ENVIRONMENT D EPARTMENT DISSEMINATION NOTES *O AR *NIRN AENTALLY AND SOCIALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT Number 17 June, 1995 Designing Community Based Development When properly designed, commiqmity based Programs can be highly effective in managing natural resources, providing basic infrastrifure or ensuring primary social services. Participationin community based development (CBD) depends on reversing control and accountability from central aithorities to community organizations. Successful design requires tapping into local needs,'understanding cind building'on the strengths of existing institutions, and defining the changes needed in intermediary implementing agencies to support community action. Costs and Benefits in three broad areas-managing natural resources, providing basic infrastructure and ensuring There are two persistent myths about primary social services. community based programs: first, that they cost more than conventional programs and, second, Conditions for Success that.they take longer. Additional costs may be incurred at the outset in building capacity at the From time immemorial, communities have local level; however, these costs aresignificant only organized themselves'to take care of collective and when community level organizations. have been individual needs. And yet, in the last fifty years, so eroded thaf substantial time and resources have so many attempts at getting people to participate to-be devoted to capacity building.And eveni when- and take responsibility f or community based initial costs are high, they are more than offset by development have failed. Experience provides subsequent gains. some clear lessons about what works and what does. not work in CBD. Prominent among the Evidence increasingly indicates that, when the. failures have been attempts to achieve results on institutional framework is right, participatory: community based programs. actually cost less (see Box 1) 'and are quicker to implement. In Bank. Box 1 funded projects, the typical pattern haslbeen a slow Does Participatory Community Based build up period,. when time is invested in Development Cost More? community organization and setting the rules for In Pakistan's.Orangi Pilot.Project, which provided interaction, followed by speedy disbursements. sewerage facilities to nearly one million people in a poor area of Karachi, costs were one-eighth of conventional Once the participatory process is established, sewerage provided by city authorities. This was due to the benefits of cpm unity based development changes in technical design and the elimination of pay include increased efficiency and cost effectiveness. offs to intermediaries (Khan, 1992). Furthermore, when the uccess of projects depends In Brazil's PROSENEAR project; a ceiling of $120 per heavily on changes in behavior at the community capita has been imposed on sanitation expenditures. o po i. c Within this cost limit, engineers and community development experts are encouraged to work with based programs may be the only means of meeting communities to devise the most appropriate solutions.' objectives. The examples in Box 2 indicate the Through this process, projects have been designed for as potential benefits of a community based Approach little as $50 per capita (Vijay Jagannathan, 1994). This note is based on Environment Department Paper No.007; which was written by Deepa Narayan as a contribution to the Participation Sourcebook. Copies of the fullpaper are available from the Environment Department, Social Policy anc Resettlment Division, of the World Bank; Washington, D.C. 20433, Fax (202) 522-3247: Dissemination Notes represent the views of their authors and are not official publications of the World Bank. Printed on 100% post-consumer recycled paper Box 2 Community Participation Yields Significant Results In Gujarat, India, during the 1980s, an average of 18,000 forest offenses were recorded annually: 10,000 cases of timber theft, 2,000 grazing, 700 fires,-and 5,300 other offenses. Twenty forestry officials were killed in coifrontations with communities and offenders, and assaults on forestry officials were frequent. In response, an experiment in joint management with communities was initiated by the conservator. This include& community meetings, widely publicized creation of forest. protection committees, and profit sharing of 25 percent of timber returns with local groups. As a result, conflicts between officials and community groups diminished, community groups assumed responsibility for patrolling forests, and productivity of land and returns to villages increased sharply. In one. year,.one village of. eighty-eight households harvested and sold twelve tons of firewood, fifty tons of"fodder, and other forest products, while also planting and protecting.teak and bamboo trees (Pathan, et al, 1993). In C6te d'Ivoire, a national rural water supply program established community water groups which managed maintenance of 13,500 waterpoints and reduced breakdown rates from 50 percent toll percent at one-third the cost. The shift to commiunity level maintenance was managed by taking away the responsibility for rural water supply from the sector agency, supporting private sector involvement in spare parts distribution, retraining technicians, and signing contracts with village groups and the water directorate. The results were sustained in those villages which.had high demand for the rehabilitated water point and where well functioning community organizations already existed (Hino, 1993). In Tamil Nadu, India, a community based nutrition outreach program in 9,000 villages resulted in a one-third d'ecline in severe malnutrition. A group of twenty women interested in health issues was hired in each village as part timacommunity workers accountable to the community. The women's groups, formed initially to "spread-the word," subsequently branched off and started food proiduction activities on their own. Earlier prografis focusing only on the creation of health infrastructure were unable to make any difference in the nutritional status of children (Tamil NaduIntegrated Nitrition Project, 1990). a wide scale through the infusion of external' need to be taken to ensure that these conditions management, funds, and technology, controlled are in place. from distant places. A fundamental prerequisite of successful participatory programs at the- What may seem an obvious point but is often community level is the reversal of control and neglected is that a group functions only because accountability from central authorities to.-the it is addressing a felt need of its members. A community level. fundamental design flaw in a natural resource management project in the Philippines, for Experience also points to a series of common example, was the assumption that upland farmers elements in the design of successful programs. were interested in forest management. In contrast, The first ingredients are knowledge and the need to solve what is perceived as an urgent understanding of local.needs, and of the existing problem may bring different class and power network of social interaction at the household, groups together. In South India, -for example, the group and community level. This knowledge entire' village manages -community based provides the basis for' defining the changes irrigation systems and has 'dev'eloped a needed, both in existing local organizations and: monitoring system to discourage water theft. in external agencies,'tomeet specified objectives. Groups continue to function so long as the benefits of participation to their members Changes at the Community Level continue to outweigh the costs (see Box 3). Hence If a community group is to function project design must be based -on knowledge of- successfully, several criteria must be met: the community demand and must ensure that group must address a felt need and a common incentives to participation are in place. interest; the. benefits to" individuals of participating in the group must outweigh the .In 'any community, inherited networks of costs; the .group should be embedded in the. organized reciprocity and solidarity -form- the existing social organization; it must have the 'basis for individual trust and cooperati6n. New capacity, leadership, knowledge and skills to community based programs need to use and build manage the.task;'and it must own and enforce its on this existing stock of social capital and, own rules Iand 'regulations.. ' Whether wherever possible, to work through existing strengthening or. modifying existing organizations. In Nepal, for example, when organizatioi-s or establishing new ones, steps government policy prescribed the creation of farmer associations, assistant, overseers found B Box 3 many informal groups of farmers organized The Benefits Must Outweigh the Costs around irrigation systems. Rather than creating new organizations, these: existing groups were In the Philippines,--farrrers actually negotiated an encouraged to register themselves- as official increase in their irrigation fees because they had worked farmer associations. . out a formula with the irrigation agency through which they would benefit from imposing and managing the collection of higher fees (NIACONSUTL, 1993). -Sometimes, notably when existing social organization is highly inequitable, creating new If the groupdoes not undertake new tasks as old ones are y .accomplished, there is no. new benefit flow and the costs groups is the- only means of promoting the begii to outweigh benefits. In Indonesia, water user participation of disadvantaged people. Many. groups that took on new tasks'and provided additional successful projects that'specifically target women benefits (such as individual household toilets and food or the poor have forited special.organizations security) continued to thrive while others that did not functioned at a low level or not at all (Natayan, 1989). such as the'Grameen Bank, the Self Employed Women's Association .of India, and womten's In Pakistan, 14,QOO water users associations (WUAs) were farmer.groups in Nigeria and Gambia. These new hurriedly created to become active in- water course improvements. However, when construction was organizations are the creation of their members, completed, the WUAs, did not move on to broader drawing as much as possible on what is already irrigation management tasks because theysawneither a in place. Attempts to speed up a community purpose nor a benefit to continued existence. Instead, development process, by circumyenting existing they reverted back to the traditional warabandi system, n ad i n which was already well established and hence -involved nstitutions and,mvestmng m new externally lower transaction costs (Byrnes, 1992). designed organizations have frequently failed in _ their aims. They also carry the danger -of undermining existing institutions, diminishing organizers.- Mer ely addmng more,communify the capacity of community members to cooperate w . workers makes no difference. unless the overall and organize effectively for other purposes. .vr uncenttive -environment rewards 'staff for An important 'reason for building on responsiveness to clients and support to . . .community workers. Incentives for performance indigenous principles of organization is that, to . . . . are easier to im`stitutewhen agencies are required be effective, a group must own and-enforce its own *ob i group musto be financially viable, have,autonomy to. rules defining membership criteria, the allocation manage themselves, and have control over hiring of responsibilities, contributions and-benefits, and. . and firmng of staff. the mechanisms for ensuring accountability andf resolving conflicts. If these rules are dictated from An alternative to restructuring existing outside, people do not feel obliged to follow them, agencies is to contract out the needed services to free riding becomes common, conflicts escalate, NGOs, (as in rural water supply. in Kenya), the and the group becomes ineffective (see Box 3). priate sector (in agricu ture t Malaysia), other government agencies (public health workers for Depending on the tasks the group is designed -a water and sanitation project in Brazil), or multi- tomana and the existing capacity of the group, o al agencies (UNICEF in low ircome mnge, or bilateralaece UIE nlwicm investment in training may be needed over a Inhousing in Guatemala). In 1exico, the National period of- several years to build the necessary Water authority has an in-house group of senior" management and technical skills. Groups have tsocial sientists and communication specialists _failed- becue tomch wsepcted of them - ecause too mu wasexpe who design the strategy for comm6unity outreach; too soon without supportive traiing . applied research and communications. This is then subcontracted to the private sector. Changes in Imiplemienting Agencies Designing an appropriate outreach strategy The choice of outreach approach needs to to support the community development process match the goals of the program. The extension often involves difficult changes in the structure approach, in which the fieli agent acts primarily and orientation of the implementing agencies. The as a channel of information and inputs, and technical personnel in engineering agencies are remains accountable to the agency father than the commonly reluctant and ineffective community community group, is not appropriate when the objective is community initiative and Box 4 responsibility for management. When the success of a program hinges on participation through Checklist: Steps in Designing strong local groups, an empowerment approach is called for, where the field agent is a community * Clarify and prioritize objectives. Link objettives organizer acting in liaison with technical agencies. to outputs. It may be essential to introduce female agents to * Identify the key stakeholders at the community ensure the participation of women. and agency levels. Assess their capacity and interests. The role of the agency and its relationship * Assess (do not assume) demand, bearing in mind with community groups. needs to be supported that demand is influenced by the confidence by.appropriate changes in legislation. Key issues people have in the service provider. include the. mandate of agencies, funding * Establish eligibility criteria for community groups, mechanisms, accountability systems, the so that communities can select themselves into registration requirements and legal status of projects, rather than projects selecting r r r ecommunities. community groups, and use and tenure rights over assets (particularly over natural resources). * Structure subsidies that do not distort demand. Many rules and regulations may also need to. be * Restructure fund release to support demand. changed, from the required qualifications for * Learn by doing, adjusting plans annually on the community workers, teachers or health educators, basis of experience. for example, to procurement rules. * Invest in strengthening social organization to increase local participation in decision making. Implementing the institutional and legislative. nmlementang the spottuar scanlegms te * Institute participatory monitoring and evaluation changes necessary to support large scale community and feedback loops. based programs inevitably meets resistance from powerful vested interests and needs strong political * Redefine procurement rules to support community level procurement where appropriate. support to see it through. Many Bank.projects that l implement institutional reform are led by reform minded senior. civil servants with access to the country's top political leaders. Box 5 Shared Control and Benefits: CAMPFIRE in Zimbabwe The incentive for Zimbabwe to, protect its wildlife resources is high. Wildlife activities such as-safari hunting, game cropping, tourism, and live animal sales contribute over $250 million annually to Zinbabwe's national economy. Most wildlife, however, is outside parks on tribal or communally owned land. The Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management has recognized that wildlife resources will only be conserved if private and communal landowners derive economic benefit from protection of the resource and are given responsibility. for conservation and management. The return of benefits to local communities from wildlife resources is the basis of Zimbabwe's Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE). Using.the CAMPFIRE approach and philosophy, the Chikwarakwara community of Approximately 150 households in the remote. Beirbridge area of Zimbabwe has taken over proprietorial management authority for wildlife resources'from the district council. After a series of negotiations focusing on community membership, household definition and revenue sharing procedures, the council devolved management responsibilities and access to revenues derived from safari hunting- activities to the community. The benefits accrued to the community as a result of this responsibility have included a new school, a new grinding mill, and a Z$200 cash payment to each household. The Council has-benefitted, through an 11.7 percent levy, and the central goverrint has benefited through an increase in taxable revenues. The CAMPFIRE approach has not worked where communities have not been involved in rule formulation or where sharing of benefits with communities is minimal. In Nyaminyami District in the Zambezi Valley, for example, there are inequities in the distribution of benefits and in the management responsibilities between the district council, the ward, and the villages. The basic issue of whether the Nyaminyami Wildlife Trust, which was created by the district council to develop institutional capacity for wildlife management, should be an income-earner at the district level or a grassroots wildlife management program has yet to be resolved. (Scoones,and Matose, 1993.)