WPS4184 Stock Market Development under Globalization: Whither the Gains from Reforms? Augusto de la Torre Juan Carlos Gozzi and Sergio L. Schmukler* Abstract Over the last decades, many countries have implemented significant reforms to foster domestic capital market development. These reforms included stock market liberalization, privatization programs, and the establishment of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. Despite the intense reform efforts, the performance of capital markets in several countries has been disappointing. To study whether reforms have had the intended effects on capital markets, we analyze the impact of six capital market reforms on domestic stock market development and internationalization, using event studies. We find that reforms tend to be followed by significant increases in domestic market capitalization, trading, and capital raising. Reforms are also followed by an increase in the share of activity in international equity markets, with potential negative spillover effects on domestic markets. JEL classification codes: G15, G18, G20 Keywords: capital market development; capital market reforms; internationalization of financial markets; cross-listing; ADRs World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4184, April 2007 The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the view of the World Bank, its Executive Directors, or the countries they represent. Policy Research Working Papers are available online at http://econ.worldbank.org. *Authors are with the World Bank. Gozzi is also with Brown University. The paper was written while Schmukler was visiting the IMF Research Department. For helpful comments, we are grateful to Eduardo Fernandez Arias, Fari Moshirian, Luis Servén, and participants at the Journal of Banking and Finance- World Bank conference "Globalization and Financial Services in Emerging Economies." We are grateful to José Azar and Marina Halac for excellent research assistance. This paper is part of a broader study on capital markets, conducted at the Chief Economist Office, Latin America and the Caribbean Region, World Bank, available at: http://www.worldbank.org/laccapitalmarkets. Email addresses: adelatorre@worldbank.org, juan_carlos_gozzi_valdez@brown.edu, and sschmukler@worldbank.org. 1. Introduction Over the last two decades, a large number of countries, both developed and developing, have implemented significant capital market reforms, including stock market liberalization, improvements in securities clearance and settlements systems, and the development of regulatory and supervisory frameworks. These reforms, together with improved macroeconomic fundamentals and related reforms, such as the privatization of state-owned enterprises and the shift to privately managed defined contribution pension systems, were expected to foster domestic financial development.1 These expectations were supported by the growing cross-sectional empirical evidence on the determinants of stock market development, which shows that countries with sounder macroeconomic policies, better institutional environments, and more efficient legal systems, especially regarding the protection of minority investors, have more developed domestic markets.2 Capital market reforms were also expected to foster domestic market development through their impact on the stock market internationalization process. According to this argument, poor domestic environments prompt firms and investors to use international markets more intensively. A poor domestic environment has long been considered one of the main reasons for capital flight and greater use by domestic residents of financial services offered abroad (see, for example, Collier, Hoeffler, and Pattillo, 2000). Over the last decades, there has been an increasing migration of securities market activities to major international financial centers, such as New York and London. As part of this globalization process, Depositary Receipts (DRs) have become increasingly popular instruments.3 For many developing countries, activity in international markets now exceeds domestic stock market activity. A number of papers argue that this internationalization process is the result of firms trying to escape from poor domestic 1This has been deemed an important goal, as financial development is linked to economic growth. For more than a century, economists have emphasized the importance of financial development for growth. Historically, the literature focused on the role of banks, beginning with Bagehot (1873) and Schumpeter (1912). More recently, Atje and Jovanovic (1993), King and Levine (1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998a), among many others, have documented that financial development leads to growth. See Levine (1997) for a review of the earlier literature and Levine (2005) for an update. 2The literature on domestic stock market development has found that more developed countries tend to have deeper stock markets (see, for example, Rajan and Zingales, 2003 and La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer, 2006) and that the laws and enforcement mechanisms that protect the rights of minority investors foster equity market development (La Porta et al., 1997, 1998). Macroeconomic stability has also been found to promote financial development (IADB, 1995; Boyd, Levine, and Smith, 2001). 3 There are different alternatives to cross-list domestic stocks in international financial markets. A very popular way to do so is through depositary receipts, called American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) or Global Depositary Receipts (GDRs). These are foreign currency denominated derivative instruments, issued by international banks like Bank of New York or Citibank, representing home securities held with a local custodian. Trading in DRs in U.S. exchanges has expanded from 75 billion U.S. dollars in 1990 to one trillion in 2005, and there are currently more than 1,900 sponsored ADR programs, issued by firms from 73 countries. 1 environments with weak institutions and poorly functioning markets.4 This view implies that capital market reforms will reduce incentives for firms to internationalize and will result in a lower share of equity market activities taking place abroad. This may have significant implications for domestic market development, as the migration of trading to international financial centers can have negative spillover effects on local markets.5 Despite the intense reform efforts, the performance of local capital markets in many developing countries has been disappointing. Although some countries experienced growth of their stock markets, this growth was not as significant as the one witnessed by the most advanced nations. Other countries experienced an actual deterioration of their domestic capital markets.6 Stock markets in many developing countries remain highly illiquid and segmented, with trading and capitalization concentrated on few stocks. The large number of policy initiatives and reforms and the dismal performance of capital markets have raised several questions. Is it possible that capital markets do not respond to reforms and that the policy prescriptions were based just on cross-country evidence? Is more time needed to see the full fruits of reforms? Does the reform agenda need to be rethought?7 In this paper we try to shed light on this issue, by analyzing how capital market- specific and related reforms have impacted both the development of domestic stock markets and the internationalization of stock market activities (listing, trading, and capital raising). We focus our analysis on six reforms that can potentially contribute to the development of stock markets, for which we were able to collect data on implementation dates for a large number of countries. These reforms are: stock market liberalization, enforcement of insider trading laws, introduction of fully automated electronic trading systems, privatization programs, structural pension reform (i.e., shifting from a public 4Karolyi (2004), for example, argues that the growth of ADR programs in emerging economies is the result of poorly functioning stock markets, resulting from economic, political, legal, or other institutional forces that generate incentives for firms to leave. This view is also behind the recent literature on "bonding," which argues that cross-listing in an exchange with better investor protection is a form of bonding, creating a credible and binding commitment by the issuer to protect the interests of minority shareholders. See Benos and Weisbach (2004) for a review of this literature. 5 Levine and Schmukler (2006a,b) analyze the impact of migration to international markets on domestic stock market trading and liquidity. Moel (2001) and Karolyi (2004) also present evidence on how the use of ADRs is related to stock market development in emerging economies 6 See de la Torre and Schmukler (2006) for a description of the evolution of capital markets over the last decades, with a focus on Latin America. 7From a more general perspective, Easterly (2001) finds that, despite significant policy reforms, developing countries have on average stagnated over the last two decades. He argues that worldwide factors may have contributed to this stagnation and says that this evidence deals a significant blow to the optimism surrounding the "Washington Consensus." Others have questioned the benefits of specific capital market- related reforms, such as capital account liberalization (see, for example, Rodrik, 1998 and Stiglitz, 2000). 2 defined benefit pay-as-you-go system to a privately managed funded defined contribution system), and institutional reform.8 From an academic perspective, the value added of this paper is to analyze the impact of different capital market reforms using the same framework and extend the analysis beyond domestic stock markets, including activity in international equity markets. There are a number of papers that analyze the impact of some of these reforms on certain aspects of local stock markets and on macroeconomic variables, such as growth and investment. We discuss these papers below, when describing in detail each reform covered by our study. However, these papers tend focus only on one reform and usually analyze its impact on a specific aspect of domestic stock markets, such as returns or size. We instead study the impact of six reforms on domestic markets, using three indicators of stock market development: capitalization, trading activity, and capital raising. Furthermore, none of these papers include international activity in their analyses. This represents an important limitation, given the significant participation of many countries in international equity markets. From an academic and policy perspective, our study allows policymakers to go beyond cross-country evidence and understand the within-country impact of reforms. Although the cross-country analysis of the determinants of stock market development is very informative, it presents some shortcomings from the standpoint of each country. The relevant policy question is how capital market reforms and improvements in the enabling environment will affect a country's stock market. Cross-country evidence might not be very helpful in this respect, as some variables are completely exogenous and beyond the control of policymakers.9 And even when the government can manipulate some variables, it may be very difficult and might take a very long time for a developing country to replicate the environment existent in rich countries, which is the one thought to be optimal for finance to flourish. Even panel data analysis may be of limited assistance, as there may be little time variation in the macroeconomic and institutional environment and panel results might thus be driven by cross-country differences. In this paper, we shift the attention away from estimating the cross-sectional relation between fundamentals and stock market development, and focus instead on event studies, which show the within- country changes in stock market development and internationalization around capital market reforms.10 We view this approach as complementary to the panel and cross-country analysis documented so far in the literature. 8 Some of these reforms were specifically directed to improving the functioning of domestic stock markets. Others, such as privatization, pension reform, and institutional reform, were implemented due to other reasons, including reducing public expenditures and improving the business environment, but were part of an overall strategy to foster market activity and were expected to support capital market development. 9 The inclusion of clearly exogenous variables, such as legal origin, religion, or geographical endowments, while informative from an analytical perspective, provides no guidance to policymakers about which course of action to take. 10 Wacziarg and Welch (2003) highlight the limitations of cross-country analyses in their study of trade liberalization. They find that cross-sectional evidence shows no significant impact of trade openness on 3 We find that reforms are associated with increases in domestic stock market capitalization, trading, and capital raising, contrary to the claim that they are not effective. However, we also find that reforms are associated with increased internationalization, and that some of the reforms seem to have been followed by a higher share of activity in international markets. This runs contrary to the view that a poor domestic environment prompts firms to access international markets and that reforms reduce internationalization. Most of the results are robust to controlling for domestic and international macroeconomic variables. These controls are important because capital market reforms can be contemporaneous to other policy changes (such as macroeconomic stabilization programs, trade liberalization, and the easing of exchange rate controls) or may occur at high points in the domestic and/or international business cycle. Since many countries implemented several capital market reforms in a short period of time, when analyzing each reform we also control for other reforms clustered around that time. We find that our results remain mostly unchanged when including this control, suggesting that the reforms under analysis tend to have a positive marginal effect on domestic stock market development and internationalization. We also present some robustness tests controlling for time effects in the regressions of domestic stock market development variables and find that some of the reform dummies remain statistically significant and positive. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the reforms under analysis. Section 3 presents the empirical results on the impact of reforms on domestic stock market development and internationalization. Section 4 discusses some potential interpretation problems and presents robustness tests. Section 5 summarizes the main results and concludes. 2. Data This section presents the data used in the paper. We first describe the data on stock market activity, both in domestic markets and abroad, and then discuss in detail the reforms we analyze. 2.1. Stock market activity data As measures of stock market activity, we use three variables: market capitalization, value traded, and amount of equity capital raised. For all, we need data for both domestic and international activity. While there are several sources on domestic stock market capitalization and value traded that comprise a large number of countries, there is no comprehensive database on capital raised domestically. There are even less data available growth during the 1990s. In contrast to these cross-sectional findings, their within-country evidence shows that trade liberalization has a robust positive impact on growth and investment rates. 4 on the extent of the internationalization of stock market activities. Therefore, we need to combine a number of sources.11 On domestic activity, the data on market capitalization and value traded on the major local stock exchanges come from the Standard & Poor's Emerging Markets Database and Global Stock Markets Factbook and cover the period 1975-2004 for 117 countries. The amount of equity capital raised by domestic firms in the local stock market comes from the World Federation of Exchanges and covers the period 1982-2004 for 46 countries. On international activity, we use data from Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2006), who collect firm-level information from several sources and aggregate it to obtain country-level variables. Here, we only present a brief description of these data. In terms of trading in international markets, the data come from the Bank of New York and cover trading in ADRs for the period 1989-2000. Capital raised abroad refers to the sum of the amount of new equity financing which is obtained by using a non-domestic instrument (such as a foreign listing or an ADR) and any new equity issue abroad. The data come from two different sources. One is the Bank of New York and covers capital raised through ADRs from 1980 to 2000. The other dataset is compiled by Euromoney and covers all capital raising operations in international equity markets by firms for the period 1983 to 2001. Data from the Bank of New York, Euromoney, the London Stock Exchange (LSE), NASDAQ, and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) are also used to identify the "international" firms in each country. International firms are those that are listed in international markets, directly or via DRs, or have raised capital in international equity markets. This classification is used to determine the market capitalization of all international firms in each country, which we use as one measure of the level of internationalization.12,13 We use nine variables for our analysis, three for the development of local stock markets, three for the internationalization of stock exchange activities, and three for the relative degree of internationalization. The first three are: market capitalization over gross domestic product (GDP), value traded domestically over GDP, and capital raised 11 The list of countries and data sources for both the dependent and independent variables used in our regressions are detailed in Appendix Tables 1 and 2. 12 This measure does not indicate whether the shares of these firms are actively traded in international markets. For some cross-listed stocks, trading is largely in the home market rather than abroad. Also, some stocks might have little free float available for (foreign) investors. Both facts may lead to an overestimation of the degree of internationalization when using this variable. The other measures of level of internationalization, trading and capital raised abroad, do not suffer from these potential biases, since they quantify the actual activity that takes place in international markets. The results using the market capitalization of international firms are similar to those using the variables that capture actual activity abroad, and thus do not alter our conclusions. 13 For all the internationalization variables (market capitalization of international firms, value traded abroad, and capital raised abroad), observations are assigned a zero when no activity in international equity markets is identified. 5 domestically over GDP. The next three are: market capitalization of international firms over GDP, value traded abroad over GDP, and capital raised abroad over GDP. The last three are: market capitalization of international firms over total domestic market capitalization, value traded abroad over value traded domestically, and capital raised abroad over capital raised domestically.14 2.2. Capital market reforms As mentioned above, we analyze the impact of six capital market-specific and related reforms: stock market liberalization, enforcement of insider trading laws, introduction of fully automated electronic trading systems, privatization programs, structural pension reform, and institutional reform.15 While these reforms were a significant part of the capital market reform programs implemented by most countries, this list is not exhaustive and does not attempt to cover all the policy initiatives oriented towards fostering stock market development that were implemented over the last decades. The focus on these reforms is driven by their relevance, as many imply significant policy changes, and by data availability on their implementation dates for a large enough number of countries. Although we believe that we cover some of the most significant capital market related reforms, some policies not included in our analysis due to lack of data may be as relevant, if not more, for stock market development. We now turn to the description of each reform and the data sources. Stock market liberalization is the decision by a government to allow foreign investors to purchase shares in the local stock market and domestic investors to purchase shares abroad. International asset pricing models predict that the integration with world financial markets should lead to a reduction in the cost of capital.16 A number of papers assess the impact of stock market liberalization on the cost of equity capital, finding evidence of an increase in share prices around the liberalization date and a reduction in the cost of capital afterwards.17 Other papers analyze the impact of stock market liberalization on real variables, reporting significant increases in investment and economic growth following liberalization.18 Regarding stock market development, liberalization increases the pool of capital available to local firms and broadens the investor base. This is likely to lead to increased liquidity and larger amounts of research, improving the quantity and quality of information available to market participants. Furthermore, the scrutiny of foreign investors and analysts may increase transparency and promote the adoption of 14 Note that for the domestic activity measures we have data up to 2004, while our data on internationalization end in 2000. As a robustness check, we also estimated all the regressions using domestic variables up to 2000 only and found similar results. 15Appendix Table 1 lists the dates of the different reforms analyzed. 16See, for example, Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977), Stulz (1981, 1999), Errunza and Losq (1985), Eun and Janakiramanan (1986), and Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan (1987). 17See, for example, Bekaert and Harvey (2000), Henry (2000a, 2003), Kim and Singal (2000), and Edison and Warnock (2003a). 18See, for example, Henry (2000b, 2003) and Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005). 6 better corporate governance practices, reducing agency problems (Stulz, 1999; Errunza, 2001). Therefore, liberalization was expected to result in deeper and more efficient stock markets. Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2001) find that liberalization had a positive impact on domestic trading and listing. Jain-Chandra (2002) also finds significant increases in trading activity and reports improvements in market efficiency following liberalization. Bae, Bailey, and Mao (2006) find that stock market liberalization improves the information environment in emerging markets.19 Our data for dating the liberalization of stock markets come from three sources: Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005), who present official liberalization dates, mostly for developing countries; Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003), who construct an index of the extent of stock market liberalization which also includes developed economies; and Vinhas de Souza (2005), who extends this index to Eastern European countries.20 We combine these three sources to get the widest possible coverage.21 As part of the capital market reform programs, governments approved new laws and regulations aimed at creating the proper legal and regulatory framework for capital markets to flourish. Many countries tried to improve corporate governance practices, by introducing new standards in a number of different areas, including voting ratings, tender procedures, and the structure of the board of directors. Some countries also enacted new insider trading regulations and improved accounting and disclosure standards. As we mentioned above, the recent literature has emphasized the role of the protection of minority investors for the development of stock markets. Most of the cross-country data available for this variable is time invariant, and therefore cannot be used to analyze the impact of reforms. To account for improvements in the legal framework for investors, we thus focus on the enforcement of insider trading regulations. The date of insider trading laws enforcement is the date of the first prosecution under these laws. These data come from Bhattacharya and Daouk (2002), who carry out a comprehensive survey of insider trading laws, finding that these laws existed in 87 countries by 1998 but had been enforced, as evidenced by prosecutions, in only 38 of them. They also find that the cost of equity does not change after the introduction of insider trading regulations, but decreases considerably after the first prosecution. Policymakers also took important strides towards establishing and improving the basic environment for capital market operations, including new policies related to 19 Levine and Zervos (1998b) analyze the impact of capital account liberalization on stock market development in 16 developing countries and find evidence of significant increases in market capitalization and trading in most countries. 20For the data from Kaminsky and Schmukler (2003) and Vinhas de Souza (2005), we consider the first year when a country's stock market is fully liberalized as the liberalization date. Alternatively, we also used the date of the first partial liberalization and obtained similar results. 21Alternatively, we also ran regressions using only the Bekaert, Harvey, and Lundblad (2005) dates and their "First Sign" liberalization measure, which is based on the earliest of three possibilities: the launching of a country fund, an ADR announcement, and the official liberalization date. We obtained similar results using these variables. 7 centralized exchanges, securities clearance and settlement systems, trading platforms, and custody arrangements. These reforms were expected to improve market performance, by increasing liquidity, enhancing efficiency, and reducing trading costs. We focus our analysis on the replacement of traditional trading floors, on which brokers manually match orders using an open outcry system, by fully automated electronic trading systems. Electronic trading systems may increase liquidity and improve efficiency by reducing transaction costs and increasing information availability. These trading systems may also attract new pools of liquidity, by providing affordable remote access to investors.22 The dates of the introduction of electronic trading systems come from Jain (2005), who collects data on stock exchanges in 120 countries and finds that the leading exchanges in 101 of those countries have introduced electronic trading over the last 25 years.23 He finds evidence that the introduction of electronic trading systems enhances liquidity and leads to a reduction in the cost of capital. In the last twenty years, governments from all over the world have undertaken significant privatization programs. Worldwide revenues from privatization soared during the 1990s, peaking in 1998 at over 100 billion U.S. dollars (OECD, 2001). This privatization process was motivated by the desire to increase government revenues, promote economic efficiency, and reduce government interference in the economy (see Megginson and Netter, 2001 for a review of the empirical literature on privatization). Domestic capital market development was also an explicit objective of privatization programs in many countries. Privatizations had a direct impact on domestic stock markets, as many governments carried out privatization sales through share offerings on local exchanges. Due to the positive externalities generated by listing decisions, these share issues were expected to foster stock market development, by increasing the diversification opportunities available to investors and therefore encouraging trading activity and new listings by private firms (Pagano, 1989, 1993). Share issue privatizations (SIPs) could also increase the participation of uninformed retail investors in local stock exchanges, reducing adverse selection in the market and increasing liquidity (Kyle, 1985).24 Perotti and van Oijen (2001) argue that privatization programs, even without share offerings on local exchanges, may foster stock market development by reducing political risk and signaling commitment to market-oriented policies. Privatizations also had a direct impact on 22 See Domowitz and Steil (1999) for a discussion of the impact of electronic trading on the exchange industry. Blennerhasset and Bowman (1998) report a fall in transaction costs after the move to electronic trading in the New Zealand Stock Exchange. Green et al. (2003) also find improvements in efficiency and liquidity following the introduction of screen-based trading in the Mumbai Stock Exchange. 23We consider the introduction of a fully automated system as the relevant change. Jain (2005) finds that in 11 of the exchanges covered in his paper floor trading coexists with electronic trading. We exclude these exchanges from the analysis. 24See Chiesa and Nicodano (2003) for a review of the theoretical arguments on the impact of privatization on stock market development. Bortolotti et al. (2004) analyze the impact of SIPs in 19 developed countries and find that they are associated with improvements in turnover and liquidity. 8 internationalization, as many privatization sales involved offerings in international financial markets.25 To date the start of privatization programs we use data from the World Bank privatization database, which records privatization transactions from developing countries between 1988 and 2003, and the Privatization Barometer database, which has data on privatization transactions starting in 1977 for 23 European countries. For some countries not included in these databases, we collected data on privatization transactions from government sources. We define the starting date of a privatization process as the first year with at least two privatization transactions that is followed by further transactions in at least three of the next four years.26 We require privatization activity to be maintained for at least some time because we want to capture the start of a privatization program and not isolated transactions. Also, note that we focus on transactions and not the announcement of a privatization program or the introduction of a privatization law, as we want to capture the actual implementation of a privatization program. Another significant reform in many countries, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, was the shift from public pay-as-you-go pension systems to privately managed funded systems.27 Chile was the first country to implement this type of reform in 1981 and several countries adopted similar systems during the 1990s. Structural pension reforms were expected to improve macroeconomic stability, by reducing the demographic pressures of pay-as-you-go systems and inducing fiscal reform during the transition, reduce labor market distortions, increase savings, and reduce political interference in the system.28 Pension reform was also seen as conductive for capital market development. As reviewed by Walker and Lefort (2002), pension reform may foster the development of domestic capital markets through three main channels: by inducing authorities to improve the regulatory framework (accumulating "institutional capital"), increasing specialization in the investment decision-making process, and improving incentives for financial innovation.29 25See Bortolotti, Fantini, and Scarpa (2002) for an analysis of the determinants of privatizations through share offerings in international markets. 26 For countries that record privatization transactions in 1988 or 1989 in the World Bank privatization database, we use the dates from Perotti and van Oijen (2001). 27The nature of the reforms differed across countries, with some countries shifting to fully funded systems of privately managed individual accounts, while others created multipillar systems, in which part of the pension system is pay-as-you-go and there is also a distinct and separate privately managed funded component. See Rutkowski (1998, 2002) for a description of the reforms in transition economies. Queisser (1998), De Ferranti, Leipziger, and Srinivas (2002) and Gill, Packard, and Yermo (2005), among many others, review the Latin American experience. 28There is a large literature discussing the impact of structural pension reforms. See, for example, World Bank (1994), Feldstein (1998), Orszag and Stiglitz (2001), and Feldstein and Liebman (2002). 29Walker and Lefort (2002) find evidence of a reduction in the cost of capital and higher trading volumes as a result of pension reform. Catalan, Impavido, and Musalem (2001) analyze the Granger causality between contractual savings (assets held by pension funds and life insurance companies) and stock market 9 To date the implementation of pension reforms we combine data from several sources, including Palacios and Pallares-Millares (2000), the International Association of Pension Funds Supervisory Authorities (AIOS), the International Federation of Pension Funds Administrators (FIAP), and the International Center for Pension Reform.30 As discussed above, cross-country evidence on the determinants of stock market development shows that countries with better institutional frameworks tend to have more active stock markets. However, for many developing countries it may be very difficult, if not impossible, to replicate the institutional environment existing in developed countries. Therefore, we focus our analysis on the impact of institutional changes on stock market development and internationalization, not on the absolute quality of institutions. To date institutional improvements we use data from IMF (2005), which analyzes changes in economic institutions for approximately 90 developing countries over the 1970-2004 period. Dates of institutional transitions are based on the evolution of the Cato Institute index of economic freedom, which measures a country's business environment by analyzing five major areas: government size, legal structure and security of property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade internationally, and regulation of credit, labor, and business (see Gwartney and Lawson, 2004 for a detailed description).31 IMF (2005) identifies 65 episodes of sustained transition towards higher economic freedom. 3. Reforms and stock market development and internationalization In this section, we analyze the impact of reforms on domestic stock market development and internationalization using event studies. Since we are interested in the within-country effects of reforms (abstracting from cross-country variations), we estimate fixed-effects regressions of our nine measures of domestic stock market development and internationalization on a dummy for each reform, defined by the reform dates described above.32 We concentrate our analysis on a ten-year window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after, including the reform year) and include only those development and find evidence that the growth in contractual savings causes increases in market capitalization and trading. 30Pension reforms in Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland involved adding a tier to an existing system or converting a voluntary funded scheme into a mandatory one. In contrast, the reforms in the remaining countries represented major changes, shifting from publicly managed unfunded schemes to multipillar systems or to completely privately managed funded schemes. Given the difference in the nature of the reforms, we also estimated our regressions excluding Australia, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Switzerland and obtained similar results. 31The index of economic freedom ranges from one (repressed) to ten (free). IMF (2005) defines the start of an institutional transition in a country as the first year in which the forward looking eight-year moving average of this index exceeds by at least one point its backward looking eight-year moving average and reaches a minimum level of four points. The list of transitions was reviewed by IMF country desks and adjusted where appropriate. 32The reform dummy equals one on and after the date of reform, and zero before. 10 countries with at least two annual observations before and after the implementation of the reforms.33 Regression results for the domestic development variables, the foreign activity variables, and the ratio of international to domestic activity are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3, respectively. Each column reports the results for a specific reform. Note that the sample of countries and the period covered varies across columns, as only those countries that implemented the reform under analysis are included in each regression and the period analyzed changes according to the reform date for each country. The estimations on market capitalization over GDP (Table 1, top panel) show that all the reform coefficients are positive and significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, the size of these coefficients is quite large. In the case of stock market liberalization, for example, the pre-reform average stock market capitalization over GDP is 19.3 percent and the within-country difference between the pre-liberalization and post- liberalization periods is 14.2 percentage points. Similar results are found for value traded domestically (middle panel) and capital raised domestically (bottom panel). All the reforms, with the exception of stock market liberalization, seem to be followed by increased trading activity in the local market. In the case of capital raised, only pension reform is not significant. Reforms also seem to be associated with increases in stock market internationalization. All the reforms under analysis are followed by significant increases in the market capitalization of international firms over GDP (Table 2, top panel). Trading abroad (middle panel) and capital raised abroad (bottom panel) also increase after the implementation of reforms. Pension reform is significant only at the ten percent level for trading abroad and is not statistically significant in the case of capital raised in international markets. These results show that reforms are followed by increased domestic stock market development and internationalization. This suggests that reforms may make local firms more attractive to foreign investors, who then grant them access to international markets at attractive terms. This evidence is consistent with the findings of Claessens, Klingebiel, and Schmukler (2006), who report that better fundamentals foster stock market development, but also increase internationalization. Some of the results may also reflect 33By focusing on a ten-year window around the reforms we may not be capturing their whole impact if they take more than five years to mature. However, while in traditional event studies the econometrician can be certain that the event under analysis is isolated, capital market reforms often coincide with other macroeconomic and institutional reforms. By focusing on a shorter event window we attempt to isolate from other changes that may also affect stock market development and internationalization. We discuss this issue in more detail in Section 4. We also tried the regressions without restricting the sample period to a preset window (i.e., including all available observations) and using a shorter six-year window, and obtained similar results in both cases. We also estimated the regressions including only countries with at least three years of data available before and after the reforms and obtained similar results. However, for some reforms and dependent variables this reduces significantly the number of countries. 11 the direct impact of reforms. In the case of privatization, for example, as we mention above, some firms were privatized through public offerings in international markets. This should have a direct effect on the three internationalization variables analyzed. A relevant question is whether the reforms are followed by similar increases in domestic and international activity. The evidence presented so far does not allow us to answer this question because the samples used for the regressions on domestic and international variables (relative to GDP) are different, due to data availability. Therefore, we analyze the impact of reforms on the ratio of international to domestic activity, which constraints the sample to be the same. These results are presented in Table 3. The results for the ratio of the market capitalization of international firms to total domestic market capitalization (Table 3, top panel), suggest that reforms are followed by an acceleration in the internationalization process. All the reform coefficients are positive and significant at the one percent level. Furthermore, the size of the coefficients is quite large. The regressions on value traded abroad over value traded domestically (middle panel) present similar results. All the reforms, with the exception of privatization and the introduction of electronic trading systems, seem to be followed by large increases in the share of trading that takes place in international markets.34 Finally, for the ratio of capital raised abroad to capital raised domestically (bottom panel), the results show that stock market liberalization, privatization, and institutional reform are associated with a larger share of activity in international markets. The rest of the reforms are not statistically significant. This may reflect the fact that this ratio is quite lumpy and fluctuates widely from year to year, depending on individual equity issues. Alternatively, the lack of significance of the reform dummies may just indicate that the reforms are followed by similar changes in domestic and international capital raising, leaving the ratio unchanged. In sum, our results show that capital market reforms are followed by significant increases in domestic stock market activity and internationalization. Furthermore, they seem to be associated with a larger share of activity in international markets. Although our regressions show a statistically significant correlation between reforms and stock market activity, both domestically and abroad, there are a number of arguments that suggest that these results should be interpreted with care and that it is difficult to show a causal link between reforms and market activity. We now turn to those arguments and present some robustness tests. 34In the case of privatization, the results are driven by two countries (the Netherlands and South Africa) that experienced very large increases in domestic trading after the reform, which translated into a lower ratio of value trade abroad to value traded domestically. If we exclude these two countries, the coefficient on privatization is positive and significant at the one percent level. 12 4. Robustness tests and alternative explanations A possible explanation for the positive relation we find between reforms and stock market activity is that it is driven by some omitted variables that are correlated with reforms, but not by the reforms themselves. For instance, countries may time their reforms to coincide with high points in the world business cycle. That is, there might be common factors.35 In this case, our results may overstate the impact of reforms, since the reform dummies may be capturing the effect of the international business cycle on stock market activity. This may be particularly relevant for some reforms, such as stock market liberalization and privatization, as governments have incentives to liberalize and privatize when they face favorable international conditions and therefore expect valuations to be higher. As another example of omitted factors, capital market reforms are often part of larger macroeconomic and institutional reform programs. Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez (1993) and Henry (2000b) discuss how policy reforms in developing countries often involve macroeconomic reforms, including trade liberalization, macroeconomic stabilization programs, and the easing of exchange rate controls. These policies may have a significant impact on growth prospects and might lead to increased stock market activity, both domestically and abroad. Our reform dummies may thus be capturing the impact of the contemporaneous macroeconomic and institutional changes, and not that of the capital market reform analyzed in each case. To address these concerns, we reestimate the regressions from Tables 1, 2, and 3 controlling for additional variables. In particular, we include U.S. interest rates and GDP growth in high-income OECD countries to control for the world business cycle.36 To capture the impact of contemporaneous macroeconomic reforms, we do not use reform dummies, as we do not have sufficient information to date these reforms for all the countries in our dataset. Therefore, we follow an indirect approach, by controlling for domestic fundamentals that may capture the outcome of these reforms. Specifically, we control for GDP growth and the fiscal deficit.37 Note that GDP growth may also be 35The international finance literature has highlighted to the role of global factors, such as interest rates and growth, in explaining capital flows to emerging markets (see, for example, Calvo, Leiderman, and Reinhart, 1993; Fernandez-Arias, 1996; and Edison and Warnock, 2003b). Albuquerque, Loayza, and Servén (2005) find that these common factors are increasingly important in the case of foreign direct investment. 36We also estimated the regressions using, alternatively, U.S., world, and G-7 GDP growth and obtained similar results. As a measure of U.S. interest rates, we use the rate on three-year Treasury bonds. We also ran the regressions using the rates on five-year Treasury bonds and three-month Treasury bills, the federal funds rate, and the S&P 500 annual return. The results using these variables are similar to the ones reported below. We also included the change in the terms of trade in each country as an independent variable, to control for external shocks, and obtained similar results. 37We also estimated the regressions using other proxies for reforms, such as inflation, trade (exports plus imports) as a percentage of GDP, and the International Country Risk Guide composite index, which measures political, economic, and financial conditions in a country. Including these variables does not affect our main results. We also controlled for each country's growth prospects, as measured by the growth opportunities index developed by Bekaert et al. (2006), and obtained results similar to those reported here. 13 interpreted as a measure of the domestic business cycle, which may also affect the timing of capital market reforms. Tables 4, 5, and 6 present the results of the regressions on domestic stock market development, internationalization, and the ratio of international to domestic activity, respectively. For each reform, we present two specifications: the first one only includes the reform dummies and domestic macroeconomic variables, while the second one also controls for those variables that proxy for the world business cycle.38 The regressions on stock market capitalization over GDP (Table 4, top panel) show that our results are robust to controlling for macroeconomic variables and the international business cycle. All the reform coefficients are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level. Most of the coefficients are lower than those reported in Table 1, which suggests that in those regressions our reform dummies may be capturing part of the positive impact of macroeconomic reforms and the international business cycle on domestic market capitalization. Regarding the remaining variables, the coefficients on fiscal deficit over GDP are negative and statistically significant while those on GDP growth tend to be positive and significant. We also find that the international business cycle affects domestic stock markets, with higher U.S. interest rates and lower OECD growth resulting in lower market capitalizations. The results for value traded domestically (middle panel) are similar, with all reform coefficients being positive and significant, except for those on stock market liberalization, consistent with the results reported in Table 1. In the case of capital raised domestically over GDP (bottom panel), all the reforms are statistically significant, with the exception of pension reform, in line with the results in Table 1. The results in Table 5 show that reforms tend to be followed by increased capitalization, trading, and capital raising in international markets, even when controlling for macroeconomic variables and the international business cycle. In the case of the market capitalization of international firms over GDP (top panel), all the reform coefficients are positive and statistically significant. The results for value traded abroad (middle panel) are similar. Only the introduction of electronic trading systems and pension reform are not statistically significant in the specifications that include all the control variables. The results for capital raised abroad (bottom panel) are consistent with those reported in Table 2, with all reforms being followed by significant increases in capital raising in international equity markets, except for pension reform. Furthermore, we controlled for GDP per capita since general economic and institutional development may affect the evolution of stock markets and the effect of reforms. The results remain mostly unchanged. 38The fiscal deficit over GDP variable is not available for all countries and periods; therefore in these regressions we have a smaller number of observations than in Tables 1, 2, and 3. We also estimated the regressions controlling only for GDP growth, which allows us to use all the available observations, and obtained similar results. 14 Finally, the results reported in Table 6 show that reforms tend to be followed by an increased share of market capitalization and trading in international markets. In the case of the market capitalization of international firms over total domestic market capitalization (top panel), all the reform dummies are positive and statistically significant at the one percent level, except for institutional reform when controlling for the international business cycle. For the ratio of value traded abroad to value traded domestically (middle panel), all the reform coefficients are positive and statistically significant, with the exception of those on the introduction of electronic trading systems and privatization. However, when controlling for international growth and interest rates the enforcement of insider trading laws and institutional reform lose their significance. For capital raised abroad over capital raised domestically, the coefficients on stock market liberalization, the introduction of electronic trading systems, privatization, and institutional reform are positive and significant when controlling only for domestic variables, but tend to lose their significance when we also include the variables that proxy for the international business cycle. The remaining reform coefficients are not significant. These results may be due to the lumpy nature of this ratio and to the fact that firms may raise relatively more equity in international markets when conditions in those markets are better. In this case, the international business cycle indicators may be capturing most of the time variation of this variable. Alternatively, the results may just mean that reforms are followed by similar increases in capital raised domestically and abroad. The evidence presented in Tables 4, 5, and 6 shows that the positive correlation between capital market reforms and stock market development and internationalization is robust to a number of potential omitted variables, but should still be interpreted with caution. Although in these regressions we attempt to control for a number of contemporaneous macroeconomic and institutional reforms, we may not be capturing all the reforms and their complete impact. Some of these reforms may be pre-requisites for successful capital market reforms. We may also be omitting other relevant variables that drive the processes of domestic stock market development and internationalization. To the extent that our reform dummies inadvertently capture the effect of these variables, we may be overstating the impact of reforms. All the analyses presented above have focused on measuring the impact of each reform, without taking into account other capital market reforms. However, countries tend to implement several capital market reforms in a relatively short period of time. In fact, our data show that 26 countries in our sample (about 40 percent of those with data available on all of the six reforms under analysis) have implemented at least three capital market reforms in a five-year period. Thus, the reform dummies in our regressions may not be capturing the marginal effect of each reform, but rather the impact of other capital market reforms implemented around the same date. Also, the literature suggests that the different capital market reforms may be closely interrelated. For instance, Rajan and Zingales (2003) argue that openness to capital flows may reduce the power of incumbents who oppose reforms that foster financial development. Similarly, Walker and Lefort (2002) argue that pension reform may prompt improvements in securities market regulations. This suggests that capital market reforms may not be independent of each 15 other. Although we try to measure the impact of each reform separately, what may matter most for stock market development is a comprehensive set of reforms and not the implementation of isolated reforms. To measure the marginal effect of each reform, we reestimate our regressions controlling for the number of capital market reforms implemented by each country, other than the reform under analysis in each case.39,40 This variable captures the impact of additional capital market reforms clustered around the reform being analyzed (i.e., reforms implemented more than five years before or after the reform under study do not affect our results). Given that we control for country-level fixed effects, our results are not affected by differences across countries in the number of reforms implemented. To keep the number of tables at a manageable level, we only report the results without including additional control variables and excluding the capital raising measures given their lumpy nature.41 The results are presented in Table 7. The top panel in Table 7 shows the regressions for the domestic stock market development variables. Most of our results are robust to controlling for the implementation of additional capital market reforms. All the reforms, except for the enforcement of insider trading laws, are followed by significant increases in market capitalization over GDP. Similar results are found for value traded domestically over GDP. All the reforms, with the exception of stock market liberalization and institutional reform, are followed by increased trading activity in the local market. Most of the coefficients are lower than those reported in Table 1, which suggests that in those regressions our reform dummies may be capturing part of the effect of other capital market reforms clustered around that time. The results also show that the number of additional reforms tends to be positive and statistically significant. Reforms also seem to be associated with increases in stock market internationalization, even when controlling for other capital market reforms (middle panel). All the reforms under analysis are followed by significant increases in the market capitalization of international firms over GDP. Trading abroad also increases after the 39This variable is calculated by adding up the different reform dummies, other than that for the reform under analysis in each case. This requires having information to determine whether countries implemented all of the six reforms analyzed in this paper or not. Therefore, the sample of countries included in these regressions is restricted to countries with data available on all capital market reforms. As an alternative, we estimated the regressions assuming that those countries with missing data on a reform did not implement it and obtained similar results. 40We use the number of additional reforms to control for contemporaneous reforms and not one dummy for each reform because the different reform dummies tend to be highly correlated. As an alternative, we also estimated the regressions including only those countries that implemented specific reforms in relative isolation from other capital market reforms. If our reform dummies are only capturing the effect of implementing a comprehensive capital market reform package, and not the impact of individual reforms, one would expect those countries that implemented isolated reforms to experience no significant change in stock market activity. However, our results indicate that even in those countries, most reforms are followed by significant increases in stock market activity both at home and abroad. 41In most cases, similar results are obtained when controlling for domestic macroeconomic variables. 16 implementation of reforms, only the introduction of electronic trading systems and pension reform are not statistically significant. The results also show that the number of additional reforms tends to be positive and significant. Finally, the results for the share of international activity (bottom panel) suggest that reforms are followed by an acceleration in the internationalization process. In the regressions of the ratio of the market capitalization of international firms to total domestic market capitalization, all the reform coefficients enter positively and significantly, except for that on institutional reform. The results also indicate that the enforcement of insider trading laws and pension reform are followed by significant increases in value traded abroad over value traded domestically. In sum, the results reported in Table 7 suggest that the reform dummies in our regressions are not just capturing the effect of implementing a capital market reform package (i.e., several reforms in a short period of time), but rather that the reforms analyzed have a positive marginal impact on stock market development and internationalization. It would be interesting to explore whether certain reforms tend to complement each other and if differences in the timing of specific reforms affect their impact on stock market development and internationalization, but this exceeds the objectives of this paper. A difficult question concerning our results is whether the reform dummies are estimating the effect of some underlying trend not captured by the controls already included in the regressions. To the extent that there are some remaining omitted factors that drive the processes of stock market development and internationalization over time, the reform variables could be capturing the impact of those omitted factors. Most of the reforms took place in the first half of the 1990s and the post-reform period coincides with strong global trends towards financial development and internationalization, posing a challenge to the accurate identification of the marginal effect of reforms. With the available data, there is no easy answer to this question. To try to address this issue, we reestimated our regressions controlling for time effects to capture any omitted factors that vary with time. But given the short time series available for the post-reform period and the presence of strong trends, including time effects in our regressions is likely to weaken the impact and significance of the reform dummies, even if reforms had a positive effect on stock market activity. Therefore, these results could be interpreted as a lower bound measure of the effect of reforms. Conversely, the results without controlling for time effects could be interpreted as an upper bound measure of the impact of reforms, as they assign the impact of any underlying trend to the reforms. Several issues emerge when including a trend. An important question that arises is whether these time effects are similar across countries and regions. The data suggest that the evolution of stock markets over the last decades has differed among developed and developing countries, therefore we include a common time trend across all countries and 17 the interaction between this time trend and a dummy variable that equals one for developing countries and zero for developed ones. Moreover, to be able to accurately estimate these time trends and differentiate them from the effect of reforms, we include all the years for which we have data available on the dependent variables in these regressions (we do not restrict the sample to a ten-year window around the reform dates). We also include all countries with data on the dependent variables, irrespective of whether they implemented the reform under analysis, to obtain better estimates of the time effects.42 We present results only for the domestic stock market development variables, as we have a significantly shorter time series for internationalization variables, which makes it very difficult to separate the effect of a time trend from that of the reforms. To keep the number of tables at a manageable level, we only present the results without including additional controls.43 The results are presented in Table 8. The results for stock market capitalization over GDP (top panel) show that, even when controlling for time effects, some of the reforms remain statistically significant. In particular, the enforcement of insider trading laws, privatization, and pension reform are followed by significant increases in market capitalization. Regarding the time effects, the results show that there is a positive and significant trend, but this trend is lower (although still positive) in the case of developing countries.44 The results for both value traded domestically (middle panel) and capital raised domestically (bottom panel) also show that some capital market reforms are followed by significant increases in domestic activity, even when controlling for time effects. In particular, the enforcement of insider trading laws, the introduction of electronic trading systems, and institutional reform are all statistically significant and positive in the regressions of value traded domestically over GDP. In the case of capital raised domestically, the introduction of electronic trading systems and privatization are both significant at the one percent level. In sum, even with the difficulty of separating the two effects mentioned above, the finding that some reforms remain positive and significant in Table 8 suggests that our reform dummies are not just capturing the effects of some underlying trend, but rather that these reforms were associated with the development of domestic stock markets. In the case of internationalization, separating the impact of a common time trend from that of reforms would require longer time series of our dependent variables. 42 The sample in these regressions is restricted to those countries for which we have information to determine whether they implemented the reform under analysis in each case or not. As an alternative, we estimated the regressions assuming that those countries with missing data on a reform did not implement it and obtained similar results in most cases. 43 In most cases, similar results can be obtained when controlling for domestic and international macroeconomic variables. 44The time trend for developing countries is equal to the sum of both the common time trend and the trend interacted with the developing country dummy. This time effect is positive and statistically different from zero at the one percent level in all specifications. 18 Finally, an important question is whether the reform decision is really exogenous or if countries implement reforms when they expect their stock markets to do well. If this were the case, causality would run in the opposite direction. We believe that endogeneity could potentially be relevant for some of the reforms analyzed, but in any case does not affect our results on internationalization. In other words, endogeneity arguments usually refer to domestic stock market development, as countries may implement reforms when they anticipate increased local market activity. It is less likely that reforms are implemented in response to expected increases in internationalization. Moreover, many of the reforms analyzed, such as privatization, institutional reform, and pension reform, constitute major policy initiatives and therefore it is unlikely that they were driven by (expected) changes in stock market activity. On the other hand, endogeneity could affect our results on the impact of capital market-specific reforms on domestic market development, as countries have incentives to invest in new trading platforms or enforce insider trading regulations when they expect increased local stock market activity. In sum, we think that even though endogeneity could be present, it would affect only a small part of our results and would not alter our main conclusions. 5. Conclusions In this paper, we analyze the impact of capital market-specific and related reforms on stock market development and internationalization. Our empirical analysis shows that these reforms are followed by increases in capitalization, trading, and capital raising in the local market. The evidence thus suggests that reforms are positively related to domestic stock market development, contrary to the claim that they are not effective and that the variation in panel data studies comes only from cross-country differences. However, we also find that internationalization increases after reforms, relative to both GDP and domestic market activity. This runs contrary to the view that a poor domestic environment prompts firms to access international markets and that reforms reduce incentives to migrate abroad. Rather, it supports the hypothesis that reforms make local firms more attractive, allowing them to access international markets. Our results come with some caveats. Reforms may be timed to coincide with high points in the domestic and/or international business cycles and with the implementation of other reforms. To address these issues, we control for domestic macroeconomic variables, U.S. interest rates, and output growth in OECD countries. We find our results to be robust to the inclusion of these variables. However, these controls may not capture the full impact of other reforms and/or the business cycle. Also, some prior macroeconomic and institutional reforms may be necessary for capital market reforms to be successful. Furthermore, our reform dummies could be capturing the impact of some underlying trend driving the processes of stock market development and internationalization, not captured by the controls included in the regressions. We try to address this issue by controlling for time effects in the regressions of domestic stock market development and find that some of the reform dummies remain statistically significant and positive, suggesting that capital market reforms are associated with increases in domestic stock market activity beyond any underlying trend. But accurately separating the impact of a common time trend from that 19 of reforms would require longer time series of our dependent variables. Thus, more future research in this direction would be welcome. Our conclusions should thus remain tentative. But they do suggest that reforms do not result in a lower level of activity abroad and a concentration of stock market activity in the domestic market, as some arguments predict. Our findings also suggest that financial globalization could pose a significant challenge to policymakers, as their efforts to foster domestic stock market development seem to translate into more activity abroad. The migration of trading to international markets may adversely affect the liquidity of those firms that remain in the local market and their ability to raise new equity capital. This could have a significant impact on medium sized firms, which are not able to directly access international markets. The unexpected impact of reforms on internationalization calls for a revision of the reform agenda and related expectations. Further research is necessary to understand whether the impact of reforms differs across countries and regions and if differences in the timing of specific reforms affect their impact on stock market development and internationalization.45 45Some of the cross-regional differences are already studied in de la Torre and Schmukler (2006) and de la Torre, Gozzi, and Schmukler (2006). 20 References Albuquerque, R., Loayza, N., Servén, L., 2005. World market integration through the lens of foreign direct investors. Journal of International Economics 66, 267-295. 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Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 12, 8-25. 24 Vinhas de Souza, L., 2005. Financial liberalization and business cycles: The experience of the new EU member states, in: Batten, J., Kearney, C. (eds.), Emerging European Financial Markets: Independence and Integration Post-Enlargement. Elsevier, The Netherlands. Wacziarg, R., Horn Welch, K., 2003. Trade liberalization and growth: New evidence. NBER Working Paper No. 10152. Walker, E., Lefort, F., 2002. Pension reform and capital markets: Are there any (hard) links? World Bank Social Protection Discussion Paper 24082. World Bank, 1994. Averting the Old-Age Crisis: Policies to Protect the Old and Promote Growth. Oxford University Press, New York. 25 Table 1 Reforms and Domestic Stock Market Development This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms between 1975 and 2004. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after, including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table 2 for the definition of the variables. Market Capitalization / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.142 *** [10.050] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.184 *** [5.465] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.159 *** [5.305] Privatization 0.155 *** [7.608] Institutional reform 0.093 *** [6.773] Pension reform 0.153 *** [4.315] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 438 315 582 392 302 211 No. of countries 45 32 62 40 32 24 R-squared within 0.207 0.096 0.052 0.143 0.146 0.094 R-squared overall 0.046 0.022 0.017 0.040 0.018 0.010 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.193 0.428 0.335 0.221 0.184 0.353 Value Traded Domestically / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.024 [0.830] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.270 *** [5.447] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.171 *** [6.127] Privatization 0.087 *** [5.623] Institutional reform 0.066 *** [3.853] Pension reform 0.072 *** [2.618] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 432 329 559 396 282 195 No. of countries 44 34 59 41 30 22 R-squared within 0.002 0.092 0.071 0.083 0.056 0.038 R-squared overall 0.001 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.017 0.004 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.108 0.196 0.073 0.051 0.065 0.171 Capital Raised Domestically / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.006 *** [2.687] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.010 *** [3.403] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.009 *** [4.285] Privatization 0.006 ** [2.271] Institutional reform 0.005 * [1.712] Pension reform 0.013 [1.409] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 127 215 218 160 77 93 No. of countries 14 23 23 17 8 10 R-squared within 0.061 0.051 0.080 0.032 0.042 0.024 R-squared overall 0.036 0.036 0.045 0.020 0.019 0.010 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.013 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.013 0.020 26 Table 2 Reforms and Stock Market Internationalization This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms between 1983 and 2000. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after, including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table 2 for the definition of the variables. Market Capitalization of International Firms / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.045 *** [5.059] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.202 *** [7.747] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.082 *** [5.685] Privatization 0.040 *** [5.034] Institutional reform 0.038 *** [4.955] Pension reform 0.062 *** [5.489] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 242 236 475 312 279 96 No. of countries 31 26 56 40 32 11 R-squared within 0.110 0.229 0.076 0.087 0.096 0.256 R-squared overall 0.031 0.095 0.033 0.009 0.028 0.084 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.022 0.097 0.032 0.035 0.023 0.049 Value Traded Abroad / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.007 *** [3.933] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.014 *** [4.748] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.003 ** [2.522] Privatization 0.004 *** [3.452] Institutional reform 0.007 *** [3.804] Pension reform 0.006 * [1.797] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 299 244 530 345 293 106 No. of countries 36 26 61 43 33 12 R-squared within 0.052 0.095 0.015 0.037 0.046 0.031 R-squared overall 0.029 0.039 0.006 0.007 0.024 0.007 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.001 0.009 0.005 0.002 0.002 0.012 Capital Raised Abroad / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.002 *** [4.909] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.002 *** [4.539] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.001 *** [4.052] Privatization 0.001 *** [6.019] Institutional reform 0.001 *** [3.704] Pension reform 0.000 [0.604] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 491 307 686 647 409 123 No. of countries 51 32 75 68 45 14 R-squared within 0.052 0.071 0.026 0.061 0.039 0.003 R-squared overall 0.044 0.056 0.018 0.042 0.024 0.001 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.002 27 Table 3 Reforms and Stock Market Internationalization Relative to Domestic Activity This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for countries implementing reforms between 1983 and 2000. The regressions consider a ten-year event window around the reform dates (five years before and five years after, including the reform year). The sample includes only countries with at least two observations before the reform date and two afterwards. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table 2 for the definition of the variables. Market Capitalization of International Firms / Total Market Capitalization (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.090 *** [5.704] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.176 *** [12.196] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.159 *** [10.848] Privatization 0.105 *** [6.692] Institutional reform 0.133 *** [5.584] Pension reform 0.187 *** [6.498] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 166 226 304 131 123 87 No. of countries 22 25 38 17 16 11 R-squared within 0.166 0.413 0.303 0.305 0.221 0.336 R-squared overall 0.112 0.121 0.087 0.027 0.096 0.052 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.020 0.205 0.118 0.126 0.127 0.219 Value Traded Abroad / Value Traded Domestically (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.059 *** [2.887] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.132 *** [3.090] Introduction of electronic trading systems -0.070 [1.298] Privatization 0.001 [0.060] Institutional reform 0.135 *** [2.734] Pension reform 0.275 *** [2.671] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 206 231 338 155 119 88 No. of countries 25 25 41 20 15 11 R-squared within 0.045 0.045 0.009 0.000 0.041 0.089 R-squared overall 0.025 0.023 0.000 0.002 0.055 0.038 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.011 0.076 0.138 0.044 0.038 0.125 Capital Raised Abroad / Capital Raised Domestically (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.235 *** [3.847] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.038 [0.727] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.078 [1.053] Privatization 0.149 *** [2.958] Institutional reform 0.407 *** [3.359] Pension reform 0.079 [0.520] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 117 212 205 148 51 60 No. of countries 13 23 22 16 6 7 R-squared within 0.127 0.003 0.005 0.054 0.220 0.006 R-squared overall 0.096 0.002 0.003 0.045 0.212 0.001 Pre-reform average of dependent variable 0.050 0.217 0.222 0.058 0.054 0.388 28 raey o wt *** ** ** *** ** ** * n-et dna 20 19 90 10 086 934] 047 431] 419 280] 144 166] 046 263] Yes 174 161 037 090 771] 263 631] 465 217] 964 459] 020 805] Yes 167 199 101 018 016] 462 538] 190 976] 123 309] 004 504] Yes 171 042 a r dei etad 0. 1. 4. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [2. [1. -0. [0. [2. -0. [2. [3. [0. -3. [2. [2. -0. [1. [1. [1. -0. [0. [0. [0. reform reform reform m nsoc orfer s.el *** ** *** ** nsoiss eht abirav Pension 20 Pension 19 Pension 90 10 142 157] 524 058] 203 132] Yes 174 121 011 106 158] 539 338] 363 132] Yes 167 172 068 012 650] 457 613] 266 572] Yes 158 091 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. e e [4. [2. -0. [0. [4. [1. -3. [2. [1. [1. -0. [1. reger for thfo be n s The cle onit Cy var itionifed *** *** *** *** *** 6 24 23 58 081 648] 558 803] 440 531] 315 488] 012 360] Yes 213 245 023 101 649] 346 851] 268 784] 363 300] 007 773] Yes 204 115 046 018 798] 040 139] 018 339] 303 485] 005 739] Yes 342 062 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2004. e [3. [2. -0. [1. [1. -0. [1. [2. [0. -0. [0. [1. [0. [3. [1. [0. [1. [2. reform reform reform sinessu nda obse o throf 2 *** *** *** ** Bl 6 1975 24 23 58 094 573 402 Yes 213 236 020 085 354 185 Yes 204 103 053 009 020 016 Yes 106 050 na iot nee wttsael elba nstitutionalI 865] 850] 397] nstitutionalI 086] 871] 535] nstitutionalI 063] 537] 262] 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. T at [5. [2. -0. [1. [3. [0. -0. [0. [2. [0. [0. erna etwb with s Int mro xidnepp nda efr riestnu A *** *** *** ** * ** ** 36 36 17 093 050] 755 684] 044 066] 206 215] 021 633] Yes 348 223 116 062 395] 287 611] 151 931] 250 309] 011 988] Yes 346 122 112 007 225] 076 473] 052 295] 061 482] 001 066] Yes 159 079 025 lsa g co 0. 0. [3. [2. -2. 0. [3. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [1. [2. [1. -1. 0. [1. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [2. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [1. [0. [1. tin en ylno See.y el atization atization atization ment emlp esdu ectiv *** *** *** *** * ** ** ** sp Priv Priv Priv 36 36 17 unda im F clni re, 136 511] 732 947] 845 113] Yes 348 211 075 083 815] 283 855] 046 993] Yes 346 117 088 005 043] 079 526] 060 505] Yes 159 070 061 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. P ic riestnu elp nte [7. [2. -1. [3. [5. [1. -1. [1. [2. [2. -0. P [1. D rcep P D D G/ mest co ams G/ G/ lly e Do neo lly n *** ** *** ** *** *** * * ** *** ** 4 rof rof Th s trading icat trading 104 icatse trading 23 ble eldo [2. [2. [2. [2. [2. [5. [1. [0. [1. [2. [3. [0. [2. [0. [0. s s s 29 Ta lling m ear).y nda,evif iota 53 53 767] 042 202] 524 681] 650 452] 036 987] Yes 490 090 065 es 134 450] 594 767] 072 057] 799 919] 043 144] Yes 487 105 035 008 566] 007 125] 088 352] 042 335] 000 505] Yes 216 095 034 liz 0. 1. -1. 5. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. -0. 5. -0. 0. 0. mo 0. 0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. taipa mo D D ro electronic electronic ed electronic C nt ectsf mro et ra *** ** Co ef efr e n,etta of edd system of of *** ** *** system *** * isa system rk 53 T 53 Rl 23 - e 149 e ed th 347] 234 448] 578 771] Yes 490 071 076 188 902] 787 950] 102 081] Yes 487 079 067 008 051] 007 150] 089 461] Yes 216 095 030 ixf g ncacif Ma 0. 1. [4. [2. -1. 0. 0. [2. lua 0. 0. [4. [1. -0. 0. 0. [0. itapa 0. 0. [4. [0. -0. 0. 0. [2. ntroductionI V ntroductionI C ntroductionI pment loe insu gnidu clni nigis Dev ated er,t nae *** ** ** *** *** *** ** *** *** ** ** ** trading 29 121 303 653 963 092 Yes 284 218 110 trading 30 285 866 848 503 023 Yes 290 123 078 trading 23 et af m 133] 343] 375] 851] 164] 753] 172] 505] 045] 868] 009 607] 122 298] 117 141] 377 543] 003 083] Yes 214 128 116 tim 0. 1. 8. 0. 0. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [3. [2. -1. [2. [3. -0. [4. [4. [1. -0. [0. [2. -0. [0. [2. [3. -0. [2. [2. -0. rka es [2. rs M earsy *** insider insider insider kco erro evif nda of laws of laws of laws ent *** ** *** ent *** ent *** *** ** d St **, ardd 29 30 23 210 323 774 Yes 284 164 100 308 968 169 Yes 290 115 075 012 120 127 Yes 214 116 082 an ic mest Do antstsub ero efb *,.stekcarb 953] 461] 846] 574] 316] 782] 929] 250] 333] 0. 1. [5. [2. -1. 0. 0. 0. 0. [2. [5. [1. -1. 0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [3. [3. -0. 0. 0. [2. Enforcem Enforcem Enforcem ro nda earsy ni *** ** ** *** * * * ith e w iv era 40 39 14 089 777] 481 320] 641 287] 801 175] 021 290] Yes 376 234 072 027 838] 067 171] 248 318] 578 650] 001 113] Yes 370 004 000 006 751] 043 662] 023 869] 141 330] 001 687] Yes 126 086 052 rmso snois 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. (f Ref res atesd egr mro scitsitats-tfo 0. 0. [4. [2. -0. [2. [1. -0. [3. [0. -0. [0. [0. [1. -0. [0. [1. [1. -0. [0. [1. -0. [0. liberalization liberalization liberalization et et et ark *** ** ** ark ark ** * m 40 m 39 m 14 126 524 569 376 210 060 021 025 249 370 001 000 006 045 021 126 077 040 areuqst efr Yes Yes Yes s 430] 586] 025] 640] 062] 329] 480] 706] 849] e tockS 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [8. [2. -0. [2. tockS [0. -0. [0. [0. tockS [2. [1. -0. [0. th easl dnu uelav e wsohs aro utlosb wod A. rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall el in within ov within ov within ov fixed fixed fixed tab wt dsra deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries is en Th ev rwetfa rowthg interest.S rowthg of of interest.S rowthg of of interest.S of of Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared raey o wt *** ** * ** ** n-et dna 95 11 12 14 044 995] 778 318] 074 534] 858 486] 021 420] Yes 329 093 002 443] 065 482] 056 753] 609 905] 004 996] Yes 104 068 051 001 712] 029 965] 013 424] 091 386] 001 092] Yes 121 060 020 a r dei etad 0. 0. 1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [2. -0. [1. [0. [1. -0. [2. [0. -0. [0. -0. [0. [1. -0. [1. -0. [0. -0. [0. [1. [1. -0. [2. reform reform reform m nsoc orfer s.el *** ** nsoiss eht abirav * Pension 95 11 Pension 12 Pension 14 063 753] 599 033] 172 409] Yes 294 095 007 199] 042 333] 046 626] Yes 104 041 020 000 324] 029 999] 015 720] Yes 121 038 005 e 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [5. -0. [1. [1. [2. -0. [0. -0. [0. [0. -0. e [0. [1. reger for thfo be n s The onit cle var itionifed ** * * ** *** 19 20 28 033 103] 092 560] 043 401] 740 534] 023 709] Yes 162 183 053 007 882] 044 243] 084 639] 364 240] 005 547] Yes 171 136 057 001 821] 006 119] 007 440] 032 915] 000 641] Yes 237 074 033 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. Cy 2000. e [2. -0. [0. [0. [1. -0. [1. [1. -0. [1. -0. [1. [1. -0. [2. [2. -0. [1. [1. [0. [0. reform reform reform nda obse o throf sinessu 2 *** *** *** Bl 1983 19 20 28 058 091 044 162 144 038 012 042 077 171 104 100 002 005 007 237 071 030 na nee wttsael elba nstitutionalI 536] 562] 416] nstitutionalI 311] 159] 535] Yes nstitutionalI 426] 969] 453] Yes T 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. at [4. -0. [0. [0. [3. -0. [1. -0. [1. [3. -0. [0. [1. iot etwb erna s with Int mro xidnepp nda efr riestnu A *** ** ** *** *** ** 24 27 48 g co See.y 065 450] 527 168] 106 137] 753 316] 009 873] Yes 178 213 021 005 717] 013 302] 016 457] 258 408] 002 311] Yes 205 076 019 001 008] 007 578] 000 231] 029 194] 000 809] Yes 443 100 051 0. [3. -0. [2. -0. 2. [1. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [2. -0. [0. -0. 0. [1. [1. -0. 0. 0. 0. [1. [5. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [1. [0. [2. [0. lsa tin en ylno el P atization atization atization ment emlp esdu ectiv D *** ** *** *** * sp G/ Priv Priv Priv 24 27 48 im unda clni re, s 069 903] 515 129] 046 517] Yes 178 173 006 007 394] 007 171] 013 169] Yes 205 065 011 001 749] 007 682] 002 938] Yes 443 090 045 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. F [4. -0. [2. -0. [0. [3. -0. [0. -0. [1. [5. -0. [1. [0. ic riestnu elp nte ams rcep Firmlan P D DP mest Do corof G/ e neo iota G/ *** ** ** * ** *** ** Th 5 rof s trading 44 trading 50 daor ** *** * * trading 63 ble eldo [2. [2. [1. [2. [1. [0. [2. [1. [2. [2. 30 s de s d [2. [2. [0. [1. [1. s Ta m ear).y nda,evif erntnI 054 662] 775 181] 141 407] 047 150] 032 846] Yes 361 127 047 adorb 000 197] 054 166] 018 128] 500 878] 003 437] Yes 415 053 011 001 304] 011 684] 002 883] 045 928] 000 781] Yes 558 043 037 0. -0. 0. 5. -0. 0. 0. A 0. -0. -0. 0. -0. 0. 0. Ab 0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. fo lling ro ectsf mro sei n of of of nt ef efr n,etta electronic ad electronic electronic iota system *** ** * Tr system ** ** system *** *** e eu Co e liza 44 50 63 096 715] 773 118] 187 741] Yes 361 109 048 Ralatip - ed th al 004 386] 055 177] 013 834] Yes 415 027 022 001 537] 011 858] 003 159] Yes 558 036 026 0. 0. 0. V 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. n ixf iot g ncacif itpa 0. [5. -0. [2. [1. [2. -0. [2. -0. [0. Ca [3. -0. [2. [1. C ntroductionI ntroductionI ntroductionI liza insu gnidu clni nigis et rk na iot ated er,t nae Ma *** ** ** *** * ** ** *** *** *** *** m trading 23 141 124 286 464 079 Yes 212 318 139 trading 23 008 064 010 659 006 Yes 218 141 063 trading 29 af 347] 543] 048] 357] 322] 945] 855] 200] 031] 426] 002 997] 008 807] 029 820] 084 798] 001 094] Yes 280 149 066 tim 0. [4. -1. 0. 6. [2. [1. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. [3. [1. -0. 0. 0. [0. [0. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [2. [2. [0. [3. [2. -0. 0. 0. erna es [3. rs earsy *** insider insider insider Int et erro evif nda of laws of laws of laws ent *** ** ent *** ent *** *** rka d **, ardd 23 23 29 an 213 M 0. 0. 0. 0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. kco St antstsub ero efb *,.stekcarb 427] 141 588] 211 869] Yes 212 267 154 015 480] 059 794] 014 280] Yes 218 111 069 002 680] 005 555] 030 775] Yes 280 131 041 0. [7. -1. [2. [0. [4. [0. [0. [4. [0. [3. Enforcem Enforcem Enforcem nda ro earsy ni ** ** * *** ** ** *** ** ith e 23 28 42 w 033 123 057 243 018 180 194 077 006 002 017 388 002 231 084 035 002 004 001 038 000 399 066 064 rmso iv era 205] 956] 502] 328] 724] Yes 996] 083] 606] 246] 073] Yes 715] 417] 245] 384] 123] Yes Ref snois (f res atesd egr mro scitsitats-tfo 0. [2. -0. 0. 3. [0. [0. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. [1. [2. -0. [0. -0. 0. [0. [2. -0. 0. 0. 0. [2. [3. -0. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [1. [2. liberalization liberalization liberalization et et et ark *** ark *** ark *** m 23 m 28 m 42 areuqst efr 056 070 119 180 139 047 009 004 011 231 067 031 002 003 001 399 062 055 s 793] 529] 980] Yes 945] 199] 407] Yes 852] 327] 099] Yes e tockS 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. [4. -0. [0. [0. tockS [3. [0. -0. [0. tockS [4. -0. [0. -0. [0. th easl dnu uelav e wsohs aro utlosb wod A. rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall el in within ov within ov within ov fixed fixed fixed tab wt dsra deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries is en Th ev rwetfa rowthg interest.S rowthg of of interest.S rowthg of of interest.S of of Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared raey o wt *** ** *** * *** n-et dna 7 87 11 88 11 60 116 298] 242 559] 680 168] 556 217] 071 023] Yes 426 105 266 792] 642 046] 344 115] 648 581] 057 854] Yes 131 050 018 712] 677 556] 007 990] 427 919] 027 300] Yes 274 255 a r dei etad 0. 0. 6. 0. 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 7. 0. 0. [3. [0. -1. [1. [2. -0. [3. [1. -2. [1. -0. [0. [0. -0. [0. -0. [0. [4. -4. [0. -7. [0. -0. [0. reform reform reform m nsoc elcy orfer s.el *** ** *** Pension 87 11 Pension 88 11 Pension 7 C nsoiss eht abirav 60 182 241] 538 134] 260 916] Yes 369 072 320 634] 441 954] 127 043] Yes 126 045 009 063] 155] 703 688] Yes 251 249 e 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 793% 0. 0. [6. [1. -1. [0. [2. -2. [0. -0. [0. -0. [0. [5. -1. e [0. ss reger for thfo be n sineu s Blanoit The onit var itionifed ** *** * *** * *** ** 5 95 12 93 12 44 054 293] 222 717] 243 580] 577 627] 112 836] Yes 410 082 094 166] 638 432] 060 143] 922 689] 127 707] Yes 148 043 213 966] 720 495] 229 226] 860 628] 123 216] Yes 625 389 0. 0. 9. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 3. 0. 0. 0. 2000. e [1. [0. -0. [0. [2. -0. [3. [1. -2. [1. -1. [1. 10. [1. -0. [2. [1. [3. [0. -0. reform reform reform -15. [2. [1. erna nda obse o throf Int 1983 nda nee wttsael 2 *** ** ** *** elba 5 nstitutionalI 95 12 143 554] 278 801] 205 422] 247 150 nstitutionalI 93 12 203 270] 441 336] 009 230] Yes 108 147 nstitutionalI 44 336 364] 373 807] 938 734] Yes 406 343 T 0. 0. [4. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [2. -2. [1. -1. 0. 0. 0. 4. [1. [2. [3. -0. 0. 0. lsa at [0. etwb s with ment mro xidnepp unda efr riestnu A n *** * * * * *** * 16 18 16 F g co See.y iota 085 874] 062 411] 185 650] 259 771] 018 800] Yes 122 347 044 024 450] 052 673] 130 817] 438 592] 014 809] Yes 140 083 033 079 748] 495 693] 731 386] 901 918] 006 288] Yes 147 173 116 0. 0. liz [3. [0. -0. 2. [0. [1. -0. 0. 0. [1. -0. 0. 0. [1. [0. [0. -0. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 3. 0. [1. [1. [3. [1. -5. [1. -0. 0. 0. [0. ic tin en ylno el taipa atization atization mest ectiv C lly atization Do emlp esdu *** lly *** *** sp et Priv Priv rof 18 16 im clni re, 16 rk 106 127] 056 350] 079 icat 286] Yes 122 326 030 003 255] 044 469] 235 516] Yes 140 012 003 icatse Priv 134 807] 329 403] 757] Yes 147 140 077 0. 0. -0. 0. 0. es 0. -0. 0. 0. 0. 927* 0. 0. elp nte Mal [6. [0. [0. mo [0. [0. [1. mo 0. 3. [2. [3. 0. [1. lling riestnu rcep D tao D ed ro nt corof ams edd e neo T/ isa s *** *** *** ra * Th T Rl 6 Co s trading 22 - 108 609] 192 193] 133 653] 614 922] 040 009] Yes 266 326 069 116 574] 124 214] 947 193] 911 802] 015 322] Yes 310 057 025 037 323] 961 396] 921 014] 629 400] 080 026] Yes 203 064 042 ble y it eldo Firmlan 0. 0. 4. 0. 0. lua 9. 0. 0. 0. taipa 0. 2. 1. 0. 0. [5. [1. -0. [0. [2. -0. [3. -0. [1. -0. [0. -0. [1. [1. [0. [0. [1. [1. 14. [1. -0. [1. 31 s s s Ta iv m ear).y nda,evif trading 33 e trading 38 V/ C/ Act ectsf mro of of ic ef efr n,etta iota electronic da electronic da electronic of system *** system system * e e ternnI rob rob 33 A 38 A 22 ed th 150 786] 165 944] 155 718] Yes 266 298 074 084 326] 023 039] 195 340] Yes 310 016 036 109 ed 862] 435 485] 262 780] Yes 203 032 012 mest ixf Do g ncacif fo 0. 0. [9. [0. -0. 0. 0. [0. edd -0. 0. [1. [0. -1. 0. 0. 0. 3. 1. 0. 0. [1. [1. [1. [0. n ntroductionI ra isa T ntroductionI ntroductionI ot e insu gnidu clni nigis iota Rl e liz ivt lua ated er,t nae taipa *** *** *** V taipa *** * C m trading 23 123 245 100 967 057 Yes 211 506 123 trading 23 102 589 454 962 037 Yes 215 088 010 trading 23 Rela af C 643] 066] 287] 701] 283] 650] 439] 566] 872] 925] 043 777] 967 555] 812 846] 947 204] 001 021] Yes 211 097 048 tim 0. 0. 5. 0. 0. 0. 0. 3. 0. 0. 0. 2. 3. 3. 0. 0. n es et [5. [1. -0. [0. [3. -0. [4. [1. -1. [1. [0. [0. -0. [0. [0. [3. [1. [1. -0. [0. iot rs earsy *** rk insider insider insider liza erro evif nda Ma of laws of laws of laws ent *** ent *** ent *** * na d **, iot ardd 23 23 23 an 184 0. erna Int antstsub ero efb *,.stekcarb 065] 186 750] 190 503] Yes 211 437 137 144 041] 573 422] 443 554] Yes 215 082 011 052 954] 970 643] 469 944] Yes 211 090 047 0. 0. [0. -0. 0. 0. 0. [0. [3. -1. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 3. 0. [1. [0. [0. [3. [1. [11. Enforcem Enforcem Enforcem et ro rka earsy ni *** *** *** ** ** *** ** ith e 18 21 13 w 067 071 121 061 033 134 285 141 046 235 285 062 023 170 072 010 085 755 028 895 032 116 301 171 M iv era 073] 367] 434] 484] 725] Yes 169] 615] 266] 596] 041] Yes 241] 952] 039] 321] 044] Yes kco snois 0. 0. 0. 0. 3. 0. 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. (f St res atesd nda egr mro scitsitats-tfo 0. 0. 0. 6. [3. [0. [0. [3. -0. [2. [2. -0. [0. [1. [1. -0. [2. [1. [2. -0. [0. -7. [2. -0. [1. liberalization liberalization liberalization et et et ark *** ark *** ark *** *** m 18 m 21 m 13 109 s 489] 173 924] 224 806] Yes 134 201 110 077 894] 211 580] 310 392] Yes 170 058 008 226 828] 922 679] 382 499] Yes 116 204 097 rmso areuqst efr e tockS 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 0. 2. 0. 0. 0. [5. [0. [0. tockS 0. [2. -0. [0. [1. tockS [3. [2. [0. th Ref easl dnu uelav e wsohs aro utlosb wod A. rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall rowthg effects rate ations erall el in within ov within ov within ov fixed fixed fixed tab wt dsra deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries deficit/GDP GDP observ countries is en Th ev rwetfa rowthg interest.S rowthg of of interest.S rowthg of of interest.S of of Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared Reform GDP Fiscal OECD U. Country No. No. R-squared R-squared tneve s.dra ** ** ** raey wretfa es 19 se 89 10 se 83 10 Y 171 Y Y 0.048 .441]2[ 0.009 .942]0[ 0.003 .713]0[ 0.003 .060]2[ 0.199 .138]2[ 0.077 .420]1[ n-et o a wt r *** ** de nda se 23 es 17 es 13 sinoc etad Y 217 Y 148 Y 103 0.001 .108]0[ 0.038 .277]4[ 0.012 .249]2[ 0.000 .050]0[ llya 0.072 .832]0[ 0.070 .884]0[ sno ssierger mrofer ticse P D G/ *** *** P *** mo D D eht es 39 llya Y 380 G/ se 26 Y 208 ded se 18 Y 142 0.039 0.052 0.006 0.001 0.020 eh T erof ticse .627]2[ .208]3[ da .854]2[ .782]0[ Tra .0180- rob e .160]1[ .474]1[ les. mo A lua be 2004. nsoitavr abirav D V/ ded *** *** ded *** da 40 Tra es 40 es 30 389 357 259 s dna e e Y rob Y Tra thfo 0.067 e .457]3[ 0.052 352].3[ lua 0.000 .123]0[ .0040 148].3[ A 0.016 .0020- lua V ded .312]1[ 305].0[ rmo bseo n V 1975 o *** *** Tra * Reflanoitid nee wt se eula ** etwb tsael itionifed 26 se 24 Y 252 Y 224 V se 23 Y 212 0.157 e .589]3[ 0.024 .961]0[ 0.011 .980]2[ 0.004 .683]1[ 0.103 .355]2[ 0.051 .580]1[ s ta Ad mr hti throf 2 *** ** rof efor w g seir elba es 38 es 31 es 22 Y 372 T 0.013 .587]1[ 0.031 .347]4[ 0.007 .360]2[ .0010- Y 258 yt .341]0[ 0.414 .261]1[ 155.0- Y 179 lling tin .141]1[ ro en untoc viitc A ci nt emlp y Co- nlo xidnepp ste im A s ent ** *** om n se oni *** *** *** *** D iota riestnu udel 0.032 0.042 0.022 0.122 0.066 liz nci co e D na pl atle n 7 el iot rof mas es 32 24 es Int 17 itap es 14 Tab erna elsdo he Y 228 P Y 142 T 0.044 0.053 D 0.022 0.038 atzi 0.052 .0710 Y 107 Int m dna .)raey See.ylevitcepser,tnecrep 20 opm Y 176 0.051 .575]2[ .670]3[ atzi se 87 10 Y ot se 81 10 Y vele .237]3[ .812]2[ vei .360]3[ .938]2[ onali ** *** R tioa liz arket ernat * *** *** oni M ock .531]2[ .215]3[ G/ .964]1[ .492]3[ Cate .637]1[ .028]4[ St arket s onali rk effects eno ci ste P *** *** M *** *** Mal *** * D ta ent ock ernat mp ed om G/ se 39 rmiFlan se 24 se 16 Y 382 St Y 188 Int To/ Y 124 loe ixf mrofer D n 0.075 0.086 tioa 0.035 0.032 s 0.092 0.017 g tioa .030]4[ .698]3[ rn .113]3[ .896]2[ .026]5[ .807]1[ te Dev insu het liz arket ng itap et *** M rmiFlan ** Info n *** *** ock tioa *** ** rka ated M tim udilcni dna,evif,netta kco es rs fter,a St dna erro ecnacifingis Cate es 41 055 Y 399 tioa es 37 rn es 28 Y 322 St te 034 Y 234 rk 0.124 .665]4[ 0. .108]2[ liz 0.020 0.048 0.113 0. Ma itap .463]3[ .235]4[ Info .666]6[ .323]2[ n *** Cate tioa rk *** *** liz ** earsy s ardd nae se 25 se 24 se 23 Y 245 Ma Y 216 itap Y 206 e m 0.070 .617]1[ 0.084 .313]3[ 0.115 .895]7[ 0.020 .509]1[ rmo fiv Cate 0.129 .403]7[ .0420 .553]2[ tans Ref tsub dna *** rk er dna *** ** ** ** Ma *** * ro es 39 es 28 es 20 ith efob **, Y 378 Y 218 Y 149 w snois earsy e *,.stekcarb 0.112 .774]6[ .0370 2.292][ 0.027 .597]2[ .0230 2.141][ 0.063 .707]2[ .0330 1.936][ esr (fiv ni reg atesd era s areuqs mr t efor leas e th scitsitats-tfo s s w emstsys under w emstsys under w emstsys under la gn g n ind adirt c tioa onir mrofer.lcxe( la gn la gn g g n ind adirt n ind adirt c c tioa tioa s wsohs dnu ect s s s el rmof ectf lizare traredis onir mrofer.lcxe( s ect traredis onir mrofer.lcxe( s el ef rmof ectf lizare ect el ef rmof ectf of m of m of m ef el roa seulav lizare traredis libte esir esir esir n rka oni relan mrofer onsitav er libte of rka infotne n oni relan mrofer onsitav er libte of rka infotne n oni relan mrofer onsitav er of tab is wod etulosb infotne m me tioa orfer dexif orfer dexif orfer dexif tio oni yr obs count tioa tioa m me tio oni yr obs count m me tio oni yr obs count kc rcof Th win A Sto En oductrtnI tiza )sisy of titus mberu kc tiza )sisy of kc tiza )sisy of ivrP ount o. of.o rcof In Pens N anal C N N Sto En oductrtnI ivrP titus mberu ount o. of.o rcof In Pens N anal C N N Sto En oductrtnI ivrP titus mberu ount o. of.o In Pens N anal C N N Table 8 Reforms and Domestic Stock Market Development - Controlling for Time Trend This table shows least square regressions with robust standard errors estimated using fixed effects models for the period 1975-2004. The sample includes only countries with at least six annual observations. Absolute values of t-statistics are in brackets. *, **, and *** mean significance at ten, five, and one percent, respectively. See Appendix Table 2 for the definition of the variables. Market Capitalization / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization -0.008 [0.330] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.171 *** [5.343] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.018 [0.653] Privatization 0.046 ** [2.172] Institutional reform 0.021 [1.206] Pension reform 0.143 *** [3.577] Time trend 0.037 *** 0.029 *** 0.034 *** 0.028 *** 0.034 *** 0.033 *** [16.418] [12.470] [15.737] [15.850] [16.748] [17.229] Time trend * developing country dummy -0.017 *** -0.013 *** -0.015 *** -0.010 *** -0.016 *** -0.015 *** [8.107] [5.348] [6.630] [5.687] [6.792] [6.702] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 1,731 1,834 1,887 1,527 1,926 1,916 No. of countries 83 95 95 81 100 99 Value Traded Domestically / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization -0.020 [0.558] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.201 *** [5.181] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.062 ** [2.365] Privatization 0.026 [1.428] Institutional reform 0.056 * [1.864] Pension reform 0.000 [0.008] Time trend 0.037 *** 0.028 *** 0.032 *** 0.026 *** 0.034 *** 0.034 *** [18.094] [12.667] [14.364] [13.313] [18.676] [18.070] Time trend * developing country dummy -0.026 *** -0.022 *** -0.024 *** -0.019 *** -0.026 *** -0.024 *** [9.953] [10.117] [11.517] [10.100] [11.529] [11.794] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 1,681 1,814 1,830 1,496 1,862 1,864 No. of countries 79 92 90 78 94 94 Capital Raised Domestically / GDP (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Stock market liberalization 0.002 [0.588] Enforcement of insider trading laws 0.005 [1.601] Introduction of electronic trading systems 0.009 *** [4.055] Privatization 0.010 *** [3.672] Institutional reform 0.003 [0.911] Pension reform 0.009 [1.045] Time trend 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** [5.001] [5.796] [4.513] [2.073] [6.472] [6.739] Time trend * developing country dummy -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 *** -0.001 * -0.001 *** -0.001 *** [3.225] [3.618] [2.909] [1.845] [3.654] [3.565] Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No. of observations 725 754 725 516 764 771 No. of countries 41 42 40 31 42 43 33 Appendix Table 1 Country Coverage and Reform Dates This table shows the list of countries included in the regressions and the dates of the different reforms analyzed by country. Countries with missing values are those with no data to determine whether they implemented the reform or not. "Before sample" means that the country implemented the reform before the start of our sample period (1975). * means that the reform was not included in any of the regressions due to lack of adequate data on the dependent variables for the required period (at least two annual observations before and after the reform date). The list of countries includes countries that did not implement any reform that are included in the regressions in Table 8. See Appendix Table 2 for a definition of the variables and the data sources. Enforcement of Introduction of Stock market insider trading electronic Institutional liberalization laws trading systems Privatization reform Pension reform Albania . . No reform No reform 1993 No reform Argentina 1989 1995 No reform 1990 1991 1994 Armenia . No reform 1996 1996 No reform No reform Australia Before sample 1996 1987 1991 No reform 1993 Austria Before sample No reform 1996 1988 No reform No reform Azerbaijan . . 1997 1997 No reform No reform Bahrain . No reform 1999 No reform No reform No reform Bangladesh 1991 1998 1998 No reform 1987 No reform Barbados No reform No reform 2000 No reform No reform No reform Belgium Before sample 1994 1996 1990 No reform No reform Benin No reform . . 1988 1992 No reform Bolivia . No reform No reform 1992 1985 1997 Botswana 1990 No reform No reform . 1998 No reform Brazil 1991 1978 No reform 1991 1999 No reform Bulgaria 1992 No reform 1997 1991 1997 2002 Cambodia . . . . 1999 No reform Cameroon No reform . . 1998 No reform No reform Canada Before sample 1976 * 1977 . No reform No reform Chile 1992 1996 No reform 1985 1976 * 1981 China . No reform 1990 1992 1978 * No reform Colombia 1991 No reform 1996 1991 No reform 1994 Costa Rica No reform No reform 1991 No reform 1990 2000 Cote d'Ivoire 1995 . 1999 1991 No reform No reform Croatia . No reform 1999 1992 2000 2002 Cyprus . No reform 1999 . No reform No reform Czech Republic 1993 1993 1998 1991 * 1991 * No reform Denmark Before sample 1996 1988 No reform No reform 1993 Djibouti . . . No reform 1996 No reform Dominican Republic No reform . . No reform 1996 * 2003 * Ecuador 1994 No reform No reform No reform 2000 No reform Egypt 1992 No reform No reform 1993 No reform No reform El Salvador No reform No reform 1994 No reform 1994 1998 Estonia 1996 No reform 1996 1993 1995 2002 Fiji No reform . No reform No reform No reform No reform Finland 1990 1993 1988 1988 No reform No reform France Before sample 1975 * 1986 1986 No reform No reform Georgia . . 2000 * No reform 1995 No reform Germany Before sample 1995 No reform 1988 No reform No reform Ghana 1993 No reform No reform 1989 1985 No reform Greece 1987 1996 1992 1997 No reform No reform Guatemala No reform No reform No reform No reform 1994 No reform Guinea-Bissau . . . No reform 1994 No reform Guyana No reform . . No reform 1991 No reform Honduras No reform No reform 1993 1988 2003 * No reform Hong Kong Before sample 1994 1986 . No reform 2000 Hungary 2000 1995 1998 1989 1995 1998 Iceland 1991 No reform 1989 . No reform No reform India 1992 1998 1995 1991 No reform No reform Indonesia 1989 1996 1995 1991 1985 No reform Iran No reform No reform 1994 No reform 1999 No reform Ireland 1992 No reform 2000 2001 No reform No reform Israel 1993 1989 1997 . No reform No reform Italy Before sample 1996 1994 1985 No reform No reform Jamaica 1991 No reform 2000 1989 1993 No reform Japan 1983 1990 1982 . No reform No reform Jordan 1995 No reform 2000 2000 1998 No reform Kazakhstan . No reform 1997 1994 No reform 1998 Kenya 1995 No reform No reform 1992 No reform No reform Korea 1992 1988 1988 . 1998 No reform Kuwait No reform No reform 1995 . 1986 No reform Kyrgyz Republic . . 1999 No reform No reform No reform Lao PDR . . . 1991 No reform No reform 34 Appendix Table 1 (Cont.) Country Coverage and Reform Dates This table shows the list of countries included in the regressions and the dates of the different reforms analyzed by country. Countries with missing values are those with no data to determine whether they implemented the reform or not. "Before sample" means that the country implemented the reform before the start of our sample period (1975). * means that the reform was not included in any of the regressions due to lack of adequate data on the dependent variables for the required period (at least two annual observations before and after the reform date). The list of countries includes countries that did not implement any reform that are included in the regressions in Table 8. See Appendix Table 2 for a definition of the variables and the data sources. Enforcement of Introduction of Stock market insider trading electronic Institutional liberalization laws trading systems Privatization reform Pension reform Latvia 1993 No reform 1997 1995 1999 2001 Lebanon . No reform No reform No reform No reform No reform Lithuania 1993 No reform 1993 1992 2000 2001 Luxembourg . No reform 1991 . No reform No reform Macedonia . No reform 2001 1994 1994 2003 * Malaysia 1988 1996 1992 1989 No reform No reform Malta 1992 No reform 1996 No reform 2004 * No reform Mauritius 1994 No reform 2001 No reform 1985 No reform Mexico 1989 No reform 1996 1985 1991 1997 Moldova . No reform 1998 No reform No reform No reform Mongolia . No reform 1999 . No reform No reform Morocco 1988 No reform 1997 1993 No reform No reform Mozambique . . 1999 1989 No reform No reform Namibia . No reform 1998 . 1995 No reform Nepal No reform . No reform No reform No reform No reform Netherlands Before sample 1994 1994 1993 No reform 1985 New Zealand 1987 No reform 1991 1987 No reform No reform Nicaragua No reform . . 1991 1994 2000 * Nigeria 1995 No reform 1999 1989 2003 No reform Norway 1989 1990 1988 . No reform No reform Oman 1999 1999 1998 No reform No reform No reform Pakistan 1991 No reform 1997 1991 No reform No reform Panama . No reform 1999 1992 2000 No reform Papua New Guinea . . 1999 No reform No reform No reform Paraguay No reform No reform No reform No reform 2004 * No reform Peru 1992 1994 No reform 1991 1993 1993 Philippines 1991 No reform 1993 1991 1994 No reform Poland 1991 1993 1996 1990 1990 1999 Portugal 1986 No reform 1991 1989 No reform No reform Romania No reform No reform 1995 1992 2000 No reform Russia . No reform 1994 1991 2000 2004 * Saudi Arabia 1999 No reform 1990 No reform No reform No reform Senegal No reform . . 1997 1994 No reform Serbia and Montenegro . . . No reform No reform No reform Singapore Before sample 1978 1989 . No reform No reform Slovak Republic No reform No reform 1994 1992 2000 2003 Slovenia 2001 1998 1993 1992 2000 No reform South Africa 1996 No reform 1996 1997 1996 No reform Spain 1985 1998 1989 1988 No reform No reform Sri Lanka 1991 1996 1997 1990 1990 No reform Swaziland No reform No reform No reform . No reform No reform Sweden 1980 1990 1989 1992 No reform 2001 Switzerland Before sample 1995 1996 . No reform 1985 Syrian Arab Republic No reform . . . 1987 * No reform Taiwan 1991 1989 1985 . 1980 No reform Tanzania . No reform No reform 1992 1997 No reform Thailand 1987 1993 1991 1993 No reform No reform Togo No reform . . 1990 1985 No reform Trinidad and Tobago 1997 No reform No reform No reform 1993 No reform Tunisia 1995 No reform 1996 1988 No reform No reform Turkey 1989 1996 1993 1988 2001 No reform Uganda . . No reform 1992 1996 No reform Ukraine . No reform 1996 1992 2000 No reform United Arab Emirates . . 2000 No reform 1988 No reform United Kingdom Before sample 1981 No reform 1981 No reform 1988 United States Before sample Before sample No reform . No reform No reform Uruguay No reform No reform 1994 No reform No reform 1995 Uzbekistan . No reform 1996 No reform No reform No reform Venezuela 1990 No reform 1992 1991 No reform No reform West Bank and Gaza . . . . No reform No reform Zambia No reform No reform No reform 1993 1997 No reform Zimbabwe 1993 No reform No reform 1994 No reform No reform 35 tsek tsek kootlu Mar Mar O kc kc toS toS and,e ic mon albol albol tabasa Eco G G D and and tsek dlro W e e Mar sr sr tabasa tabasa D D inggre and)SFI( sr 2004. tsek tsek m E tics Mar Mar se 1975- s'rooP kro Y ndicatoItne ndicatoItne ndicatoItne we tatisS d rio inggre inggre changx and Nfo pmoleve pmoleve pmoleve m m d D D pe E E inancialF D therevoc s'rooP s'rooP Efo n Bank dlro dlro dlro rve tioar tandarS, nal York see W W W w and Rl & & y ec d ko d ko deeF pe co rgeb Ne ationr of neo Bank: Bank: ta ur tenI:F ) Bank: O raedeF E da S. So tandarS actboF tandarS actboF dlro dslro ooml kna moru dlro dlro dlro W W B B E W W MI (W W U. the d, rev m of ,la irf ith nal era ni e P se tu s ie w d D n CD sei te co s ES morf s ehT. ,noit ticse E d capital G. axt itho ude w O ,eceer no m natior Y mod cialiffo changxe ssel,de iv e untroc G, annual( rcesuoS neh data morf d irf enotsaelta ro, N iereS York d monoce tugroP, s lla ntei ,e pute srev formani nclit het m e n ncyer ducto nya ew co pr tea adatiorg ceer m ay itie de 2 ta wtpe pute ing fo ni moc .seus N no morf ereh cur cul inco heT mre wro atur moc n avh is s'ye ncoi changx e nd d w igerof nya h N m ar fo nda calol cal nda antsrg h G, e hig .ero ble Da heT.tekra E tere m ar tioa sa coes sei si n ig m d capital kna sulp and, Ta dna kro nv Exc tI s iz ie d ck quitye B romonu Y y fo ro l. ticse tifn aiser toS seireS ro heT E co actual . s ancerF . . on we untroc icialffo to ice H.srall aleZ tantsnoc ndix noitp 36 m n dna is ts tantsnoc N capital ide ipts nnuaa do ey d monoce tioelped srall ductso pr and, we to t es ing 2000. anyp ke fo wef no on ar data a ie pr rof and do.S. do inlF N, .s d te ppe cri A era het iereS.raey ke ndooL m ceer m desab de het U .S. ar tho co P ro y tekra k, tateS ni e 1989- Bank D ppla U s s Des leb thefo bas ni het m ar avhro, het e omru rea roF m ar d d nal andslr djusa se G s. s in sr fo tses nueever , es mrif the ni mas E: at 2000 ity ri .s yle ice es as nme thee iten nde arey iorep se tear P D U the rc ice .d 10,066 eriS riaav ationr e d . het itarsoped detr duceo D pr ndsob use the ni pr eulav capital . G sa All.se tsekra ticse ,raey activ ading tr the to h ous inte poer 2000. re ctiveffe icate w and, y at nal e 2000. prtekra anttsnoc ing and tsne anada, N,gruob m ur and ro ugo o in isr nt het ns m m kc t.ekra mod s wt abrf m no do m y tim thr ns 1983- chas changxe ater at ni C, yb irf ationr ,s 1989- ngirev ngol 2004 ts on ehT.stpiec actof P d fo nter de ing aserT any co re pur n in . m untr be D payer ategergga mexuL K urc tos de arey ke nal atiorepo doir the n urc G deiserlla ude bas co iumgle d .S sori kc inte at doir sr us ar pe at cialiffo sa fo U ticse tos aisr pe ipts is B m edsab atiorepo ryat siore yb ith e fo d incl d nusi a,ero natior ipts )P iten m m ache w iove ceer s tickel D nal ing ctelfer nv capita ia, K pr co ater ater U data r tr the do ticse inef y atad al sioped ceer therev G( agre ton adde us raey-3 capital nda in m intefo rof m amrgorp ro therev aisr t e s th P pe I A d , ipt co natior nac y av th ciatioerped co no ue D yl de, idie ndingel G N nd,alre n do n irF. d nter level- ri ducto se ativnr worg alv rof ia, ncea worg G al pan,aJ,y dea itz tr tioa the quitye adding inte te me e e tr 2004. tioa ity ceer seires pr arey ns and talI adding y al ubss cur seires itarsoped mrif capital do e use iz iz by in A itarsoped s.e ichh us yle ta da noitp in w activ ni l al ntag ssorg rc balte ntag w d ne by 1982- het d de hg yb from ticse singu an, any ategergg ade fo nal ehT. d ehT.y tear fo ductio ns sou nditur in wS,nede activ Q aisr tr ata,d A rouht s A:era neo mod e cerep de ums inus rel cerep pexe A.sei es and,lerI d wS no .)e thefo cri capitaltek doir itarsoped ni deart es eula unto pe capitaltek srevoc tene m D Mar V A the Mar level ationr e stekra DS A eula datalevel- edtup actio m m hot ude dl m ts ncieer ans nnual the kinga tal untr e agre inte activ m N V irf Capital moc desi irf moru ssor ra aug E G cur changxe tr A is and m rautan budgllarev nnual O to A co ar incl and,lecI ain,pS ie Y av n .S. U nter S. S. riptio ipts n S. sc de tioa nter urc( iz urc( yl U.tn ceer U.tn U.tn y d fo rreu rreu (c the s rs) ticalse (c n rreu itars (c d w es sho m capitaltekra ade po rs) sec th llaod tr m tioa de in llaod roaba ripte worg m S. eulav do iz rms de ) d rs S. desi rk th P ble Na ade icitf D teartser ta es ticse U.tn ticse isar ) rs ish capitaltek filanoita ) tr rs U.tn ) rs mata rs) worg de G P P cal CD T eriS mo rreu mo llaod.S D (c D ollad Capital U. Mar rnetni ollad eula rreu ralatipa V (c C ollad D G llaod D G isF E inte.S. 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