IEG
Report Number: ICRR14810
ICR Review
Independent Evaluation Group
1. Project Data: Date Posted: 09/14/2015
Country: Nicaragua
Project ID: P108974 Appraisal Actual
Project Name: Nicaragua Hurricane Project Costs (US$M): 22.00 14.57
Felix Emergency
Recovery Project
L/C Number: Loan/Credit (US$M): 17.00 14.57
Sector Board: Agriculture and Rural Cofinancing (US$M): - -
Development
Cofinanciers: Board Approval Date : 03/06/2008
Closing Date: 05/30/2012 12/31/2014
Sector(s): Housing construction (40%); General agriculture; fishing and forestry sector (40%); Other
social services (9%); Health (8%); Sub-national government administration (3%)
Theme(s): Natural disaster management (67%); Other rural development (33%)
Prepared by: Reviewed by: ICR Review Group:
Coordinator:
Keith Robert A. Oblitas Ridley Nelson Christopher David IEGPS1
Nelson
2. Project Objectives and Components:
a. Objectives:
To support the sustainable recovery of the communities affected by Hurricane Felix in the Recipient’s Autonomous
Region of the Northern Atlantic (RAAN)
Source: Financing Agreement, May 17, 2008
(The objectives as stated in the Project Paper, February 15, 2008, are similar in substance.)
b.Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No
c. Components:
1. Early Recovery. (Planned costs $5.00 million; actual costs $5.13 million.)
Provision of early reconstruction materials (including provision of retroactive financing); (ii) institutional strengthening
of the Executive Secretariat of the National System for Disaster Prevention, Mitigation and Response
(SE-SINAPRED), and of the Government of the North Caribbean Coast Autonomous Region (GRACCN);
rehabilitation of housing (mainly roofs), and of the agriculture and fisheries sector; and funding of the environmental
and social assessments and Environmental Management Plan.
2. Recovery of small-scale fisheries sector. (Planned costs $6.30 million; actual costs $1.58 million.)
Rehabilitation of small-scale fisheries sector through: establishing a revolving fund to finance better equipped boats,
fishing equipment and working capital; provision of technical assistance; reconstruction of a fish processing plant and
shipyard, landing docks and a community store for fishing supplies; and targeted credit for women.
3. Reconstruction of housing and social infrastructure. (Planned costs $10.00 million; actual costs $6.16
million.)
Reconstruction of housing, and of social infrastructure such as churches and community centers (with dual purposes
of also serving as clinics and emergency shelters).
4. Institutional strengthening for project management, coordination, and monitoring and evaluation. (Planned
costs $0.70 million; actual costs $1.70 million).
Strengthening institutional capacity of GRACCN to implement the recovery emergency plan and to lead general
development efforts; and financing of auditing and M&E.
Revisions to components. While there were no changes to project objectives and the fundamental designs of these
components, during the various restructurings (refer sub-section 2d), and while preparing for Additional Financing, a
number of adjustments of project activities were made, the principal ones being: cancelling some of the economic
infrastructure (the shipyard and fish processing plant); and enhancing implementation capacity through increased
training and technical assistance in areas such as coordination, financial management, auditing, and preparation of a
communications strategy.
d. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates:
The Hurricane Felix Emergency Recovery Project (HFERP) was approved on March 6, 2008, with scheduled closure
on May 30, 2012 - a planned implementation period of slightly over 4 years. Actual closure was on December 31,
2014, some two years later than planned. At initiation, the project was provided an IDA Emergency Recovery Credit of
$14.0 million, and on November 13, 2012 it was provided with Additional Financing through an IDA Grant of $5.0
million. Of the combined IDA Credit of $17.0 million and IDA Grant of $5.0 million, totalling $22 million, $14.57 million
was utilized. A Project Preparation Facility allocation of $5 million, intended to support project preparation and
readiness for implementation was approved in December 2007, but was too late to support preparation activities.
Instead, it was rolled over into the funds used for the “early recovery activities” in component 1.
Subsequently, a total of $6.83 million was cancelled from the combined original Credit and the Additional Financing
Grant: $1.34 million from the original Credit on December 30, 2013; a further cancellation of $0.70 million on July 28,
2014 reflecting unused Credit funds; and a cancellation of $4.79 million of the Additional Financing Grant (96 percent
of the Grant) on April 22, 2014. The Additional Financing had been intended to complete the implementation targets
established at appraisal for component 3, and provide additional resources for project management, training and
monitoring and evaluation. The pace of implementation appeared to be improving, and inflation was adding to project
costs.
There were several restructurings: (i) on August 10, 2009 to include financing of services associated with processing
of timber; (ii) on June 9, 2011 to transfer responsibility for administrating the revolving fund from the Rural Credit Fund
to the Banco Produzcamos (BP); reallocation of funds between categories; and some of the fisheries sector’s targets
to reflect a revised fisheries recovery strategy; (iii) on January 20, 2012 for a seven month extension of the closing
date and adjustments of some output targets under component 3 to adjust for cost-overruns; and, (iv) on October 10,
2012 for a one year extension of the project closing date. The time between project approval and Effectiveness was
eight months.
3. Relevance of Objectives & Design:
a. Relevance of Objectives:
Given Nicaragua’s social conditions, extreme poverty and vulnerability to natural disasters, the broad objectives of
HFERP responded to a strategic need. At the time of Appraisal, Nicaragua was the second poorest (after Haiti)
country in Latin America, GDP growth (2002-2006) was a modest 3.2 percent per annum, or 1.3 percent per capita, 46
percent of the Country’s 5.5 million people were living below the poverty line, and economic and social conditions
(such as availability and quality of schools, health facilities, roads and other infrastructure) were poor. Nicaragua also
ranks as one of the most natural disaster-prone countries in the World, with major weather events significantly
disrupting its development. Hurricane Felix (a category 5 cyclone) was a particularly severe hurricane, affecting
200,000 people (of which 103 persons died), and wrecking nearly 20,000 houses, 84 public buildings, 107 schools
and 134 clinics. Fishing communities were particularly affected, the hurricane sometimes destroying entire villages,
with considerable loss of boats and fishing gear as well. Much of the damage from Hurricane Felix was in the
Autonomous Region of the Northern Atlantic (GRACCN), the poorest and most vulnerable of Nicaragua’s regions and
the chosen project location.
The project was consistent with both the FY08-12 Country Partnership Strategy which was the CPS at Appraisal, and
the most recent (FY13-17) CPS. Both strategies emphasized poverty alleviation and recognized the significant
disaster risks faced by the country. Building institutional capacity to respond to natural disasters was considered a
priority. Government considered disaster risk management as integral to its development strategy. More specifically,
in response to Hurricane Felix, it prepared a recovery strategy which emphasized sustainable, decentralized
development, participatory and community oriented development, and the mainstreaming of disaster risk
management into regional development programs.
Thus, the project fitted within the development strategies of both the Bank and Government, and given the extreme
poverty of the GRACCN and the severe effects there of the Hurricane, a project with the objective of supporting “the
sustainable recovery of the communities affected by Hurricane Felix” in this region was a good strategic choice.
HFERP’s’s Relevance of Objectives was High.
b. Relevance of Design:
HFERP’s logical framework (Project Paper, Annex 2) outlined a set of interventions that could be expected to help
achieve the project’s objectives, and provided generally well-chosen monitorable indicators to assess achievements
against targeted project outputs. The chosen thrusts of the project – rehabilitation of the small-scale, family fishing
sector, and reconstruction of housing and social infrastructure – were responsive to the project’s intention to help
communities reconstruct their dwellings and social infrastructure, and restore livelihoods from fishing. However, the
design contained two particularly consequential choices. First, a general problem, was the combination in one
operation of activities clearly of an emergency nature, together with activities requiring a medium to longer-term
perspective. Fishing gear, boats, provision of seed, and housing would be short-term, appropriately fitting the project’s
classification as an “Emergency Recovery Credit.” But rehabilitation of a fish processing plant and shipyard,
developing a line of credit administered by a new and inexperienced Bank, and pursuing long-term goals for
institutional development, would be more the domain of a development project with a longer-term perspective.
The second design choice with major consequences related to institutions. The project was to be mainstreamed and
decentralized into the standard Government structure, and to be a vehicle for general capacity building of these
institutions as well as project implementation (institutional strengthening would “strengthen the institutional capacity of
the GRACCN to implement the recovery emergency program, and in general, to lead regional development efforts.
Instead of establishing a separate Project Implementation Unit, project implementation will be fully integrated in the
organizational structure of the regional government.” (Project Paper, Annex 1, Detailed Project Description). (A
Project Implementation Unit had been considered by the Bank during project preparation, but was rejected given
Government's desire to promote regional autonomy and general institutional development of GRACN.) There are
elements also of trying to improve GRACCN generally: “a sustained effort was carried out to improve GRACCN’s
governance, planning, financial management, human resources management, procurement and monitoring and
evaluation” (ICR page 16). This meant a diffused project management and implementation actions.
Also, the project was operating in Nicaragua’s chronically weak institutional capacity, made more so by recent
decisions to decentralize and to create a new credit financing agency. In large part, project implementation difficulties
stemmed from the weak project implementing capacity under GRACCN. Mainstreaming project management into
GRACCN’s staff structure created an ineffective project implementation capacity, not helped by the weaknesses of
the other agencies involved. Most notable was the complete lack of experience of the eventually chosen bank which
handled the project’s line of credit for rehabilitation of the fisheries sector. At appraisal, an existing and somewhat
capable agency – the Rural Credit Fund – was chosen, but in line with national policies and Government’s insistence
that responsibility was to be handed over to a new bank – the Banco Produzcamos. (BP).
Considerable implementation difficulties could be expected in such a situation, and indeed materialized (Section 4).
Based on international experience, a better approach might have been to recognize that the broader and longer-term
institutional goals in Nicaragua, while possibly very desirable over time, did not match with emergency response. A
number of alternatives might have been considered; one for instance, often used in Bank emergency operations,
might have been to create a highly experienced project management unit empowered to have executive authority over
other agencies, and to implement activities itself. A longer-term institutional development program could have been
devised as a separate project. In view of the project’s mix of longer-term and emergency actions, and the choice of
institutional arrangements unsuited to the project’s emergency nature, the HFERP’s Relevance of Design was Modest
.
4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy):
Project Outputs
Early achievements included a successful distribution of inputs and seeds in time for the crop season; distribution of
construction materials; and the re-roofing of damaged houses - all directly related to post-disaster recovery. A survey
found that beneficiaries considered that this initial support was satisfactory. The housing program, although late,
exceeded targets - 5,000 families were provided with rehabilitated or reconstructed housing (the appraisal target was
3,300 families); and 4,200 houses had rehabilitated roofs (appraisal target – 2,800 roofs).
For most other planned actions, achievement was partial: 10 communities were provided with access to safer
buildings for emergency shelter (the appraisal target was 40 communities); 30 families were provided with
replacement boats and fishing gear (appraisal target 110 families); 10 communities were provided with communal
infrastructure such as a church or meeting room; well below the planned 25 community facilities; and no community
health centers were established compared with a target of 3 centers. Furthermore, the quality of infrastructure was
variable, and for incomplete infrastructure, the buildings were at risk from water damage due to waterlogging and
mold.
A critical weakness was the line of credit intended for financing fishing investments, which was to be a financially
sustainable revolving fund. Institutional weaknesses of the implementing agency – BP – contributed to a drop in loan
recovery, and the system is unlikely to become viable without a major revamping in BP’s management and
operations. As is often the case, actions such as the above took much longer than planned, with much of the
implementation occurring in the project’s 2 ½ year extension period.
Project Outcomes
While physical achievements were often partial or late, there is some indication of improved community welfare. Thus,
as targeted, the incomes of fishermen and women participating in the project were found in a survey to have
increased by 20 percent over the baseline of pre-hurricane conditions. (Official estimates - changes in incomes of
non-participating communities – controls – are not reported in the ICR). But this finding is not associated with
beneficiary satisfaction, which appears low. (i) Only 60 percent of beneficiaries were satisfied with project activities to
rehabilitate the fisheries sector (the appraisal target was 80 percent). (ii) And only 40 percent of the beneficiaries were
satisfied with the housing and social infrastructure program. These indicators – fisheries and housing/social
infrastructure - cover the bulk of planned project expenditures (74 percent of appraisal estimates).
There was also, as articulated in the Project Paper and ICR, a general goal in the project of strengthening disaster
response capacity within a mainstreamed and decentralized institutional structure (Section 3b). In particular, the
intention was to build the capacity of the regional government (GRACCN) to prepare and implement externally
financed projects. While not explicitly stated in the project objectives, this goal directly influenced the project’s design
(Project Paper, February 15, 2008 paras 87 and 21). The ICR (page 21) considers that GRACCN has been only
partly strengthened (for instance, in areas such as financial management and M&E). But there is little indication that
the project has enabled GRACCN’s overall managerial and coordination capacity for handling disaster response, to be
significantly enhanced.
In conclusion, there have been some achievements, but except for habitation infrastructure, outputs have been lower
than intended, both for community infrastructure and for fisheries, and a viable credit financing system has not been
developed. In these circumstances, sustainable recovery of communities is unlikely to have been significant. The
reported 20 percent increase in the incomes of beneficiaries is an encouraging development but it is difficult to
reconcile the modest improvements in economic activities (in essence, from fisheries) with a significant improvement
in incomes. HFERP’s Efficacy was Modest.
5. Efficiency:
As an Emergency Recovery Credit, an ERR was not required at appraisal and was not undertaken (OP/BP 8.0), The
ICR, however, analyzes the possible viability of most of the project's sub-components. The ERRs vary considerably,
Boats and fishing gear have estimated ERRs over 50 percent; housing has ERRs of about 18 percent; and community
centers' ERRs range from the highest ERR of 26 percent to negative values. No ERR was calculated for a
sub-component with a negative Net Present Value. An overall ERR was calculated for only the sub-components with
positive NPVs, and this yielded an ERR of 35 percent. But, as pointed out in the ICR, this has limited utility for
assessing the viability of the project as a whole, in particular because the revolving fund has the largest (negative)
NPV of all project components. Inclusion of the revolving fund and the other components with negative present values
would provide a much lower ERR. Hence this partial calculation will not be used in this ICRR. Nevertheless, some of
the individual sub-component ERRs suggest the possible directions for an emergency recovery project to take to
enable it to be more viable, although, even here, the negative NPVs of a number of community centers may be more a
reflection of poor construction than of viability under difficult circumstances.
Efficiency can be assessed from the timeliness of implementation, the degree to which planned activities were
completed, and the quality of project actions. The project was extended by two years (50 percent longer than the
planned four year project implementation period). For most activities, the extra time was necessary for making
significant progress, yet a number of actions were incomplete or progress was well behind what was desirable in an
emergency operation (Section 4). The ICR, commenting on the roofs program draws attention to its intended
completion by August, 2011, whereas appraisal intentions were to complete the program by August, 2008.
Establishing the revolving fund – key to sustainable recovery of livelihoods – was also late and ran into serious debt
recovery problems. In short, although the ERR calculations illustrate the potential viability of HFERP's activities, the
project implemented slowly and most achievements were below appraisal targets. Such a performance is not
consistent with the project’s emergency response intentions. HFERP’s Efficiency was Modest.
a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR)/Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal and the
re-estimated value at evaluation :
Rate Available? Point Value Coverage/Scope*
Appraisal No
ICR estimate No
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.
6. Outcome:
The project’s objective to support a sustainable recovery of communities affected by Hurricane Felix responded to an
urgent need in the wake of the devastation caused by this particularly severe event – its objectives were, thus,
substantially relevant. But the relevance of the project’s design, and the project’s efficacy and efficiency, were all
modest. The design had two main shortfalls. First, the project was a hybrid between emergency response and
longer-term disaster mitigation, and in the event, achievement fell short of both. Second, an attempt to mainstream
the project within existing low capacity institutions greatly limited achievements, whereas in a particularly weak
institutional environment such as in Nicaragua, more direct management using highly capable individuals in a project
implementation unit might have been more appropriate for an emergency operation. For most activities, achievements
contributing to efficacy were either late or with partial achievements, or both. Particularly problematic were the
significant shortfalls in community infrastructure, and poor loan recovery for the revolving fund. Nevertheless, by
completion, after a two year extension, incomes of beneficiaries are reported to have increased by 20 percent, but the
quality of infrastructure is questionable, and only 40 percent of beneficiaries were satisfied with the housing program.
The project's efficiency was modest because, although some sub-components may have been viable, the project
implemented slowly with uneven achievement. Finally, the project’s role as an emergency operation can be
questioned – three years after approval, only about half of the Credit/Grant had been disbursed. HFERP’s Outcome
was Unsatisfactory.
a. Outcome Rating: Unsatisfactory
7. Rationale for Risk to Development Outcome Rating:
Limited institutional capacity is likely the greatest risk to the project’s development outcome. GRACCN remains a
weak institution. It was not successful coordinating the project, and the attempt to integrate disaster risk management
into its general institutional structure does not appear to have succeeded. Its difficulties coordinating the efforts of
concerned national agencies show only modest progress towards improvement. The limited implementation capacity
also risks deterioration given the high staff turn-overs within and outside GRACCN. Completion of facilities also poses
a risk. Much of the community centers, shelters, and health facilities have been partially constructed, and without
timely completion, they risk water damage, leaving much of the social infrastructure program irretrievably damaged.
The sustainability of rehabilitated houses and rooves may also be at risk, given the low satisfaction rate of
beneficiaries, in part, reflecting poor construction quality. There is then the line of credit backstopping the fisheries
development program – the high default rate by the end of the project, if it continues, will make the revolving fund
unsustainable. HFERP’s Risk to Development Outcome is High.
a. Risk to Development Outcome Rating : High
8. Assessment of Bank Performance:
a. Quality at entry:
Project preparation was prompt (four months between appraisal and approval). The team identified a set of
actions that could reasonably be expected to have positive impact on community welfare, and these were logically
articulated from the Results Framework. But there were two key problems mirroring the issues discussed under
Relevance of Design. First, the implementation capacity difficulties of Nicaragua’s weak institutions, particularly a
regional government such as GRACCN, were underestimated. This was compounded by Government’s decision,
eventually agreed to by the Bank, to mainstream project management within this unwieldy structure. Second, the
project was a hybrid between emergency response activities such as seed, fishing gear and roofing, and
longer-term investments such as less urgent infrastructure, and longer-term institutional objectives to strengthen
GRACCN generally. These design features set the project up for a difficult implementation. Quality at Entry was
Unsatisfactory.
Quality-at-Entry Rating: Unsatisfactory
b. Quality of supervision:
Supervision was intensive, with an average of 2.7 missions per annum, and every three to four months in some
periods. Missions were solution oriented and especially concentrated in fiduciary and procurement matters, which
needed particular attention. The team was also proactive in harnessing additional technical expertise through the
FAO/TF. And the Bank team provided intensive training for the key project implementers. However, adjustments
at MTR were not major, while project implementation issues were significant. The Bank’s Supervision
Performance was Moderately Unsatisfactory, because, while basic supervision was thorough, the major project
issues could have been more fundamentally addressed.
Quality of Supervision Rating : Moderately Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory
9. Assessment of Borrower Performance:
a. Government Performance:
Government (the central and regional governments) considered the project a priority during project identification
and preparation, but in implementation, its expressed continuing dedication was not reflected in a number of key
actions. Government decision makers did not always follow through on actions agreed in Bank supervision
missions and recorded as such in aide memoires. The decision to mainstream the project within the Government
structure was well meaning and likely the right direction for the medium and longer-term. But mainstreaming and
decentralization of Government administration required a longer time period than available, and it added to the
challenge of an emergency operation. Government could have done more to resolve coordination problems, and
been more proactive in dealing with the dysfunctional revolving fund. Government Performance was
Unsatisfactory.
Government Performance Rating Unsatisfactory
b. Implementing Agency Performance:
The main implementing agency – GRACCN – had .low implementation capacity and underachieved most targeted
outputs, even with the two-year extension, though in part this was influenced by the difficulties of operating in the
unfamiliar mainstreamed institutional environment. It also had to contend with the disruptions caused by frequent
personnel turnover. Fiduciary management was seriously deficient. Management of the revolving fund under BP
was weak, jeopardizing project achievements and sustainability. The National System for Disaster Prevention,
Mitigation and Response, which was to provide technical support to GRACCN and to manage some of the early
recovery actions of component 1, implemented slowly. Performance of the Implementing Agencies was
Unsatisfactory.
Implementing Agency Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory
Overall Borrower Performance Rating : Unsatisfactory
10. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization:
a. M&E Design:
The M&E program’s design included some socio-economic measures, such as on beneficiary incomes, but most of
the system related to implementation progress and contract monitoring. Surveys on outcome impacts, and preparation
of a data base of beneficiaries were also planned.
b. M&E Implementation:
Periodic monitoring was used as a base for checking project progress and comparing with the project’s monitorable
indicators. However, implementation was limited due to institutional capacity constraints and technological problems
such as power outages. The beneficiaries’ data base was particularly impeded by these problems. Towards the end of
the project, GRACCN hired a consulting firm to do the impact assessment.
c. M&E Utilization:
While the implementation problems limited systematic monitoring of the program, M&E data formed a base of
information for managers in GRACCN and other agencies involved in project implementation. The impact assessment
was an important contributor to final evaluation of the project, in particular for the ICR. Thus, the M&E program had
some utility, but to somewhat modest effect given the implementation problems encountered.
M&E Quality Rating: Modest
11. Other Issues
a. Safeguards:
The project was environmental category B, requiring an environmental assessment and an environmental
management Plan. The following safeguards were triggered: Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01); Natural
Habitats (OP/BP 4.04); Indigenous Peoples (OP/BP 4.10); and Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11). The
emergency classification of the project (OP 8.00) allowed preparation of the environmental and social assessment to
be done after project approval (by six months), but it actually took 18 months.
At the end of the project, both environmental and social safeguards were rated Satisfactory. The ICR does not report
any significant environmental issues. On the social side, effective consultation and inclusion was needed as the
beneficiary communities were multi-ethnic and multi-cultural. The ICR reports wide consultation with beneficiaries,
following a communications strategy, and using weekly broadcasts on popular local radio stations, which encouraged
interaction and feedback and the voicing of any concerns by the audience. Land issues do not appear to have been a
concern – the ICR advises that all land in the beneficiary communities is collectively owned, and traditional decision
making practices result in no land disputes.
b. Fiduciary Compliance:
Fiduciary management was severely deficient, and at project completion was rated by the Bank as Unsatisfactory.
Deficiencies included unreconciled accounts, ineligible expenditures, lack of supporting documents and accounting
errors. Audits tended to be overdue, with substantial qualifications, and the ICR advises that ineligible expenditures
could potentially amount to $1.3 million. Intensive review and training was provided by Bank staff but this was reduced
in effect by constant staff turnover in GRACCN. Procurement was somewhat better (at project closing it was rated by
the Bank as Moderately Unsatisfactory). The main procurement problem was limited capacity in contract
management. Specific weaknesses were in procurement planning, preparation of bidding documents, and evaluation
practices. Significant Bank training and supervision helped build capacity, but this was a constant need due to staff
changes.
c. Unintended Impacts (positive or negative):
d. Other:
12. Ratings: ICR IEG Review Reason for
Disagreement/Comments
Outcome: Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development High High
Outcome:
Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory Design as a hybrid between emergency
Unsatisfactory and long-term actions, diminished
project impact. Borrower's
implementation capacity was
overestimated.
Borrower Performance : Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Quality of ICR: Exemplary
NOTES:
- When insufficient information is provided by the Bank
for IEG to arrive at a clear rating, IEG will downgrade
the relevant ratings as warranted beginning July 1,
2006.
- The "Reason for Disagreement/Comments" column
could cross-reference other sections of the ICR
Review, as appropriate.
13. Lessons:
The following main lessons are drawn from the project experience and the ICR:
1. The design of emergency recovery projects should be focused on sustainable short-term activities directly
related to the recovery which can be implemented rapidly.
HFERP was a hybrid between short-term emergency related actions, and longer-term investments in institutions
and infrastructure, which diverted attention and resulted in a longer implementation period.
2. Implementation arrangements for emergency operations should be straightforward and pragmatic rather
than supportive of more complex long-term institutional goals.
Using the project to support Government’s strategy to decentralize and mainstream national administration severely
impaired project implementation capability.
3. Make component design simple and able to take off fast.
It was unlikely that creating a revolving credit fund, and (later) switching management to a new, inexperienced bank
would take off quickly. Other options could have been considered. For instance, providing direct grants to fishermen
through an existing agency would likely have enabled a much faster response in the short term, with a more
mainstreamed credit system to be built later.
4. Provision of livelihood activities should have follow-on technical assistance to beneficiaries rather than
disengaging once the activity is launched.
Under the fisheries program, beneficiaries received technical assistance when credit was initiated, but longer-term
follow-up was not provided, even though some technologies – such as operation of new boat engines - were new to
the fisher-folk (breakages were frequent).
14. Assessment Recommended? Yes No
Why?
As part of a joint “learning” PPAR of several emergency recovery projects in different countries, with varying
approaches and experiences.
15. Comments on Quality of ICR:
The ICR is a candid and reflective analysis with a well-structured, clear and informative text. Discussion is issues
oriented, particularly appropriate for a project that attempted to apply a number of new institutional approaches to
disaster response, with little prior experience. The lessons are well thought through, based on the earlier text, forming
a good foundation for learning relevant to other emergency projects in Nicaragua, with several lessons likely to also
have relevance in other countries. The economic analysis was thorough despite both conceptual and data challenges.
It would have been helpful if there had been more discussion of why Additional Financing was taken, and of why the
MTR did not make more fundamental changes to the project. But taken overall, the report is Exemplary given its
strengths in most areas.
a.Quality of ICR Rating : Exemplary