Document of The World Bank Report No: NCO00003512 NOTE ON CANCELLED OPERATION REPORT (IDA-H6300) ON A GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 2.0 MILLION (US$3.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT) TO THE REPUBLIC OF HAITI FOR A POST DISASTER PARTIAL CREDIT GUARANTEE PROGRAM SUPPORT PROJECT June 15, 2015 Finance and Markets Global Practice Haiti Country Management Unit Latin America and the Caribbean Region 1 CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS (Exchange Rate Effective June 11, 2015) Currency Unit = Haitian Gourd (HTG) HTG 1.00 = US$0.020462451 US$1.00 = HTG 48.87 FISCAL YEAR October 1 - September 30 ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS BRH Central Bank of Haiti (Banque de la République d’Haïti) CAS Country Assistance Strategy FDI Industrial Development Fund (Fonds de Développement Industriel) FOGAPE Chilean Partial Credit Guarantee Fund FSSA Financial System Stability Assessment FY Fiscal Year GDP Gross Domestic Product IADB Inter-American Development Bank IDA International Development Association IFC International Finance Corporation IMF International Monetary Fund MFI Microfinance Institution MSME Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises NPL Non-Performing Loan PCG Partial Credit Guarantee PCGP Partial Credit Guarantee Program PDNA Post-Disaster Needs Assessment PDO Project Development Objective SIG Specific Investment Grant SME Small and Medium Enterprises USAID United States Agency for International Development US$ United States Dollar Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderón Country Director: Mary Barton-Dock Senior Global Practice Director: Gloria Grandolini Practice Manager: Alfonso Garcia Mora Project Team Leader: Juan Buchenau NCO Team Leader : Juan Buchenau 2 HAITI Post-Disaster Partial Credit Guarantee Program Support Project CONTENTS Data Sheet A. Basic Information B. Key Dates C. Ratings Summary D. Sector and Theme Codes E. Bank Staff F. Ratings of Program Performance in ISRs 1.  Context, Project Development Objectives, and Design .............................................. 6  2. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation. ............................................. 8  3. Assessment of IDA Performance .................................................................................. 10  4. Assessment of Borrower Performance.......................................................................... 12  5. Lessons Learned............................................................................................................ 12  Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes................. 14  Annex 2. List of Supporting Documents .......................................................................... 16  3 A. Basic Information Haiti Post-Disaster Partial Credit Country: Haiti Project Name: Guarantee Program Support Project Project ID: P121391 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H6300 NCO Date: 05/13/2015 MINISTRY OF Lending Instrument: SIL Borrower: FINANCE, HAITI Original Total XDR 2.00M Disbursed Amount: XDR 0.00M Commitment: Revised Amount: XDR 2.00M Environmental Category: B Implementing Agencies: Fonds de Développement Industriel, FDI Cofinanciers and Other External Partners: B. Key Dates Revised / Actual Process Date Process Original Date Date(s) Concept Review: 07/22/2010 Effectiveness: 04/07/2011 02/22/2011 Appraisal: 10/07/2010 Closing: 02/28/2017 06/28/2017 Approval: 12/14/2010 C. Ratings Summary Performance Rating by NCO Outcomes: Not Applicable Risk to Development Outcome: Not Applicable Bank Performance: Moderately Satisfactory Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory D. Sector and Theme Codes Original Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing) Banking 37 Housing finance 10 Public administration- Financial Sector 16 SME Finance 37 4 Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing) Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise support 15 Natural disaster management 35 Other Financial Sector Development 35 Urban planning and housing policy 15 E. Bank Staff Positions At NCO At Approval Vice President: Jorge Familiar Calderon Pamela Cox Country Director: Mary A. Barton-Dock Yvonne M. Tsikata Practice Alfonso Garcia Mora Lily L. Chu Manager/Manager: Project Team Leader: Juan Buchenau Hoth Juan Buchenau Hoth NCO Team Leader: Juan Buchenau Hoth F. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs Actual Date ISR No. DO IP Disbursements Archived (USD millions) 1 02/21/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00 2 08/14/2011 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.50 3 03/11/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.50 4 10/09/2012 Satisfactory Satisfactory 2.50 5 05/17/2013 Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 2.50 6 12/17/2013 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.55 7 07/07/2014 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.55 8 01/21/2015 Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory 2.55 5 1. Context, Project Development Objectives, and Design 1. Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere. About 78 percent of its population were living below the poverty line (less than US$2 a day) at the time this project was designed. Having shown in 2008 and 2009 a positive economic performance after years of stagnation, the country’s situation was dramatically affected on January 12, 2010, when it was shaken by a 7.0 magnitude earthquake. The epicenter was located only 17 km south-west of the densely populated capital area of Port-au-Prince. Over 230,000 lives were lost. Hundreds of thousands of Haitians were left homeless, adding to an economic situation which was already difficult before. 2. The Post-Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA), prepared by a joint team composed of representatives of the Haitian Government and members of the international community, evaluated the impact of losses and damage to be US$8 billion, or 1.2 times the country’s GDP. Reconstruction costs and requirements were estimated at US$12 billion. The earthquake was especially harmful for the private sector, which, according to the PDNA, suffered damage and losses in an amount of US$5.7 billion (70 percent of the total damage and losses). The earthquake disrupted borrowers’ income sources while damaging the quality of physical assets and inventories. As a consequence, the earthquake jeopardized the private sector’s ability to keep up with the terms of their loans and reduced the value of their collateral. 3. Prior to the earthquake, the financial sector was considered sound in general but with significant development challenges. The Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA) of 2008 found that Haiti’s financial system played a limited role in supporting economic growth. Constraints were found in the legal and institutional frameworks, fragile security, limited competition among banks, poor governance, high reserve requirement ratios and the absence of a functioning credit registry. Access to banking credit was limited as loans (net of provisions) only stood at 30 percent of total banking assets (this ratio was back then around 60 percent in the region). Non-performing loans (NPL) stood at 8.6 percent for the sector. The system was highly liquid. 4. The impact of the earthquake on the country’s financial institutions was three-fold: (i) financial institutions lost staff and suffered damages in their branches; (ii) as of June 2010 and in spite of substantial write-offs, the quality of loan portfolios had deteriorated to an NPL ratio of 11.9 percent, because borrower’s capacity to repay had been hindered and borrowers in the affected areas had lost their collateral; and (iii) banks restricted credit to existing borrowers in good standing considering the negative effects of the earthquake on the economy. Banks managed to reopen nine days after the disaster despite the magnitude of human and material losses. 5. In the context of high credit constraints but robust liquidity, the Haitian Central Bank (Banque de la République d’Haïti, BRH) requested support from IDA and the Inter- American Development Bank (IADB) to establish a program of partial credit guarantees to help lenders and borrowers restructure their loans as well as to help banks and cooperatives restart lending. The resources to be provided by IDA and IADB were to be 6 complemented with additional funds provided by (a) the Haiti reconstruction Fund (HRF), which were to be managed by IADB under a separate project (together “the IADB/HRF project”), as well as by (b) the Government of Haiti (GoH) making use of money that was to be freed up from the debt relief that was donated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) to Haiti after the earthquake. In total, IDA was to contribute US$3 million, IADB/HRF US$32.5 million and the GoH US$40 million. 6. The main Project Development Objective was to support the development of a partial credit guarantee program by the Recipient to help (i) financial institutions restart lending; and (ii) financial sector borrowers overcome the impact of the emergency. 7. The beneficiaries of the project were local banks and cooperatives participating in the partial credit guarantee program whose credit risk on the guaranteed loans was to be shared with the partial credit guarantor, as well as borrowers (firms and individuals), especially those who had been affected by the earthquake and who needed temporary relief to continue running their businesses. 8. Project Description: The project was designed with two components: (i) the provision of partial credit guarantees (PCGs) through a Partial Credit Guarantee Program (PCGP) that in turn consisted of two pillars; and (ii) technical assistance to the design and implementation of measures to remove obstacles to credit growth. Component 1: Supporting the Provision of Partial Credit Guarantees (US$2.5 million) 9. The two pillars of component 1: i. Pillar 1 of the PCGP was to be implemented by the Fonds de Développement Industriel (FDI), a government owned entity, specialized in providing financing to small and medium enterprises (SMEs). This pillar was to guarantee loans to customers (i) whose loans were performing before the earthquake, (ii) who had been negatively affected by the disaster, and (iii) who were expected by the financial institutions to have the capacity to serve their obligations according to the terms defined following a restructuring process. This pillar was directed towards viable borrowers who needed temporary help; it also covered the provision of additional financing to existing borrowers, especially firms, to support them temporarily. It was to provide partial guarantees for loans up to US$1 million, covering up to 50 percent of the outstanding loan amount. 1 Pillar 1 was to be temporary in nature and was not expected to be self-financed. ii. Pillar 2 of the PCGP was to be implemented by a commercially operated entity that was to be determined. It was to guarantee new loans, extended to existing borrowers outside the restructuring process or to new borrowers, with a particular focus on SMEs and housing. It involved the establishment of an organic fund and was expected to operate on a self-financed basis helping to expand lending to viable borrowers and contributing to address to some extent the existing and substantial constraints to the use of collateral in the country. 1 These loans were jointly covered with resources from IDA and the IADB/HRF project in proportion to their contribution to the first component of the PCGP. In addition, loans with an original amount between US$1 million and US$3 million were also provided a 50 percent guarantee through the IADB/HRF project alone with a maximum coverage of US$750,000. 7 10. The project’s grant resources were to support, first, the provision of PCGs under pillar 1. Any resources that were not needed for pillar 1 of the PCGP or freed up as pillar 1 fulfilled its temporary role were then to be transferred to pillar 2 to support the provision of PCGs by the organic fund that was then to be established. Component 2: Financial Sector Technical Assistance (US$0.5 million) 11. This component was to further contribute to address the limited role played by the banking sector in supporting economic growth in Haiti, an issue that had been raised in the FSSA in 2008 and that had worsened in consequence of the earthquake. To that end, the project included a small technical assistance component that was intended to support activities related to the upgrading of the financial infrastructure to improve the conditions for lending with actions such as improving regulations for the use of movable assets as collateral or for the operation of an incipient credit bureau. This component was to be implemented by BRH. 12. Risks: The project risks were deemed to be High during implementation because of (i) uncertainty surrounding the design in a complex environment, (ii) uncertainty with respect to the demand for partial credit guarantees, (iii) and the short time frame for preparation in order to meet demand on the ground. In particular, there was a high degree of uncertainty surrounding the demand for guarantees, as demand might either exceed available funding or not materialize. In addition, it was stated that the level of losses the fund would have to bear could be very high and that the risk existed that losses would exceed the available resources (the fund was to operate with a 50% leverage ratio). The risk of insufficient counterpart funding was considered low at that time, as the focus of project preparation was on the implementation of the first pillar of the PCGP (to address the emergency), for which counterpart funding through IADB/HRF had already been secured. The risk of insufficient counterpart funding for the second pillar of the PCGP was not addressed at that time. 13. Quality at entry: The PCG scheme was designed by IDA following a request by the Haitian authorities and with support of experts from the Chilean Partial Credit Guarantee Fund (Fondo de Garantía para Pequeños Empresarios, FOGAPE). A group from IDA, IADB and the US Department of Treasury (U.S. Treasury) monitored and accompanied these efforts. The relatively small size of IDA’s operation was justified given the technical leadership role that IDA had taken in designing the project and due to the fact that IDA resources were to be leveraged by substantial grant funding from IADB/HRF and GoH. 14. Overall project design can be considered satisfactory, as it provided an adequate tool to address the constraints faced by both, borrowers and lending institutions due to the earthquake in such a way that it leveraged the resources of the financial system as well as the capacity and solid performance of FDI and of participating banks. 2. Post-Approval Experience and Reasons for Cancellation. 15. Implementation of pillar 1 of the PCG: After the project became effective, the FDI began offering partial credit guarantees to the country’s banks to cover viable loans that had been negatively affected by the earthquake. In total, FDI covered loans with a total 8 outstanding balance of US$10,524,672,2 for which it granted guarantees in an amount of US$3.33 million through three private banks. These guarantees benefitted 255 businesses, two of which were large, eight small and medium and 245 micro. US$1,158,852 of the guarantees issued belonged to the category covered by the IDA grant (i.e. for loans with an original amount below US$1 million) with slightly more than half of this amount (US$0.63 million) supporting loans to microenterprises. Of these guarantees, only US$134,750 were backed with IDA resources under pillar 1 of the project with the remainder being covered by the IADB/HRF project. 16. The relatively small amount of guarantees covered by pillar 1 of this project has been mainly attributed to the delay the project took to become effective and, also, to the minority funding role of IDA. The project was effective almost one year after the earthquake, at a time, when the majority of affected loans, especially the smaller ones with shorter maturities, had already either been written off or restructured. In spite of this, the project and the announcement of its preparation provided an important signal, that the Central Bank and donors were willing to support affected borrowers and financial institutions and provided an incentive for the restructuring of such loans. The project complemented the special loan provisioning rules for restructured loans that had been issued by the Central Bank soon after the earthquake. These rules foresaw that restructured loans would require for a limited period of time lower provisions (2 percent) than non- performing loans (20 percent and up depending on their level of impairment). 17. The reception of applications for the first pillar expired on October 31, 2011. Given the very low level of IDA resources that had been committed by then to cover loans affected by the earthquake, it was agreed to transfer the uncommitted project resources from the first to the second pillar of component 1.3 18. Pillar 2 of the PCGP: Following the provisions of the original loan agreement, IDA undertook together with its Haitian partners a mid-term review in order to assess the viability for the launch of the second pillar of the PCGP. After arriving at a positive result in assessing the demand and the FDI’s management of the first pillar of the PCGP and in absence of other suitable entities that could manage the project’s second pillar, it was decided to entrust FDI also with the implementation of the second pillar of component 1. For this a new operational manual for the administration of the sustainable organic fund was elaborated by the Haitian authorities with support by the project, taking into account the experiences gained during the execution of the first pillar of component 1. At that time, the Government of Haiti agreed in the restated financing agreement to provide US$10 million as counterpart funding to the resources granted by IDA for a total of US$12.5 million, which would have enabled FDI to provide guarantees for US$50 million (using a leverage ratio of capital to guarantees of 1:4). 19. On January 29, 2013, IDA approved the restructuring of the project, so as to allow the transfer of funds from the first to the second pillar of the PCGP to update the covenants 2 This figure includes all loans covered by FDI with IDA and IADB/HRF resources; it also includes loans with an original amount between US$1 million and up to US$3 million, which were administered by FDI as one project (with some detailed reporting separating out IDA and IADB/HRF). 3 This was done in agreement with GoH and IADB. IADB expressed its consent to the transfer of IDA resources to the second pillar of the PCGP in writing (see Annex 2) as this had implications for the payment of future claims by the two projects. 9 based on the features of pillar 2. The amended and restated financing agreement was signed on March 5, 2013 foreseeing that GoH would contribute US$10 million in counterpart funding to the second pillar of component 1. 20. Delay in counterpart financing for pillar 2 of the PCG: After the signature of the restated loan agreement, the Minister of Finance was replaced and it took GoH several months to get back to IDA on the issue of counterpart funding. In the course of 2013, GoH stated that the resources of the IMF debt relief had been reallocated given unforeseen fiscal constraints. Aside of the tight fiscal position, the decision of GoH to reallocate the resources also considered the existence of alternative credit guarantee schemes that were providing guarantees in Haiti, namely those operated by the French and the American Development Agencies. GoH but decided to maintain the project as it was to provide such guarantees permanently through a sustainable entity based in Haiti that would serve all eligible financial institutions with a broader range of products; in contrast to the American and French programs which provide guarantees to more narrowly defined segments of the market in the frame of limited and time-bound agreements with individual financial institutions and which operate without an organic structure in Haiti, providing guarantees out of their home country. 21. The stagnant situation of the project was discussed in detail between IDA and GoH during the 2013 Annual Meetings of WB and IMF. As GoH expressed continuing interest in the project, it was agreed to split the counterpart funding contribution into two tranches allowing to launch of the second pillar with a first tranche of US$5 million, and with GoH maintaining the compromise to contribute additional US$5 million at a later stage.4 22. In the course of the following months the country experienced two additional replacements of the Minister of Finance (the first one occurring just a few days before the announced disbursement of the first US$5 million tranche). The situation of the contribution of GoH to this project was then discussed again at different moments between IDA, the Ministry of Finance and the Central Bank, with GoH expressing a continuing interest in the project and offering different formulas to provide the counterpart funding. 23. Cancellation of the project: As the counterpart contribution did not materialize, GoH finally requested formally on March 2nd, 2015 the cancellation and closing of the project as well as the transfer of the remaining project resources to another project due to the country’s fiscal constraints that hindered it from providing the counterpart funding as agreed.5 At the moment this note is drafted, GoH has reimbursed the unused portion of the advances granted for the execution of the project, the designated project accounts are being closed and IDA has agreed to the cancellation with value date of March 3rd, 2015. 3. Assessment of IDA Performance 24. Quality at entry: As mentioned, the project provided Haiti an adequate instrument to address the credit constraints that had been accentuated by the earthquake taking advantage of the strengths and liquidity position of the financial system. In spite of this, project effectiveness was limited due to the relatively long time it took it to become effective. This delay was mainly due to the time required to define proper safeguards, 4 See Annex 2, in which the disbursement of the first tranche was announced by GoH 5 See Annex 2 10 procurement and financial management arrangements, in spite of the use of the accommodations offered by the OP 8.30 by the project team. While funding had been secured for the project’s first pillar, the risk that counterpart funding would not materialize for the second pillar of the PCGP was not marked at project preparation. In spite of an adequate design, quality at entry is assessed to be Moderately Unsatisfactory to reflect the delay in project preparation. 25. Supervision and implementation assistance: IDA supervised the development of the project closely and maintained an intensive dialogue with the authorities to achieve its goals. In 2012 IDA carried out a mid-term review to assess its performance in the execution of the first pillar of the PCGP, which then led to define the operation of the second pillar, for which GoH committed adequate counterpart funding. While these activities were carried out in a timely fashion, IDA might have been able to accelerate GoH’s decision making process to close the project at the time, when the counterpart funding did not materialize. It took GoH two years from the date, at which the counterpart funding for the implementation of the second pillar of the PCGP was due to the moment, at which it requested the closing of the project. IDA repeatedly undertook efforts to gain clarity about the situation of the counterpart funding and to help GoH find a solution, but did not succeed. 26. While the Haitian counterparts did not make use of the small amount of funds that were available under component 2 of this project to support the definition of adequate frameworks for credit reporting and for the use of movable assets as collateral (these activities were at the end funded by IFC and IADB), the IDA project team provided substantial support to the Haitian counterparts in these areas in the form of advice. In this sense, IDA staff reviewed laws and regulations pertinent to the establishment of a credit registry providing detailed comments that were subsequently addressed by the Haitian authorities. In addition, IDA staff also provided intensive advice in helping Haiti define a National Financial Inclusion Strategy (NFIS) that addresses many of the constraints to sustainably deepen the supply and strengthen the demand of financial services. IDA coordinated project activities closely with other donors, supporting in this context actively the functioning of the Haiti Financial Sector Working Group that was set up in 2011 by BRH and that includes -aside of BRH- IMF, IADB, US Treasury, USAID, IFC and IDA. 27. Bank performance in regards to supervision and implementation is therefore rated Moderately Satisfactory. 28. Compliance with Bank policies: The mid-term review was carried according to schedule and the problems of the project in mobilizing the counterpart funding were flagged as soon as they became apparent. The IDA team carried out periodically reviews of the project’s financial management. The review of compliance with applicable safeguards focused mainly on the initial phases during of the project in which the guarantees under pillar 1 were granted. Overall compliance with Bank policies is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 29. In consequence of the above, IDA’s performance is rated Moderately Satisfactory. 11 4. Assessment of Borrower Performance 30. Government and implementing agency performance: The Government of Haiti appointed FDI and BRH as implementing agencies. Both institutions participated actively in the design of PCGP and the implementation of the first pillar of component 1. This pillar was implemented satisfactorily from an operational perspective, and losses were in consequence hereof significantly smaller than originally expected. Due to the proper design of the guarantee project, which shared the risk with the financial institutions while maintaining strong incentives to recover the guaranteed and restructured loan portfolio and to closely monitor its performance, the final amount of claims to be paid for loans with an initial amount below US$1 million will be relatively small, namely below 15 percent of the total guarantees issued (in case all guarantees for loans affected by the earthquake that were outstanding in March 2015 were to be called). At the time of the closing of the project claims for loans covered with IDA guarantees amounted to only 3 percent of the guarantees that had been granted.6 31. In order to deepen the supply of financial services in the country, BRH took the lead to advance the design of the NFIS, which is expected to provide a coherent framework to deepen the sustainable supply of and educated demand for financial services, including credit and which will leverage the country’s still very liquid financial system. The strategy was endorsed by President Martelly and presented by the Central Bank to the other authorities of the country as well as to the main stakeholders at a public event in September 2014. 32. IDA reviews found financial management to be moderately satisfactory after initial problems were overcome. The project’s compliance with applicable safeguards (environment, pests and cultural heritage) was rated satisfactory. 33. In consequence of the above, the performance of FDI and BRH is rated as Moderately Satisfactory. 34. Compliance with covenants: GoH complied with all covenants related to the institutional setup, the drafting of adequate operating manuals, the opening of project accounts and the definition of adequate environmental and social management frameworks. GoH did not comply with the provision of counterpart funding, thus making it necessary to close the project. Compliance with covenants is therefore rated Unsatisfactory. 35. Given the rating of Moderately Satisfactory for the performance of the implementing agencies and the Unsatisfactory rating of GoH in regards to the compliance with covenants, government and implementing agency performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory. 5. Lessons Learned 36. The main lessons learned are: a) While a Partial Credit Guarantees scheme may be useful to support the restructuring of loans and to help financial institutions cope with the consequences of loans in 6 According to FDI, only US$29,963 in claims for the loans under US$1 million had been paid out as of March 2015 and further payments in the amount of US$67,375 were expected to be paid thereafter (for the total amount of US$1,158,852 of guarantees that were issued for this portfolio). 12 distress after a catastrophe, 7 the time needed to set up such schemes makes it difficult to take advantage of them in countries like Haiti, in which they do not exist yet. Supporting the setup of such an instrument after a catastrophe with a WBG project may not be feasible given the time needed to cope with required safeguards and financial management arrangements, which is additional to the period that is required to design and implement the PCG instrument itself. b) The delay in setting up the PCGP after the earthquake reduced the impact of the project considerably. While Haiti had favorable conditions to set up such a facility quickly (most private banks were performing well at the time of the earthquake and were highly liquid; Haiti already had a suitable second tier entity close to the Central Bank that was professionally run and that was able to manage the guarantee program with additional technical support), these advantages could not be fully leveraged due to the time it took to prepare the project. While the time needed to define a proper institutional setup probably cannot be reduced significantly, it may be worth to consider the definition of standardized environmental and social framework templates for this type of projects that can be rapidly adjusted to the conditions a country faces after a disaster, in order to facilitate the implementation of similar projects where they make sense. c) The establishment of an organic partial credit guarantee fund requires the allocation of sufficient and adequate funding that cannot be used for other purposes. Although the allocation of the IMF debt relief resources as counterpart funding was appropriate when the decision about the implementation of the second pillar of component one was made, the country’s fiscal problems led to void the allocation of funds and to the closing of the project, thus rendering the efforts made to define and setup this fund useless for the time being and depriving the country of an instrument that could contribute to help it cope with existing structural shortcomings to the use of collateral for loans. d) The availability of professional assistance by experts with practical experience in the implementation and operation of partial credit guarantee funds is central to support the design and setup of such a scheme in a country where is does not exists yet. 7 Chile could take advantage of a pre-existing scheme after the earthquake it experienced (in 2010, as in Haiti), helping mitigate the effects of the earthquake on financial institutions and affected borrowers. 13 Annex 1. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes (a) Task Team members Responsibility/ Names Title Unit Specialty Lending Senior Financial Sector Juan Buchenau GFMDR TTL Specialist Senior Financial Sector Caroline Cerruti GFMDR Co-TTL Specialist Helene Bertaud Senior Counsel LEGAF Lawyer Catalina Marulanda Lead Urban Specialist GSURR Safeguards Josue Akre Financial Management Specialist GGODR FM Vyjayanti T. Desai Senior Economist IISEC Technical support Senior Financial Management Financial Joseph Kizito Specialist LCSFM Management Financial Nko Etesin Umoren Resource Management Analyst AFTFM Management Patricia MacGowan Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement Yingwei Wu Senior Procurement Specialist LCSPT Procurement Miguel Santiago-Oliveira Senior Finance Officer CTRFC Disbursement Eric Palladini Consultant LCSPF Editing Project Micky Ananth Program Assistant LCSPF preparation Project Monica Rivero Program Assistant LCSPF preparation Project Karina Baba Junior Professional Associate LCSPF preparation Project Patricia Melo Operation Analyst LCSPF preparation Supervision/NCO Senior Financial Sector Juan Buchenau GFMDR TTL Specialist Senior Financial Sector Caroline Cerruti GFMDR Co-TTL Specialist Prosper Nindorera Senior Procurement Specialist GGODR Procurement Senior Financial Management Financial Fabienne Mroczka GGODR Specialist Management Financial Josue Akre Financial Management Specialist GGODR management Senior Natural Resources Nyaneba E. Nkrumah GENDR Safeguards Management Specialist 14 Senior Financial Sector Technical team Yoko Doi GFMDR Specialist member Alessandro Bozzo Consultant GFMDR Consultant Monzerrat Garcia ETT GFMDR ACS Monica Rivero Program Assistant GTCDR ACS Patricia Rodrigues de Melo Finance Analyst WFALN ACS Karina Baba Junior Professional Associate LCSPF Project support (b) Staff Time and Cost Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only) USD Thousands Stage of Project Cycle No. of staff weeks (including travel and consultant costs) Lending Total: 29.51 137,709.66 Supervision/NCO Total: 117.27 501,685.97 15 Annex 2. List of Supporting Documents 1) Letter of Minister Marie Carmel Jean Marie stating that GoH would contribute US$10 million as counterpart funding to the project 16 2) Letter from IADB stating its agreement with the transfer of IDA funds from the first to the second pillar of component 1 of the IDA project 17 3) Letter of Minister Wilson Laleau announcing that GoH will disburse US$5 million 18 4) Letter of Minister Wilson Laleau requesting the closing and cancellation of the project 19 20