

Document of
The World Bank
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Report No: ICR00004796

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT

(Credit No. 5155-ET)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 273.5 MILLION

(US\$ 415 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia

FOR A

Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4

September 23, 2019

Transport Global Practice
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 26, 2018)

Currency Unit = Ethiopian Birr (ETB)

ETB 27.86 = US\$1.00

US\$ 1.38 = SDR 1.00

FISCAL YEAR

July 1 - June 30

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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGP	Agricultural Growth Program
APL	Adaptable Program Lending
CAS	Country Assistance Strategy
CPF	Country Partnership Framework
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
E&S	Environmental and Social
EIRR	Economic Internal Rate of Return
ERA	Ethiopian Roads Authority
ESIA	Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
ESHS	Environmental, Social, Health and Safety
ESMP	Environmental and Social Management Plan
GDP	Gross Domestic Products
GoE	Government of Ethiopia
GTP	Growth Transformation Plan
HDM	Highway Design Model
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IDA	International Development Association
IPF	Investment Project Financing
IRI	Intermediate Results Indicator
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
OPRC	Output and Performance based Road Contracts
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PBS	Protection of Better Services
PCN	Project Concept Note
PDO	Project Development Objectives
PSNP	Productive Safety Net Program
RAP	Resettlement Action Plan
RSDP	Road Sector Development Program
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
TA	Technical Assistance
TSP	Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
US\$	United States Dollar

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DATA SHEET	1
I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES.....	5
A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL	5
B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)	8
II. OUTCOME	10
A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs	10
B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)	10
C. EFFICIENCY	12
D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING	12
E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY).....	13
III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME.....	13
A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION	13
B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION	15
IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME ..	18
A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)	18
B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE.....	19
C. BANK PERFORMANCE	20
D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME	21
V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	22
ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS.....	24
ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION	30
ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT	32
ANNEX5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS	39
ANNEX 6. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS	42
ANNEX 7. PROJECT LOCATION MAP	43



DATA SHEET

BASIC INFORMATION

Product Information

Project ID	Project Name
P117731	Ethiopia-Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4
Country	Financing Instrument
Ethiopia	Investment Project Financing
Original EA Category	Revised EA Category
Full Assessment (A)	Full Assessment (A)

Organizations

Borrower	Implementing Agency
Ministry of Finance, Federal Ministry of Finance, Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia	Ethiopian Roads Authority

Project Development Objective (PDO)

Original PDO

The proposed Project Development Objective is to improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads being upgraded under this project.



FINANCING

	Original Amount (US\$)	Revised Amount (US\$)	Actual Disbursed (US\$)
World Bank Financing			
IDA-51550	415,000,000	290,905,981	262,666,331
Total	415,000,000	290,905,981	262,666,331
Non-World Bank Financing			
Borrower/Recipient	46,110,000	0	0
Total	46,110,000	0	0
Total Project Cost	461,110,000	290,905,981	262,666,331

KEY DATES

Approval	Effectiveness	MTR Review	Original Closing	Actual Closing
25-Sep-2012	25-Jan-2013		30-Apr-2019	26-Oct-2018

RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING

Date(s)	Amount Disbursed (US\$M)	Key Revisions
24-Oct-2018	271.61	Change in Loan Closing Date(s)

KEY RATINGS

Outcome	Bank Performance	M&E Quality
Moderately Unsatisfactory	Unsatisfactory	Modest

RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO Rating	IP Rating	Actual Disbursements (US\$M)
01	01-Mar-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0
02	09-Jun-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0



03	14-Dec-2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	58.22
04	02-Jun-2014	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	63.82
05	10-Dec-2014	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	66.60
06	15-Jun-2015	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	115.76
07	25-Apr-2016	Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	166.29
08	10-Apr-2017	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Unsatisfactory	235.57
09	03-Apr-2018	Moderately Satisfactory	Unsatisfactory	258.00

SECTORS AND THEMES

Sectors

Major Sector/Sector (%)

Transportation 100

Public Administration - Transportation 3

Rural and Inter-Urban Roads 97

Themes

Major Theme/ Theme (Level 2)/ Theme (Level 3) (%)

Economic Policy 25

Trade 25

Trade Facilitation 25

Private Sector Development 8

Jobs 8

Job Creation 8

Urban and Rural Development 66

Urban Development 33

Urban Infrastructure and Service Delivery 33

Rural Development 33

Rural Infrastructure and service delivery 33



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I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES

A. CONTEXT AT APPRAISAL

Context

1. **In the years leading up to the approval of the Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4 (TSP) around 2011-2012, Ethiopia was achieving impressive development results, but the country was still facing a number of development challenges.** Ethiopia had achieved annual average GDP growth of 11 percent during 2004-2010 according to the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) estimates (or 7-8 percent according to International Monetary Fund estimates), but the inflation was still unstable. Political instability and conflict remained a permanent constraint on development in neighboring South Sudan and Somalia. While Ethiopia was making the third fastest improvements of any country towards reaching the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) resulting from a long-term, concerted commitment to pro-poor development, over 80 percent of the population was living in rural areas. Agriculture, which accounted for about 85 percent of total export earnings, was the main source of livelihood, keeping Ethiopia as one of the world's poorest countries with a GDP per capita of US\$377 in 2009/2010. In 2010 Ethiopia ranked 157 out of 177 nations in the Human Development Index (HDI). Continued investments in infrastructure, including basic road transport connectivity, were considered a major component of Ethiopia's program towards improving development outcomes at the household, regional, and national levels. Building on the "Sustainable Development and Poverty Reduction Program" 2002-2004/5 (SDPRP), and the "Plan for Accelerated and Sustained Development to End Poverty" 2005-2010, the GoE's five-year development plan, the Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) which aimed to achieve the MDGs by 2015 and middle-income status for Ethiopia by 2023, and expansion of the road network along with other infrastructure was seen as central to the growth agenda.

2. **The GoE specifically recognized that the size and quality of the road network needed to keep pace with rising demand, and that this had been a long-term constraint to economic growth and poverty reduction.** As early as 1977, the GoE formulated the Road Sector Development Program (RSDP), which identified investments and crucial reforms needed to restore and expand the road network and to reform and modernize the sector. Since then, the GoE had four stages of RSDP as of 2012. Under those stages of RSDP there had been some recognized improvements in key transport and trade corridors through upgrading of priority road links, strengthening road management and financing, developing the capacity and participation of domestic contractors and consultants, and addressing social, environmental and development issues. However, the environmental, social, health and safety issues were increasingly being recognized during TSP preparation, and these issues were being recognized as a substantial risk for implementing the project. TSP was built on the World Bank's long-standing partnership with Ethiopia in the transport sector and intended to form an integral part of the Bank's assistance program to continue progress made under the preceding APL series and to support RSDP in its fourth stage (RSDP4).

3. **By the time of TSP approval, the World Bank had financed several road projects through International Development Association (IDA) financing since 1993.** There were five road projects financed by IDA, including three stand-alone IPFs and two stages of Adaptable Program Lending (APL 1-2: P000755, P082998) during 2003 – 2012. In addition, IDA supported interventions in rural and community roads through the Agricultural Growth



Program (AGP: P113032), the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP: P087707, P113220, P146883), and the Protection of Basic Services Program II and II P103022 and P28891.


4. RSDP and TSP were consistent with the Bank’s 2008-2012 Country Assistance Strategy (CAS), as well as the 2013-2016 Country Partnership Strategy (CPS) in which the RSDP and TSP were aligned with Pillar 1 - increasing and improving delivery of infrastructure. TSP was still relevant with the current 2018-2022 Country Partnership Framework (CPF) in supporting its objective 1.4 – Improved connectivity and enhanced regional growth and secondary cities. It was also consistent with GoE’s five-year development plan and the GTP, which reaffirmed the government’s commitment towards human development and infrastructure expansion. When implemented successfully, RSDP supported by TSP was expected to play an important role in supporting economic growth in Ethiopia over the medium to long term by providing better access for industrial, agricultural and tourism developments, and was also to provide improved access for beneficiaries in the project area to essential services.



Theory of Change (Results Chain)

5. TSP intended to support Ethiopia’s increasing demand for delivery of infrastructure through the improvement of priority regional corridors and link roads. To achieve this objective, the project provided support to upgrading of regional and link roads, and also modernization of the Ethiopian Roads Authority (ERA). These activities were intended to support the project’s PDO and higher-level objectives of enhanced regional growth and improved connectivity to secondary cities at the end of the project. Figure 1 below illustrates the theory of change with the results chain based on the links between the project’s interventions (activities), outputs, desired outcomes with the longer-term outcomes with the intended results of the project.

Figure 1: Theory of Change



Project Development Objectives (PDOs)

6. The original PDO as stated in the PAD and the Financing Agreement was: **to improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads, being upgraded under this project.**

**Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators**

7. The project had one clear development objective associated with the following PDO indicators.

Table 1: TSP PDO and PDO indicators

PDO	Indicators
To improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads, being upgraded under this project	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Proportion of rural land area within 2 km of an all-season road (Percentage: Rural Access Index) • Direct project beneficiaries (Number) • Female beneficiaries (Percentage) • Travel and turnaround time of heavy goods vehicle on Addis – Mille – Djibouti trade route (Days) • Average travel time on subject roads (km/hr)

Components

8. **At approval, the project had two components, one focused on civil works and the other on capacity building and modernization of ERA.** The total estimated project cost was US\$461.11 million, of which US\$415 million was IDA (90%) and US\$46.11 was from GoE contribution (10%).

Table 2: Project Components at Appraisal

Components	Description	Amount Allocated
Component 1: Upgrading of Regional and Link Roads	Upgrading of five selected roads and corresponding supervision services including design review and road safety audits.	IDA financing: US\$336.62 million GoE financing: US\$37.4 million
Component 2: Support to Modernize ERA	Support for the ongoing transformation and modernization of ERA, aiming at enhancing ERA's implementation capacity.	IDA financing: US\$9.0 million GoE financing: US\$1.0 million
Physical and Price Contingencies		IDA financing: US\$69.38 million GoE financing: US\$7.71 million

B. SIGNIFICANT CHANGES DURING IMPLEMENTATION (IF APPLICABLE)**Revised PDOs and Outcome Targets**

9. The PDO was not revised.

Revised PDO Indicators

10. The PDO indicators and the Intermediate Results Indicators were not revised.

Revised Components

11. The project components were not revised.

**Other Changes**

12. **The project had a Level-2 restructuring approved by the Country Director on October 24, 2018 and the amendment letter was signed on October 26, 2018 to (i) cancel the remaining balance of the credit and (ii) bring forward the closing date of April 30, 2019 to October 26, 2018 following the request from the Borrower.** As a result of the restructuring, the value of SDR75 million out of the original credit of SDR273.5 million was cancelled. The cancelled amount was equivalent to 27.4 % of the credit. The remaining balance in the designated account after this cancellation was documented for eligible expenditures incurred prior to the closing date and the rest was refunded prior to the disbursement deadline (i.e. four months after the closing date). The project also had significant exchange rate losses (US\$28.0 million with the closing balance) during the project period). The final disbursement ratio was 92.8% against the restructured amounts.

Table 3: Project Components at Appraisal

Disbursement	SDR	US\$ Value at Appraisal	US\$ Value at Closing	US\$ Value difference
Original Credit	SDR273,500,000	US\$415,000,000	US\$376,398,905	US\$38,601,095
Cancellation	SDR75,000,000	---	US\$103,217,250	---
Closing Balance	SDR198,500,000	US\$301,197,441	US\$273,181,655*	US\$28,015,786

*The actual disbursement was US\$262,666,331 (the rest was cancelled)

13. The Mizan-Dima road upgrading contract faced major environmental and social safeguards issues which led to the formulation of an environmental and social safeguards action plan by ERA which the Bank approved. However, due to the delayed full completion in the implementation of the action plan, the Bank in January 2018, decided to partially suspend disbursements on this contract, a situation which continued until the project's closing (see paras 39 and 42 for details).

Rationale for Changes and Their Implication on the Original Theory of Change

14. **The project restructuring and acceleration of closing date from April 30, 2019 to October 26, 2018 following the request from the Recipient had some implications in the theory of change and expected results.** At the time of this request on October 5, 2018, the contract for the Debre Birhan-Ankober road had been terminated due to a failure to reach agreement on the contractual requirements to start the works, and the Ambo-Wolliso road contract was also about to be terminated because of the weak performance of the contractor due to its financial problems. After these terminations, ERA intended to procure new capable contractors to complete the remaining activities using government resources. The rationale for the change was that the mobilization of a new contractor for Ambo-Wolliso under the TSP credit would need a closing date extension of at least 3 years. The GoE requested the Bank to close the project and cancel the unused balance of the credit and agreed to cover the cost of the remaining works from its own resources.

15. As the project was closed without full completion of the upgrading of roads financed under the project some of the original targets were not fully met by project closing. Nevertheless, as mentioned GoE planned to use its own funding to complete some of the original works.



II. OUTCOME

A. RELEVANCE OF PDOs

Assessment of Relevance of PDOs and Rating

16. **The project’s PDO was and remains consistent with the World Bank’s support framework for Ethiopia.** The current Country Partnership Framework (CPF) 2018-2022 identified the need for “improved connectivity and enhanced regional growth and secondary cities” under its objective 1.4, which clearly supports improvements in transport infrastructure and road connectivity to reduce travel times and enhance connectivity between markets and secondary cities. It specifically supported GoE’s capacity enhancement to construct and operate strategic road corridors.

17. **Rating: High.** As outlined above, the project’s PDO continued to be strongly aligned with the Bank’s support framework.

B. ACHIEVEMENT OF PDOs (EFFICACY)

Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome

18. **The PDO, to improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads, being upgraded under this project, was only partly achieved as the length of sub-corridors were only partly improved relative to the design at the time of project closing.** The status of the improved project sub-corridors achieved at closing is shown in the following table.

Table 4: Status of Improvements of Project Roads at Credit Closing

Project Road	Status at Closing (Oct 26, 2018)	Improved Length at Closing
Kombolcha-Burka-Mille (133 km)	Completed	133 km
Mizan-Dima (92km)	Physical Progress 84%	77 km (92km x 84%)
Konso-Yabello (105km)	Physical Progress 90%	95 km (105km x 90%)
Ambo-Wolliso (64km)	Physical Progress 52% and terminated but re-bid and awarded with GoE fund	0
Debre Birhan-Ankober (42km)	Terminated but re-bid and awarded with GoE fund	0
Total (436 km against initial estimate of 434.5 km)		305 km (70% against the target of 434.5km)

19. At the project closing, the achieved improvements of the project roads were 70% of the targeted length at appraisal (305 km improved against the targeted 434.5 km). The improvements on the Kombolcha-Burka-Mille road with a length of 133 km was fully completed. Mizan-Dima road and Konso-Yabello roads were at 84% - 90% progress, in which the improved lengths were proportional to the physical progress. Ambo-Wolliso road was terminated at 52% of the progress, in which some part of the road was provided with base course pavement, but it cannot be considered as fully improved condition as the entire road section did not function as the improved road.



20. **The PDO indicators did not achieved their targets.** The status of PDO indicator achievements are summarized in the following table (Annex 1 for details).

Table 5: Achievement of PDO Indicators at Credit Closing

No.	Description	Baseline	Target	Actual Value at Closing	Achievement
1	Proportion of rural land area within 2km of an all-season road (Rural Access Index) (Percentage)	17.80	40.00	36.90	Partly Achieved (86%)
2	Direct Project Beneficiaries (Number)	1,943,400	2,325,900	1,983,354	Marginally Achieved (10%)
2a	Female Beneficiaries (#2 disaggregated) (Percentage)	50	50	50	(proportional to #2)
3	Travel time of heavy goods vehicle on Addis-Mille-Djibouti trade route (Days)	6.00	5.00	6.00	Not Achieved
4	Average travel time on subject roads at completion compared with pre-construction base-line (km/hr)	25	80	70 *	Partly Achieved (82%)

* Average travel speed measured on the completed road sections (excluding the two roads terminated at closing).

21. The proportion of rural land area within 2 km of all-season roads (#1) was intended to measure the key outcome achievement of the whole RSDP4 program during the project period – this indicator was partly achieved (reaching 86% of the end target value). In addition, the average travel time on subject roads (#4) – measured as travel speed – partly achieved their targets (82%). However, the number of direct beneficiaries and female beneficiaries (#2) only marginally achieved the target (10%).

22. The other PDO indicator, travel and turnaround time of heavy goods vehicle on Addis-Mille Djibouti trade route (#3) did not achieve the target (5 days from the baseline of 6 days) and stayed as the same in the baseline value (6 days) in spite of the improvements of Kombolcha-Mille road under the project. This was caused by the fact that other part of the Addis-Djibouti trade route (mostly in the territory of Djibouti) had deteriorated during the project period, and consequently the total travel and turnaround time of the entire Addis-Djibouti trade route was not improved.

23. After the closing date, the project’s roads continued to be improved by ERA with its own funds. ERA had further continued the works under Mizan-Dima and Konso-Yabello roads, and new contracts were rebid and awarded for Ambo-Wolliso and Debra Birhan-Ankober roads to re-start of the works. Hence the level of the PDO achievements improved (from 305 km: 70 % to 320 km: 74 % with the completion of Mizan-Dima road) at the time of the ICR.

24. **Efficacy Rating: Modest.** Due to the partial achievement (70%) of the improvement of the roads under the project, and partial-achievement of all the PDO indicators, the project’s objective was only partly achieved.



C. EFFICIENCY

Assessment of Efficiency and Rating

25. An ex-post economic analysis was conducted on the improved corridors under the project, replicating the analysis done and assumptions during preparation to the extent possible. It was based on the traditional cost-benefit analysis using Highway Design Model – version 4 (HDM-4), which computed annual road agency and user’s costs (vehicle operating plus travel time costs) over the evaluation period of 20 years and a 10.23 percent discount rate, which is the rate used in Ethiopia to evaluate infrastructure projects.

Table 6: Economic Analysis before and after implementation

Road	PAD		Feasibility Study		Ex-Post	
	EIRR	NPV (US\$ million)	EIRR	NPV (ETB million)	EIRR	NPV (ETB million)
Kombolcha-Burka-Mille (133 km)	14.8%	69.5	15.6%	1,614	29.1%	12,929
Mizan-Dima (92km)	15.1%	25.7	17.0%	663	32.4%	4,096
Konso-Yabello (105km)	14.8%	20.0	14.0%	336	44.7%	12,283

Table 7: Financial Cost Comparison before and after implementation

Road	Initial Contract Cost (ETB million)	Actual Cost (as of May 2019) (ETB million)	Cost Increase
Kombolcha-Burka-Mille (133 km)	2,844.5	2,926.6	2.89%
Mizan-Dima (92km)	1,125.4	1,311.9	16.57%
Konso-Yabello (105km)	1,200.6	1,017.7	-15.24%

26. The ex-post economic analysis suggests that at least the improved three roads have achieved much higher than the intended efficiency based on the final costs and benefits associated with the improvements, but the rest of the two roads didn’t achieve the intended efficiency improvements at all.

27. **Efficiency is rated as Modest**, as a result of the combined evaluation of (i) the substantial efficiency achievement of the improved roads with higher-than-expected economic return, and (ii) the delays in the other two roads which didn’t achieve any efficiency at the time of the closing.

D. JUSTIFICATION OF OVERALL OUTCOME RATING

28. **The overall outcome is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory, as the project’s achievement at the time of the credit closing had substantial shortcomings.** As described above, the project’s relevance was high, but its efficacy and efficiency were modest with a substantial achievement on the improved road sections but only limited achievements on two of the original project roads.



E. OTHER OUTCOMES AND IMPACTS (IF ANY)

Gender

29. The project did not explicitly incorporate a gender dimension into its design or implementation, except for trying to confirm the share of project beneficiaries and that the percentage of trained professionals under the project should be fairly distributed to women.

Institutional Strengthening

30. Component 2 was aiming at improving the governance and technical capacity of ERA to contribute to its modernization. There were four sub-components, which were the production of manuals and guidelines for better contract and project management practices as well as procurement manuals, technical auditing and gap analysis (details in para 41), all of which eventually contributed to the management capacity improvement during the project period. An example of which is the re-contracting of the works and management of the remaining works by GoE (when the previous contractors had been terminated and after the credit closing). It also impacted the recent organizational reform of ERA to have strengthened the environmental and social management capacity under an independent department for environmental and social with increased staff. The feasibility studies for follow-on projects were not conducted, and it missed the opportunities for preparing the next projects. The number of people trained was substantially close to the target (about 97%) in the Intermediate Result Indicator (IRI).

Mobilizing Private Sector Financing

31. The project was designed as a public investment project and did not include possibilities of private sector financing. The beneficiaries of the public roads to be improved under the project were the general population of mostly rural and, to a limited extent, urban areas within the catchment area of the road corridors targeted by the project, and the public investment was an appropriate investment measure for this purpose.

Poverty Reduction and Shared Prosperity

32. **While the project was not explicitly designed to have a distributional impact on the poor, investments made under the project supported the country's poverty reduction strategy.** The project was aligned with the Bank's support framework through the series of CAS (2008-2012), CPS (2013-2016) and the current CPF (2018-2022), which aimed at reducing poverty through the promotion of sustained economic growth by increasing and improving delivery of infrastructure (CPS 2013-2016) and improved connectivity and enhanced regional growth and secondary cities (CPF 2018-2022). By enabling improved access to services, opportunities and employment in the targeted areas of the country, the project was expected to contribute to growth and poverty reduction in proportion to the achieved part of the project, although no data were collected by the project to validate such an impact.

III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME

A. KEY FACTORS DURING PREPARATION

33. **Scope of the Project.** The project was designed with two components, (i) upgrading of approximately 434.5 km (at the time of PAD) of selected national roads and enhancing connectivity of trade and commerce routes, including construction and its supervision services, based on the priority under Road Sector Development Program Phase 4 (RSDP4) which was the government's strategy at the time of preparation, and (ii) support for



modernization of ERA, with institutional development and capacity building initiatives to enhance the performance of ERA. The scope of the project was based on thorough discussions on the government's priorities. It confirmed intended results and focused capacity building activities aiming at strengthening contract management and safeguards functions within ERA based on the lessons from the past long-term engagement of the Bank in the sector. The selected five road sections were quite distant and remote from each other, but the scope of the works was simple, well aligned with ERA's implementation capacity, and matched the government's RSDP4 higher-level objectives.

34. Results Framework Design. The PDO was essentially output oriented, although the records suggest these were the suggestions from the PCN review and Decision Meetings. The PDO did not capture the institutional strengthening aspects in spite of the intended support for modernization of ERA, but it was captured only in the Intermediate Results Indicators (IRIs). The results indicators were kept straightforward and designed to confirm the outcomes related to the improvement of the rural access, the number of beneficiaries, reduction in travel time in the project roads and the key trade corridor, although the travel time reduction for the entire Addis-Djibouti routes was essentially out of the project's control except for Kombolcha-Mille part of the route. The IRIs were also kept straightforward with confirmation of the project achievements satisfying the standard at the time of appraisal.

35. Preparation Time and Readiness at Appraisal. The project was prepared in quite short period of time --- PCN approval in January 2012 to Appraisal in July and Approval in September 2012. At the time of appraisal, feasibility study of the selected five roads were provided by ERA and reviewed by the Bank team. The three contracts for Mizan-Dima and Kombolcha-Burka-Mille roads were ready for advance procurement towards the awarding by December 2012, and the Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA) and Resettlement Action Plans (RAP) for all the five roads had been cleared and disclosed prior to appraisal. As such, the readiness of the project was reasonably confirmed at the time of appraisal with enough analysis of the risks based on the experience and information available at that time.

36. Risk Assessment. The project risks were realistically assessed based on experience with ERA following the many projects financed in the road sector, but some of the issues recurrently occurred with a difficulty to fundamentally mitigate those risks within the project. The PAD assessed Substantial risks on design and social and environmental aspects. On the design risks, the past projects had cost-overruns attributed to the changes requested by the local communities and administrations and suggested that stronger penalty system to be applied for the poor performance of the design consultants. These mitigation measures were appropriate at that time, and the cost-overrun was reasonably mitigated and captured in one of the IRIs (All construction contracts delivered within 25% of the original estimated time and cost), which was substantially achieved in the completed contracts. On the environmental and social (E&S) risks, the past projects had gaps in E&S safeguards management due to delays and shortcomings in the adequacy and quality of compliance in civil works contracts, and weakness in contractor's organizations and quality of supervision were recognized. The mitigation measures were proposed for early preparation of the safeguard documents and Component 2 TAs, particularly for enhancement of ERA's capacity for contract administration including support for monitoring of E&S management. However, it turned to become a major issue during implementation.

37. The PAD recognized poor management of contractors in work site safety and poor record of basic safety enhancement measures under inadequate traffic management, diversion roads during construction, reduction of dusts and slippery wet-weather conditions. It emphasized the importance of updating contract clauses for workplace health and safety, adequate supervision staffing, reviewing the track record of contractor's safety and



safeguards managements and to take deterrent measures including sanctions or restrictions on qualifications, but those measures were not fully implemented to avoid these occurrences. The capacity of international contractors working in Ethiopia to manage OHS issues was emerging as an issue, but it was difficult to select capable contractors without restricting competition.

38. The security of the project areas at the time of preparation was not recognized as a particular issue.

B. KEY FACTORS DURING IMPLEMENTATION

Status of Physical Works at and after Credit Closing (Component 1)

39. **The civil works contracts were awarded at relatively early stage of the project, but all civil works contracts experienced issues that caused major delays in project implementation and contributed to the above-mentioned shortcomings in terms of the completion of the intended improvements and upgrades of the project roads.** The bids for the first packages (Mizan-Dima and Kombolcha-Burka-Mille roads) were received by November 2012 works started in September 2013, but they had serious delays mainly by contractor performance issues under the Kombolcha-Burka contract, and environmental and the right-of-way handover issues under Mizan-Dima. The Mizan-Dima later had major safeguards compliance issues at its quarry site, which gave rise to a partial suspension of the credit in January 2018 until the project closing. Ambo-Wolliso had significant delays due to the contractor’s weak performance due to financial problems and caused the termination by November 2018, and re-bid and awarded with GoE funds. Debre Birhan-Ankober had experienced two bidding processes, first time the awarded contractor declined to sign the contract. At the second time the contractor was selected, and the contract was signed in July 2017. However, after long delays by the contractor in providing the performance guarantee, a disagreement arose over conditions that needed to be met before the commencement of the works. Ultimately, the contractor never started the works and the parties made use of the provisions in the contract to terminate it, and ERA re-bid and awarded the contract with GoE funds.

40. **The closing date of the credit was brought forward from April 30, 2019 to October 26, 2018 following the request from the Recipient (see para 14 for details).** This Restructuring was followed with a cancellation of SDR 75 million of the credit equivalent to 27.4% of the total credit. This early closing of the project had a financing impact on the other ongoing packages. The following table summarized the status of the six contracts (5 road corridors) at the time of closing and further updates at the time of this ICR.

Table 8: Civil Works Contract Status at Credit Closing and Updates

Contracts	Commencement Date	Status at Closing (as of Oct 26, 2018)	Updated Status (as of April 2019)	Remarks
Ambo Wolliso (64km)	Mar 09, 2015	Works progress 52%	Contract terminated in November 2018 due to contractor’s poor performance.	Re-bid and awarded in March 2019 with expected completion in 2.5 years (funded by GoE).
Kombolcha-Burka (60 km)	Sep 05, 2013	Works completed by Jul 15, 2017	Road opened to traffic	
Burka-Mille (73km)	Sep 02, 2013	Works completed by Mar 07, 2017	Road opened to traffic	
Debre Birhan-Ankober (42km)	Contract signed on Jul 25, 2017	Contract terminated	No works implemented.	Re-bid and awarded funded by GoE with



	but did not commence due to disputes with contractor			expected completion in 2 years.
Mizan-Dima (92km)	Sep 23, 2013	Works progress 84%. Disbursement suspended for safeguards actions since January 9, 2018 until closing.	Works were completed by end April 2019 with government funding.	Bank remained engaged in supervising residual safeguards issues in the project after closing.
Konso-Yabello (105km)	Jun 15, 2015	Works progress 90%	Works completed except for 2km at Konso and 7km at Yabello	Works expected to be fully completed by end April 2020 with government funding.

Status of Support for Modernization of ERA at and after Credit Closing (Component 2)

41. The TA component of the project had four activities, and only two TAs had outputs that contributed partially to the intended institutional strengthening.

- 1) Better Contract and Project Management Practice (Sub-Component 2.A)** was aimed at enhancing ERA’s contract management, project management and safeguards implementation capacity by reviewing current practices, improving and providing training for the use of best practices.

At the time of this ICR, the TA consultant had delivered (i) Manual of quality assurance and supervision services, (ii) Guidelines of risk management, price adjustment, gap analysis and works contract management, (iii) Manuals of claim and dispute management, and (iv) Guidelines of work program evaluation and monitoring.

- 2) Technical Audits and Quality Management (Sub-Component 2.B)** was aimed at enhancing ERA’s capacity to undertake technical auditing of the design and delivery processes by carrying out a technical audit of selected project designs and six completed works contracts and defining procedures for technical auditing and strengthening design review.

At the time of this ICR, the TA consultant had delivered (i) Report on technical auditing of selected design and construction projects, (ii) Report on review of design documents with identification of major gaps and recommendations, (iii) Procurement manual and guidelines, (iv) Short-term training abroad and works visits to institutions abroad, and (v) Report on review of the current quality of design and accountability systems for the completed works.

- 3) Enhancing Road Asset Management Capacity through Performance Based Maintenance Contract (Sub-Component 2.C)** was aimed at monitoring Output and Performance based Road Contract (OPRC) for the designated 654 km of the road network under ERA.

The consultant was under selection process until 2016, but the contract was not signed, and the activity was not implemented. However, using government funds, ERA has prepared and awarded four contracts in 2016 for the repair and maintenance of four roads using an OPRC contract format from another project supported by the Bank (RSSP – P131118).



- 4) **Feasibility and Design Studies for Follow-on Projects (Sub-Component 2.D)** was aimed at providing support to prepare feasibility studies and designs for follow-on projects including environmental and social impact assessments. This activity was not implemented as a consulting service under the project due to the delays in identifying the candidate projects under ERA's priority.

Factors Subject to Government and Implementing Agency Control

42. **The Mizan-Dima contract was one of the first contract signed under the project, but it had significant delays with complex causes.** One of the major issues was the environmental aspects related to the crusher plant at the quarry site of Biftu. Complaints were received from the nearby village on resettlement compensation values, the impact of excessive dust emissions, drainage and damage to the properties during November 2015 to April 2016. The limitation in availability of quarry stone was known at the time of design, and provisions were included in the ESIA and ESMP to limit dust to near villages. The safeguards problems at the quarry site should have been resolved by a combination of relocating people and using a high standard of dust control, but it was not fully managed at site. The contractor failed to implement measures requested by the supervising consultant, and these complaints related to dust emissions and blasting impacts from the quarry site have led to the complex environmental and social issues. Based on the Bank's strong request to address the issue, ERA prepared an Action Plan in February 2017 with Bank's clearance. Most of the actions were implemented within a period of 10 months, and more than 95% of the complainants have obtained appropriate compensation for the damages that occurred, but the full completion of the Action Plan was delayed. The Bank provided a high level of support to ERA to complete the process, but the scope of the activities and limited capacity at local level meant that this was very time consuming for ERA to fully complete them. The delay in the full completion of the Action Plan to address these remaining critical issues eventually led to Bank's decision to partially suspend disbursement on this contract in January 2018, and it continued until the project's closing. Although safeguards issues were highlighted as a significant risk during project preparation and specific mitigation measures were proposed as part of project design, ERA's safeguards capacity remained constrained during project implementation with additional support not materializing quickly enough. In retrospect, it is to be noted that a major increase in ERA's budget and overall workload happened during that period and the pace at which safeguards staff grew did not match this demand¹.

Factors Subject to World Bank Control

43. **The Bank had issued a number of actions and notices to correct the environmental safeguards issues related to Mizan-Dima quarry site since it was brought to the Bank's attention.** The Bank examined and cleared the Action Plan, and closely monitored the time bound actions to address the issues with repeated reminders to ERA, and it suspended the Mizan-Dima related disbursement when the Action Plan implementation became unsatisfactory, and it remained until the project's closing. After closing the Bank continued to follow up by requesting ERA to address consolidated safeguards actions as required by the safeguards policy. The Mizan-Dima contract was finally completed in April 2019, after the credit closing, with substantial completion of the required safeguards actions. At the time of this ICR, few actions remain pending for the completion of the Mizan-Dima Action Plan.

44. The Bank also followed up the other remaining safeguards actions² under all sub-project contract sites (Kombolcha-Burka, Burka-Mille, Konso-Yabelo, Mizan-Dima, Ambo-Woliso) particularly in its letter of February

¹ In 2011 ERA's annual budget was of the order of US\$1.16b. This grew to US\$1.62b in 2012 and US\$2.00b by 2014.

² These required actions were remaining EMP and RAP implementation, compensation to the family of victims of fatal accidents



2019 requesting to complete the actions by the end of March 2019. The Borrower and ERA will continue to implement the project's safeguards requirements until each of the civil works contracts is completed.

Factors outside of the Control of Government and/or Implementing Agency

45. **Some of the project locations, particularly Mizan-Dima sites, had security issues (social unrest) through the works implementation period.** There were security issues on the western part of the Mizan-Dima contract site and major delays in relocating electric poles in the early stage of the project. That made difficulty for the contractors to efficiently implement the works, for ERA to manage the implementation issues, and for the Bank team to periodically monitor the progress and issues. It was a major challenge for ERA to request the electric utility company to carry out the required utility relocation in a timely manner. This was particularly serious for Mizan-Dima. Efforts to improve coordination for utility relocation was made at the national level, but no major improvements were visible at the field level. These issues had been substantial causes of delays for works progress.

46. **The project also suffered from the failed contracts and implementation.** Debre Birhan-Ankober contract was signed but the contractor did not commence the works due to contract disputes and eventually terminated. Ambo-Woliso contract was signed and progress was made until 52%, but it was terminated due to the poor performance of the contractor caused by its financial problems. The failure of these two contracts under the project was beyond what ERA could reasonably control, which led to the request from ERA to the Bank for 6-month early closure of the project and only partial completion (70%) of the intended improvements.

IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

A. QUALITY OF MONITORING AND EVALUATION (M&E)

M&E Design

47. The PDO statement was not outcome oriented but more output based. It also missed to capture the institutional aspect of the project. The outcome could have been better designed and defined to help with its attribution, though the theory of change was logically linked to the higher level of objectives. "The proportion of rural land area within 2 km of an all-season road" was defined as the main PDO indicator and explained as ERA's RSDP4 targets, but its achievement cannot be attributed to the project. The baseline beneficiary population was intended to increase with the improved condition of the project roads as targeted, with the supported number of direct project beneficiaries. "The average travel time on subject roads" was intended to capture the improved travel condition, but it was measured in speed (average speed to be increased from 25 km/hr to 80 km/hr) by the project. The "travel and turnaround time of heavy goods, vehicle on Addis – Mille – Djibouti trade route" was intended to capture the percentage of the corridor length (6 to 5 days – 17%) improved by the project against the entire Addis – Mille – Djibouti trade route, though the condition of the other part of the corridor was not considered in the definition. The overall design was simple and typical outcome indicators, but the relevance of some of the indicators within the project's control was in question.

48. The Intermediate Results Indicators (IRIs) were designed to complement the PDO indicators by capturing the direct outputs of the project for constructed road length and supervision consultancy contracts, and other three

occurred at the project sites, and screening of health and safety risks at communities and its addresses.



indicators (with one disaggregated by gender to ensure the equal opportunity for female professionals) were intended to capture the outputs associated with Component 2 (Modernization of ERA) activities.

M&E Implementation

49. **The M&E data were collected in an acceptable manner defined by ERA**, but the methodology was not clearly defined in detail, and it made the reliability of the data relatively weak.

M&E Utilization

50. **The M&E data utilization for assessing the intermediate performance and results progress was not effective**, since most of the indicators were associated with the final outputs (i.e. road improvements) and can only capture the final outcome. Due to the delays in implementation, most of the results indicators were only effective for assessing the final achievements.

Justification of Overall Rating of Quality of M&E

51. **The overall M&E quality was Modest, as its design for capturing the intended outcome, its implementation and utilization was not very effective.** There were substantial shortcomings in the M&E utilization as it could not monitor the intermediate progress in the project performance. It should have been complemented by the close documentation of the monitoring process, but it was not sufficient in the frequency of reporting during the implementation.

B. ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL, AND FIDUCIARY COMPLIANCE

52. **The project's environmental and social management was Unsatisfactory.** The project was rated with an Environmental Assessment category of A. All the environmental and social safeguards requirements under the project were set out in the Environmental and Social Impact Assessment (ESIAs), Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) and the Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) that were prepared for each civil works site. However, there were a number of compliance issues during implementation of ESMPs in many of the civil works contracts.

53. **In the Mizan-Dima contract, there were environmental safeguards issues under the quarry site, where the excessive dust emissions caused serious complaints from the village dwellers.** It led to a full assessment by ERA following a request of the Bank, and a time-bound Action Plan was agreed to address the identified issues. It however was not fully implemented in some of the critical actions, and it eventually led to partial suspension of the credit disbursement in January 2018 which continued until the credit closing in October 2018.

54. The full implementation of the Action Plan continued to be discussed after the credit closing and the Bank has remained engaged to support ERA in the implementation of the remaining actions, and review and follow up on the completion of safeguards obligations. The completion of the remaining actions was yet to be confirmed at the time of this ICR. The Borrower and ERA will continue to implement the project's safeguard requirements for the remaining civil works.

55. **There were also a number of issues in other contracts related to occupational health and safety, some of which resulted in fatal accidents³.** A Health and Safety Action Plan was prepared and agreed between the Bank

³ In total 19 fatal accidents occurred in the project - 2 fatalities under Kombolcha-Mille, 4 fatalities under Konso-Yabello, 7



and ERA to improve the situation. Substantial training and support on environmental and social safeguards and Health and Safety was provided by the Bank to ERA, their contractors and consultants. Bank's dialogue with ERA had a significant impact in improving the situation and led to the preparation of their ESHS Policy. During the course of the project, an assessment of ERA's institutional management of safeguards was carried out with support from the Bank as part of ERA's modernization process. As a result, the number of environmental and social safeguards staff was increased, separate environmental and social units were established and at the end of 2018 safeguard management was moved to the directorate level.

56. The project's procurement performance was Moderately Satisfactory. Six works contract packages (under Component 1) were planned and bid under the project, and all were awarded in reasonable time. The last awarded contract, Debre Birhan-Ankober had to be rebid and in the second bidding process the lowest evaluated bidder was found to be a state-owned enterprise. This firm was unable to demonstrate its compliance with the eligibility requirements, and ERA recommended to award to the second placed bidder, although it led to the termination after signing.

57. Seven out of the planned eight consulting services were awarded and contracted, out of which five contracts were the construction supervision services (under Component 1) and two contracts were technical assistance services (under Component 2), though some of the processes experienced long delays.

58. The project's financial management was Moderately Satisfactory. The financial management system has provided reasonable assurance that the credit proceeds were properly recorded, though there were some issues during implementation, such as (i) maintaining expenditure budget in addition to cash budget, (ii) financial reporting with budget variances in the statement of budget vs. uses of funds, (iii) closure of entity audit issues.

C. BANK PERFORMANCE

Quality at Entry

59. The project was designed as an integral part of the Bank's continued assistance program building on the previous series of projects with a good understanding of the implementing agency and its needs, particularly in support of RSDP4. The long-term relation between ERA and the Bank facilitated project design and the short preparation period. In retrospect, however, the familiarity-bred confidence on actions that needed to take place during implementation to address some of the identified risks was a shortcoming that eventually led to some of the problems, most notably on readiness, E&S and contract management. The team was under pressure from both GoE and the Bank Management to prepare the project very quickly. The team rightly identified significant safeguards challenges and raised those to Management (including the high level of fatalities in construction sites), discussed and documented them in many places during appraisal, and identified mitigation measures. However, the implementation of such mitigation measures to fully avoid the risks was difficult. The safeguards capacity of ERA was expected to be significantly increased for the project, but it didn't happen quickly enough to address all the safeguards challenges identified during preparation.

60. The PDO statement was not outcome oriented but was more output based (to improve the condition of roads). The outcome could have been better aligned and defined to help with attribution. Of the 4 outcome indicators, the travel time of heavy goods vehicle on Addis-Djibouti trade route was not well defined for attribution, and the same holds for the accessibility index indicator. The readiness of the project was

fatalities under Mizan-Dima, 6 fatalities under Ambo-wolliso during the construction periods.



reasonably confirmed at appraisal, although various causes, such as the availability of right of way, utility relocations, change of design by the city plan changes, which could not be fully confirmed during preparation (at Mizan-Dima, Konso-Yebello roads), and they eventually delayed many of the contracts.

Quality of Supervision

61. The Bank team was mostly based in the Addis Ababa office which allowed the team to follow up regularly, including safeguards trainings and diagnostic reviews. After the complaint regarding Mizan-Dima contract was known, the team spent substantial time reporting and discussing with Bank Management to advise ERA on how to address the issues. The Bank's internal discussion process was time consuming. The team worked closely with ERA to ensure the implementation of the Action Plan. The Bank team had frequent discussions and supported ERA to tackle technical issues and monitoring fiduciary and safeguards aspects throughout the implementation period, but the regular implementation review, issues to be managed and actions to be taken were not fully documented. During almost 6 years of implementation period, the number of mission records were 5 aide-memoires, and there was no record of discussions since the last aide-memoire in December 2016 until the project closing in October 2018. This timing (late 2016) coincides with time that the key project ratings (PDO and Implementation Progress) had started to be downgraded to show warning signs about the project, at which time the supervision records of the project activities should have been strengthened rather than loosened. The ISRs were documented every 6-months until middle of 2015, after which ISRs were only recorded once a year since until last ISR in April 2018 – 6 months before closing, which also was loose for a problem status project.

62. The long intervals between formal communication with the Recipient was unusual as it made difficult to share major issues and create a common understanding of actions between the managements of the Bank and the Recipient. The management letters were issued from time to time on particular serious issues in the project, such as safeguards compliance, but the lack of formal communication based on aide-memoires was significant.

63. **The mid-term review mission of the project was not conducted.** There were some disagreements between the consultant who prepared the MTR report, and ERA/Bank team on the issues noted in the draft mid-term review report, but there was no record of these discussions, and this made difficult to recognize the mid-term implementation status and direction of improvements to be shared and tackled at the critical time.

Justification of Overall Rating of Bank Performance

64. **The overall Bank performance was Unsatisfactory** based on the combined assessments of the Quality at Entry and the Quality at Supervision, but mainly influenced by the shortcomings during implementation.

D. RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME

65. **The risk of delivering the remaining activities after the project closing is considered Moderate.** The project had many difficulties and issues with extensive delays, but it was substantially completed at the time of closing except for the remaining works. The government was committed to conduct the remaining works with sustainable budget under RSDP4 program. Among the remaining activities in road improvement works at the time of closing (refer to Table 3), the Mizan-Dima road was completed by April 2019. Konso-Yabello road was substantially completed by April 2019 with the remaining 7+2 km sections expected by April 2020. The terminated contract of Ambo-Woliso road was rebid and awarded to a national contractor in March 2019 with



an implementation period of 2.5 years. The Debre Birhan-Ankober Road was also rebid and awarded with the implementation period of 3 years at the time of this ICR. However, the maintenance of the improved roads after the project and thereby impact sustainability of the project will remain as a risk.

66. Although it will take much longer time than expected under the project, these civil works improvement outputs are likely to lead to the intended achievement of PDO by the time of these completion, as the outcome of the project is directly linked to the output achievements of the physical works as described.

V. LESSONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

67. The readiness of civil works contract, such as right of way availability, social safeguards aspects particularly related to land acquisition, resettlements and compensation, utility relocation timeframe and arrangements, should be thoroughly assessed during the project preparation to avoid suspension of works after the contract commencement. Preparation of a project with a longstanding partner needs as much care as with a new partner to confirm that all measures put forward in project design are implementable. The very short preparation time and the assumptions that needed actions to address identified risks were feasible may point out to an overconfidence in the capacity of the longstanding partner. At the time of appraisal, the project looked ready for implementation with the three contracts (Kombolcha-Burka, Burka-Mille and Mizan-Dima sections) which had been ready for bidding and award soon after the signing of the Financing Agreement, and they were indeed awarded by September 2013. It however turned out that Kombolcha-Mille contracts took until July 2017, and Mizan-Dima had continued until April 2019 to complete all the works. There were many different reasons for the delays in each contract. In Mizan-Dima, substantial part of the delay was due to right of way issues caused by the change of the city plan to accommodate wider roadways, delays in relocation of utilities, environmental issues at the quarry site and the security issues in project area. The assessment of the readiness and potential risks for works implementation, particularly related to social aspects, should be carefully conducted to minimize the delays after works commencement. A substantial part of right of way clearance should be completed before contract awards. Amendments to the scope of work after contract award, often requested by local administrations, should not be accepted by ERA.

68. In case of ‘multi-packaged independent sub-project roads’, where developments/improvements of each sub-project are independent, opportunities for partial cancellation/extension should be examined to maximize the financing of the other project roads. Road development/improvement projects typically consist of two types: (i) linear road network or single corridor whose impacts are closely related, and (ii) package of independent sub-project roads. TSP was a typical project of the latter type. When each sub-project is independent, their problems and issues are also independent in nature. When some of the sub-projects causes delays or serious problems to continue the whole project, the possibility of a partial cancellation should be considered before closing the entire project. The project was closed 6 months earlier than the original closing date due to the substantial delays and terminations in Ambo-Woliso and Debre Birhan-Ankober contracts, and the Recipient requested earlier project closing to reflect it in its implementation strategy and finance the remaining activities from its own resources. If these sections were partially cancelled, then the rest of the project roads could have been continued to be financed toward the original closing date. The partial cancellation should be flexibly utilized for multi-package projects to maximize the initially intended financing of the project components.

69. The PDO indicators should be designed to reflect only the achievements under control of the project. One of the key PDO indicators, “Travel and turnaround time of heavy goods, vehicle on Addis-Mille-Djibouti trade



route”, was not achieved in spite of the intended full completion of Kombolcha-Mille corridor. It was the part of the trade route and a bottleneck at the time of project design, so it was supposed to contribute to the travel time saving of the entire trade route, but it was degraded due to the deterioration of other part of the trade route in the territory of Djibouti, which was outside of the project’s scope of work. The results indicator should be designed to reflect the intervention under the project’s control.

70. The institutional strengthening aspect of the project should be captured in the PDO to link as a results chain of the project’s intervention (activities) and outputs to the intended outcome. The interventions (Component 2 activities) and their outputs were measured with IRIs, but their intended outcome was not captured in the PDO. This made the attention to the institutional strengthening aspect of the project particularly weak.



ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS

A. RESULTS INDICATORS

A.1 PDO Indicators

Objective/Outcome: To improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads, being upgraded

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Proportion of rural land area within 2km of an all-season road (Rural Access Index)	Percentage	17.80	40.00		36.90
		30-Jun-2011	30-Apr-2019		26-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):

The data source of the indicator is for RSDP4 for the whole country, as per the PAD. The target was not achieved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Direct project beneficiaries	Number	1943400.00	2325900.00		1983354.00
		01-Jan-2013	30-Apr-2019		26-Oct-2018
Female beneficiaries	Percentage	50.00	50.00		50.00



Comments (achievements against targets):

The number of beneficiaries were lower than the target due to the limited completion of the project roads.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Travel Time of Heavy Goods Vehicle on Addis - Mille - Djibouti trade route (Days)	Days	6.00 30-Jun-2011	5.00 30-Apr-2019		6.00 26-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):

Target was not achieved in spite of the improvements of Kombolcha-Mille corridor as other part of Addis-Djibouti trade route had deteriorated during the project period, and consequently the total travel and turnaround time of the entire Addis-Djibouti trade route was not improved.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Average travel time on subject roads at completion compared with pre-construction base-line	Text	25 30-Jun-2011	80 30-Apr-2019		70.00 26-Oct-2018



(km/hr)

Comments (achievements against targets):

The achieved average travel speed measured on the completed road sections, but it was still lower than the target.

A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators

Component: Upgrading of Regional and Link Roads

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Roads constructed, non-rural	Kilometers	0.00 30-Jun-2012	434.50 30-Apr-2019		305.00 26-Oct-2018

Comments (achievements against targets):

Target only partly achieved for the upgraded roads under the project.

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of Supervision	Number	0.00	6.00		5.00



Contracts awarded		30-Jun-2012	30-Apr-2019		26-Oct-2018
<p>Comments (achievements against targets): Original target intended 6 supervision contracts against 6 civil works, but the supervision contract for Kombolcha-Burka and Burka-Mille was combined to one contract. Hence the intended target is essentially achieved.</p>					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
All construction contracts delivered within 25% of the original estimated time and cost	Yes/No	N 31-Dec-2012	Y 30-Apr-2019		Y 26-Oct-2018
<p>Comments (achievements against targets): All the construction contracts delivered were within 25% of the original estimated time and cost,.</p>					

Component: Support to Modernize ERA

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Number of person-days of	Number	0.00	4290.00		4160.00



professional training done under the TA components		31-Dec-2012	30-Apr-2019		26-Oct-2018
Percentage of female professionals trained (as a percentage of total people trained)	Percentage	0.00	20.00		18.00
Comments (achievements against targets): The conducted number of person-days of professional training was close to the target but still less than that.					

Indicator Name	Unit of Measure	Baseline	Original Target	Formally Revised Target	Actual Achieved at Completion
Concept Design and Bid Documentation for OPRC contract prepared	Yes/No	N 31-Dec-2012	Y 30-Apr-2019		Y 31-May-2019
Comments (achievements against targets): The intended TA was not implemented, but ERA has prepared and awarded OPRC contracts with its own funds.					



B. KEY OUTPUTS BY COMPONENT

Objective/Outcome 1: To improve the condition of priority regional trade corridors and link roads being upgraded under this project	
Outcome Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Population of rural land area within 2 km of an all-season road2. Direct project beneficiaries3. Female beneficiaries4. Travel time of heavy goods vehicle on Addis-Mille-Djibouti trade route5. Average travel time on subject roads at completion compared with pre-construction base-line
Intermediate Results Indicators	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Roads constructed, non-rural2. Number of supervision contracts awarded3. Number of person-days of professional training done under the TA components4. Percentage of female professionals trained (as a percentage of total people trained)5. All construction contracts delivered within 25% of the original estimated time and cost6. Concept design and bid documentation for OPRC contract prepared
Key Outputs by Component (linked to the achievement of the Objective/Outcome 1)	<ol style="list-style-type: none">1. Regional and link roads upgraded with acceptable design and quality2. Modernization of ERA supported with (i) Contract and project management improved, (ii) Audits and quality management improved, (iii) Capacity of road asset management enhanced, (iv) Design and feasibility reports on follow-on projects prepared



ANNEX 2. BANK LENDING AND IMPLEMENTATION SUPPORT/SUPERVISION

A. TASK TEAM MEMBERS

Name	Role
Preparation	
Fiona Collin	Task Team Leader
Rodrigo Archondo-Callao	Sr. Highway Engineer
Jonathan David Pavluk	Sr. Counsel
Yeshi Gizaw	Program Assistant
Yasmin Tayyab	Sr. Social Development Specialist
Shalonda Robinson	Program Assistant
Tesfamichael Nahusenay	Sr. Transport Engineer
Richard Martin Humphreys	Sr. Transport Economist
Tesfaye Ayele	Sr. Procurement Specialist
Haileyesus Adamtei	Highway Engineer
Bernard Aritua	Young Professional
Asferachew Abate Abebe	Environmental Specialist
Lillian Brenda Namutebi	Financial Management Specialist
Charles Boudry	Legal and Policy Specialist
Supervision/ICR	
James Robert Markland	Task Team Leader(s)
Binyam Bedelu Mekbib, Pascal Tegwa	Procurement Specialist(s)
Bogalech Admasu Berhane	Financial Management Specialist
Messeret Marcos	Team Member
Gaurav D. Joshi	Environmental Specialist
Chukwudi H. Okafor	Social Specialist
Desta Wolde Woldearegay	Program Assistant
Abiy Demissie Belay	Financial Management Specialist



Haileyesus Adamtei Mengesha	Highway Specialist
Simon Sottsas	Social Specialist
Nunush Elias	Program Assistant
Bereket Belayhun Woldemeskel	Governance Specialist
Yacob Wondimkun Endaylalu	Environmental Specialist
Zenebe Tilahun Abayneh	Highway Engineer

B. STAFF TIME AND COST

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost	
	No. of staff weeks	US\$ (including travel and consultant costs)
Preparation		
FY11	11.866	66,589.97
FY12	41.186	235,853.24
FY13	28.055	124,587.16
FY14	1.657	1,977.72
Total	82.76	429,008.09
Supervision/ICR		
FY13	6.625	52,293.55
FY14	29.002	98,925.53
FY15	23.142	102,524.80
FY16	22.240	117,497.18
FY17	30.259	180,188.30
FY18	46.116	317,185.75
FY19	27.965	234,409.60
FY20	3.900	23,362.94
Total	189.25	1,126,387.65



ANNEX 3. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT

Components	Amount at Approval (US\$M)	Actual at Project Closing (US\$M)	Percentage of Approval (%)
Civil Works and Works Supervision	374.02	259.67	77.1
Support To Modernize ERA	10.00	3.00	33.3
Contingency	77.0	0	0.0
Total	461.11	262.67	60.0



ANNEX 4. COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS

I. Summary

1.1 Introduction

The cost-benefit analysis is based on the feasibility for the Upgrading of Kombolcha – Burka – Mille, Konso-Yabello and Mizan - Dima.

This short note is prepared to update the economic results of each of the road under consideration due to the change in cost and traffic of the projects.

Under this report the following roads are covered:

- **Kombolcha – Bati – Mille (133.1 km)**
- **Konso – Yabello (105 km)**
- **Mizan – Dima (91.6 km)**

A number of assumptions have been considered upon revision of the economic analysis. The results of the economic viability of the roads have been modified taking into consideration recent projects disbursement and updated traffic figures. Moreover, the analysis period has been changed to incorporate the current starting period of construction.

1.2 Methodology

The HDM IV model that was developed by the World Bank has been used for the analysis for sake of consistency with the original analysis. The proposed option (which is recommended by the Feasibility Study consultant) has been compared with a “do minimum” case. The “do minimum case” assumes that a minimum amount of maintenance of the existing road will be carried out. The economic analysis is based on benefits to road traffic (in terms of savings in vehicle operating costs (VOCs) & road maintenance costs) compared with the costs of upgrading and maintenance. Discounted benefits are then compared to discounted costs to produce measures of worth.

The results are expressed in Economic Internal Rates of Return (EIRRs) and Net Present Values (NPV). The basic concept of economic evaluation is to maximize the returns on investment. Costs are expressed in terms of financial and economic costs. The financial costs are market prices that the consumers pay.

However, economic costs explain the true cost of resource consumption. Financial costs have been converted to economic costs by subtracting taxes; levies and duties, the latter, in fact, from the national economic point of view, represent a transfer payment to the government.

To be acceptable for implementation, the proposed investments have to result in an EIRR of at least equal to the opportunity cost of capital in Ethiopia, which is set at 10.23 percent. NPV's are calculated using opportunity cost of capital as the discount rate.

1.3 Construction Alternatives

The construction and maintenance alternatives for the HDM-IV analysis have been defined based on the improvement options identified for each road. For each alternative defined, a set of maintenance and



improvement standards is assigned. The maintenance and improvement standards define the work items to be carried out on the project road over the analysis period. The different alternatives proposed for each road are presented below.

Table 1: Alternatives for project Roads

Project road	Alt 1	Alt 2
Kombolcha – Bati – Mille (133.1 km) Konso – Yabello (105 km) Mizan – Dima (91.6 km)	Do Minimum	AC Option

The road is open to traffic for Kombolcha – Burka - Mille in year 2018 and Konso – Yabello and Mizan – Dima in the year 2020 the analysis period is assumed to cover 20 years period.

1.4 Construction Cost

The construction cost of the projects are presented below in detail. The financial construction and maintenance costs have been converted into economic costs by applying a conversion factor of 0.94. A discount rate of 10.23% has been used for the opportunity cost of capital. Total Financial and Economic Construction cost of the projects as pre the contract signed and final disbursement presented below table:

Table 2: Financial and Economic Cost of the Projects after implementation including supervision cost (without ROW & Taxes)

Item No.	Project Name	Length (in km)	Total Construction Cost	Total Economic Cost	Per km Final Cost (Million ETB)	Per km Economic Cost (Million ETB)
1	Kombolcha – Bati – Mille	133.1	2999.46	2819.50	22.54	21.18
	Kombolcha – Burka	60.03	1712.42	1609.68	28.53	26.81
	Burka – Mille	73.1	1287.04	1209.82	17.61	16.56
2	Konso – Yabello	107	1053.73	990.51	9.85	9.26
3	Mizan – Dima	91.6	1367.96	1285.88	14.93	14.04

Table 3: Financial Cost of the Projects as pre contract signed and Disbursement as of May, 2019 (CW+SUP+ROW+ 15% VAT+ Taxes)

Project Name	Length (in km)	As per the Contract (in million ETB)	Actual Disbursement (May 2019, in million ETB)	Increasing Cost (in %)
Kombolcha – Bati - Mille	133.1	2942.96	3044.61	3.45
Kombolcha - Burka	60.03	1605.8	1687.94	5.11
Burka – Mille	73.07	1337.1	1356.67	1.46
Konso – Yabello	107	1227.57	1085.36	-11.58
Mizan – Dima	91.6	1160.44	1637.10	41.08
Total	331.7	5331.0	5767.07	9.02



Table 4: Financial Cost of the Projects as pre contract signed and actual Disbursement for works, by each section

Project Name	Length (in km)	As per the Contract (in million ETB) without supervision	Actual Disbursement (May,2019, in million ETB) without supervision	Increasing Cost (in %)
Komblocha – Bati - Mille	133.1	2844.5	2926.6	2.89
Kombolcha - Burka	60.03	1558.85	1639.6	5.18
Burka – Mille	73.07	1285.67	1287.0	0.11
Konso – Yabello (105 km)	107	1200.6	1017.7	-15.24
Mizan – Dima	91.6	1125.37	1311.9	16.57
Total		5170.5	5256.2	2

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



Table 5: Financial Cost of Supervision as pre contract signed and actual Disbursement

Project Name	Length (in km)	As per the Contract (in million ETB)	Actual Disbursement (May,2019,in million ETB)	Increasing Cost (in %)
Komblocha – Bati - Mille	133.1	98.4	72.8	-26.0
Kombolcha - Burka	60.03	47.0	36.4	-22.5
Burka - Mille	73.07	51.5	36.4	-29.2
Konso – Yabello	107	27.0	56.1	107.9
Mizan - Dima	91.6	35.1	36.1	2.9
Total	331.7	160.5	165.0	14.8



Traffic projections on the project road have taken into account past & future trend in GDP growth, population increase, agricultural activities, tourism, AADT, vehicle fleet and fuel consumption. These are among the major factors influencing traffic growth rates on the project road.

It is assumed that the current fairly high level of traffic growth rates will reduce in the future as the economy stabilizes to steady growth. Thus, sets of growth rates have been estimated for the period 2019 & 2020 and 2028.

Traffic Projections

The table below shows the Average Annual Daily Traffic after implementation of the project roads.

Table 6: Average Annual Daily Traffic (before and after implementation)

No	Direction	Year	Car	L/R	S/Bus	L/Bus	S/T	M/T	H/T	Truck & Trailer	Total
1	Komblocha – Bati - Mille	2006	6	67	121	40	81	84	76	113	476
		2013	4	51	138	34	78	69	54	110	538
		2016	33	124	273	33	131	85	71	200	951
2	Konso – Yabello	2008	0	51	62	8	35	58	39	3	256
		2013	1	119	123	53	63	55	36	21	471
		2018	1	96	124	20	95	104	64	41	545
3	Mizan - Dima	2006	21	93	10	0	73	21	26	2	246
		2013	31	85	14	0	54	28	35	1	248
		2018	99	180	155	13	262	86	124	20	939

Source: ERA Traffic Count and Supervision consultant count for Mizan - Dima

As it is depicted in the table below, the traffic along the main roads has revealed a rapid increase in volume of traffic. The traffic growth in all upgraded projects under TSP in support of RSDP IV has significantly increased. The following chart shows the comparison of volume of traffic before and after the intervention of the road



projects under TSP in support of RSDP IV program.

Comparison of traffic data on TSP in support of RSDP IV with before and after completed stage.




Table 7: Assumed Traffic Growth Rates (Percent per Annum)

	Car	L/R	S/Bus	L/Bus	S/TR	M/TR	H/TR	T/TR
Komblocha – Bati – Mille								
2019 – 2028	9.65	9.65	9.65	9.65	10.72	10.72	7.47	7.47
2028 - 2038	8.76	8.76	8.76	8.76	10.07	10.07	6.82	6.82
Konso – Yabello								
2020-2028	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.4	9.8	9.8	9.8	9.8
2028-2037	8.7	8.7	8.7	8.7	9.1	9.1	9.1	9.1
Mizan – Dima								
2020-2028	10.4	10.4	8.5	7.8	8.5	8.5	8.5	9.1
2028-2037	8.4	6.4	6.7	6.2	6.7	6.7	6.7	7.3



Benefit -15 %

Table 8: Assumed Traffic Growth Rates (Percent per Annum)

	Car	L/R	S/Bus	L/Bus	S/TR	M/TR	H/TR	T/TR
Komblocha – Bati – Mille								
2019 – 2028	7.3	8.2	8.2	8.2	9.1	9.1	6.3	6.3
2028 - 2038	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	8.6	8.6	5.8	5.8
Konso – Yabello								
2020-2028	8	8	8	8	8.3	8.3	8.3	8.3
2028-2037	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.4	7.7	7.7	7.7	7.7
Mizan – Dima								
2020-2028	8.8	8.8	7.2	6.6	7.2	7.2	7.2	7.7
2028-2037	7.1	5.4	5.7	5.3	5.7	5.7	5.7	6.2

1.6 Economic Analysis Results

The results of economic analysis using HDM-IV model for the project road before and after implementation are summarized below.

Table 9: Results of the Economic Analysis before and after implementation (IRR in % and NPV in million Birr)

	Length (km)	Before Implementation (Feasibility)				After Implementation (Ex-Post)			
		Base Case		Benefit -20%		Base Case		Benefit -20%	
		IRR	NPV	IRR	NPV	IRR	NPV	IRR	NPV
Komblocha – Bati - Mille	133.1	15.6	1,613.85	14.5	1,213.21	29.1	12,929.0	27.4	10,321.4
Konso – Yabello	107	14	336.3	12.2	169.8	44.7	12,283	42.6	9,713.0
Mizan – Dima	91.6	17	663.4	15	443.8	32.4	4,095.89	31.4	3,526.1

1.7 Sensitivity Analysis

The benefit estimates which mainly deals with traffic forecasting involve uncertainties. Sensitivity analysis has been carried out by changing benefit estimates. The results of the sensitivity analysis are given in the above table. The results indicate the project option have a high economic rate of return.



ANNEX5. BORROWER, CO-FINANCIER AND OTHER PARTNER/STAKEHOLDER COMMENTS

ERA's Comments on the ICR

Dear James,

I hope all is well with you.

I am writing you this mail to express ERA's concern/reservation on the Bank's Draft ICR, particularly regarding the points that have been raised on the report under section III, for which it is also remembered that we have put some key remarks vide our email dated August 16, 2018.

The points and facts stated under the aforesaid email being the case; we would like to draw the Bank Team's attention on the following key process and taken action on Mizan - Dima Road Project to recall the Employer's effort with its role/jurisdiction as per the bilateral loan agreement and the respective project contract agreement.

As you may recall, it is vividly mentioned on the Engineering report of the project and verified by the Supervision Consultant upon design review preparation that except on two locations i.e. at Km 39+000 and Km 80+500, there is no sufficient material source on the project corridor that could address the project quality constructions material requirement and satisfy its quarry demand.

To this end; though the Km 80+500 quarry has sufficient material and qualify the required quality tests, due to major security problem on the vicinity, it was difficult to access the aforesaid quarry and as a result of such prohibiting factor, the Supervision Consultant endorsed and recommended the Contractor to use the quarry site at KM 39+000 (Biftu Quarry) with appropriate precaution. Accordingly; as per the Supervision Consultant's instructions and pursuant to the requirements of the signed contract, the Contractor has submitted utilization action plan vide its site specific environment and social management proposal.

Consequently; as you may well recall, in view of the Supervision Consultant's recommendation and taking in to account the approval of site specific environmental and social management plan, the quarry site and crushing yard at Km 39+000 has been handed over to Contractor after clearing obstructions as per the requirements of the contract and the applicable pertinent regulations for the expropriation of landholdings of Ethiopia.

Nevertheless; after the elapse of two solid years since the Contractor started using the said quarry area, we have received complaint from one local resident. In accordance with the local resident complaint, we assigned in house sociologists and environmentalists to investigate the matter; concurrently, in consultation with your team, the procurement process and Terms of Reference preparation for assignment of independent expert commenced.

On side of the ongoing investigation and the findings by the in house safeguard team on the Local Resident/Farm owner complaint; by getting the approval from the bank team on the TOR and the procurement process, two independent experts (Sociologist and environmentalist) have been assigned to make depth analysis and investigation on the subject matter of concern as well as impacts that might come due to the Contractor's Blasting and crushing operation.

As a result, the Independent Experts put forward their findings on December 2016 and it was learnt from the expert findings that the AOI has to be 150m from the center of crusher and the Blasting site (quarry) as well as pay the relevant compensation to all PAPs that located under the demarked



imaginary buffer zone. In effect, ERA paid the compensation to PAPs under the recommended AOI. Here shall be noted that; as per the expert findings, it was noted that there is no any damage that occur on the initial complaint.

All the above process being the case; it is remembered that, yet again, the Bank has requested to make further investigation on the effects on the Local Farm lands and in particular to the production loss due to Contractor's crushing operation. As per the Bank's Team request, ERA has assigned Jimma Agricultural Institute Experts to make investigation on agricultural production loss on the local firm due to the crushing activity.

However; while the above requested assessment was under performance, surprisingly, through a letter dated 8th January 2017 addressed to MOFEC, the Bank has mentioned that it has decided for the partial suspension of disbursement for the Mizan – Dimma Road Project that was agreed on bilateral loan agreement via credit No. 5155. *Here again, in contrary to the ICR, the disbursement suspension was imposed prior to the preparation of agreed action plan and on the time of the Employer doing its best for the compliance requirement of the bilateral loan agreement.*

Following the partial suspension of disbursement; joint discussion has been held between the Bank delegates for Ethiopian Transport Portfolio and ERA representatives to identify critical issues that remain to be addressed for the compliance of the Bank requirement to waive the suspension and overall improvement of the subject project safeguard issues. To this effect, detail action plan that comprises eight tasks has been prepared (*please refer the attached letter with Ref. No AK4/7/8-dated 18th December 2017*). Further; the aforementioned action plan has centered on addressing the project's core Social safeguard shortcomings along with the counter remedial measures and time frame for the correction of the same within 3 months since the issuance of the suspension letter.

Consequently; by pursuing every identified steps on the abovementioned action plan, it can be justified that *apart from the implementation of LRP, the remaining action plan/requirement for the waiver of suspension has been substantially completed within 3 months of time*

Upon the implementation of the agreed action plan;

- **For the damage due to inconvenience of the contractor operation for more than 4000 PAPs compensation payment made. (All evidence sent to the Bank)**
- **More than 15million Birr paid as a compensation for crop production loss that for PAPs' located in agreed AOI in line with Bank endorsed compensation formula (Testimony for same sent to the Bank)**
- **For 372 household, compensation paid due to contractor's blasting damage**
- **25 vulnerable groups getting monthly payments and 20 corporate groups established to have own business.**

Generally, it can be concluded that more than 95% of the actual complaints has got appropriate compensation for the damage that happened on them or their property.

While in spite of all the above Employer's efforts, under the section III No 42 of the ICR, it is overwhelming to see the implementing agency (ERA) blamed and note that as if it has delayed to respond and address complaints in timely manner which is very far from the actual scenario of the project.

Moreover; we are of the strong position that, the amount of the effected compensation payment and



satisfaction of more than 95% PAPs is quite agreeable evidence and testimony for ERA's timely and accurate management of such complex complaints (*please refer the attached letter with Ref. No AH/388/5-4016 30th March 2018*) In fact, there were some requests that came from the Bank side after the issuance and compliance of the agreed action plan to be incorporated as annexed action plan. But most of it doesn't have legitimate ground and lacks actual contemporary evidence.

Finally; as we have mentioned repeatedly while processing to address all safeguard related matters of the captioned project, we would like to stress and highlight on the very fact that for any PAP that has major frustration on the process in place for treatment of PAPs compensation and as a result has an interest for claim, the Country's judiciary system is active and open to address any issues.

Again under section III No 42 of the ICR, it is indicated that ERA has prepared action plan on February 2017 and its implementation has been delayed. Nevertheless, the action plan was prepared after the issuance of the suspension letter and it has been completed substantially within 3 month time after the notification of the suspension. (Please refer our attached letter with Ref.No: AH1/396/5-4068 dated 28th February 2018).

On the report it is also mentioned that as if the consultant has not got support from ERA. However, on your report it is not indicated that on which point and direction the Consultant was not supported. Basically, as you know it very well, ERA was paying compensation and cleared obstruction as well as prepared land for the construction based on the Consultant's recommendation. Without prejudice to this fact, it is preferable for the Bank to exclusively mention, under the report, the area that the Consultant was not supported by ERA to take action and appropriate response if required.

The above being said; generally, we are of the strong opinion that the draft ICR report has not considered and disregarded ERA's effort and spent resources as well as the actual public satisfaction with respect to addressing the complaint and accordingly, we would like to kindly advice the Bank team to make appropriate correction on the Final ICR report by making due consideration to the actions taken and significant achievements made on the 8 identified critical safeguard related focus areas.

Finally; we would like to kindly notify the Bank's Team that for any ambiguities and/or clarification required in relation to the step by step measures taken to address the Safeguard related matters of the Mizan – Dimma Road Project and in particular to the actions taken prior to and after the issuance of Partial Suspension, we will be more than glad to forward the needed and avail documentary evidences justifying what are indicated on the above sections of this mail, we remain,

Yours Sincerely;



ANNEX 6. LIST OF SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS

1. The World Bank, *Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4: Project Appraisal Document* (No. 70817-ET), August 29, 2012
2. The World Bank, *Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4: Financing Agreement* (No. 5155-ET), October 18, 2012
3. The World Bank, *Aide-Memoires of Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4* from 2012 to 2018
4. The World Bank, *Implementation Status and Results Reports for Transport Sector Project in Support of RSDP4* from 2013 to 2018
5. The World Bank, *Country Partnership Framework for Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia for the period FY18-FY22* (No. 115135-ET), May 22, 2017
6. Ethiopian Roads Authority, *Borrower's Implementation Completion Report, TSP in Support of RSDP4* (Cr. No. 5155-ET), July 2019



ANNEX 7. PROJECT LOCATION MAP

