Document of the World Bank Report No: ICR00003231 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT (IDA-H3030) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 99.2 MILLION (US$150 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO FOR AN EDUCATION SECTOR PROJECT April 30, 2015 Education Global Practice Africa Region CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS US$1=0.72 SDR US$1.38 = 1 SDR US$0.0011 = 1 CDF (as of March 10, 2015) FISCAL YEAR January 1 – December 31 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS CAS Country Assistance Strategy CAT Cellule d’Assistance Technique (Center for Technical Assistance) CF Catalytic Fund CONFEMEN Conférence des Ministres de l’Education des Etats et Gouvernements de la Francophonie (The Association of Ministers of Education of the States and Governments of the Francophonie) CPA Contracted Procurement Agency CRC Citizen Report Card CSR Country Status Report DCA Development Credit Agreement DEP Department of Education Planning DP Development Partner DRC Democratic Republic of Congo EFA-FTI Education for All – Fast Track Initiative EMIS Education Management Information System ENQUETE 123 National Household Survey in DRC ESDP Education Sector Development Program ESMF Environment and Social Management Framework FA Financing Agreement FM Financial Management FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product GER Gross Enrollment Rate GIR Gross Intake Rate GPE Global Partnership for Education ii HIPC Heavily Indebted Poor Countries ICR Implementation Completion and Results Report ISR Implementation Status and Results Report KPI Key Performance Indicator JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency M&E Monitoring and Evaluation MAP Multi-Country HIV/AIDS Program (World Bank Health Project) MASSN Ministère des Affaires Sociales et de la Solidarité Nationale (Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity) MDG Millennium Development Goal MEPSP Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel (Ministry of National Education) MESU Ministère de l’Enseignement Supérieur et Universitaire (Ministry of Higher Education) MTR Mid-Term Review PAD Project Appraisal Document PARSE Projet d’Appui pour le Redressement du Secteur de l’Education (Education Sector Project) PASEC Programme d’Analyse des Systèmes Educatifs de la CONFEMEN (Programme for the Analysis of Education Systems) PCMU Project Coordination and Management Unit (Project Implementation Agency outside of Government (in French UGCP)) PCR Primary Completion Rate PDO Project Development Objective PETS Public Expenditure Tracking Survey PIE Plan Intérmediaire de l’Education (Interim Education Plan) PROSEB Projet de Soutien à l’Education de Base (Basic Education Support Project) PROVEDS Provinces Educatives (Provincial Education Directorate delineation of the DRC by educational needs) PPF Project Preparation Facility PRSP Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper PURUS Project d’urgence de rehabilitation urbaine et sociale (Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project) QALP Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio QER Quality Enhancement Review RAP Resettlement Action Plan RF Results Framework SECOPE Service de contrôle et de paie des enseignants (Department for Monitoring the Payment of Teacher Salaries) sousPROVEDS Sub-Provincial Education Directorate (see PROVEDS) SSA Sub-Saharan Africa SWAp Sector-wide Approach TTL Task Team Leader UCOP Unité de Coordination des Projets (Project Coordination Unit for Phase II Construction within Government) iii UGCP Unité de Gestion et de Coordination du Projet (Project Coordination Unit for the entire Project outside of Government) UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund UNOPS United Nations Office for Project Services UPN Université Pédagogique Nationale (National Teaching University) VVoB Vlaamse Vereniging voor Ontwikkelingssamenwerking en technische Bijstand (Flemish Association for Development Cooperation and Technical Assistance) WFP World Food Programme Vice President: Makhtar Diop Country Director: Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Practice Manager: Peter Nicholas Materu Project Team Leader: Dung-Kim Pham ICR Team Leader: Dung-Kim Pham iv Democratic Republic of Congo DRC: Education Sector Project (P086294) CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Results Framework Analysis G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs H. Restructuring I. Disbursement Graph 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 7 3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 15 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome......................................................... 27 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 30 6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 34 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 36 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 37 Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 38 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis ................................................................. 45 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 48 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results ........................................................................... 50 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results................................................... 52 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 53 Annex 8. Comments of Cofinanciers and Other Partners/Stakeholders ....................... 62 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 63 Annex 10. Overview of Project Indicators ................................................................... 64 MAP v A. Basic Information Congo, Democratic DRC Education Sector Country: Project Name: Republic of Project Project ID: P086294 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H3030 ICR Date: 04/30/2014 ICR Type: Core ICR GOVERNMENT OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: DRC Original Total XDR 99.20M Disbursed Amount: XDR 99.1M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 99.20M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Unité de Gestion et Coordination du Projet. Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 10/27/2004 Effectiveness: 01/11/2008 01/11/2008 10/31/2012 Appraisal: 11/23/2005 Restructuring(s): 11/14/2013 Approval: 06/05/2007 Mid-term Review: 10/17/2010 11/29/2010 Closing: 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 C. Ratings Summary C.1 Performance Rating by ICR Outcomes: Moderately Satisfactory Risk to Development Outcome: Substantial Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Satisfactory C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR) Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings Quality at Entry: Moderately Unsatisfactory Government: Moderately Satisfactory Quality of Implementing Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Supervision: Agency/Agencies: Overall Bank Overall Borrower Moderately Unsatisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Performance: Performance: vi C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators Implementation QAG Assessments (if Indicators Rating Performance any) Potential Problem Project Quality at Entry Yes None at any time (Yes/No): (QEA): Problem Project at any Quality of Supervision Yes None time (Yes/No): (QSA): DO rating before Moderately Satisfactory Closing/Inactive status: D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Actual Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Central government administration 14 14 General education sector 2 2 Primary education 81 81 Tertiary education 3 3 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Administrative and civil service reform 17 17 Education for all 33 33 Education for the knowledge economy 16 16 Public expenditure, financial management and 17 17 procurement Social safety nets 17 17 E. Bank Staff Positions At ICR At Approval Vice President: Makhtar Diop Obiageli Katryn Ezekwesili Country Director: Ahmadou Moustapha Ndiaye Pedro Alba Practice Manager/Manager: Peter Nicolas Materu Laura Frigenti Project Team Leader: Dung-Kim Pham Susan Opper ICR Team Leader: Dung-Kim Pham ICR Primary Author: Simon Thacker vii F. Results Framework Analysis Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) To prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education and prepare ground for a sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector wide program. Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority) N/A This datasheet reports on all performance indicators included at the beginning of the Project and others added under the 2012 restructuring. See Annex 10 for a detailed overview of indicators and targets over the life of the Project. (a) PDO Indicator(s) Original Target Formally Actual Value Values (from Revised Achieved at Indicator Baseline Value approval Target Completion or documents) Values Target Years Indicator 1: Increase in Gross Enrolment Rate (GER) Value quantitative or 64% 75% 105.8% 117% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/20121 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was exceeded. The updated data for 2014 is sourced from the 2014 (incl. % Demographic Health Survey (DHS). achievement) Indicator 2: Gross 1st grade Intake Rate Value quantitative or 107.7% 129.8% 133.1% Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments (incl. % Target was exceeded. Indicator was added under 2012 restructuring. achievement) Indicator 3: Increase in girls to boys ratio in primary school Value quantitative or 85% 95% 100% 98% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2012 10/31/2014 1 Note that the most recent values provided in the 2012 restructuring paper were from 2010 (as these were the latest available data). viii Comments Significant progress was made during the life of the Project and the end-of-project (incl. % target was almost achieved. achievement) Indicator 4: Number of Project Beneficiaries Value quantitative or 6,404,921 13,587,642 4,878,140 4,878,140 Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 3/2/2012 10/31/2014 Target was achieved. Core indicator added under the 2012 restructuring (target Comments value included beneficiaries of textbooks, guides, and classrooms). The indicator (incl. % was then revised to include grade 1 and 2 students receiving textbooks. Total achievement) number of project beneficiaries (students, teachers, inspectors, etc.) is estimated to be 5,076,733. Indicator 5: Female beneficiaries (percentage of total number of direct project beneficiaries) Value quantitative or 45 50 50 Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments (incl. % Target was achieved. Core indicator was added under the 2012 restructuring. achievement) Indicator 6: Increase in Primary Completion Rate Value quantitative or 29% 35% 72.5% 80% Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was exceeded. The updated data for 2014 is sourced from the 2014 (incl. % Demographic Health Survey (DHS). achievement) Education sector strategy (including sustainable medium-term financial plan) with Indicator 7: indicators agreed with donors and approved by the Government Value quantitative or No Yes Yes Yes Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 MTR (10/17/2010) 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. This indicator was revised under the 2012 restructuring to (incl. % include the term ‘sustainable’. achievement) ix (b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s) Actual Value Formally Achieved at Revised Completion or Target Values Target Years Indicator 1: By the mid-term review, 450 classrooms will have been rehabilitated Value (quantitative 0 450 43 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 MTR (10/17/2010) 11/29/2010 Comments Indicator was revised under 2012 restructuring to include end-of-project target (as (incl. % original indicator only included mid-term review (MTR) target). achievement) Additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from Indicator 2: project intervention Value (quantitative 43 1,572 1,467 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Approximately 93 percent of classrooms were built or rehabilitated by the project (incl. % closing date. achievement) Compliance with arrêtés on abolition of primary school fees as measured by annual Citizen Report Card (CRC) surveys that show reduction in school fees from Indicator 3: first survey to last survey Value (quantitative - 90% Dropped or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2012 Comments Indicator was dropped under the 2012 Restructuring. MTR target was 70%. (incl. % achievement) Indicator 4: Parents finding the school fee in primary has been reduced Value (quantitative Added Yes Data not available or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/30/2014 Comments Indicator was added under 2012 Restructuring. There are no available data to (incl. % determine whether the end-of-project target was achieved. achievement) New school construction norms are adopted for application of cost-effective Indicator 5: school construction strategy Value (quantitative Added Yes Yes or Qualitative) x Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments End-of-project target was achieved. Indicator was added under 2012 (incl. % Restructuring. achievement) Primary teachers in “registered” schools integrated into the public payroll Indicator 6: (percent) Value (quantitative Added (0) 20,155 20,155 or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was added under 2012 Restructuring. (incl. % achievement) About 11 million textbooks and 278,000 teachers’ guides in reading and mathematics for primary grades 1 and 2 produced and distributed to schools Indicator 7: achieving a ratio of 1 textbook per student and 1 textbook and corresponding guide to each teacher 11 million Value textbooks and Revised (quantitative 0 278,000 teachers’ (see below) or Qualitative) guides; 1:2 Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2012 Comments Indicator was revised under 2012 Restructuring into three separate indicators (see (incl. % below). achievement) Indicator 8: Number of textbooks purchased and distributed Value (quantitative 0 11 million 14 million 18 million or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was exceeded. Indicator was listed as separate indicator under 2012 (incl. % Restructuring. achievement) Indicator 9: Student textbook ratio Value (quantitative 1:2 1:2 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Targeted was achieved. Indicator listed as a separate indicator under 2012 (incl. % Restructuring. This indicator meant 1 math textbook per student and 1 French achievement) textbook per student. Indicator 10: Teacher: teacher guide ratio Value (quantitative 278,000 1:2 1:2 or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 xi Comments Target was achieved. Initial target was 278,000 but this was revised to a ratio (incl. % value and listed as a separate indicator under 2012 Restructuring. This indicator achievement) meant 1 math teacher guide per teacher and 1 French teacher guide per teacher In-service training in use of textbooks reaches 80 percent of primary inspectors Indicator 11: and school advisors by end of project Value (quantitative 0 80% 100% 100% or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Under the Project, 53,230 primary inspectors and school (incl. % advisors received training in use of textbooks. achievement) Indicator 12: A textbook policy adopted by Government Value (quantitative No Yes No or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments A draft of the textbook policy was developed under the Project though not (incl. % officially adopted by the Government. Indicator was revised under the 2012 achievement) restructuring (to only include its adoption and not its implementation as well). Citizen Report Card (CRC) Survey shows improvements in quality as measured Indicator 13: by less teacher absenteeism, increased availability of textbooks, improved response from schools to parents’ concerns Value (quantitative - Yes No or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments CRC was not undertaken under this Project. Target was revised under 2012 (incl. % restructuring (original target indicated that these surveys would be “conducted achievement) annually”. Indicator 14: National pupil learning assessment mechanisms for grade 5 of primary is in place Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Target was exceeded. Two rounds of PASEC (Program for the Analysis of Comments Education Systems – learning assessment) were undertaken during the project (incl. % life. Indicator was revised under 2012 restructuring (original indicator referred achievement) to an assessment mechanism for grade 4). Basic education interim development plan is implemented according to agreed Indicator 15: plan Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was added under 2012 restructuring. (incl. % achievement) xii Indicator 16: System for learning assessment at the primary level (and rating) Value (quantitative No Yes (3) Yes (3) or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was added as a core Bank indicator under the 2012 (incl. % restructuring. Bank rating scale (1 to 4). achievement) A new teachers’ statute is approved by the Government and implementation has Indicator 17: begun Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. A statute was developed as an annex to the Education (incl. % Framework Law and was approved by Government by the end of the Project. achievement) Indicator 18: Reform guidelines for pre-service are developed and are being applied Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was revised under 2012 restructuring. Original (incl. % indicator also include in-service teacher training. achievement) Loi cadre (organic law – Institutional Education Framework Law) is Indicator 19: transmitted to Parliament for adoption Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was revised under 2012 restructuring. Originally (incl. % listed as one indicator (Loi cadre (organic law – Institutional Education achievement) Framework Law) and the Convention of Partnerships are updated or replaced). Indicator 20: Convention of Partnerships revised and implemented Value (quantitative No Yes Yes or Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 12/31/2012 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was revised under 2012 restructuring. Originally (incl. % listed as one indicator (Loi cadre (organic law – Institutional Education achievement) Framework Law) and the Convention of Partnerships are updated or replaced) Indicator 21: CRC and PETS have been piloted in selected educational provinces Value (quantitative Added (No) Yes No or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 xiii Comments By the end of project, a PETS had been undertaken but a CRC had not been carried (incl. % out. Indicator was added under 2012 restructuring. As of the second restructuring, achievement) a PETS survey had been launched. Based on lessons learnt from CRC and PETS, an action plan is put in place for an Indicator 22: eventual scale up Value (quantitative Added (No) Yes No or Qualitative) Date achieved 10/31/2012 12/31/2013 10/31/2014 Comments Target was not achieved as the CRC was not completed. Indicator was added (incl. % under 2012 restructuring. achievement) A draft teacher career structure (training, deployment, salary, incentives) Indicator 23: approved (by Government) Value quantitative or No Yes Yes Qualitative) Date achieved 05/04/2007 MTR (10/17/2010) 10/31/2014 Comments Target was achieved. Indicator was revised under the 2012 Restructuring (incl. % (originally the indicator was listed as PDO-level and the target was the reform of achievement) the teacher career structure). G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 02/15/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 06/27/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.43 3 08/31/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.71 4 03/16/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 4.71 5 06/30/2009 Satisfactory Satisfactory 6.72 Moderately 6 12/29/2009 Satisfactory 21.22 Unsatisfactory 7 06/27/2010 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 25.63 8 03/30/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 41.15 9 10/16/2011 Moderately Satisfactory Satisfactory 42.79 10 05/13/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 51.97 11 12/07/2012 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 68.87 Moderately Moderately 12 06/20/2013 93.72 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 13 11/09/2013 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 115.50 14 06/14/2014 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 134.84 xiv H. Restructuring (if any) ISR Ratings at Amount Board Restructuring Disbursed at Restructuring Reason for Restructuring & Approved Restructuring Date(s) Key Changes Made PDO Change DO IP in USD millions Level 2 Restructuring: Project 10/31/2012 MS MS 68.87 extended by one year; changes made to Results Framework Level 2 Restructuring: Project 11/14/2013 MS MS 115.50 extended by 10 months I. Disbursement Profile xv 1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design 1.1 Country context 1. At the time of project appraisal, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) was one of the poorest countries in the world despite its rich endowment of natural resources. The country also faced high levels of social unrest and political fragility, as it had recently emerged from a nine-year conflict in 2003 during which an estimated five million people had been killed. The protracted conflict, combined with decades of mismanagement, had a severe, negative impact on the country’s social and economic development. As of 2007, the DRC ranked very low on the UNDP Human Development Index (only 167 out of a total of 177 countries) and the large majority of the population lived under the poverty line. Access to basic social services was extremely limited. The country’s difficult state of affairs was reflected, in part, in its low annual Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita of US$554 and high levels of corruption and poor governance. 2 Achievement of the millennium development goals (MDGs) appeared out of reach. 2. Despite the poor living conditions of the population and the country’s faltering economy, some progress at the time was observed in the country’s recovery. In addition to holding democratic elections in 2006, the Government had also taken concrete steps to secure the fragile peace and to strengthen the country’s economy. Starting from a very low base, real GDP had steadily stabilized and began to show signs of recovery following the end of the conflict. Increased exports and inflows of foreign direct investment, together with renewed donor involvement, structural reforms in the public sector, and a more stringent monetary policy provided the necessary context for the country’s economic recovery to gain momentum. Although modest gains were observed, the economy still remained highly susceptible to external shocks and the political climate remained fragile and vulnerable to renewed instability and conflict. It was within this extremely difficult post-conflict context that the Education Sector Project (P086294) (Projet d’Appui pour le Redressement du Secteur de l’Education – PARSE) was conceived and prepared. Sector background 3. At the time of project preparation and appraisal, the education sector faced a number of critical challenges, including: (i) limited access to education (characterized by regional and gender disparities); (ii) poor quality of education services provided; and (iii) lack of a legal and regulatory framework to ensure the long-term sustainability of the sector – particularly in terms of ensuring its financial sustainability. 4. Limited access to Education. Equitable access to education, particularly at the lower levels of the education system, was problematic. Compared with other Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) countries, there was low coverage at the primary level, estimated at 64 2 The annual GDP per capita amounted to around two-thirds of the SSA average. The DRC was among the ten most corrupt countries in the World according to Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index. 1 percent.3 Although the country’s 2005 Constitution had stipulated that primary education was to be compulsory and fee-free, the Government faced considerable difficulties in rolling out this policy. In spite of the formal adoption of this policy, households continued to finance the costs of education – covering up to 75 percent of school operating fees as well as costs of teacher salary top-ups, books, uniforms and other incidentals. While these financial contributions were necessary for schools to operate, they also prevented many children from poorer households from attending and completing primary school. 5. Poor Quality of Education Services. The quality of primary education provided in the DRC was poor with only one-third of children residing in urban areas and one-fifth of those in rural areas (who had entered school) reaching fifth grade. The poor quality of education in the DRC was a result of a number of factors, including: (i) a limited number of trained teachers; (ii) inadequate and insufficient learning and teaching materials (i.e., textbooks); and (iii) an inadequate teaching and learning environment with most schools having been destroyed or in major disrepair, rendering hundreds of classrooms unusable. Approximately one-third of the country’s schools were in such poor condition that they could not withstand inclement weather. Without these necessary inputs, improvements in the quality of education in the DRC would not be possible. 6. Lack of a legal and regulatory framework to ensure the long-term sustainability of the sector. At the time of project appraisal, the sector was receiving less than two percent of the GDP which was three points below the SSA average of five percent at the time. The system had been chronically underfunded—receiving less than ten percent of the national budget in 2006—an amount which was insufficient for rebuilding and further developing the education sector. The lack of a sustainable financing mechanism posed a significant obstacle to achieving the larger objectives of increasing equitable access to education, improving its quality, and strengthening institutional capacity to manage the education system. Rationale for Bank assistance 7. The needs of the education sector were substantial.4 At the time of project appraisal, the education system was, in fact, running in ‘crisis’ mode and the Government faced extreme challenges due to the post-conflict context. As such, support from the Bank at the time of project preparation/implementation was instrumental as it would buttress the reform efforts in the sector initiated by the Government. In addition, Bank support would act as a catalyst to garner support from other development partners (DPs). Donor coverage of the education sector, despite widespread support for a sector-wide approach (SWAp) as embodied in this operation, had been fragmented up until that time. The Bank also had significant experience working in the DRC and had the relevant technical expertise to guide 3 Even if secondary at 23 percent and tertiary levels at six percent were comparable to SSA averages. 4 In addition to these major challenges, additional challenges included: M&E, mapping of school needs; reorganization and simplification of the cumbersome administrative structures, including payment of teachers; providing adequate financial resources to support the education system; empowering local communities to participate in school-level decisions; and providing adequate infrastructure. 2 the development of a sector-wide approach. Furthermore, the Bank had the experience necessary to influence the country’s macroeconomic policy. Each of these aspects of Bank support would be important in establishing the legal and regulatory framework for the long- term development and sustainability of the education sector. 8. The Education Sector Project was aligned with the Government’s development priorities at the time which were reflected in several key documents, including the 2006 Letter of Education Sector Policy which guided the reorganization and strengthening of the sector, the Education for All (EFA) Action Plan, and the Pact to Modernize Higher Education. The Project was also closely aligned with the support being provided by other donors5 active in the education sector. The Education Sector Project intended to build upon and further strengthen the Government’s consultation committee which had been gaining prominence since 2003 as a mechanism by which ministries could re-engage in the sector with DPs and better coordinate their support. 1.2 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators 9. The original PDO as described in the Project Appraisal Document (PAD) and the Development Credit Agreement (DCA) of June 8, 2007 6 was ‘to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education and prepare the ground for a sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector wide program’. The original PDO-level indicators are listed in Table 1 below.7 Table 1: Original PDO-level indicators Indicator Baseline (2007) Original Target (2012) Increase in gross enrollment rate (GER) 64% 75% Increase in girls-to-boys ratio in primary school 85% 95% Increase in primary education completion rate 29% 35% Reform of teacher career structure (training, Reform not Reform approved by deployment, salary and incentives) approved by integrated into a Government the Government single sector strategy Education sector strategy (including medium Sector Strategy and term financing plan) with indicators agreed with Education sector indicators agreed with donors and approved by Government strategy did not exist donors and approved by Government 5 United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the Belgian Agency (CfTB), the Flemish Development Agency (VVoB) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 6 The Development Credit Agreement (DCA) indicates that the project objectives are to “assist the Recipient in preventing further deterioration…” 7 A full list of PDO- and intermediate-level indicators as well as their associated baseline and target values can be found in Annex 10. 3 1.3 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators, and reasons/justification 10. The PDO was not modified during project implementation. The first restructuring, approved in October 2012, introduced the following changes to the results framework (RF): (i) two PDO-level indicators were added8; (ii) one PDO-level indicator was revised; (ii) several targets for both PDO- and intermediate-level indicators were adjusted upwards; and (iv) a number of intermediate-level indicators were added and some were made more specific. The newly added intermediate-level indicators were the following: (i) additional classrooms built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from project intervention (as a core indicator); (ii) new school construction norms adopted for the application of a cost- effective school construction strategy; (iii) primary teachers in ‘registered’ schools integrated into the public payroll; (iv) the Basic Education Interim Development Plan implemented according to an agreed plan; (v) Citizen Report Card Survey (CRC) and Public Expenditure Tracking Survey (PETS) piloted in selected educational provinces; (vi) based on lessons learnt from the CRC and PETS, an action plan put in place for eventual scale-up; and (vii) a system for learning assessment at the primary level established. A few intermediate-level indicators were also dropped. Annex 10 provides a comprehensive overview of PDO- and intermediate-level indicators and changes made to the RF over the life of the project. 1.4 Main Beneficiaries 11. This Project aimed to reach a large number of beneficiaries, including: children of primary school age; primary school students; school inspectors; educational advisors; trainers; teachers; and other government education staff. Annex 2 provides a complete list of project beneficiaries. 1.5 Original Components (as approved) 12. The Project was comprised of four components: Component 1: Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level (At Appraisal: US$104.52 million; Revised Allocation: US$108.9 million; Actual Expenditure: US$107.64 million, or 103 percent of the appraisal estimate). This component included four sub-components. 13. This component aimed to: rehabilitate primary school infrastructure (sub- component 1a), support rehabilitation of the National Pedagogical University (Université Pédagogique Nationale - UPN) (sub-component 1b); improve equity of access to primary education (sub-component 1c); and strengthen safeguards in the teacher pay system (sub- component 1d). In addition to rehabilitating primary school classrooms and other key infrastructure (e.g., latrines) and the UPN, this component also aimed to increase equitable access to primary education by eliminating parents’ monetary contributions to cover the 8 These were: (i) the number of direct project beneficiaries (percentage of whom are female (as a core indicator)); and (ii) the grade one gross intake rate. 4 operating costs of schools targeted by the Project, increase local communities’ participation in school-level decision-making, and strengthen safeguards in the payment of teachers’ salaries. Component 2: Improve Quality of Primary Education (At Appraisal: US$28.76 million; Revised Allocation: US$25.3 million; Actual Expenditure: US$28.72 million, or 99.9 percent of the appraisal estimate). This component included two sub-components. 14. This component aimed to provide reading and math textbooks and teachers’ guides in primary schools as essential teaching-learning materials (sub-component 2a). It also sought to build institutional capacity to measure learning outcomes (sub-component 2b) as a means of assessing the quality of education provided. Component 3: Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector (At Appraisal: US$5.06 million; Revised Allocation: US$7.2 million; Actual Expenditure: US$6.99 million, or 138.1 percent of the appraisal estimate). This component included two sub-components. 15. The objective of this component was to contribute to revising the legal and institutional frameworks of the education system and reinforce institutional capacity for planning, budget formulation and program execution. This would be achieved through support to key policy reforms related to the teacher career structure (sub-component 3a) and the preparation and implementation of a sector-wide education strategy, including a legal framework and financing plans (sub-component 3b). Component 4: Project Coordination and Management (At Appraisal: US$11.17 million; Revised Allocation: US$9.1 million; Actual Expenditure: US$8.85 million, or 79.2 percent of the appraisal estimate). 16. This component aimed to support project management and coordination of the Steering Committee comprised of the Ministry of National Education, the Ministry of Higher Education, the-then Ministry of Social Affairs and National Solidarity, the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Budget. It also provided support for the operation of a Project Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU) and financed the acquisition of ancillary goods and services. 1.6 Revised Components 17. Though the PDO and the project components were not revised during the life of the Project, reallocations were made between components in line with changes made to the 5 scope and nature of project activities.9 Revised allocations are found in Table 2 below. Table 2: Reallocation of funding among project components (2012 Restructuring) Original Revised Allocation Project Components (in US$ millions) (in US$ millions) 1: Increase access and equity at primary 104.5 108.9 level 2: Improve quality of primary education 28.8 25.3 3: Strengthen institutional and financial 5.1 7.2 capacity of the education sector 4: Project coordination and management 11.1 9.1 Project preparation facility (PPF) 1 0 Total 150.5 150.5 1.7 Other significant changes 18. A level 2 restructuring was undertaken in October 2012.10 The main objective of the restructuring was to narrow the scope of the Project to support those activities which could best contribute to the achievement of the PDO. Up until that point, disbursement had been sluggish and several disbursement conditions were found to be unworkable – notably those related to the payment of teachers’ salaries and operating costs of schools targeted by the Project. While the components and sub-components remained unchanged, the range of project-supported activities was reduced and the RF was significantly improved. The modifications introduced in the RF included: (a) the addition of new indicators at the PDO- and intermediate level (including measures to assess any reduction in the financial burden on households and the adoption of new school construction norms); and (b) the revision of some intermediate-level indicators to be more specific and time-bound in-line with the extension of the closing date. Further, this restructuring also introduced modifications to: (c) disbursement conditions to strengthen their alignment with the reality of the sector and its development (e.g., facilitating the financing of teachers’ salaries and the payment of school operating costs); and (d) project activities to increase focus on those expected to have the largest impact on achieving the PDO. This restructuring also introduced a new implementation method for the second phase of the civil works program (primary school 9 Proceeds initially allocated to civil works related to the rehabilitation of the UPN (sub-component 1(b)) were reduced by 48 percent. Initial costs were slightly over-estimated and with the delays in implementation, rehabilitation activities for the university were limited to works delegated to the United Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS) to manage. The remaining amount originally allocated to these works was reallocated to activities for increasing education access and quality (e.g. the provision of textbooks and school furniture, technical assistance). 10 The Level 2 restructuring was initiated in July 2011 but was only approved in October 2012. This was the results of administrative delays on the part of the Bank. 6 infrastructure) – wherein civil works activities were undertaken by the Unité de Coordination des Projets (UCOP), the Government’s project coordination unit, and community participation was strongly encouraged. It further formalized the procurement arrangements that had been in use since the Project was approved. Finally, this restructuring extended the project closing date by one year from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2013. 19. A second level 2 restructuring was undertaken in November 2013 which extended the project closing date by ten months from December 31, 2013 to October 31, 2014. 2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes 2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry Project Preparation 20. Project preparation began in 200411, but was put on hold due to concerns related to potential fiduciary risks in the DRC at the time. At the 2006 World Bank Annual Meetings, requests were put forward to re-launch project preparation. The operation’s design was reviewed, adjusted to new circumstances, and re-appraised in the fall of 2005. The Bank team which undertook the preparation of this operation possessed the necessary skills and expertise across all relevant areas. Given the difficult post-conflict context, and concerns related to capacity, a very thorough risk assessment was undertaken to identify risks and devise mitigation strategies to address them.12 As this Project was the first comprehensive operation undertaken in the sector after a series of emergency loans, a number of in-depth studies were conducted which focused on economic and financial, technical, fiduciary, social, governance, and environmental issues.13 Safeguard requirements were effectively met with an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) produced during preparation and disclosed both in- country and at the World Bank Infoshop. Design 21. The Project’s design fit squarely with the Government’s 2006 Letter of Education Sector Policy and the most significant needs of the sector, as identified in key documents 11 The key dates of the preparation were as follows: Concept Note Review– October 27, 2004; Appraisal – November 23, 2005; and final project signing – June 8, 2007. 12 In addition to Section 5 of the PAD, Annex 16 (Critical Risks and Governance Response) includes detailed information on these risks and mitigation measures. 13 These included in-depth studies of the teacher salary payment system, enrollment trends, education for under-served groups, and an institutional and policy assessment. In addition to the in-depth and comprehensive Country Status Report on the education system (World Bank, 2005), the Bank carried out a Country Financial Accountability Assessment (CFAA, 2005), a Country Procurement Assessment Review (CPAR, 2004), Public Expenditure Reviews, a survey of users of public services (BERCI, 2004), a Risk & Vulnerability Assessment to help prepare the IDA-financed Emergency Social Action Project, as well as a more comprehensive poverty analysis (Poverty Diagnostic and Priorities of the Poor, 2005). 7 produced by the Bank and the Government. The design also took into account lessons learned from Bank operations in other conflict-affected countries and in the DRC and the findings of the thorough reviews which were undertaken during preparation as well as the PRSP of July 2007. Some of the most pertinent lessons which informed the original design of the project were the following: (i) Bank support within the education sector should be integrated into the broader development framework of debt relief, poverty reduction and promotion of economic growth; (ii) education projects should be stand-alone operations in order to ensure an adequate level of operational funds and technical expertise to oversee project implementation; (iii) complementarity among donor-funded initiatives should be emphasized in order to leverage the country’s capacity to implement programs and develop reform policies in education; and (iv) the Government should take steps to increase the share of the national budget allocated to education in order to promote access and to reduce the financial burden of schooling – especially among poorer households. 22. Despite the strong alignment of project activities with the prevailing needs at the time, the design of the project was ambitious given the difficult post-conflict environment which characterized the DRC. The magnitude of need in terms of both stabilizing and strengthening the education sector in the longer-term following a period of protracted conflict played a key role in the articulation of a far-reaching and ambitious PDO – to prevent deterioration in the sector and lay the groundwork for sustainable the development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector-wide program. In attempting to stabilize a system which was in disarray, the PDO was broad and this was reflected in how the project objectives were articulated by the Government and the project team. It is important to note that the Project’s PDO was originally suggested by the 2005 Quality Enhancement Review (QER) and re-endorsed by the 2010 Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) as “relevant” and “appropriate”. While the PDO could have been more explicit, the aims of each of the Project’s components were both specific and measurable. The Project’s objectives, therefore, can be inferred by examining how the project-supported activities (as measured by both their stated aims and associated outcome targets) were expected to positively impact the sector in terms of increasing equitable access at the primary level, improving the quality of primary education, and strengthening capacity for policy planning, budgeting and program execution in key areas during both the pre- and post-restructuring period.14 23. The key performance indicators (KPIs) were highly relevant to the Government’s overarching sector objectives and, as was common practice at the time, a number of the PDO-level indicators were sector-wide. The intermediate-level indicators were also closely aligned with the specific project objectives. The RF was further improved upon under the first restructuring, when additional performance measures were introduced to more fully capture progress made towards the achievement of the PDO. 14 The approach of measuring the achievement of project objectives by examining the level of attainment across each of the outcome-level indicators is consistent with the guidance provided in the OPCS Guidelines for instances in which the PDO is less well articulated. 8 24. The rationale underlying the project design was well articulated in the PAD and provides plausible linkages between the project-supported activities and the envisioned outputs and outcomes. The PAD also illustrates how each of the supported activities could, when implemented together, lead to the achievement of both component and sub- component aims. 25. The Project’s original design was technically sound and well-justified, taking into consideration a number of potential risks that could negatively impact project implementation. At the same time, however, the original design did not fully account for the extremely difficult implementation environment of a post-conflict setting. This ambitious initial design was influenced by a number of factors: the far-reaching challenges and existing needs of the sector at the time; the Government’s strong commitment to addressing these various needs; and the Bank’s experience in successfully supporting sector-wide operations in similar contexts.15 Although this original design was laudable, it did not adequately take into account the potential impact that some of the identified risks – such as the limited institutional capacity in the DRC at the time – could have on project implementation. Though the Project design relied primarily on the Ministry of National Education (Ministère de l’Enseignement Primaire, Secondaire et Professionnel (MEPSP)) for data collection, analysis and reporting under the Project, the MEPSP did not initially possess this capacity and had only a nascent M&E system. Further, while the effective and timely implementation of activities presupposed a well-functioning fiduciary support system 16 , the financial management (FM) and procurement functions were not fully established and had to rely on ad hoc support from other Bank-funded projects in the DRC in the beginning of the project life. Moreover, although the Project supported capacity- building activities specifically related to M&E within the MEPSP, these were insufficient to guarantee the timely monitoring of and reporting on project-supported activities during the early stages of the Project. Quality at Entry 26. The original project design and objectives were strongly aligned with the Government’s goals for the primary education sub-sector and included a number of activities to attain them. The rationale behind activities supported by the Project was clear and when implemented together had the potential to positively the sector’s financial and institutional capacity in the long term. Further, the Bank team supporting project preparation possessed the appropriate mix of technical skills in all relevant areas. 27. Despite these strengths, a number of shortcomings negatively impacted the Project’s Quality at Entry: (i) although the PDO- and intermediate-level indicators were highly relevant, too few measures were included in the original RF to comprehensively 15 At the time, the project team was influenced by the Country Director and the Regional Vice-President who, after discussions with a Government eager for a project of broad scope, saw a ‘window of opportunity’ for long-term sector investment. 16 As the PCMU had limited staff and expertise, it had to rely on other teams for support (e.g., relying on FM support from the WB MAP Project team ((P082516) in Health)) 9 assess performance under each of the Project’s objectives; (ii) while efforts were made to identify and assess risks to project implementation, some were not adequately accounted for in the project design, in particular, those pertaining to capacity to execute project activities and perform key fiduciary and data reporting functions; and (iii) challenges associated with the successful implementation of far-reaching reforms (i.e., passing key legislation, implementing the fee-free policy, etc.) and developing and adopting new core structures (i.e., teacher career structure, pre- and in-service teacher training systems, etc.) to support the sector had been underestimated. 28. In light of the above, Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 2.2 Implementation 29. Project implementation can be characterized by three distinct phases – a slow beginning, an ‘accelerated’ period of implementation, and a period of steady implementation in the final phase. The evolution of the disbursement rate over the project life is shown in Figure 1. 30. The Project became effective on January 11, 2008. At that time, the Project Coordination and Management Unit (PCMU) consisted of only two staff members. The other staff joined the unit approximately ten months later in November 2008, with the entire team being in place only by early 2009. As would be expected, this resulted in a slow rate of disbursement in the initial phase. Moreover, during this period, little progress was made towards the achievement of the PDO. For instance, there was no progress in terms of identifying and absorbing teachers onto the public payroll17 and in terms of supporting schools’ operating expenses—both of which were key objectives of the Project and conditions for disbursement. Limited progress and low disbursement up until this point was reflected in the downgrading of key ratings (implementation progress and progress towards achievement of the PDO) to Moderately Unsatisfactory in ISR 6. By June 2010, only 17 percent of project financing had been disbursed. 17 This was one of the major activities of sub-component 1c. 10 Figure 1: Project Disbursement in Percentage by ISR Disbursement in % by ISR 100 90 80 70 60 50 May 2012 40 30 Dec. 2009 20 10 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 31. The second phase of the Project was characterized by an accelerated pace of implementation. Key findings of the mid-term review (MTR) of November 2010 led to the development of corrective measures to ensure the Project would move forward and included an extensive action plan – the implementation of which was to be monitored and closely followed. The rate of disbursement picked up during this period as more project activities got underway. However, a number of issues (i.e., difficulty in identifying teachers in registered schools, continued limited FM and procurement capacity) still continued to hamper project implementation and were not adequately addressed in follow- up missions. As of October 2012 (near the Project’s original closing date), 44 percent of project funds had been disbursed. 32. The level 2 restructuring which was undertaken in July 2011 and approved on October 31, 2012 reduced the scope of the Project and introduced a number of performance measures to better capture the achievements made under the Project. Although the Project’s components remained unchanged, the restructuring narrowed the range of activities that would be supported under each. Alternative disbursement conditions18 for the payment of teachers’ salaries and schools’ operating costs were agreed upon in order to facilitate project implementation. This first restructuring also extended the project closing date by one year from December 31, 2012 to December 31, 2013 to increase the likelihood that the outputs and outcomes planned under the Project would be achieved during the project life. 18 These conditions were adjusted to be more in line with the reality of the sector and its development, in turn, facilitating the financing of teachers’ salaries and school operating costs based on lessons learned from other IDA-financed projects. 11 33. Throughout each period of project implementation, the Bank team provided close supervision and support through monthly video conferences to review progress in conjunction with extensive in-country missions. The 2012 restructuring led to a marked improvement in the pace of project implementation, as reflected in an increased rate of disbursement and the large number of achievements realized during the latter part of the Project (see Section 3.2 and Annexes 2, 3, and 10 for further details). At the time of project closing in October 2014, over 99 percent of project funds had been disbursed. 2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) 34. M&E Design. The M&E activities aimed to monitor and report on a number of aspects of education sector development, including: (i) education sector improvements tracked by a set of core indicators which were Project-specific; (ii) the Government’s commitment to reforms based on implementation of key country-specific policy targets in the areas of access, equity, quality, and efficiency; (iii) analytic work for developing knowledge for education reform, forward-planning and capacity-building to provide important baseline data; and (iv) donor harmonization and financial support, which was undertaken by the education ministries and by the donor coordination group. The Project’s RF relied on the collection of data and production of statistics by MEPSP and project progress reports were to be submitted by the PCMU to track progress under the Project and in the sector overall. 35. M&E Implementation and Utilization. At the beginning of the Project, MEPSP’s capacity to collect, analyze and report on data was very limited. Although capacity- building measures were included in the Project’s design, they were not sufficient initially to ensure that M&E functions could be performed reliably and quickly enough to meet project needs and to report on project performance and progress. Limitations in M&E capacity was highlighted in aide-memoires. The timely collection of quality data, including school-level data, posed a considerable challenge given the logistical hurdles stemming from the country’s immense size and difficult topography. These limitations also delayed, to some extent, the monitoring of and reporting on progress made under the Project during the initial period of its implementation. The 2010 QALP exercise recommended, given these difficulties, that the Project team consider hiring a third party to collect and verify data. Although this recommendation was not heeded, the quality of the RF and systematic collection of data did significantly improve over the life of the Project. 36. Under the 2012 restructuring, a number of revisions were introduced to the Project’s RF and M&E arrangements. At the PDO-level, the target for the indicator related to the Education Sector Strategy was made more specific by including a sustainable medium-term financing plan. Two PDO-level indicators were added to the RF: (i) increase in the first grade intake rate; and (ii) the number of project beneficiaries, including the percentage of female beneficiaries (as a core indicator). At the intermediate-level, a number of indicators were added, sharpened and clarified while a few others were dropped. Moreover, at both the PDO- and intermediate-levels, end-of-project targets were revised upwards given the additional time allotted for project implementation. This approach reflected the team and Government’s desire to maintain the ambitious nature of the operation. A few indicators to measure change attributable to the Project were included in 12 the RF to measure the impact of project-supported interventions, including, notably, the roll out of the fee-free policy in primary education, the provision of funding for school operating costs subsidies, and the adoption of new school construction norms. One important measure, the Citizen Report Card (CRC) Survey, was to gauge the impact of the fee free policy, by systematically assessing the changes in the financial burden of school costs on households. The CRC, however, was not carried out under the Project. As such, although the Project was able to monitor the payment of teachers and provision of resources to cover schools’ operating costs (a major accomplishment under the Project), it is difficult to have a full understanding of the extent to which the fee-free policy and the Bank’s support of these activities shifted the financial burden away from households and towards the Government. 37. Another challenge which the M&E system faced was that many project-financed inputs and activities required continued monitoring and oversight, including, in some cases, at the point of service delivery. This was a significant undertaking in light of the logistical challenges of the DRC’s geographic expanse. To track these processes, the supervision team conducted: (i) a beneficiary assessment; (ii) two targeted audits (under the Bank- financed Emergency Urban and Social Rehabilitation Project (Project d’urgence de réhabilitation urbaine et sociale – PURUS)) which looked at the financing of school operating costs; and (iii) a quality of service delivery assessment as part of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) program. Assessments under the Project were frequently carried out in collaboration with other organizations. For example, two student learning assessments (PASEC) for grades 2 and 5 in 2010 and 2013, respectively, were carried out under the Project. While the RF and data reporting did significantly improve over the life of the Project, a more detailed understanding of the implementation of some project activities would have been possible if all of the planned assessments had been carried out. 38. While the M&E did significantly improve following the 2012 restructuring, overall, the M&E design, implementation and utilization is rated Modest. 2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance Fiduciary Compliance 39. The fiduciary aspects of the Project were handled by the PCMU which, after almost a one-year delay, was adequately staffed to satisfactorily carry out the Project’s FM and procurement functions. 19 Procurement was handled in one of two ways: (i) under Component 1, a Contracted Procurement Agency (CPA) was to be selected to support procurement activities; and (ii) for all other activities, fiduciary responsibilities were vested in a procurement specialist. After a misunderstanding related to the implementation of the first approach led to some initial delays, responsibility for supporting all fiduciary activities under Component 1 during Phase I of the Civil Works Program was assigned to the United 19 The delay in recruitment occurred, in part, because an interim approach had been adopted wherein procurement was handled under another Bank project, the MAP (P082516 in Health). As the full team was not in place, the Project was slow to start for most of 2008. 13 Nations Office for Project Services (UNOPS). Although the working relationship between the PCMU and UNOPS was initially problematic and caused some delays in project implementation,20 procurement was effectively handled by UNOPS. In Phase II, however, procurement under Component 1 was transferred to the Government through the UCOP, a project coordination unit in the Ministry of Planning 21 which had prior experience in procurement. The working relationship between UCOP and the PCMU faced some challenges related to the proper delineation of roles and responsibilities of these two entities. Procurement undertaken by the PCMU for activities under other components appears to have been adequate. In instances in which reporting weaknesses were detected, solutions were promptly proposed by the Bank and follow-up actions undertaken by the Government.22 40. FM under the Project was generally unproblematic and, for the most part, was rated Satisfactory in Implementation Status Reports (ISRs) throughout the project life. FM was only downgraded briefly to Moderately Satisfactory in March 2009 due to the poor quality of interim reports which subsequently improved. Annual audit reports were received on time, revealed no irregularities, and were of unqualified opinion. Only minor comments were made, most often pertaining to small-scale ineligible expenditures which were deemed to be the result of unintentional errors.23 In instances where full compliance was not observed, ineligible expenditures were reimbursed fully and without issue. Safeguard Compliance 40. Two safeguard issues were identified in the PAD related to Environmental Assessment and Involuntary Resettlement. An ESMF and a Resettlement Action Plan (RAP) were produced during project preparation and disclosed in-country and at the World Bank Infoshop. The safeguards rating in ISRs was maintained at Satisfactory throughout the life of the Project with all indications that appropriate attention was paid to these areas at all times.24 20 The relationship between the Project, the Government, the Bank, and the UN had to be formally defined before work could begin, which took some time. 21 Not to be confused with the UGCP, the PCMU for the Project. 22 From the QALP of 2010. 23 Random audits at those schools that had received operating costs from the Project revealed that correct procedures had not always been followed and so the expenses were deemed ineligible. These were minor issues. A list of eligible expenses was outlined in the Project operations manual, but before a school could use these funds, a school committee had to decide on what would be purchased. In a few cases, the auditor found that no minutes of this meeting were kept, and so he/she ruled that the expenses incurred from these purchases must be, in principle, ineligible. In all, approximately US$36,000 was determined to be ineligible (out of US$30 million) and was, therefore, reimbursed. 24 For example, the last ISR adds the following comment: “Safeguards aspects are included as an integral part of the school civil works program delegated to UNOPS and UCOP. A technical audit of UNOPS program has indicated that there is a well-defined monitoring framework and that consultation with civil society was undertaken. Mitigation measures were proposed when there are weaknesses. For on-going program [sic] with UCOP, attention has been made to ensure that the local executing agencies adhere to the principles and procedures.” 14 2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase 41. A new post-primary education project to be delivered in FY15 is currently under preparation as a follow up to the Education Sector Project. This new IDA-funded operation aims to improve learning outcomes at the lower secondary level and to support technical training in areas that are experiencing significant growth in the DRC, such as construction, agriculture and extractive industries. 42. The MEPSP will lead this operation as implementing agency in coordination with other ministries and inspectorates. The Center for Technical Assistance (Cellule d’Assistance Technique – CAT) will play an advisory role. To build institutional capacity for project management, this operation will be managed by a designated directorate within MEPSP rather than by a separate project management unit. The Bank will continue to provide technical guidance to the Government and maintain close collaboration with the Government and other DPs operating in the sector. The design of the new project builds upon approaches used under this Project and has taken into consideration findings from this evaluation, particularly in relation to ensuring realism in the implementation schedule and proposed arrangements for FM, procurement, and M&E. 3. Assessment of Outcomes 3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation Relevance of Objectives 43. The project objectives were substantially relevant as they responded to key challenges faced by the education sector in the DRC. These challenges included: a lack of equitable access to primary education; low quality of instruction; a lack of pedagogical and didactic materials such as textbooks and teachers’ guides; dilapidated school infrastructure; the lack of a legal and regulatory framework for the sector; and the absence of a sustainable financing mechanism for the sector. The activities that the Project supported under each of its four components were well-aligned with the Government’s objectives of increasing equitable access, improving the quality of education, and of strengthening the institutional and financial capacity to effectively manage the sector. More specifically, project- supported activities reflected the country’s needs as outlined in the 2006 Letter of Education Sector Policy. The Bank’s support to the sector corresponded to the needs and priorities identified in the PRSP and responded to the emphasis placed on education in the Transitional Support Strategy (TSS) wherein education would consolidate the process of stabilization and recovery – also objectives of the Education Sector Project. 44. The overarching objectives of the Project remain substantially relevant today and are aligned with the Bank’s Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) for the DRC (FY13-FY16). In particular, the current CAS highlights the need to provide sustainable financing to the sector as a way to improve quality of education and, in turn, learning outcomes—both of which are directly linked to the activities supported under this Project. 15 45. On the basis of the above, the relevance of objectives is rated Substantial in both the pre- and post-restructuring periods.25 Relevance of Design 46. As described in Section 2.1, the Project’s design was complex and ambitious, particularly in light of the difficult and uncertain context in which it was to be implemented. While the operation’s design incorporated a number of lessons learned from other contexts and identified a number of potential risks to the Project’s effective implementation, at the same time it underestimated a number of potential challenges, including: (i) the limited capacity of the implementing agency to carry out key project activities and functions; (ii) the difficulty of meeting major disbursement conditions which, in turn, significantly delayed project implementation in the initial phase; and (iii) the complexity of carrying out the M&E activities need to properly monitor project interventions and assess project implementation/performance. Though the PDO was broad, the linkages between project activities and intended outputs and outcomes were, nevertheless, sound under the original design. 47. As noted earlier, the PDO was not modified during the life of the Project as it was deemed relevant and appropriate by the QER and the QALP. However, under the 2012 Restructuring, the scope of the operation was strategically revised. Specifically, certain disbursement conditions were streamlined and a number of adjustments were made to activities supported by sub-component 1c (improve equity of access to primary education), sub-component 1d (strengthen safeguards in teacher payment system) and sub-component 3b (preparation and implementation of a sector-wide education strategy including a legal framework and financing plans). New indicators were introduced into the RF to better capture progress made towards the achievement of the PDO and completion of project outputs. The upward adjustment of end-of-project targets under this restructuring reflected the Bank’s and the Government’s desire to maintain the ambitious nature of the Project. The restructured design facilitated the uptake in project activities and led to significant increases in the level of disbursement during the post-restructuring period. The strengthened design provided the framework in which a large number of achievements were realized during the post-restructuring period. The more robust M&E allowed the team to more fully document progress made in terms of both outputs and outcomes achieved during the post-restructuring period. 48. Based on the discussion above, the relevance of project design is rated Modest in the pre- restructuring period and Substantial in the post-restructuring period. 25 For purposes of analysis, the post-restructuring period or the period following the restructuring for also includes the period following the second restructuring (as the latter restructuring simply extended the project closing date by ten months and did not introduce any modifications to the PDO, components or performance measures). 16 3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives 49. For purposes of this evaluation, and in compliance with the established Operations Policy and Country Services (OPCS) Guidelines, this section assesses project performance in relation to two time periods – the period from project effectiveness to the 2012 Restructuring (Pre-Restructuring Period) and the period following the 2012 Restructuring until the project closing date (Post-Restructuring Period). The post-restructuring period also comprises a second restructuring undertaken in 2013 which extended the project closing date by ten months. The decision to evaluate project performance in this way, in two distinct periods rather than three, stems from the fact that the restructuring undertaken in 2013 only extended the closing date and did not alter the Project’s objectives, scope, activities and/or indicators. 50. The following section provides an overview of project achievements in the pre- restructuring and post-restructuring periods by project objectives and associated output and outcome targets. Specifically, the analysis assesses the achievements against each component’s objectives and includes those performance indicators which are associated with each component’s aims. This approach is adopted since the objectives and indicators associated with each of the components are logically connected to the overarching objectives as laid out in the PDO (i.e., to prevent further deterioration in the delivery of essential services for primary education 26 and to prepare ground for sustainable development and financing of the sector that will facilitate donor coordination and future transition to a sector-wide program). For a detailed overview of activities undertaken and progress observed on each of the indicators over the life of the Project, refer to Annexes 2 and 10. As the analysis below reveals, the Project not only prevented further deterioration of the sector but, in fact, stabilized the system and achieved considerable gains by project closing. Objective 1: Increasing Access and Equity at Primary Level 51. In order to increase equitable access to primary education in the DRC, Component 1 supported the construction and rehabilitation of classrooms, rehabilitation of the UPN, provided financial resources to cover a portion of teachers’ salaries and schools’ operating costs, and strengthened safeguards within the teacher payment system. Pre-Restructuring Period 52. Progress made in terms of outcomes linked to this objective during the pre- restructuring period included an increase in the gross enrollment rate (GER) from 64 26 Preventing the deterioration in the delivery of essential services implies the aim of providing quality education in an equitable manner. This would be achieved by both rehabilitating the learning environment (through rehabilitation and construction of classrooms, etc.) and providing necessary inputs (e.g., textbooks and teachers’ guides, training of teachers) to improve the quality and relevance of education services provided. In fact, from the targets of each of the indicators, it is clear that the objective was not only to prevent deterioration, but also to further stabilize and subsequently improve service delivery. 17 percent to 90.8 percent. Gender parity also improved with the girls-to-boys ratio in primary school increasing from 85 percent to 86 percent. A cost-effective school construction strategy was developed to serve as the basis for the next phase of the rehabilitation program. There were, however, significant delays in the implementation of the school rehabilitation program with only 43 classrooms out of a planned 450 completed by the Project’s MTR in 2010. In addition, teachers’ salaries and schools’ operating costs could not be paid as the conditions related to disbursement for these activities had not been met.27 Post-Restructuring Period 53. In the post-restructuring period, the following progress was observed on PDO-level indicators that pertain to this objective: (i) GER increased from 90.8 percent to 117 percent (exceeding the end-of-project target of 105.8 percent); (ii) the gross grade one intake rate increased from 107.7 percent to 133.1 percent (exceeding the end-of-project target of 129.8 percent); and (iii) the girls-to-boys ratio in primary school increased from 86 percent to 98 percent (nearly achieving the end-of-project target of 100 percent). In terms of intermediate-level indicators linked to this objective, the following progress was observed: (i) 93 percent (1,467 out of 1,572) of classrooms were built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from the project intervention across all 11 of the country’s administrative provinces; (ii) construction norms had been adopted for the application of a cost-effective school construction strategy (achieving the end-of-project target); and (iii) the salaries of 20,15528 primary teachers in ‘registered’ schools were integrated into the public payroll (achieving the end-of-project target). 54. Studies and technical work on norms and standards for low-cost construction, community participation in school management, and community oversight of civil works activities in the DRC were also undertaken. This work contributed to the effective uptake of these approaches under the Project and contributed to the Project’s success in increasing equitable access to primary education throughout the DRC. While the unit costs of classroom construction remained high in the first phase of construction under UNOPS, in the second phase the average unit cost was lower than other comparable projects being implemented in the DRC at the time (see Section 3.3 and Annex 3 for additional details). The reduction in unit costs was a notable achievement under this Project given the challenges of the prevailing context in the DRC at the time. In addition, the Project also supported the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of 187 offices for school directors and 167 sanitary facilities, and the UPN was rehabilitated and equipped. Further, the Project covered the operating costs of 26,210 registered schools (amounting to approximately US$400/school annually). 27 Although the project had not been able to provide financing to cover teachers’ salaries and/or schools’ operating costs, the Government had undertaken its own efforts to support the fee-free policy by integrating a large number of teachers from registered primary schools into the public payroll (to reduce costs borne by households) as well as providing some financial support to primary schools to cover their operating costs and to administration and pedagogy management units to partially cover their recurrent costs. 28 This activity was supported with project funding. The total number of primary school teachers brought onto the public payroll is much larger. 18 55. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of classrooms (and associated infrastructure), the construction and equipping of the UPN, the regularization and inclusion of 20,155 primary school teachers in ‘registered’ schools on the official public payroll, and the payment of 26,210 schools’ operating costs constitute some of the major achievements of the post-restructuring period (and of the Project). Together, they supported the Government’s aim of increasing equitable access to education at the primary level throughout the country. These activities fostered improved dialogue and strengthened cooperation between Government entities (i.e., Ministries of Education and Finance) and with local communities. 56. In light of the above, the achievement of Objective 1 (Increasing Access and Equity at the Primary Level) is rated Modest during the pre-restructuring period and Substantial during the post-restructuring period. Objective 2: Improving Quality of Primary Education 57. In order to improve the quality and internal efficiency of primary education, Component 2 sought to increase the availability of textbooks and teachers’ guides in core subjects, provide in-service teacher training in the use of textbooks, and build capacity to assess learning achievements and outcomes. Pre-Restructuring Period 58. Significant progress was observed in terms of this component’s only outcome-level indicator with the primary completion rate (PCR) increasing from 29 percent in 2007 to 56.7 percent in 2012, constituting a doubling of the rate when compared to baseline at project launch. At the intermediate level, progress was notable on each of the indicators supporting this objective: (i) 14 million textbooks were purchased and distributed to provincial education directorates, with 95 percent of schools reporting to have received the books; (ii) a student-textbook ratio of 0.8 to 1 was achieved; (iii) around 278,000 teachers’ guides had been distributed; (iv) a large number of inspectors and school advisors had received in-service training in the use of textbooks and training on the national curriculum program; and (v) a dialogue on a national textbook policy had begun. Post-Restructuring Period 59. During the post-restructuring period, the positive trend observed in the PCR continued, increasing from 56.7 percent to 80 percent (exceeding the end-of-project target of 72.5 percent). In addition, by project closing, at the intermediate-level: (i) 18 million textbooks and guides had been purchased and distributed (significantly exceeding the end- of-project target of 14 million) and the student-textbook and teacher-guide ratios reached 1:2 (with each student having Math and French textbooks and each teacher having teacher guides for these subjects) (achieving the end-of-project target); (ii) a total of 53,230 inspectors and school advisors had received in-service training in the use of textbooks and training on the national curriculum program (achieving the end-of-project target); (iv) a learning assessment mechanism for grade 5 had been established and two rounds of PASEC 19 had been conducted (exceeding the end-of-project target); and (v) the Basic Education Interim Plan was under implementation (achieving the end-of-project target). Further, the component had significant outreach in terms of beneficiaries – far exceeding the end-of- project target.29 60. Prior to project effectiveness, the PCR was very low with a large portion of students not graduating and a number of quality inputs lacking. In addition to an often poor learning environment, students and teachers had limited access to necessary materials (textbooks in core subjects, teachers’ guides, and so on) and it was not possible to systematically monitor sector performance. The Project was able to provide the much-needed quality inputs and have a greater reach than originally envisaged. Not only were a large number of student textbooks and teachers’ guides for core subjects (mathematics and French) provided to schools throughout the entire country, this was accomplished within a relatively short time frame – a considerable achievement in light of the large size and often difficult topography of the country. Training provided under the Project complemented the provision of the texts and was important in ensuring their appropriate use and in increasing the lifespan of these materials. Finally, the utility of the learning assessment system for primary schools developed under the Project cannot be underestimated given its ability to inform decision- making in the sub-sector. Together, these accomplishments have provided the framework and foundation for strengthening the quality of education provided in the DRC. These quality inputs are likely to positively impact learning outcomes in the medium- and long- term. 61. In light of the above, the achievement of Objective 2 (Improving the Quality of Primary Education) is rated Substantial both during the pre- and post-restructuring periods. Objective 3: Strengthening Institutional and Financial Capacity of Education 62. Component 3 sought to revise the legal and regulatory framework of the education system by reinforcing institutional capacity for planning, budget formulation, and program execution in the education sector. Specifically, the Component aimed to support the development and adoption of: (i) a teacher career structure; (ii) pre- and in-service teacher training systems; and (iii) a sector-wide medium-term strategy for education. Pre-Restructuring 63. Prior to the 2012 Restructuring, progress under Objective 3 was limited as is evidenced in the slow progress on performance measures linked to this objective. While an education sector strategy with a medium-term financing plan and indicators was being 29 The final target for number of project beneficiaries was 4,878,140 (the total number of grade 1 and 2 students to receive textbooks under the Project). The total number of beneficiaries (including students, teachers, inspectors, etc.) is estimated to be 5,076,733. 20 prepared with support from the Government and various DPs, the following activities had not yet been completed: (i) reformed guidelines for pre-service and in-service teacher training had not been developed; (ii) the Institutional Education Framework Law (organic law or Loi cadre) had not been transmitted to Parliament for adoption; (iii) the Convention of Partnerships had not been fully revised or implemented; (iv) CRC and PETS had not been piloted in selected educational provinces; (v) an action plan had not been put in place for eventual scale-up (which was to be developed, in part, on the basis of the CRC which had not been undertaken); and (vi) a draft teacher career structure (to address teacher training, deployment, salary and incentives) had not been approved by the Government. Post-Restructuring 64. Despite the limited progress during the pre-restructuring period, significant and far- reaching gains were observed during the post-restructuring period related to this objective. In terms of the PDO-level indicator linked to this objective, an Education Sector Strategy and three sub-sector strategies 30 with a sustainable medium-term financing plan (with indicators agreed with donors and approved by Government), had been developed, thus achieving the end-of-project target. In terms of intermediate-level indicators associated with Objective 3: (i) reformed guidelines for pre-service teacher training had been developed and were being applied, achieving the end-of-project target; (ii) the Institutional Education Framework law had been approved by Government, achieving the end-of- project target; (iii) the Convention of Partnerships had been revised and implemented, achieving the end-of-project target; and (iv) a draft of the teacher career structure, including teacher training, deployment, salary and incentives, had been approved by the Government, achieving end-of-project target. While the PETS had been piloted, the CRC had not been undertaken. As such, an action plan was not put in place for eventual scale up since this activity relied on inputs from the CRC. 65. In sum, the development and finalization of the Education Sector Strategy was a major achievement under this Project, as was the promulgation of the Institutional Education Framework Law which covered all aspects of the national teaching corps and further strengthened the institutional and financial capacity of the education sector. Monitoring of sector performance improved and a statistical yearbook is now published on an annual basis. 66. In light of the above, the achievement of Objective 3 (Strengthening Institutional and Financial Capacity of Education) is rated Modest during the pre-restructuring period and Substantial during the post-restructuring period. 30 Sub-sector strategies for MEPSP, MESU, and Ministry of Non-formal Education and Literacy were developed which have received support from various DPs, including GPE. 21 3.3 Efficiency 67. Despite a slow start, the efficiency of implementation significantly improved in the post-restructuring period. 68. Textbooks. The project provided a total of 18 million textbooks. The unit cost of books for mathematics and French in grades 1 and 2 are different because two different approaches were adopted to procure them. In the first round, publishers were chosen to provide books and deliver them to three major entry points in the west, east and south of the DRC from where the MEPSP arranged local delivery. In the second phase, publishers were responsible for delivering textbooks to sub-provincial education directorates. The unit cost for textbooks, without delivery, was US$1.32. This is high compared to education projects in Eritrea31 where the unit cost is US$0.60 and Mauritania32 where the unit cost is US$0.73. The unit costs are in line with those observed in Sierra Leone33 where the unit cost ranges from US$0.97 to US$1.66 and in Niger34 where unit costs range from US$1.10 to US$1.40. 69. Construction. A comparison of the cost of construction financed by various DPs working in the DRC is relevant given the emphasis under this Project on low cost construction (see Table 3 below). It should be noted that the cost of the work amongst various DPs in different, select regions, is not easy to compare because of regional variations based on distance, logistics, etc. While construction costs are assessed to have been high during the pre-restructuring phase (phase 1) of the Project when managed by UNOPS but were markedly lower, on average, in the post-restructuring phase (phase 2). Table 3: Average Cost of Construction in DRC of a 56 m2 Classroom by Donor and by Region (in US$) Donor Provinces DRC (Average) Equateur Kasai-Occidental Bas-Congo Fonds Social (AfD) 17,164 18,868 UNICEF 13,050 13,050 CARITAS 12,500 10,500 APEP (CTB/AfD) 12,600 PARSE Phase I (UNOPS) 19,600 PARSE Phase II (UCOP) 10,073 70. While many ICRs describe unit costs per classroom, differences in classroom design make for difficult comparisons. Unit cost by square meter helps to address this to some extent. Although there are not many SSA countries with available data, the unit cost per classroom under this Project seems in line with other SSA countries (see Table 4). 31 ICR- Education Sector Investment Project, 2012 32 ICR- Education Sector Development Program, 2012 33 ICR- Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project, 2010 34 ICR- Basic Education Support Project, 2013 22 Table 4: Comparison of Classroom Construction Costs for SSA Countries Unit costs by Cost for a 65m2 square meter (US$) Classroom (US$) Gambia US$175-188 including cost of labor US$11,375-12,220 (EFA-FTI) Mauritania35 US$197 using community-based US$12,805 approach Niger36 US$220 without cost of labor US$14,300 Djibouti37 US$302-399 without cost of labor US$19,630-25,935 DRC (PARSE) US$154-$301 without cost of labor US$10,073-$19,600 Efficiency of Implementation 71. Although project implementation was initially slow because of staffing issues in the PCMU, implementation pace gradually increased in the period which followed. Following restructuring, the pace of implementation increased even further resulting in greater progress towards the achievement of project outputs and outcomes. This was, in part, a result of changes to the Project’s scope and simplified conditions which allowed for the disbursement of US$45 million for teacher salaries. Although the disbursement rate was low during the early years of the Project life, by project closing, more than 99 percent of the allocated resources had been disbursed. Further, under Component 4 (Project Coordination and Management), management costs were lower than had been anticipated (79.2 percent lower than the appraisal estimate). Efficiencies realized through donor coordination 72. The Project was efficient insofar as it fostered a high level of collaboration among government ministries, between ministerial directorates/units and between public and private actors, including public and faith-based schools. It also strengthened coordination among DPs working in the sub-sector. This high level of coordination and cross- fertilization of ideas and approaches is still observed today. 73. In light of the information above and detailed in Annex 3, the efficiency of the Project is rated Modest during both the pre- and post-restructuring periods. 35 ICR- Education Sector Development Program, Mauritania, 2012. 36 ICR- Basic Education Support Project, Niger, 2013. 37 ICR- Primary Education Support Program, Djibouti, 2013. 23 3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 74. Based on the pre- and post-restructuring ratings for relevance, efficacy and efficiency, the Overall Outcome Rating for the Education Sector Project is Moderately Satisfactory. Tables 5(a) and 5(b) summarize the detailed analysis presented in Sections 3.1-3.3 of the ICR. Table 5(a): Calculation of Overall Rating before and after Restructuring Period Relevance Achievement of PDO – Efficacy Efficiency Overall Rating (Objectives/ Design) Objective 1 Objective 2 Objective 3 Summary Pre- Substantial/ Modest Substantial Modest Modest Modest Moderately Restructuring Modest Unsatisfactory Post- Substantial/ Substantial Substantial Substantial Substantial Modest Moderately Restructuring Substantial Satisfactory Table 5(b): Calculation of Overall Project Rating* Overall Rating Overall Rating Combined (Pre-Restructuring) (Post-Restructuring) Rating Moderately Moderately Unsatisfactory Satisfactory Rating Value 3 4 Weight 44.98% 55.02% Value 3.55 rounded to 4 or 1.3494 2.2008 Moderately Satisfactory *weighting based on OPCS ICR Guidelines. Data taken from World Bank Client Connection. Total disbursement as of October 31, 2012 was SDR 44,584,007.47. This represents 44.98% of the net credit (SDR 44,584,007.47/SDR 99,106,465.22). 75. Important gains were observed in the DRC during the life of the Project in terms of increasing equitable access to education, improving the quality and relevance of education provided, and strengthening institutional and financial capacity of the sector. These objectives were substantially relevant in light of the needs at the time of project appraisal and remain highly pertinent today. Further, the operation’s objectives were and continue to be strongly aligned with the Bank’s current CAS as well as the Government’s strategic agenda for the sector. Given the large array of needs facing the sector at the time of project preparation and the Government’s commitment to stabilizing and improving education services throughout the DRC, it is understandable that the operation’s original design would be ambitious. In addition to supporting far-reaching reforms, the Project aimed to provide key quality inputs to the sector (e.g., training of teachers and education personnel, textbooks and teachers’ guides, construction of classrooms, etc.) In the prevailing post- conflict context characterized by a fragile economy and socio-political environment, the 24 effective implementation of the Project was made more challenging. This was made even more difficult with the cumbersome disbursement conditions that were included under the original design As a result of these endogenous and exogenous factors, and under- appreciation of some identified risks, implementation progress during the early stages of the operation was stymied. During the project life, however, the economy began to grow, the socio-political environment stabilized, and the first restructuring introduced a number of important changes which led to a marked improvement in project implementation and performance. 76. Equitable access to education and the quality of education provided improved under the Project. The operation’s main outputs included: the construction and rehabilitation of classrooms throughout the country; the integration of more than 20,000 teachers into the public payroll; the distribution of textbooks and teachers’ guides to all children in primary grades 1 and 2 and teachers; and the provision of essential training to various elements of the workforce (e.g., teachers as well as inspectors). In a short amount of time, and in a very difficult context, improvements were observed related to project objectives, including significant increases in the primary GER, primary PCR, grade 1 intake rate, and gender parity. Not only are more children enrolling in primary school but they are also tending to stay longer and are more likely to complete the cycle. In addition to these more tangible and immediate gains, the long-term and sector-wide focus of the Project, resulted in a number of key accomplishments useful for the continued growth and development of the sector. These included: legislation which established the framework for the sector (and sub- sectors); guidelines for pre- and in-service teacher training; a convention of partnerships; career structure for teachers; strategy for low-cost construction; the finalization of a sector strategy with a sustainable financing mechanism (agreed with all DPs). The development of the sector strategy has not only laid the foundation and framework for the sector, it has strengthened institutional capacity related to sector development, financing, management, and coordination. 77. While from a purely economic standpoint the efficiency of the Project was Modest during both the pre- and post-restructuring periods, the Project was effective in fostering a high level of collaboration across government ministries and strengthened coordination among DPs in the sub-sector. 3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes and Impacts (a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development 78. During Project preparation, one of the major impediments to primary education in the DRC was the high cost of schooling to households. Research demonstrated that these costs were preventing children from most quintiles (except the highest one) from attending school. Further, in such situations, the education of boys is prioritized. This project, by supporting country wide reforms and improvements to quality, has promoted increases in equitable access to school – achievements which are expected to be maintained in the future. Further, data from statistical yearbooks have provided some evidence that gender parity 25 has continued to improve across the DRC, reaching almost full parity in urban areas.38 The payment of salaries of more than 20,000 teachers and operating costs of more than 26,000 schools throughout the country was an important step in increasing equitable access to school. (b) Institutional Change/Strengthening 79. Institutionally, the Project was visionary. Significant institutional change has been realized which is likely to have a positive long-term impact in the sector. The reforms supported under Component 3 have, in large part, laid the groundwork for continued support to and coordinated investment in education. Achievements made – in terms of developing three sub-sector strategies; a sector-wide strategy and a Basic Education Interim Plan; establishing a structure for regularizing teachers’ careers; developing a medium-term sustainable financing framework; and passing important legislation – are all likely to positively impact the way the sector functions and grows in the future. 80. The Project had a positive impact on strengthening and solidifying the working relationship between the Government, schools/administration and communities. Many of the project-supported activities increased and strengthened the Government’s interaction with local communities wherein the Government was able to gain the trust of these communities. The Government, with project support, was able to achieve this by: (i) providing efficient and transparent services (through the use of school committees that included parents who are responsible for school operating costs); (ii) providing funding to cover schools’ operating costs and teachers’ salaries; (iii) enabling stakeholders to participate in decision making and monitor the use of funds; and (iv) updating the legal framework for the education sector. 81. The Project has had a significant leveraging effect as it has been able to attract other DPs to invest in the education sector, particularly in terms of institutional strengthening. USAID and DfID have committed to investing US$180 million during the period from 2014 to 2020 and their investment supports, among other areas: improved governance and accountability in the sector; strengthened M&E; and development and implementation of strategies to reduce the total number of out-of-school children in the DRC. 38 Between 2008/09 and 2011/12, the Education Statistical Yearbooks show that the national participation rate for girls climbed from 45.9 percent to 46.3 percent, while the province of Equateur, with the lowest rate, grew from 42.9 percent to 43.7 percent. See section 3.2.4 of Yearbooks for 2008/09 and 2011/12. (http://www.eduquepsp.cd/annuaire-statistique.html) 26 (c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts 82. Though it was expected that the Bank’s support through this Project would encourage other DPs to invest in the sector, the extent to which the Bank catalyzed support to the sector was unanticipated. As the first entity to invest in the DRC in the post-conflict period, the Bank’s leadership played a role in directing the DP community’s efforts in developing the education sector and its strategic framework. 3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops See Kinshasa Case Study in Annex 5. 4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome 83. The risks identified in the PAD were largely appropriate. The overall risk rating was substantial at the time of appraisal which, in retrospect, appears to be an accurate rating. Table 6 provides a summary of risks and mitigation measures identified at appraisal and an evaluation of risks at the time of preparation of the ICR and going forward. Table 6: Overview of Risks Risks Rating at Mitigation Evaluation of the risks at the time of ICR Appraisal Measures Preparation and Beyond the Life of the Project Political risks The fragile political and security S Democratic institutions are Risk Assessment: Moderate. The current situation leads to conflicts (either being developed; educational political situation in the country is relatively widespread or local) or civilian opportunities contribute to stable but, similar to most post-conflict unrest (triggered by high this. settings the country is somewhat vulnerable expectations that are not met). to political instability. This could lead to disruptions in government’s commitments to the Project, undermine results/effectiveness and cause country development failures. Decentralization reform H Agreed conditions of Risk Assessment: Moderate. Key reforms implemented without sufficient decentralization, and good have been undertaken to strengthen the planning and capacity. This could M&E, are required. decentralization of services and this was lead to managerial and complemented with capacity-building administrative chaos at provincial Training and institutional covering M&E. As the decentralization level, which would impede capacity building under the process takes time to fully materialize, there Project execution and increase the Project. is always a risk that the Government will opportunities for corruption. revert to more centralized decision-making. Multiple independent technical and financial audits. The political commitment to M Donor community must Risk Assessment: Moderate. The Minister education reform is low. Political engage with key stakeholders of Education had been in place for commitment is crucial for to help strengthen the approximately eight years, providing great effective Project implementation. constituency for reform. stability within the education sector. By contrast, the entities now responsible for Basic, Secondary and Tertiary Education are 27 operating somewhat independently which has created the possibility of less uniformity and smooth coordination in decision- making. Strikes or civilian unrest as a M -- Risk Assessment: Low. This particular issue result of pressure groups no longer poses much of a risk. Changes in perceiving that teachers are the education system appear to have been favored. and continue to be well-received, for the most part, by civil society. Macroeconomic risks Insufficient rate of economic M Reasonable macroeconomic Risk Assessment: Moderate. The country’s growth and high inflation rates assumptions shared and economy is currently performing relatively undermines the financial stability agreed with donor partners well, though it remains susceptible to of the Project. have been used throughout the external shocks. design of the Project. Insufficient progress in other M The Bank and other donors Risk Assessment: Substantial. While much sectors of the economy, in support the DRC through has been accomplished under this Project, it particular security, infrastructure, multi-sectoral programs. is true that the country’s development health system improvements, and challenges in other sectors remain immense food security, hinders access to which is likely to continue to have an schooling and delivery of the impact on progress in the education sector. Project’s goods and services, in Even though the Bank and other donors are particular textbooks. providing support to the Government in these areas, the risk of insufficient progress in some areas are likely to impede some of the progress in the education sector. For instance, challenges related to infrastructure, will continue to constrain progress in ensuring access to education and adequate facilities. Donor funds increase rapidly and M --- Risk Assessment: Low. Donor coordination in an uncoordinated manner after has improved significantly over the life of the DRC’s first democratic the Project and is likely to continue to be elections. This would challenge further strengthened during the post-project already low absorption capacity, period. and threaten the Project’s efficiency. Agreed budget reallocations and H Budget execution closely Risk Assessment: Substantial. The increases in education spending monitored in cooperation with Government faces many challenges are not forthcoming due to lack of the IMF. financing the areas that it recognizes as liquidity or other pressing budget priorities for the sector. Given the priorities. Budget process strengthened. competing demands for scarce resources in the country, though the Government has expressed its commitment to regularize all teachers in the education system, it remains uncertain the extent to which the Government will be able to fully mobilize the resources to achieve this ambitious objective. The same holds true, more generally, for completing the full roll-out of the fee-free policy. The 2015 forthcoming PER reveals that budget execution rates remain low in the DRC. Governance and corruption risks Inefficient use of Project H i) The results of a thorough Risk Assessment: Moderate. The resources due to corruption, analyses of the Public Government is to be congratulated for its mismanagement or non- Financial Management (PFM) strong position and performance in terms of transparency in government system are integrated into the financial management, as no qualified systems. Project design, including financial audits were issued. However, financial management and sustained capacity-building and fiduciary 28 anti-corruption safeguards; a controls will need continuous support and special procurement agent has attention at all levels in order to ensure that been selected after funds for the sector are used judiciously. recommendations of an INT investigation. ii) There was to be the computerization of key government units complemented by adequate training in accountability and transparency at all levels of the system. iii) Clear understanding with government regarding expectations. Capacity in public and private M The choice of project Risk Assessment: Substantial. Though the sectors to execute project implementation unit and use project has successfully supported capacity- objectives promptly and of agents with proven track building activities in the sector, the private efficiently is weaker than record of result is required. and public sectors’ ability to successfully expected. implement activities laid out in the country’s education agenda pertaining to increasing equitable access to quality education remains limited. Coordination and communication M A directorate to manage [and Risk Assessment: Moderate. A among the three ministries may coordinate] the Project’s day- Government directorate has been assigned prove difficult and jeopardize to-dav implementation will be to play a coordinating role in efficient project execution. chosen implementation of activities in the sector. Though challenges in terms of inter- ministerial coordination still exist, collaboration is expected to continue to improve under the new project. Other risks Schools continue to charge high H i) Use gradual approach to Risk Assessment: Substantial. The Project fees to parents despite Donors’ shift burden of school fees has introduced a mechanism to reduce support to the government to from parents to government household contributions which is now being implement its policy of phasing through increased public supported by other donors, notably the out school fees. This would expenditure. AFD. However, in reality, out-of-pocket endanger the Project’s main aim household contributions to education remain of increasing access to primary ii) Assist government in high given the Government’s inability to schooling through reduced school developing strategy for cover all of the costs associated with the fees engaging additional donors delivery of education services. As a result, where there are financing gaps some schools continue to charge fees to students (directly and indirectly). For iii) Information and instance, in situations where fees are transparency are key within reduced or eliminated, costs are still borne the Project. by parents but elsewhere in the system (for example, at the level of secondary education), as there is simply no other source of financing available. This financial reality will continue to pose risks to the provision of free education at the primary level in the DRC. Given the post-conflict situation, M --- Risk Assessment: Low. During the life of higher than expected rates of the project, the country has been able to HIV/AIDS, TB [tuberculosis] or reduce these health risks. malaria affect Project implementation. L = Low M = Modest/Marginal S = Substantial H = High 29 84. As shown in Table 6 above, although a number of risks identified at appraisal have been mitigated over time, two remain particularly salient, both of which are financial in nature: (i) although budget reallocations to the sector and increases in education spending39 have increased in recent years, sector needs remain significant and will require increases in funding over time; and (ii) in many cases, schools continue to charge parents high fees despite support provided from DPs and the Government to implement the fee-free policy. Given the negative implications of not having sufficient financial resources to carry out planned activities, these financial constraints could challenge gains made in increasing equitable access to primary education, a central objective of the Government’s education strategy. 85. The Government has expressed a commitment to maintain and scale-up many of the Project’s achievements and to coordinate these efforts with those of other DPs. The Government intends to: (i) maintain the 20,155 teachers already placed on the government payroll, an initiative which is now also supported by other donors and regularize those teachers who have not been placed on the public payroll; (ii) create a budget line item for the production of sector statistics initially financed by the Project; and to (iii) gradually increase the share of the national budget allocated to education, which has already risen.40 Despite these aims, the Government is facing fiscal challenges which may pose a significant obstacle to fully covering the costs of paying the large number of newly regularized teachers as well as those who are not yet on the public payroll and to eliminating school fees nationally in-line with the Constitution. It is expected that the sustained involvement of the donor community, both in terms of technical and financial assistance, will likely attenuate some of these aforementioned risks. As mentioned earlier (in Section 3.5 (c)), a number of DPs have agreed to provide additional support to follow up on certain activities begun under the PARSE. 86. In light of the discussion above, the Risk to Development Outcome is rated Substantial.41 5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance 5.1 Bank Performance (a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 87. The composition of the Bank team was appropriate and the team members possessed the relevant skills to properly design and implement the Project. The design was 39 Although the actual spending on education is on an increasing trend, it is not increasing proportionately to GDP growth. As of 2013, only 2.3 percent of GDP was budgeted for education (well below the recommended benchmark of 4.1 percent recommended by GPE). 40 Ibid. 41 See OPCS ICR Guidelines, p.34. 30 well-aligned with the Government’s objectives for the sector and was informed by lessons learned from other projects in post-conflict settings and in the DRC and drew on in-depth and high quality project-commissioned studies. Project design incorporated activities to support the delivery of services and to strengthen the institutional capacity and framework for the sector in the long-term. The PDO was far-reaching in order to respond to the wide- range of challenges facing the sector at the time and was endorsed by the QER. The Project’s results-chain, which guided its implementation, was sound with clear linkages between project inputs, outputs and outcomes. The PDO-level indicators were broad and focused on capturing sector gains, as was the practice at the time, while the operation’s intermediate-level indicators were appropriate for measuring progress across project- supported activities. 88. Despite the strong analytical work underpinning the original design of the Project, a number of issues negatively impacted the Bank’s ability to ensure quality at entry, including the following: (i) though the Bank accurately assessed and adopted appropriate mitigation measures for some of the risks identified at preparation, it underestimated the existing capacity available to support the Project, in particular, the capacity to fulfill fiduciary functions and to undertake M&E activities; (ii) though the PDO and intermediate- level indicators were highly relevant, in the original design there were too few indicators in the RF to adequately measure progress made under each of the Project’s objectives; (iii) there was a limited appreciation of the time required and complexity associated with the reform process which resulted in an overly ambitious implementation schedule; and (iv) the Bank had included a series of cumbersome and difficult to meet disbursement conditions. Together, these issues posed serious challenges during the early stages of Project implementation. This resulted in a low disbursement rate in the initial phase and delays in achieving the envisioned outputs and outcomes. In order to address these challenges, the Bank and the Government agreed to restructure the Project which led to a significant improvement in project performance. 89. For these reasons, the Bank’s performance in ensuring Quality at Entry is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. (b) Quality of Supervision Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 90. Initially, the Project’s Task Team Leaders (TTLs) were based in Kinshasa and worked closely with the PCMU, relevant ministries and other DPs. As such, they could be responsive to the needs and input received from the project stakeholders. The Bank team demonstrated leadership and active problem-solving, both important attributes of effective implementation support. The close collaboration between the project team and the Government, and with DPs, was further strengthened during the life of the Project. This collaboration was useful in identifying bottlenecks to implementation and other difficulties and devising viable solutions to address them. Together, the Bank and partners worked together to identify ways in which project execution could be streamlined. The supervision of fiduciary and safeguards policies and practices was also effectively undertaken. Given the Bank’s ability to provide practical solutions to issues encountered during project 31 implementation, a large number of achievements were observed in this very difficult post- conflict context. 91. Despite the commendable proactivity on the part of the Bank, a number of factors negatively impacted project supervision. First, despite the low disbursement rate and major delays in project-supported activities in the initial years of the Project, ISRs on which the Bank management relies for monitoring progress under the Project were consistently rated Satisfactory. This suggests a lack of rigorous and critical reporting on the part of the Bank during the early stages of the Project. Second, although the RF and M&E significantly improved over the life of the Project, particularly following the 2012 restructuring, in the early years of the operation there were delays in data collection and reporting. Despite improvements in M&E (to include the ability to draw on various studies – for instance, the PETS and Enquête 1-2-3), the Bank and the Government were unable to undertake some key evaluations that would have provided further understanding of the large number of achievements and, in some cases, shortcomings observed under this operation. Third, while both restructurings were important (with the first leading to an uptake in the pace of implementation), there was a considerable delay in finalizing th e Project’s first restructuring which, when undertaken, proved to have a very positive impact on disbursement and implementation progress. 92. Although there were shortcomings in the Bank’s performance, these did not ultimately preclude the Project from largely achieving its overarching objectives. While the Bank’s performance was particularly notable given the difficult context in which the Project was implemented, on balance, the shortcomings described above warrant a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for the Quality of Supervision. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory 93. Based on the performance of the Bank at entry and during supervision and the overall outcome rating, overall Bank Performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 5.2 Borrower Performance (a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 94. The Government expressed its commitment to this Project from the earliest phases of preparation. During project preparation and design, the Government ensured that the Project’s objectives and activities corresponded to the challenges faced in the educatio n sector in the DRC at the time. The Minister of Education, who was in office for eight years of the Project, provided strong leadership and added stability to the sector. The Government worked closely with the Bank and other DPs through this Project to seize the opportunity to ensure the sustainability of the sector and its achievements in the long-term. In addition to finalizing an education sector strategy and several sub-sector strategies, a medium-term 32 financing framework was also developed. In a very difficult post-conflict setting which characterized the DRC at the time, the Government succeeded in undertaking major reforms in terms of developing and solidifying the legal and institutional framework of the sector. This was an important achievement as this framework could be used to guide a coordinated and effective approach to promoting equitable access to quality education throughout the country – and for this the Government should be commended. 95. There were, however, a few areas where the Government initially faced challenges related to project readiness. First, while the fiduciary responsibilities for the Project and activities had been assigned to the Government, there were insufficient staff to support these functions in the first year of the Project life. Over time, this capacity improved, with the Government showing greater adherence to fiduciary requirements and demonstrating good practice, including the timely completion of audits. Second, also in the early phase of the Project, there was limited capacity in M&E which made monitoring and reporting under the Project more difficult, though over time, the M&E system was also considerably improved. In fact, by the end of the Project, the Government was publishing an annual statistical yearbook. Despite the difficult context, the Government remained committed to achieving the project’s objectives and had, by project closing, positively impacted equitable access to quality education and had adopted a number of reforms which are likely to have a positive impact on education in the medium- and long-term. 96. On the basis of the discussion above, Government Performance is rated, on balance, Moderately Satisfactory. (b) Implementing Agency Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 97. The PCMU was created to address the limited capacity in Government and mitigate against the risk that coordination among the five ministries42 involved in the Project would prove difficult and jeopardize efficient project execution. The PCMU was initially designed to execute the Project,43 but this conception evolved. The PCMU often had to turn to MEPSP for guidance and authorization to complete various project-related tasks, such as drawing up TORs. However, the PCMU in fact managed the Project’s day-to-day implementation and oversaw its execution, while drawing on assistance from units in a number of other ministries. Staffing issues in the first year of the project life, as well as the changing nature of the PCMU’s role in relation to the ministries, caused initial delays in Project execution. Once resolved, the PCMU became technically strong and to its credit remained a well-functioning extra-ministerial entity throughout the life of the project. It periodically encountered difficulties as a result of political pressure exerted from ministries, which might have been avoided if there could have been greater pushback from this unit. Though the PCMU was technically strong, it did not have sufficient independence to 42 MEPSP, MESU, MASSN, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Budget. 43 See para 64, p.17 of the PAD. 33 manage the activities under its purview. As such, it remained somewhat over-reliant on the Government. 98. Although the PCMU would have benefited from engaging a third party M&E firm to more fully document the Project’s implementation performance, the M&E system was nonetheless significantly improved over the life of the Project and provided evidence on the large number of achievements that were observed under this operation. 99. For these reasons, the Implementing Agency Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. (c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Satisfactory 100. Based on the performance of the Government and the Implementing Agency, and the Overall Outcome Rating, Overall Borrower Performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 6. Lessons Learned 101. Project design in post-conflict settings should be informed by an in-depth assessment of available capacity and resources and include steps to address any weaknesses in the earliest phase of project implementation. Realism in project design in a post-conflict context such as the one in which this Project was designed is essential. Though the initial FM, procurement and M&E assessments were thorough and accurate, the findings of these were not fully incorporated into project design. Although the PAD describes weaknesses in these areas, it did not provide a clear road map to address them following project effectiveness. This hampered implementation progress in the initial period. The capacity of the Government, and the financial and human resources available at the time of project preparation and appraisal should be critically assessed – and factored into the design – in order to ensure that project-supported activities can be feasibly carried out and implemented throughout the project life. 102. The identification/establishment of an entity capable of undertaking core M&E functions should be in place prior to project effectiveness. Data on outputs and outcomes can serve as an important resource for project implementation, particularly in a post-conflict setting where often little data are available. This responsibility should be assigned to an actor with adequate capacity in the earliest phases of project implementation in order to ensure that progress towards achievement of the PDO can be documented and any bottlenecks can be effectively and quickly addressed. This entity could be established by the Government and staffed with government officials or, if need be, contracted out to a third party. In difficult settings, such as the one in which this project was undertaken, the support of a third party M&E firm may be appropriate. 34 103. The decision to embed a project implementation agency within the government should be made with consideration for existing government capacity. The decision to have a stand-alone unit or one embedded in the government requires careful consideration. The strongest argument for embedding such a unit within the government stems from expected capacity gains as a result of such an arrangement. This can be quite costly as it requires the continued support of experts. It can also be burdensome for the government, particularly if the unit’s staff is assigned to various tasks, some of which may not be directly related to project implementation. Establishing a unit outside the government can be a viable alternative, as was the case for the PARSE Project where the PCMU was effective and able to support capacity-building within the Government without overburdening its staff. 104. Adopting a national strategy for school construction that involves local agencies should be pursued as a method to lower the costs of building school infrastructure. The National Strategy for the Rehabilitation and Construction of Quality Schools at Lowest Cost and associated guidelines that were developed and adopted under this Project was an important achievement. Supporting such strategies along with norms and guidelines can be a useful tool in ensuring cost-effectiveness of school construction. The costs of construction did significantly decrease over the life of the Project. 105. Placing teachers on the public payroll can be an important measure toward reducing the financial burden of schooling on households, although this alone is insufficient. Under this Project, the Government placed teachers on the national teacher payroll first and then was reimbursed by the Project. This approach promoted greater long- term commitment on this issue by Government. This form of informal results-based financing (RBF) continues to be used successfully in other projects in the DRC. 35 7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners (a) Borrower/implementing agencies (b) Co financiers (c) Other partners and stakeholders Not Applicable 36 Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing (a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent) Appraisal Actual/Latest Percentage of Components Estimate (USD Estimate (USD Appraisal millions) millions) Component 1. Increase Access and 104.52 107.64 103.0 Equity at Primary Level Component 2. Improve Quality of 28.76 28.72 99.9 Primary Education Component 3. Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education 5.06 6.99 138.1 Sector Component 4. Project Coordination and 11.17 8.85 79.2 Management Total Baseline Cost 149.51 152.20 101.8 Physical Contingencies Price Contingencies Total Project Costs 149.51 152.20 Front-end fee PPF 1.00 0.00 Front-end fee IBRD 0.00 0.00 Total Financing Required 150.51** 152.20 *This table (for appraisal data) provides financial figures included in the main text and Annex 4 of the PAD as these seem to be the agreed amounts inclusive of physical and price contingencies. Further, the total cost of the components amounts (with PPF) to US$150.51 (though presented as US$150 million). **In the PAD, this is the total amount presented, the footnote read: Identifiable taxes and duties are approximate US$0.5 million and the total project cost, net of taxes, is US$150 million. (b) Financing Type of Co- Appraisal Estimate Actual/Latest Estimate Percentage of Source of Funds financing (USD millions) (USD millions) Appraisal Borrower 0.50 0.50 100 IDA Grant 150.00 152.20 101.5 37 Annex 2. Outputs by Component 1. The achievements of Component 1 (Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level) included the rehabilitation and reconstruction of 1,467 primary school classrooms, 187 offices, and 167 sanitary facilities. 44 In addition to a guide to maintaining school infrastructure, one phase of the civil engineering also promoted the development of a community construction strategy for schools based on lowest cost. In order to improve equity of access to primary education, the component included financing to support the government in its efforts to reduce household contributions for education, a factor recognized to limit school access among the poor. The financing provided (i) operating costs to 26, 210 schools45 (and encouraged community based school management) and (ii) placed 20, 155 primary school teachers onto the Government payroll, which has regularized their civil service status and helped stabilize their salary.46 The component also supported the Government unit responsible for teacher salaries, SECOPE. 44 For the first phase, UNOPS completed 100 percent of planned construction with 623 classrooms, 58 directors’ offices, and 58 sanitary facilities rehabilitated. In the second phase, UCOPS completed 83 percent of planned construction: 844 out of 1017 classrooms, 129 out of 170 director’s offices, and 109 o ut of 170 sanitary facilities were rehabilitated. 45 Concerning operating costs, before PARSE began, the PURUS was to pay primary and secondary school operating costs of approximately US$400 per school per year to 26,200 schools (totaling US$40 million). These payments were to be assumed by the PARSE. However, PARSE could not assume the payments until the PURUS funds were exhausted and yet PURUS was late in disbursing. When disbursement was finally complete, it was then suddenly agreed that PURUS would receive additional financing (AF) of US$19 million, which, however fortuitous, continued to prevent PARSE from taking over. A solution was found: it was decided that the PURUS AF would continue paying for only secondary level operating costs, while PARSE would assume primary level costs. As it turned out, delays forced PURUS to abandon using the AF, so the problem became eventually moot. Component 1 accounted for US$104 million out of a total of US$150 million. 46 There were nevertheless difficulties paying salaries, which created delays that had to wait for the MTR and eventually restructuring to be resolved. Actually executing payments was predicated on certain criteria being established by the Government: a survey of all primary school teachers and a school mapping exercise was needed before payment could begin. However, the Government did not have a budget needed to carry out these preliminary exercises. They looked to DfID, which agreed initially to do the survey and then pulled out. During the MTR of 2010, ways were found to circumvent the preliminary survey and school mapping issues that were instituted in the restructuring of July 2011. The activities only began in 2012. The solution was the following: SECOPE, though they were not in a position to create any new list of schools, were able (on the basis of data they had at the time) to draw up a list of stable schools and their staff. These were schools identified by a government registration number (even if some have no government paid staff). The project was to take charge of placing 30,000 teachers on the government payroll during the life of the project, provided that the government continued the payment after the project. The first approach adopted, whereby the Bank paid the teachers/schools directly, was modified so that the selected teachers were first put on the Government pay-roll and then paid by the Government. The Bank then reimbursed the Government, an approach which was felt to be more likely to be sustained by Government after project end. The list was finalized in 2011 and the Government began payments in August of that year. The Bank only began to reimburse the Government in mid-2012 because it required evidence of payments to schools which took time. The project paid 20,155 salaries. If the project had begun to pay out earlier as planned, the amount in question might have paid for more salaries (given lower inflation), but the amount allocated would have also been used up earlier and it was not clear that the Government could assure the continuity of payments at that earlier point. 38 2. Capacity has been increased. The rehabilitation and reconstruction of primary school classrooms (of which 1,467 were completed by Project close in 11 administrative provinces of the country) has increased the physical capacity of the sector to accommodate more students. 3. Efforts have been undertaken to reduce the costs of schooling borne by parents. Under the Project, 20,155 teachers have been identified and placed on the Government payroll (the Government was then reimbursed by the Project). This important measure has contributed to the implementation of the ‘fee-free’ policy by attempting to reduce the burden of household contributions to education on parents and in turn, increasing the likelihood that poorer households will send their children to school. As a result of the success of this measure under the Project, the AFD has decided to support these efforts within its own C2D project. In addition, the Project’s support for SECOPE (the Government directorate responsible for salary payments) in the form of materials (computers) and training has contributed to the ongoing reform of SECOPE itself and resulted in improved monitoring of school size and number of primary teachers. 4. The payment of school operating costs (26,210 primary schools received at least US$400 per year) has also led to contributing to the Government’s ‘fee-free’ policy by reducing the need for household contributions to cover this expense. In addition, two other impacts are notable: each school now has blackboards, which did not exist before the Project; secondly, the measure has led to improvements in school governance, as the schools have begun to keep their own accounts of these operating costs. Pre-Restructuring 5. Progress made in terms of outcomes linked to this objective during the pre- restructuring period was as follows. The gross enrollment rate (GER) increased from 64 percent to 90.8 percent and gender parity improved (with the ratio of girls to boys in primary school increasing from 85 percent to 86 percent). During this period, a cost- effective school construction strategy was developed which aimed to serve as the basis for the next phase of the rehabilitation program. There were, however, significant delays in the implementation of the school rehabilitation program, with only 43 classrooms having been completed (out of a planned 450 by mid-term review (MTR)). Further, teachers’ salaries and schools’ operating costs could not be paid as the disbursement conditions linked to these activities had not been completed.47 47 Although the project had not been able to provide financing to cover teachers’ salaries and/or schools’ operating costs, the Government had undertaken its own efforts to support the fee-free policy by integrating a large number of teachers from registered primary schools into the public payroll (to reduce costs borne by households) as well as providing some financial support to primary schools to cover their operating costs and to administration and pedagogy management units to partially cover their recurrent costs. 39 Post-Restructuring 6. In the post-restructuring period, the following progress was observed on PDO-level indicators: (i) GER increased from 90.8 percent to 117 percent (exceeding the end-of- project target of 105.8 percent); (ii) gross first grade intake rate increased from 107.7 percent to 133.1 percent (exceeding end-of-project target of 129.8 percent); and (iii) girls to boys ratio in primary school increased from 86 percent to 98 percent (falling just short of the end-of-project target of 100 percent). In terms of intermediate-level indicators, the following progress was observed: (i) 1,467 additional classrooms were built or rehabilitated at the primary level resulting from the project intervention (almost achieving the end-of project target of 1,572); (ii) construction norms had been adopted for application of cost-effective school construction strategy; and (iii) the salaries of 20,15548 (achieving the end-of-project target of 20,155) primary teachers in “registered” schools had been integrated into the public payroll. 7. Although studies and technical work planned on norms and standards for low-cost construction and evaluation of existing experience in the DRC were undertaken (particularly involving community participation in school management and oversight of civil works activities), unit costs of classroom construction in the DRC remain on par with the costs reported in other countries in SSA (see Section 3.3). In addition to the rehabilitation of classrooms in all of the country’s 11 provinces, the Project also supported the rehabilitation and/or reconstruction of 187 offices for school directors and 167 sanitary facilities. The National Pedagogical University (UPN) was also rehabilitated and equipped and payment was made to 26,210 registered schools to cover operating costs (amounting to approximately US$400/school annually). 8. An important achievement under Component 1 was the regularization and inclusion of 20,155 primary school teachers in “registered” schools on the official public payroll system – which aimed to reduce the financial burden of schooling on poorer households. However, although the fee-free policy was officially enacted by the Government, there is evidence that households still continued to provide monetary support to cover schools’ operating costs and top-ups to teachers’ official base salary. While some of these supported activities have resulted in improved dialogue between Government entities (i.e., Ministries of Education and Finance) and strengthened institutional capacity, the establishment of a sustainable fee-free strategy (including payment of teachers’ salaries, support for the rehabilitation of schools, and funding to cover schools’ operating costs) intended to reduce the financial burden on households is yet to be fully realized. 9. The achievements of Component 2 (Improve Quality of Primary Education) included the provision of 18 million French and Mathematics textbooks (instead of the initial 11 million planned) that were distributed freely in primary years 1 and 2 of public 48 This activity was supported with project funding. The total number of primary school teachers brought onto the public payroll is much larger. 40 and private primary schools. 49 In addition, a guide to textbook maintenance was also developed and distributed. Further, 53, 230 inspectors, educational advisers and primary school teachers were trained on these new textbooks as well as the national education curricula.50 Finally, another sub-component financed the establishment and training of a 49 The first approach to providing textbooks was to form a committee, including members of DPROMAT, teachers, university professors and inspectors, that would identify and categorize the books in circulation, either adapt or bring them up to date, and then reproduce them. This approach was not put in place on the advice of the Bank textbook expert, Mr. Diop, who saw it as too slow. Instead, it was decided that calls for bids would be directly put out for pre-existing textbooks corresponding to the needs of the curricula and subject at the primary level in question. The first textbook, for first year primary French, was won by the French publishing house Belin. The entire process took eight months and was considered a success by the Bank. It was up to Belin to print and deliver the textbooks to three points in the DRC (in the east, south, and center). A consultant was hired to study distribution from these points; the study, however, was not well done. Instead, the approach taken was to sign an agreement with the World Food Program, working in conjunction with MONUSCO, to distribute the books using their food distribution network. This worked relatively though the delays and difficulties suggested another distribution system was really needed. The second phase of textbook acquisition – for primary first year mathematics and second year French and mathematics textbooks – used the same kind of procurement (via International Bids) but adopted another approach for distribution. Now, publishing houses were responsible for distr ibution to the DRC’s 30 education provinces (proveds), while delivery from there to sub-provincial education offices (sous-proveds) would be assured through a local call for tenders. Three different publishing houses were involved, which created some difficulties because books didn’t arrive at the proveds at the same time, causing distribution to sous-proveds to be delayed. Only when all three books arrived were they sent out. The PAD had planned an US$11 million investment in textbooks, but through savings, this rose to US$14 million; then, through further reallocation, this rose to US$18 million. 50 The approach to teacher training defined in the PAD was abandoned, creating some delay. The initial idea was to recruit a consultant who would work to strengthen capacity of the professors at the UPN. They, in turn, would train inspectors who would train educational advisors ( conseillers pédagogiques) and teachers. The approach was abandoned because the Institute became a University and as a result the training programs there changed. The approach that was subsequently put into place took advantage of the experience of the Belgian Technical Cooperation (CTB) that had already distributed primary level 5 and 6 year math textbooks and had trained teachers on their use. They had done so by training an initial group of 16 inspectors in Belgium and then, using a cascade method, they had trained other inspectors, who trained CP, who trained teachers. This approach was used between 2008 and 2010 in the Project with some success except for one technical issue: while the CTB had included a transportation subsidy for teachers having to travel to training centers, the Bank had not included this amount in Project design. At the MTR, the matter was reviewed and the problem resolved. More importantly, the question as to whether this training was effective, whether teachers were able to put into practice what they had learned, came to the fore. One problem was that the teachers were only trained on one textbook at a time, but the Project could not afford to keep sending teachers for training on just one book at a time. The approach therefore changed: training would, from then on, provide training on how to use textbooks in general. A second problem was that the textbooks were pedagogical means for teachers to teach the National Education program; however, it was soon understood that many teachers did not know the National Program (as many had not had any formal teacher training). Two training modules were subsequently put into place: one to introduce the National Program (at the same time copies of the National Program were distributed) and another to introduce the textbooks in general. The training lasted five days. According the PCMU, there has generally been a positive evolution in teacher training with some 56,000 teachers now trained in five provinces. 41 national team to work with the CONFEMEN organization to assess national learning; two PASEC learning assessments were carried out in 2010 and 2013.51 10. Good Quality Learning Materials. The distribution of 18 million textbooks to all the public and private primary schools for grades 1 and 2 has improved students’ exposure to good quality learning materials. As a complement to this, a guide to maintaining these textbooks is expected to increase the use, maintenance, and life of these textbooks. 11. Teachers trained. Under the Project, 53,230 inspectors, educational advisers and primary school teachers have been trained on the National Primary Education Program (the curricula) and on the use of new textbooks, which should lead to improved teacher performance. 12. Improved Assessment of Student Performance. Two activities to improve assessment were undertaken: i) a national team was established and trained with the assistance of the PASEC/CONFEMEN; and ii) two PASEC surveys in 2010 and 2013 were carried out. These assessments have led to a clear understanding of student performance in literacy and mathematics in grades 2 and 5, and have informed policy makers on areas for follow-up. Pre-Restructuring 13. Progress was observed in terms of this Component’s only outcome-level indicator –the primary completion rate. At the intermediate level, the following was achieved during the pre-restructuring period: (i) 14 million textbooks were purchased and distributed to provincial education directorates (with 95 percent of schools reporting to have received the books); (ii) a student-textbook ratio of 0.8 to 1 had been achieved; (iii) a large number of inspectors and school advisors received in-service training in use of textbooks; and (iv) the development of a textbook policy was underway. Post-Restructuring 14. During the post-restructuring period, the positive trend in the PCR continued, reaching 80 percent (exceeding the end-of-project target of 72.5 percent). By project closing, the following outputs had been realized: (i) 18 million textbooks and guides had been purchased and distributed (exceeding the end-of-project target of 14 million) and student-textbook and teacher-guide ratios of 1:2 had been achieved (each student had a Math and a French textbook and each teacher had a guide in these subjects) (achieving the end-of-project targets); (ii) 53,230 inspectors and school advisors had received in-service 51 The Project paid for the PASEC evaluation of student learning in grades 2 and 5 of primary school in 2010 and 2013 (thus allowing comparison). Reports were produced by PASEC. In the first round in 2010, a team from PASEC trained a national team to carry out the assessment, while in the second round in 2013 it was the national team that carried out the assessment, with only support from the PASEC team. Though student achievement was low, some evolution between rounds was noted. Some results stayed the same, while in those PROVEDS which had faced considerable difficulties and were as such targeted by the Project, results improved marginally. 42 training in use of textbooks (and training on the national curriculum program) (achieving the end-of-project target); (iii) a learning assessment mechanism for grade 5 was in place and two rounds of PASEC had been conducted (exceeding the end-of-project target of one grade 5 assessment); and (iv) a Basic Education Interim Plan was being implemented (achieving end-of-project target). Further, this Component had significant outreach in terms of beneficiaries. 15. With support of this project, student textbooks (in Math and French) and teachers’ guides were provided, within a relatively short time frame, to schools throughout the DRC. These textbooks and guides, along with training of teachers, inspectors and school advisors, was critical in ensuring the proper use of these textbooks and the quality of teaching – elements which together could lead to important gains in the quality of education in the country. The distribution of textbooks was also quite challenging in light of the size of the DRC and the often difficult terrain. Another positive outcome was the development of a learning assessment system for primary school which will serve as a diagnostic tool to inform decision-making in the sector. 16. The achievements of Component 3 (Strengthen the Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector), the objectives of which was to contribute to revising the legal and institutional framework of the education system, and to reinforce institutional capacities for planning, budget formulation, and program execution, included: (i) the development of the new Education framework law (Loi cadre), which was approved by the Government, passed by the Parliament and promulgated by the President in February 2014; and (ii) the revision of the statutes covering teachers and teacher careers (including training, deployment, salary and incentives). Developed as an annex to the Education Framework law, the statute has now been approved by the Government; (iii) the development of sub- sectoral strategies (Ministry of National Education, Ministry of Social Affairs, Ministry of Labor, and Ministry for Non-formal Education and Literacy); (iv) the elaboration of the education sector strategy, a document which has now been drafted and technically validated; (v) undertaking of a PETS survey, whose results have now been validated; and (vi) the annual production of statistical yearbooks. 17. The Education Sector Strategy has been formally recognized in Law. The Project supported the development of the new Framework Law, which was approved by the Government, passed by Parliament, and promulgated by the President in February 2014. The importance of this measure is that it will allow for the future development of the sector from a legal perspective. Similarly, the legislative statutes required to cover all aspects of the national teaching corps have been developed, approved by the Government, and now form an annex to the Education Framework Law. 18. Strategies that shape the future of the system have been developed. Three sub- sector strategies (for MEPSP, Ministry of Higher Education (MESU), and Ministry of Non- formal Education and Literacy) have been developed. The MEPSP strategy is being implemented with the financial support of DPs, most notably the GPE with US$100 million. In addition, a fully comprehensive education sector strategy (that includes the sub-sector 43 strategies) has been developed. The necessary legislation has been produced and validated technically; it now awaits approval by the Government. Pre-Restructuring 19. In terms of PDO-level indicators, an Education Sector Strategy with a medium- term financing plan (with indicators agreed with donors and approved by Government) was under preparation. In terms of intermediate-level indicators: (i) reformed guidelines for pre-service and in-service teacher training had not yet been developed; (ii) the Institutional Education Framework Law (organic law or Loi cadre) had not yet been transmitted to Parliament for adoption; (iii) Convention of Partnerships had not yet been fully revised or implemented; (iv) CRC and PETS had not been piloted in selected educational provinces; (v) an action plan had not been put in place for eventual scale up (which was to be developed, in part, on the basis of the CRC which had not been undertaken); and (vi) a draft teacher career structure (training, deployment, salary and incentives) had not yet been approved by the Government. Post-Restructuring 20. In terms of PDO-level indicators, an Education Sector Strategy (and three sub- sector strategies52) with a sustainable medium-term financing plan with indicators agreed with donors and approved by Government had been developed (achieving end-of-project target). In terms of intermediate-level indicators: (i) reformed guidelines for pre-service teacher training had been developed and were being applied (achieving end-of-project target); (ii) the Institutional Education Framework law (loi cadre) had been approved by Government (achieving the end-of-project target); (iii) the Convention of Partnerships had been revised and implemented (achieving the end-of-project target); and (iv) a draft of the teacher career structure (training, deployment, salary and incentives) had been approved by the Government (achieving the end-of-project target). However, while the PETS had been undertaken (it had not been fully rolled out to various educational provinces) the CRC had not been completed. As such, an action plan was not put in place for eventual scale up (since these activities relied, in part, on the findings from the CRC) (not achieving either indicators’ end-of-project target). 21. The development and finalization of the Education Sector Strategy was an important achievement under this Project as was the promulgation of key legislation (Loi cadre, legislation to cover all aspects of the national teaching corps, etc.) as it will be important in further strengthening the institutional and financial capacity of the education sector. In addition, monitoring of sector performance has improved (although significant capacity-building support is still needed) and the statistical yearbook is now published on an annual basis. 52 Sub-sector strategies for MEPSP, MESU, and Ministry of Non-formal Education and Literacy were developed which have received support from various DPs, including GPE. 44 Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis 1. Internal efficiency gains have been observed over the life of the Project evidenced by a marked increase in gross enrollment rates and primary completion rates. Together this means in addition to more children attending primary school, they are staying in school longer and are more likely to complete the cycle. 2. This Economic and Financial Analysis includes the following sections: (i) an evaluation of the cost-effectiveness of the main project-supported activities; (ii) efficiency of implementation; and (iii) the external efficiency of the sector in terms of earnings and other gains accrued among project beneficiaries. Cost-effectiveness of project supported activities 3. Textbooks. The project provided a total of 18 million textbooks. The unit cost of books for mathematics and French in grades 1 and 2 are different because two different approaches were adopted to procure them. In the first round, publishers were chosen to provide books and deliver them to three major entry points in the west, east and south of the DRC from where the MEPSP arranged local delivery. In the second phase, publishers were responsible for delivering textbooks to sub-provincial education directorates. The unit cost for textbooks, without delivery, was US$1.32. This is high compared to education projects in Eritrea53 where the unit cost is US$0.60 and Mauritania54 where the unit cost is US$0.73. The unit costs are in line with those in Sierra Leone55 where the unit cost ranges from US$0.97 to US$1.66 and Niger56 where unit costs range from US$1.10 to US$1.40. 4. Construction. A comparison of the cost of construction financed by various DPs working in the DRC is relevant given the emphasis under this Project on low cost construction (see Table 1 below). It should be noted that the cost of the work amongst various DPs in different, select regions, is not easy to compare because of regional variations based on distance, logistics, etc. While construction costs are assessed to have been high during the pre-restructuring phase (phase 1) of the Project when managed by UNOPS but were markedly lower, on average, in the post-restructuring phase (phase 2). 53 ICR- Education Sector Investment Project, 2012 54 ICR- Education Sector Development Program, 2012 55 ICR- Rehabilitation of Basic Education Project, 2010 56 ICR- Basic Education Support Project, 2013 45 Table 1: Average Cost of Construction in DRC of a 56 m2 Classroom by Donor and by Region (in US$) Donor Provinces DRC (Average) Equateur Kasai-Occidental Bas-Congo Fonds Social (AfD) 17,164 18,868 UNICEF 13,050 13,050 CARITAS 12,500 10,500 APEP (CTB/AfD) 12,600 PARSE Phase I (UNOPS) 19,600 PARSE Phase II (UCOP) 10,073 5. While many ICRs describe unit costs per classroom, differences in classroom design make for difficult comparisons. Unit cost by square meter helps to address this to some extent. Although there are not many SSA countries with available data, the unit cost per classroom under this Project seems in line with other SSA countries (see Table 2). Table 2: Comparison of Classroom Construction Costs for SSA Countries Unit costs by Cost for a 65m2 square meter (US$) Classroom (US$) Gambia US$175-188 including cost of labor US$11,375-12,220 (EFA-FTI) Mauritania57 US$197 using community-based US$12,805 approach Niger58 US$220 without cost of labor US$14,300 Djibouti59 US$302-399 without cost of labor US$19,630-25,935 DRC (PARSE) US$154-$301 without cost of labor US$10,073-$19,600 57 ICR- Education Sector Development Program, Mauritania, 2012. 58 ICR- Basic Education Support Project, Niger, 2013. 59 ICR- Primary Education Support Program, Djibouti, 2013. 46 Efficiency of Implementation 6. Although project implementation was initially slow because of staffing issues in the PCMU, implementation pace gradually increased in the period which followed. Following restructuring, the pace of implementation increased even further resulting in greater progress towards the achievement of project outputs and outcomes. This was, in part, a result of changes to the Project’s scope and simplified conditions which allowed for the disbursement of US$45 million for teacher salaries. Although the disbursement rate was low during the early years of the Project life, by project closing, more than 99 percent of the allocated resources had been disbursed. Further, under Component 4 (Project Coordination and Management), management costs were lower than had been anticipated (79.2 percent lower than the appraisal estimate). Efficiencies realized through donor coordination 7. The Project was efficient insofar as it fostered a high level of collaboration among government ministries, between ministerial directorates/units and between public and private actors, including public and faith-based schools. It also strengthened coordination among DPs working in the sub-sector. This high level of coordination and cross- fertilization of ideas and approaches is still observed today. External Efficiency 8. Return to education calculations undertaken for the forthcoming PER reveal that each additional year of education is associated with an average increase of 9.1 percent in monthly earnings. Additional education is associated with higher earnings and higher household consumption at all education levels (primary, secondary and tertiary). In addition to the benefits accruing from higher salaries, education confers of course other benefits as well, in terms of social outcomes to do with improved maternal health, greater control of family size, decreased likelihood of poverty, knowledge of HIV/AIDS, greater socio-political involvement, and so on. In sum, the investments in education in the DRC is justifiable and warranted from an economic standpoint. 9. Based on the analysis presented above, the efficiency during the Project during both the pre- and post-restructuring periods was Modest. 47 Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Richard Akoulouze Consultant AFMCM -- Binta Roussouloula Aw Sall Consultant AFTEW -- Renee M. Desclaux Senior Finance Officer CTRLD Finance Sakhevar Diop Senior Education Specialist AFTEE Education Senior Financial Management Jean Charles Amon Kra GGODR Financial management Specialist Nathalie J. Lopez-Diouf Language Program Assistant AFTH3 Operations Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Procurement Lead Financial Management Joseph Kizito Mubiru GGODR Financial Management Spec Susan Opper Consultant GEDDR Education Senior Public Finance Helena Maria Grandao Ramos GGODR Finance Specialist Gabrielle M. Rooz Consultant AFTG1 Education Souleymane Sow Senior Operations Officer AFTH3 -- Gilles Marie Veuillot Consultant AFTN2 Operations Souleymane Zerbo HQ Consultant ST GEDDR Education Supervision/ICR Lucie Lufiauluisu Bobola Program Assistant AFCC2 Administrative Nestor Coffi Country Manager AFMNE Management/ operations Bourama Diaite Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Aissatou Diallo Senior Finance Officer CTRLA Finance Sakhevar Diop Senior Education Specialist AFTEE Education Andre Lohayo Djamba E T Consultant AFTME -- Shungu Ivette Kandi Program Assistant AFCC2 Administrative Sr Financial Management Jean Charles Amon Kra GGODR Financial management Specialist Philippe Mahele Liwoke Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Pierre Morin Senior Procurement Specialist AFTPE Procurement Gaspy Gedeon Muanda E T Consultant AFTME -- Nadege K. Nouviale Program Assistant GSPDR Administrative Dung Kim Pham Associate Investment Officer CFGS4 Education Country Manager and previous Management/ Rachidi B. Radji AFMBI TTL operations Gilles Marie Veuillot Consultant AFTN2 Operations Michel J. Welmond Program Leader EACVF Education ICR Author, Education Simon Thacker GEDDR Education Specialist Bernardo da Cruz Vasconcellos ICR Quality Assurance GEDDR Operations Laura McDonald ICR Quality Assurance GEDDR Operations 48 (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) Stage of Project Cycle USD Thousands (including No. of staff weeks travel and consultant costs) Lending FY04 12.09 75.46 FY05 53.12 409.24 FY06 38.19 232.61 FY07 74.32 404.71 FY08 0.00 0.00 Total: 177.72 1122.02 Supervision/ICR FY04 - 0.00 FY05 - 0.00 FY06 - 0.00 FY07 - 0.00 FY08 43.05 223.89 FY09 40.71 222.39 FY10 30.18 234.12 FY11 19.55 135.75 FY12 19.70 125.06 FY13 17.15 188.69 FY14 4.00 64.41 FY15 19.94 112.64 Total: 194.28 1,306.95 49 Annex 5. Beneficiary Survey Results 1. While a beneficiary survey could not be carried out for this ICR due to resource constraints, several school visits were undertaken. This section describes findings from one such school site visit. Similar to many of the schools supported under the Project, this case study provides some insight into Project achievements and the way in which the Project supported local communities. 2. The Munshié Primary School is a fairly typical school located in in Kinshasa. The premises house two different establishments: Munshié 1 which operates from 7:30 in the morning to 12:20 and Munshié 2 which operates from 12:30 to 5:20 in the evening. Each school has its own director and staff. As the site visit was undertaken in the morning, the description largely pertains to Munshié 1. 3. Infrastructure. Three buildings – two blocks of classrooms (with eleven classrooms in total) and a smaller block of offices – have been rehabilitated with support from PARSE. This has included the provision of new and painted: roofs; new ceilings and lights; windows; and doors. The classrooms have been furnished with new student desks and classrooms have Mathematics and French textbooks for primary years 1 and 2. In addition, a sanitary facility was rehabilitated. Certain infrastructure requirements, however, have not been met – and this is, in large part, due to the limited allocation to rehabilitation of classrooms under the PARSE. The school does not have electricity, nor does it have a flood drainage system (causing flooding in the school courtyard when it rains). In addition there is only one drinking water tap for the entire school. As a result of community participation in school maintenance encouraged under the PARSE, the Parent-Teachers Association (PTA) of Munshié 1 and 2 are now responsible for these issues, using funds reserved from the school operating costs. 4. Access. The PARSE project covered the annual operating costs (US$400) of Munshié 1 while the Government provided an additional US$50 per month (totaling US$600 for the year). As the school is located in Kinshasa it does not have fee-free status,60 so parents are expected to pay US$85 annually (or around US$30 each trimester) for tuition, in addition to other costs (e.g., uniforms) which parents find burdensome. There are 344 students attending this school in the 2014/2015 school year with a similar number the previous year. The school director explained that only about 50 families paid full tuition last year. Because of this, many students are forced to drop out. A teacher in Year 5 explained that out of the 50 students that were in his class during the last school year, just over one-half of them completed the academic year. 5. Quality. Prior to beginning school at Munshié, most students learn to speak Lingala at home, though a few households may speak some French. This poses learning challenges for new students as all schooling is in French. This challenge often persists throughout the primary school years. Nevertheless, like most urban establishments, students finishing at 60 The Government could not afford to roll out this measure in the DRC’s largest cities, Kinshasa and Lubumbashi. 50 Munshié 1 go on to secondary school. At the end of the last school year (2013/2014), 53 out of 54 students continued on to secondary school after passing the end of primary placement exam, the TENAFOP (an exam that the Country Status Report (2012) estimates to be a poor reflection of quality/learning outcomes). The School Director has been working at the school for around twenty years, like many of the staff. When asked about teacher training, she mentioned that UNICEF had provided some in the past but did not mention training provided under the PARSE, which provided support related to the introduction of new textbooks and/or in the use of textbooks, more generally. 51 Annex 6. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results Not Applicable 52 Annex 7. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The Project Coordination and Management Unit (UCGP/PARSE) initiated work in January 2008 and ended in October 2014, with the Project lasting 6 years and 10 months instead of the five years initially planned. The Project (in French called PARSE) provided assistance to the DRC in order to (i) stop the deterioration of essential primary education services and (ii) to prepare the ground for the development and sustainable financing of the sector with the aim of facilitating donor coordination and transitioning to a comprehensive Education program covering the entire sector. The approach adopted for the implementation of the Project was essentially one of financial and technical support to the technical ministries involved with the planned activities. Despite the difficulties encountered -- due in large part to institutional arrangements agreed between the two partners (the Government and World Bank) and due to low institutional and financial capacity of the different stakeholders who participated in the realization of planned activities -- PARSE has produced satisfactory results and achievements. It is the conclusion of the present evaluation that the Project was relevant and in coherence with the objectives of the DRC’s development of its National Education Sector. Numerous physical and institutional achievements are to be noted to the benefit of the Sector:  Physical infrastructure and equipment: the rehabilitation and reconstruction of school buildings, the rehabilitation and re-equipping of the National Teaching University, the supply of student textbooks and teaching guides to teachers of Primary 1st and 2nd grades;  Institutional achievements: the payment of operating expenses to primary schools, the payment of teacher salaries and their integration onto the Government, which was intended to ease parents’ household contribution, the development of a strategy of lowest cost for the construction and rehabilitation of schools (with the involvement of local communities), support to rewriting of the Education framework law (La Loi Cadre) adopted in February 2014, support for the development of several Education sub-strategies (in Basic Education, Tertiary, and in Literacy and non-formal Education), support for the development of the overall Sector Strategy (currently being finalized), support to SECOPE, the development of a Guide to the maintenance of school infrastructures, and support for a guide for the provision and upkeep of textbooks. These accomplishments have had a non-negligible impact on the Sector and many of them have led to the reform and strengthening of the Sector governance. However, major challenges remain: assuring the sustainability of the Project’s key activities, the integration of Project changes into the day-to-day management of the education system, as well as ongoing support for the Project initiatives with and by State Budget (in terms of school operating fees, the payment of teacher salaries, the process of incorporating teachers onto the Government payroll, the supply of textbooks, and the completion of ongoing 53 rehabilitation and construction of schools). All of this requires follow-up and monitoring to ensure sustainability. INTRODUCTION The Government of the DRC and the World Bank signed the Grant Agreement (IDA H303 DRC) for the PARSE Project on 8 June 2007 in the amount of US$150 million. The development objectives of the Project were the following: •Provide assistance to the DRC in order to halt further deterioration of essential services in the field of primary education; •Prepare the ground for the sustainable development and financing of the Education sector in order to facilitate donor coordination and the future transition to a comprehensive sectorial program. PARSE’s specific objectives were the following: -To facilitate access and promote equality of opportunities at the primary level; -Improve the quality of primary education; -Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector (Governance) It should be noted that the emphasis of this Project was on Primary level education given that three-quarters of the budget was devoted to that sub-sector. I. PROJECT DESCRIPTION AND INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 1.1 Project Description PARSE had a dual mission: the first consisted of intervening rapidly through urgent initiatives to deal with the crisis besetting the education system (in general and at the primary level in particular) at a time when the country was still in full armed conflict in certain areas. The second was paving the way for the sustainable development of the Education sector as a whole. The Project was to be implemented over a period of five years. Apart from the component dealing with Project management, the main activities were grouped around three components corresponding to the three specific Project objectives. The first two components related to the first objective of stabilizing the Education sector, while the third component related to the second objective of general sector development. 1.2 Institutional Arrangements The implementation of PARSE involved the following institutions and structures: - The Steering Committee; - The Project Coordination and Management Unit (UCGP); 54 - The technical ministries in charge of the Education sector: the Ministry of Primary, Secondary and Professional Education (MEPSP), Tertiary Education (ESU) and the Ministry of Social Affairs (MASAHSN) in charge of non-Formal Education and Literacy. - The various partners involved in the sector (Public Administration, Civil society, the technical and financial partners) The UCGP provided coordination, follow-up and reporting. The administrations of Ministries and partner institutions executed the planned activities. II. THE EVALUATION OF PROJECT OBJECTIVES, ITS DESIGN AND IMPLEMENTATION 2.1 Evaluation of the Project Objectives Given the context in which the Project was designed, one characterized by the sharp deterioration in the provision of essential services, the present evaluation concludes that the objectives assigned to the Project were relevant. On the one hand, it was necessary at all cost to halt the deterioration of the educational system, particularly at the level of basic education which is the base of the system, and, on the other, to lay the groundwork for the development of the sector as a whole, in line with Government policy in this matter. In light of the results obtained at Project closure, it is clear that these two defined objectives were achieved. Accomplishments have had non-negligible impacts on the sector. The Project has introduced important reforms and has strengthened the governance of the system. 2.2 Assessment of Project Design The PARSE project ranks as a second generation project within the framework of the cooperation between the DRC and the World Bank. It was specifically a sectorial project defined to take into account of the particularities of the education system. Its design was inspired by: (i) the document entitled “Education Policy in the DRC 2006” developed by the Government; (ii) the report on the State of the National Educational System 2004-2005 (RESEN); (iii) the reports and studies carried out by the Government along with partners, including Education for All (2007), the ESU·PÁDEM Modernization Pact (2003), the DSCRP 61 (2006), the memoranda of understanding between the Government of DRC and other donors (the EFA - UNESCO, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, WB), the funding of the education sector. (Source: CSA, May 2007). The design was also inspired by other multi-sectorial, emergency projects that were set up at the beginning of this cooperation. The experience of other post-conflict countries, as in the DRC, showed that, in the context of a multi-sectorial program, interventions in the field 61 No explanation of this acronym is given in the Government Report 55 of education do not necessarily lead to the expected results for the simple reason that emphasis was often placed more on the rehabilitation of infrastructure, rather than on the whole education system. Rather, the effective rehabilitation of the educational system must be based on a combination of several factors including: (i) inputs (teaching materials, the quality of teachers), (ii) technical assistance with regard to the planning of a sustainable policy for the system, and (iii) the reintroduction of mechanisms to regulate institutional procedures. That said, our assessment of the Project design reveals some weaknesses, especially for a post-conflict context such as the DRC. These include: (i) the complexity of the Project, akin really to a program, with a large number of executed activities, grouped into three components; the implementation of these activities -- dependent on the administration of technical ministries whose weakness in terms of technical capacity was obvious -- that constituted an obstacle to the start of the Project (cited in annex 6 of the PAD: Implementation Arrangements); (ii) the fact that the Bank and the Borrower had not assured the capacity of the borrower, to satisfy conditions of effectiveness agreed in the Grant Agreement for the implementation of certain key activities, including civil engineering, the payment of operating fees to primary schools and the salaries of primary school teachers. This is the case, for example, of the teacher/ school census, meant to lead to the development of a School Map, (agreed as a prior condition to the payment of school operating fees and teacher salaries, as well as the organization of quarterly technical audits), which did not take into account the sheer size of the country and logistical difficulties in a post-conflict context. These activities that represented more than 45% of the amount of the Grant amount experienced considerable delay in their implementation (3 years after implementation) while alternatives means to execute had to be found during the Project mid-term review. 2.3 Evaluation of the implementation work of the Project a. Project Calendar The planned schedule for Project implementation experienced delays, which ultimately resulted in Project extensions. This was justified by the noted delays in the implementation (i) of key activities (payment of operating expenses and salaries) due to the non-satisfaction, by the borrower, of agreed condition in the Grant agreement, which had to be amended during the Mid-term review, three years after the start of implementation, (ii) of the Phase 2 of civil engineering following the under-performance of contractors. Nevertheless, all of the activities agreed upon between the two parties (WB and Borrower) have been executed satisfactorily and the overall objectives have been attained. b. Personnel Capacity strengthening of the various Administrations’ personnel has permitted their active involvement in the implementation of Project activities, especially in the assessment of textbooks, in teacher training, in the follow-up training for delegated contract managers 56 (for construction), the production of the documents of policies and strategies for the education sector. However, it is also appropriate to point out some weaknesses in the reporting between the provincial and central levels. Overall, the coordination and the fiduciary management of the Project were carried out in line with the procedures agreed upon in the Grant agreement. The establishment of the UCGP had to precede the start of the Project by a few months, which was expected to avoid delays, especially during the start-up, and ensure a strong start to the implementation of planned activities. However, at the start of the Project, only the national coordinator and the administrative and financial coordinator had been recruited. Other members of the staff were only recruited 8 months later. c. Role of other partners (Local donor partners, NGOs, businesses) The PARSE defined itself as the project of reference for other technical partners who were inspired by the strategies and results obtained by the Project as they sought to ensure duplication of the model, mostly notably by: the support provided to the MEPSP for the development and implementation of the Interim Education Plan, the payment of operating fees and salaries, the lowest cost construction strategy (with the implication of local communities), the construction standards, the strategic distribution of textbooks, the strategy and continuous teacher training module, the results of discussion on the organizational diagnosis, and the functional review of SECOPE. III. EVALUATION OF THE RESULTS OF THE PROJECT IN RELATION TO ITS OBJECTIVES In regard to the results achieved, the specific objectives assigned to the Project have been achieved overall. Indeed, the Project produced the following: (i) In relation to the first project objective, related to halting the further deterioration of the provision of basic education services, the following were achieved: • 1467 classrooms, 187 offices for school directors, and 167 sanitary facilities were rehabilitated or rebuilt; • Payment of operating costs to 26,210 registered schools; • Salary payments of 20,155 teaching posts; • Acquisition of 18 million textbooks, all of which have been delivered to the provincial levels; • Training of 53,230 teachers and inspectors on the national curriculum program; • Rehabilitation and equipping of the National Pedagogical University; (ii) Concerning the second project objective, the sustainable financial and institutional development of the Education Sector, the following activities have been carried out: 57 • Sectorial diagnosis was produced by the Independent Education Commission (CISE); • The National Strategy for the Rehabilitation and Construction of Quality Schools at Lowest Cost; • A National Policy Note on School Buildings; • A Guide to the Maintenance and Upkeep of School Infrastructures for all Primary schools; • A Guide for the Management of textbooks for all primary schools; • Manual of procedures for the management of school operating costs; • An organizational diagnosis of the MEPSP • The Education Framework Law promulgated on February 14, 2014; • Sub-sectorial strategies for Basic, Tertiary and non-Formal Education; • A technically validated draft of a Comprehensive Education Sector Strategy; • A survey of expenditure tracking (PETS) in the education sector; • The State of Literacy and Non-Formal Education; • An organizational and functional audit of the Ministry of Literacy and Non-Formal Education; • Two Assessment of Student Learning Achievement; • Study of School Health in the DRC • Diagnosis of the SECOPE • The strengthening of the institutional capacity of Governments. IV. PERFORMANCE OF THE PARTNERS: GOVERNMENT (BORROWER) AND BANK (DONOR) 1.1 Preparation of the project Borrower The preparation of the Project should have better taken into (i) the context of the country and the major challenges (prolonged armed conflict impacting the DRC’s socio-economic conditions and the country’s governance), (ii) the lack of reliable statistics and (iii) the relative weakness of technical skill in the concerned Ministries. This would have avoided the difficulties related to institutional arrangements that later had a negative impact during the Project’s implementation phase. Indeed, the Bank should have better evaluated the Project context. World Bank The evaluation of the PARSE project was made without taking into account the socioeconomic and politico-economic particularities of the country and the technical capacity of the Government at the time. The delay between preparation and implementation of the project (2004-2008) as well as the lack of funds for preparation of the CN and other studies should be noted. 58 However, throughout the preparation and implementation phases of the Project, Bank- borrower relations remained exemplary. 1.2 Implementation of the Project Borrower Overall, all the activities agreed between the Borrower and Bank were carried out, even if this required an extension of the Project. For the civil engineering component, the program was carried out, except for activities related to the reconstruction of primary schools in rural areas (in phase 2), which executed to 76% of its objectives. The allocated amount of 99 million SDRs was totally disbursed. Fiduciary management of the Grant was satisfactory, as attested by regular World Bank reporting. The borrower ensured sound implementation of the Project through the following governmental entities: the Steering Committee, the PCMU, the M&E department. In addition to these units, it should be noted that Project coordination meetings organized by the Ministry of Finance with the relevant technical departments helped resolve certain difficulties inherent in the implementation of the Project. It is also appropriate to point out that the Steering Committee met on average once a year, instead of the planned three times a year (i.e. once per trimester), to approve the program of activities and annual budgets. The main constraints encountered were: • In the civil engineering component: the long period of recruitment of the delegated Project Managers and the weak technical and financial capacity of stakeholders (companies and consultant study firms); • For textbooks: the lack of reliable student statistics hampered the planning and distribution of books; the poor state of communication between central and local levels; the weak number of stakeholders available at the decentralized level; • For school operating costs and the reimbursement of teacher salaries: the long delay before the conditions could be revised at the Mid-term review; the long delay before the stabilization of school lists and teachers; the slowness in the collection of receipts and payroll reports. The Bank The World Bank ensured regular supervision missions and follow-up during the implementation phase of the Project, which helped to resolve issues and provide appropriate solutions to outstanding challenges. At the Mid-Term Review, important amendments were brought forward to improve project implementation, most notably linked to the conditions required for disbursements. Indeed, the measures taken by the Bank in consultation with the Government helped boost the rate of disbursement of the project substantially. 59 In addition, Bank support has had a non-negligible impact in the execution of Project activities, particularly in relation to the components for infrastructure. The organization of joint Government/World Bank portfolio reviews (one per year) on the various projects financed by the Bank, sometimes in collaboration with the African Development Bank, has allowed various country managers to get an overall idea of the Bank portfolio as a whole, share the problems encountered in project execution (and their solution), particularly with regard to the unique problems of each project as well as cross- cutting issues such as financial management, procurement, M&E, disbursement, Project closing, and the management of projects in gestation. Each joint review was followed up with action plans. In addition to regular supervision missions organized by the World Bank, and in the framework of staff capacity-building for the implementation of projects, various workshops were organized, in the country or in the sub-region, on different themes including financial management, procurement, and monitoring and evaluation. Further, the Bank developed a suite of project management tools, in (i) financial management (e-disbursement and e-signature) that have significantly reduced delays in payment, (ii) procurement (using the PPM table) and (iii) in evaluation. Overall, the performance of the World Bank is judged to be satisfactory. V. REFLECTIONS ON THE ENDURING CHARACTER OF CERTAIN PROJECT INITIATIVES The contributions of the project have had a positive effect in the management and governance of the Education sector. As an example, we cite: (i) the use of the results from the construction and rehabilitation component of the Project in the Rehabilitation and Reconstruction of School infrastructure (PRRIS project) financed by the Government and the AFD; (ii) the operationalization of the several sub-sector strategies, in addition to the Interim Education Plan, which has served as support for the subsequently designed Basic Education Project (PROSEB) finance by SMEs; (iii) the approach to reimbursements of teacher salaries which is currently employed by the APEP2 project. The Education Sector Strategy, which is currently being finalized with input from the local donor partners, constitutes an important tool that will allow the sector to be managed with a holistic vision. The establishment of an interdepartmental committee, made up of different experts from various departments (PHPA, ESU, MASAHSN, Budget and Finance), is the beginning of an important process, aided by international consultants, in institutional capacity-building and will have an important unifying effect on Government. VI. LESSONS LEARNED PARSE, the first sectorial-based project benefitting from funding from the World Bank, has attained results that are globally satisfactory. Its disbursement reached 100% of the 60 amount of the Grant after six years and ten months of implementation instead of the five years initially planned. In accordance with its objectives and in the light of the results obtained, the project helped to halt the emergency situation confronting the provision of essential services and laid the groundwork for the development of the Education sector. The main lessons learned from PARSE may be summarized as follows: a. In connection with the design and the preparation of the Project • The assessment of technical and financial capacity of the Borrower is an important prerequisite for implementation success, especially when this is based on improved accountability of Administrations; • The conditions for effectiveness must take into account the socio-political and economic context and economic of the Borrower; • Respecting all the anticipated steps in the preparation phase of a project will largely determine the first steps in the implementation phase, especially when it comes to deadlines. During the PARSE project preparation, the non-realization of certain initial activities in the implementation of the project followed directly from the lack of preparation funds (PPF) and so constituted an obstacle to the start of the project. b. In connection with the implementation of the Project • An awareness campaign and the mobilization of beneficiary communities, as well as capacity strengthening of stakeholders (ALEs, in business, in the School Infrastructure Administration), are major assets for the implementation for the successful implementation of an approach to the construction of quality schools at least cost with the involvement of communities. In addition, the launch of a few sub-project pilots in certain areas also introduces stakeholders to this kind of approach. • Experience has shown that some appropriate measures can contribute to improving the effectiveness of planned project activities. For example, when rehabilitating and reconstructing schools, it is useful (i) to create a database of likely schools to be worked on, (ii) to establish and comply with the criteria guiding the selection of schools, which would include accessibility to sites for ease of effective work during the period of the life of the project; and (iii) to dispose of norms for the construction of infrastructure, as well as prior studies (of different possible architectural typology, estimates and pricing for work). • Reliable statistics (on schools and students) as well as the development of logistical plan which takes account of local specificities is a prerequisite for the success in the distribution of textbooks and other educational inputs to schools. • The importance of field visits is necessary to detect technical weaknesses of different stakeholders in the implementation of the activities; • The training of stakeholders constitutes a strategic intervention to boost the implementation of certain activities. 61 Annex 8. Comments of Co-financiers and Other Partners/Stakeholders Not Applicable 62 Annex 9. List of Supporting Documents Aide-Memoires and Project and Implementation Status Reports Agreement Providing for the Amendment and Restatement of the Financing Agreement. Education Sector Project between DRC and IDA. Grant number H303-DRC August 30, 2011. DRC Statistical Yearbooks for Education (at http://www.eduquepsp.cd/annuaire- statistique.html) Financing Agreement. Education Sector Project between DRC and IDA. Grant number H303-DRC. June 8, 2007. OPCS. Status of Projects in Execution – FY08. Africa Region. Country: Democratic Republic of Congo. Report No: 49640, October 11, 2008. Project Appraisal Document. Education Sector Project. May 4, 2007. Quality Enhancement Review (QER). 2005. Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP). 2010. Rapport d’état sur le système éducatif national (RESEN).2014 Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of an Education Sector Project (Board Approval Date: June 5, 2007) to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report No: 55685-ZR. July 29, 2011. Restructuring Paper on a Proposed Project Restructuring of an Education Sector Project to the Democratic Republic of Congo. Report No: RES12257. November 7, 2013. 63 Annex 10. Overview of Project Indicators PDO Level-Indicators for Component 1 (Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level) Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term (October 17, 2010) Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) Increase in Gross Enrollment Rate Target was exceeded. (GER) *Indicator included in FA and PAD Under 2012 Restructuring, the No change No change No change most recent values provided for 105.8 90.8 90.8 GER were from 2010 (as these 117 64 75 -- were the latest available data. Gross (first grade) intake rate Target exceeded. indicator 107.7 129.8 133.1 New 122 [indicator added under 2012 Indicator added under 2012 restructuring] restructuring. Increase in girls to boys ratio in primary Significant progress was made school during the life of the Project and *indicator only in PAD and the end-of-project target was 100 85 95 86 86 98 restructuring papers almost achieved. 64 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term (October 17, 2010) Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) Number of project beneficiaries of textbooks/guides: Target was achieved. Indicator Students was added as a core Bank Teachers indicator under the 2012 restructuring and target value From classroom rehabilitation: included beneficiaries of Total textbooks, guides and classrooms. The indicator was 4,878,140 (students) (not formally revised) [indicator added under 2012 then revised to include only 93,107 (students) total: 13,587,642 restructuring] children receiving textbooks in first and second grade and this 4,878,140 (students) 13,377,452 students target was achieved. The actual 125,208 (teachers) 6,259,221 students 145,700 teachers 210,190 teachers Total: 6,404,921 1,265 (students) number of direct beneficiaries (students, teachers, inspectors, etc.) is estimated to be 5,076,733.5,076,733 to include in addition to the 4,878,140 children benefitting from textbooks: 53,230 inspectors, educational advisors receiving training); 20,155 teachers placed onto the public payroll; and 26,210 primary schools who received funding to cover operating costs. 65 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term (October 17, 2010) Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) Of total beneficiaries, percentage female Target achieved. [indicator added under 2012 Indicator added under 2012 restructuring] restructuring as a core indicator The final figure achieved 45 50 50 pertains only to children in first and second grade who received textbooks. Note that the most recent values provided in the 2012 restructuring paper were from 2010 (as these were the latest available data). 66 Intermediate Level-Indicators for Component 1 (Increase Access and Equity at Primary Level) Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator for Dec 31, 2012 closing paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring Original mid-term 2012 restructuring Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) date 450 classrooms will have been Target not achieved. rehabilitated by mid-term review *indicator included in FA; then replaced This measure was incorporated into by indicator below the indicator below under the 2012 restructuring. 450 0 This indicator was only tracked until mid-term review. By MTR (11/29/2010), 43 had been constructed/rehabilitated Additional classrooms built or Approximately 93 percent of rehabilitated at the primary level classrooms were built or rehabilitated resulting from project intervention by the project closing date [indicator added under 2012 1,572 1,467 restructuring as core indicator] 43 67 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator for Dec 31, 2012 closing paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring Original mid-term 2012 restructuring Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) date Compliance with arretes (law) on There are no available data to Indicator modified to: parents finding the school fee in abolition of primary school FDF as determine whether the end-of-project measured by annual CRC surveys that target was achieved show reduction in school fees from first While a CRC survey was undertaken survey to last survey (it was not of adequate quality) and *indicator in PAD and restructuring these surveys were not taken at primary has been reduced” Unknown/Not achieved paper; also written as Percent reported various intervals over the Project. No compliance on arretes of primary school systematic assessment or tracking of fees (this figure is included in this indicator was undertaken. As parentheses) such, status of achievement is (70) (90) Yes uncertain. The original indicator appears to have been dropped under the 2012 Restructuring and the new indicator added under the 2012 restructuring related to the measurement of implementation/ effectiveness of school fee reduction policy was “parents finding the fee in primary has been reduced”. New school construction norms are End-of-project target was achieved. New indicator adopted for application of cost-effective school construction strategy Yes Yes No [indicator added under 2012 restructuring] 68 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator for Dec 31, 2012 closing paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring Original mid-term 2012 restructuring Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) date Primary teachers in “registered” schools Target achieved. integrated into the public payroll (percent) The PAD indicates that the original objective was 30,000 teachers though [indicator added under 2012 this was not formally included as an restructuring] indicator. 20,155 20,155 New Under the 2012 Restructuring, the main text indicates that the target was reduced to 20,155 (which was the number of primary teaching positions that had been included in the 2011 national budget) 69 Indicator Increase in primary completion rate 29 *Indicator included in FA and PAD Original Baseline Original mid-term review target October 17, 2010 Original (2007) 35 Original End target for Dec 31, 2012 closing date Achievement noted in 56.7 2012 restructuring paper (latest date from 2010) 70 No change Indicator change Revised Target Restructuring (2012) 72.5 for December 31, 2013 closing date Achievement noted in 2013 restructuring 64 paper (latest data from 2012) Indicator Change Revised target for Restructuring (2013) October 31, 2014 closing date 80 Achievement PDO Level-Indicators for Component 2 (Improve Quality of Primary Education) Comments Target was exceeded. Project closing Intermediate Level-Indicators for Component 2 (Improve Quality of Primary Education) Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring Original mid-term 2012 restructuring Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) About 11 million textbooks and 278,000 Target achieved. teachers’ guides in reading and 18 million textbooks purchased (majority delivered) mathematics for primary grades 1 and 2 Under 2012 restructuring, this produced and distributed to schools indicator (from the PAD) was achieving a ratio of 1 textbook per separated into three distinct textbooks purchased and distributed student and 1 textbook and indicators. The objective was to Separated into three indicators: corresponding guide to each teacher by provide each child with a French 1:2 (teacher: teacher guide) 0.8:1 (teacher guide ratio) 1:2 (student;: textbook) student: textbook ratio the end of the Project and Math textbook and each Teacher guide ratio *Indicator only in PAD teacher with a guide in each 18 million 11 million subject. As such, ratios should 14 million 14 million 278,000 have been written in the following 1:2 1:2 way: 1 math and 1 French textbook for each student  1:2 1 math and 1 French teachers’ guides for each teacher  1:2 The Bank presented this as three separate indicators 71 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) In-service training in use of textbooks Target achieved. reaches 80 percent of primary inspectors and school advisors by end of project 53,230 primary inspectors and *Indicator in PAD school advisors had received 53,230 (100 percent) training in use of textbooks. 100 80 75 0 Government adopts an updated textbook Target not achieved policy by 2011 and begins implementation before end of project. Policy was drafted under this A textbook policy adopted by Implementation beginning *Indicator only in PAD, different in Project and is still under (Policy implemented) another place in PAD – textbook policy preparation/consideration. Policy adopted is adopted and implemented (see parentheses) Government Yes No No No 72 Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) CRC Survey shows improvements in As described for previous Indicator not listed in quality as measured by less teacher indicator, the CRC survey was Conducted annually restructuring paper absenteeism, increased availability of undertaken (but was not of textbooks, improved response from adequate quality) and it was not schools to parents’ concerns undertaken annually. *indicator only in PAD; in another section in PAD indicator is slightly Indicator not listed under 2012 simplified to CRC Survey shows restructuring (informally improvements in quality. dropped). National pupil learning assessment Target exceeded. mechanisms for grade 4 of primary is in assessment mechanism for National pupil learning place Two rounds of PASEC (learning grade 5 is in place *indicator only in PAD assessment) were undertaken during the project life. Yes Yes No -- -- -- Basic education interim development Target achieved. Plan developed New indicator implemented plan is implemented according to agreed and being plan Yes No [indicator added under 2012 restructuring] 73 [indicator primary level restructuring] added Indicator under 2012 System for learning assessment at the Original Baseline Original mid-term review target October 17, 2010 Original (2007) Original End target for Dec 31, 2012 closing date Achievement noted in No and 1 2012 restructuring paper (latest date from 2010) 74 New indicator Indicator change Revised Target Restructuring (2012) Yes and 3 for December 31, 2013 closing date Achievement noted in 2013 restructuring paper (latest data from 2012) Indicator Change Revised target for Restructuring (2013) October 31, 2014 closing date Yes and 3 Achievement Target achieved. Comments Project closing (on a scale of 1 to 4) 3 refers to the utility of the system PDO Level-Indicators for Component 3 (Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector) Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring Original mid-term 2012 restructuring Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) Education sector strategy (including Target achieved (original medium-term financial plan) with target, however, not achieved Yes (with indicators agreed by donors and approved by Government) indicators agreed with donors and by mid-term review). Change in wording with – sustainable medium term financing plan Financing plan (mid-term sustainable financing framework) approved by the Government Yes, Document drafted and technically validated with *Indicator in PAD and FA, however, FA In FA, only sector strategy and specifies that the strategy and plan will financing plan to be agreed by be approved by the Government by the Government by the MTR. Sector strategy drafted and under review mid-term review The PAD, however, separates this into two performance measures and the target is for the end-of-project. Financing plan No change It is included both as a PDO- Yes Yes No No and intermediate-level indicator in the PAD. In the 2012 restructuring paper, it is listed as an intermediate-level indicator. The strategy was drafted and validated, and is being revised to reflect new data pertaining to sector’s performance. 75 begun service teacher applied and *Indicator in PAD Indicator training approved by the Government A new teachers’ statute is and implementation has Reform guidelines for pre- developed and are being in-service are No No Original Baseline Original mid-term review target October 17, 2010 Original (2007) Guidelines developed and being Legal instrument formally approved Original End target applied and implementation started for Dec 31, 2012 closing date Achievement noted in No 2012 restructuring paper (latest date from 2010) Reform guidelines for pre-service teacher training are developed and are Not included in restructuring paper Indicator change being applied 76 Restructuring (2012) Revised Target Yes Yes for December 31, 2013 closing date Achievement noted in 2013 restructuring paper (latest data from 2012) Indicator Change Restructuring (2013) Revised target for October 31, 2014 closing date Yes, Statute developed as annex to Yes Education Framework Law has Achievement been approved by Government Project closing by year 4. committee committee Comments Intermediate Level-Indicators for Component 3 (Strengthen Institutional and Financial Capacity of the Education Sector) Target achieved. Target achieved. entered for year 3. values were: reform In the PAD, the target values were: reform In the PAD, the target (Year 1) and new agreed (Year 2); and The final target was guidelines implemented appointed statutes agreed (Year 2). appointed (Year 1); guidelines the replaced by 2011 Indicator Convention Loi cadre (organic law) and Partnerships are updated or of No Original Baseline Original mid-term review target October 17, 2010 Original (2007) Updated or replaced by 2011 Original End target for Dec 31, 2012 closing date Achievement noted in No 2012 restructuring paper (latest date from 2010) Separated into two separate indicators: Loi cadre (organic law) is transmitted to Parliament for adoption Indicator change Convention of Pratnerships revised and impelmented 77 Restructuring (2012) Revised Target Yes for December 31, 2013 Yes closing date Achievement noted in 2013 restructuring paper (latest data from 2012) Indicator Change Restructuring (2013) Revised target for October 31, 2014 closing date Yes, Both achieved Achievement Project closing Comments Target achieved Original (2007) Restructuring (2012) Restructuring (2013) Project closing Indicator paper (latest data from paper (latest date from for December 31, 2013 Achievement noted in Achievement noted in Original End target 2013 restructuring 2012 restructuring Original mid-term Revised target for Indicator Change Original Baseline Indicator change October 17, 2010 October 31, 2014 for Dec 31, 2012 Revised Target review target Achievement closing date closing date closing date Comments 2010) 2012) CRC and PETS have been Target partially piloted in selected achieved. PETS undertaken but not PETS survey was launched educational provinces Indicator added (though CRC not undertaken described as revised) Indicator added under [indicator added under 2012 2012 restructuring rolled out restructuring; though (though described as Yes No described as revised] revised). By end-of- project, the PETS survey had been undertaken (but not rolled out) and while the CRC had been undertaken, it was not of adequate quality. Based on lessons learnt from Target not achieved. Indicator added CRC and PETS, an action described as revised) (though plan is put in place for an Yes No No eventual scale up [indicator added under 2012 restructuring] Reform of teacher career Target achieved. (training, deployment, salary and structure (training, Draft teacher career structure incentives) approved by the deployment, salary, No information on status incentives) approved (by in 2013 restructuring Government) paper Government *Indicator in PAD only and Yes Yes Yes No No restructuring paper (2012), Original indicator listed however, in the latter it is as PDO-level. Under listed as an intermediate- 2012 restructuring, it level indicator was listed as an intermediate-level indicator. 78 MAP 79