DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
LEVERAGING COMPETITION IN THE TELECOM SECTOR TO
ACCELERATE ECONOMIC GROWTH
World Bank Policy Note
January, 2021
International Development Association
Macroeconomics, Trade and Investment Global Practice
Latin America and the Caribbean Region
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ii
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR
January, 1 – December, 31
CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit: Dominican Peso (RD$)
(Exchange Rate Effective as of 5/20/2020)
US$1.00 = RD$55.45
Abbreviations and Acronyms
BTI Bertelsmann Transformation Index
DR Dominican Republic
DFS Digital Financial Services
FDI Foreign Direct Investment
GNI Gross National Income
ICT Information and Communications Technology
INDOTEL Instituto Dominicano de las Telecomunicaciones (Dominican Telecommunications
Institute)
ISPs Internet Service Providers
LAC Latin America and the Caribbean
LRIC Long-Run Incremental Costs
MCPAT Market and Competition Policy Assessment Tool
MoUs Memoranda of Understanding
MVNOs Mobile Virtual Network Operators
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PMR Product Market Regulations
SPEI Interbank Electronic Payment System
Vice President: Carlos Felipe Jaramillo
Country Director: Michel Kerf
Global Director: Marcello Estevão
Sector Managers: Jorge Thompson Araujo and
Martha Licetti
Task Team Leaders: Johannes Herderschee and
Georgiana Pop
iii
Acknowledgements
This is a Policy Note is part of a Public Expenditure Review series. The series is grounded in an ongoing
dialogue between World Bank staff and the Dominican Republic’s Ministry of Finance and Ministry of
Planning and Economic Development. At the Ministry of Finance, the task was managed by Mr. José Luis
Actis, Advisor to the Minister until September 2020 and since October 1, 2020 by Mr. Gian Lucas Marra,
Advisor to the Minister, and supported by Paola Maria Vargas Antigua, Coordinator, and Camila
Hernandez Villaman, Economist. At the Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the task was
managed by Martin Franco, Public Finance Unit Coordinator, UAAES, and Paula Salvador, World Bank
Group Project Coordinator. Experts from sector ministries were invited to collaborate with the World Bank
team on the preparation of each chapter. At the request of the Government of the Dominican Republic,
the French Development Agency (Agence Française de Développement, AFD) provided financial support
for this project. AFD Director Sandra Kassab was instrumental in the preparation of the analysis, and
valuable contributions were made by Eleonore Pocry, Country Officer in charge of DR and Martinique and
Gwenola Pellen, Procurement Officer, in Paris and Lucas Gimenez, Project Officer, in Santo Domingo.
This PER was prepared by an interdisciplinary team led by World Bank staff. Johannes (Han) Herderschee
(Senior Country Economist) coordinated the team in close collaboration with Craig Kullmann (Senior
Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist, SLCWA), Miriam Montenegro (Senior Social Protection Specialist,
HLCSP), James Sampi Bravo (Economist, ELCMU), Anjali Shahani (Operations Officer, LCC3C), and Carmen
Amaro (Operations Officer, LCCDO). The team benefited from guidance and advice provided by Jorge
Araujo (Manager, MTI), Rita Cestti (Practice Manager, SLCWA), and Pablo Gottret (Practice Manager,
HLCSP). The team would also like to acknowledge the valuable overall guidance and comments provided
by Tahseen Sayed Kahn (Country Director for the Caribbean), Michel Kerf (Country Director for Central
America and the Dominican Republic), Alessandro Legrottaglie (Country Manager until June 30, 2020),
Alexandria Valerio (Country Manager since July 1, 2020), Abha Prasad (Program Leader), Tim Johnston
(Program Leader), and Vickram Cuttaree (Program Leader), and Ricardo Habalian (Operations Officer,
LCC3C). Juan Carlos Parra Osorio (Senior Economist, ELCPV until June 30, 2020) and Alejandro De La
Fuente (Senior Economist, ELCPV) advised on poverty issues and the expenditure-impact analysis. Sincere
thanks are also due to the peer reviewers who contributed at various stages of the analysis, including:
Aline Coudouel (Lead Economist HSASP), Mark Charles Dorfman (Senior Economist, HEASP), Henri Fortin
(Lead Financial Management Specialist, EA2G2), Chris Heymans (Senior Water and Sanitation Specialist,
SAFW3), Phil Keefer (Principal Economic Advisor, IDB), Professor Thierry Madies (University of Fribourg),
and Guillermo Javier Vuletin (Senior Economist, LCRCE).
The team would also like to thank Oscar Parlback (Consultant) and Sean Lothrop (Consultant) for much-
valued assistance in revising drafts and editing the PER. Sylvaine Cussac (Consultant) formatted this
version. Giselle Velasquez (Program Assistant, ELCMU) greatly supported this work by tirelessly facilitating
administrative processes. Maria Hermann (Executive Assistant in the World Bank’s Santo Domingo office)
and Samahara Hernandez Angulo (Team Assistant in the Santo Domingo office) supported the numerous
consultations of the visiting missions.
This Policy Note was prepared by Georgiana Pop (Global Lead for Competition Policy), Cesar Borja Galan
Santos (Analyst, Global Competition Policy Team) and Noelia Carreras Schabauer (Competition Expert,
Global Competition Policy Team). Graciela Miralles Murciego (Senior Economist, Global Competition
iv
Policy Team) provided valuable inputs. Martha Licetti (Practice Manager, ETIMT) provided valuable advice.
Harish Natarajan (Lead Financial Sector Specialist, EFNFI) and Fredesvinda Montes (Senior Financial Sector
Specialist, EFNFI) prepared Box 1 on payment services and benefited from advice from Yira Mascaro
(Practice Manager, ELCFN).
v
Table of contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms ......................................................................................................................iii
Acknowledgements ....................................................................................................................................iv
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations................................................................................... viii
I. Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1
I.1. Main features and competition issues in the telecommunications sector ................................... 6
I.2. Market outcomes in the telecommunications sector remain suboptimal .................................. 10
I.3. Regulatory Bottlenecks and institutional constraints may limit competition along the Dominican
Republic’s Telecommunications Value Chain ....................................................................................... 13
I.4. Restrictive licensing requirements and a lack of effective asymmetric regulation appear to limit
market entry and protect incumbents.................................................................................................. 14
I.5. Suboptimal tariff regulation undermines merit-based competition among market players ...... 15
I.6. Limited infrastructure access appears to create barriers to entry in the telecommunications
sector 18
I.7. Overlapping institutional mandates may weaken the enforcement of prohibitions on
anticompetitive behavior ..................................................................................................................... 20
II. Policy recommendations
.................................................................................................................................................................. 23
II.1. Introducing pro-competition regulations in the telecommunications sector can eliminate
barriers to entry ................................................................................................................................... 23
II.2. Improving enforcement is vital to prevent anticompetitive practices ...................................... 25
Bibliography .............................................................................................................................................. 27
Annex: The World Bank’s Market and Competition Policy Assessment Tool (MCPAT) ............................. 28
List of figures
Figure 1. Restrictiveness of Product Market Regulation in the Dominican Republic .................................. 1
Figure 2. BTI Scores for the Dominican Republic and Selected LAC Countries ............................................ 4
Figure 3. Telecommunications Industry Features and Competition Dynamics ........................................... 6
Figure 4. Examples of Business Separation ................................................................................................. 7
Figure 5. The Three Stages of Opening Telecommunications Markets to Competition .............................. 9
Figure 6. Mobile Subscriptions and Internet Penetration in the Dominican Republic .............................. 11
Figure 7. Average Prices per Minute for Fixed Telecommunication Services, ........................................... 12
Figure 8. Average Prices per Minute for Mobile Telecommunication Services (Postpaid), ....................... 12
Figure 9. Prices for Mobile/Cellular Services (70 min + 20 sms) in Selected Countries (US$/month) ....... 13
Figure 10. Prices for Fixed Broadband Services (5GB) in Selected Countries (US$/month) ...................... 13
Figure 11. Regulatory Restrictions on Services-Based and Facilities-Based Competition in the Dominican
Republic .................................................................................................................................................... 14
Figure 12. Share of Countries in Which Interconnection Rates Are and Are Not Regulated ..................... 16
Figure 13. Interconnection Charges in Fixed Networks (Local Termination), Dominican Republic and
Comparators (2020) .................................................................................................................................. 17
Figure 14. Conventional Practices for Telecommunications Regulation ................................................... 18
Figure 15. Recommendations for Strengthening Competition in the Telecommunications Sector .......... 23
Figure A 16. High-level overview of the MCPAT approach ........................................................................ 28
Figure A 17. MCPAT Typology of competition restrictions ........................................................................ 29
Figure A 18. Competition along the Telecom Value Chain ........................................................................ 30
vi
List of tables
Table 1. Scope of institutional mandates in DR’s competition policy for the telecommunications sector 21
List of boxes
Box 1. Widespread deployment of payment services may require regulatory changes ............................. 4
Box 2. Balancing Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Enforcement in the Competition Framework ................ 9
Box 3. The International Experience with Implementing a Combined Wholesale and Retail Regulatory
Strategy to Lower Interconnection Costs .................................................................................................. 19
Box 4. Promoting the Development of Passive Infrastructure in Mexico.................................................. 20
Box 5. Coordinating Policy Implementation: The UK’s Concurrency Framework for the
Telecommunications Sector...................................................................................................................... 22
Box 6. Pro-Competition Spectrum-Regulation Instruments ...................................................................... 24
vii
Executive Summary and Policy Recommendations
Limited competition hinders the optimal use of telecommunication services in the Dominican Republic,
which lags peer countries in mobile subscriptions and internet penetration . Despite recent reforms
designed to enhance competition, the telecommunications sector remains dominated by a small number
of companies. In addition, the antimonopoly policy is perceived to be weak compared to regional peers.
High infrastructure costs limit the economic viability of replicating key facilities, creating bottlenecks.
Fixed telecom prices have remained largely unresponsive to changes in demand over the last eight years.
Moreover, prices for both mobile communications and fixed broadband are higher in the DR than in peer
countries.
Following the World Bank Group’s Markets and Competition Policy Assessment Toolkit (MCPAT) , this
policy note provides a brief overview of key bottlenecks affecting the telecommunications sector, as
well as key pro-competition reforms that could improve the regulatory landscape.
Due to its inherent characteristics, the telecommunications markets – fixed, mobile and internet - in DR
are concentrated. Currently, there are three main operators in the fixed, mobile and internet markets,
with few smaller operators having a residual market share in the fixed and internet markets. While market
concentration is common in the telecommunication sector in many countries, the interaction between
market characteristics and the regulatory framework for telecommunications is key to yield efficient
market outcomes in terms of prices, quality and access to services.
Infrastructure and regulatory bottlenecks appear to limit competition along the telecommunications
value chain. Stringent licensing regime and burdensome qualifying proceedings may hinder the entry of
new telecommunications operators, including mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) and internet
service providers (ISPs). The lack of effective asymmetric regulation weakens oversight of operators with
significant market power and reinforces the position of incumbents. To prevent anticompetitive practices,
regulators must formally identify operators with significant market power. However, the Dominican
Telecommunications Institute (Instituto Dominicano de las Telecomunicaciones, INDOTEL), in charge of
regulating the telecommunications sector in the DR, has not yet taken this step.
Suboptimal tariff regulation may also undermine merit-based competition among market players.
Unsatisfactory regulation of interconnection rates can lead to on-net/off-net price differentiation and
encourage club effects, reinforcing market dominance. Lack of effective ex ante tariff regulation also
constrains access to infrastructure, notably the international gateway. Although the government has
passed important reforms designed to enable new competitors to use essential passive infrastructure,
these rules and obligations are not defined in an asymmetric manner to ensure that players with
significant market power are properly regulated.
Lack of clear rules granting access to essential infrastructure may raise barriers for new entrants.
Moreover, regulatory constraints that inhibit the deployment of additional fixed network infrastructure
further benefit incumbents at the expense of small firms and new entrants. As far as radio spectrum
policies are concerned, even though spectrum rights are allocated through auctions, tender conditions do
not appear to be consistently open and non-discriminatory, which creates an uneven playing field
between operators.
viii
Overlapping institutional mandates may have weakened the effective enforcement of prohibitions on
anticompetitive behavior in the telecommunications sector. The Telecommunications Law empowers
the sector regulator, INDOTEL, to review mergers and prosecute anticompetitive practices, while
ProCompetencia has concurrent powers to promote competition in the telecommunications sector. In the
absence of effective coordination mechanisms between ProCompetencia and INDOTEL, their overlapping
mandates may weaken the enforcement of competition law.
Limited competition in the telecommunications sector is slowing the development of the digital
economy, including the deployment of new payment methods that are essential to financial inclusion .
Competition in payment markets occurs between both rival payment providers and alternative platforms.
However, a lack of interoperability among payment platforms can distort competition among providers.
Policy Recommendations
Policy recommendations encompass ex ante and ex post regulatory aspects to foster competition and
better market outcomes. Ensuring an effective ex ante regulation is essential to facilitate entry of new
operators, eliminating regulatory barriers and imposing asymmetric obligations to operators with a
significant market power. Once markets are adequately regulated, an effective competition enforcement
system further guarantees market contestability. 1 The table below presents a set of pro-competition
reforms prioritized based on their feasibility in the short and medium-term.
1 See also: World Bank (2018), Better Markets for All through Competition Policy in Senegal, box 17.
ix
Recommendations Responsibility Priority
Ex ante regulatory interventions to enhance contestability
Adopt a clear general authorization regime subject to minimal INDOTEL Short-term
administrative requirements
Promote roaming agreements and require MNOs with significant INDOTEL Medium-term
market power in the mobile sector to host MVNOs
Introduce a secondary spectrum market INDOTEL Medium-term
Grant preferential access to the spectrum to new and smaller INDOTEL Medium-term
operators in a non-discriminatory manner
Promote an effective harmonization and coordination of the INDOTEL \ Short-term
licenses for the deployment of fixed network infrastructure
Introduce asymmetric principles in the existing regulation on INDOTEL Short-term
passive infrastructure sharing and effective enforcement of the
mechanisms for conflict resolution
Eliminate non-dominant operators’ obligations to provide access INDOTEL Medium-term
to their network infrastructure
Combine interconnection charges with off-net price caps for the INDOTEL Short-term
incumbent operator
Ex post competition policy enforcement mechanisms
Limit the prohibition of abusive conducts to operators with ProCompetencia / Short-term
significant market power INDOTEL
Strengthen the institutional framework and further develop the ProCompetencia / Short-term
rules, guidelines, and administrative capacities necessary to INDOTEL / Ministry of
effectively prevent, investigate, and prosecute anticompetitive Industry, Commerce
practices. and SMEs
Introduce a cross-sectoral merger-review system ProCompetencia / Short-term
INDOTEL / Ministry of
Industry, Commerce
and SMEs
x
I. Introduction
1. In recent years, the Dominican Republic (DR) has taken important steps to promote competition,
both in key sectors and economy wide. In 2008, the government approved a new competition law, and
in 2011 it established an independent competition authority, the National Commission for the Defense of
Competition (ProCompetencia). Meanwhile, the elimination of sector-specific barriers to competition has
reduced restrictions, as indicated by the Product Market Regulations (PMR) indicators which are now
aligned with the regional average (Figure 1). 2 The private sector’s increased participation in network
industries, especially telecommunications;3 the unbundling of the electricity market;4 the establishment
of independent sectoral regulators;5 the expansion of access to markets for professional services;6 and the
lack of restrictions on foreign direct investment (FDI) in most sectors highlight the government’s
commitment to fostering competition.
Figure 1. Restrictiveness of Product Market Regulation in the Dominican Republic
Source: WBG/OECD PMR data 2013-2016.
Note: OECD PMR indicators are on a scale of 0-6, with higher values denoting more restrictive
regulations affecting competition. a/ Top 5 OECD countries include Netherlands, United Kingdom,
Austria, Denmark and New Zealand. b/ LAC countries include: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia,
Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Peru.
2 PMR measures the extent to which de jure public policies either promote or inhibit market forces in key economic sectors,
including electricity, gas, telecommunications, postal services, transportation, water, retail distribution, professional services, and
other sectors. It also evaluates administrative requirements for starting a business, the treatment of foreign parties, the
governance arrangements for state-owned enterprises, antitrust exclusions and exemptions, and similar issues. For more on the
PMR methodology, see: Nicoletti et al. (1999), Conway et al. (2005), and Wolf et al. (2009). The World Bank Group collected PMR
information for the DR in 2013 as part of a joint initiative with the OECD to calculate PMR indicators for 16 regional countries.
3 According to the PMR data, there are no public enterprises in the telecommunications sector. See also WTO (2015). Trade Policy
Review, Dominican Republic. WT/TPR/S/319, p.191. (https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/s319_e.pdf)
4 Although operated by public enterprises, ownership separation in the generation and transmission segments is established by
Article 11 of Law No 125-01 (http://sie.gob.do/images/sie-documentos-pdf/leyes/LeyGeneraldeElecctricidadNo.125-01.pdf)
5 The DR has an independent regulator for the telecommunications sector (INDOTEL), which was created by Article 76 of Law No.
153-98 (http://www.sice.oas.org/investment/NatLeg/RDM/L_TeleCom_s.pdf). The regulator receives most if its budget from
services to the regulated industry (Article 102.1 of Law No. 153-98), and its decisions can be appealed before the court (Article
96.3 of Law No 153-98). The electricity sector is regulated by the Superintendent of Electricity, which has the powers to set prices
in the industry and issue sanctions and penalties (Article 24 of Law No 125-01). Finally, the Port Authority is an independent
regulator for oversea transportation (Article 1 of Law No. 70).
6 The PMR data include four regulated professions: lawyers, accountants, engineers, and architects.
1
2. However, remaining regulatory bottlenecks in network industries and the limited
implementation of the competition law are inhibiting the DR’s ability to unleash the full potential of a
competitive economy. The most recent Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI) found that the DR lags
both its peers in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) and global comparator countries on perceptions-
based indicators of antimonopoly policy and market competition (Figure 2). The country’s BTI score of 6
2
out of 10 on both indicators 7 points to an uneven playing field for market participants, inconsistent
enforcement of the competition law, a high degree of market concentration, and state presence in
7The market-organization indicator measures perceptions regarding market fundamentals, including: barriers entry and exit in
product and factor markets, the freedom to initiate and withdrawn investments, discrimination based on ownership type (state
versus private, foreign versus domestic) or firm size, the presence of the informal sector, market pricing mechanisms, and the
movement of labor and capital across borders. The competition policy indicator measures perceptions regarding competition
safeguards, including antitrust law, the presence of an independent competition authority, and the overall role of the state in the
market. See: Bertelsmann Stiftung. “BTI 2020 Codebook for Country Assessments” ( https://www.bti-
project.org/content/en/downloads/codebooks/BTI_2020_Codebook.pdf)
3
strategic sectors, including electricity. 8 The PMR data confirm that the regulatory protection of
incumbents, coupled with significant state intervention in network sectors, continues to pose a major
obstacle to competition. 9 While greater competition could yield important benefits, improving key
services that depend on telecom, such as payment services would require further regulatory changes (Box
1).
Figure 2. BTI Scores for the Dominican Republic and Selected LAC Countries
Source: BTI, 2020.
Note: The BTI is a perception indicator based on in-depth assessments by Bertelsmann Stiftung.
Box 1. Widespread deployment of payment services may require regulatory changes
The ability to transact digitally is an important element in building digital economies. Enhancing access to and
usage of transaction accounts requires strong public-private sector commitment, foundational
telecommunication services and financial infrastructure and conducive legal and regulatory framework that
allows innovation and support entry of new players and business models. In addition, catalytic actions on four
areas are required - product design, financial literacy, increasing access points and digitizing large volume and
recurring payment flows.10 Global experience shows that countries that implement basic regulatory and policy
enablers11,12 see greater innovation, adoption and use of Digital Financial Services (DFS). For example, countries
where mobile money has taken off typically allow non-banks to own and operate DFS deployments and agent
networks that allow customers to get cash in and out of their digital wallets.
Competition in payment markets takes place among both payment providers and payment methods. Traditional
payment methods such as credit cards and checks must now compete with new methods like mobile money and
8 Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2020. “’Country Report — Dominican Republic” (https://www.bti-
project.org/content/en/downloads/reports/country_report_2020_DOM.pdf)
9 The OECD-WBG PMR data are available at https://www.oecd.org/economy/reform/indicators-of-product-market-regulation/
10 See: World Bank Group and Bank for International Settlements (2016), Payment aspects of financial inclusion, available at:
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/963011459859364335/payment-systems-PAFI-Report2016.pdf
11 See the Payment Aspects of Financial Inclusion (PAFI) guidance developed jointly by the World Bank and the Committee for
Payments and Market Infrastructure (CPMI) of the BIS. https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/financialinclusion/brief/pafi-task-
force-and-report
12 CGAP’s Basic Regulatory Enablers Focus Note offers an overview of the key regulatory enablers of DFS, as well as where
various countries stand in terms of their progress towards putting them in place
4
fast payment services (also called instant payment services), which may provide more attractive services. For
instance, the DR’s central bank has developed a retail payment system called Instant Payments, which allows end-
users to process urgent or high-value payments, fund transfers, or pay off credit cards or loans in just 15 minutes
by using the electronic platforms of their respective banks which are all participating in the Instant Payments.13
In the DR, the central bank is exclusively responsible for regulating payment methods . Under the Regional Treaty
on Payment Services and the Law on Systematic Risk, the central bank is the sole overseer of the payment and
settlement systems.14 Multiple payment systems can coexist and are classified according to the amount or priority
of the transfers that they manage and other design attributes. The DR is integrated into Central America’s
Interconnected Payment System, which aims to modernize, harmonize, and link different payment systems in the
Central American Countries.15
Interoperable retail payment systems that are accessible to banks and non-banks alike improve convenience,
enhance efficiency and promote competition. In the absence of interoperability, network effects generated by
dominant platforms can disincentivize the emergence of new platforms and providers. As a result, the market
either may become concentrated with a few dominant DFS providers or inefficient, with constrained usage of
digital payments – for example by forcing individuals and businesses to maintain multiple accounts and decide
which account to use based on the type of transaction and counterpart. Restricting access to retail payment
systems to only financial institutions that have a settlement account at the central bank could inhibit market entry
by non-bank financial institutions and slow the adoption of new financial technologies. 16 On the other hand,
forcing non-bank financial institutions to incur on the costs of obtaining a banking license before they can access
the national payment infrastructure could create a serious barrier to entry.
In this context, a market study could be undertaken to assess options for the government to design specialized
protocols for these institutions, in line with the analyses undertaken by other countries of the region to balance
the need for access for the non-banks versus the policy objective of continued safety, reliability and efficiency of
the national payment system. Access to a payment system has two dimensions – ability to directly interface to
send and receive payment instructions; and ability to settle for the transactions on own account. Some
jurisdictions allow non-banks to access only the former, some both and some neither. The direct interface to retail
payment systems is more important than direct access to settle on own account. In the absence of a direct
interface, non-banks could still indirectly participate in a payment system through partner banks, although this
can introduce inefficiencies for the non-bank and makes them dependent on a potential competitor. However, in
some contexts indirect access has also worked, particularly where there are regulatory requirements to protect
the interests of the non-banks or where the market structure allows non-banks to partner with specific set of
banks that are not active in retail payment services. Some examples of jurisdictions allowing direct access to non-
banks include Mexico, Switzerland and UK. Mexico allows non-bank financial institutions to participate in the
Interbank Electronic Payment System (SPEI), which enables customers to make instant electronic payments.
Similarly, Switzerland allows access to the Swiss Interbank Clearing system for entities licensed as financial
technology firms, so long as they comply with financial rules, anti-money-laundering provisions, and audit
requirements. The United Kingdom has issued guidelines allowing certain non-bank institutions, including
payment providers, to create accounts at the Bank of England and directly access national payment systems,
though they are subject to enhanced supervisory oversight, including compliance assessments and periodic
13 Central Bank of DR’s webpage: https://www.bancentral.gov.do/a/d/4030-instant-payments.
14 See Article 27 of the Monetary and Financial Law no. 183-02. The Treaty, Art. 11, does not include the respective Central banks
as supervisors but as overseers of Systemic Important Payment Systems with the relevant need to coordinate with other
supervisors (e.g. Junta Monetaria or Superintendencias). The supervisory framework is established under the laws of the
respective country.
15 Banco Central de la República Dominicana https://www.bancentral.gov.do/a/d/4011-conceptual-aspects
16 Regulation on Payment Systems of 18 th December 2014.
5
audits. 17 For a detailed discussion on these aspects, please refer to the discussion in the World Bank Global
Payment Systems Survey analysis18.
In parallel, any regulatory reforms should be complemented with a strong institutional framework that ensures
competition enforcement in the payments sector. In this regard, enhancing cooperation between the central bank
and ProCompetencia will be critical to prevent anticompetitive effects arising from market consolidation in
payment systems. Although competition enforcement is not part of the explicit mandate of the central bank, its
regulatory functions include authorizing mergers, takeovers, splits and other actions by financial-intermediation
entities that may affect market concentration. Even though there is no general merger control proceeding in place
yet, the central bank's competence for reviewing these transactions could be used to analyze the impact of
mergers in the financial sector from a competition standpoint. In this context, systematic cooperation between
the central bank and ProCompetencia under a memorandum of understanding could help enhance legal certainty
in line with the practices of other countries of the region.
I.1. Main features and competition issues in the telecommunications sector
3. The interaction between market characteristics and the regulatory framework for
telecommunication services appears to be weakening competitive pressure in the sector in DR. A well-
functioning telecommunications value chain requires dynamic market conditions and pro-competition
regulation at all levels (see Annex). Although the telecommunications sector is often characterized by
disruptive innovation and the rapid growth of startup firms, telecommunications markets are also subject
to the traditional characteristics of network sectors, which are prone to market concentration and
vulnerable to anticompetitive practices. These characteristics include significant fixed costs and sunk
investments, economies of scale and scope, bottlenecks in essential infrastructure, and a reliance on finite
resources, including spectrum bands. Entrants in upstream market segments often face especially high
fixed costs for both technical and commercial infrastructure, which offers incumbents a strategic
advantage, as new firms have fewer clients over which to distribute their fixed costs. In addition, enabling
equitable access to telecommunications services among firms and households may require the authorities
to intervene directly in local markets where private service provision would be commercially unviable
(Figure 3).
Figure 3. Telecommunications Industry Features and Competition Dynamics
17 https://www.snb.ch/en/mmr/reference/pre_20190111/source/pre_20190111.en.pdf; https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-
/media/boe/files/markets/other-market-operations/accessfornonbankpaymentserviceproviders;
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/news/2018/april/non-bank-psp-access-to-the-payments-system-announcement ;
https://www.banxico.org.mx/sistemas-de-pago/d/%7B9ACA4DC8-2B96-8EB3-6FF3-F58DDFA3FE51%7D.pdf
18 http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/115211594375402373/pdf/A-Snapshot.pdf
6
State’s procompetitive
Industry Features Competition Dynamics International Best Practices
interventions
Significant fixed costs and Setting obligation of Competition as the central
Bandwagon effects
sunk investments interconnection regulatory tool for prices
Regulation only used to correct
Operators need to interact
Economies of scale and scope Setting termination rates market failures or where competition
reciprocally to compare calls
is not viable
Network’s essential facilities Operator’s refusal or
Asymmetric regulation of Market-based pricing in competitive
and bottlenecks operators with significant markets and cost-based pricing in
discriminatory practices
market power non-competitive markets
Government controls access Procompetitive spectrum Market-based approach to spectrum
Reliance on scarce resources
to radio spectrum and assignment; allowing spectrum (tenders and secondary market level)
(spectrum and numbering)
numbering resources transfers; promote entry and anti-hoarding rules
Disruptive innovation and Continuous review of relevant
First-mover advantage and Light-handed regulation in emerging
constant technological markets; level playing field in
anticompetitive practices markets
change spectrum assignment
Source: World Bank Group Global Competition Policy Team.
4. High infrastructure costs limit the economic viability of replicating certain facilities, leading to
bottlenecks and market concentration. Market entry into retail telecommunications services requires
either access to essential network infrastructure or the ability to resell services. Unless the regulatory
framework mandates that infrastructure access be offered to new entrants, incumbents will be able to
discriminate in favor of their vertically integrated subsidiaries. Consequently, preventing market
dominance in the telecommunications sector often requires that the incumbent firm that controls
essential infrastructure be transparently separated from downstream operators (Figure 4).
Figure 4. Examples of Business Separation
Source: World Bank Group Global Competition Policy Team elaboration; OECD (2012).
5. Because the structural features of the telecommunications sector can create barriers to entry
and enable the abuse of market power, a pro-competitive regulatory framework is necessary to prevent
the abuse of market dominance, including preventing incumbents from monopolizing essential
infrastructure. A strong and independent competition authority must effectively enforce competition
rules ex post to complement sector-specific regulations (Box 2). If concurrent powers for ex post
prevention of anti-competitive practices exist between the competition agency and the sectoral regulator,
cooperation between both authorities is essential to facilitate enforcement and prevent duplicative
efforts. The United States, many European countries, and several Latin American countries —including the
7
DR—have executed memoranda of understanding (MoUs) between competition agencies and sectoral
regulators that define how they will exercise their respective functions when their purviews overlap.19
19European countries with such MoUs include Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Portugal. In the United
States, the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice often advise sector-specific regulators on non-merger issues
that affect competition. In the DR, the relevant MoU is known as the Interinstitutional Cooperation Agreement between INDOTEL
and PROCOMPETENCIA (Acuerdo de cooperación interinstitucional INDOTEL – PROCOMPETENCIA), which is available at
https://transparencia.indotel.gob.do/media/10701/acuerdo-coop-interinstitucional-procompetencia-indotel-6-7-2018.pdf
8
Box 2. Balancing Ex Ante Regulation and Ex Post Enforcement in the Competition Framework
An appropriate balance between pro-competition regulation and enforcement should reflect the progressive
opening of markets to competition. This process involves three stages and entails an evolving role for sectoral
regulators and competition authorities (Figure 5).
Figure 5. The Three Stages of Opening Telecommunications Markets to Competition
During the first phase of opening markets to competition, regulation is proactive and asymmetric, as it must
establish the conditions to allow new operators to enter the market and compete with entrenched incumbents.
This first phase is characterized by a focus on tariff regulation at the wholesale level (e.g., network infrastructure
access and termination rates) and, if necessary, at the retail level (e.g., telephone service subscriptions). Tariffs
should be consistent with the costs of an efficient operator, though determining what these costs are requires
overcoming information asymmetry between the incumbent and the regulator regarding the former’s cost
structure. An independent auditor designated by the regulator can control the costs of the operator, and the
regulator or independent trustees designated by the regulator can design ad hoc cost models that reduce
information asymmetry and help ensure that regulated tariffs reflect objective and verifiable benchmarks.
Once wholesale markets are adequately regulated, the freedom for players to choose their own tariffs can be
introduced at the retail level in the second phase. However, an effective competition authority must be in place
to detect and deter potential abuses by the dominant operator in newly deregulated retail markets.
In the third phase, the progressive establishment of viable operators can enable the creation of competitive
wholesale markets in some segments. These segments may be regulated primarily on an ex post basis through
competition enforcement. In market segments where structural conditions make competition especially difficult
or impossible, the authorities may continue to focus on asymmetric regulation. Competition may be infeasible in
geographic areas with low population density or where certain capital assets (e.g., radio frequencies, passive
infrastructure, capacity links) cannot easily be replicated and can be leveraged by incumbents as barriers to entry.
Identifying these essential facilities allows the regulator to determine the parameters of long-term regulation, as
a competitive, transparent and objective process for assigning rights to finite resources is essential to competition.
The market must remain active, and service-based competition can complement infrastructure competition
whenever the latter is not viable in the near term.
Source: World Bank Group Global Competition Policy Team and Tera Consultants. See: World Bank (2018), Better Markets for
All through Competition Policy in Senegal.
9
I.2. Market outcomes in the telecommunications sector remain suboptimal
6. The DR’s telecommunications sector is concentrated and composed of vertically integrated
operators. Claro is the main operator in the fixed telecommunications market, with a 69.6 percent market
share in 2019. Smaller operators include Altice (23.1 percent) and Viva (4.4 percent). Other operators such
as Wind Telecom occupy a residual position, with a combined 2.9 percent market share in the fixed
telecommunications market. The mobile telecommunications market is composed of three operators:
Claro (58.9 percent market share), followed by Altice and its subsidiary, Tricom (35.0 percent), and Viva
(6.1 percent). All three operators are vertically integrated, and the DR has no mobile virtual network
operators (MVNOs). Similarly, the internet services market is dominated by Claro (54.8 percent market
share), followed by Altice (37.9 percent), Viva (6.1 percent), and other operators (1.2 percent). 20 As a
result, the fixed, mobile and internet markets are concentrated, as shown by a Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) above 2,500 for each of them. 21 Market concentration is not unusual in the
telecommunication sector across countries given its inherent features that result in competition dynamics
which can create strategic barriers to entry. The latter would require both ex ante and ex post regulatory
intervention to ensure market efficiency and protect consumers and competitors from abuses of market
power.
7. Although mobile technologies now dominate the telecommunications sector, the DR lags its
peers in terms of both mobile subscriptions and internet penetration. Demand for mobile services is
robust across the country, and 3G and LTE coverage rates are high at 99.2 percent and 90.4 percent,
respectively. However, the number of mobile subscriptions per capita is significantly below both the LAC
and OECD averages.22 While internet penetration in the DR has improved in recent years, it remains well
below the OECD average (Figure 6).
20 INDOTEL (2019), Memoria Institucional. Market shares are calculated based on the number of subscriptions for each company.
21 Based on 2019 market shares, the HHI ranges between 5,397.13 and 5,405.54 in the fixed telecommunications market (the
number of companies holding 2.9% of the market shares is unavailable based on public information). Similarly, in the mobile
telecommunications market, the HHI is 4,723.42. Lastly, the HHI in the internet telecommunications market ranges between
4,476.66 and 4,478.1, depending on the number of operators that hold 1.2% of the market shares. Based on the HHI, the
concentration levels are classified as follows: 1) Unconcentrated Markets: HHI below 1,500, 2) Moderately Concentrated Markets:
HHI between 1,500 and 2,500, 3) Highly Concentrated Markets: HHI above 2,500 (Horizontal Merger Guidelines 2010; U.S.
Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission).
22 See also INDOTEL’s 2019 Annual Report. For every 100 inhabitants, 81.4 are subscribed to mobile services, whereas 12.4 are
subscribed to fixed lines. Although the use of fixed lines is progressively disappearing, triple play offers helps decelerating this
trend. Taken together, fixed telephony and mobile telephony penetration indicators are still lower than the world average.
10
Figure 6. Mobile Subscriptions and Internet Penetration in the Dominican Republic
150
100
50
0
OECD Average LAC Average Dominican Rep.
Mobile Subscriptions (per 100 inhabitants)
Internet access (% of individuals)
Source: International Telecommunication Union, 2017 (internet) & 2018 (mobile).
8. New entrants and small firms face significant obstacles in obtaining access to essential
infrastructure, which appears to shield incumbents from competition. According to a recent study,
competition in the DR’s telecommunications sector has been limited over the past several years, and as
dominant operators have slightly increased their market shares, market concentration has increased. 23 In
a similar vein, inadequate regulatory enforcement may have enabled dominant firms to create unjustified
delays in granting competitors’ access to essential infrastructure or impose prohibitive tariffs on upstream
services.24
9. The lack of adjustments in the prices for fixed and mobile telecommunications in response to
changing demand indicate a lack of market dynamism. For example, prices for voice calls in the fixed
telecommunications market have not fallen in response to declining consumer demand (Figure 7). While
prices in the mobile telecom market have proven somewhat less rigid, they have remained relatively
stable overall, particularly among the DR’s three main operators, Claro, Altice, and Viva. The lack of data
from Altice and Tricom (acquired by the former in 2014)25 for 2018 and 2019 prevents an analysis of
whether Altice’s average postpaid price remains higher than those of its competitors (Figure 8).26
23 For instance, the main operator has reinforced its dominant position in the fixed telecommunications market. Similarly, in the
mobile sector, Claro seems to get an ever-larger share of the market. See: European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020),
Consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes sujetos a regulación ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de
la república dominicana, presented in Resolution no. 047-2020.
24 In this regard, VIVA (the third mobile operator) reported that dominant operators tend to delay access to their essential
facilities and charge excessive tariffs for it, thereby preventing entry of potential competitors. See: Alliance For Affordable
Internet (2017), Infraestructuras compartidas de telecomunicaciones en la República Dominicana.
25 The acquisition of Tricom, S.A. by Altice Dominican Republic, S.A.S. was approved in March 2014 by INDOTEL’s Resolution no.
008-14. Until 2017, the companies were operating in the market as different commercial brands.
26 See European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020) .
11
Figure 7. Average Prices per Minute for Fixed Telecommunication Services,
Q2-2011 to Q2-2019
Source: European Union, COWI and INDOTEL, 2020.
Figure 8. Average Prices per Minute for Mobile Telecommunication Services (Postpaid),
Q2-2011 to Q2-2019
Source: European Union, COWI and INDOTEL, 2020. Lack of data is shown as “0”.
10. Moreover, prices for mobile communications and fixed broadband in the DR are higher than in
peer countries. The monthly cost of mobile calls and texts in the DR represents 2.02 percent of gross
national income (GNI) per capita, below the regional average of 3.16 percent.27 However, monthly prices
for mobile services in the DR are still significantly higher in nominal terms (US$12.41) than the average
for comparator countries (US$8.63) (Figure 9). Similarly, monthly broadband prices represented 3.21
percent of GNI per capita, below the regional average of 5.45 percent, but they are slightly higher in
nominal terms (US$19.69) than those of some comparator countries (US$18.47) (Figure 10)28.
27International Telecommunications Union, 2019. ICT Price Baskets (https://www.itu.int/net4/ITU-D/ipb/#ipbrank-tab)
28The International Telecommunications Union defines “the Americas” as including all sovereign nations in continental North
and South America as well as the Caribbean.
12
Figure 9. Prices for Mobile/Cellular Services (70 Figure 10. Prices for Fixed Broadband Services
min + 20 sms) in Selected Countries (5GB) in Selected Countries (US$/month)
(US$/month)
35 18
30 16
14
25
12
20 10
15 8
10 6
4
5
2
0 0
CHL ECU MYS DOM CRI SRB PHL ALB CHL DOM PHL ECU SRB ALB MYS CRI
2019 Comparators' average 2019 Comparators' average
Source: International Telecommunication Union (2019).
Note: These service levels (70 min + 20 sms for mobile services and 5GB for fixed broadband) represent low usage.
I.3. Regulatory Bottlenecks and institutional constraints may limit competition along the
Dominican Republic’s Telecommunications Value Chain
11. A variety of constraints can inhibit competition in the fixed and mobile telecommunication
value chains. The DR’s telecommunication sector appears to suffer from regulatory bottlenecks at the
wholesale and retail levels (Figure 11). Key challenges include restrictive licensing, a lack of asymmetric
regulation, suboptimal tariff policies, administrative and regulatory barriers to accessing essential
infrastructure and overlapping institutional mandates.
13
Figure 11. Regulatory Restrictions on Services-Based and Facilities-Based Competition in the
Dominican Republic
Source: World Bank Group Global Competition Policy Team.
I.4. Restrictive licensing requirements and a lack of effective asymmetric regulation
appear to limit market entry and protect incumbents
12. A restrictive licensing regime and burdensome qualifying procedures may limit the entry of new
telecommunications operators, including MVNOs and ISPs. Pursuant to the Telecommunications Law,
the provision of all public telecommunications services is subject to a concession and licensing regime.29
As opposed to an authorization system, licenses and concessions allow regulators to set absolute limits
on the number of permits that can be issued. Moreover, the current rules require new operators to
complete a burdensome process before they can provide telecommunication services, which likely
discourages market entry. Applicants are required to be incorporated or registered as a legal person,30
and all telecom operators are required to submit an investment plan and establish a guarantee fund with
the Dominican Telecommunications Institute (Instituto Dominicano de las Telecomunicaciones, INDOTEL)
equal to up to 20 percent of the proposed investment for the first five years of operation. 31 These
29 See Article 19 of the Telecommunications Law (No. 153-98), in conjunction with Article 13 ff. of Resolution No. 036-19
on the "Regulation of authorizations for telecommunications services". See also: Resolution 004-00 on the "Regulation of
Concessions, Inscriptions in Special Registries and Licenses to Provide Telecommunications Services in the Dominican Republic".
See also: https://www.indotel.gob.do/servicios/gesti%C3%B3n-de-autorizaciones/solicitud-de-concesion/
30 See Article 22 of the Telecommunications Law (No. 153-98).
31 See Article 20 of Resolution 004-00 on the Regulation of Concessions, Inscriptions in Special Registries and Licenses to Provide
Telecommunications Services in the Dominican Republic.
14
requirements may constitute important administrative barriers for new entrants, including ISPs and
MVNOs, which may lack the resources necessary to comply.32
13. A lack of effective asymmetric regulation weakens oversight of operators with significant
market power and can reinforce the position of incumbents. While the Telecommunications Law
requires operators with significant market power to provide timely access to their essential facilities and
bars them from charging discriminatory prices,33 similar obligations are imposed on operators without
significant market power. For instance, the legal definition of essential facilities can be applied to all
operators regardless of their market power. Similarly, practices that would be generally considered
unlawful for a dominant market player—such as below-cost pricing or price discrimination—are
prohibited for all players irrespective of their market power.34 These regulations prevent smaller firms
and new entrants from offering competitive prices and promotions to attract consumers. By contrast,
practices that are generally considered abusive, such as bundling or margin squeezing, are not illegal for
operators with significant market power. This allows dominant operators to leverage their position in one
market to assert control over another and to develop foreclosure strategies against other operators,
stifling competition.
14. Operators with significant market power have not been formally identified. The market analysis
recently approved by the telecoms regulator, INDOTEL, represents a first step in the identification of
dominant players. 35 Although the study also explores competition conditions and identifies possible
dominant companies in each market, INDOTEL has yet to formally designate firms with significant market
power.
I.5. Suboptimal tariff regulation undermines merit-based competition among market
players
15. Unsatisfactory regulation of interconnection rates may lead to on-net/off-net differentiation
and encourage club effects, reinforcing market dominance of incumbents. The Telecommunications Law
establishes freedom of contract as the general principle for defining interconnection rates.36 Although the
law empowers INDOTEL to set interconnection rates in cases where the parties disagree, INDOTEL does
not currently invoke this authority.37 This is at odds with international good practices, as most countries
have established a system of ex ante interconnection rates regulation (Figure 12). According to a recent
32 Another example include public broadcasting services (i.e., radio and broadcast television) must be controlled by a Dominican
national, which would require foreign companies to create a joint venture with a national company in order to provide services
in the DR. See Article 73 of the Telecommunications Law (No. 153-98).
33 See Article 9 of the Telecommunications Law (No. 153-98) and Article 9 of Regulation No. 022-05 of 24 February 2005, on free
and loyal competition in the telecommunications sector.
34 Other obligations are also imposed to all service providers irrespective of their market power, such as prepare and submit
Reference Interconnection Offers if required by the regulator. See Article 6.3. Regulation on Infrastructure.
35 See European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes sujetos a regulación
ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de la república dominicana, presented in Resolution no. 047-2020.
36 The principle is established in Article 41 of the Telecommunications Law and Article 5 of the Regulation on Infrastructure.
However, under Resolution no. 049-03, INDOTEL overruled the precedent setting contractual freedom as the general principle
for determining interconnection costs.
37 After receiving a formal complaint from one of the operators, INDOTEL decided to open a proceeding to set interconnection
fees. However, this decision has been subject to several appeals from the incumbent operators, which is slowing down the final
decision (see, for instance, Resolution no. 077-18). One example of regulation of interconnection rates can be found in Resolution
056-17 on the decision approving the concentration between Altice Hispaniola, S.A, and Tricom, S.A. However, these obligations
are justified by INDOTEL on the basis of remedies considerations rather than on the application of the competences described by
the Resolution on Interconnection.
15
market study, current rates in the DR are significantly higher than those in other countries in the region
and do not reflect actual service costs (Figure 13). 38 Lack of effective implementation of the long-run
incremental costs (LRIC) methodology may lead to wider price gaps for on-net and off-net calls, increasing
club effects for the operator with the largest user base and reinforcing its dominant position. To address
this situation, most telecom regulators determine interconnection rates by following the LRIC approach,
under which rates are set at the level that an efficient entrant would face, thereby facilitating market
entry. For instance, the European Commission recommends using the LRIC methodology to reduce market
distortions and promote efficiency,39 and LRIC models have been adopted in New Zealand, Australia, the
United Kingdom, and the United States, among others. LRIC models are based on estimates of the
forward-looking incremental costs incurred by an efficient operator. Incremental cost measures the cost
variance when the production output increases or decreases in a discrete increment. Since LRIC cost
modelling only consider costs that are incurred during the efficient provision of an additional increment
of output, LRIC models promote efficiency and minimize potential competitive distortions.40
Figure 12. Share of Countries in Which Interconnection Rates Are and Are Not Regulated
Not Regulated 14%,
(including the Dominican Republic)
Regulated
86%
Yes No
Source: PMR data for Dominican Republic, 2014, OECD and OECD – WBG PMR data.
38 For instance, the DR’s interconnection rate is US$0.014, whereas aspirational comparators such as Costa Rica and Chile charge
US$0.006. See European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes sujetos a
regulación ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de la república dominicana in Resolution no. 047-2020.
39 European Commission Recommendation 98/195/EC
40 International Telecommunication Union, “Regulatory accounting guide”, 2017.
16
Figure 13. Interconnection Charges in Fixed Networks (Local Termination), Dominican Republic and
Comparators (2020)
US dollar cents Purchasing-power parity
Source: European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes
sujetos a regulación ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicationes de la república dominicana.
16. Lack of effective ex ante tariff regulation also affects access to infrastructure, notably the
international gateway. The General Interconnection Regulation for Public Telecommunications Services
networks defines international gateways and submarine cables as essential facilities and mandates that
all operators be allowed to access them.41 However, INDOTEL can only regulate access tariffs in the event
of a disagreement between the parties, which would trigger the opening of formal administrative
proceedings.42 Moreover, INDOTEL’s power to set access tariffs in the event of a dispute between the
parties has not yet been invoked, and the local loop –although formally mandated— has not been fully
unbundled, which is inconsistent with international good practices (Figure 14).43 Consequently, dominant
operators can refuse access to their essential facilities. Similarly, mobile operators are subject to
transparency obligations when setting their own international roaming rates, but wholesale and retail
roaming rates are unregulated, which creates incentives to charge higher rates to foreign operators. 44
41 Article 13 of the Regulation for Public Telecommunications Services networks, as modified by Resolution no. 038-11.
42 Alliance For Affordable Internet (2017), Infraestructuras compartidas de telecomunicaciones en la República Dominicana.
43 See, for instance, World Bank (2016), Building a better future together : Dominican Republic policy notes, available at:
https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/949151486105331993/building-a-
better-future-together-dominican-republic-policy-notes. See also: Annex to the study on shared telecommunication
infrastructures in Dominican Republic: comments made by companies Trilogy Dominicana, S.A. (VIVA) and Altice Hispaniola, S.A.
(Orange) and written reply of the author.
44 Resolution No. 069-17 on measures for activation and billing of mobile data services; international roaming services (data and
voice roaming) and premium mini-message services (SMS) by public service telecommunication providers, as amended by
Resolution 048-18.
17
Figure 14. Conventional Practices for Telecommunications Regulation
Are local loop unbundling prices Are international wholesale roaming Are international retail roaming
regulated? rates regulated? rates regulated?
No 30% (including DR)
Yes
46% Yes
47%
Yes
70% No No
54% (including 53% (including
DR) DR)
Yes No Yes No Yes No
Sources: PMR data for Dominican Republic, 2014, OECD and OECD – WBG PMR data.
I.6. Limited infrastructure access appears to create barriers to entry in the
telecommunications sector
17. Although the government has passed important reforms designed to facilitate access to
essential passive infrastructure, rules and obligations are not defined in an asymmetric manner. While
the recent adoption of new regulations on passive infrastructure is a positive step, the new regulations
unnecessarily mandate access to ducts, poles, towers and other infrastructure by every owner,
irrespective of their relative market power, which unnecessarily burdens small operators. 45 For instance,
the main operator in the fixed, mobile, and internet markets (Claro) owns most of the country’s fixed
broadband lines and fiber-optic networks.46 The high costs of replicating the existing infrastructure would
require an investor to have a large customer base over which to spread its fixed costs. Since smaller
players and new entrants lack such a base, Claro is able to maintain a de facto monopoly in 69 of the DR’s
154 municipalities and a quasi-monopoly position in another 37.47 The symmetrical regulatory obligations
imposed on smaller operators prevent potential entrants from recovering their investment costs within a
reasonable period. The international experience underscores the importance of asymmetric regulation in
both the wholesale and retail service markets (Box 3).
45 General Regulation (Resolution 089-17) on passive infrastructure and connected facilities sharing, as amended by Resolution
005-19. After review of the Regulation by INDOTEL, access to dark fiber was finally excluded from the list of passive
infrastructures. Granting access to the dark fiber could increase competition in internet services but might reduce operators’
incentives to deploy their own infrastructure. Thus, dark fiber should only be included in the regulation if national fiber is
sufficiently developed.
46 Alliance for affordable Internet (2017), “Infraestructuras compartidas de telecomunicaciones en la República Dominicana”.
47 European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes sujetos a regulación ex
ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de la república dominicana, presented in Resolution no. 047-2020.
18
Box 3. The International Experience with Implementing a Combined Wholesale and Retail
Regulatory Strategy to Lower Interconnection Costs
In Mexico, the Instituto Federal de Comunicaciones (ITF) introduced asymmetric price caps in its licensing
agreements with Telmex, an operator with significant market power, to promote competition in the fixed
telecommunications sector. These price caps cover international tariffs, interconnection rates, and similar
services. To define the level of the cap, the ITF applies a CPI-X cost model, calculating the X factor based on a
study of productivity gains from the firm and the industry, the price of the inputs used by the operator to provide
its service, and broader price changes in the economy. This study is carried out by a group composed of one expert
selected by the IFT, a second selected by the operator, and a third agreed upon by both parties.
In Kenya, after unsuccessfully attempting to introduce competition in the retail voice market, the
Communications Authority adopted a rule requiring dominant providers to implement a price cap for off-net call
prices to the level of their on-net prices. This rule successfully addressed club effects in a market with persistently
high percentages of on-net traffic, significant asymmetries between MNOs, and a dominant operator that
regularly employed price-differentiation strategies. Due to the nature of this rule, the Communications Authority
has committed to regularly review it and to eliminate it once there is enough evidence of effective competition
at the retail level.
Sources: OCDE (2017), Estudio de la OCDE sobre telecomunicaciones y radiodifusión en México 2017, Éditions OCDE, París;
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280656-es. See also: World Bank (2018), Better Markets for All through
Competition Policy in Senegal; and Determination no. 1 of 2007, which can be accessed at: https://ca.go.ke/wp-
content/uploads/2018/02/Determination-on-Interconnection-Rates-for-Fixed-and-Mobile-Telecommunications-Networks-
Infrastructure-Sharing-and-co-location-and-Broadband-Services-in-Kenya-16th-August-2010.pdf
18. Additional regulatory constraints that inhibit the deployment of new fixed network
infrastructure further benefit incumbents at the expense of small firms and new entrants.
Administrative barriers to the deployment of passive infrastructure at the municipal level appear to be an
important restriction on competition in infrastructure.48 The process for granting permits by municipal
districts and neighborhood associations seem to be needlessly slow and complicated by a lack of
uniformity in regulations across city councils and municipal districts. Moreover, multiple licenses cannot
be requested in from different municipal authorities simultaneously, only sequentially, which
unnecessarily extends the time required to obtain them. 49 Other countries in the region –such as
Mexico— have approved innovative regulatory reforms to address similar challenges (Box 4).
48 See European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), consultoría para la identificación de mercados relevantes sujetos a regulación
ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de la república dominicana, presented in Resolution no. 047-2020. See also: Alliance
For Affordable Internet (2017), “Infraestructuras compartidas de telecomunicaciones en la república dominicana”, available at:
http://a4ai.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Medios-Compartidos-en-la-Republica-Dominicana_Estudio-A4AI-RD_FINAL.pdf.
49 Alliance For Affordable Internet (2017), “Infraestructuras compartidas de telecomunicaciones en la república dominicana”,
p.11, see supra.
19
Box 4. Promoting the Development of Passive Infrastructure in Mexico
In Mexico, an OECD study identified multiple administrative barriers to the deployment of network infrastructure
at the municipal level. A lack of clear and harmonized rules on civil works and licenses created significant barriers
to the deployment of passive infrastructure and heightened legal uncertainty for both investors and local
authorities, which prevented market entry and limited the development of new infrastructure. To facilitate the
approval of licenses and authorizations for the deployment of passive infrastructure, the OECD recommended: (i)
ensuring effective coordination between all government levels and the industry through cooperation agreements
and the development of harmonized rules; (ii) establishing a system for renting government infrastructure; (iii)
creating a national registry of passive infrastructure; (iv) promoting rights of way; and (v) deploying new backhaul
and backbone infrastructure. In this context, the Communications and Transport Secretariat and the National
Regulatory Improvement Commission published a paper consolidating the OECD recommendations and
proposing other administrative and regulatory reforms to harmonize and simplify local and national requirements
for the deployment of passive infrastructure in Mexico.
Sources: OCDE (2017), Estudio de la OCDE sobre telecomunicaciones y radiodifusión en México 2017, Éditions OCDE, París;
available at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264280656-es; Government of Mexico (2020) Despliegue de Infraestructura
Pasiva de Telecomunicaciones; https://www.xevt.com/nacional/pide-economia-a-alcaldes-del-pais-ponerse-de-acuerdo-con-
conamer-para-tener-acceso-a-telecomunicaciones/103531
19. Even though spectrum rights are allocated through auctions, tender conditions do not appear
to be consistently open and nondiscriminatory, which creates an uneven playing field between
operators. INDOTEL has exclusive authority to design tenders for spectrum assignment. While tenders
are subject to the principles of open and equal access for all interested companies,50 in some cases tender
conditions have been set in a discriminatory manner. For instance, in tender No. LPN-002-2017, INDOTEL
excluded bidders that did not already hold a valid operating license, which prevented new foreign and
domestic entrants from participating. In addition, the tender limited potential bidders to those having less
than 60 MHz of spectrum allocated. 51 While this second requirement was designed to favor smaller
players, it effectively narrowed the field to the mobile operator Viva, which was the only operator that
fulfilled both conditions. Consequently, the bidding process was not effectively competitive and barred
the entry of new players. These challenges can be addressed by clearly defining the rules and principles
that INDOTEL must follow when designing spectrum tenders.
I.7. Overlapping institutional mandates may weaken the enforcement of prohibitions on
anticompetitive behavior
20. The Telecommunications Law empowers INDOTEL to prosecute anticompetitive conduct and
review mergers in the telecommunications sector. The Law on Telecommunications52 includes enforcing
pro-competition policy in the telecommunications sector within INDOTEL’s mandate. The law and its
implementing regulations 53 define competition as a principle for ex ante regulation and also grant
INDOTEL ex post antitrust enforcement powers, including merger review. Sectoral regulations issued by
INDOTEL that are designed to promote or protect competition supersede the general competition law
enforced by ProCompetencia.54 Consequently, breaches of sectoral regulations must be prosecuted and
50 Regulation on authorizations for telecommunications services (Resolution no. 036-19).
51 Licitación Pública Nacional No. INDOTEL/LPN-002-2017
52 Article 3 of Law 153-98.
53 INDOTEL Resolution 022-05 ‘’Regulations for Free and Fair Competition in the Telecommunications Sector’’.
54 Law 42-08, article 2
20
sanctioned under sectoral rules and not general antitrust provisions, as the latter only apply in a
supplemental manner.
21. ProCompetencia has concurrent powers to prosecute anticompetitive conduct in the
telecommunications sector (Table 1). The General Law on the Defense of Competition, which has been
in full force since 2017, applies to all sectors and delineates the mandate of ProCompetencia. The law
prohibits anticompetitive conduct, but it does not include a cross-sectoral merger control system, and
thus INDOTEL has exclusive jurisdiction to review mergers in the telecommunications sector. In July 2020,
the law’s key implementing regulations were issued, but other procedures and guidelines necessary for
its full enforcement (e.g., leniency and settlement programs for anticartel actions) are still at a draft stage.
ProCompetencia also has explicit powers to advocate for pro-competition regulatory reform across all
sectors, and it has pursued initiatives in the telecommunications sector. 55 For example, in 2018,
ProCompetencia issued an opinion to the legislature on a bill regulating prepaid mobile services arguing
that it was within INDOTEL’s mandate to regulate such services under open and transparent procedures.
Table 1. Scope of institutional mandates in DR’s competition policy for th e telecommunications
sector
ProCompetencia INDOTEL
Anticompetitive Practices Yes Yes
Merger Review No Yes
Competition Advocacy Yes No
Regulatory Principle of
N.A. Yes
“Competition Promotion”
Source: World Bank Group Competition Policy Team.
22. Unless effective coordination mechanisms are established between ProCompetencia and
INDOTEL, their overlapping mandates could weaken the effective enforcement of competition law. The
agencies signed a Cooperation Agreement in 2018, which sets forth procedures and timelines, describes
the execution of joint activities, defines information-sharing and confidentiality obligations, and
establishes a working group to enforce competition law in the telecommunications sector. Coordination
is vital to avoid duplicative efforts and guaranteeing the uniform interpretation of competition law. Formal
collaboration protocols to address instances of potential jurisdictional overlap are common worldwide
(Box 5).
55Law 42-08, articles 13-15
21
Box 5. Coordinating Policy Implementation: The UK’s Concurrency Framework for the Telecommunications
Sector
In the United Kingdom, the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) and Office of Communications (OFCOM)
have concurrent powers to enforce competition law (except merger review) and carry out market studies in the
telecommunications sector. Both agencies are part of the broader concurrency legal framework meant to ensure
proactive enforcement of competition law by sector-specific regulators and improve interagency coordination.
The framework encompasses the exchange of information, decision-making authority, dispute-resolution
mechanisms, and case transfers. Both agencies are also part of the UK Competition Network, which coordinates
the competition regime and promotes complementary regulatory practices. The network composes all UK
agencies with a role in supporting and enabling competition.
In 2016, the CMA and OFCOM signed a memorandum of understanding that established a framework for
cooperation in relation to competition issues. Under the memorandum, both parties declare that they will use
their powers to achieve more-competitive outcomes in the electronic communications, broadcasting, and postal
sector via the concurrent application of competition law, merger control, and direct regulatory action. The parties
will always consult each other before applying their concurrent competition enforcement powers and before
launching a market study. The parties will engage in open dialogue and share relevant information on cases and
consult each other on relevant issues. Finally, the parties will endeavor to reach an agreement as to which agency
will exercise concurrent competition powers in each case; however, the CMA will have the final decision.
Source: Government of the United Kingdom (2016). Memorandum of Understanding between the CMA and the OFCOM
https://www.ofcom.org.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0021/83523/cma_and_ofcom_mou_on_use_of_concurrent_consumer_p
owers_webversion.pdf
22
II. Policy recommendations
II.1. Introducing pro-competition regulations in the telecommunications sector can
eliminate barriers to entry
23. The competition constraints identified in this analysis can be addressed through both ex ante
and ex post interventions. To achieve their full effect, reforms targeting the retail market must be
complemented by reforms targeting both the upstream and downstream wholesale markets (Figure 15).
Figure 15. Recommendations for Strengthening Competition in the Telecommunications Sector
Source: World Bank Group Global Competition Policy Team.
24. Rationalizing administrative procedures, including the concession and licensing regime, would
encourage market entry, particularly for ISPs and MVNOs. Telecommunication activities should be
subject to a general authorization regime without quantitative limitations or unnecessary restrictions,
such as nationality requirements or the obligation to submit a guarantee bond. Moreover, MVNOs and
ISPs should be subject to minimal administrative requirements to encourage market entry. Concessions
and licenses should be limited to the allocation of scarce resources, such as spectrum bands, and the
issuance of contracts for subsidized service provision in low-density areas.
25. Regulation of interconnection charges can be temporarily coupled with other regulatory
policies at the retail level, such as off-net price caps for the incumbent operator. Implementing a
combined strategy at both levels is more likely to eliminate club effects for dominant operators with a
wide network of clients. However, once retail markets are competitive, all price regulation should be
withdrawn.
26. Improved regulations for sharing essential infrastructure could substantially reduce barriers to
entry in the fixed and mobile telecommunication markets. For instance, establishing a clear and detailed
23
set of rules for the DR’s fixed telecommunication market, including the technical conditions that underpin
the cost-estimate methodology, could facilitate access to essential facilities. These rules could be
complemented by measures that enable access to bitstream (including technical provisions and terms of
remuneration), so that alternative providers can offer added-value services under their own brands. In
the mobile sector, promoting voluntary agreements between operators or mandating that MVNOs be
hosted by MNOs with significant market power could foster the entry of new MNVOs into the mobile
telecommunications market.
27. Allowing a certain degree of preferential access for small operators or new entrants for a limited
amount of time could incentivize market entry and reduce spectrum hoarding in the mobile subsector.
In this light, several pro-competition spectrum-regulation alternatives, such as set-asides, caps, or band
plans, can incentivize new or small operators for a limited time (Box 6). However, any measures granting
preferential access to smaller or new operators should be defined in an objective and non-discriminatory
manner, and the entry of foreign operators should be explicitly permitted.
Box 6. Pro-Competition Spectrum-Regulation Instruments
Pro-competitive spectrum regulation can help mitigate the risks posed by assigning spectrum through tenders, as
is generally the case in the DR. If preferential access is temporarily granted to a smaller operator or a new entrant,
the authorities should consider adopting price concessions, such as spectrum set-asides, caps, or band plans, to
avoid spectrum hoarding by incumbents, who generally have more financial resources and can propose lower
bids.
• Set-asides remove the incumbent from the bidding process, and one or more blocks of spectrum are
reserved for a specific type of bidder, such as a new entrant or a smaller operator. This approach is often
highly effective in attracting participation in the auction, as it guarantees that a new entrant or smaller
firm will at least win the designated block(s). However, this approach can also encourage the entry of
operators with higher costs and less attractive services than incumbents, and INDOTEL’s efforts to create
a set-aside policy have attracted criticism.56
• Bidding credits subsidize a specific class of bidders, such as new entrants, by offering a discount on the
winning bid.
• Spectrum caps limit the maximum quantity of spectrum that can be held in a specific geographic area.
Caps can be applied either to an individual auction or to a category of radio frequencies. Spectrum caps
allow entrants to bid on larger quantities of newly available spectrum, and limit spectrum hoarding
among incumbents. However, spectrum caps can result in the inefficient allocation of spectrum.
• Band plans partition spectrum by geographic areas and block size. Band plans slice radio spectrum into
blocks and divide it across geographic areas. These areas must be precisely defined: if they are too broad,
smaller and local operators may be excluded; if they are too narrow, larger operators may have difficulty
obtaining all the licenses necessary to develop more expansive and transformative business plans.
Source: Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, and Andrzej Skrzypacz, Using Spectrum Auctions to Enhance
Competition in Wireless Services, SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 10-015; Arthur D. Little (2009), Mobile Broadband, Competition
and Spectrum Caps (study for Ofcom). See also: WBG (2020), Getting the Competition Game Right in Mobile Communications
and Radio Spectrum in West Africa: An Assessment of Regulatory Restrictions to Competition. WBG Global Competition Policy
Team’s elaboration.
28. Introducing market-based mechanisms for spectrum management, such as the creation of a
secondary spectrum-trading market, could further enhance competition in the mobile subsector. This
56 INDOTEL lanza licitación favorecería a VIVA y a empresario Juan Ramón Gómez Díaz, available at:
https://acento.com.do/economia/INDOTEL-lanza-licitacion-favoreceria-a-viva-y-a-empresario-juan-ramon-gomez-diaz-
8518066.html
24
reform, which is envisaged by the DR’s Plan on Frequencies Attribution, would promote the efficient use
of spectrum over the long term. 57 In addition, reverse auctions could allow the state to re-acquire
inefficiently used spectrum and address the risk of spectrum hoarding.58
II.2. Improving enforcement is vital to prevent anticompetitive practices
29. Reaping the benefits of pro-competitive regulation requires coupling it with effective ex post
enforcement against anticompetitive practices. Market-based instruments and infrastructure-sharing
agreements increase the risk of anticompetitive practices, requiring a strong ex post competition
enforcement framework. Network or infrastructure-sharing agreements can vary greatly in terms of the
level of integration between network operators, and competition issues can arise when network sharing
restricts competition or creates a dominant position in the market. The competition implications of
infrastructure-sharing agreements reflect the extent of the cooperation between the parties. Agreements
for sharing passive infrastructure tend to raise fewer concerns: because they do not involve significant
information and forecast exchanges between competitors, they do not require the sharing of extensive
network elements, and therefore they do not create a situation of high common costs. As the degree of
cooperation increases (i.e., in active infrastructure sharing, spectrum sharing, or network roaming), the
risk of collusion rises.
30. Key factors determining the potential for cooperation include geographic scope, market power,
duration, and commercial independence. All else being equal, the broader the geographic scope of the
agreement, the greater the risk of anticompetitive effects. Similarly, the greater the combined market
shares of the operators involved, the more significant the impact of the infrastructure-sharing agreement
will be on the overall market. While some infrastructure-sharing agreements are structural and effectively
permanent (including active and passive infrastructure sharing), other forms of cooperation (such as
national roaming) can easily be scaled back to avoid negatively impacting investments in mobile network
infrastructure. One of the main benefits of infrastructure sharing is that, in contrast to a merger, operators
continue to compete at different service levels, and it is therefore critical that each party to a network-
sharing agreement should retain as much commercial freedom as possible.59
31. Moreover, boosting competition in the telecommunications sector will require strengthening
the institutional framework and developing the rules, guidelines, and administrative capacities
necessary to effectively prevent, investigate, and prosecute anticompetitive practices. This applies to
both cross-sectoral enforcement by ProCompetencia and sector-specific enforcement by INDOTEL.
Reforms should strive to guarantee the full independence of regulators and ensure that they have
adequate financial and technical resources, comprehensive implementation guidelines, and the
capabilities required to execute their mandates. In addition, ensuring effective anticartel enforcement
57 See Resolution no. 046-2020 and the Plan Nacional de Atribución de Frecuencias (PNAF).
58 According to the study of European Union, COWI and INDOTEL (2020), “consultoría para la identificación de mercados
relevantes sujetos a regulación ex ante en el sector de las telecomunicaciones de la república dominicana”, presented in
Resolution no. 047-2020, some operators have denounced the existence of these practices.
59 For an example of this analysis, see: “Guidelines for the interpretation and application of article 5(2) of the Competition L aw
no. 21/1996 republished, as subsequently amended, on co-investments agreements, respectively on mobile network sharing
agreements”. A summary of the guidelines is available at:
https://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/brief/04_2014/brief_04_2014.pdf
25
through the rationalization of applicable exemptions, the establishment of a leniency framework,60 the
design of an appropriate fining system, and the prioritization of case work is especially important.
32. Introducing a cross-sectoral merger-review system can also help prevent anticompetitive
market concentration in sectors related with telecommunications, with important implications for the
digital economy. As mentioned above, competition law in the DR does not include a cross-sectoral
merger-control framework. Given the strong relationship between the telecommunications sector and
the digital economy, where an increasing number of mergers have been occurring, cross-sectoral merger
review could be vital to guarantee contestable markets and innovation. A general merger-review system
should focus only on those mergers that could have a significant anticompetitive effect on the market, as
opposed to the universal notification model currently used in the telecommunications sector.
60Leniency policies are a tool to enhance anti-cartel enforcement. A leniency program destabilizes and deters cartels by giving
any member the chance to come forward to the competition authority and reveal the existence of a cartel in exchange for total
or partial amnesty from potential fines or other sanctions.
26
Bibliography
27
Annex: The World Bank’s Market and Competition Policy Assessment Tool
(MCPAT)
The MCPAT is a methodological instrument of analysis developed by the WBG’s Markets and Competition
Policy Cluster to identify specific problems at the market level and prioritize competition tools accordingly
(markets to be prioritized as well as the tools vary by country – and in some cases, complement each other).
With a practical nature and a focus on implementation, this methodology has been developed based
primarily on the experience of the WBG Competition Policy Cluster implementing pro-competitive reforms
in more than 60 developing countries. Therefore, the MCPAT provides a standardized and comprehensive
tool with which to i) understand competition dynamics created by market feature (including supply-side
characteristics and buyer characteristics), and ii) identify and assess the potential anticompetitive effects
of government intervention in markets (Figure 16). The interaction between these two elements can then
be analyzed to determine the risk of anticompetitive behavior, both in terms of collusion and exclusionary
abuse of dominance.
This assessment can inform the development and prioritization of effective strategies to promote
competition through changes in policies, regulations and rules.
Figure A 16. High-level overview of the MCPAT approach
Market features
Economies Reliance
Use of Multi- Vertical
of scale vs Network on imports State Buyer
scarce market integra-
market effects & global control power
resources contact tion
size markets
Government intervention that create obstacles to competition
Rules that are conducive to Rules that discriminate, distort
Rules that reinforce dominance
collusion or increase costs to the level playing field and
or limit entry
compete protect vested interests
Outcomes
Impact of a lack of
competition and
Anticompetitive Concentration and
Prices savings from tackling
behavior entry
anticompetitive
4 behavior
Source: Competition Policy Cluster 2016.
The MCPAT builds on the identification of those rules and regulations that may have anticompetitive
effects on the basis of the following typology:
(1) Rules that reinforce dominance or limit entry;
(2) Rules that are conducive to collusive outcomes or increase costs to compete in the market;
(3) Rules that discriminate and protect vested interests.
28
Within each of these categories, specific sub-typologies of rules have been identified and illustrated with
specific examples. This typology feeds into a holistic step-by-step methodology to promote competition
reforms (Figure 17).
Figure A 17. MCPAT Typology of competition restrictions
General typology based on Specific examples
Specific typology
effects
Ban on permits Restricted # of establishment or
permits/quotas
Monopoly rights and absolute ban for Permits only by official initiative
entry
Temporary exclusivity Minimum distance rules
Relative ban for entry and expansion of Geographic exclusivity
Permits for limited geographic
Rules that reinforce activities areas/clients
Competitors’ opinion needed to enter
dominance or limit Restrictions on permit
entry Incumbents participate in entry assignments / transfers
decision Other associations’ opinion required
to enter
Registration/permit regime
Requirements for registry (licenses and Opinion of other authorities
permits) required
Annual renewals/unnecessary
complexity/duration of
procedures
Regulations enable agreements/ reduce
ability to decide on key variables
Rules that reduce the ability of firms to Regulated business days/times
Association membership needed to enter
Rules that are choose their strategic variables or to exit Limits on discounts/sales
conducive to collusive Enhance the powers/scope of co-
outcomes or increase Restrictions on type of products and regulation/business associations Restrictions on advertising
services/format and location
costs to compete in Unnecessary regulation on
Maximum/minimum prices/rates fixed by
the market authorities
Physical characteristics
Price control Excessive regulation on the
Restriction to supply low cost services type/design/application of
products
Discriminatory application of rules or Discrimination against certain types
of firms Lack of standard permitting
standards rules/criteria
Rules that discriminate Rules benefitting incumbents
and protect vested Discretionary application of rules Reduced accountability
interests State control of/participation in
Lack of competitive neutrality vis a vis markets/ regulators provide services
Unfettered official capacity to
government entities change/cancel permits
Preferential treatment to state-owned
State aid/incentives distorting level firms
playing field
Source: WBG’s Market and Competition Policy Assessment Toolkit.
The analytical framework provided by the MCPAT provides a preliminary basis for assessing competition
issues in specific sectors, such as telecommunications (Figure 18).
29
Figure A 18. Competition along the Telecom Value Chain
Source: World Bank Group’s Global Competition Team Policy Assessment Toolkit (forthcoming).
30