



WORLD BANK GROUP

From Isolation to Integration

An Overview of the Borderlands of the Horn of Africa








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of the Horn of Africa*



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Abbreviations and Acronyms

COMESA Common Market for East and Southern Africa

EU European Union

IGAD Intergovernmental Authority on Development

LAPSSET Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport

SDG Sustainable Development Goal

UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees



Overview

The World Bank Group's Horn of Africa Regional Initiative promotes resilience and economic opportunity in one of the world's most challenging regions for security and development. Within the region, extreme poverty, vulnerability, fragility, and food insecurity are disproportionately concentrated in the arid and remote border regions.



Development policy makers and social scientists often suffer from “borderland blindness,” treating the territorially bounded nation-state as both the central unit of analysis and as the primary site of development intervention. Underpinning such a state-centric approach to policy making are three key assumptions: (1) that the state wields sovereignty over its entire territory; (2) that the domestic and international spheres can be clearly delineated; and (3) that group identity is coterminous with the geographical boundaries of a state (see Goodhand 2014: 13). In the Horn of Africa,¹ with its long history of colonial rule, separatism, territorial conflicts within and among states, fluid identities, mobility, and multiple overlapping hybrid governance institutions, *each of these assumptions is demonstrably false.*

A “borderlands” perspective challenges policy makers to reconsider the nature of conflict, development, and state building. By foregrounding the particularities of border regions and the communities that live in them, this perspective reinforces the need to take context and history seriously and to understand power as it actually exists on the ground. It does not yield simple policy prescriptions, but it does offer an analytical lens that complements others, such as the need to explicitly consider the gendered nature of—and responses to—each of these phenomena, as well as the need to foreground environmental concerns. In sum, it can help policy makers craft better-targeted policies.

The borderlands of the Horn of Africa have long been synonymous with economic, social, and

political marginalization; entrenched poverty; conflict and violence; forced displacement; and environmental degradation, spilling across national boundaries. The reach of the state is weak, and livelihoods rely on a combination of informal, illicit, and criminal strategies. In Goodhand’s words (2014): “these regions seem immune to the development successes celebrated at national and international levels.”

But despite its challenges, there are areas in the borderlands with real economic potential. For example, the region’s international borders have long allowed communities to benefit from price differentials through licit and illicit trade (Scott-Villiers 2015). Pastoralism and trade, the dominant livelihoods in the Horn of Africa, require the easy movement of people and goods within and across borders—and continue to heavily rely on cross-country clan and ethnic affiliations. Local institutions therefore still play a key role in regulating and facilitating economic activity and managing conflict, especially as the formal institutions are often weak or absent. Even in areas at the periphery of state control, the borderlands remain highly connected to circuits of global capital and exchange.

Increasing stability and improving the welfare of the people in the borderlands requires a fresh approach unconstrained by international borders. Actions by individual countries to support development in their respective borderland regions could help. But given the importance of transnational mobility to local livelihood patterns and the prevalence of external shocks that straddle international boundaries, including conflicts and natural disasters, development cannot take hold in the absence of a spatial approach. Regional

1. The countries in the Horn of Africa are Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, and Uganda.

collaboration is essential to the joint management of access to grazing lands and water, trade, and security. Cooperation is also needed to harmonize policies on mobility and economic integration. Regional institutions and programs are beginning to show what is possible when countries work together, but much remains to be done.

Developing a Borderlands Approach

The World Bank first discussed the idea of the borderlands serving as potential conflict triggers in a 2014 report entitled *Regional Initiative in Support of the Horn of Africa*, noting the extent to which these areas are contested and fought over. The report cites resource scarcity combined with rapid population growth, poverty, and underdevelopment as exacerbators of communal conflict and civil war in border areas. In the prevalent discourse, borderlands are not regarded as economically or politically important; they are usually inhabited by groups that lack representation in central power structures and are viewed by others as offering limited economic potential. Borderland communities frequently rely on traditional conflict management mechanisms and tools to resolve competition over resources, such as rangeland or water, as well as to manage violence. In many cases, these communities have been overwhelmed by well-financed criminal networks and by armed groups that appeal to the historical grievances of marginalized groups in their recruitment strategies. Border areas are becoming increasingly militarized, with an increase in the circulation of weapons as well as in the number of people who use violence in pursuit of their goals (World Bank 2014a).

To unpack these observations and examine the analytical and policy implications of a borderlands perspective for the World Bank and other national and international policy makers, the World Bank commissioned five background papers, which are being published along with this overview. The remainder of this overview introduces each of the background papers; summarizes some of the drivers of fragility and sources of resilience in the region; discusses key themes that run across the papers, namely, livelihoods, mobility, and gender; sets out recommendations for action; and concludes by touching on some current World Bank initiatives that are relevant to issues identified in the background papers.

Jonathan Goodhand's 2014 paper on the political economy of development in borderlands provides an overarching background to the borderlands approach. His approach is predicated on an understanding of three interconnected elements: (1) power, especially material interests and power relations as mediated by formal and informal institutions; (2) space, particularly the ways in which the flows of people and commodities across space unsettles the orderliness of states; and (3) time and history, or the ways in which neither borderlands nor states develop in a smooth or linear way. When considered in this light, borders are not merely lines demarcating territorial boundaries—they are institutions underpinned by specific interests and power relations and they represent mentalities or ways of thinking about the world bolstered by particular worldviews and ideologies. For instance, labor markets and systems of production may be oriented around borders, and the protection of borders may be the basis on which violence is mobilized.

Goodhand warns against considering the borderlands merely as “lagging regions” that their respective states and development processes will inevitably absorb through improved infrastructure, better connectivity, and investments in people. Instead, borderlands must be understood as political and social spaces, created by the interplay of power, geography, and specific historical context. A borderlands approach does not yield simple policy prescriptions. Take the example of infrastructure development. From a national development angle, roads, railways, communications, and irrigation projects are often rightly seen as necessary public goods that allow “lagging areas” to catch up with the rest of their respective country. However, a borderlands approach demands policy makers consider concerns such as the extent to which political and security objectives of national capitals drive the specific configuration of these infrastructure projects and the manner in which they affect communities residing in borderlands whose livelihoods and trading relationships may be more closely connected to communities across national borders (Goodhand 2014).


The other papers commissioned by this project cover thematic areas and geographically specific borderland regions.² As their point of departure, these papers build on the notion of cross-border “clusters” identified by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These clusters represent regions of the Horn of Africa that have historically suffered from underinvestment and whose challenges and vulnerabilities cannot be

2. Because the papers were commissioned over an extended period of time, they have been lightly updated to account for specific empirical changes that have occurred in the interim, such as the addition of detailed information regarding recent South Sudanese displacement, which has had significant impacts on the region.

tackled by national action alone. All of the clusters are identified based on physical and social factors as well as with their demonstrated importance in terms of human and animal cross-border movement. The four delineated IGAD clusters are Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera, and Dikhil; an additional four clusters are being considered. The papers do not seek to endorse a specific institutional mechanism for dealing with cross-border challenges but instead to analyze the challenges in and identify lessons from areas that have been identified by an existing intergovernmental initiative.

The background papers build off one another. Laura Hammond’s 2017 paper on livelihoods and mobility in the border regions of the Horn of Africa provides a conceptual framework for the study of borderlands. Dereje Feyissa Dori’s paper takes up the discussion of resilience and development assistance in the Horn of Africa. By doing so, they each draw heavily on two rich empirical case studies of IGAD clusters: Patta Scott-Villiers’ paper, which covers the borderland regions from Lake Turkana in the west to the Mandera triangle of Kenya in the east, and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites’ 2015 study, which encompasses the Karamoja cluster, including the borderlands of northeastern and northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. All of the papers assess the interactions between livelihood, mobility, and resilience in the border regions of the Horn of Africa with a view toward informing the design of development interventions that address the drivers of fragility while building on the region’s sources of resilience.

Map O.1. IGAD Clusters



Note: The four IGAD clusters are Karamoja, Borana, Somali/Mandera and Dikhil while a further four clusters are under consideration. All clusters are mainly based on physical and social factors, but also with demonstrated importance for human-animal cross-border movement.

Hammond (2017) also introduces the three analytical frameworks used across the subsequent papers: the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, the Drivers of Migration Framework, and the Household Economy Approach. The analysis generated through the application of these frameworks provides decision makers with actionable data on livelihood patterns, information on the economic welfare of households within the livelihood zones, and an understanding of mobility as a response

to external shocks and in relation to livelihoods. Such approaches can inform decisions on how to minimize forced displacement and distress migration and how to facilitate the kind of mobility that generates income.

The Sustainable Livelihood Framework assesses people’s command over a range of assets: physical, financial, natural, human, and social. The degree to which an individual, household, or community

has access to these assets determines the quality of their livelihood and, in turn, their resilience to shocks and crises, such as conflict and drought. The Household Economy Approach analyzes livelihood zones and provides a detailed rundown of the income, expenditure, and consumption patterns of the people living there. Livelihood zones can then be disaggregated based on wealth group to examine the varying levels of control that people have over assets and the various ways they respond to shocks. Finally, the Drivers of Migration Framework complements the other frameworks by shedding light on how people in different livelihood and wealth groups respond to shocks and how they make decisions about mobility. Understanding these dynamics is crucial in a region where mobility is central to livelihood and crisis response. A borderlands approach combines the three frameworks to provide a detailed understanding of livelihood, welfare, and mobility. Examples abound in the papers by Dereje Feyissa Dori, Patta Scott-Villiers, and Kristen Bushby and Elizabeth Stites.

This approach can serve as a powerful tool for preparedness and adaptation. If drought hits, how will agropastoralists respond? Will they move within or across borders to access water? If violent conflict breaks out, will people flee en masse, or will only the wealthy be able to move to a city? If climatic conditions are favorable to agriculture, can an influx of migrants be expected? Will tightening borders improve security or increase crime and violence by forcing people into “maladaptive” livelihood choices? The answers to such questions can help governments and development agencies identify interventions to protect and promote essential forms of mobility and provide meaningful alternatives to forced migration.

Drivers of Fragility and Sources of Resilience in the Borderlands

Challenges and Drivers of Fragility

High levels of poverty are entrenched in the Horn of Africa despite the existence of natural resource wealth and some of the world’s rapidly growing economies. Existing on the periphery of state control, the borderlands face major development challenges including violent conflict, forced displacement, low agricultural productivity, food insecurity, environmental degradation, climate change vulnerability, natural hazard risks, poor public health, and high levels of illicit money flows as well as human and small-arms trafficking. Violent extremism is an increasing threat. Combined with the other challenges, high rates of population growth have led to stresses on finite land and natural resources. In particular, a large youth cohort is demanding improved social services and increased livelihood opportunities, and most institutions in the region lack the capacity to deal with such stresses. It is important to note, however, that some drivers of fragility can also be sources of resilience; these are discussed in greater detail below.

The geopolitical context in the Horn of Africa has changed markedly since the background papers were commissioned. A tentative peace deal has been agreed between the rival political groups led by President Salva Kiir and Riek Machar in South Sudan, while in Sudan a transitional civilian-led government has replaced the regime led by former President Omar al-Bashir (after nearly 30 years in power). Ethiopia remains in transition, but Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali has made

wide-ranging changes after being elected as prime minister by the ruling Ethiopian People's Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) in April 2018. He began a rapprochement with Eritrea after nearly two decades of stalemate and regional proxy warfare, released political prisoners, pardoned and welcomed back armed groups and opposition members, apologized for human rights violations, and announced his intention to open up the Ethiopian economy. Finally, in Somalia, the federal government has taken notable steps to consolidate its control over regional governments, has undertaken economic reforms, and has also taken concrete steps toward debt relief. The longer-term impact of these geopolitical changes remains to be seen, but the broader structural challenges identified by the background papers continue to remain relevant to the region.

Insecurity and conflict


Insecurity, conflict, displacement, poverty, and underdevelopment are closely related, although the precise relationship depends on context. The Horn of Africa is affected by a number of major conflicts. Bandits and armed groups, including the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Al-Shabaab, are active in some areas. The state's absence is an oft-cited cause of violence, but a heavy-handed state presence that views the borderlands through the prism of security or terrorism can also exacerbate instability and a sense of marginalization. The proliferation of small arms and light weapons has made conflict deadly, regularly triggering the mass displacement of thousands of people fleeing violence. Communal conflict is present in some areas, as are high levels of gender-based violence. Government efforts to control the proliferation of small and light weapons in some areas, such as the Karamoja

triangle, appear to have resulted in knock-on improvements in women's safety, and on existing livestock-based livelihoods—which have been quite dangerous due to cattle-raiding practices, as an example. The impacts of insecurity are heavily gendered across the region. In Karamoja triangle, young men are the most affected by traditional practices around cattle raiding as those who take part in raids and protect the cattle. Women and children have primarily been affected by spill-over effects on their security, such as when they travel outside their villages to collect firewood, water, and food. Women, of course, are disproportionately affected by gender-based violence in general, as well as by forms of structural patriarchy, such as male control over productive assets (Bushby and Stites 2015).

Demography

The population of the Horn of Africa is young and rapidly growing. The “youth bulge” is a significant demographic trend offering opportunities and posing challenges. In Kenya, over 60 percent of the population is under the age of 25; in South Sudan and Somalia, an estimated 70 percent is under the age of 30. Most youth in the region are either unemployed or—more worryingly—underemployed or in highly vulnerable employment. Given that the population is expected to double over the next 23 years, none of the countries across the region is creating jobs quickly enough for the expanding workforce, and young women tend to be particularly disadvantaged in the region's labor markets. High rates of youth unemployment may increase young people's susceptibility to illicit activities and high-risk behavior, especially in political contexts marked by political grievances and perceptions of exclusion from political and economic development.

Map 0.2. Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa



Environmental factors

Risks related to natural hazards, such as floods, drought, and climate change effects, are increasing across the broader Horn of Africa. In the borderlands, environmental hazards typically include erratic and decreasing rainfall, land degradation, and changes to the flood seasons (Hammond 2017). Such events affect soil quality and drive down agricultural productivity, which contributes to widespread food insecurity (see map 0.2). In turn, food insecurity and conflict are major drivers

of displacement in the Horn of Africa. They are also interrelated. In South Sudan, for instance, the declaration of famine in 2017 was closely related to conflict in the country. Further, climate change vulnerability not only affects those pursuing rural livelihoods, but in a region undergoing rapid urbanization, it can also lead to a reduction in available drinking water, affect urban agriculture, and increase the likelihood of floods and other weather-related events.

Socioeconomic factors

Most countries in the Horn of Africa are poor, but extreme poverty is more common in the border regions. Furthermore, while poverty has declined in Africa over the last 20 years, the same is not true for the borderlands. Food insecurity is a significant proxy for a wider range of vulnerabilities, and as map O.2 illustrates, millions of people in the Horn of Africa remain undernourished and at risk of famine. Chronic food crises, a rising number of people living with HIV/AIDS,³ and an increasing incidence of other infectious diseases contribute to high levels of morbidity and mortality. Poverty in the borderlands is deeply gendered, especially where women do not have full control of or access to property or incomes.

Livelihood options are limited; and both public and private investments are minimal. Most people earn a living through pastoralism and/or agropastoralism. Trade across borders, mostly in livestock and consumer goods, also represents a vital source of income. Much trade activity is informal, operating outside of governmental regulation. There has been scant public or private investment to support trade or pastoralism. In fact, public policy has at times been inimical to the interest of pastoralists by supporting commercial agriculture and by tightening borders in response to international security threats.

Displacement

Both mobility and displacement can be drivers of and reactions to development challenges, conflicts, violence, and political persecution. The Horn of Africa is one of the world's main sites of displacement: at the close of 2018 (the latest year for

3. HIV/AIDS = Human immunodeficiency virus/acquired immunodeficiency syndrome.

which statistics are available from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), the countries in the region were hosting 3.9 million refugees or people living in refugee-like situations; and another 120,000 people were seeking asylum.⁴ And given the difficulty of counting displaced persons, these probably underestimate actual numbers. Further, the region continues to receive refugees and asylum seekers from countries in the region as well as from neighboring countries such as the Democratic Republic of Congo, Burundi, and Yemen. Internal displacement is also a major issue: at the end 2018, the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre estimated that there were 8.95 million internally displaced persons living in the region.⁵ Refugee camps and informal settlements located in the region's borderlands shape the economy in significant ways by creating market opportunities and attracting development and humanitarian resources into the region, but can also trigger competition between the displaced and other residents, lead to environmental degradation, and produce changes in livelihood patterns (Hammond 2017; Waters 1999; Whitaker 2002).

Political and governance factors

The capacity of borderlands to cope with vulnerability and fragility risks is becoming increasingly limited for two reasons: (1) the region's formal institutions—including social service delivery, economic and financial systems, law and order,

4. Data are available at http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/persons_of_concern.

5. Data are from <https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/displacement-data>. These numbers may have changed because, as an example, many of the internally displaced in Ethiopia (a significant contributor to the overall number for the region) have since been resettled or have returned to where they had been displaced from. In addition, the total number does not include internally displaced persons in Eritrea (for which no data were available) but does include 31,000 from the disputed region of Abiyei between Sudan and South Sudan.

and justice and safety—remain weak and inconsistent. (2) At the same time, informal institutions have been eroded over time, greatly undermining social, economic, and climate resilience among local populations. It is not always clear who enjoys legitimacy and exercises authority over the borderlands, making a nuanced understanding of governance crucial. As Conciliation Resources (2017) observes, “navigating diverse governance structures and sources of authority in borderlands is vital to more effective peace and development interventions.”

A Zone of Potential: Opportunities and Sources of Resilience

Despite the challenges, opportunities exist for building resilience to cycles of conflict, insecurity, and poverty. For example, border areas offer a “spatial discount,” where buyers, sellers, and employers can take advantage of different prices, wage rates, levels of security, degree of regulation and enforcement, availability of natural resources, quality of health or education systems, and access to markets—*across national borders*. As Goodhand (2014: 19) has argued,

“These dynamics take place not just in the border *but because of the border*. The intensity of economic flows and relations may be greater across the border than with the metropolitan center within the state” (emphasis added).

A good example of this comes from the border regions between Somaliland and the Somali Regional State (Abdi and Hagmann 2020). Borderlands can provide trade corridors for landlocked countries, labor for seasonal agriculture, and increased animal production for export.

Robust trade, especially in livestock

The livestock trade is robust, even in times of conflict. Livestock exports from the Horn of Africa exceed US\$1 billion per year, tapping markets in Egypt and the Middle East even as they remain vulnerable to climate crises and external market shocks (FAO 2018). There is potential for expansion as “the largest part of the borderland economy—the livestock economy—has received hardly any useful investment inside the borderlands themselves” (Scott-Villiers 2015). In particular, the prevalence of pastoralism (or agropastoralism) as the primary livelihood across the borderland region helps sustain this trade, as described in greater detail below.

Mobility for livelihoods and survival

Mobility is a major source of resilience. While recent global attention is focused on forced displacement and mixed migration as a response to external shocks, mobility is and has long been an effective strategy for maintaining livelihoods as people travel in search of employment or better conditions for farming and pastoralism.

Traditional institutions

In an area where state institutions are weak and inefficient, traditional, and informal institutions retain legitimacy. However, the authority of traditional leaders has been diminished by urbanization and by the proliferation of young men with guns making their own rules. Community-based institutions do continue to regulate the livestock trade, manage trade relations, solve problems, and resolve disputes. Many of these institutions are clan-based and cut across artificially imposed international borders.

Urbanization

The rapid urbanization that has taken place across the region has brought development challenges and opportunities. Urbanization affects major as well as secondary cities, although it is the latter that has witnessed the most rapid growth. Some countries have responded to such changes by investing in infrastructure and employment opportunities. Ethiopia, for example, has an ambitious plan to develop industrial parks—which will also employ refugee labor. This has made it necessary for Ethiopia to engage with much broader questions of decentralized service delivery and macroeconomic policy and to balance the needs of the vast majority of its citizens who earn their livelihoods from agriculture or pastoralism with the much smaller group whose livelihood comes from manufacturing (Ronnas and Sarkar 2019). Urbanization has had a major impact on livelihoods: many of the jobs in the newly urbanized and peri-urban areas are informal and precarious, including quarrying, construction, domestic work, and selling mobile phone credits. However, urban populations tend to have better access to services, notably education and health.

The emergence of extractives

The recent expansion of the extractive industries, primarily oil, gas, and mining, represent an opportunity for local economic development. The 2012 discovery of as much as 1 billion barrels of oil in Turkana County in the northwest of Kenya, which shares borders with Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Uganda, has increased the potential for economic development in one of the country's most impoverished areas. Exploration was announced in 2015, and export was scheduled to commence in 2017 but was since delayed to 2021. If well

managed, oil revenues could spur employment and development.

The entrance of extractive industries can attract government attention as well as public and private investment. For example, there are plans for a road network and oil pipeline known as the LAPSET⁶ (Lamu Port-Southern Sudan-Ethiopia Transport) corridor to connect Kenya's coast with South Sudan, Uganda, and Ethiopia. This corridor would link South Sudan's oil to Kenya and open up the potential for additional foreign investment. However, like many such large projects, it is unclear if and how quickly this one will proceed due to security concerns and other geopolitical tensions among the countries of the region. If completed, the LAPSET corridor could potentially demonstrate how investment in neglected borderland areas can spark local development and reduce vulnerability.

Any potential benefits achieved through the extractive industries can be undone by the "resource curse." Tensions arose in Turkana as soon as exploration began. Oil operations blocked off land, denying pastoralists the ability to access to grazing land and local residents to access water. Armed groups launched multiple attacks, seeking extortion payments for personnel and property from the Tullow Oil Corporation to the extent that the company has threatened to withdraw its investment (Achuka 2017). Many of the jobs created have reportedly been allocated to outsiders, with only menial work available to locals. There are fears of rising inequality. Ensuring that locals benefit from oil industry activities requires careful planning, local consultations, and the mitigation

6. For more on LAPSET, see www.lapsset.go.ke/.

Table O.1. Challenges and Opportunities in the Horn of Africa

Challenges and Drivers of Fragility	Opportunities and Sources of Resilience
Isolation. The borderlands are at the margins of the state and are largely neglected.	Spatial discounts. Differences across borders can create opportunities for people to profit from transnational pricing, knowledge and service differentials, and labor opportunities.
Conflict and governance. In addition to the region's major interstate conflicts, there are communal conflicts—often over land or natural resources. These regions are also marked by a higher incidence of gender-based violence and rising violent extremism. Formal institutions generally lack the capacity to manage these stresses; informal institutions can do so but have been eroded over time and are under pressure.	Traditional institutions. Despite challenges, traditional institutions retain legitimacy and influence. Often based on clan or ethnic affiliations, they can cut across borders and play significant roles in providing social stability, regulating trade, and managing conflict.
Displacement. Conflict and climate-induced disasters, including droughts and floods, are causing mass forced displacement. There are around 3.9 million refugees and almost 9 million internally displaced persons living in the region.	Trade and mobility. Trade is robust and resilient, mostly in livestock and consumer goods, continuing even in times of high conflict and in the absence of supporting investment. Trade is facilitated by mobility—the primary resilience strategy as people move in search of better livelihood opportunities or better conditions for farming and livestock.
Poverty. The proportion of people living in poverty has declined slightly, but the absolute number of poor is increasing. Poverty remains highly gendered.	Extractive industries. Emerging industries, including oil and small-scale mining, carry social risks but also offer the potential for local economic development, including connective infrastructure.
Demography. The population is very young and is expected to double in 23 years. This can be seen as both a challenge and an opportunity.	Regional institutions. Approaches are being piloted to promote greater cross-border collaboration and policy harmonization on trade and freedom of movement. However, some regional institutions have been more successful at resolving conflicts than with developmental matters.

of environmental and social impacts, such as land acquisition and involuntary resettlement.

Artisanal and small-scale mining

The artisanal and small-scale mining sector has long been influential in the Karamoja cluster as a source of livelihood and cross-border trade. Although it has generated economic benefits, the work is hazardous and can damage the environment. Furthermore, 62 percent of the 27,000 square kilometers of land in the cluster is now subject to mining licenses, displacing indigenous populations who often lack registered titles. The sector has also

reduced the amount of land available for agropastoralism. Improving occupational health and safety and more inclusively managing land issues could support responsible small-scale mining.

Summary of Challenges and Opportunity

Table O.1 provides a summary overview of the key challenges and drivers of fragility as well as opportunities and sources of resilience in the Horn of Africa.

Some Key Themes

Livelihoods

Livelihood systems in the borderlands cross, defy, and exploit international borders. Drawing on the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, Hammond (2017) maps out livelihood zones for the entirety of the Horn of Africa, demonstrating that while pastoralism and trade stand out as the main livelihoods, some inhabitants engage in agrarian activities, labor, and self-employment. The common thread across the region is that *livelihoods are intrinsically transnational*. The example of the Hawd grazing area is illustrative: Somalis graze their camels in Ethiopia during the dry season, and Ethiopians of the Somali Regional State take advantage of common kinship and language ties to sell their herds in markets across the border in Somalia. Many people and households hold a portfolio of jobs, requiring seasonal movement from rural to urban areas. Gender remains a crucial determinant of livelihood. Women are often responsible for herding smaller animals, maintaining homestead gardens, and marketing agricultural products; men usually do the plowing, sowing, and harvesting.

Pastoralism

In 2015, UNECA (2017: 6) estimated that over 38 million people in the Horn of Africa were pastoralists.⁷ As Feyissa (2016) explains, “Other livelihoods are barely viable.” In areas where land is more fertile and rainfall more abundant, such as in the southern tip of the Horn, many people pursue

7. www.worldbank.org/en/news/press-release/2014/03/18/world-bank-pastoralists-horn-africa. This should be considered a very broad estimate. It is difficult to accurately count pastoralists in the Horn of Africa because of (1) major data constraints in the region and (2) difficulties of classification.

agropastoralism as a dual subsistence strategy to balance the risk of pursuing either livestock or farming alone.

Pastoral communities rely on shared livestock management practices, use of grassland and water resources, trade links, and access to information about weather, prices, and the availability of water. Many agricultural communities take advantage of borders by marketing produce in towns and cities across their border. Others attract seasonal labor from bordering countries.

Decisions regarding livestock mobility—where to go and when—are based on local knowledge and traditional systems of governance. However, pastoralists are increasingly using technology, such as mobile phones, to access information about market prices and trade opportunities. Satellite imagery can provide information on vegetation, informing better migration decisions and thereby reducing livestock mortality rates.

Trade

Trade in livestock and consumer goods is vibrant in the borderland region. While systematic and up-to-date data are extremely difficult to obtain, the extent of the livestock trade can be estimated using multiple sources. For example, one authoritative study estimates that the total value of Ethiopian cattle, goats, sheep, and camels sold across the border in Somalia, Kenya, and Djibouti in 2009 was US\$250–300 million (Aklilu and Catley 2009; Hammond 2017). In 2005, turnover at a single market on the Ethiopia–Somalia border was US\$50 million; more recently, the value of the livestock trade on the Somaliland border was an estimated US\$ 200–300 million—about four or five

times the officially recorded level (World Bank and DFID 2019). Livestock exports—particularly those to Gulf countries—play an outsized role in some countries' economies. In 2015, the World Bank and the Food and Agriculture Organization estimated that Somalia had exported 5.3 million animals (World Bank and FAO 2018). However, the outsized importance of the livestock trade also means that countries remain extremely vulnerable to the effects of climate change and the outbreaks of disease, as illustrated by the livestock exports from Somalia in 2016 and 2017. A combination of a Saudi ban on Somali livestock imposed at the end of 2016 due to an outbreak of disease (temporarily lifted for the haj season of July–September 2017) and the impact of the drought on the health of animals and on herd losses led to a sharp fall in exports from 5.3 million animals in 2015 to 1.3 million in 2017 (Sarkar and Serriere 2019).

Small traders, including many women, transport kerosene, cooking oil, grain, pasta, cloth, and even luxury items—such as electronics from ports on the Indian Ocean—to and through the borderlands. Illicit trade in weapons is also a lucrative industry, albeit a major challenge to security. In communities living in border areas, most opportunities come from the informal sector, particularly for women. Informal trade outweighs formal trade by a factor of 30 in some areas. Important sources of income for people living in border communities include trade in livestock, khat (a local stimulant), cereals, second-hand clothing, and consumer goods that are either produced in the region or imported (usually from Gulf states) and then

moved farther inland.⁸ Over half of the informal cross-border traders in the region are women.

Clan and kinship ties are crucial to cross-border trade. Most transactions cover relatively short spans. Traded goods are handed over to other actors in the value chain, who in turn pass them to others higher up the chain. Clan affiliations are central to trust and connections across borders, and they provide a form of protection against rent-seeking officials, warlords, and armed groups seeking to disrupt trade. Traditional customary institutions therefore play a crucial role in managing trade activities and resolving disputes. These institutions are often clan-based, so they can cut across international boundaries and at times clash with state authorities.

A range of factors hampers intraregional trade. Intraregional exports among the IGAD countries was estimated at US\$1.9 billion in 2011 (more recent figures are difficult to find). While this is an increase in real terms, it is a four percent decline in the share of overall intraregional export since 2000 due to: (1) a lack of infrastructure connecting the countries of the subregion; (2) the fact that countries in the region tend to produce similar commodities, which limits trade complementarities; (3) the economic imbalance among members; (4) ineffective taxation systems and tariff barriers; and (5) overlapping memberships in regional groupings that duplicates efforts and makes institutions compete with one another.

8. Not all border regions are on land—the Red Sea is a critical “borderland” to communities living in the region, with livelihoods, trade, mobility, and conflict playing out across the sea-border in many of the same ways that they do on land.

Box O.1. Trade, Pastoralism, and Mobility in the Horn of Africa: The Karamoja Cluster

The Karamoja cluster includes northeastern Uganda, northwestern Uganda, northwestern Kenya, southeastern South Sudan, and southwestern Ethiopia. While diverse, many of the groups in the area share a similar language, livelihood patterns, and cultural practices.

Most people in the cluster are agropastoralists, combining a nomadic livestock-based livelihood with sedentary agriculture. Mobility, including the crossing of international boundaries, is central to agropastoralism in terms of accessing grazing land, water, and markets.

Security in the cluster has improved, but challenges persist. South Sudan remains unstable. Bandits operate in the Turkana region of Kenya, extorting money from local people. Cattle raiding, which has become violent, is frequently used as a means of redistributing wealth. Communal conflicts have been triggered by the presence of the extractive industry and have arisen between pastoralists and farmers over communal land. Fluid migratory patterns support pastoralism but also contribute to cross-border conflicts.

Livestock-based livelihoods are the predominant source of income because they are well adapted to minimal and variable rainfall. Livestock also provides social and cultural capital as they are an indicator of wealth. Government policies, poverty, and conflict are pushing people out of pastoralism and into agrarian or urban livelihoods, especially in Uganda. Some households make this shift permanently; others move seasonally or split households. In urban areas, many people have a portfolio of jobs, engag-

ing in activities like informal trading or manual labor. The extractive industries are emerging as a potential source of employment in various parts of the cluster, but not without social risk.

Social and family networks are essential to livelihoods in the cluster; and community-based institutions and traditional alliances are crucial to accessing grazing land and to the sophisticated networks that underpin the exchange of goods and services, such as livestock; consumer goods; and illicit trade; including small arms and light weapons.

As government policies favoring sedentary agriculture makes pastoralism more difficult, a variety of “maladaptive” livelihood practices have emerged, including cattle raiding, trading in firewood and charcoal, engaging in banditry, and joining armed groups. Limitations on mobility also hinder pastoralism in the cluster. Restrictions have been imposed for reasons of security, the gazetting of land as national parks, the growth of private investment, and private land titling. Poor infrastructure also negatively impacts mobility.

The Karamoja cluster functions through hybrid systems of governance that rely on formal and informal institutions. Formal institutions of the state are generally weak and inefficient. And while violence has undermined their authority, traditional institutions continue to have legitimacy and power within societies, including customary justice institutions, which play a crucial role in settling disputes.

States have been taking measures to formalize informal trade. Ethiopia and Sudan have agreed that small traders are allowed to make 48 cross-border trips per year with goods valued at a maximum of US\$117 per trip. Ethiopia has also placed value and movement limits on trade with Djibouti, Kenya, and Somalia.

The formalization of trade protects licensed traders and generates revenue for the government, but it hinders traders who cannot secure licenses. Unlicensed traders tend to come from marginalized groups, such as women and the very poor; and licensing regimes create rent-seeking opportunities. Movement restrictions impact pastoralists dramatically, sometimes forcing them to overgraze, which degrades the land and depletes the water table. Pastoralists then can feel forced to engage in maladaptive livelihoods. The example of the Karamoja cluster vividly illustrates the intersection of spatial aspects, livelihoods, and mobility in the Horn of Africa (see box O.1).

Despite these challenges, the prospects for greater regional economic integration through trade and mobility are considerable. Improving transport links, including corridors to the major seaports; developing secondary seaports and the Ethiopian power sector; and proceeding with the LAPSET project could accelerate regional economic linkages and trade. Efforts in the border regions to improve the management of shared water resources, enhance the common management of pastoral rangelands, and promote the free movement of people could also increase cross-border trade.

Finally, it is worth noting that policy makers can draw on the experiences of other regions as they try to leverage the importance of cross-border

trade in the pursuit of greater cooperation and integration. For instance, small-scale cross-border trade (dominated by women) is an important issue driving a greater dialogue on trade between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda. Some monitoring systems have been developed to capture data on the extent and the nature of small-scale trade to further remove barriers and facilitate such commerce. Facilitation of cross-border trade has been mainstreamed into the national trade policies of some countries; and with World Bank assistance, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), a regional economic community, has developed and adopted a charter to help normalize the processing of small-scale trade at the border. This, in turn, has reduced harassment and bribe-seeking, and has facilitated border crossings. COMESA and the East African Community, another regional economic community, have also developed simplified trading regimes to facilitate the formalization of trading businesses without imposing insurmountable regulatory and tax burdens.

Diversification and maladaptive livelihoods

While pastoralism and trade remain dominant, livelihood patterns continue to evolve. Many people in the Horn of Africa have had to diversify their livelihoods in the face of increasing populations and a depletion of the natural resource base due to environmental changes, large-scale infrastructure projects, and restrictions on cross-border mobility. Some have moved into urban areas or are engaged in agrarian activities, either permanently or seasonally. The extractive industries are creating some job opportunities as well.

Where diversification is not possible, people can fall out of pastoralism and take up high-risk livelihoods such as:

“various and potentially damaging livelihood strategies, including unsustainable use of natural resources, such as cutting trees for charcoal production and sale, sending daughters to work as house servants in towns, thereby exposing them to risk of abuse; engaging in illegal contraband trade; and criminal activity such as ‘organized livestock raiding’ or banditry.” (Feyissa 2016)

Across the region, technical initiatives to increase food production or reduce pressure on natural resources have been elusive, largely because of environmental and social constraints. Alternate nontechnical operations focused on human capacity building may hold the key to future efforts toward livelihood diversification and improving risk management (Coppock et al. 2011). One such initiative targeted the Borana, who were once considered a model of sustainable pastoralism in East Africa but who had grown progressively poorer and more vulnerable due to a combination of population growth and development investment, a trend exacerbated by repeated droughts. A participatory process was implemented that involved the pastoral community in problem diagnosis, charting pathways for change and ultimately the implementation of interventions. The process, which involved collective action, microfinancing, and participatory education, resulted in women taking on leadership roles, major improvements in the quality of life, accumulation of wealth, reduction of hunger, and management of risk (Coppock et al. 2011: 395). Interventions like this can be models for borderlands programming. In other words, development policy makers need to build elements of human capacity building into their programmatic interventions in addition to the spatial element of borderlands programming.

Mobility

Given the importance of trade and pastoralism to the livelihoods and resilience of the people of the borderlands, freedom of movement is crucial. Such freedom allows a trader from Somalia to buy cheap livestock in Ethiopia and then sell it in Kenya, where the prices are higher. Even small price differentials can mean the difference between survival and extreme poverty. Furthermore, where movement is restricted, the effect on trade disadvantages both the people living in the border zones as well as people relying on goods further along the value chain. For example, vegetables grown in the agropastoral zones of Ethiopia are traded in border-area markets for ultimate distribution in southern Somalia. Blocking borders can impact markets as far away as Mogadishu. In the western borderlands, along the Ethiopia–Sudan border, agricultural production also depends on the mobility of agricultural labor, domestically and across borders.

Mobility is particularly essential for pastoralism because in areas where it is the dominant livelihood, people must be able to move around a wide area to access essential resources for themselves and for their herds. Constraining pastoralist movement leads to overgrazing, depletion of the surface water table, and long-term degradation of rangeland resources (Hammond 2017). While agropastoralism and irrigated agriculture is possible in some border areas, this is not the case for most of the border regions in the eastern part of the Horn of Africa, where the land is not suitable for sedentary agriculture, making the transhumant livelihood practice necessary.

The key to understanding the role of mobility in resilience and vulnerability is an analysis of how

mobility influences daily livelihood practices and adaptation to shocks. Most forms of mobility in the Horn of Africa are driven by multiple overlapping drivers, including migration to sustain specific types of livelihoods; longer-term movement for economic gain or to find employment; involuntary movement due to violence, conflict, or persecution; or displacement caused by environmental changes such as drought, flood, deforestation, or other extreme weather events—which are increasingly common in the Horn of Africa. Mobility is, of course, regulated by multiple legal regimes, but decisions about who migrates, where to, and when, are both gendered and generational. For instance, in erstwhile northern Bahr el-Ghazal state (on the border regions between South Sudan and Sudan)—civil war has led to profound changes in livelihood patterns and an increasing reliance on market economies in societies previously dependent on cattle ownership. Young men have begun to migrate, either to join armed groups or in search of paid wage labor in Sudan; young women have taken jobs marketing produce and, if able to, have migrated to Sudan in search of paid work, profoundly restructuring family and intergenerational relationships (Majok 2019).

Gender

As previously mentioned, like the other phenomena discussed in the background papers, livelihood strategies, migration, and mobility are deeply gendered. In pastoral communities, culturally defined divisions of labor mean that women are usually responsible for herding smaller animals, such as sheep, goats, and sometimes cattle, remaining close to their homes, while men take their camels farther in search of grazing areas during the dry season.⁹ This pattern weakens the

overall food security of households as husbands and wives can be separated for several months per year, and women and children providing for themselves while the men are away. In agricultural areas, women are normally responsible for homestead gardens and for weeding larger plots; men plow, sow, and harvest. Women are often also responsible for marketing the agricultural products, which makes them effective managers of the household economy (Hammond 2017). Climate change, economic crises, conflict, and insecurity therefore have very different impacts on men and women across the region—leading to a re-shaping of these culturally defined gender roles and, in many cases, driving the decisions of young men and women to migrate (Feyissa 2016). Many traders engaged in small-scale, cross-border, and informal trade are women. Compared with men, they have lower profit margins, face greater security risks, and are less able to protect themselves against exploitation.

As previously noted, gender influences people's decisions about movement. During times of food insecurity and economic hardship, women may move into cities or stay with relatives, while men move farther afield for labor migration, to graze camels or other large animals, or to find work in other countries. There is a higher proportion of women to men in refugee camps than in society more generally because women are more likely to seek assistance for their children while men are more likely to be engaged in employment, business, military activity, or maintaining the family's property in the area of origin. Another major form of gendered migration is the movement of young women from the Horn of Africa to Gulf countries

9. In other words, women frequently engage in the production and marketing of small livestock, as well as in the processing

and marketing of livestock products, while men are more engaged in the production and marketing of larger livestock, such as camels, cattle, and donkeys (World Bank and DFID 2019).

to find employment as domestic workers. In 2013, the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Consular Monitoring and Support Directorate estimated that 1,500 Ethiopian women were leaving the country every day, and unlike men who leave the country for the Gulf or another destination, the women usually travel with the assistance of a private employment agency, which secures them an offer of employment—or at least claims to—prior to departure (Hammond 2017). Once at their destination, many women work under precarious conditions; and reports of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse by employers are common. The borderlands play a critical role in many of these journeys: while some women travel to Gulf countries by plane, many others travel over land to one of the numerous ports that dot the Horn of Africa's coast. Border crossings are risky. If a woman lacks the necessary documentation and permission to cross the border, or if they are traveling using smuggling networks, she is at risk of being extorted and sexually assaulted (RMMS 2014).

Operational Implications

Livelihood and mobility patterns in the borderlands highlight the need to support pastoralists and small-scale traders. In practical terms, this would entail infrastructure investments, including roads and electricity, as well as mobile phone and Internet coverage to enhance communications and access to market and climate information. Extension services could expand to serve pastoralists, including mobile phones. Policy makers in the region could draw on lessons from other regions and countries (specifically COMESA) that have been helpful in facilitating cross-border small-scale traders. In turn, cross-border trade can act as a “hook” for closer cross-border cooperation and integration.

Enhancing livelihoods in the borderlands goes hand-in-hand with building resilience. Localized cross-border collaboration and the integration of formal and informal institutions and civil society could help capitalize on thriving informal trade routes and the versatility and interconnectedness of its business communities. As such, opportunities and entry points exist to soften borders, promote public safety, build capacity for cross-border government collaboration, deregulate trade, and develop cross-border livelihoods. Further, policy makers should draw on existing success stories, such as interventions aimed at building human capacity in pastoralist communities, which may hold the key to future livelihood diversification and improving risk management (Coppock et al. 2011).

At the policy level, decisions that limit trade and access to pastoral lands should be carefully reviewed. Issues of concern include the expansion of commercial agriculture, extractive industries, and even national parks. In addition, an assessment is needed regarding the implications of tightening borders and converting trade from informal to formal.

Informal clan- and ethnic-based institutions can act as a bulwark against cross-border mobility risks. Given their prevailing legitimacy and authority, support should be extended to such institutions to strengthen their capacity to govern economic activity and resolve disputes.

Finally, the absence of robust and reliable data compounds borderland blindness. Datasets and strategies of social inquiry are bound to the nation state. Statistics are largely based on national, aggregated datasets. There is an urgent need to collect better and more borderlands-focused data.

Institutional and Policy Context for Regional Action

Regional Initiatives

There is an increasing recognition among countries and regional organizations in the Horn of Africa that the borderlands require regional action. Despite the challenges of its weak economies, political instability, violent conflict, and economic imbalances between countries, analysts still conclude that “the prospects for regional integration [in the Horn of Africa] ... look good” (Feyissa 2016: 13). Important building blocks underpin deeper regional collaboration. In 2015, under the auspices of IGAD, the countries of the Horn of Africa, international development partners, and financial institutions instituted a “borderlands partnership.” The IGAD’s cross-border cluster approach, referred to earlier, provides an entry point for concrete action (see map O.1). The clusters represent zones that share resources, services, and cultural values, often bound by clan and/or ethnic networks. The clusters also tend to be pastoral or agropastoral in nature. Some basic analysis has been completed: most of the Horn of Africa has been assessed using the Household Economy Approach, and livelihood zone maps have been prepared for each of the member countries (see Hammond 2017).

Bilateral, multilateral, and regional institutions support cross-border initiatives. Kenya and Ethiopia are piloting an integrated cross-border development program to tackle deficits in development and security. The IGAD Drought Disaster Resilience and Sustainability Initiative fosters regional collaboration on natural resource management, market access and trade, livelihood support, and conflict prevention. The African Union’s Border Program

aims to promote “peaceful, open and prosperous borders” (AU Peace and Security 2018). The African Union is committed to instituting a system of electronic passports to facilitate visa-free movement in the continent by 2020, although it is unclear whether this will be achievable. The EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa has provided €63 million for cross-border activities, focusing on stability in the four IGAD clusters. The European Union is also supporting research to better understand the dynamics of cross-border economies as zones of common livelihood practice. And finally, the Horn of Africa Regional Resilience Network of the United States Agency for International Development seeks to strengthen regional and cross-border collaboration to expand livelihood opportunities, strengthen governance, and improve human capital.

At the bilateral level, trade, mobility, and cooperation agreements impact cross-border dynamics. In 2013, Kenya and Uganda signed a memorandum of understanding that harmonized the assessment and control of transboundary animal diseases. They have also established a harmonized regulatory and customs system for trade.

Despite the number of regional and donor-supported initiatives, tensions between regional and national action persist. National agricultural policies tend to favor sedentary agriculture and commercialization, often at the expense of pastoralism. The expansion of extractive industries—and even national parks for conservation purposes—reduces the land available to pastoralists, forcing many into less sustainable livelihood choices, including participation in armed groups. Further, national security policies often result in the tightening of borders, which restricts trade and pastoralist activities.

In the absence of a focused approach to the borderlands, national and regional initiatives remain mostly uncoordinated. A clear opening therefore exists to strengthen regional cooperation through a dedicated borderlands approach. The precise institutional configuration for engaging in the borderlands also remains open for discussion.

Relevant Initiatives within the World Bank

Some recent World Bank initiatives have taken up the issues identified in the background papers presented here, including an updated regional integration strategy for Africa; a World Bank strategy on fragility, conflict, and violence that is the process of being finalized; and a new Horn of Africa initiative. The findings of these papers are relevant to all of these initiatives. For example, the draft fragility, conflict, and violence strategy builds on the joint United Nations/World Bank report, *Pathways for Peace* (2018), which emphasizes inclusion as a key value to mitigate the drivers of conflict (UN and World Bank 2018). The findings of the papers presented here can help influence how the strategy is operationalized on the ground, especially in terms of preventing violent conflict and/or interpersonal violence, helping countries transition out of fragility, and mitigating spillover effects. In particular, both the draft World Bank strategy and the background papers recognize the need to take a spatial approach in addressing fragility at the community, subnational, and regional levels and in tackling cross-border challenges.

The World Bank's new Horn of Africa Initiative has four pillars of engagement. The first focuses on regional infrastructure networks covering

economic corridors, energy transmission, and steps toward the formation of a single digital market. The second focuses on trade and economic integration and aims to facilitate trade in priority corridors, develop regional value chains, and improve the investment climate. The third pillar, which focuses on resilience and climate change, is aimed at building resilience to climatic shocks. And the focus of the fourth pillar is the development of human capital. The borderlands papers can provide useful programmatic insights for each of the four pillars as the initiative progresses.

Recommendations for Action

Addressing the security and development deficits in the borderlands will require integrated action on three fronts (summarized table O.2). First, regional collaboration at the policy and institutional levels is needed to ease the flow of capital, labor, goods, and services. Second, to mitigate the impact of geographic isolation and neglect, investments are needed in basic infrastructure and social services, such as roads, energy, education, health, water, information and communications technology, and access to finance. Finally, given the quality of governance and presence of conflict, there is a risk that investments will not be sustained. Hence, formal and informal institutions should be supported to strengthen collaborative border management and their capacity for conflict management and violence prevention. Needless to say, all interventions need to be extremely sensitive to the gendered nature of livelihood and resilience strategies across the Horn of Africa, as well as the gendered impact of conflict, insecurity, and violence.

Table O.2. Supporting Development and Stability in the Borderlands

Strategic development challenges	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Borderlands are isolated, poor, and insecure. • Access is limited to infrastructure, social services, and livelihoods. • Freedom of movement for people and goods is essential to livelihoods and survival but is restricted by some states for security reasons, creating the need for regional collaboration to deal with cross-border issues. • Governance systems are hybrid and often weak. 	
Programmatic response	Short-Term	Medium to Long-Term
Regional integration and collaboration	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support regional dialogue through IGAD and the African Union for cross-border management of natural resources, including water and grazing land. • Provide technical support to IGAD to manage the regional dialogue. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand regional dialogue to harmonize policies on trade and freedom of movement. • Build capacity for collaborative border management of the movement of people and livestock and of security threats.
Strengthening social contracts through infrastructure and social and economic services	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Invest in basic services—health, education, and water—including through cross-border planning and sharing of resources in identified livelihood zones. • Support community-based projects for climate change adaptation. • Expand investment in transport, energy, and mobile phone coverage for market linkages and to promote private sector development. • Provide livelihood assistance, particularly focused on agropastoralism and informal cross-border trade. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Expand Internet connectivity. • Expand skills-based livelihood programs for youth. • Support access to finance, including through e-banking.
Strengthening local institutions	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Build the capacity of formal and informal institutions to manage economic activity and conflict. 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Support cross-border collaboration for development planning and shared investments in infrastructure and basic services.
Coordination and partnerships	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Partner with IGAD Secretariat and African Union for regional dialogue and collaboration. • Conduct joint analytical and operational work with Horn of Africa Initiative development partners. • Establish private sector reference group to advise on investments and job creation. 	

IGAD = Intergovernmental Authority on Development.

The borderlands approach seeks to address the drivers of fragility in the Horn of Africa based on the following principles:

- Facilitate mobility and trade as central to livelihoods in the region;
- Prioritize the poor and vulnerable, particularly youths and women;
- Support preparedness to minimize mixed migration; and
- Follow a community-driven approach to promote participation and transparency.

Cross-border initiatives need to be multisectoral and must address livelihoods, institutions, and stability/security in the following areas:

- Regional cooperation to strengthen and harmonize policies for the movement of people and goods that builds on the draft Protocol on the Free Movement of People and to promote the joint management of resources and development planning;
- Establishment and strengthening of social contracts between states and borderland communities by investing in infrastructure and social and economic services;
- Local and community-based climate change adaptation;
- Local livelihood opportunities, focused on at-risk youths and women; and
- Support to formal and informal institutions for social cohesion and conflict prevention.

Regional Cooperation and Integration

Additional support to existing development initiatives is needed, including those formulated by IGAD and the African Union on borderlands, to strengthen platforms for dialogue as well as technical capacities aimed at: (1) harmonizing policies on trade and freedom of movement, including by building on lessons from other countries and regional economic communities; (2) promoting the shared management of water and land resources; and (3) facilitating cross-border development planning for shared investments in infrastructure and social and economic services.

Infrastructure and Social and Economic Services

Regional transport and energy infrastructure are poor in the Horn of Africa, which exacerbates the impact of isolation and hinders trade and investment. Transportation links could facilitate private investment, connect smaller markets, and support livestock routes. Access to power is limited and needs to be expanded in rural areas and secondary cities. Expanding information and communications technology services, such as mobile phone coverage and Internet connectivity, would reduce isolation and improve access to information on markets and climate.

Shared investments in health and education require cross-border planning and resource sharing among local governments. Many children from Somalia and Ethiopia, for example, attend school in Kenya, where the quality of education is thought to be higher. Greater use of shared services could maximize limited resources.

Adaptation to Climate Change

Because of the region's vulnerability, all activities under a borderlands approach must be climate-informed. Community-based projects are a viable means of supporting climate change adaptation, and many local civil society organizations have the capacity to support communities. Local government capacity for cross-border collaboration on climate change adaptation could be enhanced.

Supporting Livelihood Opportunities

Agriculture and pastoralism are the bedrock livelihoods of the Horn of Africa and must be the focus of livelihood assistance to the region. Support could include the following:

- **Informal cross-border trading to help small traders and to build the private sector base for future growth and development.** This could also act as a hook for greater regional integration or cross-border cooperation, as the example of COMESA illustrates.
- **Alternative cross-border, market-based livelihood projects, including for youth.** Projects should seek to improve livelihoods, strengthen livelihood resilience, and increase incomes, primarily through skills that support wage employment and self-employment in the traditional agropastoralism sectors and that respond to market demand. There should be a focus on youth, given the high levels of unemployment and the risk of their being pulled into crime and violence.
- **Access to finance.** This effort could include e-banking to harness the growing levels of mobile phone ownership.

Strengthening Institutions

Community-based institutions continue to play an important role in managing economic activity and dispute resolution. While the traditional leaders' authority is being eroded by youths in armed and criminal groups, they still retain considerable sociocultural capital. Supporting local leaders by enhancing their mediation and conflict resolution skills can help manage conflict in this fragile region, including economic disputes and gender-based violence.

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