Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
Tajikistan Risk
and
Resilience
Assessment
APRIL 2017
1
1
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Cover design and text layout: Duina Reyes-Bakovic
Table of Contents
Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................................................................................................................5
Executive Summary ..............................................................................................................................................................7
I. Introduction........................................................................................................................9
II. Context and History...........................................................................................................12
A. Context – Demography, Economy, Development Trends ............................................................................................12
B. Tajikistan’s Civil War ....................................................................................................................................................13
C. Recent Violence and Instability in Tajikistan .............................................................................................................14
III. Fragility, Conflict and Violence (FCV) - Priority Risks...........................................................15
A. Governance Risks – Cross-Cutting .............................................................................................................................15
B. Economic Risks ...........................................................................................................................................................16
C. Regionalism, Equity, and Inclusion Risks ...................................................................................................................21
D. Cross-Border and Global Risks ....................................................................................................................................25
IV. Potential triggers/scenarios...............................................................................................28
V. Sources of Resilience..........................................................................................................29
VI. Recommendations: World Bank Support through the Risk Mitigation Regime...................32
A. Background and Current World Bank Approach .........................................................................................................32
B. Tajikistan and The Risk Mitigation Regime..................................................................................................................33
Recommendations - New Programming ........................................................................................................................34
Recommendations Toward an ‘FCV Sensitive’ Portfolio ..................................................................................................36
Recommendations – Process Support.............................................................................................................................38
Annex 1 - References..............................................................................................................................................................41
List of Tables
Table 1: Freedom House Nations in Transit Ratings and Averaged Score........................................................................17
Table 2: Remittances to Tajikistan - Net Inflow in USD (million) per month....................................................................20
Table 3. Social Group Membership and Percentage Who Attended a Meeting of theOrganization in the
Past Year...........................................................................................................................................................................24
Table 4. Life in Transition III Key Findings........................................................................................................................29
Table 5: Considerations – Enhancing FCV Sensitivity In The WB Portfolio.......................................................................37
Table 6: Illustrative Indicators – Risk Monitoring System................................................................................................39
3
List of Boxes
Box 1: RRA Sources..........................................................................................................................................................10
Box 2: Summary - Sub-Regions impacted by Conflict/At Risk.........................................................................................23
List of Figures
Figure 1: Topographic Map of Tajikistan..........................................................................................................................12
Figure 2: GNI per capita, Atlas method ...........................................................................................................................12
Figure 3: RRA framework – Key risks................................................................................................................................16
Figure 4: New business density in Tajikistan ..................................................................................................................18
Figure 5: How Tajikistan and comparator economies rank on the ease of doing business (2016).................................18
Figure 6: How far has Tajikistan come in the areas measured by Doing Business?.........................................................19
Figure 7: Ratios of remittance inflows to GDP (for the “top ten” remittance-receiving countries)..................................20
Figure 8: Unemployment rate in Tajikistan (2000-2013)................................................................................................21
Figure 9: Locations – Conflict Events During Civil War (1992 – 1997)............................................................................22
Figure 10: Locations – Conflict Events in Post-War Period/Recent Violence (1998 – 2015).............................................22
Figure 11: Conflict Events (1998-2015) and Poverty Rates.............................................................................................22
Figure 12: Conflict Events (1998-2015) and Non-Monetary Poverty Measures..............................................................22
Figure 13: Youth Idleness................................................................................................................................................23
Figure 14: Suicide fighters by nationality ......................................................................................................................25
Figure 15: Life satisfaction: percentage of respondents who are satisfied with life, all things considered.....................29
Figure 16: Personal Life Satisfaction...............................................................................................................................30
Figure 17: Do Representatives on the Mahalla Committee Work for the Community or Do They Work
for the State? ...................................................................................................................................................................30
Figure 18: New Programming Areas in Response to RRA-Identified Risks......................................................................34
Acknowledgements
The Risk and Resilience Assessment was prepared by a team jointly led by the Social, Urban, Rural and Resilience (GSURR) Global Practice and Fragility,
Conflict and Violence Cross-Cutting Solutions Area (FCV CCSA), in close cooperation with the Tajikistan Country Management Unit (CMU) under the leader-
ship of Patricia Veevers-Carter, Country Manager. The RRA core team was co-led by Holly Benner, Senior Social Development Specialist/GSURR and Radhika
Srinivasan, Lead Operations Officer/FCV CCSA and included Julia Komagaeva, Country Operations Officer; Sobir Kurbanov, Consultant; Jennifer Murtazashvili,
Consultant; Paul Quinn-Judge, Consultant; and Robert Wrobel, Senior Social Development Specialist. The team is grateful to the Tajikistan country team, in-
cluding the CMU and task teams based in Dushanbe and Washington D.C., for their collaborative efforts on the RRA development process and their excellent
support to the RRA mission in February-March 2017. A special thanks to Sarosh Sattar, Senior Economist and Kimberly Johns and the Governance Global
Practice for their contributions in developing the RRA draft.
4
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ACP Agriculture Commercialization Project EFCA Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia
ACLED Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Base EITI Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative
ADB Asian Development Bank EU European Union
AF Additional Financing FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence
AKF Aga Khan Foundation FSAP Financial System Assessment Program
ALG Accountability in Local Government FY Fiscal Year
(survey) GBAO Gorno-Badakshan Autonomous Oblast
ASA Analytical and Advisory Services GDP Gross Domestic Product
BEEPS Business Enterprise Survey GNI Gross National Income
CA Central Asia GOT Government of Tajikistan
CAEWDP Central Asia Energy and Water Development GPSA Global Partnership for Social Accountability
Program
GTD Global Terrorism Database
CARS4 Central Asia Road Links
HPP Hydropower Plant
CASA1000 Central Asia South Asia Power Transmission
Line IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development
CAMP4ASB Climate Adaptation and Mitigation Program
for Aral Sea Basin IFIs International Financial Institutions
CCSA Cross-Cutting Solution Area IDA International Development Association
CPF Country Partnership Framework ICG International Crisis Group
CPS Country Partnership Strategy ICCT International Center for Counter-Terrorism
CPI Consumers Price Inflation IFC International Finance Corporation
CPIA Country Portfolio Instituional Assessment IED Identified Explosive Devise
CSO Civil Society Organizations IMU Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
CSP Community Suport Program IMF International Monetary Fund
CE Citizens Engagement IOM International Organization for Migration
CLD Community Led Development IRPT Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan
CMU Country Management Unit IS Islamic State
DSA Debt Sustainability Analysis ISIS Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Levanta
DCC Development Coordination Council IWMI International Water Management Institute
DFID UK Department for International KWH Kilowatt Per Hour
Development LDC Local Development Committee
DRM Disaster Risk Management LGA Local Governance Assessment
DPF Development Policy Financing LGP Local Governance Project
EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and LITS Life in Transition Survey
Development
L2T Listening to Tajikistan Survey
ECA Europe and Central Asia
5
MDI Multi-Dimensional Poverty Index PREM Poverty Reduction and Economic
Management
MFI Microfinance Institutions
PSD Private Sector Development
MOF Ministry of Finance
RRA Risk and Resilience Assessment
MOEDT Ministry of Economic Development and
Trade RMR Risk Mitigation Regime
MOLEM Ministry of Labor, Employment and ROSC Report on Observance of Standards and
Migration Codes
MTDS Mid Term Development Strategy SCD Systematic Country Diagnostic
MOEWR Ministry of Energy and Water Resources SMEs Small and Medium Size Enterprises
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization SOEs State Owned Enterprises
NGO Non-governmental Organization TA Technical Assistance
NBT National Bank of Tajikistan TF Trust Fund
NDS National Development Strategy TJS Tajikistan Somoni
NEET Neither Employed nor Looking for Work UCDP Uppsala Conflict Data Program
NPLs Non Performing Loans UNDP United Nations Development Program
OBOR One Belt One Road Initiative UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and UNHCR United Nations High Commission for
Development Refugees
OMON Special Police Forces UNODC UN Office on Drugs and Crime
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation USAID United States Agency for International
in Europe Development
PEFA Public Expenditure and Financial USD United States Dollar
Accountability UTO United Tajik Opposition
PER Public Expenditure Review WBG World Bank Group
PFM Public Financial Management WDR World Development Report
PPA Project Preparation Advance WGI World Governance Indicators
PLR Performance and Learning Review VE Violent Extremism
6
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
I n recognizing the changing nature and scope of fragili-
ty, conflict and violence (FCV), the World Bank (WB)
is taking a new and differentiated approach to addressing
il war that took upwards of 60,000 lives and displaced many
more. Pervasive governance challenges impact across sectors,
including consolidation of political and economic power,
the full spectrum of FCV situations. This includes action corruption, and the closing of political space.
in fragile situations in middle-income countries, not just in
the least-developed countries and considering regional con- Political and security challenges exacerbate, and are exac-
flicts and spillovers, not just national-level fragility. This also erbated by, economic, social, and cross-border risks. Tajiki-
includes tackling FCV risks and long-term drivers, not just stan remains the poorest of the former Soviet Republics, and
the adverse development outcomes of conflict. By targeting as the most remittance dependence country in the world, is
potential socio-economic fault lines in vulnerable countries, highly vulnerable to fluctuations in the Russian economy.
the WB seeks to contribute to the avoidance of wide-scale Rampant and systemic corruption plagues Tajikistan along-
crises and their significant human and economic costs. The side issues of tax practices, and administrative barriers that
new International Development Association (IDA) 18 ‘Risk stymie private sector growth.
Mitigation Regime (RMR)’ pilots development interventions
Tajikistan also faces the growing specter of radicaliza-
as a prevention tool—scaling up financial support that proac-
tion and recruitment to violent extremism as well as de-
tively targets FCV risks and reinforces sources of resilience.
cades-long border tensions, disputes with its neighbors
Tajikistan is included as one of four pilot countries (also over natural resource management and the ongoing threat
Nepal, Guinea, and Niger) under the RMR. Countries eligi- of climatic and natural disaster shocks. Tajikistan’s more
ble for support were identified on the basis of the following than 1,300-kilometer border with Afghanistan is of concern
criteria: (i) evidence of significant FCV risks; (ii) evidence because of its length and relative insecurity. Decreased U.S.
of government and donor commitment to address the risks; and NATO troop presence has resulted in expanded Taliban
(iii) stable macroeconomic framework; and (iv) availability and Islamic State (IS) presence. The Tajik-Kyrgyz border is
of financial resources. Under the RMR, a “Risk and Resilience also a source of regular, low-level friction over access to water
Assessment (RRA)” is conducted and then an “Implementa- and pasturage and Tajikistan has experienced tensions with
tion Note” is prepared to guide the allocation of increased neighboring Uzbekistan over the construction of the Rogun
financing. Dam.
This RRA Report identifies the multi-dimensional risks Many stakeholders within Tajikistan express concern that
that increase Tajikistan’s vulnerability to violence and in- large and growing numbers of unemployed and idle youth
stability, as well as sources of resilience, and makes recom- could be a future threat to stability. This includes the grow-
mendations on potential areas of WB programming. The ing numbers of returning and, in particular, deported mi-
assessment draws on a literature review and consultations, grants that might be more susceptible to recruitment to vi-
including an RRA mission to Tajikistan in February-March olent extremism. The government estimates that more than
2017 in developing its analysis and recommendations. How- 1,000 Tajik citizens have fled to join IS. The return of even a
ever, it was beyond the scope of the RRA to include new pri- few recruits intent on destabilizing the country through ter-
mary data collection. rorist attacks could have significant repercussions.
Since the end of its civil war in 1997, Tajikistan has made Despite challenges, there are several sources of resilience in
impressive gains that are currently under threat in large Tajikistan that could help mitigate FCV risks and potential
part due to an escalating governance crisis that impacts triggers of violence. These include the collective memory of
across sectors. Most global indices that examine fragility and the severe costs of the civil war and popular interest in sta-
conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk. The bility, the strength of local institutions, ‘up-skilling’ and mo-
primary source of uncertainty surrounds the consolidation bility as a positive dynamic of labor migration, the potential
of political power, which has undermined the power-sharing (alongside peril) of energy investments, and the opportunity
principles of the 1997 peace accord that ended a five-year civ- for enhanced regional cooperation.
7
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
The goal of incremental financing support through the RMR development border
Tajik-Afghan on thewould also address
Tajik-Afghan the multi-vector
border would also
is to pilot preventive support to address FCV risks that con- water-food-irrigation-energy challenges faced by both
address the multi-vector water-food-irrigation-energy
strain development progress. Financing cannot be used for countries.
challenges faced by both countries.
‘business-as-usual’ investment operations that are not linked
to identified •
• Agriculture
Agriculture and
and food
food security:
security: Recognizing
Recognizing Tajikistan’s
Tajikistan’s
risks,even
identified risks, these
evenifif theseinterventions
interventions may contribute
may contrib-
to broader development goals. RRA analysis points to three vulnerability to climate
vulnerability climate shocks,
shocks, natural
natural disasters
disasters and and re-
resul-
ute to broader development goals. RRA analysis points to
categories of recommendations, including: 1) new areas of sultant
tant foodfood insecurity
insecurity challenges,
challenges, additional
additional financing
financing to
three categories of recommendations, including: 1) new areas
programming; 2) 2)
considerations for to assist the government to set up a contingency fund to
of programming; considerations enhancing the
forenhancing the ‘FCV
‘FCV assist the government to set up a contingency fund to
sensitivity’ ensure a
ensure a more structured approach
more structured approach to agricultural risk
to agricultural
of the current WB
sensitivity’ of the current WB portfolio; and 3) process and
portfolio; and 3) process and risk
capacity building support.
support. management, tailored to the risks that threaten sustain-
capacity building management, tailored to the risks that threaten sustain-
able food security.
able food security.
Options
1) for new
Options multi-sectoral
for investments
new multi-sectoral targeting
investments prior-
targeting
ity FCV risks: RRA analysis points to potential pathways to increase the
priority FCV risks: 2) RRA analysis points to potential pathways to increase
sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gover-
the sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gov-
•
• Employment
Employment and inclusion initiative
and inclusion targeting youth
initiative targeting youth nance and FCV risks, with particular attention paid to
ernance and
addressing FCVFCV risks,
and with particular
governance attention
challenges paid to
in high-risk/
and returning migrants: Combination
and returning migrants: Combination of supply side
of supply side addressing FCV and governance challenges
high-reward sectors such as extractives and energy. Ap- in high-risk/
(preparing
(preparing for and connecting
for and youth to
connecting youth jobs) with
to jobs) with de-
de- high-reward
proaches sectors
include such as extractives
benefit-sharing arrangementsand in energy. Ap-
large-scale
mand side
mand (supporting entrepreneurship,
side (supporting entrepreneurship, re-skilling,
re-skilling,
SME development) to spur job
to spur job creation.
creation. Also
Also to proaches include benefit-sharing arrangements
infrastructure investments as well as governance and over- in large-scale
SME development) to include
include infrastructure investments
complementary youth engagement and inclusion activ-
complementary youth engagement and inclusion activ- sight preconditions attachedas towell as governance
mitigate governanceand risksover-
and
ities. sight preconditions
increase transparency. attached to mitigate governance risks and
ities. increase transparency.
Local The RRA also suggests a series of process-related recom-
•
• development platforms:
Local development Developing new
platforms: Developing new mecha-
mecha-
nisms 3) The RRA
mendations, also suggests
focusing a series
on capacity of process-related
building to implement rec-
nisms to enable the
to enable GoT to
the GoT to allocate
allocate resources
resources toto jamoat
jamoat
(sub-national/community) ommendations,
RMR programming, risk on
focusing capacity and
monitoring building to implement
promoting citizen
level, including tailored
(sub-national/community) level, including tailored sup- sup-
port RMR programming,
engagement. risk monitoring
As a pre-condition and promoting
for advancement of thecitizen
Risk
to high
port to high risk
risk sub-regions.
sub-regions. Such an approach
Such an approach would:
would:
(i) engagement.
Mitigation Regime financing, the
As a pre-condition World
for Bank and
advancement theGov-
ofthe Risk
promote equitable
(i) promote equitable and transparent sub-national
and transparent sub-national re-re-
source allocation; (ii) facilitate participation in local
local de- ernment
Mitigation of Regime
Tajikistan could commit
financing, the Worldto a Bank and monitor-
joint risk the Gov-
source allocation; (ii) facilitate participation in de-
cision-making; (iii) build
build trust
trust between ing system
ernment offor the RMR.
Tajikistan Joint monitoring
would commit to woulda jointinclude
risk moni-two
cision-making; (iii) the citizen
between the citizen and
and
state; and (iv) stimulate local economic activity. categories
toring systemof indicators.
for the RMR. First, a set
Joint of contextual
monitoring would indicators
include
state; and (iv) stimulate local economic activity.
to
twomonitor whether
categories FCV risks
of indicators. are a
First, increasing or whether
set of contextual the
indica-
•
• Cross-border development
Cross-border developmentprogramming:
programming: Encouraging
Encourag- country is on a more positive and stable path.
tors to monitor whether FCV risks are increasing or wheth- This would
joint action on shared development challenges,
ing joint action on shared development challenges, includ-
in- include a priority
er the country list
is on a of governance-related
more positive and stable indicators
path. This to
ing: exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship
cluding: exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship Line’, track reform progress. Second, a collection of programmatic/
will include a priority list of governance-related indicators
a power
Line’ transmission
, a power line between
transmission Tajikistan
line between and/or
Tajikistan anda outcome indicators
to track reform to assess
progress. whether
Second, investments
a collection through
of program-
regionally-focused Ferghana Valley development
Uzbekistan; regional cooperation on disaster prevention pro- the Risk Mitigation Regime are effectively
matic/outcome indicators to assess whether investmentstackling identified
gram. River basin and riparian zone development on the risks.
through the Risk Mitigation Regime are effectively tackling
and response; and/or a regionally-focused Ferghana Val-
ley development program. River basin and riparian zone identified risks.
RRA Identified Risks Possible Areas – New Programming
Governance reform and joint
Governance challenges monitoring
Youth/Migrant Employment and
Economic risks -
Unemployment/idleness, youth bulge,
Inclusion Initiative
migrants, barriers to PSD
Local development platforms
Regionalism and Inclusion
Disparities in sub-regional development;
‘hot spots’ – FCV risks
Agriculture and food security
Cross-border and global risks
Cross-border development
programming
8
8
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
I. INTRODUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
1.
1. Tajikistan was
Tajikistan was ill-equipped
ill-equipped for for
independence
independence in 1991,in after that, in perhaps
significance against thethe backdrop
most significant security event
of announcements in in
late
and slipped
1991, and slippedalmost immediately
almost immediatelyinto violence.
into violence. In the
The collapse recent years,
2014 that thea IMU
top Tajik
had special forces commander
sworn allegiance defected
to the Islamic State
of the of
words Sovieta prominent
Union gave Tajikthehistorian,
country the options,endured
fewcountry a senior to IS.32 Soon after that, in perhaps the most significant security
(IS).
“one of the most painful state building
politician and religious figure later recalled. In 1991 attempts of modern
few peo- event in recent years, a top Tajik special forces commander
Central Asian 3. to IS.3and security challenges exacerbate, and are
Political
ple were even history”,
thinking 1
slipping almost immediately
about independence, let alone into vi-
draw- defected
olence. The civil war that erupted in 1992 took more than exacerbated by, economic, social, and cross-border risks.
ing up plans. As a result, in the words of a prominent Tajik
60,000 lives, Tajikistan
3. remains
Political andthe of the post-Soviet
poorestchallenges
security exacerbate,states,
andde-are
historian thedisplaced many more
country endured “one andof further
the most damaged the
painful state
country’s fragile infrastructure. It also brought to 1the fore pendent
exacerbatedlargely oneconomic,
by, migrant worker
social, remittances, which have
and cross-border risks.
building attempts of modern Central Asian history”, slipping
the continuing power of regionalism: fluctuated
Tajikistan sharply
remains the past
in the few years
poorest of the in response tostates,
post-Soviet Russia’sde-
almost immediately into violence. Thewhile the belligerents
civil war that erupted economic problems. sector development
Private worker has been
claimed to espouse varying political and religious aims, they pendent largely on migrant remittances, which have
in 1992 took more than 60,000 lives, displaced many more hindered poor governance
bysharply practices, and
were largely organized, politically and militarily, along re-It fluctuated in the past few years in the country
response to has
Rus-
and further damaged the country’s fragile infrastructure. recently experienced a series of banking
gional lines. The civil war also pushed many of the country’s sia’s economic problems. Private sectorcrises. The country
development is
has been
also brought to the fore the continuing power of regionalism: also facing by a significant youth bulge with high rates of youth
best educated academics, cultural figures and administrators hindered poor governance practices, and the country has
while the belligerents claimed to espouse varying political unemployment and idleness.
out of the country. recently experienced a seriesWith its unique
of banking geography,
crisis. The countryTa- is
and religious aims, they were largely organized, politically jikistan is also subject to regional tensions
also facing a significant youth bulge witharound border
high rates se-
of youth
and militarily,
2. The civilalong regional
war ended lines.with
in 1997 The a civil war
peace also pushed
accord that, curity and natural resource sharing, particularly over water
unemployment and idleness. With its unique geography, Ta-
many of the country’s best educated
thanks to a power sharing agreement, was able for a fewacademics, cultural fig- and riparian zones.
jikistan is also subject to regional tensions around border se-
ures and administrators out of the country.
years to ensure a degree of peaceful political competition. curityIndeed,
4. and natural
most resource sharing,
global indices examine over
particularly
that water
fragility
In recent years, the potential for increased fragility has grown and riparian zones.
The civil
2. Tajikistan,
in aswar
haveended in 1997challenges.
governance with a peace accord
Over that,
the past and conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk.4
thanks to a power sharing agreement,
decade, violence in the country has not been characterized was able for a few Although Tajikistan has made substantial progress in certain
4. Indeed, most global indices that examine fragility and
years to ensure a degree of peaceful political
by widespread social or political unrest. Much of it has taken competition . In areas over the past decade, trends over the past two years
conflict place Tajikistan in a category of elevated risk.4 Al-
recent years, political instability and the
place in two eastern regions, Gharm and Gorno-Badakhshan, potential for violence indicate the potential for an increase in fragility, vulnerabil-
though Tajikistan has made substantial progress in certain ar-
in Tajikistan
that were the have grown,
backbone ofas have pervasive
opposition forcesgovernance
in the civil chal-
war ity, and overall instability that could threaten development
eas over the past decade, trends over the past two years indi-
and which have been traditionally suspicious of theand
lenges, including extreme consolidation of political eco-
central progress. For this reason, as part of the World Bank’s IDA 18
nomic power, Meanwhile
government. corruption, in the closing
andnorthern of political
Tajikistan, space.
Islamic
Over the past decade,
fighters—described violence
as the Islamic in Movement
the country ofhas not been
Uzbekistan 2 Russia’s RIA Novosti reported the event in October 2015. https://ria.
ru/world/20141006/1027067431.html. Other reports date the swearing of
(IMU) or an off-shoot—claimed
characterized by widespread social responsibility for fatal
or political unrest. at-
Much
allegiance to late July 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/.
tacks. The
of it has magnitude
taken place in these
oftwo attacks
eastern was smaller
regions, Gharm thanand those
Gor- 3 3 Commander
Commander elite
of of Tajik
elite police
Tajik policeforce defects
force to Islamic
defects to Islamic State
State-
in the east, but the attacks http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-tajikistan-idUSKB-
no-Badakhshan, that werehave taken on greater
the backbone significance
of opposition forces http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-tajikistan-idUSKB-
N0OD1AP20150528.
against the backdrop
in the civil war and which of announcements in late 2014
have been traditionally that the
suspicious 4
N0OD1AP20150528.
The Fund for Peace Fragile States Index assessed Tajikistan as
IMU had sworn allegiance to the Islamic 4 The Fund for Peace ofFragile States against
Index assessed Tajikistan as “High
of any central government. Meanwhile inState (IS).2 Tajiki-
northern Soon “High Warning.
Warning.
” As
” As a result
a result
oppression
ofReport
oppression religious
against religious
groups, the
groups, the U.S. De-
U.S. Department of State on International Religious Freedom for
stan, Islamic fighters—described as the Islamic Movement of State Report
partmentdesignated
Tajikistan on International
Tajikistan as a “country Religious Freedom
of particular for Tajikistan
concern” a
of Uzbekistan (IMU) or an off-shoot—claimed responsibility designated Tajikistan
deterioration as a “country
from its previous rank asofa particular
country on concern”—a
the “watch deteriora-
list.” https://
from its previous rank as a country on the “watch list.
tion uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf.
www. ” https://www.
Over the past
for fatal attacks. The magnitude of these attacks were smaller
1 http://kamolkhon.com/conflict-resolution-in-tajikistan. uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf.
decade, Freedom House Democracy Scores for Tajikistan Over the
fell past
from decade,
5.96 to
than Russia’s
2 those RIA in the east,
Novosti but the
reported the attacks have taken
event in October on greater
2015. https://ria. Freedom
6.54 House
(on a scale Democracy
from Scoresit
1 to 7), making for Tajikistan
one felldemocratic
from 5.96 to
of the least 6.54 (on
former
ru/world/20141006/1027067431.html. Other reports date the swearing of Soviet
a scalerepublics.
from 1 to In 2016,
7), the OECD
making it one ofclassified
the leastTajikistan
democraticas a fragileSoviet
state
former
allegiance to late July 2015, http://www.eurasianet.org/node/. for the first time
republics. since
In 2016, the2011.
OECD classified Tajikistan as a fragile state for the
1 http://kamolkhon.com/conflict-resolution-in-tajikistan. first time since 2011.
9
9
scale up in support to countries facing FCV challenges, Tajik- jikistan’s four regions in February-March, 2017, to identify a
istan was included as one of four pilot countries (also Nepal, subset of risks that are analyzed in detail in Chapter 3 of this
Guinea, and Niger) in a new ‘Risk Mitigation Regime.’ The report. It was beyond the scope of the assessment to collect
Risk Mitigation Regime provides incremental World Bank fi- primary data. Thus data gaps limit the depth of analysis for
nancing to undertake preventive programming to target FCV certain themes.
risks before they result in widespread violence. Countries el-
igible for support are identified on the basis of the following 6. Structure of the report. Chapter 2 of the Report pro-
criteria: (i) evidence of significant FCV risks; (ii) evidence vides an overview of Tajikistan’s geography, demography, and
of government commitment to address the identified risks; economy and discusses the historical context that has led to
(iii) stable macroeconomic framework; and (iv) availability Tajikistan’s current challenges. Chapter 3 then provides an
of financial resources. Under the Risk Mitigation Regime, a overview of the priority risks—governance and security, eco-
“Risk and Resilience Assessment” is conducted and then an nomic, inclusion/regionalism, and cross-border/global that
“Implementation Note is prepared to guide the allocation of increase Tajikistan’s vulnerability to violence and instability.
increased financing. Chapter 4 goes on to discuss the specific triggers or scenarios
that could destabilize the status quo or lead to widespread un-
5. This Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) is in- rest. Chapter 5 identifies sources of resilience the WBG may
tended to provide a comprehensive understanding of the wish to consider and build upon. In Chapter 6, the Report
FCV stresses facing Tajikistan and the potential role of the concludes with suggested recommendations to the World
Bank in helping to address these risks. The RRA identifies Bank on the way forward. The analysis of this report draws
the multi-dimensional risks that worsen Tajikistan’s vulner- on the Systematic Country Diagnostic for Tajikistan that is
abilities to economic, political, governance and social break- under development, the Country Partnership Strategy (CPS)
down and propensity for organized violence. It gives greatest for Tajikistan FY 2014-2018 and the draft Performance and
priority to fragility risks and fault lines that are actively pre- Learning Review (PLR) of the CPS, as well as key fragility
venting development pathways from taking root. The assess- frameworks such as the World Development Report 2011 and
ment utilized a literature review, and a series of consultations, the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuild-
including consultations carried out in-country in three of Ta- ing (see box 1 for an overview of RRA sources).
BOX 1: RRA SOURCES
This report relies on several sources of information, including Government Tracking Impact of Tajikistan Land Reform Across Multiple Projects, Donors
strategic documents and statistics, WBG assessments and reports, other and Districts from 2006-2016 Using a Common Core of Survey Questions
partner assessments, public opinion and surveys, and RRA mission con- and Field Method, Paper prepared for presentationat the 2017 World
sultations. Below is the short summary of each category: Bank Conference on Land and Poverty, The WorldBank - Washington DC,
March 20-24, 2017
Government information:
Real Estate Registration Project, Social Assessment Report, March2016
Tajikistan National Development Strategy, 2015-2030
Water Management in Central Asia: Problems, Causes and Consequenc-
Tajikistan, Mid Term Development Strategy, 2016-2020 es,a social assessment based on water user perceptions, January 2014,
Tajikistan, Demographic Statistics, State Statistical Committee Social Development Unit of the Sustainable Development, Europe and
Central Asia Department (ECSSO).
Tajikistan, Concept on Local Government Development till 2030, Decree
of the President of RT, #522, July 2015 Poverty Diagnostic and Social Impact Assessment of the Water Supply and
Sanitation Sector in Tajikistan, Concept Note, June 2015 Tajikistan Finan-
World Bank Analysis: cial Sector Assessment (FSAP), 2016, World Bank,IMF
The note on Fragility, Conflict & Disaster Nexus: Focus on Tajikistan and Tajikistan: Jobs diagnostic, Strategic framework for jobs, January 2017,
ECA region. Jobs CCSA
Improving service delivery through governance reform, is decentraliza- Assessment of Household Energy Deprivation in Tajikistan, June 2014,
tionan answer for Tajikistan, World Bank Policy Note,March 2013. Social Development Unit of the Sustainable Development, Europe and
Central Asia Department (ECSSO).
Mid-term Report on Youth Entrepreneurship in Tajikistan, Tajikistan Youth
Entrepreneurship project LLI, November 2016 Tajikistan Agriculture Policy Update, August 8, 2014
10
BOX 1: RRA SOURCES (CONT.)
Other partner assessments: Public opinion and surveys:
Life in Transition (LITS): EBRD: The survey seeks to analyze and understand
Sociological survey: The causes of radicalization of young people and mea-
how transition has affected the lives of people in regions, and what their
sures on its prevention, Eurasia Foundation of Central Asia (EFCA) project,
views are on issues such as democracy, the role of the state, and prospects
as was conducted in five districts of the Republic of Tajikistan
for the future. LITS sampled 1,500 men and women in Tajikistan to achieve
Inter-governmental fiscal relations analysis, European Union, (ongoing) a nationally representative sample.
Assessment of service delivery in the pilot districts through decentraliza- Listening to Tajikistan (L2T): World Bank, UNICEF, a survey to monitor the
tion, USAID local governance project impact of emerging trends in poverty throughout the country at high fre-
Analysis of Peace and Conflict Potential in Rasht Valley, Shurabad District quency. It tracks the wellbeing and deprivations of a nationally representa-
and GBAO, Tajikistan, Aga Khan, GIZ, 2004 tive random sample of 800 households in Tajikistan.
Assessing Increased Awareness and Use of Land Restructuring and Land Doing Business in Tajikistan: The data in this report are current as of June
Use Rights and Their Impacts on Farming, Crop Diversification and House- 1, 2015 (except for the paying taxes indicators, which cover the period from
hold Food, and Gender in 12 Project Rayons of Khatlon Region, Tajikistan, January to December 2014).a
Eric A. Abbott, International Consultant August, 2016, USAID
Tajikistan Food Security Monitoring, World Food Program, 2015-2016 a For more see: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/109111468186539
635/pdf/100861-WP-Box393248B-PUBLIC-DB2016-TJK.pdf
11
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
II. CONTEXT
II. CONTEXT
AND
AND HISTORY
HISTORY
CONTEXT–
A. CONTEXT – DEMOGRAPHY,
DEMOGRAPHY, FIGURE 1: TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF TAJIKISTAN
A. CONTEXT
ECONOMY, – DEMOGRAPHY,
DEVELOPMENT TRENDS
FIGURE 1: TOPOGRAPHIC MAP OF TAJIKISTAN
ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS
7.
ECONOMY, DEVELOPMENT TRENDS
Landlocked and largely mountainous, with a popula-
7. Landlocked and largely mountainous, with a popula-
tion
7. of about 8 million
Landlocked and a GNI
and largely per capita with
mountainous, of US$1,240
a popula- in
tion of about 8 million and a GNI per capita of US$1,240 in
2015
tion (Atlas
of about methodology),
8 million and Tajikistan
a GNI per is the poorest
capita of country
US$1,240 in
2015 (Atlas methodology), Tajikistan is the poorest country
in
2015Europe
(Atlas and Central Asia
methodology), (ECA). Bordering
Tajikistan Afghanistan
is the poorest country
in Europe and Central Asia (ECA). Bordering Afghanistan
to
in the south,
Europe andChina to the
Central east,
Asia Kyrgyz
(ECA). Republic to
Bordering the north,
Afghanistan
to the south, China to the east, Kyrgyzstan to the north, and
and
to theUzbekistan
south, to theto west, barely 7 percent of the country’s
Uzbekistan toChina
the west, the east,
barely 7 Kyrgyzstan
percent of the to the north,
country’s and
land
land area isto
Uzbekistan arable,
the due barely
west, to its elevation
7 percent and
of topography;
the country’s the
land
area is arable, due to its elevation and topography; the rest
rest
area consists
is arable,of glaciers,
due to mountains,
its elevation and
and pastureland
topography; or steppe
the rest
consists of glaciers, mountains, and pastureland or steppe
that support
consists livestock
of glaciers, grazing. Endowed
mountains, with abundant
and pastureland or steppewa-
that support livestock grazing. Endowed with abundant wa-
ter
that resources,
support Tajikistan’s
livestock hydropower
grazing. Endowed potential,
with includingwa-
abundant for
ter resources, Tajikistan’s hydropower potential, including for
export,
ter is substantial.
resources, Coal,
Tajikistan’s silver, and
hydropower gold, areincluding
potential, present and for
export, is substantial. Coal, silver, and gold, are present and
possibly
export, significant
is substantial.reserves
Coal, of hydrocarbons
silver, and gold, were
are discovered
present and
possibly significant reserves of hydrocarbons were discovered
in mid-2012.
possibly significant reserves of hydrocarbons were discovered
in mid-2012.
in mid-2012.
8. The population of Tajikistan is ethnically diverse, al
8. The population of Tajikistan is ethnically diverse, al-
though
8. Thethe vast majority
population of the population
of Tajikistan is ethnicallyarediverse,
ethnically al- FIGURE 2: GNI PER CAPITA, ATLAS METHOD
though
Tajik.
though
the vast majority
According to
the vast majority2010
of the population
estimates, 84 percent
of the population
are ethnically
of
are the popu- FIGURE 2: GNI
(CURRENT US$)PER CAPITA, ATLAS METHOD
Tajik. According to 2010 estimates, 84 percent of ethnically
the popu-
lation
Tajik. are ethnic Tajiks,
According to 2010 14 percent are 84Uzbeks, and 2 percent (CURRENT US$)
lation are ethnic Tajiks, 14estimates,
percent are percentand
Uzbeks, of the popu-
2 percent
consist
lation are of other groups (including Pamiri, and 2Russian,
Kyrgyz,
consist of ethnic Tajiks, 14
other groups percent are
(including Uzbeks,
Pamiri, Kyrgyz, percent
Russian,
Turkmen, Tatar,
other and
consist of Tatar, and
groupsArabs). 5 The population
5
(including remains
Pamiri, Kyrgyz, largely
Russian,
Turkmen, Arabs). The population remains largely
rural
Turkmen,(73 percent).
Tatar, and With the
Arabs). exception
5 of
The population Dushanbe
remains (popula-
largely
rural (73 percent). With the exception of Dushanbe (popula-
tion of
rural (73about 800,000),
percent). Withmost of Tajikistan’s
the exception cities (as(popula-
of Dushanbe defined
tion of about 800,000), most of Tajikistan’s cities (as defined
by the
tion ofgovernment)
about 800,000), are small of with fewer than 50,000 inhabi-
by the government) are most
small with Tajikistan’s
fewer than cities (as defined
50,000 inhabi-
tants. About 40
by theAbout
government) percent of
are of all
small urban residents
with fewer live
thanlive in
50,000 Dushan-
inhabi-
tants. 40 percent all urban residents in Dushan-
be. Over
tants. the past
About 15 years,
40 percent of the level of
all urban urbanization
residents live inhas grown
Dushan-
be. Over the past 15 years, the level of urbanization has grown
only by
be. Over 0.21 percentage
the percentage
past 15 years, points, with
the level oflimited mobility
urbanization hasfor rural
grown
only by 0.21 points, with limited mobility for rural
populations.
only by 0.21 percentage points, with limited mobility for rural
populations.
populations.
9. Tajikistan is Central Asia’s least accessible, most iso-
9. Tajikistan is Central Asia’s least accessible, most iso-
lated
9. country,
Tajikistan with only limited
is Central Asia’sregional and international
least accessible, most iso-
lated country, with only limited regional and international
lated country, with only limited regional and international
5 CIA World Factbook, Tajikistan Country Profile, https://www.cia.
5
5 CIAWorld
CIA Factbook, Tajikistan
WorldFactbook, Country Profile,
Tajikistan Country Profile, https://www.cia.
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html Source: World Bank Development Indicators
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html
gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ti.html Source: World Bank Development Indicators
12
12
12
connectivity. This is partly a function of the country’s geog- gions pushing hard for greater self-determination and other
raphy and topography: internal and regional communication regions embracing opposition political parties. These ten-
and transportation are problematic, especially in winter. Ta- sions were based on an unequal distribution of power and
jikistan’s relations with its neighbors are encumbered by at resources during the Soviet period.
least three concerns: (a) the management of shared energy
and water resources—exemplified by Uzbekistan’s opposition 13. The debate also saw the re-emergence of regional
to the proposed Rogun Hydropower Plant6; (b) the flow of animosities. Tajikistan, which had hoped to remain part of
illicit drugs across Tajikistan’s territory from South Asia to a loosely federated single successor state to the Soviet Union
Eastern Europe; and (c) uncertainties stemming from the and thus continue receiving the vital economic subsidies
situation in Afghanistan following the withdrawal of most in- from Moscow that kept the country going, had no choice but
ternational forces.7 to opt for independence. A contest for power, economic re-
sources and increased regional rights ensued. The civil war
10. The return of stability after the conclusion of the civil featured fighting between factions representing four regions
war and initial reforms led to growth averaging 8 percent of the country.
annually from 2000-16, with significant poverty reduction.
Poverty declined 81 percent in 1999 to 47 percent in 2009 and 14. Regional rivalries that manifested during the Tajik-
down to about 31 percent in 2015. Extreme poverty dropped istan civil war were a product of long-simmering tensions
even faster—from 73 percent to 14 percent during the same that began to emerge after World War II. Elites from Khu-
period. Labor earnings accounted for half the decline and re- jand dominated both the government and the Communist
mittances for about one-third. The benefits of growth were Party in Soviet Tajikistan during the postwar era. Khujandis
also widely shared: consumption by the bottom 40 percent seemed to have a monopoly on the most lucrative govern-
grew faster than that of the population at large. However, ment portfolios. Sitting in the agriculturally fertile Ferghana
economic mobility was volatile and higher in rural compared Valley and located on rail lines that connected to Moscow,
to urban areas. Moreover, poverty reduction for women was Khujand was also the center of economic production. Elites
lower than for men and the gender wage gap widened.8 from Khujand used their position to “distribute patronage
and manage networks based on resources distributed from
11. Tajikistan has been unable to create enough jobs the national level.”10 By the 1970s, Kulobi elites emerged as
for its growing labor force. Since 2006, the population has the second most powerful group in the country, managing
increased by 17 percent, while formal employment rose by patronage networks and partnering with Khujandis to con-
only 10 percent. Employment growth in industry has been trol most of the country’s industrial base. Individuals from
minimal and only modest in agriculture and services, the two these two regions represented the bulk of communist party
largest sectors. The relatively small construction sector expe- membership in the country.
rienced the highest growth rates (8 percent), driven mainly
by remittances. This low growth in overall employment, as 15. The collapse of the Soviet Union provided an oppor-
well as limited internal labor mobility, explain the relative- tunity for regions who had fewer ties to Moscow and lim-
ly small contribution of employment to poverty reduction, ited access to control of industry and patronage networks,
compared to migration.9 to forge a realignment of regional powers in the nascent
democracy. Groups from Gharm and Badakhshan, who long
B. TAJIKISTAN’S CIVIL WAR felt excluded from the most important government and eco-
nomic institutions, began to agitate for democracy, cultural
12. The civil war grew out of the ferment of the last few rights, and other issues that would allow them a more prom-
years of perestroika. The country was drawn into the pas- inent seat at the table. Rivalries among these regional groups
sionate debates across the Soviet Union on multiparty de- first emerged over control of government positions, at both
mocracy, sovereignty and self-determination. The debate in the national and sub-national levels, in the late-Soviet pe-
Tajikistan often had a strong regional tinge, with certain re- riod at a time when Soviet authorities in Moscow had little
ability to manage these regional conflicts.11 Long festering re-
sentment of Khujandi/Kulobi domination led to an alliance
forged among groups from Gharm and Badakhshan under
the umbrella of the United Tajik Opposition. After the civ-
6 Note: At the time of writing the Uzbek opposition to the hydropower
plant appears to be abating with a new President in Uzbekistan.
7 The World Bank, “World Bank Group Country Partnership
Strategy for Tajikistan for the Period FY15-18” (Washington, DC:
The World Bank, May 2014), 3, http://documents.worldbank.org/
curated/en/294261468339630573/pdf/863720CAS0P146010Box- 10 Kirill Nourzhanov and Christian Bleuer, Tajikistan: A Political and
385211B00OUO090.pdf. Social History (ANU E Press, 2013), 141.
8 The World Bank, “World Bank Group Country Partnership Strategy 11 Lawrence P. Markowitz, State Erosion: Unlootable Resources and
for the Period FY15-18” (Washington, DC: The World Bank, May 2014), 4. Unruly Elites in Central Asia, First edition (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
9 Ibid., 8. University Press, 2013).
13
il war, the Kulobi faction displaced Khujandis as the group to about 70 percent below its 1991 level.14 Following the war,
dominating of state organizations of power. the country remained sharply divided between regions that
had fought on the losing side and a new ruling elite.
16. Most of the fighting was concentrated in the south of
the country. The war was largely deadlocked by 1993, and ne- C. RECENT VIOLENCE AND INSTABILITY
IN TAJIKISTAN
gotiations began tentatively the following year. The UN spon-
sored a ceasefire between opposition and the government in
1996. A peace accord followed in 1997. This accord included
18. Most violence involving significantly sized armed
an extensive power sharing between the government and the
group events in Tajikistan since the end of the civil war in
opposition. In 1998, the government pardoned all opposition
1997 has stemmed from confrontations between govern-
leaders, even those in exile, and appointed Akbar Turajonzo-
ment forces and former members of the opposition. Violent
da, a prominent UTO leader, as first deputy prime minister.
events have mainly taken place in civil war opposition strong-
The power sharing compromise was strongly criticized by
holds. In each case the dominant aim of the opposition has
UTO hardliners, while pro-government politicians expressed
been to push back and deter efforts by the central government
deep reluctance at another part of the agreement, the legal-
to control their regions.
ization of the IRPT.
19. Much of the violence has been geographically limit-
17. The civil war left a terrible legacy that affects the coun-
ed, characterized by struggles between the central elite and
try to this day: the war killed over 60,000 people, displaced
local leaders for the control of state resources. Recent vio-
more than a half a million12, and left the poorest republic of
lence has come from Gorno-Badakhshan and Gharm, two
the former Soviet Union in shambles – “a ruined economy,
eastern regions that have lost much of their political and eco-
a destroyed administration and a highly fragmented soci-
nomic clout.
ety.”13 By the end of the war, the country’s GDP had dropped
12 At the height of the Tajik civil war, there were approximately 600,000
internally displaced people inside of Tajikistan and over 100,000 who had
fled the country. By 2016, this number was down significantly. According
to the UNHCR, there were 19,469 refugees and internally displaced persons
living in Tajikistan in 2015.
13 Iskandar Asadullaev, Politics of compromise: The Tajikistan peace 14 Challenges of Transition economies: economic reforms, immigration
process”, Conciliation resources http://www.c-r.org/accord-article/tajiki- and employment in Tajikistan Omair Amir and Albert Berry, UNDPSP-
stan-government. G&E_ch4_tajikistan-1.pdf
14
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
III. FRAGILITY,
CONFLICT AND
VIOLENCE (FCV) -
PRIORITY RISKS
20. PriorityFCV
21. Priority risksfor
FCVrisks Tajikistan can
for Tajikistan can be divided into
be divided into political and economic relations are based on highly-person-
political and economic relations are based on highly-person-
four
four categories: 1) political and governance risks;risks;
categories: 1) governance risks; 2) economic 3)
2) eco- alized relationships, which in the long run diminish chances
alized relationships, which in the long run diminish chances
inclusion, equity and regionalism risks; and
nomic risks; 3) inclusion, equity and regionalism risks; and4) cross-border for economic expansion or political stability.17 The limited ac-
for economic expansion or political stability.17 A closed circle
and global risks.
4) cross-border While
and globalthere are a
risks. variety
While of challenges
there with-
are a variety of cess order emerges from an elite bargain that provides access
of elites run the state and the economy. The limited access
in each category (see figure 3), the RRA analysis
challenges within each category (see figure 3), the RRA anal- highlights to political power and rents from key economic sectors in ex-
order emerges from an elite bargain that provides access to
priority risks that
ysis highlights are most
priority risks likely
that areto most
interrupt
likely development
to interrupt change for stability and a commitment to maintain the status
political power and rents from key economic sectors in ex-
progress and where development interventions
development progress and where development interventions could play a quo. Such a system can be stable in a context of economic
change for stability and a commitment to maintain the status
key
could role.
playRisks role. internal
include
a key and external
Risks include stresses,
internal institu-
and external growth, but is highly unstable in the face of economic shocks,
quo. Such a system can be stable in a context of economic
tional challenges, and issues around agency
stresses, institutional challenges, and issues around agency and incentives, contractions, or structural changes. Furthermore, limited ac-
growth, but is highly unstable in the face of economic shocks,
and sources of and
and incentives, resilience,
sources based on a variety
of resilience, based of
on FCV-related
a variety of cess orders inherently stifle economic growth and dynamism,
contractions, or structural changes that cause sources of rents
analytic frameworks, including the 2011 World
FCV-related analytic frameworks, including the 2011 World Development as business interests of the closed circle of elites are protected
to dry up. Furthermore, limited access orders inherently sti-
Report (WDR):
Development Conflict,
Report (WDR): Security Development,
and Security
Conflict, OECD
and Develop- from international and domestic competition, and new busi-
fle economic
nesses growth
or sources dynamism,
and are
of rents seized by as business
elites interests of
in power.
States of Fragility Report, International Dialogue
ment, OECD States of Fragility Report, International Dialogue on Peace-
the closed circle of elites are protected from international and
on Peacebuilding and Recovery, 2017 WDR: GovernanceLaw,
building and Recovery, 2017 WDR: Governance and the and domestic
22. Thecompetition,
space for civiland new businesses
society or sources
in Tajikistan, of rents
long restrict-
and andanalysis
relevant
the Law, relevantby North,by
analysis Wallis,
North,Webb, and
Wallis, Weingast
Webb, and are seized
ed, by elites
has become evenin power.
more limited. The civil society groups
on limited
Weingast onaccess
limitedorder
access governance systems.15
order governance Governance
systems. 15
Po-
risks are viewed by RRA analysis as a cross-cutting and fun- that remain active are those that are engaged in service deliv-
litical and governance risks are viewed by RRA analysis as The space for civil society
damental constraint to development progress,
23. activities
ery and social welfarein Tajikistan,
provision. long
The restricted,
government
a cross-cutting and fundamental constraint to with impacts
development has become even more limited. The civil society groups that
across sectors. has employed rigid registration requirements and increas-
progress, with impacts across sectors. remain active are those that are engaged in “non-political”
ingly strenuous financial reporting requirements. Similarly,
A. GOVERNANCE
A. POLITICAL ANDRISKS –
service
the delivery activities
government has also and worked to welfare
social provision.
limit foreign The
funding
GOVERNANCE government has employed rigid registration
for NGOs by placing restrictions on the amount of foreign requirements
CROSS-CUTTING and increasingly strenuous receive reporting
financial requirements.
RISKS – CROSS-CUTTING
financing organizations can and on its use. A 2015
Similarly, the government has also worked
law “On Public Associations” requires all non-governmen- to limit foreign
21. Governance in Tajikistan closely resembles what Bar- funding
tal for NGOs
organizations by placing
operating restrictions
in Tajikistan toon the amount
declare of
all grants
Governance
22.Weingast,
ry in Tajikistan
Douglass North, andclosely
Johnresembles
Wallis deemwhat Bar-
a “lim- foreign financing organizations can receive and on its use.
they received from donors (both domestic and international)
ry Weingast,
ited Douglass
access order” North, andpolitical
society—where and deem
John Wallis a “lim-
economic re- A 2015 law “On Public Associations” requires all non-gov-
with a registry within the Ministry of Justice. Organizations
ited access
lations order”
comprise asociety—where whoand
political
small group of elites economic
interact re-
through ernmental organizations operating in Tajikistan to declare all
lations personalized
highly relationships.
comprise a small group of elites
16
Inwho interact
almost everythrough
sector,
highly personalized relationships.16 In almost every sector,
Social
lence andand
Violence Orders:
Social A Conceptual
Orders: Framework
A Conceptual for Interpreting
Framework Recorded
for Interpreting
Human History
Recorded Human (New York:(New
Cambridge
History University Press,
York: Cambridge 2009).
University Press, 2009).
15
15 See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/ states-
See: http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fragility-resilience/ 17
17 Greif,“Impersonal
AvnerGreif,
Avner “ImpersonalExchange Impartial Law:
withoutImpartial
Exchangewithout Law: The
The
states-of-fragility-report-series.htm;
of-fragility-report-series.htm; http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fra-
http://www.oecd.org/dac/conflict-fra-gility- Community Responsibility System,” Chicago Journal of International Law
gility-resilience/states-of-fragility-report-series.htm;
resilience/states-of-fragility-report-series.htm; http://www.worldbank.
http://www.worldbank. org/ 109; Avner
5 (2005 2004): 109; Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom,
Greif, Paul Milgrom, and
and Barry
Barry R.
R. Weingast,
Weingast,
org/en/publication/wdr2017;
en/publication/wdr2017; https://web.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/
https://web.stanford.edu/group/mcnollgast/ Enforcement: The
“Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: Caseof
TheCase ofthe
theMerchant
Merchant
cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Limited_Access_Orders_
cgi-bin/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Limited_Access_Orders_ (1994): 745–76;
Guild,” Journal of Political Economy 102, no. 4 (1994): Avner Greif,
745–76;Avner Greif,
in_DW_-II_-2011.0125.submission-version.pdf. Lessons from
Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy: Lessons from Medieval
Medieval
16
16 Douglass
DouglassC. North,John
C.North, Joseph Wallis,
JohnJoseph and Barry
Wallis, and R. Weingast,
Barry R. Weingast, Vio- York: Cambridge
Trade (New York: University Press,
Cambridge University 2006).
Press, 2006).
17
15
FRAMEWORK –
FIGURE 3: RRA FRAMEWORK KEYRISKS
– KEY RISKS
B. ECONOMIC
GOVERNANCE RISKS
• Erosion of power-sharing agreement – peace process 25. Tajikistan is the
• Closing of political space
poorest country in the
• Security sector challenges
former Soviet Union and
has been hit by a series
ECONOMIC EQUITY/INCLUSION REGIONAL/GLOBAL of economic shocks, some
EQUITY AND INCLUSION exogenous and some
• Remittance-dependency • Lagging/remote regions – • Recruitment to violent self-induced. Econom-
• Poverty /size of pie vulnerability/FCV risks extremism ic decline has enormous
• Corruption • Youth bulge – impacts on inclusion • Opiates trade
• Small/fragile private and and employment • Border tensions- Water/riparian/
implications for the size
financial sectors – ‘captured’ • Social impacts - migration energy issues of the economic pie with
• Mining/hydropower potential • Agriculture and land rights • Climate and disaster risks broader implications for
but also risk
poverty reduction and
shared prosperity.
Governance as a cross cutting and fundamental constraint 26. The recent col-
lapse of Tajikistan’s ma-
must also report all projects they conduct with these funds. jor banks and insolvency underscores the fragility of the
Local NGOs also report increased inspection of their orga- Tajik economy. Large systemic banks in Tajikistan—which
nizations.18 account for 84 percent of total financial sector assets—are at
high risk of insolvency and illiquidity. Microfinance institu-
23. Tajikistan’s international ratings for democracy have tions (MFIs) account for most of the remainder. The National
declined. Over the past decade, the Freedom House Democ- Bank of Tajikistan has already revoked licenses of 17 MFIs
racy Score for Tajikistan fell from 5.96 to 6.54 since 2007 (on since 2015 over their failure to meet the central bank’s mini-
a scale from 1 to 7), making it one of the least democratic for- mum capital requirements. The banking sector faces vulnera-
mer soviet republics (see Table 1 below). As Freedom House bilities in credit risk due to rapid credit growth (to the SOEs,
put it, “Tajikistan increasingly resembles a one-party state… and directed lending to government interests), and funding
Tajikistan’s post-independence elections have been marred by and liquidity risks related to the Russian financial crisis and
corruption and the intimidation of opposition candidates… the pass through to remittances. These weaknesses are aggra-
Security services arrested approximately 200 members of the vated by a high level of non-performing loans, low quality of
IRPT from September 2015 onwards.19 financial sector enforcement mechanisms, and weak enforce-
ment of prudential regulations. For the past two years, the
24. The narrowing of political space has been accompa-
banking system has been heavily hit by economic and finan-
nied by general repression of freedom of expression and re-
cial crises linked to declining exports and remittances, which
ligion. The U.S. Department of State Report on International
Religious Freedom for Tajikistan designated Tajikistan as a have left many of the country’s businesses and individuals
“country of particular concern” under the International Reli- unable to repay their loans.21
gious Freedom Act—a deterioration from its previous rank as
27. In response to escalating solvency and liquidity issues
a country on the “watch-list”.20
in the banking sector, the National Bank of Tajikistan re-
cently recapitalized and bailed out key banks. While this re-
solved the immediate crisis, risks remain high since the Gov-
ernment decision was not accompanied by reforms to address
future vulnerabilities. The country remains on the brink of a
financial sector crisis that could have large development im-
pacts both in the short- and long-term.
18 World Organization Against Torture, “Tajikistan: Clampdown on
Civil Society - Preliminary Findings of a Fact-Finding Mission on the 28. Systemic governance challenges hold back Tajiki-
Situation of Human Rights Defenders and NGOs,” November 30, 2015,
http://www.omct.org/human-rights-defenders/urgent-interventions/ stan’s socio-economic development, alongside issues of tax
tajikistan/2015/11/d23494/.
19 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit
2016--Tajikistan” (Freedom House: Washington, DC), 2, accessed February -
2, 2017, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/NIT2016_Tajikistan.
pdf. 21 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016··Tajiki-
20 https://www.uscirf.gov/sites/default/files/Tajikistan%202015.pdf. stan.”
16
18
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
TABLE 1:
TABLE FREEDOMHOUSE
1: FREEDOM HOUSENATIONS
NATIONSIN
INTRANSIT
TRANSITRATINGS ANDAVERAGED
RATINGSAND AVERAGEDSCORES
22
SCORES22
cial sector enforcement mechanisms, and weak enforcement “you would have to be crazy to do business in Tajikistan. No
practices, and administrative barriers that stymie private highest rates in the region), only about 55 percent of those
of prudential regulations. For the past two years, the banking companies with values can be competitive.” And as the director
sector growth. Because of the threat of capture, there are very who attempt to start a business succeed, compared to almost
system has been heavily hit by economic and financial crises of a micro-finance institution in Sughd province, noted, “do-
limited incentives for firms to grow. As one senior 64 percent in ECA region as a whole. 24
linked to declining exports and remittances, whichrepresen-
have left ing business in an environment of slowing demand and falling
tative of a financial institution noted,
many of the country’s businesses and individuals “ doing business
unable in anto revenues is gettingtomore difficult due to increasing and highly
environment of slowing
22 demand and falling revenues is getting 30. According the World Bank Doing
23
Business indica-
repay their loans. uncertain tax and regulatory ”
pressure.
tors, Tajikistan ranks 128 out of 190 economies in terms of
more difficult due to increasing and highly uncertain tax and
regulatory pressure. ”23escalating solvency and liquidity issues the ease of doing business ( figure 5). One of the most sig-
29. In response to 31. Indeed, one of the most significant challenges to long
nificant challenges of doing business in the country is ac-
in the banking sector, the National Bank of Tajikistan re- term economic stability in Tajikistan is the business envi-
29. Indeed, one of most significant
thebailed challenges to long cessing electricity, where Tajikistan stands at 173 out of 190
cently recapitalized and out key banks. While this re- ronment in the country. For 25 example, implementation of the
term economies on this measure. Another obstacle for business
economic stability in Tajikistan
solved the immediate crisis, risks remain high since the envi-
is the business Gov- new tax code appears at times arbitrary and driven by reve-
ronment in the country. For example, implementation of the is access to credit. Tajikistan ranks 118 out of 190 economies
ernment decision was not accompanied by necessary reforms nue quotas. This fosters lack 26 of transparency in the financial
new tax code appears at times arbitrary and driven by reve- on the ease of getting credit. Not only do entrepreneurs in
to address future vulnerabilities. The country remains on the management of local companies which in turn contributes to
nue quotas. This fosters lack of transparency in the financial Tajikistan face challenges accessing credit, once borrowers do
brink of a financial sector crisis that could have large devel- informality and corruption. The number and frequency of in-
management of local have credit they have very limited legal rights compared to
opment impacts bothcompanies
in the short- which in turn contributes
and long-term. The GoT’s to teractions with authorities increases the potential for abuse
informality and corruption. The number and frequency of other former Soviet republics (Tajikistan ranks 1 on a scale
resolution of the banking crisis also went against IFI recom- and informal payments. The 2013 Business Environment and
interactions with authorities increases the potential for abuse of 1 to 12 in terms of strength of legal rights of borrowers and
mendations to implement systemic corporate governance Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) shows 19 percent of
and informal payments. In the 2013practices,
Business and Environment lenders).27
reforms to limit fraudulent lending was part respondents said bribery was frequent in dealing with taxes.
and
of Enterprise
the reason for Performance
continued delay Survey in (BEEPS),
negotiation 19on percent
an IMF of The same respondents report dealing with public officials or
respondents
program said bribery
(alongside was frequent
fundamental in dealing
concerns regarding taxes.
with Tajik- public Globally,
31. Tajikistan
services regarding ranks
taxes 140 out
takes of 190
up 27 countries
percent on
of their
The same
istan’s respondents report
macroeconomic dealing
framework). Awith
seriespublic officials
of budget or
sup- the ease of paying taxes. This means that firms
time, compared to the ECA average of 17 percent. Much of in the country
public
port services regarding
operations (World Bank, taxes takesEU),
ADB, up 27 and percent
a large of their
EBRD are
thissubject
time is to arbitrariness
dealing as they deal
with inspections. withis
There government offi-
very little space
loan
time,and technical
compared toassistance program,
the ECA average ofhave been putMuch
17 percent. on hold of cials, making long term investments riskier than
or freedom to operate private companies, ensure competition they would
due be ifsecure
paying taxes were easier
Lawandandthus more predictablere-to
this to concerns
time is dealingregarding the country’s
with inspections. Lawfinancial sector, and
and contract en- and property rights. contract enforcement
firm owners.28 In addition to an unpredictable and challeng-
adequacy
forcementof the macro-economic
remains extremely weak framework.
and discretionary. As a re- mains extremely weak and discretionary. Relatively successful
ing tax environment, firms that wish to trade across borders
sult of the predatory business environment, the entry of new medium and large SMEs are typically controlled by a small
face significant challenges, as Tajikistan ranks 144 out of 190
firms Rampant
30. is very low and systemic corruption
in Tajikistan to otherTajikistan
compared plagues countries circle of elite
economies onwhich prevents
the ease competition
of trading and magnifies
across borders. 29 risks
alongside issues of tax practices, and administrative
in the region (figure 4). Despite a significant entrepreneur- bar- for new entrants (see Annex 2 – ownership of State-Owned
riers that stymie private sector growth. With the financial Enterprises). As a result of the predatory business environ-
ial potential in Tajikistan with almost 40 percent of the labor
crisis, the government is increasingly utilizing private sec- ment, the entry of new firms is very low in Tajikistan com-
force having a preference for self-employment (one of the
tor resources to cover its expenses. Because of the threat of pared to other countries in the region (figure 4). Despite a
capture, there are very limited incentives for firms to grow. significant entrepreneurial potential in Tajikistan with almost
As the head of one of the largest firms in Tajikistan noted, 24 Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics and Strategy, January 2017;
40 percent of the labor force having a preference for self-em-
25 Ibid., 44.
22 Freedom House, “Freedom House: Nations in Transit 2016··Tajiki- 26 Ibid., 62.
stan.” 27 Ibid., 63.
23 Quotes
22 from
Freedom World
House, Bank consultations
“Freedom in Transit–2016··Tajiki-
in Tajikistan
House: Nations Feb-March 28
23 Ibid., 77.from World Bank consultations in Tajikistan – Feb-March
Quotes
2017.
stan.” 29
2017. Ibid., 83
17
19
Confidential – Not
Confidential – for Release
Not for or Distribution
Release or Distribution
FIGURE 4: NEW BUSINESS DENSITY IN TAJIKISTAN24
30
24
32.
ployment
ployment With(one
(onelimits
of
of the private rates
on highest
the highest sector
rates in
ingrowth
the and investment,
the region),
region), only about
only about FIGURE 5: HOW TAJIKISTAN AND COMPARATOR
migration
55 percent
55 percent of those who attempt to start a business succeed,
and
of remittances
those who have
attempt been
to start the
a backbone
business of the
succeed,
Tajik economy, making it vulnerable 26 ECONOMIES RANK ON THE EASE OF DOING
compared
compared to
to almost
almost 64 percent
64 percent in ECA
in ECA to economic
region
region as
as a fluctua-
a whole.
whole. 26
(2016)34
BUSINESS (2016)
BUSINESS
31
31
24
25
24
tions in receiving countries. According to World Bank and
25
32. According
32. According
International to the
to
Monetary the World
World
Fund data,Bank Doing Business
Doing
BankTajikistan Business
is the mostindica-
indica-
re-
tors, Tajikistan
tors, Tajikistan ranks
mittance-dependent ranks 128
128 out
country out inof
of 190
190
the economies
economies
world, meaning in
in terms
terms
that theof
of
the
the ease
ratio ease doing business
of doing
of
of remittance flows to (figure
business GDP has
(figure 5). One of
One
5). been the most
the
higher
of than sig-
most any
sig-
nificant
other
nificant challenges
country.
challenges of
of doing
In addition,
doingmore business
than 90
business in
in the
the country
percent is
is ac-
of the remit-
country ac-
cessing
tance
cessing electricity,
inflows comewhere
electricity, where Tajikistan
Tajikistan stands
from Russia—Tajikistan stands at atis173
173veryout
out of
of 190
vulnera-
190
28
economies
ble to economic
economies on this
on this measure.
conditions
measure. in28 Another
27
27 Russia.
Another 31 obstacle for business
obstacle for business
is access
is access to credit. Tajikistan
to credit. Tajikistan ranks
ranks 118 out of
118 out 190 economies
of 190 economies
33. the Poverty and unemployment aredo drivers of Tajiki-
29
on the
on ease of
ease of getting
getting credit.
credit.29 NotNot only
only do entrepreneurs
entrepreneurs in
in
stan’s massive
Tajikistan
Tajikistan face
face challenges
wave of labor
challenges migration.
accessing
accessing credit, once
credit, According
once borrowers
borrowers to the
do
do
2009
have theyLiving
Tajikistan
have credit
credit they have
have very
Standards
very limited
limited measurement
legal rights
legal rights compared
survey, nine
compared to
to
percent of the population worked abroad resulting
ranks
(Tajikistan
republics
other
other former Soviet republics (Tajikistan ranks 1 on a scale of
former Soviet 1 on in
a 28 per-
scale of
cent
1 of to
1 to
to 12
12 in tal
in terms
termshouseholds
of
of strengthhaving
strength at least
of legal
of legal rights
rightsoneoflabor
of migrant.
borrowers
borrowers and
and
32
The THPS
lenders).
lenders). 30 survey in 2011 showed that more than half (51
30
percent) of all households in Tajikistan had been involved in
33.
labor Globally,
Globally, Tajikistan
33. migration (with one ranks
Tajikistan family
ranks 140
140 out of
out
member 190
190 countries
of currently on
or pre-
countries on
the ease
the easeliving
viously of paying
of paying taxes.
abroad)
taxes. This
since means
ThisTajikistan
means thatthat firms
became
firms in in the country
independent
the country
are
in
are subject
1991. 33 to arbitrariness as they deal with government offi-
subject This survey revealed
to arbitrariness as theythat Tajikistan
deal not only has
with government a
offi-
cials, making
cials, making long long term
term investments
investments riskier than they
riskier than they would
would
be if
be paying taxes
if paying taxes were
were easier
easier and thus more
and thus predictable to
more predictable to
30 Doing business entrepreneurship database, World Bank Group
24
24 Doing business entrepreneurship
Doing business database, World
entrepreneurship database, World Bank
Bank Group.
Group.
31 Ibid.
25
25 Ibid.,
Ibid., 8.
8.
32 Alexander M. Danzer, Barbara Dietz, and Kseniia Gatskova, “Migra- high dependence on remittances, but that it was poor house-
26 Tajikistan Jobs 3 1
26 and
tion Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics
Remittances Diagnostics and
and
in Tajikistan: Strategy,
Strategy,
Survey January
January
Technical 2017;
2017;
Report,” IOM Working 3
3 1
27
27
Papers Ibid.,
Ibid., 10.
10. Ludwig-Maximillians University, Institute for East and
(Munich:
28
28 Ibid.,
Ibid.,
Southeast 44.
44.
European Studies, February 2013), 1, http://www.dokumente. ios-
29 Ibid., 62.
Ibid.,
regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_ios_327.pdf.
29 62.
30
33 Ibid.,
30 Ibid., 63.
Ibid.,11.
63. 31
31 Ibid., 8.
Ibid., 8.
20
20
18
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
FIGURE 6: HOW FAR HAS TAJIKISTAN COME IN THE all households in Tajikistan had been involved in labor mi-
37 gration (with one family member currently or previously liv-
AREAS MEASURED BY DOING BUSINESS?35 35. Remittances
ing abroad) are not utilized
since Tajikistan became for investment
independent in back
1991.in 38
Thiseconomy
the and thus
survey revealed do Tajikistan
that not contribute not only to national
has a high devel-
de-
opment
pendence andon social safety but
remittances, nets. Migrants
that it was prefer to provide
poor households
assistance channels upon
through depends
whose livelihoods where they the
them can most.
use established
Similarly,
relations with family
labor migrants members
are generally and already-established
low-skilled and work in one sec- so-
cial networks,
tor (87 percent such as the that
indicated mahalla.
they38 Households
work spend most
in the construction
of the remittances
sector). This implies on immediate
that migration cash
will consumptions
not significantly needs,
alter
or diversifyhealth,
education, the human and home
capital repair rather of
capabilities than to promote
migrants, cre-
income generation
ating barriers activities,
for future to investwhen
employment in businesses,
migrants and/or
return
to contribute
home. 39
The clearto social protection
majority systems.
of migrants are39
Over
men thepercent)
(95 last de-
cade,
nearly all Government
the of them migrate has done to improve
little with
to Russia, systems
most ending that
up in
would
Moscow (59to
help 40 absorb remittances by the national
effectively
percent).
economy and provide avenues for migrants and their families
The economic
36.contribute
to to broader slowdown
economic growthhas
in Russia anddrastically
development. re-
duced the amount of remittances to Tajikistan. Table 3 below
36. According
illustrates the amount to theofWorld Development
remittances Indicators,
into Tajikistan over Ta-
the
jikistan
course of theconsistently
has past ten years. maintained
Remittances the highest
hit a peakofficial
at $4.3 un-
bil-
employment
lion in 2013. By rates
2015,among the had
this level formerfallen Soviet
to $2.6 Central
billion—a Asian60
republics. Unemployment rates have hovered
percent reduction, although remittance rates have increased around 11 per-
cent for the past decade. High unemployment is an outcome
in 2016-2017.
of a growth model which is based on remittance-driven con-
33
sumption and neglects
37. Remittances the importance
utilized for of
are not domestic job
investment back cre-
in
firm
holds owners. In addition
whose livelihoods to an unpredictable
depends upon them the and challeng-
most. Simi- ation through formal
the economy and thusprivate sector and to
do not contribute SMEs. Employment
national develop-
32
ing tax environment, firms that wish to trade across borders growth industry
in social minimal
wasnets. and only modest
larly, labor migrants are generally low-skilled and work in one ment and safety Tajik migrants prefer into agricul-
provide
face
sectorsignificant challenges,
(87 percent indicated asthat
Tajikistan
they work in144
ranks theout of 190
construc- ture and services, the two largest sectors.
34 assistance through channels where they can use established
economies on the ease of trading across borders.
tion sector). This implies that migration will not significantly relations
37. Thewithyouthfamily members
labor inactivityand already-established
rate is particularlysocial high
alter or diversify the human capital capabilities of migrants, networks, such as the mahalla. 41
Tajik households spend most
34. With limits on private sector growth and investment, and growing. The working-age population (15–64 year olds)
creating barriers for future employment when migrants re- of the remittances on immediate consumptions
cashmillion
migration 36 and remittances have been the backbone of the
turn home. The clear majority of migrants are men (95 per- rose from 3.31 million in 2000 to 5.23 in 2015. needs,
While
Tajik economy, making it vulnerable to economic fluctua- education, health, and home repair
the potential workforce is growing, only 43 percent rather than to promote
of them
cent) nearly all of them migrate to Russia, with most ending income generation activities, to invest age in businesses, and/or
tions in receiving countries. According to World Bank and are in the labor force. Many working youth are neither
up in Moscow (59 percent).37 to contribute to social protection systems. 42
Over the last de-
International Monetary Fund data, Tajikistan is the most re- employed nor looking for work (NEET), representing 40 per-
cade, the Government has done little to improve systems that
mittance-dependent
34. The economiccountry slowdown in world,
in the Russia meaning that the
has drastically cent of the total, which is high by international standards.
ratio of remittance flows to GDP has been higher than any would help
Between 2003 effectively
to and absorbrates
2013, NEET remittances
among youth by the national
increased
reduced the amount of remittances to Tajikistan. Table 2
other country. In addition, more than 90 percent of the remit- economy and provide avenues for migrants
from 37 to 41 percent. Almost a third of employed young and their families
peo-
below illustrates the amount of remittances into Tajikistan
tance inflows come from to contribute to broader economic growth and development.
over the course of the pastRussia—Tajikistan
ten years. Remittances
36
is very vulnera-
hit a peak at ple are in unpaid (informal) jobs compared to 15 percent of
ble to economic conditions in Russia.
$4.3 billion in 2013. By 2015, this level had fallen to $2.6 bil- adults. The informal sector is particularly large in rural areas
38. in According the World
to where Development Indicators, Ta-
35
lion—a 60 percent reduction, although remittance rates have and agriculture, unpaid family workers, including
35. Poverty and unemployment are drivers of Tajikistan’s jikistan has consistently
youth, are very common. maintained
40 the highest official un-
increased in 2016-2017. employment rates among the former Soviet Central Asian
massive wave of labor migration. According to the 2009 Ta-
jikistan Living Standards measurement survey, nine percent republics. Unemployment rates have hovered around 11
of the population worked abroad resulting in 28 percent of to- percent for the past decade. High unemployment is an out-
tal households having at least one labor migrant.37 The THPS come of a growth model which is based on remittance-driven
survey in 2011 showed that more than half (51 percent) of consumption and neglects the importance of domestic job
creation through formal private sector and SMEs. Employ-
ment growth in industry was minimal and only modest in
32 Ibid., 10. agriculture and services, the two largest sectors. Lack of 43
33 Ibid., 77.
commercialization and development of value chains limit the
34 Ibid., 83.
35 Ibid.
36 UNDP, “Labor Migration, Remittances, and Human Development
in Central Asia” (United Nations Development Programme, 2015), 12, 38 Ibid., 11.
file:///C:/Users/jmurtaz/Downloads/CAM&RHDpaperFINAL.pdf.
34 Ibid., 8. 39 Ibid., 2.
37 Alexander
35 UNDP, M. Danzer,
“Labor Barbara
Migration, Dietz, and
Remittances, Kseniia
and Human Gatskova, “Migra-
Development 40 Ibid., 21.
tion and Remittances
in Central in Tajikistan:
Asia” (United Survey Technical
Nations Development Report,”
Programme, IOM Working
2015), 12, 41
38 Mukomel,Vladimir,
Mukomel, Partner
Diaspora––Partner
Vladimir,Diaspora in
in the
the Developmentof
Development of
Papers (Munich: Ludwig-Maximillians University, Institute for East and
file:///C:/Users/jmurtaz/Downloads/CAM&RHDpaperFINAL.pdf. Tajikistan, Dushanbe:
Tajikistan, Dushanbe: IOM Mission in
IOM Mission Tajikistan,2014,
in Tajikistan, 2014,p.5.
p.5.
Southeast
36 IbidEuropean
., 2. Studies, February 2013), 1, http://www.dokumente. 42
39 World Bank
Source: World
Source: Bank
ios-regensburg.de/publikationen/wp/wp_ios_327.pdf.
37 Ibid., 21. 43 Source: World Bank
40 Ibid.
21
19
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
FIGURE7:
FIGURE 7:RATIOS OFREMITTANCE
RATIOSOF INFLOWSTO
REMITTANCEINFLOWS GDP(FOR
TOGDP THE“TOP
“TOPTEN”
(FORTHE REMITTANCE-RECEIVINGCOUNTRIES)
TEN”REMITTANCE-RECEIVING COUNTRIES)41
44
Source: UNDP calculations, based on World Bank and IMF data
TABLE 2:
TABLE 2: REMITTANCES TO TAJIKISTAN
REMITTANCES TO NET INFLOW
TAJIKISTAN -- NET INFLOW IN USD (MILLION)
(MILLION) PER
IN USD MONTH42
PER MONTH 45
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Jan 45 77 122 96 102 136 175 221 216.6 125.7
Feb 40 68 129 83 103 150 185 228 203.3 126.0
Mar 55 81 145 99 125 185 215 245 239.7 162.8
Apr 53 91 181 111 153 196 239 288 274.6 201.8
May 75 123 220 134 171 255 305 344 352.5 244.5
Jun 96 150 261 172 216 321 332 402 423.2 301.6
Jul 114 189 328 203 259 357 414 493 496.7 306.5
Aug 141 217 319 202 284 392 445 492 448.6 279.9
Sep 129 184 310 203 253 326 382 438 437.3 252.8
Oct 140 225 266 194 262 312 428 439 365.8 237.8
Nov 117 192 194 166 218 274 318 347 253.5 196.4
Dec 118 177 195 169 218 270 326 363 227.0 190.0
TOTAL 1,123 1,774 2,670 1,834 2,363 3,174 3,764 4,298 3,939 2,626
potential of returns to agriculture. Agriculture generates 70 compared to migration.46
percent of employment in-country, but many of these jobs are
informal, and less attractive for the rural population due to 39. The youth labor inactivity rate is particularly high and
low productivity.44 45This low growth in overall employment, growing. The working-age population (15–64 year olds) rose
as well as limited internal labor mobility, explain the relative- from 3.31 million in 2000 to 5.23 million in 2015. While the
ly small contribution of employment to poverty reduction, potential workforce is growing, only 43 percent of them are
in the labor force. Many working age youth are neither em-
44 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
45 World Bank
Source: World
42 Source: Bank 46 Tajikistan Jobs Diagnostics and Strategy, January 2017
22
20
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
FIGURE 8: UNEMPLOYMENT
UNEMPLOYMENTRATE
RATE IN TAJIKISTAN (2000-2013) 39.
promoting There
the statusappears
quo in- to be
IN TAJIKISTAN (2000-PRESENT) strong correlations between those
cluded groups from Sughd
province, which had been the civil
sub-national areas where
war violence
industrial base was strongest
in the north and as well
as
had those wheremost
benefited recent violent in-
substan-
cidents
tially from taken subsidies,
haveSoviet place. Recent
violent
and factions from have
incidents Kulob.been Themost
United Tajik
prevalent Opposition
in those areas thatwas wit-
characterized
nessed the most groups with
by extreme violence
ideological
during the differences
civil war (see with the 9
Figures
central
and 10), government—seeking
especially the Rasht Val-
cultural,
ley, religious,
several districts and inpoliti-
Southern
cal reforms.
Khatlon, and These
GBAO. ideological
Violence in
areas also
differences
these mapped
has been onto by
triggered
distinct regional differences.
intraelite conflicts that, in some
The UTO
cases, has consisted
spilled over of groups
into street
Source: World Development Indicators from GBAO and Gharm. The
protests and larger scale violence.
eminent scholar of the Per-
sianate world, Olivier Roy characterized
40. Although not touched by civil war the Tajik civil political
violence, war
C. REGIONALISM, AND Between
EQUITY,standards.
ployed nor looking for work (NEET), representing 40 percent 49
of the total, which is high by international the “Warhas
as violence of the Kolkhoz [collective farms]. ”
emerged recently in the more deeply impover- According to
INCLUSION RISKS
2003 and 2013, NEET rates among youth increased from 37
to 41 percent. Almost a third of employed young people are
Roy, the roots of the civil conflict were in forced
ished parts of Sughd Province in northern Tajikistan in the
gration
denselyby the Soviets Ferghana
populated of whole populations
valley. Although
internal
from one therepart
mi-
hasofbeen
in unpaid (informal) jobs compared to 15 percent Tajikistan to another. The Soviets resettled populations into
38. As the experience in the Tajik civil war of adults.
illustrates, limited violence, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan and as-
new collective farms in the recently irrigated land in the south
The informal sector is particularly
fragility and violence has been driven by leaders andlarge in rural areas within re- sociated groups appear to be responsible for targeted killings
where they retained their local identities. Rather than reduc-
agriculture,
gional power bases where unpaid family
fighting for workers,
greater including
autonomy youth,
and re- of police officers as well as a suicide bombing. Sughd prov-
are very from
common. 47 ing tensions between groups, these forced population trans-
sources the central government. The civil war was char- ince, most of which is located in the fertile and densely popu-
fers fomented the divisions that would serve as the basis for
acterized by fighting between groups defending the status lated Ferghana Valley, has been a prime recruiting ground for
C. REGIONALISM, EQUITY, AND
the Tajik civil war.
quo and the IRPT that sought political and religious reforms, both violent and non-violent Islamist extremist groups.
INCLUSION RISKS
including greater regional autonomy—it was a conflict root-
ed in ideological and regional rather than ethnic differences.
41. There appears to be strong correlations between those
41. Another
sub-national areas source
whereof violence
civil that does
war violence was appear con-
notstrongest
Those promoting the status quo included groups from Sughd as well as those where recent violent incidents have borders
nected to the civil war are skirmishes along the taken of
40. As the experience in the Tajik civil war illustrates, fra- the country. include skirmishes
Theseincidents
province, place. Recent violent have been in mostsouthern
prevalent Tajikistan
in
which had been the industrial
gility and violence has been driven by leaders with the base in north
region- along Afghan
thethat border, which
and had benefited most substantially from Soviet subsidies, those areas witnessed the most are typically
extreme associated
violence during with
al power bases fighting for greater autonomy and resources the drug
and the civil wartrade. There 9
(see Figures areand also
10), conflicts
especially overtheland
Rasht and
Val- water
fromfactions
the central from Kulob. The
government. The United
civil warTajik
wasOpposition
characterized was
characterized by groups with ideological differences with the the Ferghana
inseveral
ley, districtsValley in northern
in Southern Tajikistan.
Khatlon, and GBAO. These very lo-
Vio-
by fighting between groups defending the status quo and the
central government—seeking calized
lence conflicts
in these areas typically involve conflict
has been triggered over land
by intra-elite resulting
conflicts
IRPT that sought political and cultural, religious religious, and politi-
reforms, including
cal reforms. These ideologicalwas differences also mapped onto from
that, in unresolved
some cases, border
has spilled demarcation
over into issues.
street protests and
greater regional autonomy—it a conflict rooted in ideo-
distinct regional differences. The UTOdifferences.
consisted 48 groups
ofThose larger scale violence. Conflicts follow a similar pattern in that
logical and regional rather than ethnic
haveThe
42.
they civilafter
erupted warthe has left an
ouster orimportant legacy of
forced resignation of contin-
an
from GBAO and Gharm. The eminent scholar of the Persi- ued violence where fighting was most intense, but it also left
important local political leader who had previously recon-
anate world, Olivier Roy characterized the Tajik civil war as a legacy of poverty, poor service delivery and stunted devel-
ciled with the central government.
47 “War
the Ibid. of the Kolkhoz [collective farms].” According to
43
opment. There appears to be some correlation between FCV
Roy, the roots of the civil conflict were in forced
48 Edward W. Walker, “Ethnic War, Holy War, War O’ War:internal
Does the mi-
42.riskAlthough
areas and not touched
poverty (see byFigure
civil war11),violence,
and an even political
stronger
Adjective Matter in Explaining Collective Political Violence?,” Berke-
gration by the Soviets of whole populations from one part of
ley Program in Eurasian and East European Studies, February 1, 2006, violence has emerged
correlation betweenrecently
non-monetaryin the more poverty deeply impov- and
measures
Tajikistan to another. The Soviets
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6dd333r5. resettled
either to individual into
populations
with respect erished
previousparts of Sughd
violence (see Figure in
Province 12).northern
Non-monetaryTajikistan in
measures
new collective
conflicts or globally?farms in the
The author recently
argues irrigated land
that distinguishing among in types
the south
of the densely populated Ferghana valley. Although
include indicators such as access to services, education levels, there has
internal conflict is more difficult than is often assumed and that theories
where they retained their local identities. Rather than reduc- been
and limited
employmentviolence, the This
rates. Islamic Movement true
is particularly of Uzbekistan
of several dis-
of ethnic conflict typically explain not ethnic conflict as distinct category
ing tensions
but sustained between
internal violencegroups, these
in general, forced
including population
religious conflict. trans- and associated groups appear to be
tricts in the Region of Republican Subordination responsible for targeted
(Tavildara,
fers fomented
Further, while these the divisions
theories that
typically would
attempt serve
to explain why asconflict
the basis
breaksfor killings
Rasht, ofTojikobod,
police officers
and asNurobod)
well as a suicide
and GBAO bombing. thatSughd
have high
out in
the multiethnic
somecivil
Tajik war. regions but not others, they do not attempt to
explain why conflict when it occurs is ethnic rather than something else, levels in non-monetary measures of poverty and violence
why the nature of individual conflicts changes over time, or why certain (both civil war violence and more recent conflict).
kinds of internal conflict are characteristic of particular periods in history given”:”Edward W.”}],”issued”:{“date-parts”:[[“2006”,2,1]]},”accessed”:{“date
and not others. The paper investigates these questions by looking at three ”schema”:”https://github.com/citation-style-lan-
-parts”:[[“2017”,3,14]]}}}],
43. Regionalism is exacerbated by Tajikistan’s system of
cases: Afghanistan since 1978, Tajikistan from 1992-1997, and Chechnya guage/schema/raw/master/csl-citation.json”}
since 1994.”,”URL”:”http://escholarship.org/uc/item/6dd333r5”,”shortTi- 49 intergovernmental relations, in whichand
Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics the Birth government
national of Na-
tle”:”Ethnic War, Holy War, War O’ War”,”author”:[{“family”:”Walker”,”- agencies
tions 2007), on
decide
(NYU Press, 94. resource allocation to sub-national ad-
43 Olivier Roy, The New Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Birth of ministrative units, which are responsible for public service
Nations (NYU Press, 2007), 94. 23
21
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
FIGURE 9:
FIGURE LOCATIONS –
9: LOCATIONS – CONFLICT
CONFLICT EVENTS
EVENTS DURING
DURING FIGURE 10:
FIGURE 10: LOCATIONS
LOCATIONS – CONFLICT EVENTS
– CONFLICT IN POST-
EVENTS IN POST-
CIVIL WAR (1992 – 1997)*
CIVIL WAR (1992 – 1997)* WAR PERIOD/RECENT VIOLENCE (1998 – 2015)*
WAR PERIOD/RECENT VIOLENCE (1998 – 2015)*
FIGURE 11: CONFLICT EVENTS (1998-2015) AND FIGURE 12: CONFLICT EVENTS (1998-2015) AND NON-
POVERTY RATES** MONETARY POVERTY MEASURES**
*Figures 9&10 illustrate conflict event data recorded between 1992 and 2015 by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Program
(UCDP)—reviewed
province, most of expert consultants
by which is located as part of RRA
in the analysis.
fertile and dense- conflicts typically involve conflict over land resulting from
ly populated Ferghana Valley, has been a prime recruiting
** Poverty and non-monetary poverty measures derived from WB ‘Poverty Mapping unresolved border
in Tajikistan” Report,demarcation issues with
April, 2016. Non-monetary communities
poverty indicators in
ground for both violent
measure “deprivations” and non-violent
or “vulnerabilities” to provideIslamist
informationextremist Kyrgyzstan.
on living standards and the quality of life, including on issues such as education, employ-
ment, services, and infrastructure.
groups.
44. The civil war has left an important legacy of continued
43.
deliveryAnother
but aresource of violence that
not accountable does not
for doing appear
so down to con-
citi- violence
framework where fighting
includes the was
1994most
Lawintense, but it also left in
on “Self-Government a
nected to the
zens. This civil creates
system war are skirmishes
regional along in
inequities theresource
borders al- of Towns of
legacy andpoverty,
Townships,poor ” service delivery and
which attempted stunted devel-
to decentralize au-
the country.
location, These
as well as include
challenges skirmishes in southernefficient
for the transparent, Tajiki- opment. There
thorities and appears to be some
responsibilities to thecorrelation between FCV
local administrations in
stan
use ofalong the funds.
public Afghan 44 border, which are typically associated
This state of affairs persists despite a risk areas
villages and
and poverty
towns Figure
(see areas
in rural 11), and 45
(jamoats). anAneven stronger
amendment
with
legal the drug trade.
framework thatThere
allows foralso
are conflicts over
sub-national land in the
administrations to this law was
correlation made in
between 2009, which aimed
non-monetary at enabling
poverty measures greater
and
and local Valley
Ferghana in northern
communities to playTajikistan.
active rolesThese very localized
in decision-mak- citizen participation
previous violence (see inFigure
local administration
12). Non-monetary and facilitating
measures
ing over resource allocations and service delivery. The legal local social and economic problem-solving. The amend-
*Figures 9&10 illustrate conflict event data recorded between 1992 and 2015 by the Global Terrorism Database (GTD) and the Uppsala Conflict Data Pro-
gram (UCDP)—reviewed by expert consultants as part of RRA analysis.
** Poverty and non-monetary poverty measures derived from WB ‘Poverty Mapping in Tajikistan” Report, April, 2016. Non-monetary poverty indicators
measure “deprivations” or “vulnerabilities” to provide information on living standards and the quality of life, including on issues such as education, employ-
44 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is 45 For an overview of the sub-national administrative structure in
ment, services, and
Decentralization infrastructure.
the Answer for Tajikistan?” World Bank (2013), p. 6-7. Tajikistan, see Cieslewska (2015) pps. 102-104.
24
22
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
BOX 3: SUMMARY - SUB-REGIONS IMPACTED BY CONFLICT/AT RISK
BOX 2: SUMMARY - SUB-REGIONS IMPACTED BY CONFLICT/AT RISK
Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO): This is the poorest, most sparsely popu- in Rasht. In almost every case, the violence was intra-elite as it featured
lated, and most geographically
Gorno-Badakhshan (GBAO): remote
This isprovince
the poorest,of Tajikistan that suffered
most sparsely popu- former
District IRPT commandersSubordination
of Republican who had since integrated into the Tajik
(Rasht, Tavildara govern-
districts):
significantly
lated, and most during the civil war.
geographically In recent
remote years,of
province has witnessed
it Tajikistan several
that suffered ment.
Several The
high Government
profile violent of events
Tajikistan has
have blamed
taken placeIslamic
over the extremists
past decade for
outbreaks of intra-elite
significantly during the violence,
civil war. based on cleavages
In recent years, it hasthat emerged several
witnessed during recent
in Rasht.episodes,
In almost every independent
without case, the violencemedia wasit is difficult as
intra-elite verify
to it gov-
featured
the civil war,
outbreaks of that have spilled
intra-elite violence,over into on
mass
based protests
cleavages and
that street violence.
emerged during ernment
former IRPT claims. The root causes
commanders who had of violence districts
in these into
since integrated appear
the Tajik to be
govern-
These isolated
the civil events
war, that have have mobilized
spilled over into some
mass citizens
protests inand remote
this street region
violence. the
ment.same
Theregional
Governmentrivalries that triggered
of Tajikistan the Tajik
has blamed civil war.
Islamic With frequent
extremists for re-
These
and isolated
have reopenedevents have mobilized
grievances towards some central in
thecitizens this remote Unlike
government. region episodes of violence
cent episodes. in this
The root region
causes and increasing
of violence in these antagonism towards
districts appear to the
be
and have
other regionsreopened grievances
of Tajikistan, towards
the Pamiri the central
population thatgovernment.
constitutes the Unlike
ma- central government, this region appears to be
the same regional rivalries that triggered the Tajik civil war. at greatest risk for future
otherof
jority regions
residentsof Tajikistan,
in GBAO has thea Pamiri
distinctpopulation
ethnic and that constitutes
religious the ma-
identity. conflict.
jority of residents in GBAO has a distinct ethnic and religious identity.
Southern Khatlon (Shorobod, Hamadoni, Nosiri Hisrav, Sharitus
Sughd (Isfara,
(Isfara, Kohistoni
Soghd Mastchoh): Sughd
Kohistoni Mastchoh): Soghd province
province in in northern
northern
Tajikistan was
Tajikistan historically the
was historically wealthiest, most
the wealthiest, industrialized, and
most industrialized, and main-
main-
Southern These
districts): Khatlon were areas of heavy
(Shorobod, fighting during
Nosiri the
Hamadoni, Tajik Sharitus
Hisrav, civil war. the closest
tained the
tained closest ties to Moscow.
ties to Moscow. Since the collapse
Since the collapse of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union,
These districts also share a border with the increasingly
districts): These were areas of heavy fighting during the Tajik civil volatile Kunduz
war. districts have
several districts have experienced
provinces in Afghanistan. several experienced high poverty rates
high poverty rates and have emerged
and have emerged
These districts also share In years,
recent with
a border several
the violent incidents
increasingly along
volatile Kunduz as fertile
fertilerecruiting
as groundfor
recruitingground for violent
violent extremist
extremist groups,
groups, suchsuch as the
as the IslamIs--
the borderin
provinces have involved drug
Afghanistan. smuggling
In recent and kidnapping
years, several of locals.
violent incidents Al-
along lamic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as non-violent religious extremists
ic Movement of Uzbekistan, as well as non-violent religious extremists
though
the borderthere
havehave been some
involved drugremnants
smuggling of civil
and war fissures, of
kidnapping the primary
locals. Al- as Hezb-e
such as Tahrir. There
Hezb-e Tahrir.
such was almost
There was no violence
almost no violence in in northern
northern Tajikistan
Tajikistan
violence in this
though there region
have been has
some been criminalof
remnants activity
civil warrelated to cross-border
fissures, the primary during the civil war. The violent
during the civil war. The violent events that have occurredin
events that have occurred recentyears,
inrecent years
violence inand
smuggling thisthe trade
drughas
region with
been Afghanistan.
criminal activity related to cross-border such as suicide bombings, represent a new kind of violent extremism that
represent a new kind of violent extremism—including suicide bombings
smuggling and the drug trade with Afghanistan. has not been previously present in the country.
District of Republican Subordination (Rasht, Tavildara districts): and targeted assassinations of government officials—that has not been
Several high profile violent events have taken place over the past decade previously present in the country.
ment included such asto
changes provide administrations
jamoat education
include
with
indicators
budgets, and introduce
access
a
to services,
system for direct
levels,
election of FIGURE 13:
FIGURE 13: YOUTH
YOUTH IDLENESS
IDLENESS
and employment rates. This is particularly true of several dis-
jamaot councilors (rather than appointment
tricts in the Region of Republican Subordination (Tavildara, by district (ray-
on) governments).
Rasht, Tojikobod, and 1994 and 2009
The Nurobod) and lawsGBAO werethatonly partial-
have high
ly implemented, however, due to concerns
levels in non-monetary measures of poverty and violence over inadequate
capacity
(both civil jamoat
ofwar administrations
violence and more recent to manage
conflict).resources au-
tonomously.46Fiscal decentralization has not taken place, and
45. system
the for direct
Regionalism iselection
exacerbatedof jamoat councilors system
by Tajikistan’s has yet of to
be enacted. However,
intergovernmental in 2015,in
relations, the Local
which Development
national Com-
government
mittee
agencies (LDC)
decidewas onestablished under the to
resource allocation President’s
sub-national Office to
ad-
promote
ministrative units, which development
socio-economic are responsible thepublic
in for regions, and
service
build capacity
delivery but are of not accountable administration
the sub-national for doing so down to plan and
to citi-
implement programs.
zens. This system createsTheregional
establishment of the
inequities in LDC
resourcesignals
al-
the government’s
location, as well as interest in revisiting
challenges for thethe agenda of efficient
transparent, reform-
of public funds.50 relations.
ing intergovernmental
use This state of affairs persists despite a
legal framework that allows for sub-national administrations
In addition
44. local
and communities to regionalism
to play active rolesTajikistan
risks, faces a
in decision-mak-
significant youth bulge, with high rates of
ing over resource allocations and service delivery. The legal youth unemploy-
ment and idleness
framework includes that 1994 Lawboth
the represent a threat and oppor-
on “Self-Government in Source: World Bank Jobs Diagnostic 2017
tunity for future stability.
Towns and Townships,” which attempted According to UNICEF, 33 percent
to decentralize au-
of the population
thorities is less than 14
and responsibilities years
to the and young people
old,administrations
local in and the old
councilors age dependency
(rather bybe
ratio will
than appointment quite (low.
district rayonAn im-
) gov-
aged 14-30 make up 35 percent of the
villages and towns in rural areas (jamoats). An amendmenttotal51 population. Just
this1994
plication ofThe
ernments). is that
andthe government
2009 laws wereshould invest heavily
only partially imple-
five percent
to this law was the population
of made in 2009, whichis over 60 years
aimed old. Each
at enabling year
greater into education
mented, however, challenge
– adue compounded
to concerns by the brain
over inadequate drain
capacity of
130,000 enter the
citizen participation in working age population, with
local administration and facilitating 50 percent
associated
jamoat with externalto
administrations migration and the fact
manage resources that nearly 75
autonomously. 52
youth unemployment.
local social and economic
47
The majority of returning
problem-solving. econom-
The amendment percent
Fiscal of the population
decentralization hasremains in rural
not taken areas.
place,
48
and the system
ic migrants are also male youth. This
included changes to provide jamoat administrations with creates a situation in
which the young age dependency ratio will be relatively high, for direct election of jamoat councilors has yet to be enacted.
budgets, and introduce a system for direct election of jamaot 45. Lack of opportunities for youth may well be the key
However, in 2015, the Local Development Committee (LDC)
long term challenge for Tajikistan. Youth participation in
was established under the President’s Office to promote so-
the labor market declined rapidly from 2003, and those look-
50 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is Decen-
tralization
46 the Answer
“Improving for Tajikistan?”
Service World
Delivery through Bank (2013),
Governance p. 6-7. Is De-
Reforms:
51 For an overview
centralization the Answerof the sub-nationalWorld
for Tajikistan?” administrative structure
p. 4. in
Bank (2013), 52 “Improving Service Delivery through Governance Reforms: Is De-
Tajikistan,
47 Statesee Cieslewska
Statistics (2015) pps.
Committee; 102-104.
quoted by the GoT - Deputy Minister for
centralization the Answer for Tajikistan?” World Bank (2013), p. 4.
Labor and Migration 48 https://www.unicef.org/tajikistan/overview.html.
25
23
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
THE ORGANIZATIONIN
TABLE 3. SOCIAL GROUP MEMBERSHIP AND PERCENTAGE WHO ATTENDED A MEETING OF THEORGANIZATION IN
THE PAST YEAR
2013 2% 95% 1% 66% 32%
Women’s association
2016 8% 88% 0% 75% 25%
2013 2% 96% 1% 64% 27%
Youth group
2016 4% 90% 0% 79% 21%
2013 8% 90% 1% 72% 22%
Farmers’ association
2016 14% 84% 0% 63% 36%
2013 2% 96% 1% 69% 31%
Credit or savings group
2016 6% 92% 0% 13% 85%
2013 6% 92% 1% 89% 8%
Trade union
2016 13% 86% 0% 93% 8%
2013 6% 91% 1% 88% 11%
School management committee
2016 13% 84% 0% 93% 7%
2013 3% 94% 2% 87% 13%
Community housing committee
2016 10% 89% 0% 84% 16%
2013 7% 90% 1% 92% 7%
Gashtak/gap
2016 7% 91% 1% 77% 22%
cio-economic
ing for work now development
are likely toin be
the regions,
more poorlyand build capaci-
educated than the labor market
communities declined
by non-IS rapidly from
militants– 2003,
local and
Salafis those look-
calling for a
ty of the
their predecessors and few will have received any implement
sub-national administration to plan and vocational ing for work now are likely
stricter and more exclusive form of Islam. to more poorly
53 educated than
programs.
training. 49 The establishment of the LDC signals the govern-
One 2012 study of youth in the Ferghana valley their predecessors and few will have received any vocational
55
ment’s interest
noted a sense of in alienation
revisiting theand agenda
exclusion of reforming
that wentintergov-
well be- training.
46. Women’sOne dominant
2012 study of youth
presence inin
thethe Ferghana
informal valley
economy
ernmental relations.
yond unemployment. Those interviewed “feel largely exclud- noted
also a sense
makes them of susceptible
alienation and exclusion
to economic that went
shocks; andwell
migra-be-
ed yond
tion unemployment.
has had significant Those interviewed
impacts on gender “feel largely
roles andexcluded
family
46.from Inpolitics,
addition the
to economy,
regionalism therisks, system, protection
legal Tajikistan faces a sig-by
from politics,
structure, the economy,
including the legal system,
the emergence of a largeprotection
number by
oflawde
law enforcement, quality public services and
nificant youth bulge, with high rates of youth unemployment decision making
processes at local, family and even personal level,” it noted. enforcement,
facto women-headedquality public servicesTajikistan
households. and decisionhasmaking
a sound pro-
le-
and idleness that represent both a threat and opportunity for cesses
gal at local, family
framework and even
that supports personal
gender level,”but
it noted.
equality, has not Many
im-
Many young people interviewed in
future stability. According to UNICEF, 33 percent the report were the“feel-
ofleft pop-
ing that isthey young people
plemented many interviewed
of the laws in and
the report were left
international “feeling that
agreements to
ulation thanno
lesshave 14legal
yearsor non-violent
old, and young means
people live digni-
toaged 14-30 they have
which it is no legal
party. or non-violent
From an economic means to live dignified
perspective, lives
educational
fied lives in their home countries. ” 50
Another
make up 35 percent of the total population. Just five study notes that
percent
in areas adjoining the border with Afghanistan, unemployed in their home
differences betweencountries.
men ”56 Another
and women study
mean notes that in
that there areareas
sig-
of the population is over 60 years old. Each year 130,000 en- adjoining
nificant the border
income withbetween
disparities Afghanistan,men and unemployed
women. Femaleyouth
ter thegravitate
youth working towards withwhich
smuggling,
age population, brings
oftenyouth
50 percent them
unem-
into contact gravitate towards
enrollment smuggling,
in tertiary education which often brings
is among them
the lowest in into
the
53 with warlords and, by extension, radical Islam.
51
ployment. The majority of returning economic migrants are contact
world. 54
with
Women warlords and, in
are active bytheextension,
informal radical Islam.
economy, 57
which This is
This report
also male stressed
youth. This that that a
creates the key to radicalization
situation in which the young is not
poverty per se, but the absence of “social lift” – the opportu- report’s lead
typically author,with
associated Parviz Mullojanov,
lower stressedof
salaries, absence that that
social the
ben-
age dependency ratio will be relatively high, and the old age key to
efits, andradicalization
fewer opportunitiesis not poverty
for skillper se, but theWomen’s
absence
development.
nity to find better
dependency work,
ratio will beidentity and
quite low. Ana better lifestyle.
implication
52
This
of this is
can of “socialin
presence lift”
the the opportunity
– informal economy to makes
find better
theirwork, identity
employment
that lead not only increase
the government should the attraction
invest heavily ofinto
IS, but can also
education – and a better
situation quite lifestyle. 58
susceptibleThis tocan lead not
economic only increase
shocks, makingthe wom- at-
make people more open
youngcompounded
a challenge by the radicalization
tobrain in their own
drain associated with traction
en more of IS, but can also
economically make young
dependent people
and prone tomore open to
insecurity. 55
external migration and the fact that nearly 75 percent of the country isin
radicalization
The their own
plagued communities
by unofficial by non-IS
marriages as wellmilitants
as ear-
population remains in rural areas.54 ly marriages and polygamous relationships that often leave
47. Lack of opportunities for youth may well be the key
49 55 Drivers of Change in Tajikistan, DFID November 2011 p38.
term of
long Drivers Tajikistan,
Change in for
challenge DFID November
Tajikistan. 2011 p38.
Youth participation in
50 http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/640-nobody- 56 http://www.saferworld.org.uk/resources/view-resource/640-nobody-
hasaever-asked-about-young-peoples-opinions. hasaever-asked-about-young-peoples-opinions.
51 Проект Фонда Евразии в Центральной Азии (ФЕЦА) «Снижение 57 Проект Фонда Евразии в Центральной Азии (ФЕЦА) «Снижение
53 Ibid.
уровня
53 радикализации
State молодежи
Statistics Committee; в Таджикистане»
quoted Автор Minister
by the GoT - Deputy отчета: for уровня
54 радикализации
World молодежи
Bank, “Tajikistan: в Таджикистане»
Country отчета:
Автор(Washington,
Gender Assessment”
Labor and
Парвиз Migration. .
Муллоджанов TheМуллоджанов
Парвиз
DC: . 2013), .3.
World Bank, June
54 Parviz
52 Mullojanov, interview with WB delegation, March 2017.
https://www.unicef.org/tajikistan/overview.html. 55 bid., 5. Mullojanov, interview with WB delegation, March 2017.
58 IParviz
26
24
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
– local salafis
women without calling
legalfor a stricter
rights. and more exclusive
Representation of women form of
in the FIGURE 14: SUICIDE FIGHTERS BY NATIONALITY
Islam.59 realm also lags behind the government’s goal of 30
political
percent representation of women in public bodies, as men
48. Women’s
continue dominant
to dominate andpresence
lead most in political
the informal economy
organizations
also makes them 56 susceptible to economic shocks; and migra-
in the country. Finally, violence against women is a pro-
tion has had
nounced threatsignificant
in Tajikistan.impacts In on gender
a 2005 rolesin
survey and family
Khatlon,
structure, including the emergence
nearly sixty percent of women between 17 and 47 reported of a large number of de
facto women-headed households. Tajikistan
to have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their has a sound le-
gal framework that supports
husband at least once during their lives. gender quality,
57 but has not im-
plemented many of the laws and international agreements to
which it
47. Data also From
is party. showsan economic
very perspective,
low participation educational
rates in civic
differences between men and
life more broadly, highlighting further challenges ofare
women mean that there sig-
inclu-
nificant income disparities between men
sion and citizen engagement. To get a sense of associational and women. Female
enrollment
life in tertiary education
in the community, the Assessment is among the lowest
of Local Governancein the
60
world. Women are active
Survey in Tajikistan asked whether respondents belonged
58 in the informal economy, which is
typically associated with lower salaries,
to any mostly formal organizations that are known to exist absence of social ben-
efits, and fewer
throughout opportunities
Tajikistan. The surveyfor skill development.
shows very low Women’s
partici-
presence in the informal economy
pation in civic life. The most common social organizationsmakes their employment
situation
in the sampledquite susceptible
jamoats are economic
to farmers’ shocks, making wom-
associations—and only
8 percent of those surveyed in 2013 said prone
en more economically dependent and that they insecuri-
to belonged
to 61
ty. Thean
such country
organization,is plagued while by14 percent marriages
unofficial in 2016 said as they
well
as early marriages and polygamous
belonged to this type of group. The second most common relationships that often
leave
form of social without
women organization legal in rights. Representation
Tajikistan were gashtak of or
women
gaps,
in the political realm also lags behind
a form of microcredit and self-help that predominates with- the government’s goal
of 30 percent representation of women
in Tajik and Uzbek communities in Central Asia. Of those in public bodies,
59 as
men continue to dominate and lead
surveyed, 7 percent said they participate in gashtak or gap most political organiza-
tions in the country.62 Finally, violence against women is a
activities.
pronounced threat in Tajikistan. In a 2005 survey in Khatlon,
D. CROSS-BORDER AND GLOBAL RISKS
65
nearly sixty percent of women between 17 and 47 reported in Tajik
stan, and Uzbek
Tajikistan, communities
Turkmenistan, and Central Asia.
in Uzbekistan OfSyrian
are in those
to have experienced physical and/or sexual violence by their surveyed, 7 percent said they participate in gashtak
and Iraq with IS—an estimated 380 from Tajikistan. Radioor
62gap ac-
48.
husband Tajikistan
at least once faces the increasing
during their lives. 63
specter of radicaliza- tivities.
Free Europe recently listed Tajikistan as the highest contrib-
tion and recruitment to global violent extremism, but the utor of suicide fighters recruited from around the world (see
49. Data
scope of thealso
life more broadly,
challengeshowsis very low participation
debated.
highlighting
Most reportsrates
further challenges
indicatein civic
that
of Russia
inclu-
D. CROSS-BORDER AND GLOBAL RISKS
figure 14).
recruitment is mostly done among migrant workers in
sionperhaps
and and citizen engagement.
Kazakhstan. To get are
Few figures a sense of associational
available for recruit- 49. In late 2014
50. Tajikistan and
faces theearly 2015 two
increasing eventsof
specter happened
radical-
and community,
life in the
ment, those that are Assessment
theavailable are of Local Governance
unreliable. President that may
ization change
and the nature
recruitment to of the Islamist
global threat to Tajik-
violent extremism, but
Rahmon Tajikistan64
Survey inannounced early whether
inasked 2016 thatrespondents
that more than belonged
1,000 istan. In late
the scope 2014
of the a faction
challenge iswithin
debated.the Most
IMU,reports
which has long
indicate
to any
Tajik mostlywere
citizens formal organizations
fighting that are
for the Islamic known
State (IS) toin exist
Iraq been closely linked
that recruitment to Al-Qaeda
is mostly done and
among the migrant
Taliban, workers
reportedly in
throughout
and Syria.60 A Tajikistan.
few months The survey
before this, shows
Vladimir very low claimed
Putin partici- pledged
Russia andits allegiance to IS.63 Then in
perhaps Kazakhstan. FewMay 2015, Colonel
figures Gul-
are available
pation
that in civic
5-7,000 life. The
Russian most common
or citizens of former social
Soviet organizations
states were murad Halimov, and
for recruitment, commander
those that of are
the available
Tajik OMON, the Inte-
are unreliable.
in the sampled
fighting for IS.61 jamoats
The Soufan Group associations—and
are farmers’ estimates that a com- only rior Ministry’s
President Rahmon Special Forces, defected
announced in early to IS. Halimov
2016 that that wasmore a
8 percent
bined total of
of 2,000surveyed
those young people in 2013 fromsaid that they belonged
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz- rising star in
than 1,000 Tajikistan’s
Tajik citizens security establishment
were fighting who had
for the Islamic re-
State
to such an organization, while 14 percent in 2016 said they (IS) in Special
ceived Iraq and Forces
Syria.66 A fewfrom
training months both the US
before and
this, Russia.
Vladimir
belonged to this type of group. The second most common Halimov is now
Putin claimed believed
that 5-7,000 be one of
toRussian or the highest-ranking
citizens of former So- IS
form of social organization in Tajikistan were gashtak or gaps, commanders.
viet states were fighting for IS.67 The Soufan Group estimates
a form of microcredit and self-help that predominates with- that a combined total of 2,000 young people from Kazakh-
56 Ibid, 1–2. 50. Halimov’s defection and partial IMU switch of pa-
57 Ibid., 3. stan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan
58 Jennifer Murtazashvili, “Assessment of Local Governance in Tajik- trons means that the bulk of Tajik militants inside and
istan” (Washington, DC: United States Agency for International Develop- outside the country report to single command and have a
ment, October 2016).
59 Ibid. For more oncharismatic
high-ranking,
65 gashtak/gap, seeleader.
Victoria Reports
Koroteyeva in
andlate 2016 Ma-
Ekaterina and
59 For more on gashtak/gap, see Victoria Koroteyeva and Ekaterina Ma-
60 World Bank, “Tajikistan: Country Gender Assessment” (Washington, karova. 1998. “Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet
karova. 1998. “Money and Social Connections in the Soviet and post-Soviet
DC: The
Uzbek World
City. Bank,
” Central June Survey
Asian 2013), .3.
17(4):579. Uzbek City.” Central Asian Survey 17(4):579.
61 Ibid., 5.
60 Uran Botobekov, “ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting 66 Uran Botobekov, “ISIS and Central Asia: A Shifting Recruiting
62 Ibid,
Strategy,” The 1–2.
Diplomat, accessed February 1 2017, http://thediplomat. Strategy,” The Diplomat, accessed February 1 2017, http://thediplomat.
63 Ibid., 3.
com/2016/05/isis-and-central-asia-a-shifting-recruiting-strategy/; Foreign Fighters: http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/up- http://rus.
com/2016/05/isis-and-central-asia-a-shifting-recruiting-strategy/;
62
64 Jennifer
http://rus. Murtazashvili, “Assessment of Local Governance in Tajik-
azattyk.org/a/tajikistan-more-than-thousand-fighters-syria- azattyk.org/a/tajikistan-more-than-thousand-fighters-syria-iraq/27508035.
loads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate_FINAL.pdf.
istan” (Washington,
iraq/27508035. DC: United States Agency for International Develop-
html. html. http://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2016/08/former-imu-cleric-
63
October 2016).
ment, http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50515.
61 67 http://kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/50515.
denounces-islamic-state.php.
27
25
early 2017 refer to a ‘Tajik battalion’ operating around Mosul. export of opiates it produces in Afghanistan, A significant
At least two Tajik fighters were involved in an attack on a Ka- percentage of opiates produced in Afghanistan are trafficked
bul military hospital in March 2017. And a report produced through the Tajik-Afghan border for further distribution to
in February 2017 by the International Center for Count- Eastern Europe, Russia and China. According to the Bureau
er-Terrorism (ICCT) reported that 27 Tajiks had carried out of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, in
suicide operations in Iraq and Syria from December 2015 to 2016 Tajikistan was located at one of the “highest volume il-
November 2016.64 There is no indication yet that Halimov licit drug trafficking routes in the world, between Afghani-
and IS have turned their attention to their homeland. Howev- stan’s opium harvests on its southern border and the illicit
er, IS flags have been seen in various parts of the country, and drug markets of the Russian Federation and Eastern Europe
the impacts of the fall of Mosul and possible return of Tajik IS to the north.”69 The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNO-
fighters could lead to a change in approach. DC) believes that Tajik authorities seize only a very small
percentage of the more than 75 metric tons of Afghan heroin
51. Some scholars of Tajikistan argue that the threat of
and 35 metric tons of opium that flow out of Afghanistan and
the Islamic State in Tajikistan remains overblown. Edward
into Tajikistan. The border has become an important source
Lemon argues that the closing of space for political and reli-
of livelihood for those who live and work along the border,
gious expression—not radicalization— is the primary driving
including local populations, particularly youth, who lack al-
force of violence in Tajikistan society. He and others have ar-
ternatives, and military and police officials who are rumored
gued that the Tajik population has been relatively immune to
to take bribes as they turn a blind eye to or even facilitate drug
messaging from IS and other Islamist groups.65
smuggling from Afghanistan into Tajikistan.
52. Many stakeholders within Tajikistan express concern
that disenfranchised youth, including the growing numbers 55. With its unique geography, Tajikistan is also sub-
of returning and, in particular, deported migrants, might ject to regional tensions around natural resource sharing,
be susceptible to radicalization and recruitment to violent particularly over water and riparian zones. Tajikistan has
extremism. experienced tension with neighboring Uzbekistan over the
construction of the Rogun Dam.
53. Tajikistan’s more than 1,300 kilometer border with
Afghanistan is of concern to countries in the region because 56. The historically complicated and largely un-delimit-
of its length and relative insecurity. The border between Af- ed 970-kilometer-long Tajik-Kyrgyz border, in the Ferghana
ghanistan and Tajikistan is neatly separated by the Panj Riv- Valley, with its multiple enclaves is also a source of regular,
er that sits between the two countries.66 The long border is low-level friction over access to water and pasturage. This
porous, with security checkpoints that dot this lengthy span. affects about 160,000 residents of some of Sughd’s most dense-
Concerns over the situation on the border have become more ly populated jamoats. The construction of national borders
acute in recent years as the US and NATO forces decreased in the Ferghana Valley has exacerbated conflict over natural
their presence in Afghanistan. The decreased troop presence resources, in particular water and land, because Soviet-era
has resulted in expanded Taliban and IS presence throughout infrastructure to support agriculture and other industries was
Afghanistan, especially in northern parts of Afghanistan.67 In not designed to suit republic borders. As a result, a collective
2015, the head of Tajikistan’s strategic studies center declared action dilemma has emerged whereby residents in both coun-
that IS also has a presence along the border, but estimated tries have no incentive to maintain infrastructure because it
that only 8,000 “terrorists” were gathered in the area.68 It is does not serve their own citizens, but instead serves those
difficult to establish with any clarity the extent of the threat across the border.70 Efforts to separate communities from one
emanating from Afghanistan. another across borders have interrupted commerce, trade,
and traditional herding arrangements.
54. Potential insurgent activity cannot be separated
from drug smuggling and other for-profit criminality that 57. Tajikistan is also the country in the ECA region most
takes place on the border. The Taliban is heavily reliant on vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. In the
last year, extreme weather and record snows resulted in
55 cases of disasters and 50 deaths. The Government is
seeking new ways to develop early warning systems and
64 https://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ICCT-Winter-War-by-
Suicide-Feb2017.pdf
65 Lemon, “Violence in Tajikistan Emerges from within the State,” 73.
66 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Tajikistan. http://mfa.tj/en/
border-issues/tajik-afghan-state-border.html. 69 Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs,
67 Asia-Plus, “More than 10,000 Militants Concentrated along Afghan- “Tajikistan: 2016 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report” (Wash-
Tajik Border, Says Tajik Minister,” January 20, 2017, http://news.tj/ en/ ington, DC: US Department of State, 2016), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/
news/tajikistan/security/20170120/235773. nrcrpt/2016/vol1/253311.htm.
68 ATN News, “Around 8,000 Terrorists Gather along Afghan-Tajikistan 70 Madeleine Reeves, “Locating Danger: Konfliktologiia and the Search
Border,” Ariana News, accessed January 25, 2017, http://ariananews. af/ for Fixity in the Ferghana Valley Borderlands.,” Central Asian Survey 24, no.
latest-news/around-8000-terrorists-gather-along-afghan-tajikistan-bor-der/. 1 (March 2005): 67–81.
26
build community resilience to protect households assets potential impact on fiscal sustainability could be significant
and vital source of rural livelihoods, prevent and respond to in case of natural disasters since the country has very limited
the avalanches, land and mud slides, and flooding that have fiscal reserves for quick and effective response.
posed significant stress on infrastructure, agriculture and
food security, and livelihoods, particularly in remote regions. 59. Given low level of preparedness, poor awareness
and weak social cohesion at the community level, natural
58. Tajikistan is not well prepared to address the conse- disasters may potentially exacerbate existing inequalities,
quences of climate change and natural disasters. There are trigger loss of already scarce economic assets by the farms
number of factors that exacerbate disaster impact in the coun- and households such as land, livestock, and housing. Thus
try, including poverty, a vulnerable economy, acute infrastruc- disaster risk magnifies socio-economic fragility of the rural
ture needs and lack of financial capacities of the government population. The majority who suffer are the poorest house-
and population to address the consequences of disasters. As holds, women and children.
concluded by Tajikistan’s country diagnostic hazard note, the
27
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
IV. POTENTIAL
TRIGGERS/
SCENARIOS
60. The
62. Thefollowing section briefly
followingchapter briefly highlights trig-
potential trig-
highlights potential However,
its neighbors.nearly one half
Another of the area
growing population no longer
of concern has
are natu-
gers of heightened fragility or more wide-scale violence
gers of heightened fragility or more wide-scale violence and and clear first hand memories of the period. These
ral disasters, which are becoming more frequent as climate are the young
instability in Tajikistan. These are sparks that could turn
instability in Tajikistan. These are sparks that could turn the people
change’s who are having
impact increasing
is increasingly felt.difficulty finding work and
risks described in Chapter 3 into more explosive drivers
the risks described in Chapter 3 into more explosive drivers of who express alienation and a sense of exclusion from society
conflict that would interrupt development progress. The
of conflict that would interrupt development progress. The like- at large.
63. TheThey may have
young fewer reservations
population of Tajikistan about
does resorting
not have to
lihood possible
andand
likelihood scenarios
possible for future
scenarios forms
for future of FCV
forms are also
of FCV are violence. They may be drawn to IS, but may
the memory of the Civil War—the value of stability may no equally be attract-
included.
also included. ed by the
longer as deeply of
be teachings home-grown
held. The argument Salafithat
evangelists, whose
the population
rigorously disciplined version of Islam is now
is still so traumatized by the horrors of the civil war that itunder intense
61. Risks
63. Risksof regionalismremain
ofregionalism remainacute.
acute.A number of vio-
Subnational im- pressure
would do from the government.
anything to avoid more violence has long been a
portant political forces are watching carefully for
lence is a continuing risk, over power-sharing, access to re- signs that convincing source of resilience. However, nearly one half of
unity at the
sources, top linked
and/or is fracturing.
to risksTwo regions,
of violent Gharm and Gor-
extremism. 66. The IS threat.
the population While
no longer hasthe Taliban
clear has not
first hand tried to of
memories inter-
the
no-Badakhshan, have been completely squeezed out of the vene in its Central Asian neighbors’ affairs
period. These are the young people who are having increas- the IS has a dif-
62. Tajikistan
political is alsospace
and economic vulnerable broadA
to ayears.
in recent array
third,ofKhu-
eco- ferent view offinding
ing difficulty its mission.
workTheandchances
who express intervention
of IS alienation andarea
nomic
jand and
has climatic
seen shocks that
its traditional could role
result
leadership in widespread
sharply reduced. slim, but the consequences would
sense of exclusion from society at large. be grave. The presence in
instability.
Groups A banking
in Gharm crisis is
and GBAO already
have underway,
in recent its impact
years resorted to its highest ranks of a former senior security officer from Du-
lessened
armed byrepel
so far to
violence the small proportion
perceived attempts ofby
Tajiks who have
government to shanbe
64. The has ISput Tajikistan
threat. Whileonthe jihadisthas
theTaliban map notand may
tried towell
in-
bank accounts.
curtail Further extension of the crisis, however, could
their activities. be in itsTajik
boosting
tervene Centralrecruitment to the IS
Asian neighbors’ cause.
affairs the The Rahmon
IS has a dif-
affect both public and private sector, resulting in the collapse regime would
ferent view not
of its be able The
mission. to handle
chances a major IS armed chal-
of IS intervention are
64. Tajikistan
of payment system is for
alsopublic
vulnerable
sector to a broad array
employees, of eco-
for example, lenge andthe
slim, but would have to call
consequences on Russia
would andThe
perhaps
be grave. China.
presence in
nomic and climatic shocks that could result in
and the suspension of the vast majority of banking transac- widespread The former
its highest is worried
ranks possible
at the senior
of a former spreadofficer
security of radical
from Islam
Du-
instability. A banking
tions. The impact crisis is
of Russia’s already underway,
economic its impact
problems underlines to its Central
shanbe has put Asia back yard;
Tajikistan China
on the is deeply
jihadist mapaware
and may that Xinji-
well be
lessened so far by the small proportion of Tajiks
another major potential threat: Tajikistan’s deep dependence who have ang shares
boosting a border
Tajik with Badakhshan.
recruitment to the IS cause. IS would probably not
bank accounts. Further extension of the crisis,
(through migration) for any degree of financial stabilityhowever, could
on be deterred from fighting either Russian or Chinese troops,
affect both public and private sector, resulting in the collapse and has shown a lack of interest in civilian collateral deaths.
of payment system for public sector employees, for example,
and the suspension of the vast majority of banking transac- 67. While the most likely may be a “muddle through” sce-
tions. The impact of Russia’s economic problems underlines nario, this outcome perpetuates vulnerability and risk and
another major potential threat: Tajikistan’s deep dependence continues to threaten development progress and share pros-
(through migration) for any degree of financial stability on perity. The government may well receive enough money from
its neighbors. Another growing area of concern are natu- foreign donors to allow the president to achieve his longtime
ral disasters, which are becoming more frequent as climate dream of opening the world’s highest dam at Rogun. This will
change’s impact is increasingly felt. allow him to provide his nation with a steady source of elec-
tricity for the first time in years, and to present himself to the
65. Young Tajiks do not have the memory of the Civil outside world as the only option for stability. Such a scenario
War—the value of stability may no longer be as deeply held. is unlikely to produce any real change, however, unless the
The argument that the population is still so traumatized by president and his family are willing to abandon their gover-
the horrors of the civil war that it would do anything to avoid nance model, which is largely aimed at increasing the wealth
more violence has long been a convincing source of resilience. of the ruling elite at the expense of the population.
30
28
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
V. SOURCES
V. SOURCES OFOF
RESILIENCE
RESILIENCE
68. This Chapter details potential sources of resilience that
68. This Chapter details potential sources of resilience that
could to mitigate
help Chapter risks and
FCVpotential potential triggers of vi- TABLE 4.
TABLE LIFE IN
4. LIFE IN TRANSITION
TRANSITION III III KEY
KEY FINDINGS
FINDINGS 79
65. This
68. details sources of resilience that
(SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION
(SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION FINDINGS
TABLE 4. LIFE IN TRANSITION III KEY III SURVEY)
III
could Thisto
help mitigate
Chapter FCV risks
details and
potential potential
sources triggers of
of resilience vi-
olence.
could These
help to include the
mitigate FCV public’s and
risks risksaversion to a return
potential triggers to of
massvi- SURVEY)79
olence.
that could
violence,
olence.
These
These
help include
to mitigate
formal the
localinclude
the public’s
FCV
informal
andpublic’s
aversion
aversion
andto a return
potential
social institutions,
to a return
to mass
triggers
toaccess
mass (SOURCE: EBRD LIFE IN TRANSITION III SURVEY)79
violence,
of violence. local Theseformal includeand informal
the public’s social institutions,
aversion to a returnaccess to
to the Russian
violence, local laborformal market, women,
and informal hydropower
social and miner-
institutions, access
to
mass Russian
theviolence, local market,
labor formal women,
and informalhydropower and miner-
social institutions,
al
to wealth,
the Russian and a shared
labor physical
market, women, and cultural
hydropower heritage
and with
miner- its
al wealth,
access to the and a shared
Russian physical
labor market, andwomen,culturalhydropower
heritage with andits
neighbors
al wealth, as part
and a of thephysical
shared ancient “Silk and Road.” heritage with its
cultural
neighbors
mineral wealth, as part of the
and ancient
a shared “Silk Road.
physical and ” cultural heritage
neighbors as part of asthe ancient the “Silk Road. ” Road.”
with
69. its neighbors
With the memory part ofofa brutal ancient
civil war “Silk
and its far-reach-
69. With the memory of a brutal civil war and its far-reach-
ing impact,
With mass mobilization to violence andbe
may itsunlikely—
69.
ing
66. impact,Withthe mass
thememory
mobilization
memory of a ofbrutalto
a violence
civil war
brutal may
civil be
war far-reach-
unlikely—
and its
stability
ing impact, is deeply
mass valued.
mobilization Despite
to significant
violence may cracks
be in the
unlikely—
stability is deeply valued.
far-reaching impact, mass mobilization to violenceinmay
Despite significant cracks the
social
stability contract
is deeply between
valued. the people
Despite and the
significant state,
cracksthe older
in the
social contract between the people
be unlikely— stability is deeply valued. Despite significant and the state, the older Source: EBRD Life In Transition III Survey
generation
social contract in Tajikistan
between are people
well aware
the and of the
the opportunity
state, the older of the economic and security devastation in Tajikistan in the
generation in Tajikistan are well
cracks in the social contract between the people and the state, aware of the opportunity of the economic and security devastation in Tajikistan in the
costs of violence. Increased authoritarianism inside of Tajiki- aftermath
is
of better of the
than
the economic civil
and four
it was war, years
securityit is not
ago,surprising
57 percentthat small
said mar-
there is
generation
costs of in
violence. Tajikistan
Increased are well
authoritarianism
the older generation in Tajikistan are well aware of the op- aware of the opportunity
inside of Tajiki- aftermath of the civil war, it isdevastation
not in Tajikistan
surprising that small in the
mar-
stan
costs has made
of violence. assessing public opinion particularly challeng- ginal
less corruption
aftermath changes
of in
the one’s
than
civil foureconomic
war, years
it is ago,
notsituation
while 63produce
surprising percent
that increased
said
small they
mar-
stan 77has
portunity made of Increased
costsassessing violence. publicauthoritarianism
In opinionmost
general, inside challeng-
of Tajiki-
particularly
longitudinal sur- ginal changes in one’s economic situation produce increased
individual satisfaction. On the other these positive
hand,produce as-
ing. However, in general, most longitudinal opinion surveys are satisfied with their personal financial
stan 77has made assessing public opinion particularly challeng- ginal changes in one’s economic hand, situation
situation (see Ta-
increased
78
ing.
veys. 78
However, in general, most longitudinal
In general, most longitudinal opinion surveys show an opinion surveys individual satisfaction. On the other these positive as-
show
ing. 77 an improvement in public perception—especially with
However, in general, most longitudinal opinion surveys sessments
individual
ble 4). are at odds
satisfaction.
According to thewith
Onsame other
the cross-national
other
survey, hand,
life these indices
positive
satisfaction that
amongas-
show
improvement in public perception—especially with satisfac-
78
an improvement in public perception—especially with sessments are at odds with other cross-national indices that
satisfaction
showwith with
an improvement individual economic
in public and personal
perception—especially situations
with show
sessments a
Tajikistani deterioration
are at odds
respondents in human
with otherrights, democracy,
cross-national and
indices eco-
that
satisfaction
tion with individual
individual economic economic and and personal
personal situations
situations than show a deterioration inincreased
human rights, from 73 percent in
democracy, 2010
and to
eco-
than in previous
satisfaction with years. Given
individual economicthe depth and personal situations show a deterioration in human rights, democracy, and eco-
than in previous years.
in previous years. Given the depth of the Given the depth
than in previous
economic and security years.devastation
Given the depth in Ta- FIGURE FIGURE 15: LIFE SATISFACTION:
15: LIFE SATISFACTION: PERCENTAGE PERCENTAGE OF OF RESPONDENTS
RESPONDENTS WHO WHO
jikistan
77
in the aftermath
In examining public opinion data that
of the civil war, ARE
FIGURE SATISFIED
15: LIFE WITH LIFE,
SATISFACTION: ALL
ARE SATISFIED WITH LIFE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED THINGS
PERCENTAGE CONSIDERED OF RESPONDENTS WHO
it
77 is
77 with
not
In surprising
examining
In examining
public
deals with satisfaction of the national government,
public
that
opinion
opinion
smalldata
data
marginal
that
that
ARE SATISFIED WITH LIFE, ALL THINGS CONSIDERED
deals
changes
president, satisfaction
in one’s
national of the
economic
institutions national situation
or other government,
assessmentspro-
deals with
president, satisfaction
national of the
institutions national
or other government,
assessments
duce
of
of theis
increased
the country’s
president, national
country’s
individual
general
general
direction,
institutions
direction,
satisfaction.
or
it is apparent
other
itsurveysassessments
is apparent
On
that
that
there
the othera great
hand, deal of bias
these in these
positive making
assessments
of the
there country’s
is a great general
deal of direction,
bias in these is apparent
itsurveys making that
responses to most questions on these topic unreli-
are
there at
is a
responses odds
able sources
great
to of with
deal
most of other
bias inon
questions
assessment.
cross-national
these
This these
surveys
topicin
is evident
making
unreli-
two
in-
dices
responses
able
common that
sources to of show
most
factors:
questions
assessment.
largea deterioration
on these
This
percentages
topic
is evident inin human
unreli-
of individuals two
able
commonsources of assessment.
factors: This is evident in two
rights,
who respond thatlarge
democracy, percentages
and
government economic of individuals
performance freedom
is “very
common
who respondfactors:that large percentages
government of individuals
performance is “very
in the
good” general as For
incountry.
who respond thatas
well as
government
example,
high numbers according
performance
of indi-
is “very
to
good”
viduals in general
who respond well
“do as
nothigh numbers
know” when of indi-
asked.
the
good” in
vidualsLITS survey,
general as well
“doas
despitehigh a growing
numbers of indi-eco-
Both of whothese respond
factors are not
common know” inwhen
survey asked.
data
nomic
viduals
Both
whenof crisis
who
these
individuals
respondthat
factors “do
are are has
asked to forced
not know”
common inwhen
respond thousands
survey
to
asked.
data
a sensitive
Both
when
of of these
individuals factors
are are
askedcommon
to in
respond survey
to a data
sensitive
unemployed migrant laborers
question. Although most survey data in Tajikistanto back
when individuals
question. Although are asked
most to respond
survey data into a sensitive
Tajikistan
Tajikistan
(and all authoritarian
question.
(and
from their
Although
all authoritarian
environments)
most workdata
survey
environments)
abroad,
must be
must
per-
75treat-
in Tajikistan
be
ed carefully, it is apparent which questions aretreat-
less
cent
(and
ed of
all authoritarian
carefully,respondentsapparent said
environments)
it is generally which their economic
must be aretreat-
sensitive as they exhibitquestions
more variation lessin
ed carefully,
situation it is
is apparent
better which
than questions areyears
less
sensitive
responses as
aretheyfar generally
fewer “do notit
exhibit was
more
know” orfour
variation
“refused in
sensitive as they generally
responses
ago.
to Similarly,
answer”
responses
are
responses.
are
far exhibit more
despite increased levels in
fewer “do not know”
far fewer “do not know” or “refused
orvariation
“refused of
to
78 answer” responses.
http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki-
political
to
78 answer” repression, 75 percent also said
responses.
http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki-
stan/ Source: EBRD Life in Transition III Survey 89
that the
78
stan/ political situation in the country Source: EBRD Life In
http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajiki- in Transition III Survey 89
stan/ Source: EBRD Life in Transition III Survey 89
31
31
31
29
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
FIGURE 68. Where the state has been absent or ineffective in its
16: PERSONAL
FIGURE 16: LIFE SATISFACTION
PERSONAL LIFE SATISFACTION 70. The Listening to Tajikistan Survey showed that most
development focus, local institutions provide an important
FIGURE 16: PERSONAL LIFE SATISFACTION 70. The
Tajiks Listening
are satisfied to Tajikistan
with the quality Survey
of their showed
lives. The that most
survey
source
Tajiks of resilience
are satisfied to
with FCV risks.
quality of their
the significant One such institution
lives. The of par-
survey
data shows that there is not variation among indi-
ticular
data
vidualsshowssignificance
that there
regarding in Tajikistan
is not significant
life satisfaction is
among the mahalla.
variation
urban/rural Cieslewska
among indi-
dwellers
defines
viduals
nor is their mahalla
the variation
regarding as “a self-governing
life satisfaction
among among
the top urban/rural
60 percentsmallof community
dwellers
earners or
regulated
nor is their
the bottom by rules
variation
40 percent.based
among
On on athetraditional
scaletop of60 topractices
1 percent
5, life and cus-
earners
ofsatisfaction or
toms
the deeply40
bottom
in Tajikistan rooted
percent.
remained the
On Central
in largely a scale
steady Asian
of 1 to the
over Islamic
5, life tradition”
satisfaction
two-year peri-
thatofcontinue
in
od Tajikistan
the survey to atbe
remained observed
around largely by local
steady
3.4 (see over
Figure communities
theThe
3). two-year
memory this
toperi- of
day
od
theof (2015:1).
the survey
brutal 1992-97While
at civil historically
around war 3.4
may (see informal
Figure
also play 3). in
its Thenature,
part, memory recent
though as of
legislation
the brutal 1992-97
mentioned (the 2008
in Chapter “Law
civil 4,war
thisonmay
mayPublic
also Self-Initiative
play its
be fading nowpart, Bodies”)
though
that over 50 as
suggests
mentioned
percent of an in
theintention
Chapter
population to
4, incorporate
this
are 24 may orbe mahallas
fading
under. 7980 now asthat
part of the
over 50
formal state administrative
percent of the population are 24 or under. structure. 7980 this ambiguity,
Despite
71.
evidence Where thathas
the state
suggests been absent
mahallas continue or predatory,
to play an local import- in-
71. Where
stitutions
ant role the state
inprovide
contemporary has socio-economic
an important been absent source predatory,
orof resilience
life. local
In a surveyto FCV in-
of
stitutions
risks.
nearly One 1,400 provide
such an important
institution
households from particular
of all source
four regionsof resilience
significance to
of the countryin FCVTa-
Source: Listening
Source: to Tajikistan
Listening to Tajikistan90 risks.
jikistan
carried Oneis the
out such institution
by mahalla.
the USAID of particular
Cieslewska
Tajikistan Localsignificance
defines the mahalla
Governance in as Ta-
Proj- “a
Source: Listening to Tajikistan90 jikistan
ect (LGP), themahalla.
is the
self-governing small Cieslewska
community
clear majority defines by
regulated
of respondents the mahalla
rules
(86 based
percent) asin-“a
on
self-governing
traditional small
practices community
and customs regulated
deeply
dicated that they have a mahalla committee. Individuals were by
rooted rules
in based
the Cen- on
FIGURE 17: DO REPRESENTATIVES ON THE MAHALLA traditional
tral Asian practices
Islamic and
tradition” customs deeply
that continue rooted
to work—thein the Cen-
be observed by
FIGURE 17: DO
COMMITTEE REPRESENTATIVES
WORK ON THE OR
FOR THE COMMUNITY MAHALLA
DO THEY
asked
tral
local
for whom
Asian Islamic
communities
they
to
believe
tradition”
this day
mahalla
that continue
(2015:1).
officials
Whileto be observed
historically
state
by
in-
or the community (Figure 17). Three fourths of respondents
COMMITTEE WORK FOR
WORK FOR THE STATE? THE COMMUNITY OR DO THEY local
formal communities
in nature, to
recent this day (2015:1).
legislation (the
said that mahalla officials work for the community, 17 percent While
2008 historically
“Law on Public in-
WORK FOR THE STATE? formal in work
Self-Initiative
said they nature, forrecent
Bodies”) legislation
both suggests
the communityan(the 2008
intention
and “Law
the tostate,onwhile
Public
incorporate 5
Self-Initiative
mahallas as partBodies”)
of the suggests
formal an
state intention
administrative
percent said they work for the state exclusively. Mahalla lead- to incorporate
structure.
80% 75% mahallas
Despite
ers had the ashighest
this part oflevel
ambiguity, the formal
evidence
of citizen state administrative
suggests
accountabilitythat mahallas structure.
of any con-
public
80% 75% Despite
tinue to
organization.this
play ambiguity,
an important evidence
role insuggests that
contemporary mahallas
socio-eco- con-
70%
tinue
nomicto play
life. Inan important
a survey role in1,400
of nearly contemporary
households socio-eco-
from all
70%
60% 50% nomic
four life. In
69. regions
Labor of survey
athe
migrationcountry of
can nearly
carried 1,400
be viewed out by households
as thea riskUSAIDbut from Tajik-
also all
a
50%
60%
50%
four
istan
source regions
Local of the country
Governance
of resilience, with Projectcarried
a range (LGP),
of out by
thethe
economic clearUSAID
majority
benefits, Tajik-
skillof
50%
50%
istan Local Governance
respondents
development (86
and percent)
changing Project
indicated
gender(LGP), thatthe
roles. they clear
There have majority
are mahal-
a positive of
40% 36%
36%
respondents
la committee. (86 percent)
Individuals indicated
were asked
benefits to migration, which include increased human capital thatfor they
whom havethey a mahal-
believe
40%
30% la
forcommittee.
mahalla
migrant officialsIndividuals
work—the
populations inwere stateasked
constructionor the whom
forand
community they (Figure
industrial believe
tech-
30%
20%
17% mahalla
17). Three officials
fourths work—the
of respondents state
niques along with the remittances they provide. Migrant la-or
saidthe community
that mahalla (Figure
officials
20%
10% 17% workThree
17).
borers for thefourths
represent community,of respondents
a better 17 percent
educated saidsaidthat
population they mahalla
work
than officials
for
those both
who
10% 5%
1% 1% 2% 3% 10% work
the for
community the community,
and the 17 percent
state, while
have remained in the country. Three-quarters of migrants said
5 percentthey work
said for
they both
work
10% 5%
0% 1% 1% 2% 3% the community
for the
have state exclusively.
secondary and state,
the Mahalla
general or while 5 percent
leaders
secondary had thesaid
vocational they
highest work
level
general
Refused Don't know Work for the state Work for both Work for the
0%
state and community
for
of the
citizen state exclusively.
accountability Mahalla
of any leaders
public
education. About 17 percent of migrants have degrees from had the
organization. highest level
Refused Don't know Work for the state Work for both Work for the
community of citizen accountability of any public organization.
state and
community
community higher
72. Labor educational
migration establishments.
can be viewed Many asmigrants
a risk but in Russia
also a
2013 2016
have expressed
sourceLabor
72. a
migration
of resilience, desire
with to
can help the
be viewed
a range Tajik economy
as a risk
of economic but through
benefits, also skilla
2013 2016
skills-transfer
source
development programs
of resilience,
and with
changing and appear
a range
gender ofto be ready
economic
roles. There to contribute
benefits,
are skill
positive
nomic freedom in the country. For example, according to to the development
development
benefits and changing
to migration, of Tajikistan,
which genderdespite
include roles.
increased the human
There fact
are that they
positive
capital
nomic
the LITS freedom
survey, in the country.
despite a growing For example,crisis
economic according
that has to reside
benefits
for in
migrant Russia.
to migration,
71
populations which include increased
in construction human capital
and industrial tech-
75
the percent
forcedLITS in 2016,
survey,
thousands of making
despite
unemployed Tajikistan
a growing the laborers
economic
migrant crisis happiest
second that
backhas to for migrant
niques along populations in construction
with the remittances and industrial
they provide. Migrant tech-la-
country infrom
the transition region, 70. Absence of men as a result of labor migration has
forced
Tajikistanthousands of work
their abroad,despite
unemployed migrant
75 itslaborers
percent status asback
one to
of respondents of niques along with
borers represent the remittances
a better educated populationthey provide. than Migrant
those who la-
the poorest
Tajikistan countries in
from theirsituation terms
work abroad, of GDP per
75 percentcapita. created opportunities for women. Women than taken
have those on
said their economic is better than it of wasrespondents
four years borers represent
have remained a better
in educated
the country. population
Three-quarters of migrants who
said their economic
ago. Similarly, despite situation
increased is better than
levels of four years
it wasrepression,
political leadership
have secondary
remained positions
in in rural
the country. areas. The ALG dataof
Three-quarters finds many
migrants
general or secondary vocational general ed-
67. The Listening to Tajikistan Survey showed that most female mahalla leaders have emerged since mass male mi-
ago. Similarly,
75 percent alsodespite
said that increased levels
the political of political
situation repression,
in the country have
ucation. About general
secondary 17 percent or secondary
of migrants vocational
have degrees general fromed-
of the population is satisfied with the quality of their lives. gration abroad
75 percent
is better thanalso thatyears
saidfour
it was the political situation
ago, 57 percent in the
said country
there is less ucation. About began
higher educational to occur.
17 establishments.
percent This
of migrants mayhave
Many change
migrants communi-
degrees from
in Russia
The survey data shows that there is not significant variation ty dynamics in athe years
is better than
corruption it was
than fourfour years
years ago,ago, 57 percent
while 63 percent said there
said is less
they are higher
have educational
expressed desire toto
establishments. come.
help Similarly,
theMany Tajik migrants
economytherein has also
Russia
through
among
corruptionindividuals
than fourregarding
years ago, life satisfaction
while 63 percentamong urban/
saidTable
they are been a substantial feminization of agriculture in the country
satisfied with their personal financial situation (see 4). have expressed
skills-transfer a desire and
programs to helpappear the to Tajik economy
be ready through
to contribute
rural
satisfieddwellers
with nor is
their their variation
personal financial among
situation the 60 per-
topTable
(see 4). because so many
skills-transfer men have
programs and leftappearthe to country.
be ready
82
Atorecent
contributeFeed
According to the same survey, life satisfaction among Tajik-
cent
istani earners
ofrespondents
According to the the
or same bottom
survey,
increased 40 life
from percent. On a scale
satisfaction
73 percent among
in of 1
2010 toto75
Tajik-5,
life satisfaction
istani
percent respondents in
in 2016, makingTajikistan
increased remained
from the
Tajikistan largely
73 second steady
in 2010 coun-
percenthappiest over the
to 75
two-year
percent
try in the inperiod
2016, of the
making
transition survey
Tajikistan
region, at around
despite the (see
3.4 happiest
second
its status Figure
as one coun-
of 3).
the
79 http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajikistan/
The memory of the brutal 1992-97 civil war may also play its 80
79 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/869151482470337678/Wellbe-
http://litsonline-ebrd.com/countries/tajikistan/
try in the
poorest transition
countries region,
in terms of despite
GDP per its status as one of the
capita. 71 IOM, “Diaspora: Partner in the Development of Tajikistan” (Dushan-
ing-Eng-21-2.pdf
80 http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/869151482470337678/Wellbe-
part, though as mentioned, this
poorest countries in terms of GDP per capita. may be fading now that over be: International Organization for Migration, 2015), 15.
ing-Eng-21-2.pdf
50 percent of the population are 24 or under.
30
32
32
the Future survey showed that women in households with a Rogun could also mean a reduction in government spending
family member working abroad had higher levels of women’s on the social sectors for several years. Based on the current
decision making in households with no members working governance environment, there are also acute risks around
abroad.72 The influx of women into the agricultural and local benefit sharing, oversight and transparency.
government sectors creates possibilities that these areas can
be platforms through which gradual transformations in the 72. Tajikistan also shares a rich physical and cultur-
role of women can take shape. al heritage with its neighbors. Cities such as Penjikent and
Khujand were important cities on the “Silk Route” connect-
71. Tajikistan’s hydropower potential and mineral ing China with South Asia, Iran, Anatolia, and the Mediter-
wealth could be a significant source of economic growth but ranean world. Major investments and new efforts to place
is also fraught with governance risks. The Rogun Dam, on Central Asia on the global map of trade, including the One
the Vakhsh tributary of the Amu Darya River in Tajikistan, Belt One Road (OBOR), provide an opportunity for Tajiki-
for example, is an important symbol of Tajikistan’s indepen- stan and its four Central Asian neighbors to revive and make
dence and a cornerstone of the government’s plans for de- accessible a unique heritage. Improving connectivity and re-
veloping the national economy. The mountainous state lacks ducing barriers to the movement of people and goods across
the industry and natural riches that bless other former Soviet the countries that comprise the Fergana Valley, and between
Central Asian republics but has more than 40 percent of Cen- Penjikent and the historically Tajik cities of Samarkand and
tral Asia’s water, prompting the sentiment, “water is life”. For Bukhara in Uzbekistan are two examples of clusters with the
this reason, the government has pinned Tajikistan’s economic potential to attract tourists from Europe, Russia, China, and
hopes on its hydropower potential. However, investment in South Asia and the local job-creating services that they re-
quire.
72 Ibid.
31
Confidential
Confidential – Not
– Not for Release
for Release or Distribution
or Distribution
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS:
WORLD BANK SUPPORT
THROUGH THE RISK
MITIGATION REGIME
BACKGROUND AND
A. BACKGROUND CURRENT
AND CURRENT
75. The the
improving Bank’s active portfolio
investment climate andcurrently comprises
strengthening com-22
operations, including
petitiveness regional
in key sectors; projects, totaling
2) supporting US$366.9
social inclusion by
WORLD BANK
WORLD APPROACH
BANK APPROACH million. The
increasing largest
access the active
share of social
to improved portfolio
services, is inedu-
including the
cation, health,
water sector (23social assistance,
percent), water
followed bysupply
energy and(14sanitation;
percent),
76. Tajikistan’s independence,
Since Tajikistan’s
73. Since independence, the World Bank’s
the World Bank’s and 3) promoting
transport regional
(12 percent), connectivity
governance (12 to increase
percent), the coun-
urban, and
strategy and
strategy and portfolio
portfolio has evolved over
has evolved over time
time in response to
in response to ruralaccess
try’s to regional
development and global
marketseducation
(9 present), (8information and
percent), health
changing development
a changing
a development context. context. Tajikistan
Tajikistan joined
joined the World
the World knowledge.
(7 percent), Mainstreaming climate change,
agriculture (6 percent), improving
environment gover-
and natural
Bank in
Bank in 1993
1993 and and IDA IDA in 1994. Since
in 1994. 1996, the
Since 1996, the Bank
Bank has
has nance,
resourcesand (5narrowing the gender
percent), trade gap are cross cutting
and competitiveness mea-
(3 percent),
US$1.11 billion
provided US$1.11
provided billion in IDA grants,
in IDA highlyconcessional
grants, highly concession- sures. Tajikistan’s
and social new National
protection and labor (1 percent). Strategy
Development (NDS)
Three projects
credits,
al credits,and andtrust
trust funds,
funds, of of
which
which US$890 million
US$890.61 has been
million has 2016-2030
are currently also reflects
being these objectives,
prepared with ato
and scheduled focus on ener-
be delivered
disbursed. In the late nineties, the World
been disbursed. In the late nineties, the World Bank’s pro- Bank’s program fo- in independence
gy FY17: i) Nurek and the efficient use
Rehabilitation of energy;
(US$170 connectivity;
million, includ-
cused on post conflict reconstruction
gram focused on post conflict reconstruction projects and projects and providing food and expanding
security;million
ing US$100 Scale Up productive employment.
Facility); ii) Strengthening
emergency funding in
providing emergency response
funding in to food insecurity
response and nat-
to food insecurity Critical Infrastructure (US$20 mln), and iii) Zarafshon Irri-
78. The Bank’s active portfolio currently comprises 22
ural disasters. Beginning in
and natural disasters. Beginning in 2000 following the agree-
2000 following the peace peace gation Rehabilitation and River Basin Management Project
ment, the focus
agreement, shifted
the focus to economic
shifted to economicand social
and development
social devel- operations, including regional projects, totaling USD 366.9
(US$16.6mln TF Grant funded by EU). Four projects are in
through investments
opment through aimed aimed
investments at restoring productivity-led
at restoring productivi- million. The largest share of the active portfolio is in the water
preparation and scheduled to be delivered in FY18: i) Ta-
growth
ty-led and job
growth and creation, betterbetter
job creation, access to healthcare
access and safe
to healthcare and sector (23 percent), followed by energy (14 percent), transport
jikistan Railways Project (US$30 mln); ii) Road Sector In-
drinking
safe drinkingwater, land
water, rights,
land diversification
rights, diversification of agriculture
of agriculture in (12 percent), governance (12 percent), urban, and rural devel-
vestment Project (US$30 mln); iii) Rural Water Supply and
in rural areas, opment (9 present), education (8 percent), health (7 percent),
rural areas, andand an improved
an improved business
business environment. Ac-
environment. Sanitation Project (US$25 mln) and iv) Additional financing
cording to a country opinion survey undertaken in 2017, the agriculture (6 percent), environment and natural resources
(US$15 mln) for Agriculture Commercialization Project.
74.
Bank is The
viewedWorld Bank Group
positively in terms Country Program
of its overall Strategy
effectiveness, (5 percent), trade and competitiveness (3 percent), and so-
The World Bank’s Trust Fund (TF) portfolio in Tajikistan
(CPS) for 2015–18 supports efforts to
staff preparedness and its development results. Perceptions reduce poverty and cial protection and labor (1 percent). Three projects are cur-
includes 25 Bank-executed trust funds totaling US$12.7 mil-
promote shared prosperity in Tajikistan.
of its relevance and alignment with country priorities have The CPS includes rently being prepared and scheduled to be delivered in FY17:
lion and 18 Recipient executed Trust Funds totaling US$92.9
three pillars:
increased since advancing
1) the same survey private insector–led growth
2014. Relatively through
lower rat- i) Nurek Rehabilitation (US$170 million, including US$100
million. Trustfund activities complement the Bank assistance
improving the investment climate and
ings are shared when respondents consider the Bank’s flexibil-strengthening com- million Scale Up Facility); ii) Strengthening Critical Infra-
structure and
program (US$ finance andrange
a wide
20mln), of projects
iii) Zarafshon in key strategic
Irrigation Reha-
petitiveness
ity and the way in key sectors;
in which it 2) supporting
collaborates theinclusion
social
with private sec-by sectors, including education, energy, agriculture, food securi-
increasing access to improved social services,
tor and civil society in particular. As for the priorities for the including edu- bilitation and River Basin Management Project (US$16.6mln
TFand
ty, Grantthe social sectors.
funded by EU). Four projects are in preparation and
health,
cation, Bank
World tosocial
focus, assistance,
the survey water
pointssupply and sanitation;
to greater emphasis
and
on 3) promoting
private regional connectivity
sector development, followed to byincrease the coun-
energy, jobs, gov- scheduled
76. Theto be also
CPS delivered in
puts a FY18: emphasis
special onRailways
i) Tajikistan Proj-
collaboration
try’s access
ernance andto marketsthe
regional Finally,
education. and global
Bank’s information
support and
to capacity ect (US$30 mln); ii) Road Sector Investment Project
and policy dialogue with development partners through the (US$30
development in Tajikistan is
knowledge. Mainstreaming considered
climate change, high importance
of improving gover- mln);
regulariii) Rural Water
platform of theSupply and Sanitation
Development Project Council
Coordination (US$25
to survey
nance, and respondents.
narrowing the gender gap are cross cutting mea- mln) and iv) Additional financing (US$15 mln) for Agricul-
(DCC), which is chaired by the World Bank and compris-
sures. Tajikistan’s new National Development Strategy (NDS) ture Commercialization Project. The World Bank’s TF portfo-
es 28 international agencies active in Tajikistan. The DCC
77. The World
2016-2030 Bank these
also reflects Group Countrywith
objectives, Program
a focus Strategy
on en- lio in Tajikistan includes 25 Bank-executed trust funds total-
plays an important role in fostering country ownership and
(CPS) for 2015–18 supports efforts
ergy independence and the efficient use of energy; connec-to reduce poverty and ing US$12.7 million and 18 Recipient executed Trust Funds
mutual accountability through several sector-specific and
promote shared prosperity in Tajikistan.
tivity; food security; and expanding productive employment. The CPS includes totaling US$ 92.9 million. Trust fund activities complement
thematic working groups: public administration and gov-
three pillars: 1) advancing private sector–led growth through the Bank assistance program and finance a wide range of
32 35
ernance, private sector-led growth, development of human challenges that could constrain development progress. Find-
potential, energy independence, food security, and transport ings of this Risk and Resilience Assessment will help inform
connectivity. The Bank is working with a number of other the developing SCD scheduled to be delivered by September
development partners in the implementation of key CPS pro- 2017. As part of its participation in the IDA 18 Risk Mitiga-
gram areas, including with Asian Development Bank on en- tion Regime, Tajikistan is expected to see a substantial in-
ergy reforms; the European Union on water policy and irriga- crease in its IDA allocations.
tion; Japan on health and nutrition; DFID on public financial
management and investment climate reforms; and EBRD on B. TAJIKISTAN AND THE RISK
energy and financial sector reforms. In response to changes
in the donor landscape, the Bank is actively exploring oppor-
MITIGATION REGIME
tunities to engage with new donors including the Islamic De- 80. The goal of incremental financing support through
velopment Bank, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, the Risk Mitigation Regime is for the World Bank to pilot
the Eurasian Development Bank, China and Russia to in key preventive support to address FCV risks that constrain de-
sectors including transport, energy and education. The Bank velopment progress. Funding is flexible to respond to coun-
worked closely with other partners and the Government to try-specific risks and can be used, for example, for operations
inform the preparation of the NDS (2016-2030), and MTDS targeted at tackling grievances surrounding economic mar-
(2016-2020). ginalization and uneven development; reducing conflicts
surrounding land use; addressing regional imbalances; cre-
77. The draft Performance and Learning Review (PLR) ating meaningful livelihood opportunities for youth at risk;
for the FY15-18 CPS finds that the deteriorating domestic and increasing transparency in natural resource governance.
economy and changes in IDA financing terms have had a However, financing cannot be used for ‘business-as-usual’
significant impact on delivery of the Bank’s program. The investment operations that are not linked to identified risks,
banking crisis, a deteriorating macroeconomic environment, even if these interventions may contribute to broader devel-
and pressures on the private sector has led to tightened fis- opment goals.
cal space, reduced demand and fewer job opportunities. At
the same time, a positive joint IMF-WB Debt Sustainability 81. In the case of Tajikistan, the RRA finds that the World
Assessment and changes in the Bank’s CPIA led to the rapid Bank has a unique role to play in addressing FCV risks
transition of IDA financing terms from full grants to mixed through the Risk Mitigation Regime due to its credibility,
IDA grant/credit and then to full IDA credits in the first two convening power, neutrality, and capacity. Based on stake-
years of the CPS implementation. The switch from grants to holder consultations and RRA analysis, the following princi-
mixed grants/credits to full credits, and then back again to ples can help guide identification of priorities for Tajikistan
grants/credit in the third year of IDA implementation, has under the Risk Mitigation Regime.
made negotiations with GoT difficult. The changed terms
had the effect of shifting government priorities towards in- • The Bank has a key role to play in continuing to push for
frastructure investments, which resulted in the dropping of governance reforms and oversight, particularly on high
some operations in social protection and services. risk/high reward investments (like hydropower, mining,
and extractives) that are particularly vulnerable to cap-
78. The draft PLR underscores that CPS objectives re- ture.
main valid but challenging due to limited GoT commitment
• The Bank portfolio could more directly tackle FCV risks
to reforms, and with increased risks to inclusive growth
while maintaining its emphasis on areas of comparative
and job creation in the private sector. Nevertheless, the PLR
advantage and expertise on issues such as job creation
finds that progress on the Tajikistan CPS indicators remains
and labor markets, energy, agriculture and water invest-
broadly satisfactory, given the conservatively set indicators.
ments.
The review also highlights the low capacity of implementing
agencies, poor financial management and procurement ca- • The Bank could consider making its current portfolio
pacity that have also slowed disbursement rates and affected and investments more ‘FCV sensitive’ alongside advanc-
the country’s liquidity problems. ing new areas of work under the Risk Mitigation Regime.
79. Preparation of a new Systemic Country Diagnostic 82. Government stakeholders, in introductory conver-
(SCD) has been launched and it will provide a robust ana- sations on the Risk Mitigation Regime, were particularly
lytical foundation for a new Country Program Framework interested in programming related to job creation and pri-
(CPF) for Tajikistan for 2019-2023—both these strategic vate sector development, promoting local development, the
documents offer the opportunity for the World Bank pro- potential of cross-border development programming and
gram to more directly address FCV risks and institutional on issues related to commercialization of the agriculture
33
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
NEW PROGRAMMING
FIGURE 18: NEW PROGRAMMINGAREAS
AREASIN
INRESPONSE TORRA-IDENTIFIED
RESPONSETO RISKS and
RRA-IDENTIFIEDRISKS Employment
85. disaster and Inclu-
risk management.
sion Initiative
However, consulted targeting youth
Ministries
and
wanted returning
additional migrants:
time to map RRA
Possible Areas – New Programming
analysis
risks and underscores
consider the the
most grow-
ap-
RRA Identified Risks ing risks of youth
propriate mix of unemployment
potential in-
Governance reform and joint and idleness,
vestments. Local including due to
and provincial
Governance challenges monitoring
demographics
government expressed and youth bulge
interest
Youth/Migrant Employment and
and
in in
workinglight of
with the therecent
Bank reces-
to
Economic risks -
Inclusion Initiative sion
address in Russia
specific and the need
development to
Unemployment/idleness, youth bulge,
migrants, barriers to PSD
provide
needs basedopportunities
on their local for
devel- the
Local development platforms increasing
opment plans. number of returning
Regionalism and Inclusion migrants (majority youth). The
Disparities in sub-regional development; 87.
initiative RRA wouldanalysis
build on points to
findings
‘hot spots’ – FCV risks
Agriculture and food security three categories of
from a recent Jobs Diagnostic recommen-
including: 1)
dations,completed
Report fornew areas
Tajikistan,
Cross-border and global risks
of programming
pilot programming through the that directly
Cross-border development
programming
address
Youth identified risks;
Empowerment and con-
2) Entre-
siderations for enhancing
preneurship initiative, a recently the
‘FCV sensitivity’ of
launched study on Youth Inclu- the current
WBGin
sion Central and
portfolio; Asia 3) andprocess
global
support.
experience on youth programming in FCV environments. New programming in-
Bank has a unique role to play in
sector and disaster risk management. However, consulted addressing FCV risks cludes options for innovative and multi-sectoral operations
through
Ministries the Risk Mitigation
wanted additional time Regime due risks
to map to itsand
credibility,
consider that The the
86. address aim political,
would be economic,
to combine inclusion,
supply and cross-bor-
side interven-
convening power, neutrality, and capacity.
the most appropriate mix of potential investments. Local and Based on stake- der/global risks and potential sources
tions (preparing for and connecting youth to jobs) of resilience identified
with the
holder consultations
provincial government and RRA analysis,
expressed interesttheinfollowing
working with princi-
the in the RRA.
demand sideBased on sector
(supporting analysis, suggestions
entrepreneurship are also
and, important-
ples
Bank canto help
address guide identification
specific development of priorities for Tajikistan
needs based on their made ly, theon how to SME
nascent makesector
current andinvestments
high potential morevalue sensitive to
chains)
under the Risk Mitigation
local development plans. Regime. governance issues and underlying drivers
to spur job creation. The program would also include com- of FCV. Finally,
process
plementary recommendations
youth engagement are included
and inclusionto tackle challeng-
activities to in-
83. International
• RRA analysis partners
points rely on
to the World
three Bank, including
categories of recom- es related to effective multi-sectoral project
crease participation and voice. There may also becapacity design, scope to
through its
mendations, chairmanship
including: 1) new of the
areasDCC, in holding GoT
of programming to
that building,
consider citizen engagement,
the ‘up-skilling’ and ongoing
of migrant laborers risk monitoring.
as has been done
account, for example, on the decision
directly address identified risks; 2) considerations for en- Theto withhold bud- process recommendations are intended to recognize
in the Philippines and Indonesia to increase earning power
get support
hancing the ‘FCV due to macro-economic
sensitivity’ challenges
of the current WBG and fiscal
portfolio; that
andwithout
mobility. adjusting
A particular way it
the focus operates,
would be on thethe Bank runsand
profiling a
and risks.
3) processHowever, support.withNew the departure
programming of the Country
includes Man-
options reputational risk of not being able to deliver
targeting of ‘at risk’ youth who may be most vulnerable to on the potential
ager in April
for innovative and2017, is now held
the Chairoperations
multi-sectoral KfW, and
byaddress
that the increased IDA
recruitment violence andand/or
tocommitment not being able
close coordination to use
with it
private
Deputy
political, the EU. and cross-border/global risks effectively.
Chair byinclusion,
economic, sector development activities. Activities could include:
potential
and The
• Bank has a key of
sources role to play inidentified
resilience continuing in
tothe
push RRA.
for
Based on sector reforms
governance analysis,and suggestions
oversight, are also madeon
particularly how Recommendations
onhigh • On the “supply side” - New Programming
: profiling of potential beneficiaries
to make current
risk/high investments
reward investments more sensitive
(like to governance
hydropower, mining, and providing tailored services (training and improved
issues
andand underlying
extractives) drivers
that of FCV. Finally,
are particularly processto
vulnerable recom-
cap- 88. jobThe following
matching for proposed
wage employmentnew investments respond
and entrepreneur-
mendations
ture. are included to tackle challenges related to effec- directly to priority areas identified
ship training informed by best practices); in the RRA that height-
tive multi-sectoral project design, capacity building, citizen en the potential for conflict and instability or that rein-
• The Bank portfolio could more directly tackle FCV risks •
force On the
potential “demand
sources side”
of : a package
resilience. of
Figure training/business
16 summarizes
engagement, and ongoing risk monitoring.
while maintaining its emphasis on areas of comparative development
RRA-identified risks services to start-ups
and suggestions for and
new existing
targeted SMEs;
pro-
Recommendations - New Programming
advantage and expertise on issues such as job creation
and labor markets, energy, agriculture and water invest-
comprehensive
gramming. Nearly support
all the to high-potential
proposed engagements value chains
would
need toor besectors
multi-sectoral
73
; competitive matching
in their approach, grant mechanisms
recognizing theto
84. ments.
The following proposed new investments respond multi-dimensionality increase expected of return of
ratechallenges.
of the The private
following investment,
section 74
directly
• The to Bankpriority
could areas
consideridentified
making in the RRA that
its current height- details
portfolio business
the types incubators;
of activities that may be considered within
en the potential for conflict and instability
and investments more ‘FCV sensitive’ alongside advanc- or that rein- each of these proposed new investments.
force potential sources of resilience. Figure
ing new areas of work under the Risk Mitigation Regime. 18 summarizes
RRA-identified risks and suggestions for new targeted pro- 89. Employment and Inclusion Initiative targeting youth
86. Government
gramming. Nearly stakeholders,
all the proposed in introductory
engagements would and returning migrants: RRA analysis underscores the
conver-
sations
need to on the Risk Mitigation
be multi-sectoral in their Regime,
approach, were particularly
recognizing the growing risks of youth unemployment and idleness, includ-
73 due
ing See for
to example Tunisia and
demographics Productive
youth Inclusion
bulge and for Young Men
in light and
of the
interested in programming
multi-dimensionality related to job
of the challenges. The creation
following and pri-
section Women (P158138)
vate sector
details development,
the types of activities promoting
that may local
be development,
considered within the recent recession in Russia and the need to provide opportu-
74 Through subsidies aimed at increasing job creation. See for example
potential
each of theseof cross-border
proposed new development
investments. programming and on designfor
nities the increasing
of Lebanon Subsidized number
Temporary ofEmployment
returning migrants
Program (STEP)(ma-
issues related to commercialization of the agriculture sector jority youth).
and Capital The
for Private initiative
Jobs. would build on findings from a
37
34
• Promoting youth engagement, including for example basic services; and (iv) stimulating local economic activity
through “soft” skills development, peer mentoring, through modest local development investments. Activities
youth-led community engagement, dialogue and volun- could include investments across sectors (e.g., water supply
teer opportunities. and sanitation, health, small infrastructure, education, sport
and cultural facilities). Efforts could also be made to improve
87. For returning migrants,.some of whom would be eligi- transparency and effectiveness of service delivery, including
ble for the support above, in addition activities may include: through the potential of one-stop-shop administrative service
(i) Support/improvement in skills certification and expanded delivery centers at local level. The program would provide
job matching/job search assistance; (ii) Retraining (vocation- capacity building on developing project proposals, gover-
al skills) or business skills training linked to access to finance; nance and implementation and monitoring of small works
(iii) Competitive matching grants for migrant-led start-ups; projects chosen by citizens. The proposed initiative would be
(iv)Priority or referrals to services above. coordinated with other international partner investments in
local governance and local development and could build on
88. Foundational analytic work would be required on a the CASA-1000 Community Support Program (CSP) under
range of issues in order to design the program, including on preparation. Baseline diagnostics would be required to assess
profiling ‘at-risk’ youth, assessing youth preferences and con- public financial management (PFM) systems at local level
straints, jobs-focused value chain/sectoral assessments, and and to identify policy options that would provide scope for
qualitative data collection on youth/migrant barriers to in- increased flow of resources, greater discretion in application
clusion and integration. of funds and local level accountability. Preliminary analytic
work would also be required to design the citizen service cen
89. Local Development Platforms: RRA analysis iden-
ter approach, including the implementation of a Governance
tifies that regionalism has featured prominently as a driver
Diagnostic, a citizen experience survey on service delivery
of FCV, including during the civil war and in characterizing
and access to identify gaps in service access, and differences
recent violence. The existing government system for sub-na-
in access, cost and quality across gender and income levels.
tional resource allocation also risks exacerbating regional
tensions. There are also significant regional disparities in 91. Cross-Border Development Programming: RRA
poverty and non-income poverty measures across Tajiki- Analysis points to Tajikistan’s unique geography, subject to
stan—remote districts, border communities, and those that cross-border tensions around natural resource sharing, in-
were impacted by violence are often most affected. Where the cluding between border communities and at the national lev-
state has been absent, local institutions, however, have also el. However, Tajikistan also shares a rich physical and cultural
been identified as a source of resilience in managing and mit- heritage with its neighbors, with the potential of develop-
igating FCV risks and supporting community-based devel- ment progress, opening of markets, and new energy sources
opment. The GoT has put in place a legal framework with the through regional cooperation.
potential to introduce greater levels of transparency, equity,
and accountability in intergovernmental relations. However, 92. The aim of proposed new programming is to encour-
the framework has yet to be implemented due to concerns age joint action on shared development challenges in an
over the capacity of local (jamoat) administrations to manage effort to enhance regional cooperation. This could include
resources for local development investments. Recognizing further exploration of reinvestment in the ‘Friendship Line’,
these challenges, the GoT recently created the Local Devel- a power transmission line between Tajikistan and Uzbekistan
opment Committee to fill an important gap by mandating it to take advantage of a potential window for increasing coop-
to, among other functions, build capacity at all levels of the eration between the two countries. The ‘Friendship Line’ of-
sub-national administration. ficially the Central Asia Energy transmission line, dismantled
in 2007, provided for interchange of electric power between
90. The proposed local development platforms would en- thermal power abundant downstream countries (Uzbekistan,
able the GoT to allocate resources to the jamoat-level using Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan), and hydropower abundant
a simple set of transparent criteria (such as population size Tajikistan and the Kyrgyz Republic during the winter and
and poverty levels as well as FCV risks) to finance invest- summer periods. CA countries lost up to an estimated 2 bln
ments prioritized through participatory, inclusive local de- USD between them from dismantling this line. Additional fi-
velopment planning. Local development investments would nancing may be considered by linking this component with
be accompanied by a program of capacity-building for local the on-going regional connectivity project – Central Asia
governments and community-based organizations. Such an Road Links (CARs-2) and planned CARs-4.
approach would address drivers of fragility by: (i) equitable
and transparent sub-national resource allocation; (ii) pro- 93. A regionally-focused Ferghana Valley Development
viding avenues for participation, voice, and accountability in program involving Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyz Re-
local decision-making and resource utilization; (iii) building public focused on job creation through increased connec-
trust between the citizen and state by increasing provision of tivity, agricultural and horticultural development, tourism
35
and cultural heritage could also be considered. River basin 97. Particular attention needs to be paid to addressing
and riparian zone development on the Tajik-Afghan border FCV and governance challenges in high-risk/high-reward
would also build confidence and address the multi-vector sectors such as extractives and energy. The GoT is highlight-
water-food-irrigation-energy challenges faced by both coun- ing the potential economic growth potential of mining and
tries. Finally, further regional cooperation on disaster preven- of major hydropower projects. Indeed, the SCD and growth
tion, management and response, could provide a non-polit- models for Tajikistan emphasize the need to capitalize on op-
ical issue as a foundation for enhanced communication and portunities for investment. However, these are also the sectors
to build trust. Additional financing for the on-going work most vulnerable to governance challenges that is highlighted
under CAMP4ASB regional project and Central Asia Energy in the RRA analysis, and where reforms, community engage-
and Water Development Program TF that aims to strengthen ment, and transparency/oversight will be critical to ensure in-
cooperation among five Central Asia and Afghanistan in the vestments do not become triggers for violence and instability.
area of water resource management may be considered. The potential of the mining industry to trigger social discon-
tent and FCV has been widely studied. This is often driven by
94. Agriculture and food security: As highlighted in RRA
a mismatch between expectations from local populations for
analysis, Tajikistan is the country in the ECA region most
vulnerable to climate shocks and natural disasters. The direct employment in mining activities and improved “local
Government is seeking new ways to develop early warning content” in subsidiary businesses and the ability of the min-
systems and build community resilience to protect house- ing companies to deliver on these expectations. A sound legal
holds assets and vital source of rural livelihoods, prevent and framework that protects the rights to land use – when mining
respond to the avalanches, land and mud slides, and flooding industries displace people’s access to land and livelihoods and
that have posed significant stress on infrastructure, agricul- commitment to local economic development are critical to
ture and food security, and livelihoods, particularly in remote ensuring that a limited focus onsector development does not
regions. With only 7 percent arable land, the country’s food worsen disparities and generate tensions.
security situation remains vulnerable to seasonal and external
98. Benefit-sharing arrangements in large-scale infra-
shocks and may not be sustainable in the long run. The sea-
structure investments can promote FCV-sensitive approach-
sonal nature of poverty and its association with food security
is also observed through the Listening to Tajikistan survey es. The MoEWR is piloting an innovative approach to shar-
carried out by the poverty team. ing benefits with local communities from revenues generated
through electricity exports from the CASA-1000 through the
95. Additional financing for the Agriculture Commer- Community Support Program (CSP). Other line agencies/
cialization Project (ACP) may be considered. The project sectors (mining, for example) may consider introducing
development objective is to increase the commercialization similar mechanisms as part of existing and future large-scale
of farm and agribusiness products by improving the perfor- investments. Alternatively, if the GoT decides to pursue the
mance of selected value-chains and productive partnerships Local Development Platform recommendations, it could
through increased and more affordable access to finance, and channel a portion of revenues from energy and mining reve-
strengthened capacity of project beneficiaries to create more nues as a means to share benefits. A Sovereign Wealth Fund
productive employment opportunities on rural farms. Fur- may be another way of managing governance risks if large
ther financing could be targeted to assist the government to export earnings materialize.
set up a contingency fund to ensure a more structured ap-
proach to agricultural risk management, tailored to climatic 99. Governance and oversight pre-conditions attached to
and disaster risks that threaten sustainable food security. large scale investment projects can also be effective in miti-
gating the risk of elite capture and rent seeking. The Bank’s
Recommendations Toward an ‘FCV Sensitive’ recent Nurek Hydropower Plant Rehabilitation Project and
the accompanying threshold reform conditions as a pre-con-
Portfolio dition for investment could serve as a model for future sup-
96. In addition to new areas of programming, RRA port. Under this operation the number of critical covenants
analysis also points to potential pathways to increase the were included, which will serve as preconditions for Bank’s
sensitivity of the current World Bank portfolio to gover- and other donors support, including in the areas of financial
nance and FCV risks. Building on the Bank’s current strong management (restructuring of short term debt of a public en-
portfolio across a variety of sectors, activities to more directly ergy utility, cost recovery tariff policy including mitigation
tackle these risks could be undertaken as part of project su- of tariff increases for the most vulnerable), corporate gover-
pervision, restructuring and additional financing efforts un- nance, financial transparency, increased efficiency of invento-
der IDA 18. Table 5 provides a snapshot summary of some ry and asset management.
of the key sectors, risks, and potential issues and objectives
to consider.
36
TABLE 5: CONSIDERATIONS – ENHANCING FCV SENSITIVITY IN THE WB PORTFOLIO
Sector Possible FCV Risks (Sector) WBG programming Possibilities for Enhancing FCV Sensitivity
- Water most severe nonmonetary risk to poverty Poverty Diagnostics in Water - Promote decentralization and reform of
vulnerable groups and Sanitation; governance of water sector
- Highly centralized, inefficient, untransparent Rural Water Supply and - Community mobilization and citizen
Water supply governance Sanitation Project; engagement for effective management of
and sanitation - Poor water management systems and unfair Social Accountability in Water shared water resource
processes for distribution contribute to water Sector
scarcity and potential conflict Dushanbe water supply
- ‘upstream/downstream’ tensions/potential
conflict, including across borders
- Series of reforms that have improved land rights Real Estate Registration Project; - Continue to expand land registration services/
but majority of poor rural households have Environmental Land implementation of land reform policies
small land plots/poor quality Management and Rural - Aim to make land certificates tradeable to
Land Reform - Social tension and potential conflict around Livelihoods project; increase the mobility of rural population
allocation of scarce land Land Governance Assessment - Improve the governance and transaction
- Lack of land market and tenure security stalls (proposed) system of property registration
mobility – particularly for vulnerable groups - Remove barriers for vulnerable populations
(women, poor)
- Land capture by large farm managers and
developers
- Significant growth potential but subject to Private Sector Competitiveness - Tackle the sector’s challenges as part of the
corruption and governance challenges – elite Project; reforms to promote more liberal investment
capture and rent seeking EITI Technical Assistance; CASA climate and private sector environment
Mining - Mining and extractive industry does not 1000 CSP - Promote community engagement and
feature social corporate responsibility or citizen mobilization for oversight and to ensure
engagement mechanisms protection of land and established livelihoods
- Absent conditions for responsible mining
including benefit sharing with the shareholders,
employees and local communities
- Access to energy is seen as one of the important Winter Energy Program (PPA); - Widen partnership with CSOs on transparency
part of social contract in Tajikistan as electricity CASA1000; Nurek Hydropower and accountability of energy utility
shortages in rural areas affect the quality of Rehabilitation project; - Broaden the engagement with CSOs/
social service delivery. Energy efficiency consumers on more socially responsible
Energy - Rural households have fewer coping strategies energy tariff policy
than urban ones to meet the basic needs - Promote energy efficiency and affordable
for heating. Fuel form the bulk of energy technologies to at the rural level
expenditures. - Economic and social empowerment of rural
- Poor electricity governance and frequent rise communities along CASA1000 corridors with
in electricity tariffs is an important source of close proximity to large energy facilities
citizens grievance
Escalating banking crisis could trigger payment Development Policy Operation; - Continue supporting for reforms to promote
system collapse, economic shock, social unrest and Financial sector development greater stability, create framework for better
instability. (TA and lending to the equity of corporate governance, and enforce critical
Access to Government decision to recapitalize and bail out key key banks); regulatory framework of the banking system
Finance banks was not accompanied by necessary reforms Consumers and deposit - Boost small banks and microfinance
of corporate governance practices needed for future protection TA; institutions in order to enable them to fulfil
stability. Financial literacy TA; Access to the function of a responsible and affordable
High risk of bankruptcy among SMEs and borrowers Finance for rural finance provider to SMEs, rural farms,
as a result of banking crisis, currency depreciation SMEs/farms through Agriculture communities and individual entrepreneurs
and high interest rates. Commercialization Project AF - Technical assistance and capacity building
activities aimed to strengthen consumer
protection, mobile banking and other
financial sector instruments which could
make individual small borrowers more
resilient to financial crisis
37
High disaster risk in Tajikistan and limited financial Strengthening Critical - Strengthen focus on building local
reserves poses threat to fiscal sustainability. Infrastructure Against Natural DRM resilience through targeting local
Both central and local Government lack capacity and Hazards communities with the combination of
DRM mechanisms for emergency response. awareness raising, DRM planning, capacity
More frequent natural disasters amid low building and investments to strengthen the
preparedness further undermines socioeconomic resilience against various natural disasters,
resilience of rural households especially in remote such as floods, mudflows, earthquakes, etc.
mountainous areas
Decline of remittance and fiscal pressures have Targeted Social Assistance, AF - Promote targeted social protection to
eroded an already very limited social protection Social Safety Nets; Health compensate against major tariff increases for
system in Tajikistan. Services Improvement Project water and electricity
Social GoT is unable to protect vulnerable populations - Given Government’s indicated interest to
Protection against rising prices and lack of assistance – could set up a system of social assistance and
lead to widespread grievances. compensation for disaster response, consider
Social protection mechanisms are virtually social cash transfer scheme for compensation
nonexistent at the community level (except for - At the local level consider introduction of
informal mobilization of resources) local and community based social protection
and services as administered by local
Government,jamoats, communities at cost
effective way.
indicators. First, a set of contextual indicators to monitor
Recommendations – Process Support whether the overall situation is deteriorating and FCV risks
100. In order to support effective implementation of the are increasing or whether the country is on a more positive
Risk Mitigation Regime in the challenging Tajikistan con- and stable path. This will also include a priority list of gov-
text, a series of process-related recommendations are also ernance-related indicators to track reform progress. Second,
included. These focus on ensuring necessary resources for a collection of programmatic/outcome indicators to assess
capacity building, ongoing risk monitoring and promoting whether programming and investments through the Risk
transparency and citizen engagement. It is envisioned that Mitigation Regime are contributing to positive progress.
these activities could be supported through a combination These indicators will have to be further developed based on
of financing from the enhanced Project Preparation Facility, the design of Risk Mitigation Regime programming. Table 6
trust fund, and Bank budget resources. below presents illustrative indicators in each category to be
further developed as part of the Implementation Note and in
101. Risk monitoring system: As a pre-condition for ad- consultation with the GoT.
vancement of the Risk Mitigation Regime financing, the
World Bank and the Government of Tajikistan could commit 103. Supplementary project preparation/supervision/ca-
to a joint risk monitoring system. Since the RRA represents a pacity building funds: In order to successfully implement
snapshot assessment in time, the monitoring system would the RMR financing, additional support is also needed to pro-
aim to provide for ongoing monitoring of risks to measure mote multi-sector project preparation, baseline analytics for-
progress, allow for mid-course corrections under the risk mit- effective risk-sensitive design, hands-on supervision and to
igation regime, and to anticipate crises. GoT commitment to address implementation capacity constraints. This could in-
track progress on governance risks could be a pre-condition clude, for example, a centralized/cross-program PIU for the
for eligibility for RMR financing. The risk monitoring system Risk Mitigation Regime financing that would also promote
could also include capacity building initiatives for the GoT learning across RMR activities. Funding for these types of ac-
in data collection. Financing could include support for joint tivities would be required from the enhanced for FCV Project
monitoring on governance reform indicators, rapid and per- Preparation Facility, trust fund resources, and Bank budget.
ception-based surveys, data on migrants and migration, and Funding (potentially through the GPSA) for enhanced sup-
for poverty and non-poverty welfare measures sub-nationally. port to citizen engagement across programming should also
be provided, including support to national NGOs, commu-
102. Given the complex context in Tajikistan, learn- nity based organizations, capacity building and civil society
ing, monitoring and adaptive programming are critical. engagement in proposed multi-sectoral programming and in
Through the proposed risk monitoring system, the Bank tracking governance indicators to enlarge the space for civil
and Government will together monitor two categories of society.
38
TABLE 6: ILLUSTRATIVE INDICATORS – RISK MONITORING SYSTEM
CONTEXTUAL INDICATORS – MONITORING EVOLVING FCV RISKS
Type of Risk Illustrative indicators Possible Data Sources
Political participation and voice - Freedom House ratings
- Bertelsmann Transformation Index: Political and Social Integration,
Political Participation, Stateness
- Civil society surveys
Rule of Law World Governance Indicators (WGI)
Political and Public Financial Management: - Improved accountability of public expenditures measured by the
governance risks quality of annual financial reports (PEFA25i and iii)
- Key procurement information is made available to the public in a
timely manner through appropriate means (PEFAI19iii)
- Total value of contracts that were awarded through an open and
competitive process (Percentage)
Enforcement of regulatory framework for natural EITI
resource management
Corruption - Transparency International ratings
- WGI Indicators
- TI Global Corruption Barometer Percentage of Citizens reporting they
paid a bribe to access key public services
- World Economic Forum: Favoritism in Government Decisions
- World Economic Forum: Diversion of Public Funds
Private sector: Taxation, new business density, legal - Doing Business Surveys (paying taxes)
Economic risks rights - WB EBRD Business Enterprise Survey (BEEPS)
Financial sector stability: banking supervision IMF ROSC and FSAP, World Bank, IFC, EBRD, NBT banking supervision
(Nonperforming loans; capital adequacy; deposits to
capital; liquid assets to total assets; effective banking
resolution framework in place)
Remittance levels/migration trends Administrative data; NBT; IOM
Tracking remittance flows/investment Administrative data; NBT; State Investment Committee; IOM
Inequality in poverty/nonmonetary poverty measures GP Poverty/GoT State Statistical Committee (Goskomstat)
at subnational level
Regionalism,
Perceptions of wellbeing, confidence, trust Listening to Tajikistan Survey; additional survey perception data
exclusion risks
disaggregated by regions
Youth idleness/unemployment rates NEET data; perception surveys
Figures/trends – recruitment to VE Soufan Group; Intl Center for Counter Terrorism; Global Terrorism Database
(GTD); additional qualitative research
Crossborder and
Crossborder tensions and violence incidents Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), Uppsala Conflict
global risks
Data Program (UCDP)
Fluctuation in food prices/food shortages Administrative data, Goskomstat (CPI inflation data)
- Tracking violent incident data subnationally - ACLED, UCDP, GTD
FCV monitoring
- Tajikistan rating on FCV indices - Fund for Peace Fragile State Index, OECD States of Fragility
39
PROGRAMMATIC/OUTCOME INDICATORS – RISK MITIGATION REGIME FINANCING
Program Type Illustrative indicators Possible Data Sources
- Annual citizen experience survey/governance diagnostic: Percentage
increase in citizen access to administrative services (survey/governance
Access to administrative services diagnostic) For example: percentage of citizens stating it was “easy” or
“very easy” to access administrative services.
- Annual citizen experience survey/governance diagnostic: Percentage
Governance stating the cost of service is prohibitive.
- Increase in Voluntary Compliance number of active taxpayers
Inspections/Tax Administration - Improved taxpayer service – number of hours required for filing tax
reporting OR BEEPS: Time Tax
- BEEPS: Informal Payments for Tax Administrations
- BEEPS: Number of Inspections (Tax)
- Youth perceptions – economic opportunities and Survey to be developed; project data on employment rates/new businesses
Employment and participation (disaggregated by regions, gender) sustained
Inclusion – Youth/ - Employment rates; new business development –
Migrants project beneficiaries
- Subnational Government Share of revenue and To be developed as part of local development platforms
expenditures Citizen Engagement indicators: Number of citizens attending local
Local Development - Transfers to subnational government community planning meetings, number of CSOs participating, number of
Platforms - Local perceptions – welfare and participation citizen proposals, etc.
(participating localities)
- Establishment of enhanced crossborder To be monitored through regional project data; Ministry of Economic
Regional communication/cooperation on development Development and Trade; Goskomstat
Development activities
Programming - Cross border trade
Agriculture and Food Improved strategy/capacity to manage disasters and To be developed based on baseline national/local level strategies +
Security climatic shocks tracked in response to economic shocks
104. In advancing the Risk Mitigation Regime program the RMR, potential cooperation on advancing the risk mon-
package, continued close cooperation with international itoring systems with partners with complementary expertise
agencies under Development Coordination Council (DCC) (for example in judicial and security sector reform), as well
will be essential: The DCC could serve a platform for discus- as exploring synergies in advancing a more ‘FCV sensitive’
sion and collaboration on proposed new programming under World Bank portfolio.
40
Confidential – Not for Release or Distribution
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