
responsible for institutionalized to installation investment counterpart PHWC to be
water in Rivers at PHWC of basic attracted for funds to WB managed by
State drove reform accounting and Port Harcourt and AfDB external PIU
agenda (2011– billing system from AfDB ($170 investment
2015) million) and WB
($80 million)
ROC GoC has initiated Water point No progress No SIP GoC has GoC financing
sectorwide mapping on delegated established reduced 80% of
dialogue on a new initiated policy management of investment in WB project
policy dialogue but standposts in the sector due managed
monitoring not urban areas to lower than through a PIU
institutionalized expected oil in the Ministry
and no JSRs revenues in of Equipment
2015 and Public
Works
23
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
Intermediate 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Outcomes Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use
country leadership rigorous sector recovery in inclusive sector domestic of country
in sector monitoring and urban utilities, investment investment in systems by
coordination joint sector small-towns, plan (SIP) the sector development
and policy review processes and large rural and process partners
development piped water that mobilizes
schemes infrastructure
investment
Sierra Leone A sector policy Ministry of Water Replacing No SIP has No increase WB
was approved in created civil billing system been developed in GoSL Decentralized
2010 but provides service posts for and updating investment Service
weak guidance on sector monitoring customer in WASH Delivery
cost recovery or but did not retain databases has infrastructure Program
tariff setting and staff recruited increased billing used country
review and stabilized systems but
utility revenues link with sector
institutions not
made
Somalia Where it exists, Multiple Strengthened No SIP but HWA WB investment
sector leadership data sources corporate analysis of reinvesting using
from regional integrated into governance potential scope surplus utility embedded
state level but wadi evaluation improved cost for, and impacts revenues PIUs led by
implementation by tool used recovery at HWA of, rural water in strategic civil servants
non-state actors by regional supply used improvements complemented
very fragmented governments to to design WB- to its by WB support
guide investment financed project infrastructure to MoF for
such as PFM systems
additional strengthening
pumps
South Sudan Leadership JSRs with Main utility Juba sanitation Significant A decrease
from ministry representation SSUWC agreed SIP included drop in GoSS in donor
responsible from states in on a corporate investment investment appetite for
for water has 2011/12 have not plan which planning due to dispute use of country
not translated been repeated enshrined a processes but over revenue systems
into country- due both to commitment to neither have sharing from compounded
led program as capacity and cost recovery mobilized oil pipeline with sanctions
external response security issues but restoring infrastructure followed by against GoSS
fragmented only a low level investment escalation in by some
achieved conflict since donors
2014
Zimbabwe GoZ led dialogue Service-level SLB process has SIP established Some WB
and approved benchmarking led to gains in and detailed municipalities investments
National Water (SLB) process efficiency across small town using water in Beitbridge
Policy (2013). in place for some of the 32 investment revenues ($2.6 million)
Coordination 32 urban municipalities planning led for system and ZINWA
strengthened municipalities to $20 million improvements ($20 million)
with peer to peer ZIMREF use(d)
review process investment embedded
and JSRs administered by PIU led by civil
the WB servants or
utility staff
Source: World Bank data.
24
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
5.2 Work-Stream 1: Reestablishing the
BOX 5.1: COMPACTS—AGREEMENTS BETWEEN
Sector Oversight Role Relies on
THE POLICY MAKERS OF A STATE AND SERVICE
Government’s Ability to Access Critical
DELIVERY PROVIDERS
Sector Data
The WSP’s starting assumption was that bringing the The WDR 2004 describes compacts as the
state back into a sector oversight role would be facilitated agreements between the policy makers of a
by generating hard-to-get field data. This data would state and service delivery providers. It may be an
provide sector oversight institutions with the evidence explicit contract or an implicit understanding and,
base to pinpoint critical sector issues—poor quality well more often than not, a combination of the two. It
construction or health hazards due inappropriate technology can be between the state and an agency, private
use—and so the authority to renegotiate a “compact” (see or not-for-profit organization or between tiers
Box 5.1) among the disparate array of external responders of government agreement. Compacts are about
and local coping strategies to service delivery. inducing providers to achieve the outcomes of
interest to citizens through:
This data-focused approach was a strategic choice selected
Clarifying responsibilities—by separating the
against a more conventional policy-led approach which
role of policymaker, accountable to citizens, from
would have led off with institutional analysis. While in
that of provider organizations, accountable to
politically stable countries policies, laws and regulations
policymakers.
are seen as means of upholding the “compact” for inducing
providers to achieve outcomes of interest to citizens, these Choosing the appropriate provider—civil
instruments are less viable in FCV affected countries. servants, autonomous public agencies, NGOs or
In low-income FCV affected countries the experiences private contractors.
generated by this TA have confirmed that: Providing good information—Just monitoring the
a) Most service delivery is done directly by non-state performance of contracts requires more and better
actors including private actors with little or no measures. Keeping an eye on the prize of better
incentive to comply with the state. outcomes requires regular measurement as well
b) State institutions have very little capacity to as finding out what works by rigorously evaluating
enforce laws and policies. programs and their effects.
c) There is a vacuum of evidence on which to base
policy formulation. Source: World Bank, 2004.
d) In the absence of the traditional sector service
roles and instruments, good sector data provide
a platform for governments to broker sector
agreements. Reestablishing state leadership of the sector through
compacts with existing and emergent providers requires
It was established that policy tends to lag against practice— data on the, often, co-existing service delivery models
especially good practice as was the case in the DRC with driven by (a) the remaining if weak public sector providers
AWS (see DRC case study in appendix). In FCV affected (utilities, municipalities, and districts); (b) household
countries, where service delivery models emerge largely coping strategies including informal market provision;
outside the control and purview of public institutions, and (c) external and non-state and private actors which
standard analysis of sector institutions was of limited use. provide direct service.
This is not to say that there is no place for policy, there
may be especially in the latter stages of transition, but the This evidence informs the public sector choices on which of
idea that de jure policy is able to direct practice is flawed the multiple service delivery models (public sector, coping
as the levers to translate policy into practice, or to redirect strategies, externally supported) will deliver the best sector
practice, are so weak. outcomes and so which models to promote and which to
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
phase out. Further, reliable data also helps states to defend
BOX 5.2: USING WATER POINT MAPPING AS A
and manage the conflict which can emerge when shifting the
BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING SECTOR OVERSIGHT
balance towards, and then expanding, the service delivery
IN LIBERIA
models that have better sector outcomes—especially where
models are in direct competition, for example, when The Ministry of Public Works’ focal point who
promoting a return from manually drilled coping strategies had led the water point mapping exercise tried to
to utility supply in Port Harcourt. institutionalize the capture of data on new water
points being built or rehabilitated by the large
Work-stream 1 not only confirmed the valuable role of number of sector actors operating in Liberia.
sector data in reasserting the role of the state, but generated Agencies were consulted, simple reporting forms
additional related lessons on the nature of the sector were drawn up and circulated, and the focal point
agreements that the data facilitates, as described below. followed up regularly with agencies to get updates.
Despite a number of attempts to reinvigorate the
5.2.1 Compacts are more likely to stick where there updating mechanism, including migrating it to the
are incentives for mutual accountability digital “Really Simple Reporting” platform,6 uptake
Compacts with existing, external, and emerging providers has been limited.
need to be negotiated rather than established through
There was some voluntary reprioritization by sector
a top-down legalistic approach. A number of different
actors responding to the water point atlas that
negotiated approaches to developing compacts among
was published. UNICEF explicitly incorporated the
sector actors were tried under this TA including: issue-
data into project designs to improve the targeting
based approaches (for example, to improve water point
of investment. In late 2015, the Ministry of Public
functionality); investment-based approaches (for instance,
Works decided to use water point mapping data
a sector investment plans); internationally-led sectorwide
and technology for a self-financed campaign to
compacts, and; country-led JSR processes.
repair 500 water points requiring only very simple
spare parts costing less than US$100. Based on this
Examples of issue-based approaches were (a) specifically
intervention criteria, teams of WASH coordinators,
targeting the poor construction quality of externally
pump technicians, and social workers have repaired
financed wells in Sierra Leone (see appendix on Sierra
handpumps within Mountserrado County.
Leone); and (b) getting all agencies operating in the
sector in Liberia to register new and rehabilitated water But the greater opportunity to use the water point
points (see Box 5.2). Taking a narrow, but evidence based, mapping data as the basis for a regularly updated
approach to translating analytics into action, such as sector overview—or even a compact for results
where handpumps were needed most or where handpumps based financing—has not yet materialized.
needed fixing, was a logical first step in developing a
Source: World Bank data.
compact between the state and non-state actors’ service
providers. The anticipated advantage of compacts based
on single issues such as infrastructure functionality, was A second approach to developing compacts with sector
their simplicity and focus. An additional benefit was some actors, tried in Liberia and Zimbabwe,7 was through
voluntary use by external actors of the water point mapping sector investment planning. SIPs were an opportunity
data in financing agreements with donors—a sign that the to break down ambitious national plans into bankable
data were both useful and that donors want to see better projects that could be picked up by a range of sector
targeting of their finance. Yet despite creative attempts,
both the governments of Liberia and Sierra Leone have 6
Akvo Really Simple Reporting is a web and Android-based system that makes it easy
for development aid teams to bring complex networks of projects online and instantly
found it difficult to make this means of establishing sector share progress with everyone involved and interested.
oversight stick as sector actors do not feel obliged to be 7
The Zimbabwe Water Sector Investment Framework was financed by the AMDTF,
accountable to government. not this project, but its utility has been monitored under this TA.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
financiers. SIPs have potential to be an investment-based government (led by the Ministry of Planning). At the
compact to coordinate both government and donor inputs time many sector representatives managing investments
to a sector without transaction-heavy regular coordination in Liberia were based in other countries and so had not
meetings.Initially, after the SIP in Liberia was launched, met before. The compact committed both donors and
there was a limited response from donors or the MoF. But government to strengthen institutional capacity, reinforce
in support of the funding response to the EVD crisis the efforts to provide equitable services, support sector
SIP was used as a means of structuring and prioritizing monitoring, and improve sector-financing mechanisms.
critical, and vetted, investment requirements to donors. The WASH Compact created a new multistakeholder
This included private sector donors such as Firestone coordination committee led by the MoPW that provided
and NOCAL who committed to financing water supply a locus of authority and coordination for rural WASH for
projects in their areas of operation in Harbel and Ganta, the first time. The compact was a very simple document
respectively. By contrast the SIP in Zimbabwe, at the time that outlined commitments to the WASH sector arranged
of writing this report, had not been widely used by donors around four key thematic areas, for delivery over a two-
or private sector—evidence that mutual accountability in year time period, to:
the sector had not yet been generated. • Strengthen institutional capacity.
• Ensure equity, prioritize service provision.
5.2.2 Though mutual accountability is in short supply • Develop a monitoring system.
the solution is to demand more • Improve sector financing mechanisms.
A third approach to sector compacts based on sector data
is a multistakeholder approach. Two examples were A significant result of the compact has been the improved
an internationally-led approach through the Sanitation coordination and networking across the WASH sector
and Water for All (SWA) partnership and a country- in Liberia. Regular meetings of the sector coordination
led approach through JSRs. A distinction between these committee provided a forum for information sharing and
multistakeholder compacts and those described above, a focus for sector discussions. The four commitments of
is the greater emphasis on mutual accountability in the the 2011 Compact formed the structure of the Sector
multistakeholder approach. Rather than relying on weak Strategic Plan (SSP). The SSP set out a detailed roadmap of
sector oversight institutions to enforce accountability, sector reform and became the focus of the JSRs in Liberia,
the onus both to make and to uphold multistakeholder and even more robust, country-led compact process.
compacts lies with all parties.
JSR processes, a country-led multistakeholder compact,
SWA is a multistakeholder partnership committed to can provide a dynamic and flexible basis for a compact
achieving universal, sustainable access to water, sanitation between the state and other sector actors. JSRs are a
and hygiene services by 2030. Recognizing that much of periodic process that brings different stakeholders in a
the investment by donors still comes through projects particular sector together to engage in dialogue, review status,
(85 percent in 2013), often concentrating on direct progress and performance, and take decisions on priority
infrastructure investment, SWA members agreed to actions. JSRs have their origins as a review mechanism
work towards an internationally-led multistakeholder within the Sector Wide Approach (SWAp) although
compact in Liberia. today they are carried out in contexts without a SWAp.
JSR processes have been introduced into countries with
The Liberia WASH Compact was the result of a Joint a high dependence on aid (Packer, 2006), and have been
Mission of SWA members undertaken with the support of driven by the Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda’s push
the Government of Liberia (GoL). This was the first time for results-oriented reporting and assessment, as well as
sector representatives from nearly all agencies (bilateral, the principles of ownership, alignment, harmonization,
multilateral, and civil society) working in the Liberian and mutual accountability.
WASH sector came together under the leadership of In a background study for this report, to better understand
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
Figure 5.2: SCHEMATIC OF THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW CYCLE
Pregathering
preparation such Postgathering
as: meetings, data report, commitments
JSR
collection, field and follow-up
gathering
visits, preparation of meetings
input papers and/or
sector report
National context, reforms and WASH service delivery
CYCLE 1 CYCLE 2 CYCLE 3
Key: Communication
Status and action
Time
Source: World Bank data.
the scope for fostering mutual accountability through It takes political incentives to uphold multistakeholder
JSRs, the first study of countries reporting to have a compacts as they require a step change in the behavior
WASH JSR process were studied. The study included a both of sector oversight institutions and the multitude of
review of the experience in Liberia, Sierra Leone, South actors in the sector. Making the shift to more collaborative
Sudan, and Zimbabwe. behaviors can be assisted with international attention. Just
as international advocacy from SWA helped rally sector
A key tenet of JSRs is getting agreement on priority actions. actors into closer collaboration and a series of JSRs in
But the review showed that this is a major challenge in most Liberia so similar processes could initiate more mutual
countries and only in two cases—Uganda and Nepal—were accountability in other countries. International pressure
priorities both committed to and reviewed in subsequent to monitor and periodically peer review JSRs would likely
JSRs (see Table 5.3). Frustration with this aspect of the JRSs strengthen these processes.
was raised repeatedly from all sides. Despite the centrality
of mutual accountability to JSRs, with few exceptions, the 5.3 Work-Stream 2: Cost Recovery can
documentation of JSR processes and outputs in WASH was Support Performance Improvements
hard to find without contacting those directly involved and and is an Entry Point for Broader Utility
only available online in seven out of 19 countries where Reform
JSRs had taken place. Though improving cost recovery in FCV affected countries
may seem particularly intractable, as conflict has left
The study concludes that, despite its potential, WASH JSR’s utilities with severely damaged infrastructure, inefficient
contribution to mutual accountability can be demonstrated organizations, and widespread illegal connections,
in only a few countries. Yet with a growing number of JSRs the experience in Liberia and Sierra Leone shows that
taking place and few other options for bringing sector improvement is possible and indeed an essential building
oversight to the multitude of actors operating in the sector, block for sustained and improved service provision.
particularly in FCV affected countries, the way forward
must be to strengthen and not abandon these processes.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
TABLE 5.3: EVIDENCE OF JSR PROCESSES LEADING TO MUTUALLY AGREED ‘BINDING COMMITMENTS’
Criteria Objectives Accountability Priorities
No. of Agreed Actions,
Binding Commitments
JSR
No. of Years of JSRs
Wide Representation
Documentation Reports
Recommendations
Commitments or
Presents Online
at JSR Gathering
Information on:
Undertakings
Explicitly Set
JSR Year
Country
Sector Report
No. of
Expenditure
Gathering
Outputs
Status
Burkina
7 2013 - - 10
Faso
Burundi 5 2014 22 0
Ethiopia 6 2013 4–9 per year
Ghana 4 2013 - - - 27 0
Liberia 3 2015 13 0
Kenya 9 2015 5 34 ?
21–28
Malawi 8 2014 -
(2012–2014)
Nepal 2 2014
Niger 8 2015 ? 20 (+39) 0
Rwanda 11 2015
Senegal 8 2014 - 0 -
South
4 2012 3
Sudan
Sierra 2013 ? ?
2
Leone 2014 - - - 37 4
Tanzania 9 2014
Uganda 15 2005-2015
2006 - -
Yemen 2
2007 - -
Zambia 6 2014 - 30 -
Zimbabwe 3 2011 - 4 (+21)
Source: World Bank data.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
BOX 5.3: THE JOINT SECTOR REVIEW PROCESS IN LIBERIA
In 2014, the Government of Liberia (GoL) published the country’s first Sector Performance Report (SPR) on
WASH. The SPR collated information from surveys, studies, and reports for stakeholders to use as an evidence
base to debate and agree priorities for action.
The report was written by a team of Liberian authors identified from the key WASH ministries and agencies.
The support team helped find and repackage data from the Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information Services
and supported a robust process of peer review, discussion, and refinement.Over 200 attendees spent the two
days reviewing the SPR, listening to each other’s points of views, and deciding on the best way forward for the
sector by prioritizing actions.
The multistakeholder planning and review process has further strengthened sector coordination including
greater circulation of information among actors and has created a focus for annual reporting on the activities
in the Sector Strategic Plan. However, key institutional changes such as setting up the Water Supply and
Sanitation Commission and a National Water Resources and Sanitation Board have been slow, undermining
momentum on other equally important steps such as consolidating sector monitoring and attracting sector
investment which were to be done by these institutions. Furthermore, more support will be required to help
the government maximize the SPR and the joint sector reviews and to use them as a means to assess sector
performance. Data on the relation between inputs and outputs in the sector is still far too fragmented to enable
a quantitative analysis of sector performance.
The principle of mutual accountability, in turn, is not well understood among actors—both by GoL’s water sector
institutions and by development partners in the water sector. The persistence of highly contractual norms of
humanitarian aid in Liberia instead of the more collaborative norms of development assistance in low-income
politically stable countries is likely one of main reasons for this. There are also no internal or external oversight
mechanisms to hold the GoL and partners in the sector accountable to specific commitments. The ministries of
finance, planning or the President’s Office, for example, currently play very limited roles in the multistakeholder
planning and review process. Similarly, there are no obvious external budget support or Peace and State-
building Goal processes that could be used as accountability mechanisms.
Source: World Bank data.
To improve revenue collection, the WSP helped the LWSC interventions and tariff reform. This revenue increase
and GVWC locate and enumerate tens-of-thousands of its helped stabilize the financial positions of the utilities and
own customers, found thousands of suspicious connections increase the confidence of customers in the performance
triggering a clampdown on unregistered and nonpaying of the utility.
users, facilitated the upgrading of billing software systems
at both utilities, piloted improved metering and customer In addition to improving operating ratios the improved
acquisition processes, and worked on developing a pro- customer information management systems installed
poor output-based connection subsidy program to through this TA helped these utilities cope with the
overcome a major barrier to expanding the customer economic shock resulting from the EVD outbreak—by
base—high connection fees. substituting revenues from businesses that closed with
revenues from the relief operations that opened up.
The progress made was reflected in positive cost recovery
trends both at the GVWC and LWSC, the latter recording The increased credibility gained by the LWSC also
more than a 100 percent increase in revenue in 2014 contributed to the World Bank’s decision to finance the
compared with 2011 through a combination of these first stand-alone International Development Association
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
(IDA) allocation to urban water in post-war Liberia—a
US$10 million investment targeting improvements of the
LWSC’s infrastructure expected to start in 2016.
5.3.1 Cost recovery is best addressed at the point
of restarting utility operations in the postcrisis
period when government budgets are still
constrained
Utility cost recovery of at least operation and maintenance
(O&M) varied greatly across countries, from the PHWC,
in Nigeria that was entirely subsidized from government
revenues, to the HWA, in Somaliland, that was a net
contributor to government revenues. Most municipal
water utilities and departments in Zimbabwe were net
contributors to the government revenues and, in the
DRC, the national utility REGIDESO recovered over 80
percent of its O&M costs.
Once tariff structures were set below a level sufficient to
cover O&M costs it was difficult to raise them to reflect
O&M even where alternative sources were more expensive.
In Freetown, Sierra Leone, for example, the average GVWC
tariff was US$0.17 per m3 while alternative sources were
up to US$6.00 per m3. In Brazzaville, ROC, the national
utility’s (SNDE: Societé Nationale de Distribution d’
Eau) average tariff was US$0.35 per m3 while alternative
Collecting data in the field on Fiamah.
providers charged at least US$3.50 per m3. Yet in both
(Photo credit: Kerstin Danert.)
these situations renegotiating the tariff to reflect at least
TABLE 5.4: THE COST OF WATER SUPPLY PER CUBIC METER FROM UTILITIES VERSUS PRIVATE
PROVIDERS
Country City Utility Cost Per Cubic Meter (USD)
Utility Alternative Provider
(Average Tariff) Charges
Sierra Leone Freetown Guma Valley Water Company $0.17 $6.00
Liberia Monrovia Liberia Water and Sewer $1.32 $10.00
Port
Nigeria Port Harcourt Water Corporation - $2.00
Harcourt
DRC Kinshasa REGIDESO $0.75 $2.00–$5.00
ROC Brazzaville Societé Nationale de Distribution d’ Eau $0.35 $3.50
Zimbabwe Harare Harare Water and Sanitation $0.40 $12.00
South Sudan Juba SSUWC/Juba $1.00 $15.00
Somalia Hargeisa Hargeisa Water Agency $1.20 $8.00–$12.00
Source: World Bank data.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
O&M costs has not been possible. In the case of the 5.3.2 Recovering operation and maintenance
GVWC there has not been a tariff adjustment since 2006 costs for utility services is unlikely to impact
despite there being evidence that raising the average tariff the poor negatively and may reduce their
to US$0.73 per m3 would benefit both GVWC viability expenditure on water
and consumers (PEM consult, Colan Consult & Dalan Where utilities had no option but to recover all operation
Development Consultants, 2014). Likewise, at SNDE and maintenance costs from customers, there was still a
in the ROC, despite there being agreements to raise the substantial positive differential between utility network
tariff to cover O&M costs, both in a performance contract average tariffs and charges levied by alternative providers.
between government and SNDE and under a private In Hargeisa, Somaliland charges levied by alternative
sector service contract that was signed with VEOLIA in supplies of water were over 6 to 10 times those charged
2013, tariffs remain at 1994 levels (Government of the by the utility. In Kinshasa and urban parts of the DRC
Republic of Congo, 2011). where its national utility REGIDESO operates, alternative
supplies of water were priced between 2.5 and 6 times those
Moreover, there may only be a narrow window of charged by the utility. This positive differential highlights
opportunity for fragile states to put in place cost recovery. the economies of scale available through utility provision
Both Liberia and Sierra Leone are resource rich countries versus alternative sources but needs to be confirmed
and there is a danger that not addressing cost recovery through further analysis of concessional capital support
early in the emergency to development transition will and deferred maintenance across utility and alternative
leave utilities dependent on subsidy, as has been the case source delivery models.
in a large number of utilities in Nigeria.
However, these benefits, whether or not from economies
This TA and the underlying case material points to of scale, were not always being spread to the majority of
addressing cost recovery at the point when utility households, let alone the poor. Though data on access to
operations are restarted in the postcrisis period and while utility supplies by wealthier and poorer households was
government budgets are constrained. limited, analysis carried out for urban DRC showed that
FIGURE 5.3: POORER HOUSEHOLDS WOULD BENEFIT FROM CONNECTING TO UTILITY-PROVIDED PIPED
WATER ON PREMISES
100%
90%
80%
70%
60%
50%
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
Improved water Piped water Piped on premises (in Piped off-premise
dwelling or yard/plot) (public tap or from
neighbor)
Wealthiest quintile Second quintile Third quintile Fourth quintile Poorest quintile
Source: World Bank data.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Outcomes and Lessons from the Technical Assistance
piped water on premises (a proxy for utility supply) was 5.3.4 TA to improve cost recovery should have
almost exclusively captured by the wealthiest households been combined with limited infrastructure
(the top quintile). Virtually all other households (in the investment
bottom four quintiles) had to fetch water from alternative A question for future interventions in utilities in FCV
sources including: buying from neighbors with utility affected situations is whether the low-cost, short-term
connections who sell utility water with a mark-up; interventions taken under this TA would have been more
from utility standposts which charge a mark-up for the effective if combined with infrastructure investment
operator; from alternative, more expensive sources; or funding. Because there were huge investment needs in all
from unimproved sources (World Bank, Forthcoming). the targeted utilities, availability of investment funding
Spreading the benefits of lower utility tariffs to poorer would likely have shifted attention away from the difficult
households can, therefore, be a progressive strategy even work of increasing revenues from the existing utility
with levels of cost recovery for covering O&M. operation to building infrastructure.
5.3.3 Cost recovery is an entry point to other reform However, there were good examples of where small
actions investments would have been very effective in reducing
The focus on cost recovery was explicit, in the case of operating costs for utilities, particularly in relation to
the LWSC and GVWC, but was an implicit focus of the water pumping costs. Many utilities in FCV affected
TA provided to two other utilities operating in fragile countries are dependent on diesel generated power for
environments, namely, PHWC in Rivers State, Nigeria, water pumping. The utility in Hargeisa has spent an
and HWA in Somaliland. In these utilities the initial average of 60 percent of its revenues on supplying 7,000
interest in supporting improvements in cost recovery liters of diesel a day to its generators. In 2013 the LWSC
morphed into support on other reform actions, but for spent an average of US$28,000 a week on diesel equal
two different reasons. In the case of the PHWC the utility to one-third of its operating costs. In both these cases
was in the midst of crisis requiring leadership change, investing the equivalent of one year of turnover in more
complete review of staffing skills, and an emergency line efficient solutions to these energy needs would have freed
of credit to keep it going at all. Working directly on cost up a great deal of revenue with a repayment period of less
recovery would have been premature, though it remained than three years.
an implicit target even of efforts to stabilize the immediate
crisis. In the case of the HWA, water sales were enough In summary, though understanding the issues underlying
to cover its basic staff, electricity, chemical, and other cost recovery (or the lack of it) was the right entry point
costs. Cost recovery mechanisms were ‘good enough’ for engaging with utilities in FCV affected situations, an
so the WSP’s TA focused on strengthening the utilities’ understanding of the cost recovery issues led to a range
corporate governance by setting up a board of directors of broader reform actions. In the case of the LWSC and
to oversee the organization’s operations and ring-fence GVWC these actions, such a customer enumeration, were
its revenues in advance of a large increase of production very closely associated with improving revenues, while in
capacity coming on-stream. In this case safeguarding the PHWC the focus shifted to putting in place the human
future (increased) revenues was a primary concern resources to manage the operation and, in the HWA, the
addressed both by setting up the board of directors and in governance mechanism to oversee the revenues. These
shifting from cash accounting to International Financial low-cost, short-term actions were productive interventions
Reporting Standards. even without the indirect impact on cost recovery. Some
complementary, and relatively modest, investment to
address specific cost cutting measures such as energy needs
for water pumping would have freed-up valuable revenue
US$28,000
Average amount spent by the Liberia
Water and Sewer Corporation (LWSC) for addressing other aspects of cost recovery including
in a week on diesel, equal to one- physical losses.
third of its operating costs.
33
VI. Conclusion and Recommendations
A central challenge in providing sustainable water supply In all countries the data sparked constructive dialogue
services in FCV affected countries is described in this between government and its development partners and
report as the capacity conundrum. This is a central trade- have influenced the nature and targeting of funding to
off between delivering urgently needed water supply service delivery.
infrastructure in the quickest way possible versus investing
in building institutions that deliver water supply. In a subset of the countries this data have been used by
governments to shift the relationship with the multitude
The large datasets on service delivery generated through of actors operating in the sector towards one in which
this TA confirm that the current response to this trade-off state sector oversight institutions play a more decisive
in FCV affected countries results in the vast majority of role in defining where and how services are delivered
aid being delivered directly by international agencies and (the sector oversight work-stream). The tools used for
non-state actors. This leaves local water sector institutions this reestablishment of oversight included issue-based
in their postcrisis weakened condition. This bypassing of agreements, sector investment plans and, most importantly,
the state locks FCV affected countries into an aid modality, multistakeholder compacts based on mutual accountability
that even years after the peak of crisis shows few signs of of both government and other actors in the sector.
building sector institutions that deliver water services.
Under the utility reform work-stream, short-term, low-
This WSP project took initial steps to rebuild capacity of cost actions undertaken by the WSP included upgrading
sector oversight institutions and initiate reform in utilities. accounting and billing systems; customer enumeration
In doing so WSP has: surveys to update customer databases; reducing non-
• Demonstrated new tools and methods for working revenue water by regularizing illegal connections; and
in FCV affected countries. expanding the revenue base by streamlining approaches
• Generated new data and insights on service to connecting new customers. These led to direct
delivery, particularly water supply services. improvements in cost recovery trends at both the GVWC
• Influenced new funding flows to FCV affected and LWSC. The initial assessment of cost recovery also
countries. provided an entry point to reform actions focused on
• In a subset of countries, shifted the role of the sector human resources and financial management at both the
oversight institutions towards a developmental PHWC and HWA. In the case of the HWA there was
leadership role. also strengthening of the utility’s corporate governance
through the setting up of a board of directors to oversee
The extensive primary data collection on service delivery the organization’s operations.
across countries facilitated by using a range of tools—from
water point mapping, through water quality monitoring, Across the countries the WSP worked with, the data and
to service level benchmarking—enabled ministries knowledge generated through this TA influenced both
responsible for water supply to pinpoint critical sector levels and direction of over US$323 million of donor and
issues, both: government funding (see Appendix C). The data on service
• Opportunities—such as service delivery models delivery, for instance, were used by governments and
that were working well, and; development partners to better target sector investments
• Challenges—such as poor targeting of water and stimulated new investment on service delivery models
points, poor quality well construction, health that were shown to work well. Service delivery models
hazards due inappropriate technology use. evaluated by the WSP, such as sand dams in Somalia
and autonomous piped water systems in the DRC, were
34
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations
Ben Daw Weah collects water at a new pump in Vai Town, Monrovia. Before a pump was built here, Ben and other Vai Town
residents spent hours every day walking to collect water. (Photo credit: Liberia WASH Consortium, 2010.)
adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that on utility • Local coping strategies—such as hand dug and
billing systems in fragile environments, led to donors and manually drilled wells—had become mainstream
governments financing specific upgrades in accounting supply models, marginalizing utility service
and billing systems. delivery models.
The experience gained during this TA, and revealed in Even in oil-rich ROC, where the government was the main
the related primary data on service delivery, provided financier, sector oversight institutions had been bypassed
insights to common issues across countries that were in favor of rapid roll-out of infrastructure delivered by
holding back the transition from relief to development. a foreign company with similar consequences to those
These included that: enumerated above.
• The vast majority of services were delivered by
international agencies and non-state actors. The TA also provided a better understanding of the sources of
• These aid modalities bypassed sector institutions variation in results across countries—valuable information
long after the end of crises (6 to 10 years). for future intervention strategies and program design.
• Targeting, quality, and sustainability of
handpumps delivered this way was poor. Though the emergence of local coping strategies was
• The capacity of sector institutions to deliver or common to all the FCV affected countries studied, the
even oversee WASH service delivery had not been extent to which these strategies dominated service delivery
built. was inversely related to the political will to charge for
services. Greater political incentives to charge for utility
35
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations
services—observed where subnational authorities were This TA project showed that investing relatively small
striving to prove themselves in the face of weakening amounts of funding in the focused developmental entry
central governments—bolstered utility viability and points yields short-term sector results. Progress on building
stemmed the proliferation of local coping strategies. In the capacity of sector oversight institutions and of utility
wetter countries where the economic threshold for tapping reform in FCV affected countries supports the transition
into groundwater was lower, the proliferation of local to country-led development programming.
coping strategies was higher and political will to charge
for water services was lower. Sector oversight institutions are able to shift the
relationship with the multitude of actors operating in the
The bigger question for those living and working in sector towards one where there is mutual accountability
FCV affected countries is: What does it take to address for sector results with development partners.
fragility itself, and is improving WASH services a means
to this end? Support to utilities on cost recovery led to improved
revenues and reinvestment in improved service delivery.
This system building TA is underfunded in low-income
FIGURE 6.1: HIERARCHY OF OUTCOMES TOWARDS FCV affected countries. Judiciously increasing funding
ESTABLISHING COUNTRY-LED DEVELOPMENT to this type of TA would increase the likelihood of a
PROGRAMMING AND THE DOUBLE DIVIDEND transition from humanitarian driven interventions to ones
OF IMPROVED WASH SERVICES AND IMPROVED that are country-led and development oriented, and reduce
CITIZEN-STATE RELATIONS the likelihood of countries sliding back into relying on
humanitarian assistance for water supply service delivery.
With the ultimate aim of delivering a double dividend—
both improved water services and improved citizen-state
relations—this hierarchy of objectives forms a ground-
up approach to reestablishing country-led WASH service
delivery.
Double dividend
6.1 Recommendations
Delaying investment in both sector oversight and utility
reform reduces the prospects for achieving a transition from
Hierachy of outcomes
emergency to country-led development programming.
As time passes, the combined effect of unmanaged aid and
Mutual the entrenchment of alternative service delivery providers
accountability
makes it ever more difficult to reestablish a compact
between sector oversight institutions and the growing
number of non-state and informal private suppliers.
Direct delivery of infrastructure leaves an unmanaged
infrastructure burden. The burgeoning of local coping
strategies makes it harder to reestablish and reform utility
Developmental service provision.
entry points in
fragile states
The above insights based on the experience and
evidence generated in this TA project lead to the central
Source: World Bank data.
recommendations to governments of countries that are
36
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations
FCV affected, to donors funding service delivery, and The evidence from the water point mapping exercises
to international development agencies operating in in Liberia and Sierra Leone demonstrated that existing
these countries. emergency cluster coordination mechanisms are inadequate
in ensuring equitable coverage or ensuring accountability
Governments in countries that are FCV affected should for the quality of rural water supply service delivery.
actively encourage utilities to cover their operation and Improved data for sector oversight led to voluntary
maintenance costs through consumer tariffs as early as incorporation of data for targeting in the investments of
possible and even during subsequent emergencies (for both governments and external actors (see Appendix C).
example, EVD).
The demonstrated benefits of setting cost recovery Engagement in utility reform led to demonstrated
tariffs was that utilities used their own revenues to make improvements in cost recovery at the LWSC and GVWC.
immediate improvements in performance. It also made Earlier engagement may have headed off the possibility
utilities more demand responsive and keen to connect new of alternative providers becoming a barrier to future
customers—as new customers could generate revenues to utility service provision. It might also have allowed for
further build the utility. In Somalia and Zimbabwe, where engagement with those alternative providers to become
utilities have a tariff structure that enabled them to cover a part of the solution to the delivery of services in the
operating costs, utilities reinvested revenues in reducing postcrisis recovery period.
physical losses and more efficient pumps and generators.
Even in Liberia where the LWSC was not yet able to fully Donors should reassess the balance between investing
cover operating costs, positive cash flow from revenues in infrastructure versus investing in capacity building.
was invested in improvements to customer enumeration A dollar spent on building sector oversight capacity or
and billing systems as well as connecting new customers. utility reform to respond to the capacity conundrum is a
dollar lost to infrastructure investment. But it is clear from
Utilities that recovered their costs reduced their need for this project and the data it has generated that there is a
operating subsidies, releasing funds for other purposes need to rebalance support for building infrastructure versus
such as improving sector oversight institutions, further investing in the sector management interventions needed
expanding infrastructure or extending access to the poor. for sustainable service delivery. The rates of nonfunctional
systems, the poor construction quality, the burgeoning low
International development agencies should engage quality local coping strategies—all point to the efficiency
earlier–in the first years of the postcrisis recovery gains that could be achieved by developing the oversight
period–in building both sector oversight capacity and capacity necessary to monitor, oversee, and sustain
in reforming utilities. infrastructure.
The benefits of earlier engagement in building sector
oversight capacity and in reforming utilities include TA to the water sector across 32 FCV affected countries
better targeting and accountability of available resources, averaged below 2 percent of total sector ODA over a 10-
the possibility of improved utility cost recovery, and the year period (Figure 6.2). Carefully redirecting a proportion
opportunity to develop appropriate institutional and of this existing ODA to sector oversight capacity and
governance structures. utility reform would help better prepare countries for
managing investment in infrastructure, sustaining service
In rural areas the early engagement can help support the delivery and, ultimately, helping countries transition from
establishment of databases for performance and asset dependency on humanitarian response to country-led
management, which can be used to better target resources, development programs.
and to help set up supply chains that will lead to more
sustainable service delivery. Across the countries the WSP worked with, the data
and knowledge generated through this TA influenced
both levels and direction of over US$323 million
of donor and government funding
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Conclusion and Recommendations
FIGURE 6.2: SHARE OF ODA THAT IS TA VERSUS INFRASTRUCTURE AND TOTAL FUNDING LEVEL FOR
PERIOD 2005-2014
Total WASH ODA (US$ million)
Technical assistance Infrastructure Total WASH ODA
Source: OECD and author’s calculations.
Governments, international development agencies, There is a need to invest more in developing solutions
and donors should agree and regularly review the roles to the challenges of managing the transition from
and responsibilities of different actors with the aim of emergency to development support.
improving aid and development effectiveness. While it is fully recognized that the transition from emergency
While policies and laws are a key component of defining the to development is neither unidirectional nor linear, stretching
division of labor between the state and providers, their role development interventions into the postcrisis recovery phase
in fragile contexts is limited by the state’s ability to enforce opens up greater opportunity for a double dividend: that of
them and because most service delivery is done directly by improving WASH services and of state building. This TA
non-state and private actors with little or no incentive to has brought to light a number of challenges for which more
comply with the state. Rather, agreements—or compacts— analytical work is needed to provide a better understanding
established and upheld through multistakeholder of how to work with countries and partners as they transition
consultative mechanisms can facilitate the state’s step (back) from conflict to stability including: What are the most
into a policy making role. The formation of these compacts appropriate utility models in this transition period? How
should be at country level. In the short-term they should might subsidies be used to benefit the greatest number of
aim to improve the targeting, quality, and sustainability of people? How can development partners better engage with
service delivery. In the medium-term they should support humanitarian response actors, and vice versa, to ensure a
the development of country-led programming. To increase smoother transition between the two types of response? These
the likelihood that these compacts are upheld, recourse to all need more thought in order to create more opportunities
an internationally agreed set of aid effectiveness standards for earlier, lasting, and more cost effective transitions.
such as SWA’s Collaborative Behaviors or the New Deal for
Engagement in Fragile States may be needed to incentivize
mutual accountability of external actors.
38
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Appendix A: Country Appendixes
This chapter provides additional details of the Each case study begins with a summary table of the
achievements recorded against the intermediate outcomes TA provided by the WSP and progress made across
for each of the seven FCV affected countries which intermediary outcomes. The color coded cells are areas
received WSP TA. No substantive TA was provided in the in which the WSP intervened; white cells are where no
eighth country, South Sudan, due to the outbreak of civil intervention was made. The table is followed by a narrative
conflict in 2013. of the context, WSP activities, and results.
The interventions across all countries were developed The order in which countries appear is to aid comparisons
with the same objective—transitioning to country-led in the results across the different countries. A summary
development programming—but the actual areas of table at the end of the chapter provides the country results
intervention were shaped by the specific context and in alphabetical order.
opportunities in each country. Each of the case studies,
therefore, brings to light different context-appropriate
tools and methods.
Re-establishing sector oversight role
Re-establishing sector oversight role • Sector assessment and infrastructure policy
• National mapping of 28,000 urban and note to inform the World Bank Somalia ISN
rural points for sector planning • Study to assess the potential for
• Fixing Freetown case study implementing small dams
Utility reform • Study of the socioeconomic impacts
• Assessment of GVWC billing system (winners and losers) of water resource
• Replacement of GVWC billing system developments
(with DFID) Utility reform
• Support to GVWC enumeration and • Assessment of Hargeisa Water Agency
management of over 19,500 billing system
household, commercial and public • Assessment and support to the corporate
customers governance of HWA
Re-establishing sector oversight role
Re-establishing sector oversight role
• Provincial sector overviews for Sud Kivu,
• National mapping of 10,000 urban and rural
Addressing fragility
Nord Kivu and Katanga
water points for sector planning
• National mapping of 520 autonomous piped
• Sector investment plan for 2012-17
water schemes covering 4 million people
• Support to JSRs in 2013,14,15
• Support sector dialogue on water law
• Studies for piped water systems in Monrovia
• Study on improving WASH service delivery
requires action on:
and secondary towns.
in protracted crises (with UNICEF)
Utility reform
Utility reform
• Water quality survey in Monrovia
• Assessment of REGIDESO billing system
• Assessment of LWSC billing system and
• National mapping of 4,100 REGIDESO stand-
enumeration of over 5,000 customers
posts
• Study for output based aid approach to low-
• Facilitated delegated management of 150
• Jobs
income households in Monrovia
stand-posts by REGIDESO
Re-establishing sector oversight role Re-establishing sector oversight role
• Justice
• Support for an update of the 2006 • Support to national water policy
inventory using the water point mapping • Review of sector coordination and
method regulation assessing whether existing
Utility reform Re-establishing sector oversight role institutions were fit for purpose
• Water quality survey (dry and wet • National mapping of 1,500 water points • Impact Assessment of Beitbridge Emergency
season) of household water use in Port • Facilitated sector institutional assessment Water Supply and Sanitation project
• Security
Harcourt following the 2003 Water Act Utility reform
• Customer enumeration survey in service • Facilitated dialogue on development of • Urban utility service level benchmarking in
area targeted by PHWC pilot national policy 32 municipal councils over 3 annual cycles
rehabilitation Utility reform
• Assessment of PHWC billing and • Assessment of service models for urban
accounting systems poor including through social connections
and stand-posts
39
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Liberia
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• National map of 10,000 urban and rural points reporting • Water quality survey of 200 public water points in
location, functionality, technology, and management Monrovia
• Sector investment plan for 2012–17 translating PRSP • Assessment of LWSC billing and accounting systems
targets into specific project investments
• Support to LWSC enumeration of over 5,000 customers in
• Support to sector coordination and dialogue including Monrovia and Kakata as well as pilot connection program
joint sector reviews in 2013, ’14, ’15, and 2013 sector
• Prefeasibility study for implementing an output-based aid
performance report
approach to expand access to piped water supply to low-
• Prefeasibility studies for the development of piped water income households in Monrovia
systems in Monrovia, Gbarnga, Greenville, and Harper
Intermediate outcomes
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of
country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems
in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development
coordination joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners
and policy processes rural piped water that mobilizes
development schemes infrastructure
investment
WASH Compact A regular JSR Updating of the Detailed SIP Raised level of WB investment
signed by the process supported billing system exists for 2012–17 domestic thwarted ($10 million) in
President in 2011, by an SPR in place and customer mobilized (circa in FY14 by lack Monrovia’s urban
established and a led by NWSHPC databases helped US$30 million as of of absorption water supply will
series of guiding increase revenue 2016) with greater capacity of ministry be managed by
documents and collection at LWSC attention since the responsible for rural PIU embedded in
events EVD epidemic water supply LWSC
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
In 2003, Liberia emerged from 14 years of civil war and Water service delivery in Liberia faces real and complex
conflict that destroyed government institutions, forced structural problems rooted in the postconflict emergency
the flight of thousands of Liberians, including an exodus response. For many years after the war, the water sector
of educated Liberians, and decimated infrastructure remained highly fragmented and lacked cohesive planning,
in the country. Following the signing of the Accra with ineffective government institutions remaining on the
Peace Accord in 2004, Liberia embarked on national sidelines. Non-state actors provided emergency relief but
reconstruction, which included rebuilding government lacked the overview and reach to deliver services equitably
institutions and infrastructure. across the country, or to put in place management systems
and processes to sustain interventions effectively.
40
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Rebuilding the sector’s oversight role sector actors. The Liberian delegation discussed the
This TA began with a nationwide water point history of Uganda’s sector development with senior
infrastructure mapping exercise to create a credible officials, participated in a Joint Sector Review (JSR) to
baseline for the sector and as means of analyzing how services see how actors worked together in the SWAp, and visited
were being delivered and through whom. Working with small town private sector operators—of specific interest
the MoPW, UNICEF, and the NGO WASH Consortium, as USAID and the African Development Bank were
the WSP surveyed all protected water points in rural and financing piped systems in six small towns in Liberia.
urban areas of Liberia—over 10,000 in total—within a
six-month period. As well as establishing the first postwar To provide a framework for better collaboration among
baseline,the survey revealed: 85 percent of Liberia’s water actors in the very fragmented Liberian water sector a joint
points had been built since 2003; construction had peaked Sanitation and Water for All mission took place in 2011 to
in 2007 and by 2010 was tailing off; rates of functionality negotiate a Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) sector
were poor at just 60 percent; 43 percent of handpumps compact.8 This was the first time sector representatives from
had no local water committee; and, though 80 percent nearly all agencies (bilateral, multilateral, and civil society)
of handpumps were of the Afridev brand, there were no came together under the leadership of the government (led
government or market mechanisms to supply spare parts. by the Ministry of Planning).
An early intervention organized by the WSP was a south- The compact was a very simple document that
south learning visit in 2011which provided a senior Liberian outlined four joint commitments to the WASH sector,
sector delegation with exposure to Uganda’s water sector’s agreed by government and development partners, for
Sector-Wide Approach (SWAp) and good example of a
country-led sector development and monitoring process
8
Sanitation and Water for All is a global partnership of developing countries and de-
working with a wide range of donors, nongovernmental velopment agencies campaigning for political leadership and improved accountability
organizations (NGOs), local governments, and private to achieve universal access to WASH.
Daniel Tomah draws water from a new pump in Chocolate City, Monrovia. His family says he never used to help collect water,
but that’s changed now that the pump is close to his home. (Photo credit: Liberia WASH Consortium, 2010).
41
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
implementation over a two-year time period: strengthen In 2013, WASH related line ministries requested TA
institutional capacity; ensure equity and quality in service for the preparation of their annual budget request in a
provision; develop a monitoring system; and improve format that conformed to the Medium Term Expenditure
sector financial planning and management. Framework (MTEF). Capital funding from the national
budget for WASH had been negligible until 2013. The
The WASH Sector Compact was a key turning point as WSP’s TA supported the ministries and agencies to
it established consensus, among both Government of prepare their budget requests in the MTEF format and
Liberia (GoL) institutions and development partners primed staff to defend requests at the Ministry of Finance’s
with a stake in the sector, on a short and achievable list (MoF) budget hearings. The TA led to increased budget
of priority activities. The process of creating the longer allocations to WASH from US$1 million to US$3.5
and more comprehensive Sector Strategic Plan (SSP) million. However, actual expenditures were only US$2.5
document generated a high level of buy-in across sector million due to slow disbursement and a lack of absorption
stakeholders and has proved to be a useful road-map to capacity, particularly at the MoPW. Furthermore, much
coordinate sector reform activities by both domestic and of the actual disbursement was channeled into subsidizing
non-state actors. running costs of the Liberia Water and Sewer Corporation
(LWSC) (LWSC, 2014).
The compact was expanded into a SSP that has become
the overall road-map for the sector. The 2015-16 budget raised the amount allocated to
WASH to US$4,953,612 as part of the Ebola Response
Based on a compact commitment, the WSP supported and Recovery WASH Plan. This could be the first year
a sector investment plan (SIP) to deepen stakeholders’ that the GoL has not only subsidized the LWSC but will
understanding of the specific infrastructure investments finance infrastructure investments.
required to meet agreed sector goals. The SIP was a strategic
initiative that translated the high-level targets set out in the Annual JSRs were initiated in 2013. This first JSR in
government’s “Agenda for Transformation” and SSP, into 2013 was mainly an information sharing exercise. Inputs
discrete WASH investment projects, estimating associated from a senior Ugandan water sector official, brought in as
costs and time scales required to improved coverage across an observer, convinced government of the need to prepare
urban and rural Liberia. Published by the MoPW, the a Sector Performance Report (SPR) prior to the 2014
SIP defined priority projects for WASH, providing the JSR. The WSP then supported the GoL in publishing
government with a credible plan and well-defined needs to the country’s first WASH SPR in advance of the 2014
approach investors, both domestic and donor. JSR. This report, written by a team of Liberian authors,
TABLE A1: ADDITIONAL FUNDING MOBILIZED BY THE SECTOR INVESTMENT PLAN
Donor Implementer Project Amount Status
DFID UNICEF Rural WASH Project–Eastern Liberia US$6.5m Under implementation
(£4.5m)
DFID Liberia WASH Sustainable WASH in Fragile Contexts US$12.5m Not disbursed due to delays
Consortium (£8.5m) caused by Ebola Epidemic
DGIS UNICEF Accelerating sanitation and water for all US$4m Under implementation
in Liberia
World Bank LWSC Urban water and sanitation infrastructure US$10m Effectiveness expected 2015
Firestone LWSC Water and Sanitation System in Harbel tba Feasibility study ongoing
NOCAL LWSC Water and Sanitation System in Ganta tba Feasibility study ongoing
Note: ‘m’ means million.
42
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
presented stakeholders with an evidence base to debate data and has developed a process of certifying non-state
and agree priorities for action. This multistakeholder actors. The Committee’s remaining weakness is that it has
annual planning and review process has continued, now a strong rural water supply and sanitation focus but has
in its third year of government leadership. been less successful at involving actors working on urban
water supply and water resources management.
The WASH Sector Compact was a key turning point as
it established consensus, among both GoL institutions Utility reform, starting with cost recovery
and development partners with a stake in the sector, on a In 2003 Liberia experienced a cholera outbreak with
short and achievable list of priority activities. The process over 34,000 cases and it has consistently reported over
of creating the longer and more comprehensive SSP 1,000 cases a year up to 2011 (WHO, 2012). In 2014,
document generated a high level of buy-in across sector the outbreak of the EVD generated over 28,000 cases
stakeholders and has proved to be a useful road-map to and caused over 11,000 deaths. Though not water-borne,
coordinate sector reform activities by both domestic and unsafe WASH services and the lack of proper hygiene
non-state actors. practices contributed “to the propagation of the Ebola
virus”, and was listed as a “critical factor” in the context
The 2015 JSR was the third in a row, marking successful of hand-washing in schools (United Nations/World
progress towards institutionalization of the JSR process. Bank/EU/AfDB, 2015). For both the cholera and the
The introduction of the SPRs, in particular, have brought EVD outbreaks, caseloads in Monrovia were high due
greater rigor to the sector monitoring process. The SPRs to its population density and lack of sanitary conditions.
consolidate key data from household surveys managed by To better understand the water quality implications of
the Liberia Institute of Statistics and Geo-Information supplying Greater Monrovia through handpumps, a water
Services, sector inventories such as the water point quality survey was commissioned in 2011. Using the
mapping, sector studies, and reports. The evidence base water point mapping data, 20 percent of the water points
set out in the SPR provides the evidence base for debate in Greater Monrovia were randomly selected for water
at the JSR and for decision making on the priorities for quality testing. The results showed high levels of fecal
action over the next year. contamination in both formal and informal water supply
with 57 percent of the samples testing positive for E. coli
Out of an array of proposed sector institutions, it is the and 80 percent for coliform contamination (Kumpel,
National WASH Promotion Committee (NWASHPC) that Forthcoming). These results pointed to the need to move
has emerged as the main sector coordination mechanism. away from this emergency handpump infrastructure
Chaired by the MoPW and with a small secretariat, it is towards piped household connections in urban areas.
this Committee that has succeeded in bringing together the
GoL with other sector actors. Through the combination of The LWSC, mandated to supply services to all urban areas,
regular meetings and a simple but well managed website9 served 12 cities with piped water in the 1980s. The1989–
the Committee greatly improved communication among 2003 civil war destroyed much of its infrastructure as well
sector actors. The Committee has driven the JSR process as its institutional and human capacity. In 2010 the LWSC
and has been credited with a substantive response by the served only a small proportion of Monrovia’s residents and
WASH sector during the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) was reliant on GoL subsidy to cover all water pumping
crisis. Though the sector coordination role was temporarily costs and treatment costs.
taken over by the Cluster System shortly after the EVD
outbreak, it reverted to MoPW leadership in early 2016, Though improving cost recovery alone would not
a signal of the government’s readiness to take back up the guarantee that the LWSC would deliver improved services,
leadership. The Committee now requires actors to discuss it was seen as a precondition for enabling it to extend and
and submit annual work plans along with monitoring maintain sustainable services. A series of practical actions
with immediate operational impact on improving revenues
9
http://wash-liberia.org/
43
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
BOX A1: WATER POINT MAPPING IN LIBERIA
With developments in Information Communications Technology (ICT), a range of mapping methods have
become available to plug difficult-to-fill data gaps. With basic training teams of enumerators (often young
unemployed youth) equipped with smartphones and apps such as FLOW, Fulcrum, and DoForms can work
their way across countries capturing hundreds of data points on services a day and covering whole countries
in a matter of months.
The survey covered 10,000 improved water points serving (or not) some 4 million people. The survey generated
a comprehensive picture of the number, type (for example, protected springs, wells, standposts), the make of
pumps (for instance, Afridev, India Mark, Kardia, Vergnet, and so on), which organization they were constructed
by, the age of the installation, the functionality of water points (including reasons for nonfunctionality), adequacy
of water (throughout the dry season), how they were managed by the community, and whether there were
regular financial contributions for maintenance.
Overlaying this data on water points with census data on population, by enumeration areas, relative service
levels were calculated—in terms of water points per 1,000 people (Figure A1.a). Adding road infrastructure
provides further insights into bias of past investment or opportunities to increase investment around emerging
growth points (Figure A1.b). The costs of these surveys were in the order of US$20 to US$30 a water point.
FIGURE A1.A: PEOPLE WITHOUT ADEQUATE FIGURE A1.B: “CORRIDOR OF NEED” CONTAINING
ACCESS TO IMPROVED WATER IN SHADES OF 75% OF LIBERIANS WITHOUT ADEQUATE ACCESS
RED (GREEN REPRESENTS ADEQUATE ACCESS, TO SAFE WATER
GREY IS UNINHABITED AREAS)
44
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
were identified and implemented. These short-term, low- The LWSC has reported a 145 percent revenue increase
cost actions included upgrading the accounting and between FY11 and FY14, has increased connected
billing system; a customer enumeration survey to customers by 20 percent, and streamlined its staffing.
update customer databases; reducing non-revenue water The EVD crisis in 2014–15 impacted revenues in
by regularizing illegal connections; and expanding the FY2015, both because collection efforts were temporarily
revenue base by streamlining approaches to connecting interrupted due to widespread panic and quarantines in
new customers. Monrovia, and due to the closure of many businesses at
the height of the epidemic. However, due to a determined
These low-cost, short-term actions to improve cost recovery effort by the LWSC which saw collection efficiency on
or reduce non-revenue water were prioritized over other issued bills rise from 69 percent to 89 percent, the utility
interventions such as: reduction of production costs and still managed to record US$4,085,420 in billed revenue
physical water losses which would rely on infrastructure in FY15 compared with US$4,709,932 in 2014. The GoL
interventions to reduce energy costs; or tariff reform which continues to provide a significant operating subsidy to
would rely on difficult-to-get political support. However, the LWSC, though it fell to 23 percent of total LWSC
reducing physical losses and expanding the distribution revenues in FY14, compared with an average of just under
network was later built into the design of a World Bank 40 percent annually in FY11–FY13.
project, the Liberia Urban Water Project ($10 million),
initiated by the WSP team, and the first stand-alone water
sector intervention by the Bank since 1985.
FIGURE A2: TOTAL CONNECTIONS AND FINANCIAL RESULTS REPORTED BY LWSC
FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
Revenues Billings $1,922,261 $1,950,204 $2,474,158 $4,709,932
GoL subsidy $636,969 $1,325,000 $2,726,299 $1,479,913
Total revenues $2,559,230 $3,275,204 $5,200,457 $6,189,845
Expenses Cost of production n/a n/a $1,638,130 $2,007,330
Selling/distribution n/a n/a $322,815 $274,100
Administration n/a n/a $2,823,813 $3,184,383
Other n/a n/a $50,303 $213,974
Total expenses $3,155,442 $3,693,563 $4,835,061 $5,679,787
Balance -$596,212 -$418,360 $365,396 $510,058
excl. subsidy -$1,233,181 -$1,743,360 -$2,360,903 -$969,855
Sources: LWSC Corporate Audit (2012), IFRS Financial Statement (2014), LWSC Presentation, AfDB MWSSRP Appraisal Report (2007), and JICA
Masterplan (2009).
45
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Sierra Leone
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• National map of 28,000 urban and rural points reporting • Assessment of GVWC billing and accounting systems
location, functionality, technology, and management
• Replacement of GVWC billing system (with DFID)
• Fixing Freetown case study examining rationale for a
• Support to GVWC enumeration and management of over
holistic approach to tackling dilapidated urban services
19,500 household, commercial and public customers
and institutions in postconflict countries
Intermediate outcomes
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of
country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems
in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development
coordination joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners
and policy processes rural piped water that mobilizes
development schemes infrastructure
investment
A sector policy Ministry of Water Replacing billing No SIP has been No increase in WB Decentralized
was approved in created civil system and developed GoSL investment Service Delivery
2010 but provides service posts for updating customer in WASH Program used
weak guidance on sector monitoring databases has infrastructure country systems
cost recovery or but did not retain increased billing but link with
tariff setting and staff recruited and stabilized sector institutions
review utility revenues not made
No WSP Substantial
Legend: No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress
intervention progress
Sierra Leone has been conflict-free for over 10 years; it has services are still delivered through non-state actors with no
grown rapidly and has enormous potential for continued substantive involvement of government.
economic growth both from minerals and from other
sectors including agriculture, fisheries, and tourism. Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role
Progress has been made in reestablishing the civil service As in Liberia, the WSP supported a nationwide water
and service delivery including at decentralized levels of point mapping exercise in Sierra Leone. The results, widely
government albeit that the process of decentralization disseminated in 2012, revealed many problems common
has partially stalled with some functions still effectively to the survey in Liberia. Among these was the need for
managed by central government. better coordination of external agencies. Of the existing
28,000 waterpoints, 86 percent were built by non-state
Investment in service delivery in this context should therefore actors including thousands of small interventions from
be led by government institutions with the aim of building local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), religious
their capacity to sustainably manage services. However, the groups, communities, and private individuals as well as 25
vast majority of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) major external agencies. Among the 25 external agencies
46
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Water treatment plant at Guma Valley, Sierra Leone. (Photo credit: Ato Brown.)
identified there was no geographic division of labor with To address this issue, the WSP supported the Government
high numbers of agencies operating in all of Sierra Leone’s of Sierra Leone (GoSL) to develop official government
13 districts and even in the same chiefdoms (of which there guidelines, quality standards, and procedures for the
are 149). For example, over the period 2009–12, seven construction and maintenance of hand dug wells. The
different major external agencies were active just in Kholifa guidelines were compiled based on international best
Rowala Chiefdom (Action Aid, CARE, Concern, GOAL, practice, in close coordination with implementing
Red Cross, Save the Children, and United Nations). agencies on the ground and linked the national Water
and Sanitation Policy and the rural Water Supply and
The survey revealed the specific problem that 40 percent Small Towns Strategy. It was intended for water sector
of protected in-use water points provided insufficient practitioners and managers who coordinate and oversee
water during the dry season. This was on top of the 18 water supply service delivery with the aim of harmonizing
percent of water points not functioning at all (see rates and professionalizing hand-dug well construction
of seasonal use in table A2). Technically this seasonality practices. The guideline set basic standards while leaving
problem was due to poor construction methods, wells space for adaptation to local conditions.
not dug deep enough, and/or an inappropriate choice
of waterpoint location. But it was also a symptom of The guidelines included a memorandum of understanding
the incomplete accountability there is among donors, to be signed between agencies working in the sector and
implementing agencies, and government. An issue-based the Ministry of Water Resources in Sierra Leone. The local
compact between government and external agencies control and enforcement of the guidelines and standards was
was proposed that included policies and standards intended to be through District Councils based on mandatory
for construction and clearer geographic division of well completion forms and a certificate of completion. The
labor, which would provide the framework for greater guidelines also recommended consolidation of pump types
accountability for water point functionality. around the three most commonly used models (India Mark
ii, Kardia, and Inkar).
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TABLE A2: NUMBER AND FUNCTIONALITY OF SIERRA LEONE’S PUBLIC, IMPROVED WATER POINTS
Waterpoints by Functionality Number % of total
All public, improved waterpoints 28,845 100%
Under construction 1,480 5.1%
Broken down 5,137 17.8%
Partly functional 4,148 14.4%
Fully functional 18,080 62.7%
Protected, in-use points 18,908 65.5%
...... of which are seasonal 7,696 -
Published in mid-2014, the guidelines have become a Utility reform
frequently referenced document in Sierra Leone, with 500 In Sierra Leone, the Guma Valley Water Corporation
hardcopies distributed directly to leading NGOs such as (GVWC), responsible for supplying the capital Freetown
Concern, GOAL and Oxfam, and through the Ministry for with a population of around 1.2 million, the billing
Water Resources to district councils.The guidelines were system and the underlying customer database had become
also published online on three sector websites. Statistics a serious bottleneck to cost recovery. An assessment of the
are only available from the Rural Water Supply Network billing system reported that the software reached the end
site, where the document was viewed approximately 500 of its useful life, that there is no maintenance and support
times over the past two years—in the top 15 percent of contract, and technicians with basic knowledge of MS-
document downloads for the site. Access were able to alter data, including bills, directly. It
took between six and eight hours for the system to update
While there was wide distribution of the document, the customer bills.The system often crashed and corrupted
planned tracking of the guideline’s application to new wells data tables, requiring staff to rebuild from backup files.
using mandatory completion forms and certificates has The customer database consisted of a total of 79,000
remained an unrealized ambition. Though the Ministry accounts, of which around 18,000 were actively billed
of Water went through a lengthy process with the Public and only 6,000 paid regularly (Nest Builders Int., 2015:p.
Service Commission to create permanent civil service 2). Of more than 8,000 meter numbers registered in the
posts for sector monitoring—both to follow up on this database, only 2,814 functional meters could actually be
specific issue and to update the water point mapping— ascertained on the ground in late 2012 (ASPA Utilities,
the staff recruited were not retained with most of the 2013).
district posts remaining vacant. As a result, consistent
coordination and tracking of non-state implemented well To improve revenue collection at the GVWC, the WSP
construction exceeded the logistical capacity of district supported a survey to locate and enumerate tens-of-
governments, and self-submission by constructors has thousands of its own customers to update the GVWC’s
not worked due to the weak compliance incentives. This customer database. The survey covered (a) GPS location
highlights the need for there to be a broader compact of customers; (b) the current account number; (c)
among donors, implementing agencies, and government confirmed the full name of the customers; (d) collected
that puts in place incentives for implementing agencies phone numbers; (e) included a photograph of properties;
to report to government and for government to report on (f ) detailed address descriptions; and (g) details of meters.
not just seasonality but other aspects of functionality are The data was collected using mobile-to-web survey
improving or not. applications running on hand-held smartphones and
tablets. Surveying teams were also instructed to scan the
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
area for suspected illegal connections, that is, properties had gone out of business (ASPA Utilities, 2013). With
receiving piped water but not being billed. funding from the DFID (US$220,000) and around
US$70,000 in counterpart funding from the GVWC,
Over 19,500 existing GVWC customers and over 3,000 hardware and software was upgraded and the new billing
suspected illegal connections in Freetown were mapped. system was rolled out in early March 2015 (see Box A2).
The customer data were transferred into upgraded billing The roll-out has been a success in terms of improved bill
systems that have allowed management to review and generation and accuracy, improving critical commercial
track metering routes better. The precise localization of processes like automating the calculation of bills with
customers has helped field officers to assign and supervise the correct application of tariff levels by use, tracking
collections more effectively. applications for new connections, and generating and
assigning work orders. With the new system, billing takes
The data helped to identify additional cost recovery just five minutes and the commercial team is able to use a
opportunities through improved accuracy of billing, series queries to run integrity checks on the bills generated
including identification of water-intensive businesses such (for example, checking for large deviations in consumption
as hotels, that were being billed at lower residential rates, or and ensuring bills are properly addressed).
multiple, separate properties sharing one account and thus
profiting illegally from single property flat rates. The GVWC Remaining challenges at the GVWC include internal
also launched an initiative to use phone numbers collected resistance to the new billing system—especially from meter
during the exercise to send monthly bills by SMS, thus readers—that need to be confronted while continuing to
reducing costs and delays associated with paper billing. This regularize illegal connections. With the comprehensive data
was a particularly helpful step during the Ebola epidemic on customers and an effective billing system, introducing
which complicated the physical delivery of paper bills. new meters to customers currently on flat-rate connections
and replacing nonfunctioning meters will raise revenues
The WSP worked closely with the UK’s Department for and improve demand management. Demand management
International Development (DFID) which committed to will be critical in light of the constrained availability of
financing a billing system upgrade following the WSP’s water in the Guma Valley dam and the limited prospect of
findings that the existing GVWC billing system had developing a new source in the near future.
numerous limitations and the billing support company
FIGURE A3: OUTCOME OF WSP-FUNDED GVWC CUSTOMER ENUMERATION: DISTRIBUTION OF
CUSTOMERS IN FREETOWN
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BOX A2: PROCURING BILLING SYSTEMS FOR UTILITIES IN FRAGILE STATES
The WSP provided technical assistance to the GVWC for the diagnosis of its existing billing system and procurement
of a replacement, with financial assistance from the DFID.
Assisted by ASPA utilities, the WSP visited and studied a number of utilities in fragile states to take stock of the
sorts of billing systems they had in place, their particular constraints, and gain insight into how (and if) the numerous
challenges of a weak governance environment were overcome. The WSP also visited a number of small utilities in
Kenya and Uganda, where various small-scale computerized billing systems had been successfully implemented.
The first striking finding was that the utilities strongly preferred paying for locally-supported and adapted software
rather than having donors provide generic applications. The ability to tailor and support the software locally was highly
valued but this often came at a relatively high cost, was single-sourced, and depended on a single developer.
The second key finding was that identifying providers of utility billing software is not simple. A search leads one to a
plethora of small providers who appear to be offering variations on bespoke applications developed for municipalities.
Drawing on the World Bank and ASPA’s experience with major utilities in both developing and industrialized countries,
a list of known software brands used by large urban utilities was prepared. Finding the actual providers of the software
was complicated by the fact that software brands frequently change name, are upgraded, phased out, bought and
sold between different IT service providers, and are merged into other systems. Also, many utilities either used “in
house” software (Veolia, Suez), or regional providers (the case of the United Kingdom and Australia), used bespoke
systems, or used billing modules of highly sophisticated Enterprise Management Systems (EMS) such as SAP. There
appeared to be few truly international utility billing software providers.
The lessons from the visits, as well as the diagnosis of the GVWC’s current billing system, were used to develop
a strategy for procuring the new billing system for the utility. To ensure maximum participation in the procurement
process, as well as advertising the contract on dgmarket.com, identified potential providers were directly contacted.
Ten companies expressed interest in the project, of which five were shortlisted.
A challenge was the scope of the billing system. These can vary enormously between providers, some of whom
propose simple MS Access-based systems of the sort the GVWC already had in place, or C++ standalone, single
PC type systems, through to very sophisticated web-enabled EMS. From site visits, it was known that utility billing
systems often claim to perform a large number of functions, making assessment of quality difficult in a tender
evaluation where there is a very wide range of prices (from $2,000 to $50 million).
The GVWC had a specific budget constraint, and it was felt that unless bidders had some idea of the budget,
such a wide range of prices (and scope) risked that the “quality” weighting of the procurement would be entirely
outweighed by the price weighting, leading to the cheapest product being selected even if there were misgivings
about the quality. It was therefore decided to announce the budget, and to some extent remove price competition.
The terms of reference noted that the budget was a “maximum”, which allowed competitive pricing, and also
included minimum software, hardware, support, and service requirements, as well as optional items to be priced
separately. Ongoing costs had to be made explicit, so that some consideration could be given to the effect on the
GVWC’soperating budget. Services included a training component and three years of support from a local partner
as well as two visits per year from the international partner, if requested by the GVWC.
The three tenders submitted were of good quality, although the bidders proposed different hardware scope,
which necessitated some adjustment to allow a like-for-like price comparison. Bidders also included different tax
assumptions which needed to be equalized to allow a fair comparison. The company that won the tender worked
closely with the GVWC and persevered during the very difficult circumstances of the Ebola outbreak. The billing
system finally went live in March 2015.
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Republic of Congo
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• National map of 1,500 rural points reporting location, • Assessment of service models for urban poor including
functionality, technology, and management through social connections and standposts
• Facilitated sector institutional assessment to gauge the
level of implementation of the reform based on the 2003
Water Act
• Facilitated dialogue on development of national policy
Intermediate objectives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase domestic Increase use of
country rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector investment in the country systems
leadership monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan sector by development
in sector joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process partners
coordination processes rural piped water that mobilizes
and policy schemes infrastructure
development investment
GoC has initiated Water point No progress No SIP established GoC has reduced GoC financing
sectorwide mapping initiated on delegated investment in the 80% of WB
dialogue on a policy dialogue management of sector due to lower project managed
new policy but monitoring not standposts in than expected oil through a PIU in
institutionalized urban areas revenues in 2015 the Ministry of
and no JSRs Equipment and
Public Works
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
The Republic of Congo (ROC) is a lower middle income This was followed by a suite of new institutions established
country due to its large oil revenues (fourth largest in by decree in 2008 including: the Water Sector Regulatory
Sub-Saharan Africa) and relatively small population of 4.1 Body (ORSE: Organe de Régulation du Secteur de l’Eau),
million. In the 1990s, the ROC went through a turbulent the Rural Water Supply National Agency (ANHYR:
period of civil conflict over control of oil resources. Since Agence Nationale de l’Hydraulique Rural), and the Water
the cessation of active civil conflict in 2000, the political Fund (FDSE: Fonds de Développement du Secteur de l’Eau).
climate in the country has stabilized but decision making Few of these institutions are fully operational as their
remains tightly controlled by the President. governing boards have not been appointed. The decrees
establishing the new institutions were not aligned with
The government has sought to improve access to Water, the water law nor did they provide for a distinct division
Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) services. Structural of roles and responsibilities.
reform over the last decade began with a water law of 2003.
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A centralized public-owned utility (SNDE: Societé Nationale estimated to be just 26 percent as of December 2012.
de Distribution d’ Eau) created in 1967 is responsible for service The data revealed very high average water point failure
provision in all urban centers of the country since 2009. rates (26 percent) as well as a further 25 percent of water
points that did not yield water year round. These average
Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role failure rates increased rapidly with the age of the water
The WSP provided TA for a national water point mapping point (see Figure A4.b). Apart from the high level of
exercise which was mainly financed by the government. nonfunctionality and the low level of access, the water
Over 1,500 water points were surveyed in rural areas point mapping revealed a high level of inequity across
and small towns. Though the numbers of water points regions ranging from 4 percent in Sangha region to 39
constructed each year is rising, access in rural areas was percent for the Cuvette region (see Figure A4.c).
FIGURE A4.A: NUMBER OF WATER POINTS FIGURE A4.B: PERCENT OF FAILED WATER POINTS
CONSTRUCTED BY YEAR BY YEAR OF CONSTRUCTION
FIGURE A4.C: ACCESS TO WATER SUPPLY INVERSELY CORRELATED WITH HIGH UNDER-5 MORTALITY
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A water tanker supplying a broken village scheme in the Republic of Congo. (Photo credit: Michel Duret.)
In 2013 a Presidential initiative, the “Water for all Project” In both rural and urban water supply the current array of
(2013–2016) was launched to build 4,000 boreholes in sector institutions and contracts reflect an accumulation
rural areas with an estimated budget of US$400 million of attempts to improve WASH service delivery driven
negotiated by the Presidency directly with a Brazilian from the Presidency, each with limited success and with
Contractor, ASPERBRAS. There was no consultation no attempt to dissolve the institutions set up by previous
with sector institutions and the contract is managed by rounds of reform.
the “Delegation General des Grands Travaux” (DGGT),
an agency closely linked to the Presidency. Sector institutions that therefore remain are very
fragmented and lack strategic vision, with major
Though the water point mapping data were paid for interventions being shaped by the presidential political
and collected through a joint exercise by the ministries agenda through a highly centralized process and the
responsible for water and planning, the data have not been government is bypassing and undermining the country’s
integrated into the planning for the large new investment sector institutions.
implemented by the Brazilian contractor.
Utility reform
In response to the problem of this and previous capital The centralized public-owned utility (SNDE) that
investments bypassing water sector institutions, the originally served Brazzaville and Pointe Noire was in 2009
ministry in charge of water requested support from the made responsible for service provision in all urban centers
WSP to carry out an institutional assessment as the in the ROC. Following a period of poor performance a
basis for developing a new national water and sanitation private sector service contract was signed with VEOLIA
policy. The ministry maintained that the previous policy in 2013.
dating back to 2009, a sector policy statement (Lettre de
Politique), failed to assign clear roles and responsibilities
to institutions operating in the water sector.
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The main problems with this contract have been (a) standpost pilot included participation of beneficiaries
nonpayment of the water bills by government ministries, at all stages of implementation of the standposts (from
departments, and agencies; and (b) that the new tariff identifying location to management) as well as defining
structure, a condition of the contract, has not been appropriate arrangements and defining roles and
approved even three years after the start of the contract. responsibilities of management structures and the utility.
However, after only a few standposts had been built, the
The WSP supported an assessment of service models for development of the standposts program was stopped due
the urban poor including through standposts and social to a lack of commitment of the utility to the approach.
connections, a component of a WB-funded project, Projet The utility instead shifted the funding to a social private
Eau, Électricité et Développement Urbain (PEEDU). The connections program that is yet to be completed.
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Democratic Republic of Congo
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• Provincial sector overviews to assess institutional capacity • Assessment of REGIDESO billing and accounting
and development prospects at provincial level in Sud Kivu, systems
Nord Kivu, and Katanga
• National map and assessment of 4,100 REGIDESO
• National map and assessment of 520 autonomous piped standposts and their management
water schemes covering 4 million people
• Facilitated delegated management of 150 standposts
• Support to sector coordination and dialogue on water law by REGIDESO in Kinshasa building on study tour to
Burkina Faso
• Study on improving WASH service delivery in protracted
crises (with UNICEF)
Intermediate objectives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish country Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an inclusive Increase Increase use of
leadership in sector rigorous sector recovery in urban sector investment plan domestic country systems
coordination and monitoring and utilities, small- (SIP) and process that investment in by development
policy development joint sector review towns, and large mobilizes infrastructure the sector partners
processes rural piped water investment
schemes
Water law ratified Survey and REGIDESO is Investment plan for Funding to No sector
and promulgated by evaluation of testing delegated autonomous piped WASH has budget support
the President in early autonomous management of water schemes (AWS) not been mechanism.
2016 piped water standposts but no developed but not for prioritized by the WB investment
schemes (AWS) conclusive results sector as a whole government managed by PIU
initiated dialogue on impact on cost led by Secretary
on management recovery General for
and regulation REGIDESO
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
Political instability and armed conflict over the last two of low population density, autonomous (piped) water
decades has resulted in a gradual withdrawal of the state schemes (AWS) are increasingly being financed by donors
from the provision of basic water and sanitation services. in peri-urban areas of large towns as well as in small urban
Institutional and state service provider capacity across the centers and larger villages. This is an increasingly popular
sector has eroded, leaving a large portion of the population model with donors in which they provide hardware, the
resorting to surface water or turning towards non-state pipes, software, and the management system to sustain the
suppliers to meet their service delivery requirements. scheme. But due to the highly fragmented nature of aid in
the DRC, little was known about the AWS, including their
In the absence of state efforts to build and maintain total number, actual location, their size and the number of
water and sanitation infrastructure, a service delivery people they served, how they were managed, the type of
model financed, built, and managed by non-state actors technology, their functionality, financial viability or their
has emerged across the Democratic Republic of Congo investment requirements.
(DRC). While handpumps are still deployed in areas
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Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role Characteristics of each of the schemes were recorded to
In the DRC, the WSP commissioned a nationwide survey build up a picture of the investment costs, the number of
that identified 520 AWS, 83 percent of which were tap stands and household connections, water production,
functional, serving over 4 million people. Around half were storage and consumption, as well as the nature of
gravity-fed systems located in the two Kivus, the other half, management and revenues (see Table A3).
pump and engine, spread mainly through a central belt
from Bas Congo in the west to Katanga in the east. TABLE A3: CHARACTERISTICS OF AWS
Mean Median
FIGURE A5.A: LOCATION OF AWS ACROSS DRC
Average total collected 830 60
($/month)
Average expenditure ($/month) 620 90
Average investment ($)10 275,000 150,000
Average population coverage 10,850 6,500
Investment cost per tapstand 15,700 6,390
Quantity produced (m3/day) 160 80
Average reservoir capacity 100 60
Average consumption/day/ 16 12
person11
While a quarter of the schemes charged for water by
volume used (mainly those with a diesel or electric pump),
the other half of schemes levied a monthly flat rate with
the remainder not charging (mainly gravity schemes),
instead collectively paying for breakdowns. Though most
FIGURE A5.B: CUMULATIVE NUMBER OF AWS did have management committees, and nearly two-thirds
BUILT BY PROVINCE employed operatives, only 15 percent of schemes had
meters at their tapstands to monitor water consumption
as a means of monitoring revenue.
The results of the WSP’s study on AWS in the DRC
clearly demonstrated the emergence of a successful service
delivery model that is functioning well in an extremely
challenging fragile context. An investment plan, drawing
on cost data from recent projects, estimated that access
could be expanded to around 19 million people at a cost
of US$425 million over a period of six years. The plan
proposed a mix of rehabilitation and new systems for each
province depending on the existing stock.
10
These costs are declarative. They do not take into account design cost, project
management costs, and other soft costs needed to undertake these investments.
11
See the calculated indicators. This per capita daily consumption seems relatively high.
Perhaps tap stands cover a greater amount of people for a smaller consumption rate.
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However, the existing AWS deployment model almost to implement participatory approaches to planning and
entirely circumvents the state, which has implications managing the services.
for the sustainability, equity, and scalability of services
provided through these systems. This point sparked heated Recent developments in the broader policy environment
debate between government and donor stakeholders in of the DRC offer a number of entry points for reengaging
the sector. Although AWS rates of functionality are higher the state in WASH service delivery. In mid-2015, the
than for handpumps, the service delivery model still has a Decentralization Bill was passed, giving greater authority
20 percent nonfunctionality rate. On the one hand there to provinces. This was followed in late 2015 by the long
is no mechanism to ensure that cost recovery is adequate anticipated ratification of the Water Law which12 establishes
to cover operations and maintenance (O&M). On the the principle of delegated management of water services
other, there is no monitoring of affordability or check and recognizes the role of community associations, such
on whether revenues are being siphoned off for activities as AWS management committees. It also calls for cost-
other than O&M. Government technocrats argued that based tariffs and special pro-poor measures to facilitate
there is a key role for government in regulating AWS. access for vulnerable households.
Donors, who point to evidence of an extractive, even
predatory state, expressed concern at the risks of drawing These developments in devolution and sector policy
the state into a sector oversight role. Underlining this provided new opportunities for provincial level sector
concern was the national utility’s expressed desire to take institutions to use the data to monitor existing AWS
over the ownership of AWS in peri-urban areas. Yet, in services and to work with donors to target investments
the medium-term, not involving the state undermines to areas that are underserved. The findings of the study
the potential for a constructive dialogue around service and the investment plan are already influencing funding
delivery to emerge between citizen and state. flowing into the sector at province level. The African
Development Bank has committed US$60 million to
Circumventing the state also makes it unlikely that a constructing 60 AWS and is working with the authorities
version of the AWS model is scaled up to meet the SDGs. in Kivu Orientale and Kivu Occidental on a provincial
While the AWS are serving 4 million people, there are still level investment plans using the data from the study.
currently more than 38 million people without access to
improved water sources in the DRC. Current population Transitioning service delivery towards a country-led
growth rates indicate that this number is likely to more development program in the DRC is still in its very
than double over the next decade as the population grows early stages. That the Water Law was passed is a signal of
and as urban networks come under greater strain. growing political will to see advances in the sector but this
has yet to translate into budget allocations at the province
The existing AWS were developed gradually over almost level. In the meantime, ways to better manage the highly
30 years with intensive support from nongovernmental fragmented aid to the WASH sector are needed. While
organizations (NGOs) and international donors. It would in urban areas there is emerging competition between
not be possible to scale up the AWS models without services provided by the national utility through household
adjusting the mechanisms through which the networks connections, through its own standpost programs funded
are financed, built, and managed. Even if the state did by donors, and from AWS in peri-urban areas. This needs
play a role in constructing infrastructure, it would likely regulating too.
need to draw on the expertise and experience of NGOs
38 Million 12
Over the past five years, the WSP has provided numerous inputs to the development
Estimated number of people without access to of this comprehensive water sector law, working closely with the national water and
improved water sources in the DRC. sanitation committee (CNAEA) and the German Development Cooperation.
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Nigeria (Rivers State)
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• Support to GoN for an update of the 2006 inventory • Water quality survey (dry and wet season) of household water
using the water point mapping method use in Port Harcourt
• Customer enumeration survey in service area targeted by
PHWC pilot rehabilitation
• Assessment of PHWC billing and accounting systems
• Replacement of PHWC accounting and billing system (with
USAID SUWASA)
• Introduction of FM and HR policies and procedures for PHWC
• Urban utility service level benchmarking in 36 states (funding of
national workshop)
Intermediate objectives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish country Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an inclusive Increase domestic Increase use
leadership in sector rigorous sector recovery in urban sector investment investment in the of country
coordination and monitoring and utilities, small- plan (SIP) and sector systems by
policy development joint sector review towns, and large process that mobilizes development
processes rural piped water infrastructure partners
schemes investment
Dynamic Water quality Assessment of Urban water supply Domestic AfDB and WB
Commissioner monitoring systems led to investment attracted investment as investment for
responsible for institutionalized at installation of investment for Port counterpart funds PHWC to be
water in Rivers State PHWC basic accounting Harcourt from AfDB to WB and AfDB managed by
drove reform agenda and billing system ($170 million) and WB investment external PIU
(2011–2015) ($80 million)
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
Since the late 1990s, during military administration of major urban centers in Rivers State. When Governor
the oil-rich Rivers State, the Water Board tasked with Chibuike Amaechi was elected in 2007 he appointed a
water supply to urban areas has been in crisis. In 1998 its dynamic Commissioner to the MoWRRD with the aim
governing board was dissolved and it has only had acting of improving water supply in the state, and Port Harcourt
general managers since. From 1998–2006 the water supply in particular. The Commissioner quickly put in motion a
service declined rapidly. Since 2006 the state rehabilitated series of sector reforms including a Water Policy and Law
and restarted operations under direct control by the defining the roles and responsibilities for all stakeholders
Ministry for Water Resources and Rural Development and corporatized the Water Board (now the Port Harcourt
(MoWRRD). This move restored a very basic level of Water Corporation/PHWC).
service provision to the city of Port Harcourt and other
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Improving fecal sludge management for protecting water resources in Port Harcourt, Nigeria. (Photo credit: Michel Duret.)
Utility reform rainy seasons. During each round of data collection, the
While preparing an investment plan for the city it was sample collection teams navigated to the selected locations,
recognized that both self-supply from private manually identified the structure closest to each location (home,
drilled boreholes and bottled water had become significant office, place of worship, and so on), and asked occupants
service delivery models but little was known about their to identify their water sources.14 At each location, water
extent, quality, location or the degree to which these samples were collected from the sources identified for
alternatives competed with supply from the PHWC. A drinking, cooking, and/or washing (if different). In most
better understanding of the structure of service delivery cases, water was stored on-site, and samples were taken
in the city would be critical to defining the short- to from the storage containers to assess quality at the point-
medium-term reform strategy. of-consumption. In the second study round, enumerators
conducted a short survey on sanitation in addition to
The WSP used water quality as an entry point to collecting samples.
understand the structure of service delivery.13 A stratified
sampling method based on the city’s 17 hydraulic zones Both studies showed that the PHWC’s role in the structure
randomly assigning 400 sampling locations within each of water service delivery represented less than 1 percent of
zone proportional to estimated zonal populations. Half the water sources used in Port Harcourt but were, at the
of the sampling locations were in unplanned settlements. point of testing, better quality than other sources. The vast
Water quality surveys were carried out both in dry and majority of residents, businesses, and other institutions
13
There was an initial expectation that the water quality of utility-supplied water would
be much higher than that of self-provision and so would be a means of encouraging Navigation to, and field data from, sampling points was managed with the Fulcrum
14
people to reconnect to the utility. mobile phone application (Spatial Networks Inc., DE, USA).
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
relied on privately constructed and maintained boreholes not significant. The percentage of respondents drinking
for domestic purposes (washing and cooking), which were bottled and sachet water was over 50 percent higher in
supplemented with commercially packaged bottled and the dry season than the rainy season, which may reflect a
sachet water for drinking. Drinking water sources varied preference for chilled or convenient drinking water during
according to neighborhood status (formal versus informal warmer periods.
settlements), with residents of planned settlements
showing a greater preference for drinking bottled water The major water quality concern detected in Port
and residents of unplanned settlements primarily drinking Harcourt was contamination by fecal indicator bacteria
borehole water. The differences in drinking water quality (fecal coliforms), which increased in frequency from 21
between neighborhoods and geographies, however, were percent of drinking water sources in the dry season to
FIGURE A6: FECAL COLIFORM CONCENTRATIONS IN DRINKING WATER SOURCES BY SEASON
a. Dry season b. Rainy season
FIGURE A7.A: WATER SOURCES FOR FIGURE A7.B: QUALITY OF SOURCES: FECAL
DIFFERENT PURPOSES COLIFORM
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
42 percent of drinking water sources in the rainy season control stemmed from legacy staffing, contracts and
(Figure A6). These increases were particularly striking for behaviors—a carry-over culture formed during direct
sachet water: during the dry season; sachet water showed state control of the provision function. In response, the
the lowest frequencies of contamination; during the rainy Commissioner took over direct control of the finances.
season sachet water showed the highest frequencies of
contamination (Figure A7.B). The percent of samples An investment plan was made to rehabilitate the network
from boreholes positive for fecal coliform also increased and the Commissioner was successful in attracting US$280
from 29 percent of samples in the dry season to 38 percent million of financing from the African Development Bank
in the rainy season, as did the concentrations of fecal (US$200 million), the World Bank (US$80 million) as
indicator. A key risk factor that significantly increased well as counterpart funding from the state government.
the likelihood of fecal contamination of on-site and However, it became clear that this funding would take
neighboring boreholes was hanging/pier latrines found time to mobilize. In the interim the Commissioner
mainly in the city’s southern riverine creek system. The worked with the WSP and USAID-SUWASA to jump-
findings raised two key policy issues: start operations of the PHWC.
i) That the deterioration of drinking water quality in
private boreholes and commercially packaged water The Commissioner started rebuilding the utility from
during the rainy season is a real public health risk— the ground up. The civil servants were shifted back into
particularly in areas of the city with hanging/pier the MoWRRD. A chief executive officer (CEO) with a
latrines. private sector background was hired. A small poorer area
ii) That, although unsafe, the extremely high levels of of the city called Eagle Island was identified as a possible
reliable self-supply water that have developed in target area to start charging for services. It was chosen
Port Harcourt pose a challenge to the viability of on the basis of a combination of factors including (a) a
the PHWC. customer enumeration survey that had reported that
households were willing to pay for the services; (b) that
What could be done to shift the structure of service delivery the water quality in the area was showing signs of saline
back to the safer utility supply? Two complementary intrusion and groundwater contamination from hanging
strategies were considered by the Commissioner: (a) to toilets; and (c) that it was technically feasible to deliver
set up a regulator to oversee the borehole development water to the area with limited rehabilitation. Along with
in the city; and (b) to reform the PHWC and invest in this plan a new accounting and billing system, a financial
its expansion. While a regulator was set up, little progress management, and an HR procedures manual were
was made on regulating boreholes and so the main focus installed. The new CEO hired new staff into the utility and
became reforming the utility. the state government financed the initial rehabilitation of
engineering works.
The utility was originally a department of the MoWRRD.
Initially when it was corporatized the civil servants staffing This pilot is still at an early stage but the ground-up
it were retained. The intermittent services that the utility approach to restarting the PHWC shows promise in
provided to the 1 percent of Port Harcourt that it covered restoring the stability of the provider. In the meantime the
cost the MoWRRD US$3.5 million a year. The utility did donor funding is still delayed and the Commissioner has
not charge for its services, had no accounting or billing moved on since the general elections held in 2015. Whether
system, no customer database, and no human resources the same degree of political support will reemerge remains
(HR) procedures manual. Despite the corporatization the to be seen. In the meantime the regulator and investors
parent ministry found it impossible to make a compact in the PHWC need to develop a clear strategy to deal
with the utility as the utility itself was unable to control with the competition the utility faces from manual drilled
the quality and functions of frontline staff. This lack of solutions that dominate the market in Port Harcourt.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Somalia
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• Sector assessment and infrastructure policy note to • Assessment of HWA billing and accounting systems
inform the World Bank Somalia ISN
• Assessment and support to the corporate governance of
• Study to assess the potential for implementing small HWA including HWA exposure visit to Windhoek, Namibia
dams (sand/subsurface dams) across northern Somalia
• Study of the socioeconomic impacts (winners and losers)
of water resource developments in northern Somalia
• Preparation of Water and Agro-Pastoralist Livelihoods
pilot project (with State and Peace-building Fund)
Intermediate objectives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use of
country rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector domestic country systems
leadership monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan investment in the by development
in sector joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process sector partners
coordination processes rural piped water that mobilizes
and policy schemes infrastructure
development investment
Where it exists Multiple data Strengthened No SIP but analysis HWA reinvesting WB investment
sector leadership sources integrated corporate of potential scope for surplus utility using embedded
from regional into wadi governance and impacts of rural revenues PIUs led by
state level but evaluation tool improved cost water supply used to in strategic civil servants
implementation used by regional recovery at HWA design WB-financed improvements to complemented by
by non-state governments to project its infrastructure, WB support to MoF
actors very guide investment such as for PFM systems
fragmented additional pumps strengthening
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
Somalia has struggled with protracted violent conflict a year (OECD, 2016). Typically 15 to 20 percent of
for over 20 years. Though progress is being made in humanitarian pooled funding to Somalia is spent on
reestablishing the state in Somalia, particularly at the WASH interventions (OCHA, 2016). Development aid
municipal level, fragility and conflict define both what specifically allocated to the water sector averaged under
is possible to achieve and what needs to be achieved US$3 million a year, over the same period, none of which
across Somalia. was channeled through government.
The fragmented and non-state dominated service Improving access to water resources for multiple uses—
delivery situation typical of low-income countries is domestic and industrial water supply and sanitation,
extreme in Somalia. Over the past 10 years humanitarian livestock keeping and agriculture—are key development
aid flows to Somalia have averaged over US$400 million objectives for the Somali state. Over years of providing
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Humans and animals share water resources in Somaliland with devastating health consequences. (Photo credit: Chantal Richey.)
direct humanitarian aid to rural water supply in northern and manage construction contracts, set up community
Somalia, emergency actors have built a combination of management structures, and evaluate the results. This will
boreholes with pumps and engines and small surface water prime regional governments for managing larger scale
dams for livestock. Though providing short-term relief, rural water supply projects financed from the Somali
this aid has resulted in very low levels of safe water for Multi Partner Fund.
people, inadequate permanent sources for livestock, and
no capacity in government to manage these sources. In the In preparation for the project, two upstream studies were
north of Somalia there are fewer than 100 permanent and carried out: a macro study of water harvesting potential;
operational rural water sources for 4 to 5 million people and a micro study examining the socioeconomics of
and 20+ million livestock. There are high nonfunctionality water resource development. The macro study examined
rates, only 1 percent of functioning sources are reported the potential for exploiting water harvesting in seasonal
as protected (a standard proxy for safe water), and water rivers across the north of Somalia. It developed a Wadi
from boreholes is often saline. Evaluation Tool (WET) tool combing given ‘physical’
parameters (precipitation, slope, soil composition,
Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role and so on) with ‘use’ parameters (for example, for sites
The WSP worked with the nascent State Government near livestock routes, settlements, roads, and so on) to
of Puntland and the Government of Somaliland to set determine the most appropriate wadis for potential water
up the first government-managed rural water supply harvesting (see Figure A8).
project in over 20 years. This small US$2 million State
and Peace Building pilot project is both building low-cost Water can be a source of cooperation and a source of
infrastructure (sand and subsurface dams) and building the conflict in Somalia.The micro study examined the way in
capacity of government to scan for potential sites, procure which water resource developments created both winners
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
FIGURE A8: EVALUATING THE SUITABILITY OF POTENTIAL WATER HARVESTING SITES USING
THE WADI EVALUATION TOOL
and losers. The study drew attention to the way land tenure government capacity to identify and develop sites for
patterns influenced access to water. With a growing land government projects is a necessary precursor to using the
enclosure movement driven by cash cropping of tomatoes, data to direct the activities of non-state actors in the sector
onions, and other horticultural products, powerful and, in the medium term, to develop policy for water
individuals or groups fenced off large sections of shallow resource development.
groundwater or rationed the use of a pumps between a
private farm and public tap stand. This led to households Utility reform
in communities with the highest levels of water resource In the Somali civil war of the late 1980s military air-
availability with lower levels of access to water even for uses strikes and shelling caused heavy destruction of Hargeisa
other than irrigation such as for livestock and domestic city. Along with the physical destruction of water
use. The study also demonstrated that communities with transmission lines the fall of the central government of
relatively higher levels of water resource availability received Somalia led to the collapse of central ministry oversight
the most aid from donor agencies. and of water utilities. Somaliland unilaterally restored
its independence from the rest of Somalia in 1991 but
These studies are being used by the government teams for was itself affected by conflict until a political settlement
the targeting of project investments and for assessing the was reached in 1997. This paved the way for a revival of
risks of disrupting cooperation and exacerbating conflict home-grown institutions and the reestablishment of the
over water at selected sites. This first step in building Hargeisa Water Agency (HWA) as an autonomous agency.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
constituencies with interest in the city’s water supply. A
persistent problem was that the south of the city—home to
a relatively wealthy opposition area—was poorly covered
by the network. Though this disparity was a misfortune
of geography rather than design—as the city falls on
two sides of a valley, it made it difficult to reach from
the northern reservoir—the continuous burden of dealing
with this grievance fell on the CEO’s shoulders.
In January 2015, with support from the WSP, the CEO
led a series of consultative meetings on a proposal to
set up a Board of Directors to oversee its operation. A
wide range of ministers, government officials, elders,
businessmen, civil society organizations, religious
leaders, and intellectuals were consulted. Importantly,
the consultative process captured key players in the
Somaliland public and private sector.
Geed Deeble well field, north of Hargeisa, Somaliland.
(Photo credit: Chantal Richey.)
The discussions covered lessons from other boards that
had been set up contrasting the first Roads Agency board
considered ineffective with that of the one of Hargeisa’s
main hospitals considered effective; the need that board
A Chinese grant was secured to rehabilitate the core water members should be drawn from all parts of Hargeisa;
supply infrastructure in Hargeisa. The boreholes in Geed and the board should be made of people from diverse
Deeble, the source for Hargeisa, were repaired, water backgrounds and with a diversity of skills.
production and boosting equipment installed, and a new
water distribution network extended to new settlements. The board of directors, drawn from all parts of the city, was
The water supply system had originally been designed to endorsed by the President in 2015. The board oversees the
supply 180,000 but has grown to serve over half a million HWA’s operations and attracts investment to the utility. It
people living in and around Hargeisa, a city of just under also act as a liaison with local communities, explaining the
a million people. Having restored basic services further issues that the HWA faces helping address grievances. The
infrastructure investment has been provided by the utility has adopted new HR and financial management
European Commission to increase production from 9 to procedures that are helping the agency transition from
24 million liters of water per day. an informal system of management highly dependent on
discretionary decisionmaking by the CEO to one that is based
To manage the HWA’s expansion to the rest of the city on organizationwide policies and procedures. The adoption
and to address growing grievances about inequitable of these procedures has already helped attract additional
supply, the chief executive officer (CEO) requested the infrastructure investment that will be managed by the HWA.
WSP’s support to set up a board of directors and to
rebuild the HWA’s ‘software’—the systems and processes
for managing the people and finance that keep the services +US$400 Million
operating and the city.
Average amount of humanitarian aid flows to Somalia per
year over the past 10 years, with development aid specifically
With no board to oversee the institution, there was a huge allocated to the water sector averaging under US$3 million
weight on the CEO to be accountable for all aspects of a year, over the same period, none of which was channeled
the running of the HWA and of managing the multiple through government.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
Zimbabwe
WSP Technical Assistance by work-stream
Reestablishing sector oversight role Utility reform
• Support to national water policy • Urban utility service level benchmarking in 32 municipal
councils over three annual cycles
• Review of sector coordination and regulation assessing
whether existing institutions were fit for purpose
• Impact Assessment of Beitbridge Emergency Water
Supply and Sanitation project
Intermediate objectives
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.
Reestablish Institutionalize Restore cost Establish an Increase Increase use of
country leadership rigorous sector recovery in urban inclusive sector domestic country systems
in sector monitoring and utilities, small- investment plan investment in by development
coordination and joint sector review towns, and large (SIP) and process the sector partners
policy development processes rural piped water that mobilizes
schemes infrastructure
investment
GoZ led dialogue Service-level SLB process has SIP established and Some WB investments
and approved benchmarking led to gains in detailed small town municipalities in Beitbridge ($2.6
National Water (SLB) process in efficiency across investment planning using water million) and ZINWA
Policy (2013). place for 32 urban some of the 32 led to $20 million revenues ($20 million) use(d)
Coordination municipalities with municipalities ZIMREF investment for system embedded PIU led
strengthened peer to peer review administered by the improvement by civil servants or
process and JSRs WB utility staff
Legend: No WSP intervention No progress Slight progress Moderate progress Good progress Substantial progress
The story of Zimbabwe’s urban water supply and The fragility of urban services was severely exposed during
sanitation sector is one of a high coverage followed by a the devastating cholera outbreak in 2008/09, when over
dramatic decline in the wake of political and economic 100,000 people were infected and 4,300 lost their lives.
shocks over the decade to 2008. Hyperinflation, out-
migration and a halving of the Gross Domestic Product This humanitarian crisis triggered a concerted effort
(GDP), eroded domestic revenue and undermined to save lives, secure assets, and halt the decline but it
Zimbabwe’s strong institutional capacity, pushing the also coincided with the formation of a Government of
country into a state of fragility over the span of less than National Unity and the dollarization of the economy.
a decade.15 Urban services were unable to function as The dollarization in particular drove a rebound in
revenues collapsed and infrastructure fell into disrepair. municipal service revenues and with it opportunities
for stabilizing and incrementally improving services
with this cash from customers.
From US$8,785,898,074 in 1998 to US$4,407,197,679 in 2008 at 2005 constant
15
market prices.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
A tractor procured under a project to haul a trailer used to collect rubbish doubles as a watering tank to help the council
get the town green. (Photo credit: Anusa Pisanec.)
Reestablishing the sector’s oversight role The WSP structured its TA program so that national and
and utility reform local actors led the design and implementation of the
Noting that water and sewer revenues were being used SLB program from the very beginning. The consultation
to finance many other municipal expenditures—to the phase included representation from local authorities,
detriment of the autonomy of water and sewer services— Town Clerks’ and Town Treasurers’ Forums, members of
the WSP initiated and supported a highly participatory the Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe (UCAZ),
process of service level performance benchmarking (SLB) GIZ, and a GIS and database specialist. The data
across 32 urban local authorities. Benchmarking was collection phase, which started with a test-run in Harare,
recognized as a tool through which provider autonomy Chitungwiza, Ruwa, and Epworth in January 2013 to
and accountability could be reestablished. ensure the methodology worked, was designed to foster
ownership of the SLB process amongst local authorities,
The SLB program drew on international experience: as well as to help transfer knowledge and to develop
establishing a uniform set of indicators, definitions, the capacity of sector stakeholders within Zimbabwe to
and calculation methodology to enable meaningful manage and implement the exercise.
comparisons, using a participatory approach involving all
32 urban local authorities to create consensus on desired The process of implementing SLB has required
service standards; using data reliability scores to highlight engineering, finance, and housing personnel to work
and address issues of data quality; and adopting a peer- together to collect, verify, and analyze data. These
review mechanism for reporting and verifying performance meetings have helped develop a shared ‘language’ across
levels (as against consultants) to ensure ownership of both departments and a more comprehensive understanding
data and process. of the core issues across the sector, and the importance
67
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
of matching service delivery revenues with costs. The finance, and engineering units are better coordinated.
finance teams, for example, are better able to see how Most local authorities have responded to similar situations
engineering and infrastructure issues, such as metering, by computerizing billing and putting in place processes to
affect billing and collections and, as a result, revenues for monitor water sales more closely.
the local authority. Similarly, engineers were exposed to
the importance of reducing water losses to improve the Zimbabwe’s SLB program has influenced both the thinking
financial viability of water services. and practice of local authorities’ approach to service
delivery, improved coordination within and between urban
Furthermore, local authorities have noted improved authorities responsible for delivering services, facilitated
relations with national actors, including the Ministry an evidence-based dialogue between local authorities and
of Water, Ministry of Local Government, and ZINWA, central government ministries, and provided a strong
as a result of SLB. A number of officials across the local foundation for ring-fencing and regulating the financing
authorities observed that the national ministries used to be of services going forward.
seen as ‘punishing authorities’ that would fine or penalize
local authorities for poor service outcomes without In 2015 the Ministry of Environment, Water and Climate
understanding the issues and challenges of providing (MoEWC), initiated the process of establishing a sector
services. Officials at the Ministry of Water and ZINWA regulator. SLB’s operational and financial data would be
supported this perspective, noting that local authorities an important tool that will eventually form the basis for
previously viewed the ministry with trepidation and some determining tariffs and regulating services. Furthermore,
suspicion and were therefore often hesitant to share data while the central government is not currently allocating
or work closely with the ministry. Political distinctions funds based on SLB data, the MoEWC noted that SLB
were one major reason for this divide, but the national does provide a strong evidence base through which the
agencies also genuinely did not have access to information government and donors can prioritize support. The
that could help them assess services and performance ministry also noted that it would consider using SLB
more effectively. data to create incentives for local authorities to make
operational improvements in the delivery of services
Developing and using an evidence-base for better going forward.
management and decisionmaking, SLB has also helped
local authorities and, in some cases ZINWA, identify By 2015 the SLB program in Zimbabwe had reached its
and better understand critical gaps and weaknesses in the third year of implementation. The program has taken root
supply chains for water and sanitation services. In 2012, for within local and national stakeholders and is already being
example, local authorities did not have data on the number used to influence decisions and investments. This is in
of properties, and therefore the number of connections itself an important result. The successful implementation
and customers, they were serving. SLB has helped local of the program provides useful insights on how to design
authorities develop and use more robust information and implement SLB programs and, more broadly, on how
systems that have revealed significant opportunities to to deliver technical assistance in FCV affected countries.
strengthen the revenue stream going forward. Rusape
Town Council, for example, reported discovering over The active participation of national and local stakeholders
1,000 customers that were not being billed following the was at the core of every aspect of the SLB program’s
housing surveys. design. This was a critical success factor because, while
Service providers are increasingly using this evidence-
base to improve service outcomes. Ruwa Local Board, for +100,000
instance, upon discovering that a significant number of Estimated number of people who were infected (and
customers were drawing water but were not being billed, 4,300 lost their lives) during a devastating cholera
has adopted a common form to ensure their housing, outbreak in 2008/09.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix A: Country Appendixes
SLB is a useful monitoring tool, it is most effective if local There are still a number of challenges that need to be
stakeholders use the platform to inform decisions and addressed before SLB can truly impact the delivery of
investments. Their ownership and understanding of the water and sanitation services. Despite the ownership over
processes is therefore critical. The implementation team the process, it is clear that many local authorities still view
explicitly moved away from using external consultants SLB as a reporting mechanism and not a daily process
to design indicators and the data collection and analysis that is ingrained in how their services are managed.
systems. Instead, SLB was entrenched within local Furthermore, while the peer-to-peer reviews are a critical
authorities from the very beginning through a heavily feature of the program, there is some risk that they will
localized approach where local authorities came together increasingly showcase positive aspects of service delivery
to establish indicators and benchmarks and used local as SLB gains more political attention.
resources to collect and analyze data.
69
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile States lists
Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile
States lists
There are many definitions of state fragility used by think- Bank. To reflect evolving country circumstances, both these
tanks, and bilateral and multilateral donors, both for lists have changed over time. The OECD list is broader,
analytical and operational purposes pointing to the very comprising 50 countries and including countries with
subjective nature of the term (Pavanello, 2008). For the pockets of instability (OECD, 2015b). The World Bank
purposes of this report fragile states are understood to be list, harmonized with the African and Asian development
countries, or territories, that lack capacity—or in some banks and based on the CPIA ratings (or equivalent) of
cases political will—to deliver security, good governance, these institutions, is a shorter list of around 35 countries
and basic services to all their citizens. (depending on which year) with a strong operational
focus. The great majority of countries on the World Bank
Though definitions of fragile states are multiple, evolving, list are struggling with the “capacity conundrum” and
and subjective, two authoritative lists of fragile states are the transition towards country-led service delivery both
those published by the Organisation for Economic Co- in WASH and other sectors, 18 of which were in Sub-
operation and Development (OECD) and the World Saharan Africa in 2013.
TABLE B.1: Harmonized list of fragile situations FY15a/
Country WB CPIA Score ADB/AfDB CPIA Harmonized Political and Peace-Keeping
Score Average Peace-Building Missionsc/
Missionsb/
IDA Eligible
Afghanistan 2.650 2.842 2.7 P Pk
Burundi 3.242 3.409 3.3 P
Central African 2.500 2.262 2.4 P
Republic
Chad 2.600 3.247 2.9
Comoros 2.758 2.392 2.6
Congo, DR 2.883 3.290 3.1 Pk
Cote d’Ivoire 3.183 3.342 3.3 Pk
Eritrea 1.992 1.933 2.0
Guinea-Bissau 2.525 2.644 2.6 P
Haiti 2.833 – 2.8 Pk
Kiribati 2.908 2.983 2.9
Kosovo 3.592 – 3.6 Pk
Liberia 3.125 3.492 3.3 Pk
Madagascar 3.017 3.162 3.1
Mali 3.383 3.775 3.6 Pk
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix B: World Bank and OECD Fragile States lists
Country WB CPIA Score ADB/AfDB CPIA Harmonized Political and Peace-Keeping
Score Average Peace-Building Missionsc/
Missionsb/
Marshall Islands 2.642 2.967 2.8
Micronesia, FS 2.692 2.883 2.8
Myanmar 2.950 – 3.0
Sierra Leone 3.267 3.447 3.4 P
Solomon Islands 2.933 3.308 3.1
Somalia – 1.104 1.1 P
South Sudan 2.092 2.279 2.2 Pk
Sudan 2.358 2.620 2.5 Pk
Togo 2.967 3.093 3.0
Tuvalu 2.767 3.050 2.9
Yemen 2.992 – 3.0
Territories
West Bank and Gaza – – P
Blend
Timor-Leste 3.058 3.317 3.2 Pk
Zimbabwe 2.258 2.173 2.2
Middle Income
Bosnia & Herzegovina – – – P
Iraq – – – P
Libya – – – P
Syria – – – P
Notes:
a/
“Fragile Situations” have: either (a) a harmonized average CPIA country rating of 3.2 or less, or (b) the presence of a UN and/or regional peace-
keeping or peace-building mission during the past three years. This list includes only IDA eligible countries and nonmember or inactive territories/
countries without CPIA data. IBRD countries with CPIA ratings below 3.2 do not qualify on this list due to nondisclosure of CPIA ratings; IBRD countries
that are included here qualify only by the presence of a peace-keeping, political or peace-building mission—and their CPIA ratings are thus not
disclosed.
b/
Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (for example, AU, EU, OAS) peace-building and political mission in this country in the last
three years. [Sources: UN DPKO website, AU website, EC website.]
c/
Specifically defined as the presence of a UN and/or regional (for example, AU, EU, OAS, NATO) peace-keeping operation in this country in the last
three years, with the exclusion of border monitoring operations. [Sources: UN DPKO website, AU website, EC website.]
71
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix C: Influence of Results on Domestic
and Donor Financing
Appendix C: Influence of Results on
Domestic and Donor Financing
The information and knowledge generated by the and investment plans triggered new investments. Service
WSP’s interventions across the seven FCV affected delivery models evaluated by the WSP, such as sand dams
countries influenced over US$323 million of donor and in Somalia and autonomous piped water systems in the
government funding (see Table C1). WSP interventions DRC, were adopted by new projects. Studies, such as that
in improving sector data (water point mapping, water on utility billing systems in fragile environments, led to
quality monitoring, service level benchmarking) were donors and governments financing specific upgrades in
used for better targeting investments. New sector policies accounting and billing systems.
TABLE C1: SUMMARY OF FUNDING LEVERAGED OR INFLUENCED
Country WB Donor or Funding How WSP has or intends to influence funding, for example, target
funding government source population OR model of service delivery
leveraged funding
influenced
(US$ million)
DRC 3.00 85.00 AfDB, The model developed by the WSP and Belgian Technical Cooperation in
AFD the mid-2000s was adopted by the AFD and DFID as a service delivery
model. The 2013 WSP-financed national study mapping and evaluating 500
autonomous piped water systems (AWS) serving over 4 million people has
been used by the AfDB to define the service delivery model used and areas
to be targeted for the $60 million PIRUS project which will add 60 more AWS
in peri-urban and rural areas in the Kasai regions.
Liberia 10.00 25.50 UNICEF, The 2010 water point mapping (WMP) exercise used as method of targeting
DGIS, funding to poorly served rural areas and water points in need of repair and
DFID, rehabilitation by UNICEF and the Liberia WASH consortium drawing on DGIS
GoL and DFID funding. In 2016 GoL allocated 100k to carry out minor repairs of
500 waterpoints using the WPM data.
WB allocated $10 million to finance rehabilitation and expansion of the
national utility’s (LWSC) distribution network in Monrovia. This was based on
investment planning and preparatory design studies carried out by the WSP.
Post-Ebola crisis, the LWSC and Ministry of Public Works used the Sector
Investment Plan to request $2.5 million of GoL capital investment allocated
in the 2016 budget.
Nigeria 75.00 2.50 USAID, In Rivers State, recommendations from the WSP’s TA to the Port Harcourt
GoN utility (PHWC) were implemented by USAID-SUWASA and the Rivers State
ministry responsible for water. USAID-SUWASA installed an accounting
system based on the WSP’s billing options study and supported a pilot
investment in Eagle Island based on the WSP’s customer enumeration
exercise and water quality monitoring.
The PHWC has adopted financial and HR management procedures supported
by the WSP, setting the foundation for reestablishing cost recovery initially
in Eagle Island, to be expanded to other parts of Port Harcourt with WB
financing to rehabilitation and expansion of network.
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The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | Appendix C: Influence of Results on Domestic
and Donor Financing
ROC 2.00 0.00 GoC The 2012 water point mapping exercise revealed 50% of water points
nonfunctional after five years of installation. The institutional audit in 2014
showed that the water reforms of 2009 had not been successful in delineating
roles and responsibilities and institutions were only partially staffed. To
address these issues the ministry responsible for water is leading a process
to develop a national water policy aligned with the SDG 6. This policy
dialogue was initially supported by the WSP and in 2016 will be financed
from the WB loan which is 80% financed by GoC.
Sierra 10.00 80.25 AfDB Water point mapping used by UNICEF and AFDB drawing on DGIS
Leone and DFID funding as method of targeting funding to areas in need
of rehabilitation, poorly served areas, and as baseline for projects.
WB investment in Resilient Cities Project will build on improved financial
stability of the main utility in Freetown (GVWC) resulting from a customer
enumeration survey and replacing the billing system, jointly funded by DFID
and WSP.
Somalia 10.00 0.00 Two WSP studies informed the design of a $2 million WB pilot investment
in sand dams: (a) a ‘macro level study’ that defined the potential for
enhancing water storage in the north of Somalia; and (b) a ‘micro level
study’ evaluating the impact of existing water infrastructure interventions
in wadis (sand rivers) on cooperation and conflict over water resources.
A $6 million WB investment will build on the WSP’s improvements to Hargeisa
Water Agency’s corporate governance (formation of a board of directors,
strengthening FM, procurement and HR policies and procedures), and;
exposing the senior management team to good practice of utilities in other
arid areas of Africa through an exchange with Windhoek, Namibia.
South 0.00 0.00 No influence due to upsurge in conflict though strong relations and dialogue
Sudan kept with GoSS on improving aid effectiveness reported in “Improving WASH
service delivery in protracted crises: The case of South Sudan”.
Zimbabwe 20.00 0.00 WSP TA to the National Water Policy, sector coordination, service level
benchmarking across 32 municipalities provided the foundation for the
$20 million WB National Water Project. The service delivery models to be
deployed in the first seven small towns builds on the recommendations of
the Beitbridge Impact Assessment carried out by the WSP following on a
$2.65 million State and Peace-building Fund investment.
Total 130.00 193.25
73
The Transition from Emergency to Development Support: Evidence from Country Case Studies in Africa | References
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