33084 Capacity Enhancement b r i e f s S H A R I N G B E S T P R A C T I C E S A N D L E S S O N S L E A R N E D BUILDING CAPACITY IN POST-CONFLICT COUNTRIES Alastair J. McKechnie, Country Director for Afghanistan, Bhutan, Maldives, and Regional Programs in the South Asia Region, World Bank This brief looks at the challenge of building capacity in post-conflict countries, reviews options for 1 creating capacity, and identifies trade-offs between a rapid result and longer-term impacts of capacity strategies. Six lessons for more sustainable approaches to capacity building are identified: (a) leadership matters, (b) incentives also matter, (c) build on what exists, (d) arrange learning activities within a country wherever possible, (e) training needs to be defined in its strategic capacity, and (f) training should build on the comparative advantage of international partners. The Context for Building Capacity under Second, a conflict-affected country's ability to uti- Post-Conflict Conditions lize aid is low immediately after the conflict due to Those of us partnering with countries to build institutional and physical constraints. World Bank capacity to reconstruct in a post-conflict environ- research shows that absorptive capacity for aid is ment must at the outset become fully aware of the relatively low for three years after the conflict. In context in which we operate. Apart from the obvi- the next seven years, this capacity is double its ous destruction of infrastructure, presence of normal level, growing two percentage points on armed groups, and difficult working conditions, we average a year, but peaking between the third and 2 need to appreciate several other characteristics of seventh years, before tapering off. post-conflict conditions: Third, public expectations of the benefits from First, civil conflicts seldom end in clear-cut victo- peace are likely to be unrealistically high. After ries for one side. Nonetheless, some elements of suffering from war, the people expect a "peace divi- "winners" and "losers" exist, although the winners dend" and want it immediately. are likely to have settled for less than they sought Fourth, donor pressures to achieve early results to achieve. Moreover, even if one side appears to are also likely to be unrealistically high. Donor have "won," how that winner treats the defeated country policymakers rarely understand either the party is critical to national reconciliation and the project planning, design, procurement, delivery and sustainability of peace. Failure to effect genuine construction process or the institutional constraints reconciliation is likely to lead either to an unstable to project implementation. This is compounded by alliance of competing parties or to an uneasy coali- the "CNN effect," which heightens international tion between former fighters and technocrats who interest when the country is least able to absorb sat out the war in relative comfort abroad. aid and diminishes such interest when the country is able to utilize foreign assistance most effectively. M A R C H 2 0 0 4 NUMBER 5 Options for Creating Capacity to processes. It remains to be proven whether bypass- Reconstruct ing, rather than building local capacity, produces Given the risks of conflict re-emerging and high results more quickly. expectations inside and outside the country for Buy capacity. Governments may buy capacity by results on the ground, the challenge for the post- contracting services to the private or nongovern- conflict government is to lift the ability of the mental sectors, particularly when there is no time country to absorb aid productively when donor to build indigenous capacity. It may also be neces- resources are most likely to be available. Because sary to establish confidence in the government, the greatest capacity constraints to implementing particularly to assure donors that their funds will programs are institutional--human and organiza- be well spent. In such circumstances hiring inter- tional--early institution strengthening will not national firms to provide key fiduciary services only provide long-term benefits from aid, but such as procurement, financial management, and enable effective use of aid when most available audit services has been successful, for example, in and mitigate risks from unfulfilled expectations; Afghanistan. In other countries, large international however, this can be difficult in the immediate firms have been engaged to provide a broad range post-conflict period and has been addressed in sev- of services--so-called "reconstruction consul- eral ways: tants"--but with mixed success. Few firms can Bypass weak government capacity. Donors are offer a wide breadth of services with uniform tech- often tempted to bypass weak government capacity nical depth, and large firms may lack the agility or and rebuild the country themselves, that is, con- experience to respond to the unpredictable reality tract services directly and provide assistance in of a post-conflict country. Buying capacity can kind. This strategy appears most attractive when work when no other option exists, but it is better government institutions are demonstrably weak, to employ a number of medium-sized firms, each skilled nationals are in short supply, and fiduciary with particular strengths. systems to ensure money goes to intended pur- Such external service providers also often have a poses are poorly or not at all developed. A bypass- conflict of interest: they see the merit of undertak- ing strategy seems even more attractive when fail- ing the reconstruction process well, but have a ure of the reconstruction program has regional or financial incentive to structure reconstruction to global costs or jeopardizes the prestige of the assure their long-term presence in the country. donor. External suppliers, therefore, tend to focus more on A bypassing strategy, however, can undercut the the quick results of emergency rehabilitation and more important long-term strategy of transforming often lack skills to develop the capacity of nation- weak institutions into capable ones in a manner als to take over the effort once the firms depart. It that allows a people and their leaders to take own- is important, therefore, that post-conflict govern- ership of post-conflict development policy. Even in ments hold these external firms accountable for the short term, bypassing may not achieve antici- transferring knowledge and skills to nationals. pated results. Donor country firms may not per- Create temporary capacity. In between buying and form well in a post-conflict situation, where logis- building permanent capacity is a strategy to build tics, start-up, and learning local conditions may temporary capacity to jumpstart a reconstruction cause formidable costs and delays. The recipient program before more permanent capacity can be country bureaucracy may refuse to cooperate or, at put in place. One solution is to attract nationals best, passively support foreign interventions, and with good technical skills residing abroad back to technical and institutional solutions designed with- senior government positions in a managerial out local participation may turn out culturally, and/or advisory role. These advisors may be per- institutionally, and/or economically inappropriate, manent or temporary, although one hopes they will creating citizen resentment. Moreover, bypassing sink roots into their country and remain. Tensions local institutions is often more expensive than local can arise, however, between those who lived out- solutions, particularly when aid money is used to side of and those who remained in the country fund donor country firms and NGOs and these are during the conflict. Foreign advisors with good not selected through competitive and transparent technical skills and cultural sensitivity have M A R C H 2 0 0 4 NUMBER 5 worked well, but these people are first and fore- ety, are respected for their abilities, and have most advisors, not policymakers. integrity. They can also communicate their vision, Another temporary approach is a local aid man- programs, and achievements to society; attract agement agency. These concentrate scarce technical high-quality staff and advisors; and mobilize fund- and decision-making skills and provide fiduciary ing. assurance to donors as part of a multidonor trust Incentives also matter. It is almost impossible to fund process that is designed to generate, coordi- attract and retain motivated staff and fight corrup- nate, and streamline donor funding of reconstruc- tion unless staff receive decent pay for honest work tion programs, among others. Such aid manage- 3 and merit forms the basis for selection and promo- ment agencies have in several post-conflict tion, rather than factional or ethnic bias. Creating situations made up for weak government capacity. the right incentives may require a fundamental For example, the Council for Development and restructuring of the civil service, which is difficult Reconstruction in Lebanon, the Palestinian in the frenetic atmosphere of post-conflict recon- Economic Council for Development and struction; however, the process need not be com- Reconstruction in West Bank and Gaza, and the prehensive and completed immediately, but create Afghan Assistance Coordination Authority have all permanent islands of excellence as a first step in formed useful bridges between donors and the longer reform. country during the early years of reconstruction. Build on what exists. Institutions that survive a Similar to entrenched external suppliers who war may be more resilient than they appear. For undercut local capacity building, however, such example, the Afghani system of local government agencies are easier to start up than end, particu- has in many respects survived two decades of con- larly when they become governments within gov- flict. Municipalities in the West Bank and Gaza ernments with little or no accountability to an have maintained good administrative and financial elected leadership. Often corrupt, they can prevent capacity. Often U.N. agencies and NGOs have the development of capacity in conventional ministries field presence and experience of implementing that do face accountability mechanisms. To suc- humanitarian programs that can be scaled up to ceed, an aid management agency must have a implement government reconstruction programs, charter with built-in sunset provisions transferring possibly changing their roles from independent its functions to other ministries as they develop actors to government contractors. capacity. This is happening in Afghanistan with the Arrange learning activities within the country transfer of aid coordination and payments process- wherever possible. Because country capacity is ing to the Ministry of Finance, reconstruction pro- already scarce in a post-conflict country, sending gram management and fiduciary capacity to the people out of the country for training and meetings new Ministry of Economy, and capacity building to does not make sense, unless absolutely essential, the Civil Service Commission. and can slow reconstruction; instead, such activi- ties should be used selectively and targeted for Building Permanent Capacity results. Most knowledge needed for work is not Building permanent capacity is clearly the best acquired in classrooms, so support should go to option, if not an immediately feasible one, but will knowledge outcomes, not learning instruments. only work if initiated early in the reconstruction Instruments should provide on-the-job, just-in- process and must move ahead in parallel with tem- time knowledge, for example, establishing Internet porary arrangements enabling a quick start to access and e-mail early in the reconstruction reconstruction. Several key lessons have emerged process or an in-country distance learning center from experience in post-conflict countries: with content relevant to post-conflict conditions. Leadership matters. Building institutions depends Training needs to be defined in its strategic con- critically on leaders in key ministries and institu- text. Learning activities should be selective and tions who can articulate a vision for their domain, focused and support the government's reconstruc- translate this vision into programs, and insist on tion and development strategy. Destruction of insti- accountability for results. Strong and effective tutional capacity due to war provides an opportu- leaders have legitimacy through deep roots in soci- nity to eliminate government departments, functions, and enterprises, and generally to depends, however, on strong government leader- restructure government and the public sector. It, ship and coordination among the donor partners. therefore, makes sense to focus learning activities on core functions of a post-conflict government Peer Reviewers: Robert Ebel, Lead Economist, and/or practice a policy of benign neglect for min- WBIRC, and David Potten, Lead Specialist, istries, departments, and public enterprises des- Country Programs, WBIRC. tined for closure or major restructuring. References Furthermore, learning must complement modern- Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler. 2002. "Aid, Policy, and ization of institutions by introducing modern infor- Growth in Post-Conflict Countries." Working Paper. Development Research Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank. mation and human resource systems, as well as McKechnie, Alastair J. 2003. "Humanitarian Assistance, changes in organizational culture toward out- Reconstruction, and Development in Afghanistan: A comes, client orientation, and performance moni- Practitioner's View." CPR Working Papers, No. 3. Social toring. Development Department. Washington D.C.: World Bank. Rohland, Klaus and Sarah Cliffe. 2002. "The East Timor Training should build on the comparative advan- Reconstruction Program: Successes, Problems and Tradeoffs." tage of international partners. Some organizations CPR Working Papers, No. 2. Social Development Department. are good at providing strategic and policy advice, Washington D.C.: World Bank. others at technical studies, and others at providing Schiavo-Campo, S. 2003, "Financing and Aid Management Arrangements in Post-Conflict Situations," CPR Working training. The challenge is to ensure that all aspects Papers, No. 6. The World Bank, Washington D.C. of capacity assistance fit together so that the whole World Bank. 2002. "Rebuilding the Civil Service in a Post- is greater than the sum of the parts. Conflict Setting: Key Issues and Lessons of Experience." CPR Dissemination Notes, No. 1. Washington, D.C. Conclusion ------. 2003. Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy. 157­59. Washington, D.C. The characteristics of post-conflict countries ------. 2003. "Recent Bank Support for Civil Service require that capacity be put in place quickly to meet Reconstruction in Post-Conflict Countries." PREM Notes, No. 79. expectations of the population for improved living Washington, D.C. conditions. The international community is also likely to expect quick results, particularly if the consequences of renewed conflict spread beyond 1. This CE Brief is based on a lecture delivered at the UNITAR the country's borders. Although it may be neces- Inaugural Conference on Training and Human Capacity Building sary in some situations to buy capacity, bypassing in Post-Conflict Countries in Hiroshima on November 19, 2003. The note was also published in the Conflict Prevention and government capacity may not prove better at deliv- Reconstruction series of Social Development Notes, No. 14, ering reconstruction outcomes than building the December 2003 (http://www.worldbank.org/conflict). government's own capacity. New capacity must be 2. Collier and Hoeffler (2002). built on what already exists and may require 3. For a discussion on aid management agencies see Salvatore Schiavo-Campo, "Financing and Aid Arrangements adjustments to incentives for public employment as in Post-Conflict Situations", World Bank Social Development part of administrative reform. Success ultimately Papers, No. 6 (June 2003) About World Bank Institute (WBI): Unleashing the Power of Knowledge to Enable a World Free of Poverty WBI helps people, institutions, and countries to diagnose problems that keep communities poor, to make informed choices to solve those problems, and to share what they learn with others. Through traditional and distance learning methods, WBI and its partners in many countries deliver knowl- edge-based options to policymakers, technical experts, business and community leaders, and civil society stakeholders; fostering analytical and networking skills to help them make sound decisions, design effective socioeconomic policies and programs, and unleash the productive potential of their societies. WBI Contacts: David Potten, Lead Specialist, Country Programs Tel: 202-458-7873, Email: dpotten@worldbank.org Imtiazuddin Ahmad, Sr. Operations Officer Tel: 202-458-1878, E-mail: Iahmad2@worldbank.org Visit our website for more information and download the electronic copies of all Capacity Enhancement Briefs: http://www.worldbank.org/capacity M A R C H 2 0 0 4 NUMBER 5