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The World Bank

Report No: ICR00003782

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-50410)

ON A

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 3.3 MILLION
(US$ 5 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF RWANDA

FOR A

GOVERNANCE FOR COMPETITIVENESS TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT

Public Disclosure Authorized

October 31, 2016

Trade and Competitiveness Global Practice
Africa Region

CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective October 25, 2016)

Currency Unit = Rwandan Franc (RWF)
RWF 808 = US$1
SDR 0.72 = US$1

FISCAL YEAR
July 1–June 30

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AfDB	African Development Bank
CB	Convention Bureau
CEDP	Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project
CPS	Country Partnership Strategy
DFID	U.K. Department for International Development
EAC	East Africa Community
EDPRS	Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy
G4C	Governance for Competitiveness TA Project
HRM	Human Resource Management
ICA	Investment Climate Assessment
ICCA	International Congress and Convention Association
ICR	Implementation Completion and Results Report
IEG	Independent Evaluation Group
IFC	International Finance Corporation
ISR	Implementation Status and Results Report
M&E	Monitoring and Evaluation
MICE	Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events
MIFOTRA	Ministry of Public Service and Labor
MINAGRI	Ministry of Agriculture
MINECOFIN	Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning
MINICOM	Ministry of Trade and Industry
MININFRA	Ministry of Infrastructure
MTR	Midterm Review
NAEB	National Agriculture and Export Board
NCBS	National Capacity Building Secretariat
NES	National Export Strategy
PAD	Project Appraisal Document
PDO	Project Development Objective
PPD	Public-Private Dialog
PPR	Post Procurement Review
PSCBP	Public Sector Capacity Building Project
PSCBS	Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat
PSDS	Private Sector Development Strategy

PSF	Private Sector Federation
QMS	Quality Measurement and Standards
RAB	Rwanda Agricultural Board
RAPCO	Rwanda Association for Professional Conference Organizers
RDB	Rwanda Development Board
RHIO	Rwanda Horticulture Inter-Organization
RWF	Rwandan Franc
SCBI	Strategic Capacity Building Initiative
SDR	Special Drawing Rights
SPIU	Single Project Implementation Unit
TA	Technical Assistance
TMEA	Trade Mark East Africa
TOR	Terms of Reference
TTL	Task Team Leader
WB	World Bank

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RWANDA
Governance for Competitiveness Technical Assistance Project

CONTENTS

Data Sheet

A. Basic Information			
Country:	Rwanda	Project Name:	Rwanda - Governance & Competitiveness TA Project
Project ID:	P127105	L/C/TF Number(s):	IDA-50410
ICR Date:	10/30/2016	ICR Type:	Core ICR
Lending Instrument:	SIL	Borrower:	REPUBLIC OF RWANDA
Original Total Commitment:	SDR 3.30 million	Disbursed Amount:	SDR 3.29 million
Revised Amount:	SDR 3.30 million		
Environmental Category: C			
Implementing Agencies: Ministry of Trade & Industry			
Co-financiers and Other External Partners: n.a.			

B. Key Dates				
Process	**Date**	**Process**	**Original Date**	**Revised / Actual Date(s)**
Concept Review:	07/14/2011	Effectiveness:	05/14/2012	05/14/2012
Appraisal:	10/21/2011	Restructuring(s):	—	04/21/2015
Approval:	01/26/2012	Midterm Review:	10/28/2013	10/28/2013
		Closing:	04/30/2015	04/30/2016

C. Ratings Summary	
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR	
Outcomes:	Moderately Satisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome:	Moderate
Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory
Borrower Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory

C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)			
Bank	**Ratings**	**Borrower**	**Ratings**
Quality at Entry:	Moderately Unsatisfactory	Government:	Moderately Satisfactory
Quality of Supervision:	Moderately Satisfactory	Implementing Agency/Agencies:	Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance:	Moderately Satisfactory	**Overall Borrower Performance:**	Moderately Satisfactory

C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators			
Implementation Performance	**Indicators**	**QAG Assessments (if any)**	**Rating**
Potential Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality at Entry (QEA):	None
Problem Project at any time (Yes/No):	No	Quality of Supervision (QSA):	None
DO rating before Closing/Inactive status:	Moderately Satisfactory		

D. Sector and Theme Codes		
	Original	**Actual**
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Agro-industry, marketing, and trade	9	7
General industry and trade sector	12	18
Other industry	8	7
Public administration - Agriculture, fishing, and forestry	30	28
Public administration - Industry and trade	41	40
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)		
Administrative and civil service reform	12	15
Export development and competitiveness	54	56
Other Private Sector Development	14	12
Other public sector governance	8	7
Regulation and competition policy	12	10

E. Bank Staff		
Positions	**At ICR**	**At Approval**
Vice President:	Makhtar Diop	Obiageli Kathryn Ezekwesili
Country Director:	Diarietou Gaye	Johannes C.M. Zutt
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ICR Team Leader:	Herve Assah	
ICR Primary Author:	Diana Hristova	

F. Results Framework Analysis

Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document)
The Project Development Objective (PDO) was to strengthen institutional capacity of selected institutions to improve competitiveness of selected sectors in Rwanda.

Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
The PDO was not revised.

(a) PDO Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from Approval Documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Number of project priority institutions that have undertaken functional reviews and have in place organizational frameworks aligned with their mandates			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	5	3	3
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Original target missed but revised target achieved at 100%. MINAGRI and MIFOTRA were dropped to focus on institutions directly supporting export competitiveness. Indicator was achieved for remaining institutions: NAEB, RDB, and MINICOM.			
Indicator 2 :	Percentage increase in volume of select fruits and vegetables exported by firms/cooperatives with certified market standards under the project			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	6,900 MT	5%	20%	12% in 2014, dropped at restructuring in 2015
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2015	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Dropped at restructuring because no data was collected specifically from supported coops (baseline and results reported were national) and because the certification activity was also dropped. Target was increased from 5% to 20% during the MTR.			
Indicator 3 :	Number of cooperatives supported to produce horticulture products for export			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicator added in 2015)	18	90
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. The target was exceeded by 400%. This indicator was added during restructuring by rephrasing and upgrading an intermediate results indicator.			
Indicator 4 :	Number of tourism arrivals from targeted new markets			
Value (quantitative or	245,276	150	480,000	627,893

qualitative)				
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Revised target was exceeded by 31%. Original target was likely meant as a percentage growth from the baseline, which is equivalent to 367,914, and was thus exceeded by 71%.			
Indicator 5 :	Direct project beneficiaries			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	300	6,500	11,540
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Upwardly revised target was exceeded by 78%.			
Indicator 6 :	Female beneficiaries (%)			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	10	30	30
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved.			

(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)

Indicator	Baseline Value	Original Target Values (from approval documents)	Formally Revised Target Values	Actual Value Achieved at Completion or Target Years
Indicator 1 :	Number of Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) Action Plans implemented in the project priority institutions			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	5	3	3
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Original target missed but revised target achieved at 100%. Target was reduced at restructuring from five to three institutions.			
Indicator 2 :	Number of project priority institutions implementing the Pay and Retention Policy related to HRM elements			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	5	3	0
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Not yet achieved. Target reduced at restructuring from five to three institutions. The policy has been developed and approved by MIFOTRA but is not yet approved by Cabinet at project closing.			
Indicator 3 :	Number of project priority institutions implementing the Rwanda public service competency framework			

Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicators added in 2015)	3	3
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100% post completion. Indicator was added at restructuring to supplement the Pay and Retention indicator. The framework was incorporated into the RBM policy, which has been approved by Cabinet and is currently implemented in 25 institutions.			
Indicator 4 :	Number of project priority institutions implementing the career development plans			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	6	3	3
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved post completion. Original target missed but revised target achieved at 100%. Wording was slightly changed at restructuring with no change in meaning. Career development plans were approved by Cabinet as part of the RBM policy.			
Indicator 5 :	Number of staff retained in project priority institutions			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	75	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Dropped at restructuring because of attribution challenges, as factors external to the project activities also influence staff turnover in public institutions.			
Indicator 6 :	Number of horticulture firms/cooperatives that gain access to new market standards for selected fruits and vegetables under the project			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	20	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Revised at restructuring to intermediate indicator 7.			
Indicator 7 :	Number of horticulture cooperatives that receive training in QMS for selected fruits and vegetables			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicator added in 2015)	10	10
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100%. Wording revised at restructuring from indicator 6 to remove reference to certification, since that activity was dropped.			
Indicator 8 :	Number of horticulture commodity unions formed under the project			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	2	10	17	17
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016

Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Original target exceeded by 70%; upwardly revised target achieved at 100%. Indicator was added at restructuring.			
Indicator 9 :	Number of cooperatives supported in the production of clean planting materials			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicator added in 2015)	8	8
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100%. Indicator was added at restructuring.			
Indicator 10 :	Percentage satisfaction of producers and buyers of horticulture produce with their relationship by survey			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	95	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Dropped at restructuring because baseline data was never collected.			
Indicator 11 :	Number of clusters identified and supported for production and value addition			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	2	n.a.	2
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100%. The two clusters supported were passion fruit and tamarillo.			
Indicator 12 :	Tourism diversification strategy developed and implemented			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	3	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Dropped at restructuring and replaced by tourism master plan in intermediate indicator 14.			
Indicator 13 :	Tourism marketing strategy developed and implemented			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	6	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)	n.a. (indicator dropped in 2015)
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	—
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Dropped at restructuring in order to move away from project outputs and measure outcomes with new intermediate indicators.			
Indicator 14 :	A revised and published sustainable tourism master plan aligned with EDPRS II			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	N	Y	n.a.	Y

Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2016	—	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved.			
Indicator 15 :	Number of outbound operators packaging and selling destination Rwanda			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicator added in 2015)	5	25
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved. Target exceeded by 400%. Indicator added at restructuring to strengthen causal chain to impact.			
Indicator 16 :	Number of MICE events organized by the Rwanda Convention Bureau			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	n.a. (indicator added in 2015)	15	10
Date achieved	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Partially achieved. 67% of target met. Indicator added at restructuring to strengthen causal chain to impact.			
Indicator 17 :	Number of sector analytical papers produced and submitted by PSF to GoR for consideration			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	3	n.a.	3
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	—	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100%.			
Indicator 18 :	Number of dialogs to discuss progress of NES per year between private sector and the Government			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	2	4	3
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Partially achieved. Target met at 75%.			
Indicator 19 :	Number of women from chambers and associations trained under the project in leadership, entrepreneurship, and issues for competitiveness			
Value (quantitative or qualitative)	0	100%	500	500
Date achieved	12/30/2011	04/30/2015	04/30/2016	04/30/2016
Comments (incl. % achievement)	Achieved at 100%. Unit of measure changed from percentage to number at restructuring.			

G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs

No.	Date ISR Archived	DO	IP	Actual Disbursements (US$, millions)
1	07/11/2012	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	0.00
2	01/02/2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.00
3	06/28/2013	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	1.10
4	12/25/2013	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	1.18
5	07/11/2014	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	2.78
6	01/18/2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.06
7	07/22/2015	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.86
8	02/04/2016	Moderately Satisfactory	Moderately Satisfactory	4.91
9	05/05/2016	Satisfactory	Satisfactory	4.91

H. Restructuring (if any)

Restructuring Date(s)	Board Approved PDO Change	ISR Ratings at Restructuring		Amount Disbursed at Restructuring in US$, millions	Reason for Restructuring & Key Changes Made
		DO	IP		
04/21/2015	No	MS	MS	4.06	The restructuring aimed at (a) revising the project's results framework to better measure achievements under the project objective, be more realistic and reflect the activities undertaken under the different components; (b) extending the project's closing date from April 30, 2015, to April 30, 2016, to allow for implementation of remaining activities and achievement of the PDO; (c) dropping some activities that could not be undertaken given funding availability; and (d) reallocating proceeds of financing to components where further support is needed to complete activities.

I. Disbursement Profile



1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design

1.1 Context at Appraisal

1. **Country context.** Rwanda's economy recovered quickly from the effects of the 2008–2009 global financial crisis, and by 2010, economic growth had rebounded to 7.5 percent. Much of the growth, however, was driven by spending related to large aid flows, public investments, and agricultural production. Services were the largest contributor to gross domestic product, but agriculture had been the most resilient and the main driver of growth during the financial crisis. The low levels of foreign direct investment (US$119 million in 2009) and the small contribution of the private sector to Rwanda's economy point to a set of systemic challenges to private sector–led growth identified by the 2008 Investment Climate Assessment (ICA): low access to electricity, serviced land, and finance; high transportation costs; and a low skills base.

2. **Government strategy.** The government's medium-term development framework was anchored in the Economic Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy (EDPRS), which focused on sustainable growth. Rwanda's first generation of reforms contributed to a sound investment climate as a foundation for a private sector–led development model. Yet, the global economic downturn underscored the importance of productivity enhancements and diverse and sustainable growth drivers as critical to export competitiveness, in addition to the cross-cutting challenges identified by the ICA. In response, the National Export Strategy (NES) was adopted in 2011 and is centered on enhancing export competitiveness and product and market base diversification. The government also recognized that institutional and human capacities remain an obstacle to effective development as confirmed by a number of Africa Governance Initiative reports in 2010. The Strategic Capacity Building Initiative (SCBI) was launched in 2010 to address this and boost the capacity of the Government to deliver on its priorities.

3. **Rationale for World Bank (WB) involvement.** The World Bank had previously supported the Government in both private and public sector development through the Competitiveness and Enterprise Development Project (CEDP, P057295, closed on 07/31/11) and the Public Sector Capacity Building Project (PSCBP, P066386, closed on 12/31/11) respectively, both of which had closed with major disbursement challenges. The Governance for Competitiveness TA Project (G4C) was designed to maximize the WB's value added by continuing the reforms started under the previous projects and ensuring continuity, while at the same time overcoming past implementation challenges through a more focused and flexible approach. It was intended to be a programmatic series of smaller technical assistance (TA) projects combining support for specific cross-cutting public sector priority reforms and direct support to competitiveness initiatives at the sector level. To ensure flexibility, each successive TA would focus on new sectors and learn from the implementation lessons of the previous one.[1]

4. **Higher-level objectives to which the project contributed.** The Government's long-term development vision was articulated in *Vision 2020* and anchored in six pillars: (a) good governance and a capable state; (b) human resource development and a knowledge-based economy; (c) a private sector–led economy; (d) infrastructure development; (e) productive and market-oriented

[1] The programmatic approach was never formalized, and management eventually decided not to continue the series.

agriculture; and (f) regional and international economic integration. G4C supported this vision and the WB's Country Partnership Strategy (CPS, 2014-2018, document no. 88941, discussed by the WB Board on 06/14/14) and aimed to contribute to increased growth and poverty reduction through the acceleration of exports in horticulture and tourism, as well as through the increased efficiency and effectiveness of public institutions and private enterprises.

1.2 Original PDO and Key Indicators

5. **The Project Development Objective (PDO)**, as stated in the Legal Agreement, is to strengthen the institutional capacity of selected institutions to improve competitiveness in selected sectors in Rwanda.

6. **The project's theory of change was predicated on the assumption that improved institutional capacity combined with an improved ability to design and implement sector strategies will improve the competitiveness of horticulture and tourism.** To this end, the project took a multipronged approach by (a) supporting relevant institutions with capacity building and strategic planning aimed at improving the institutions' ability to support the private sector; (b) providing TA directly to critical stakeholders of the two selected value chains aimed at increasing exports and diversifying into new products and markets through improved inputs, factors, and conditions; and (c) improving the dialog between the public and private sector.

7. **Key indicators linked to the PDO were as follows:**

- Number of project priority institutions that have undertaken functional reviews and have in place organizational frameworks aligned with their mandates
- Percentage increase in volume of selected fruits and vegetables exported by firms/cooperatives with certified market standards under the project
- Number of tourism arrivals from targeted new markets
- Direct project beneficiaries, of which 10 percent are female

8. **The intermediate results indicators for each component focused on tracking primarily outputs and some intermediate outcomes.** To measure the strengthening of institutional capacity, the project tracked the number of action plans and strategies developed and implemented; to monitor progress toward the development and implementation of competitiveness strategies in the two sectors, the project tracked the support to cooperatives and clusters in the horticulture sector and to outbound operators in the tourism sector; to track the dialog between public and private sector, the project monitored the number of meetings and analytical papers produced. The full list of outputs and intermediate outcomes and progress toward their achievement is included in annex 2.

1.3 Revised PDO and Key Indicators

9. **A restructuring, approved by the Country Director on 04/21/15, revised the project's results framework, including PDO indicators, without changing the PDO.** The project had originally identified five priority institutions for support, the National Agriculture and Export Board (NAEB), the Rwanda Development Board (RDB), the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MINICOM), the Ministry of Agriculture (MINAGRI), and the Ministry of Public Service and

Labor (MIFOTRA). At restructuring, MINAGRI and MIFOTRA were dropped because the government wanted to focus only on institutions directly supporting exports in the two sectors. Targets for corresponding PDO and intermediate indicators were adjusted. PDO indicator 2 was reformulated to "Number of cooperatives supported to produce horticulture products for export" because the certification activity was dropped from the project. Due to under-budgeting and exchange rate fluctuations, other planned activities were also dropped and funds were redirected to activities considered critical to the PDO. The baseline and targets for the tourism PDO indicator were revised to reflect data from targeted markets only. A few intermediate outcome indicators were added to improve attribution to project activities. All changes to the results framework are described in the data sheet and their implications are discussed in sections 2 and 3.

1.4 Main Beneficiaries

10. **The Project Appraisal Document (PAD) identifies the staff of the selected priority institutions as the direct beneficiaries of the project, as well as all stakeholders in tourism and horticulture, particularly the private sector federations.** People involved in tourism and horticulture activities were identified as indirect beneficiaries, and private activity generated by the project was expected to have spillover effects into other connected sectors. Targeted beneficiaries were not revised during project restructuring.

1.5 Original Components

11. **Component 1: Support to Priority Institutions under the SCBI (US$1.3 million).** The objective of this component was to strengthen the institutional framework of the project's selected priority institutions to better deliver on their respective mandates in support of improved competitiveness and the implementation of Rwanda's EDPRS and NES. The component aimed to contribute to the PDO through improved organizational and human resource capacity. Main subcomponents included the following:

- Support for the SCBI coordination and implementation in priority institutions
- Support for the Pay and Retention Policy implementation in priority institutions
- Building capacity for competitiveness

12. **Component 2: Support the Implementation of the NES (US$2.6 million).** The objective of this component was to support the implementation of the NES for two key growth sectors, tourism and horticulture, through the review and development of sector strategies and plans related to competitiveness; and TA to guide their implementation. The component aimed to contribute to the PDO through sector development and diversification. Main subcomponents included the following:

- Support diversification of tourism
- Support horticulture development
- Strategies and policy formulation for competitiveness

13. **Component 3: Improved Public-Private Dialog for Competitiveness (US$0.6 million).** The objective of this component was to promote the capacity of the private sector for greater policy formulation and advocacy relative to the Government through support for the Private Sector

Federation (PSF), the umbrella organization representing the private sector in Rwanda. The component aimed to contribute to the PDO through improvements in the relevance and accountability of government policy. Main activities included the following:

- Strengthening analytical, research, and public relations roles of the PSF
- Strengthening the PSF interactions with relevant chambers and associations
- Strengthening the capacity of the private sector and the Government to hold each other mutually accountable for the implementation of the NES
- Functional review of the PSF
- Support to the exporters forum

14. **Component 4: Project Coordination (US$0.5 million).** This component was designed to create and support the Single Project Implementation Unit (SPIU) under MINICOM.

1.6 Revised Components

15. **Project components were not changed**, **but due to the change in scope of Component 1, proceeds were reallocated between different components.** Funds for Components 1 and 3 were reduced, and funds for Component 2 were increased to cover the costs of contracted consultancies that were higher than budgeted. The allocation for operating costs was also increased because of the increased implementation support and the price escalation of goods and services.

1.7 Other Significant Changes

16. **Due to delays in procurement, the project's closing date was extended by one year,** from April 2015 to April 2016, to allow the project to complete all planned activities and achieve its intended objective.

2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes

2.1 Project Preparation, Design, and Quality at Entry

17. **The background analysis conducted during project preparation was sound.** The project focused on priorities identified in government strategies and aimed to address specific sector barriers to growth that had been highlighted in various sectoral studies, conducted by the WB, the Government, or other development partners.[2] The project aimed to continue the reform momentum of the CEDP and PSCBP and to underpin the WB's budget support for further implementation of the SCBI. G4C was designed as an integrated approach aimed to leverage the synergies between public sector capacity-building and economic growth initiatives by addressing capacity constraints and removing barriers to growth directly at the sector level.

18. **The design was informed by lessons from previous projects, which were included in the PAD.** The programmatic series of TA, of which G4C was intended to be the first, were meant to support a more flexible approach that would allow the World Bank to respond faster to emerging

[2] 2008 ICA, Tourism Value Chain Analysis, Horticulture Value Chain Analysis, Private Sector Development Studies, and others.

and evolving government priorities. The design also emphasized selectivity yet did not fully manage to avoid the complexity and resulting implementation capacity challenges experienced by the previous operations. G4C also attempted to address lessons related to weak ownership and held extensive consultations with all stakeholders to ensure full engagement, critical focus, technical inputs, and buy-in by the private sector. It was less clear how the design addressed another main lesson regarding the need to leverage ongoing initiatives and partnerships in the selected sectors to ensure complementarity. This is discussed in more detail in section 3.1, relevance of design.

19. **Key risks were spelled out though not fully mitigated.** Key risks were identified in the PAD, and the project attempted to mitigate some of them through the project activities (though see comment on sequencing in para. 20). The main risks identified include: (a) the institutional risk related to the SPIU's leadership of the project's technical and fiduciary work; and (b) stakeholder risks related to weak private sector representation and organization, as well as weak private-public collaboration. Given the disbursement delays experienced during the project life, the risks related to the ownership and implementation readiness may have been underestimated.

20. **Component structure was complex and not well integrated and sequenced.** G4C was more focused than its predecessors yet still included too many activities that did not always fit in a coherent framework. G4C wanted to leverage public sector support for private sector growth but some of its activities were not sequenced well enough to have the desired catalytic effect. For instance, the Pay and Retention Scheme requires Cabinet approval, which at project closure has still not been obtained, and thus, it has not yet generated the expected positive effect on staff retention in the sectoral institutions. In addition, the first component included staff training on monitoring and evaluation (M&E) but it does not appear to have been targeted at staff involved in other project activities; so, an opportunity for synergies was missed.

21. **Beneficiary institutions' commitment and ownership of project activities was uneven.** The SPIU was set up by the Government in 2011 and was in charge of implementing multiple projects including G4C. Due to the multitude of activities in G4C, five different institutions were directly involved in project implementation and the SPIU noted that their levels of ownership and commitment at project start varied due to the quick project preparation. The low ownership at entry required additional time to familiarize each beneficiary with the details of project implementation and put a large strain on the SPIU to coordinate activities between multiple stakeholders.

22. **The links between the theory of change and M&E framework were weak.** Some of the main shortcomings of the M&E arrangements are related to the choice of results indicators, which were insufficient to confirm the theory of change and do not provide enough evidence to connect project activities to ultimate impact. This will be discussed in more detail in section 2.3 and 5.1.

2.2 Implementation

23. **The project was largely implemented as designed as the restructuring came very late in the project cycle when disbursement was already at 81 percent.** In the first two years of the project disbursements were seriously delayed but picked up significantly after the midterm review (MTR). The main factors affecting implementation and causing delays were (a) uneven ownership at entry and low prioritization of project activities; (b) low coordination; (c) high staff turnover; and (d) low implementation capacity, which are discussed in more detail in section 5.

24. **Most of these challenges were largely mitigated after the MTR, though others persisted throughout the project.** Poor coordination between agencies was often due to unclear boundaries and responsibilities, and resulted in difficulties in ensuring that the right decision makers are in the room. This was largely resolved when the SPIU appointed focal points in each of the beneficiary agencies. High staff turnover of government staff, on the other hand, was a persistent and common issue and there is indication that in Rwanda officials are moved very frequently and projects and institutions are restructuring if they do not show quick results. This was very disruptive for G4C and arguably should have been foreseen at design stage by sequencing the Pay and Retention reforms first and increasing retention before providing capacity building to staff who are likely to move away. Low capacity to draft good terms of reference (TOR) and select good consultants for the various activities was another challenge and necessitated additional time and much more frequent feedback on TOR and contracts than initially planned. Even so, there were instances of very poor quality of consultant work, which in some cases were the result of the very low costing of contracts. Some government contracts were cancelled either by consultants due to low pay or by the government due to low quality.

25. **The MTR highlighted the above-listed design and implementation challenges and recommended a restructuring, including dropping of under-performing activities, and changes to the results framework.** MINICOM was reluctant to drop activities and requested additional time to push implementation forward and to address the disbursement issues. The different beneficiaries were motivated to show strong performance and to prioritize project activities, and ownership increased significantly. The discussions were protracted and took from MTR to the original closing date of the project. In the meantime, Government pushed implementation forward and committed a number of contracts increasing disbursement to 81 percent by the time the restructuring was finalized. This disconnect left little room for the restructuring to make far-reaching strategic changes to the project design. Instead it dropped uninitiated activities as a response to the budget shortfall, and made minor changes to indicators.

26. **Significant exchange rate fluctuations between the US$ and the SDR during the life of the project caused G4C to lose around US$80,500.** This loss in proceeds additionally contributed to the dropping of certain activities.

2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation, and Utilization

27. **Design.** The design of the M&E framework was weak for several reasons. First, the causal chain between project activities and the PDO was not well established and PDO indicators were not easily attributable, which is discussed in more detail in section 3.1, relevance of design. In addition, PDO indicators were not precisely specified (for example, tourist arrivals were initially reported globally and not just from the targeted markets) and baselines and targets for some indicators were not established or were unclear (for example, the original tourist arrivals target was 150, and it is unclear whether this is an absolute number or percentage increase). No mechanism was set up to measure the main instrumental objective of the project—the capacity of public servants in the supported agencies—and consequently, progress was tracked entirely through the delivery of outputs such as action plans and organizational structures, and there was no benchmark or progress data on whether the delivery of these outputs affected capacity. Another weakness of the results framework at design was the fact that some indicators, such as the Pay and Retention and competency framework had a political dimension and had to go to Cabinet for

approval, which could be influenced by factors outside the scope of the project. Other indicators at design were difficult to measure, such as the satisfaction of horticulture producers and buyers, which was subsequently dropped at restructuring.

28. **Implementation.** Up until the project MTR, M&E quality was optimistically rated Moderately Satisfactory despite continuing lack of baseline data for some indicators, such as tourist arrivals, as well as lack of data on progress, which for the first couple of years was largely due to the late start of project activities. The project restructuring aimed to correct shortcoming of M&E at design, to limited success. Positively, some intermediate indicators for horticulture and tourism were added to strengthen the causal chain, but a similar indicator was not added for capacity building, even though the MTR recommended it. The M&E activity of the project delivered M&E training to 64 staff of the priority institutions and developed metrics for public sector capacity; but those metrics were not utilized to measure the capacity-building interventions of the project, which would have substantially strengthened the logical chain of the PDO.

29. **Utilization.** Because most of the indicators were process or output oriented, monitoring them closely allowed the team to identify delays in implementation of activities, and during the restructuring proceeds were reallocated from slower to faster moving components. Since most M&E data were captured at output level (see para. 27), they did not inform conclusions at the outcome level. For example, as M&E data did not provide information on whether capacity-building activities led to increased capacity, the team could not have made decisions to increase, decrease, or change capacity-building activities based on real-time monitoring data.

2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance

30. **No safeguards policies were triggered during the life of the project.** The project had been category C since approval, and no environmental assessment was required.

31. **There were no major issues with fiduciary management during the project.** The project's financial management arrangements were in compliance with legal covenants and considered adequate to provide reasonable assurance that the loan proceeds were being used for intended purposes. Some weaknesses throughout implementation included unclear budgeting processes and failure to provide annual budgets, which improved after the project's MTR. The project received clean and unqualified audits in 2013, 2014, and 2015.

32. **Procurement of contracts for the project encountered serious delays, mainly related to the understaffed procurement capacity of the SPIU, but also other factors including** (a) delays in furnishing technical inputs to TOR and other documents by the beneficiaries and delayed clearance by the Public Sector Capacity Building Secretariat (PSCBS) before submission to the WB for no objection; (b) inadequate capacity of the Internal Tender Committee to execute its responsibilities due to work load; (c); high staff turnover within the SPIU. The findings of the most recent Post-procurement Review show that there were no procedural gaps associated with procurement and remedial actions of the findings of the previous Review have been adequately implemented.

2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase

33. **There are no current plans to continue the programmatic approach that G4C was meant to start.** During project implementation, the World Bank shifted its engagement with the Government away from direct private sector support. The International Finance Corporation (IFC) has a three-year advisory program that covers engagements in tourism and agriculture and supports cross-cutting government-to-business services and sector-specific reforms including investment generation in horticulture and tourism that will build on the achievements of G4C. Other donors, such as the Netherlands and the U.K. Department for International Development (DFID), are planning to deepen their engagement and the African Development Bank (AfDB) recently committed US$100 million to the implementation of the Private Sector Development Strategy (PSDS) that G4C supported. The post completion arrangements and the sustainability of project activities are discussed in section 4.

3. Assessment of Outcomes

34. **The PDO formulation to 'strengthen institutional capacity to improve competitiveness' contains different levels of the project outcomes, and evaluating it directly is challenging.** While strong institutional capacity is arguably a necessary factor in enhancing competitiveness, it is by no means sufficient. This formulation reflects a common challenge in determining feasible indicators with which to measure capacity development, which are often either too close to the activity (PDO indicator 1), or too far up a long results chain (PDO indicators 2 and 3). However, apart from capacity-building activities, the project also supported sector-level TA interventions, in parallel, which is not reflected in the PDO formulation. To address these challenges, the following section assess the PDO achievement by assessing three key outcomes derived from the theory of change outlined in para. 6, and the objectives of the main parallel activities and the corresponding original PDO indicators, referenced in section 1.5. The three key outcomes are (a) increased capacity of selected public and private sector institutions to deliver on their mandates; (b) improved competitiveness of horticulture through export development; and (c) improved competitiveness of tourism through diversification.

35. **Due to the changes to PDO indicators and associated targets made during the restructuring, a split evaluation is required according to the guidelines.[3]** Section 3.2 will assess in detail each of the three key outcomes and whether the changes were material to its achievement and if so what is the effect of a split evaluation on the assessment of that achievement.

3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design, and Implementation

Rating: Modest

36. **Relevance of objectives (Substantial).** The objective of the project was relevant to the achievement of the Government's development strategy and remains relevant at closing. The current EDPRS II, approved in May 2013, places an even greater emphasis than its predecessor on the private sector as the driver of economic growth and poverty reduction. Improved competitiveness and accelerated export growth are central elements of EDPRS II's pillar on

[3] *OPCS: Implementation and Completion Results Report Guidelines*. Appendix J. IEG Guidance on ICR Reviews. Section 7.

economic transformation, and horticulture and tourism are among the targeted export-oriented priority sectors. Prioritized institutional capacity building is a cross-cutting issue. In addition to the overall development strategy of Rwanda, the project objectives are relevant to the continued implementation of the SCBI and the NES. The first of the three themes in the current CPS for Rwanda, is 'accelerating economic growth that is private sector–driven and job-creating', so private sector–led growth remains a strategic priority, with increased investment by the World Bank in the enabling factors for private sector development, such as energy and urban development, and complementary advisory and investment support by the IFC on investment climate and financial sector strengthening.

37. **Relevance of design (Modest).** The relevance of design is modest to the achievement of the stated objective because, even though most chosen activities were relevant, it is far less clear that their sum total was critical.

38. **Most of the chosen interventions were relevant to the objective.** The public sector support activities fall squarely within an Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) framework of structural and capacity-building conditions for institutions' change.[4] Those include skills (M&E coaching), management (planning and coordination, policy formulation, and implementation), formal incentives (Pay and Retention Schemes), external checks and balances (public-private dialog [PPD]), and so on. The choice of sectors was also relevant, because horticulture and tourism are among the priority sectors in EDPRS II as well as the NES and dominate the export sector.[5] Sector interventions were also chosen to respond to pre-identified barriers and to enhance upgrading by improving production processes or product quality or by fostering diversification.[6] For example, during preparation the main constraints to horticulture development in Rwanda were identified to be the small size and lack of scale in the sector caused by lack of coordination efforts and information asymmetry. The low level of quality certification further inhibited export growth. In tourism, the PAD identified the limited breadth of offering, inadequate infrastructure, and marketing effort as the main impediments to growth in the sector. A case study[7] subtitled 'Gorillas and More' explicitly recommended diversification away from gorillas. The Meetings, Incentives, Conferences, and Events (MICE) subsector was for the first time identified as a priority sector in EDPRS II and the Tourism Strategy was designed with a view to developing it further. The project, however, also included interventions that were superfluous to the PDO, such as support to MINAGRI and MIFOTRA. The two institutions were relevant to the two selected sectors, but do not explicitly support export growth, hence were not critical to PDO achievement in a narrow sense. The 2015 restructuring dropped activities to support them.

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[4] OED/IEG. 2001. *Evaluating Public Sector Reform: Guidelines for Assessing Country-level Impact of Structural Reform and Capacity Building in the Public Sector.*

[5] A number of sector studies were completed during project preparation helping the team prioritize sectors for support. The 2009–2010 Investor Conference aimed at attracting foreign direct investment also focused on horticulture and tea. Follow-on projects in the planned series were going to focus on ICT, coffee, and tea.

[6] IEG. 2016. Preliminary draft. *World Bank Support to Industrial Competitiveness and Its Implications for Jobs.* Competitiveness is defined as the ability to achieve higher market share through increased productivity led by industrial upgrading.

[7] Nielsen, Hannah and Anna Spenceley. April 2010. "The Success of Tourism in Rwanda: Gorillas and More." Africa Success Stories. Chapter 14.

39. **As much as the majority of the chosen interventions were clearly relevant to the objective of enhancing competitiveness, it is far less clear whether they were sufficient.** It is particularly not clear that public sector capacity is a critical barrier to competitiveness. A recently conducted Portfolio Enhancement Review of the project noted that the chosen sector support was also relatively insignificant in the scale of need. Direct support to exporters, improvements of export-related policies, and logistics are examples of other potential support to export growth. The PAD does little to expound on the full set of constraints and whether barriers not addressed by G4C are being addressed through other programs in parallel. In horticulture, for example, beneficiaries repeatedly noted land availability as a major barrier to growth, and without addressing it, structural or organizational improvements in the sector may be inconsequential. As mentioned in paras. 27 and 34, project design did not make a convincing case for strong causal links between direct results from project interventions and PDO achievement. As such, project design was not fully consistent with its stated objectives.

40. **Relevance of implementation (Modest).** The project had high staff turnover and, despite identifying bottlenecks early, was slow to respond to disbursement delays. The team was responsive to the Government's request to reduce the scope, and as a result a number of activities were dropped during the restructuring. They were ultimately funded by other sources, such as from the respective agencies, or other ongoing projects. The restructuring attempted to address the disconnect between outputs and outcomes and introduced a number of intermediate indicators that logically follow from project activities. It also, however, removed the PDO indicator measuring exports of fruits and vegetables, which further weakened the project's causal chain by removing any measure of competitiveness, however weak the attribution. As the restructuring was also very late, it appears to have been largely reactive to a funding shortfall rather than strategic about the overall objective and did not have a significant impact. Implementation issues and the World Bank's response are further discussed in sections 2.2 and 5.1.

3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives

Rating: Substantial

(a) Key outcome 1: Increased capacity of selected public and private sector institutions to deliver on their mandates

Rating: Substantial

41. **The theory of change of this key outcome holds that strengthening organizational structures and enhancing capacity would improve institutional performance and thus enable supported organizations to deliver on their mandate.** As the ultimate objective of the project is improved competitiveness in the two selected sectors, support was focused on institutions whose mandate is to support those sectors. The project restructuring dropped two institutions, MINAGRI and MIFOTRA, because they do not directly support export competitiveness. Thus, dropping them, and reducing the associated PDO and intermediate outcome indicator targets is not material to the overall achievement of this key outcome, and therefore, no split evaluation is conducted. This key outcome is rated Substantial because all associated activities have been delivered and they have a very strong theory of change to improved institutional performance. Some supported policies, such as the Pay and Retention, are still pending approval by Cabinet, but are expected to be fully incorporated in the next budget cycle, and this key outcome is thus expected to be fully achieved.

This implementation time lag, however, as well as the lack of an actual metric for institutional performance detracts from a potential High rating.

42. **The project activities directly contributed to organizational, strategic, and capacity improvements in the supported institutions.** The functional reviews directly informed the public sector reviews and restructuring in June 2014, led by the Government. A detailed assessment conducted by the NCBS found that the vast majority of the recommendations made by the reviews are either implemented or in the process of being implemented. The resulting restructuring mainly addressed weaknesses in organizational structure, skills, and personnel mix (for example, more marketing staff hired at RDB) and introduced a variety of systems for planning, management, or procurement, which have significant potential to increase the administrative efficiency of the public sector. The Pay and Retention Policy introduced two new schemes (Canteen and Home Ownership) and equalized the compensation index structure between agencies with the goal of improving staff retention, which is a significant issue in the public sector. A competency framework was developed for the three priority institutions, which outlines technical, general, and core competencies customized for each institution. Early feedback from pilots suggests that it has been useful in clarifying work programs and removing overlaps. It has had a substantial demonstration effect and leveraged government funds, as MIFOTRA has developed it with own funds for a total of 25 public agencies. M&E training was provided to staff of priority institutions, and a number of new tools and systems were developed, which are expected to be rolled out as part of a new national M&E policy. A results framework for capacity-building interventions was also developed as part of this training but was unfortunately not used by the project, thereby missing an opportunity for synergies between components. There has also been no systematic tracking of staff who received the training, and some are no longer in their posts.

43. **Activities under this outcome also strengthened the dialog with the private sector.** The PSF has already had an impact on revisions of the NES 2 though sectoral PPDs. An example of a policy recommendation driven by the PSF is the imminent introduction of a Rwandan barcode. The PSF has also become a much stronger voice for the private sector, through its 'Club of Champions', which is a form of grassroots PPD, as well as a National Exporters Forum and Conference. The organization has substantially strengthened its export associations and enhanced its own offerings and sustainability though additional funding mobilized thanks to G4C support.

44. **Counterfactual.** Feedback from beneficiaries suggests that the project capitalized on the reform momentum and accelerated the achievement of benefits. The public service reform was a major undertaking for the Government and would have very likely proceeded even without the project, but the TA provided the catalyst for the reforms by carving out a clearer vision for the institutional reorganizations. The sector-specific approach of G4C allowed it to focus resources on three institutions and yet to have a significant demonstration effect. The support of the WB has had the effect of catalyzing other donor funding through its convening power and name recognition.

(b) Key outcome 2: Improved competitiveness of horticulture through export development

Rating: Modest

45. **The theory of change for this outcome posits that enhancing the ability of the horticulture sector to organize itself and providing cooperatives with training, certification,**

and improved inputs would enhance the export competitiveness of the sector. The activities that were implemented would definitely be expected to contribute to export growth of the sector, but there is little indication that they were critical. The certification activity had perhaps the closest link to exports, but it was dropped at restructuring together with its associated PDO indicator necessitating a split evaluation of this key outcome. This outcome is rated Modest against its original PDO indicator of increased exports due to the weak attribution with project activities since there is a multitude of other factors identified as barriers, such as access to land. Baseline and results for the original PDO indicator were reported until 2014 but the reported data was for exports of all fruits and vegetables rather than only for exports of supported cooperatives, further weakening any potential attribution. The outcome is nonetheless rated Modest rather than Low, because the rest of the activities that were implemented, albeit insufficient, are still expected to contribute to sector competitiveness.

46. **The implementation of activities under this outcome did have a positive effect on the sector's ability to organize itself and to design and implement long-term strategic interventions.** The project supported the drafting of the Horticulture Strategy, which did not exist before and which selected the subsectors, markets, and commodities that would be prioritized for growth and defined the marketing strategy and marketing requirements for export. The project also significantly contributed to the sector's ability to organize growers and exporters and to facilitate communication between them, through support for the umbrella organization for the horticulture sector, the Rwanda Horticulture Inter-Organization (RHIO), as well as the creation of commodity unions and a national federation which has been able to negotiate sales for growers, ensure the timely delivery of inputs, act as a one-stop center, and provide advocacy. One of the most significant contributions of the project to the competitiveness of the horticulture sector was the training in quality measurement and standards (QMS). In the original design, the training was going to be followed by inspections and audits to confirm adequate systems are in place and then ultimately by awarding export certification. Due to under budgeting of the horticulture activities, there was no funding left for audits and certification and NAEB undertook those activities from its own budget. Three cooperatives have already obtained certification, as well as NAEB itself, which would allow it to facilitate future certification of cooperatives by providing information, and access to internal auditors. As noted above, dropping the certification activity weakens project attribution to export growth, though arguably G4C support to the QMS training was critical in conducting the follow on activities. One of the main effects of QMS certification is its demonstration effect—once it is acquired, it is easier to obtain other certifications, such as organic or fair trade, and it is thus expected to positively influence overall exports.

47. **The component had much less of an impact on improving inputs for increased crop production.** The two commodities chosen for support, passion fruit and tamarillo, were in high demand but were vulnerable to wooden virus disease, which damages the crops. Eight cooperatives received training on clean planting materials, established protocols, and produced seeds, but at harvest time, the new seeds did not work and the disease reoccurred. As the project was closing, the company hired to produce the seeds did not attempt to reintroduce clean seeds from neighboring fields. NAEB intends to seek support from Rwanda Agriculture Board (RAB) and other donors to continue this work as the two crops remain important to Rwandan horticulture.

48. **This key outcome is also rated Modest against its revised PDO indicator.** The new PDO indicator added at restructuring measures the delivery of support to cooperatives without

providing any intermediate evidence of whether that support had a positive effect. The result reported is in fact a sum total of a number of intermediate outcomes indicators that separately measure the different types of support the project provided. So, despite the new PDO indicator target being met and surpassed, it does not add value and consequently does not change the assessment of achievement of this key outcome, which remained improved export development. Thus, the split evaluation produces an overall rating of Modest.

(c) Key outcome 3: Improved competitiveness of tourism through diversification
Rating: Substantial

49. **The theory of change for the tourism outcome holds that increasing demand through marketing and supply through developing new products would diversify the tourism offering and increase arrivals.** No changes were made to the PDO indicator associated with this outcome; so, no split evaluation is conducted. The PDO indicator measures the number of tourist arrivals and is subject to similar attribution concerns as the PDO indicator for horticulture that was dropped at restructuring. Attribution of increased tourist arrivals to project activities is questionable due to the potential significant effect of external and cyclical factors, as well as the long time lag. It is in fact telling that tourist arrivals were on an upward swing even before project implementation started. The efficacy of this key outcome is nonetheless rated Substantial because, even though there is weak attribution to overall tourist arrivals, the leisure marketing work demonstrates solid progress on intermediate outcome indicators, which, all things equal, are expected to increase leisure arrivals, and the MICE activity has shown sizable and attributable growth in MICE arrivals.

50. **To increase demand, three firms were hired to market Rwanda in (a) the East Africa Community (EAC), (b) Europe, Russia, and North America, and (c) China.** The PDO indicator for tourism primarily reflects this activity because tourist arrivals are disaggregated to show data from each of the targeted markets. The indicator, however, reports on the total number of visitors, while the marketing activity intended to increase only leisure arrivals. Table 1 shows that, even though the overall trend in visitors is positive over the past few years, the trend in leisure arrivals is only positive for EAC, negative for Europe and Asia, and neutral for the Americas. Marketing activities, albeit necessary, are hardly sufficient to increase tourist arrivals, plus they were only completed in 2015 and their effect could not yet be seen in the data. With regard to intermediate outcomes, however, the firm conducting the marketing activities in Europe and the Americas reports 140 tour operators that are proactively marketing Rwanda in 2015, compared to 77 before the activities were conducted. Similarly, the firm for EAC reports 95 committed marketing partnerships since the inception of activities. All other things being equal, the increased promotion by contracted tour operators is expected to directly contribute to an eventual increase in arrivals from source markets. Results from the China marketing work are less successful (though in a very small market), and some beneficiaries suggested that marketing in Asia was misdirected due to the prevalence of primates there and the often negative association with them.

Table 1. Visitors to Rwanda by Origin (2012–2014)

Source Country	Visiting for Tourism			Total Visitors			Change from 2013 to 2014 (%)
	2012	2013	2104	2012	2103	2014	
EAC	26,915	33,106	30,889	436,319	473,837	526,227	11
Central Africa	21,377	22,153	31,053	476,399	490,446	539,121	10

Source Country	Visiting for Tourism			Total Visitors			Change from 2013 to 2014 (%)
	2012	2013	2104	2012	2103	2014	
Rest of Africa	3,405	3,550	3,805	22,622	23,251	24,883	7
Europe	22,750	21,428	19,285	62,135	61,380	61,860	1
Americas	13,606	15,960	13,792	32,799	37,457	35,036	−6
Asia/Pacific	7,217	7,589	6,389	31,034	35,764	32,402	−9
GRAND TOTAL	95,270	103,786	105,213	1,061,308	1,122,135	1,219,529	9

51. **In terms of increasing supply, one of the most significant contributions of the tourism component was the large growth in the MICE segment of the tourism market.** In 2015, contributions from the MICE sector exceeded US$37 million, and in 2017, revenues are projected to reach US$55 million. The attribution of G4C to increased arrivals and revenues from the MICE segment is much stronger than for the marketing work. G4C created the Convention Bureau (CB) and built its research and marketing capacity. The CB has been instrumental in growing the sector demonstrated by the fact that, even though the Convention Center was delayed by more than three years, the CB was already winning bids for it prompting the Government to open the Kigali Convention and Exhibition Village as a temporary facility. The pipeline of MICE events, however, has been strong enough that there is likely to be enough business for the village to stay on even after the center opens. Over 1,000 new three-plus star hotel rooms are expected to open, which would double the existing hotel capacity in Kigali. Rwanda is the only country in east Africa with a MICE CB and has moved from 21st in Africa in 2013 to 7th in 2015 in the MICE segment, with Kigali being 5th among African cities.[8] The CB also supported the creation of the Rwanda Association for Professional Conference Organizers (RAPCO), which is currently developing accreditation for professional conference organizers, and would enhance the private sector's ability to bid at the tender stage of incoming MICE events, and gradually fully take over that role from the Government. Only South Africa in Africa follows a similar business model of linking the MICE business directly to private sector bidders. The CB has also created a research desk to create a database and estimate the length of delegate stay, amount spent, and pre- and post-initiative impact on the entire value chain, which will help target its future efforts better.

Table 2. Number of Visitors for Conferences and Revenues Generated

Year	Number of Visitors	Revenue Generated (US$, millions)
2008	12,698	15.2
2009	10,875	13.7
2010	13,533	17.9
2011	17,948	24.8
2012	16,214	23.5
2013	15,441	23.6
2014	19,085	29.6
2015	23,804	37.7
2016 (as of June)	35,100	21.1
2017 (projection)	n.a.	55
2018 (projection)	n.a.	85

[8] International Congress and Convention Association 2015 data.

52. **The component's activities were well linked and tried to leverage each other.** The marketing component created a training program for operators to market the country as having a more diverse offering than just mountain gorillas. A study of the handicrafts industry was also conducted attempting to leverage the increase in tourism arrivals from new products and markets and grow this linked sector, which primarily employs women. The MICE segment is also working on integration with leisure tourism by working with conference organizers to feature leisure tourism options on their event websites and thus extend the length of stay and economic impact that business travelers bring to the country.

Overall Efficacy
Rating: Substantial

53. **The overall project efficacy is rated Substantial.** This is based on the above assessment of real or expected achievement of outcomes against the PDO and their attribution to project interventions, and on the split evaluation of key outcome 2. The three key outcomes are weighed equally. A disbursement-weighed calculation has no effect on the overall rating, see table A5.

3.3 Efficiency
Rating: Substantial

54. **The project's economic benefits cannot be quantified, but the scale of committed resources versus potential gains points to efficient use of project funds.** A credible economic benefit calculation of net present value and economic rate of return was not conducted at appraisal and is not possible at closing given the TA nature of the project activities and the tenuous attribution to impact. Due to the time lag of project interventions, quantitative impact data is not available to demonstrate the project's contribution to increased competitiveness, but intermediate results point to diversified and expanded markets in the tourism sector, better managed and more organized cooperatives in the horticulture sector, and the adoption of numerous capacity and organizational tools that are likely to contribute to a more efficient public sector. The optimization of organizational mandates alone is likely to lead to significant savings in the running of the public sector by removing overlaps and streamlining functions. A clear demonstration of the value for money the beneficiaries see in project activities is that they find the cost justified and have committed own resources or raised funds from elsewhere to continue implementing the reforms after G4C close. For example, the development of the competency framework was scaled up by the Government from three to 25 institutions.

55. **G4C was also cost-efficient, and all TA was contracted through international competitive bidding.** The low availability of high-quality consulting firms in Rwanda likely increased the price of some contracts. On the other hand, beneficiaries noted that the low quality of some of the deliverables was likely due to the contracts being priced too low. Two examples, albeit imperfect comparisons, also point to overall cost efficiency. A functional review similar to the ones conducted in the three priority institutions was conducted in MININFRA at a cost of RWF 110,000,000 (approximately US$141,000) compared to an average cost of RWF 88,000,000 (around US$113,000) for the G4C functional reviews. The Uganda Competitive Enterprise Development Project just hired three international firms to market Uganda in North America, the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Germany, and although the TORs are broader and include training

to Ugandan tourism business, the cost over one year of US$1.5 million is over 50 percent higher than the amount spent by G4C.

56. **The administrative efficiency of the project was also good.** It was implemented within budget though reallocations between components during the restructuring actually increased the cost of project coordination and implementation from 10 percent (US$0.5 million out of a total project cost of US$5 million) at appraisal to 16 percent (US$0.8 million) at closing. A small TA project, however, suffers from certain diseconomies of scale, given that a certain number of implementation staff is needed, regardless of overall implementation amount. A review of the most recent 10 Implementation Completion and Results Reports (ICRs) of TA loans points to an average of 13 percent cost of project management; so, G4C's administrative efficiency is on par with similar projects. However, the dropping of two institutions for support from the original project scope as well as the one-year extension detract somewhat from the project's design and implementation efficiency and warrant an overall rating of Substantial.

3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

57. **The overall project outcome is rated Moderately Satisfactory.** Relevance is rated Modest, and efficiency is rated Substantial. Efficacy is also rated Substantial, and takes into account the split evaluation of one of the key outcomes. The three sub-ratings are weighed equally. The overall rating recognizes that the vast majority of activities were delivered efficiently and most of them have a theoretically sound and strong expected contribution to the PDO. However, even though most activities are necessary, their total sum does not appear to be sufficient, undermining their attribution to the ultimate objective of export growth.

3.5 Overarching Themes, Other Outcomes, and Impacts

(a) Poverty Impacts, Gender Aspects, and Social Development

58. **Long-term effects of the project on women's employment prospects and poverty reduction through employment growth are expected to be positive.** The goal of the project was to support exports in horticulture and tourism, two sectors that employ a large part of the population and a lot of women. About 30 percent of the beneficiaries of project activities were women, though only one activity in the project specifically targeted women. The business training in entrepreneurship skills conducted by the PSF was delivered to 500 women. Apart from that, the project did not focus explicitly on poverty, gender, or social development.

(b) Institutional Change/Strengthening

59. The PDO was centered on strengthening the institutional capacity of a number of institutions, and the relevance, efficacy, and efficiency of this objective are detailed in section 3.

(c) Other Unintended Outcomes and Impacts (Positive or Negative)

60. **In 2015, Rwanda, Uganda, and Kenya announced a uni-visa for the three countries**, and although the project did not support the adoption of the uni-visa, there is some indication from beneficiary interviews that the project's diversification work gave tourism a much greater presence and put Rwanda on the map as a key destination and a key partner, and thus accelerated the

inclusion of Rwanda in the uni-visa implementation. The uni-visa will additionally amplify the growth of the tourism sector by making Rwanda more accessible and more integrated into regional tourism markets.

61. **The SPIU is piloting a more streamlined approach to procurement processing in order to reduce the litany of bureaucratic hurdles that caused delays for G4C.** Putting both the procurement and coordination functions of G4C in the SPIU proved to be challenging and created multiple steps for the processing of each TOR. In a new WB project, the SPIU has embedded the procurement function with the final beneficiaries through a 'subsidiary entity' arrangement, which shortens the process substantially and enhances the autonomy and ownership of beneficiaries.

3.6 Summary of Findings of Beneficiary Survey and/or Stakeholder Workshops

62. See annex 5.

4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome

Rating: Moderate

63. **The risk to sustaining long-term competitiveness in horticulture and tourism is primarily related to factors outside of the project's design.** Fluctuations in demand, regulatory environment, seasonality, and other unpredictable external shocks can significantly affect exports in the two sectors. More directly related to project activities is the risk of sustainability of the capacity-building and strategic design and implementation efforts that underpin sector competitiveness. The PSDS, supported by the project, is currently the guiding document of support for the sector and has received funding from multiple donors for its implementation. Export development is among the flagships of the PSDS, and its continued implementation could build on some of the achievements of G4C and ensure their sustainability.

64. **The capacity-building initiatives that the project supported are likely to be sustained.** The SCBI is a government program, and commitment and ownership are likely to remain strong, though without project support, implementation may be delayed. MIFOTRA has already committed funding for customization of the competency framework to all public agencies, Human Resource Management (HRM) specialists have been hired in most agencies, and an integrated results-based management system is being rolled out, which incorporates the competency frameworks developed by the project, and is integrated with each organization's performance contract. Sustainability of the support provided to the PSF appears high, because the technical specialist hired by G4C has been retained under the PSF's own budget and the federation has obtained a grant from TMEA in the amount of US$400,000. The general growth of the organization is likely to also make it financially sustainable by eventually shifting from donor funding to membership fees.

65. **The strategic interventions at the sector level are also likely to be sustainable, though there is also some concern over the ability to maintain momentum.** In horticulture, NAEB's certification gives it the ability to facilitate the certification of further cooperatives and to become a financially sustainable provider of a range of services to firms in the sector. In tourism, the institutional setup for the MICE segment is now in place and fully funded by the RDB, because

the segment has demonstrated its substantial potential to drive tourism growth in the country. During the national retreat in 2015, led by the President of Rwanda, the MICE segment was very high on the agenda; so, it has clearly become a national priority. The CB is likely to become its own ring-fenced institution with the RDB as its main shareholder, which would make it much more sustainable, accountable, and committed. In addition, the RAPCO is developing accreditation for professional conference organizers, which will enhance the private sector's ability to bid at the tender stage of incoming MICE events, and gradually fully take over that role from the Government. The sustainability of the marketing work is less clear because there is no committed budget to continue it and the RDB is looking for funding from other donors and embassies.

5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance

5.1 Bank Performance

(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry

Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory

66. **The project's quality at entry is described in detail in section 2.1, and key points are summarized here.** Fiduciary and safeguards aspects were thoroughly reviewed. The World Bank team aligned project interventions very closely with government priorities and aimed to directly support two government strategies. Choosing to support existing programs was intended to ensure ownership and commitment. The choice of activities was relevant to the achievement of the objective though there was insufficient analysis as to whether they are critical or if they depend on other factors. One of the shortcomings of project design was the insufficient appraisal and mitigation of the low implementation and coordination capacity risk, which ended up causing numerous delays and made the three-year time frame unrealistic. Sequencing some of the capacity-building activities better could have mitigated this risk and amplified project impact and also facilitated a more direct logical link between the two parts of the PDO. Choosing outcomes that are dependent on political processes outside the scope of the project was also a shortcoming that led to delayed implementation, extension of closing date, and ultimately an inability to show results of some reforms by project close.

67. **One of the main weaknesses at entry was in the results framework.** The absence of outcome indicators and metrics to connect project deliverables with targeted impact meant that during implementation the team did not have sufficient information on whether the chosen interventions were delivering the desired results and contributing to impact. For example, there was no benchmarking of institutional performance and consequently no evidence that it has improved as a result of the conducted reviews and reforms. The lack of a full results chain also presents a challenge for the establishment of attribution to the PDO impact-level indicators.

(b) Quality of Supervision

Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

68. **The project had two task team leaders during implementation, and multiple other team members and technical experts changed.** Sufficient budget and staff resources were allocated to the project, and in fact supervision costs during 2013 and 2014 were unusually high because the project had two TTLs and a junior officer based in the field. Throughout the project life, at least one task team leader (TTL) was based in the field. The team conducted regular supervision missions and prepared regular aide memoires in which the government was alerted to

problems with project implementation. The team very closely followed fiduciary compliance during implementation. The significant disbursement lag during the first two years was primarily due to low coordination and implementation capacity. The World Bank pointed out, in multiple Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs), the insufficient capacity and recommended hiring additional staff in the SPIU, to limited success, and the delays were further exacerbated by the WB itself not having a full-time procurement specialist in the Kigali office. However, the project was never rated below Moderately Satisfactory even when there was very little progress in implementation of activities between missions. In particular, the project was rated Satisfactory in all three ISRs before the MTR even though, up until the MTR, disbursements were particularly low. This lack of candor and realism in the ratings may have delayed the restructuring and dropping of certain activities, which could have happened sooner and avoided the need for an extension. A number of activities were dropped during restructuring due to a shortage of funds brought about by certain contracts exceeding the estimates in the approved procurement plan.

69. **The ISRs and aide memoires were largely focused on delivering against the procurement plans and signing contracts rather than on the overall progress toward the PDO.** This is partly because most indicators were at output level and could be considered met when reports or training were delivered. The final ISR was consequently rated Satisfactory based on almost full disbursement of funds and completion of activities and corresponding indicators, rather than assessment of attributable impact.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Bank Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

70. The rating is justified on the basis of the project's strategic relevance and integration with government priorities, and diligent supervision, while the shortcomings include a weak theory of change, low candor in performance reporting, and delayed restructuring.

5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

71. **In general, legal covenants were met and appropriate levels of financial accountability were maintained.** Overall, the Government was very responsive, though on occasion, the information provided would not be sufficient to meet the request and the back-and-forth communication would cause delays. Low technical capacity to draft TORs and other documents necessitated more involved supervision and contributed to increased project management costs. There is an overall sense of over-commitment to too many initiatives and programs with insufficient levels of staffing or necessary expertise. While general ownership of the project is evident, it was uneven between the different beneficiaries, particularly at the beginning of the project, and the distraction of working on too many fronts led to weaker oversight of project activities than originally anticipated As different owners felt ownership of different parts of the project, it was initially difficult to fully capitalize on synergies. In particular, the delays in the implementation of the Pay and Retention Policy as well as the career development framework were entirely in the control of the Government and arguably jeopardized the success of other capacity-building activities. Ownership and commitment improved significantly after the MTR.

72. **The lack of coordination between ministries and agencies was sometimes due to unclear responsibilities in decision-making power.** This was particularly evident between the different agencies involved in the SCBI. The agency charged with implementing the SCBI was the PSCBS (later renamed to the National Capacity Building Secretariat [NCBS] to reflect its expanded functions), which is housed within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN), but did not always have the sufficient funding or mandate to implement reforms.

(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

73. **The SPIU had extensive experience with implementing World Bank projects and was generally committed to the PDO.** At appraisal, the SPIU was assessed to have adequate capacity to implement. The speed of project implementation was, however, persistently hampered by inordinate delays in contract procurement. Some of the main reasons were the chronic understaffing of the SPIU and the extraordinary delays in hiring additional staff. Due to the high turnover in the SPIU, frequent retraining was also necessary and was also significantly delayed further exacerbating capacity constraints. Multiple consecutive aide memoires pointed out those deficiencies, but the resolution of implementation bottlenecks was extremely slow. In addition, the SPIU was overstretched because it was also in charge of implementing all government-financed projects, and there was no prioritization between activities, or clear division of responsibilities between staff members. The project team continually asked for a dedicated staff in the SPIU and eventually got one, which accelerated implementation. The SPIU took proactive steps to resolve the bottlenecks caused by the low coordination within the multiple beneficiaries and after the first year hired focal points embedded in MIFOTRA, NAEB, and the RDB, which significantly helped speed up disbursement.

74. **With regard to fiduciary compliance, accounts were generally kept in good order and financial reports were usually submitted on time.** The M&E capacity was adequate, and progress reports were generally submitted on time.

(c) Justification of Rating for Overall Borrower Performance
Rating: Moderately Satisfactory

75. The rating is justified on the basis of initial low ownership by beneficiary agencies, low level of coordination, and low readiness to implement due to staff turnover and insufficient staffing. The SPIU was proactive in addressing implementation challenges and maintaining stakeholder involvement, and implementation accelerated significantly.

6. Lessons Learned

76. **The results chain should be credible.** A full results chain linking activities to impact is critical in establishing the causal logic of the project, informing lending decisions, and enabling midcourse corrections. If the middle part of the results chain is missing, the project team will not be able to establish attribution of project activities to impact. The theory of change of capacity building interventions is particularly challenging and teams tend to measure capacity building either at the output level with indicators such as training delivered, or at the impact level where attribution is hard to establish given the multitude of external factors. If capacity building projects

do not incorporate some metric of institutional performance, they would not only struggle to assess the effectiveness of activities but they would also miss an opportunity to test the hypothesis that institutional performance was in fact a binding constraint to the ultimate objective.

77. **The assessment of capacity and timeframes during design and implementation should be realistic.** Beneficiaries noted that the initial challenges with low and uneven project ownership were due to the quick preparation which did not allow enough time for the institutions to familiarize themselves with activities and mainstream them into their planning. This in turn adversely affected the speed of implementation. Timelines for implementing project activities also need to be realistic. Capacity building activities in particular can take a long time and the TA project cycle is often too short for results to manifest. Design should anticipate how long activities would take to implement, because if critical activities are completed right before project close, there will not be enough information to assess project performance, and we could not credibly claim that any perceived changes in impact data are due to project interventions. Frontloading training and expertise can help mitigate capacity-related risks. In the case of tourism, for example, the catalytic effect of the support to MICE was primarily due to the embedded expertise in RDB, and the rigorous on the ground day-to-day engagement which was critical for the development of a new product offering and the quick demonstration of results in the segment.

78. **Relatedly, appraisal of uncertainty should also be realistic.** G4C was designed to be the first in a series of projects but, due to factors outside the control of the project team, the rest of the series did not materialize. A lot of the interventions of G4C, particularly related to public sector capacity building, were meant to lay the foundation work for future operations, and their full impact will be evident only after project close. Projects should secure commitments ahead of time to facilitate realistic planning, and if the authorizing environment for future follow-on operations is uncertain, projects should incorporate that uncertainty in the design and be ready to refocus toward interventions that are more self-sustaining and do not require significant follow-up.

79. **Sequencing and complementarity should be carefully assessed and leveraged.** Careful sequencing of project activities can significantly increase synergies between components and amplify the expected outcome. The capacity-building activities (including M&E) that were part of G4C could have been better linked with implementation and helped avoid delays. In addition, if staff retention is a serious issue, it is arguably better to address that first before training staff who are subsequently likely to leave. In addition, beneficiary feedback suggests that TA could be more transformational if directly linked to material investment and thus arguably project impact could have been enhanced if it had been directly linked to existing or pipeline investments.

80. **Projects could actively foster sustainable government collaboration.** Despite coordination challenges, including multiple beneficiary agencies in the design can have a very positive impact on their ability and willingness to work together. During the beneficiary workshop, all stakeholders noted that, at the outset of G4C, there were issues with coordination and designation of responsibilities, but after having to work together to ensure successful delivery of project activities, they now much more regularly communicate with each other to enhance synergies and to avoid duplication of work.

7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners

81. See annex 6 for the executive summary of the borrower ICR.

Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing

Table A1: Project Cost by Component (in US$, million equivalent)

Components and Subcomponent	Appraisal Estimate (US$)	Appraisal Estimate (US$) after Restructuring	Actual/Latest Estimate (US$)	Percentage of Appraisal
Component 1. Support to Priority Institutions under the SCBI	**1,300,000**	**726,920**	**735,040**	**56.54**
1.1 Support for the SCBI coordination and implementation in priority institutions	500,000	129,400	87,236	17.44
1.2 Support for the pay and retention policy implementation in priority institutions	500,000	494,489	502,292	100.45
1.3 Building capacity for competitiveness	300,000	103,031	145,512	48.50
Component 2. Support the Implementation of the NES	**2,600,000**	**3,035,963**	**2,725,828**	**104.84**
2.1 Support diversification of tourism	1,200,000	1,504,029	1,394,066	116.17
2.2 Support to horticulture development	900,000	1,018,305	837,087	93.01
2.3 Strategies and policy formulation for competitiveness	500,000	513,629	494,675	98.94
Component 3: Improved Public-Private Dialog for Competitiveness	**600,000**	**521,348**	**581,492**	**96.92**
Component 4. Project Coordination	**500,000**	**715,769**	**802,154**	**160.43**
Total	**5,000,000**	**5,000,000**	**4,844,515**	**96.89**

Table A2: Project Financing by Source

Source of Funds	Appraisal Estimate (US$)	Appraisal Estimate after Restructuring (US$)	Actual/Latest Estimate (US$)	Percentage of Appraisal
Borrower				
International Development Association (IDA)	**5,000,000**	**5,000,000**	**4,844,514.89**	**96.89**

Annex 2. Outputs by Component

Table A3: Outputs by Component

Planned Activity	Actual Output
Component 1: Support to Priority Institutions under the SCBI	
Subcomponent 1.1: Support for the SCBI coordination and implementation in priority institutions	
M&E coaching for the SCBI institutions	• Mentoring and coaching sessions conducted for Planning and M&E staff in the NCBS, the RDB, and NAEB • 64 staff benefited from coaching sessions
Capacity needs assessments for NAEB, the RDB, and MINICOM	• Three functional review/capacity needs assessment conducted for the three institutions • Frameworks reorganized to align with mandates • Information technology and knowledge management systems, management training, and new strategic plans established
Subcomponent 1.2: Support for the Pay and Retention Policy implementation in priority institutions	
Public sector pay and retention schemes implementation	• Public sector competency framework developed across 25 selected public institutions • Customized for the three priority institutions • Career development plans prepared and customized for the three priority institutions with clear job profiles • Core and general competencies integrated in the performance management system, that is, the Integrated Personnel and Payroll Information System and results-based management module to facilitate a competency-based performance appraisal • Retention schemes developed, including the home ownership scheme and the canteen scheme
Assessment of rare and specialized skills	• A database of rare and specialized skills was established by MIFOTRA • Planning, policy analysis, and research were found to be highly needed skills in Rwanda
Subcomponent 1.3: Building capacity for competitiveness	
SCBI rollout in horticulture and tourism	• SCBI pilot rollout extended to NAEB and the RDB
Component 2: Support the Implementation of the NES	
Subcomponent 2.1: Support diversification of tourism	
Tourism marketing in EAC	• Social media audiences re-engaged • Database of EAC target market with 690 contacts developed • 159 tour operators in Uganda, Tanzania, and Kenya proactively selling Rwanda • Destination specialist program developed and conducted with 181 operators • 1,157 outreach activities completed • 95 committed marketing partnerships established • 92 educational trip participants involved

Tourism marketing in Europe, Russia and North America	• 2,000 sell-in tools produced and distributed in targeted markets, such as DVDs and printed materials • Educational trip for 48 international tour operators arranged • 14 international trade events attended • Familiarization trips for 15 international media journalists arranged • Over 60 press releases • Rwandatourism.com website optimized • 10 joint marketing events with destination operators • 916 outreach meetings held • Editorial coverage and advertising, newsletters, embassy presentations released • 140 international tour operators proactively selling Rwanda
Tourism marketing in China	• Website in Chinese visited by over 2 million people • 48,000 fans following the Rwanda tourism account on the World Travel Online website
MICE CB management expert	• CB established and staffed with three full-time people • 25 bids submitted • 10 events held, including World Export Development Forum (800 delegates), Rotary Club International (300 delegates), Conference of Rectors, Vice Chancellors and Presidents (250 delegates), Capital Market East African conference (300 delegates), Health Care Conference (400 delegates), Association of African Universities conference (250 delegates), East African Petroleum (400 delegates), Conventions for sports in Africa (120 delegates), and Africa Leadership Network (450 delegates)
Implementation of the tourism master plan	• Revised tourism master plan • Completion and validation of certain parts is still pending, such as implementation plan, marketing and branding action plans, product development plans, and so on
Assessment of the handicrafts industry	• Report delivered with recommendations
Subcomponent 2.2: Support to horticulture development	
Elaborate a horticulture strategy	• A revised and updated horticulture strategy • Key recommendation is to organize horticulture producers into cooperatives and facilitate the formation of commodity unions
Production of protocols for clean planting materials	• 8 cooperatives supported in the production of clean planting materials and grown in 8 districts • The supported cooperatives have used the seeds this planting season with no success
TA for RHIO	• Registration of the RHIO into an independent entity
TA for horticulture cooperatives in proper management	• 45 cooperatives received training and support in proper management • Support to cooperatives to get legal status • TA on corporate governance of cooperatives • 17 commodity unions formed under the project that will also form a national horticulture federation • Benefits include a mapping of producers in each subsector

TA to develop and implement QMS in horticulture cooperatives	• 10 cooperatives received training in quality management standards for selected fruits and vegetables • 10 cooperatives with pending certification to meet export market requirements • NAEB as an institution is also getting certified
Develop horticulture agribusiness interactive database	• Database includes a mapping of producers and crops • Published on the RDB website, and used by investors to fill information gaps
Subcomponent 2.3: Strategies and policy formulation for competitiveness	
Development of a PSDS	• PSDS developed • 5 priority flagships identified, including (a) export development; (b) investment implementation; (c) high impact entrepreneurship growth; (d) infrastructure for growth; (e) institutional capacity for delivery • Active participation in EDPRS II discussions and positioning of the private sector • Funds committed by donors (€5 million by KFW, US$100 million by AfDB)
TA for Industrial Development Council process	• Industrial development council formed, comprising high level government officials only to oversee the implementation of the NES • Regular quarterly meetings
Managerial and development training	• 24 people received management and leadership skills training at MINICOM
Component 3: Improved Public-Private Dialog for Competitiveness	
Studies on key policy issues affecting the private sector	• Tourism study conducted • Horticulture study dropped due to budget constraints • Position paper to the Ministry of Finance advocating for exceptions to law requiring private entities to have cashier register machine linked directly to tax authorities • 10 quarterly sectoral PPDs (tea, coffee, handicrafts, minerals, hides and skins, roofing, woods, agro-processing, vegetables, and flowers) • Position papers, including recommendation being implemented on introducing Rwanda barcode
Feasibility study of collective investments in district	• Study of districts to assess feasibility of collective investments • 90 groups identified with a total of 2,475 members • 20 groups expressed interest and were supported with business plans and training to help them get commercial financing
Reviewing associations legal documents	• 25 cooperatives in horticulture and tourism supported to become legally registered
International PSF-SPIU director	• Operational manuals developed • Three projects designed and presented to potential donors
Support to women entrepreneurs	• 500 women trained • 10 visitors to Canada women entrepreneur conference • 4 visitors to the U.S. business tour trip to Chicago • Planned impact assessment cancelled because of budget constraints

PSF outreach campaign	• Outreach campaign conducted in 30 districts • 2,735 people reached • 1,350 new members registered • 66% increase in PSF membership

Table A4: Dropped Activities

Institution	No	Activity
NAEB	1	Conduct inspections, audit, and certifications for horticulture cooperatives and products
	2	Develop a fruit and vegetable marketing strategy and conduct a study to develop horticulture nursery business partnerships management
	3	TA in horticulture chain management, market access, and promotion
	4	TA in floriculture development
	5	Rent offices for associations and chambers
	6	TA in fruit and vegetable commercial production and development
	7	Study in pyrethrum market potential
	8	Business cases and promotional materials for selected exports
	9	Organize a customer care campaign targeting the tourism chamber members
MINICOM	10	Develop a domestic market recapturing strategy
PSF	11	Hiring a local PSF-SPIU manager
NCBS	12	Develop change management plans in selected institutions

Table A5: Disbursement-weighed calculation of split evaluation for efficacy

	Against original PDO indicators	Against revised PDO indicators	Overall
Rating	Substantial	Substantial	
Rating value	3	3	
Weight (% disbursed before and after restructuring)	81	19	
Weighed value	2.43	0.57	3
Final rating		Substantial	

Note: the following values were assigned to efficacy ratings for the purposes of this analysis: High=4; Substantial=3; Modest=2; Negligible=1.

Annex 3. Economic and Financial Analysis

Not applicable

Annex 4. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes

Table A6: Task Team Members

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Lending			
Akamanzi Antoinette	Procurement Assistant	AFMRW	Task Team
Austin A. Mark	Senior Operations Officer	AFTAR	Task Team
Beg Noreen	Environmental Specialist	AFTEN	Task Team
Beloderik Elena A	Information Specialist	SECPO	SECPO
Chacon F. Irene	Program Officer	AFTFE	Task Team
Chantal Kajangwe	Procurement Specialist	AFTPR	Task Team
Corlett Michael	Senior Country Officer	AFTFP	Task Team
Dagne Yeshareg	Program Assistant	AFTFE	Task Team
Diallo Aissatou	Sr. Finance Officer	CTRLA	Task Team
Douglas Zeng	Private Sector Development Specialist	AFTFE	Task Team
Dreger Theodore S.	Governance Specialist	AFTPR	Co-Task Team Leader
Fye Lucy M.	Sr. Private Sector Development Specialist	AFTFE	Task Team Leader
Hansl Birgit	Sr. Economist	AFTP2	Task Team
Ingabire Sylvie	Program Assistant	AFMRW	Task Team
Isabirye Peter	Operation Officer	AFMRW	Task Team
Ishihara Yoichiro	Senior Economist	OPCS	Task Team
Kaiser Kai	Sr. Economist	PRMPS	Peer Reviewer
Kassim Suhail	Private Sector Development, FPD Competitive Practice	SASFP	Peer Reviewer
Kern Jutta Ursula	Sr. Monitoring and Evaluation Specialist	AFTDE	Task Team
Kumar Praveen	Lead Economist	AFRP1	Peer Reviewer
Larbi George	Sr. Public Sector Specialist, Civil Service Reform/ Pay and Retention Expert	AFTPR	Task Team
Mamadou Barry	Sr Mining Specialist	GEEX2	Task Team
Messerli Hannah	Tourism Specialist	AFTFE	Task Team
Moses K. Kibirige	Senior Private Sector Development	GTC01	
Mukaindo Stephen Mugendi	Senior Counsel	LEGAL	Task Team
Mwumvaneza Valens	Senior Agriculture Economist	AFTAR	Task Team
Nagaraja Rao Harshadeep	Lead Environment Specialist	GENDR	
Nanshemeza Hope	Team Assistant	AFMRW	Task Team
Nightingale Rukuba-Ngaiza	Senior Counsel	LEGLE	
Niyibizi Peace Aimee	Economist		
Odhiambo Berry	Agribusiness Investment Officer	CICIN	Task Team
Opagi Michael	Sr. Investment Officer	CASPA	Peer Reviewer
Otieno Ayany	Financial Management Specialist	AFTME	
Rajiv Sondhi	Sr. Finance Officer	CTRLA	Task Team
Sebastian-A Molineus	Director	GFMDR	
Shahina Shermamod	Finance Analyst	WFALA	
Taye Alemu Mengistae	Sr. Economist	AFTFE	

Names	Title	Unit	Responsibility/ Specialty
Tessa Rachel Macarthur	Sr Public Sector Specialist	AFTPR	Task Team
Usanase Alice	Junior Professional Associate	GTCAF	
Vis Thomas A.	Risk Management Specialist	AFTFE	Task Team
Wagle Dileep	Consultant	AFTFP	Consultant
Welton Paul	Sr Financial Management Specialist	AFTME	Task Team
Wong Michael D.	Lead Private Sector Development Specialist	AFTFW	Peer Reviewer
Zeng Zhihua	Sr. Economist	GTC01	Task Team
Supervision/ICR			
Alles Ashani Chanuka	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTCAF	Task Team
Appiah-Koranteng Alex	Senior Governance and Public Sector Specialist	GG019	Task Team
Assah Herve	Lead Private Sector Specialist	GTC01	ICR Team Leader
Beg Noreen	Senior Environmental Specialist	GEN04	Task Team
Beloderik Elena A.	Information Specialist	SECPO	
Corlett Michael	Senior Financial Sector Specialist	GFM01	
Dagne Yeshareg	Program Assistant	GFM01	Task Team
Dahourou Adja Mansora	Private Sector Specialist	GTC07	Project Team Leader
Delmon Victoria Hilda Rigby	Sr. Counsel	GWAGP	Task Team
Desai Vyjayanti Tharmaratnam	Program Manager	GTIIC	Task Team
Dreger Theodore S.	Operations Officer	GGO11	Task Team
Fye Lucy M.	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC01	Task Team Leader
Hristova Diana	Monitoring & Evaluation Specialist	GTCCS	ICR Primary Author
Kah Le Guil Jeannette	Sr. Program Assistant	GTC07	Task Team
Larbi George Addo	Practice Manager	GG019	Task Team
Mengistae Taye Alemu	Sr. Economist	GTC13	Task Team
Messerli Hannah R.	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTCCS	Task Team
Mukaindo Stephen Mugendi	Counsel	LEGAM	Task Team
Mwumvaneza Valens	Sr. Agriculture Specialist	GFA13	Task Team
Namutebi Lillian Brenda	Consultant Financial management Specialist	GG025	Task Team
Nanshemeza Hope	Team Assistant	AFMRW	Task Team
Ngwira Tanangachi	Operations Analyst	GTC07	Task Team
Ramalho Rita	Manager	DECDB	Task Team
Rasagam Ganesh	Practice Manager	GTCIE	Task Team
Usanase Alice	Junior Professional Associate	GTCAF	Task Team
Vis Thomas A.	Sr. Private Sector Specialist	GTC04	Task Team
Wagle Dileep M.	Consultant	GTC07	Task Team
Weber Barbara	Sr. Operations Officer	GTC07	Task Team
Zeng Zhihua	Sr. Economist	GTC01	Task Team
Zhou Jiazhen	Consultant	GTCCS	Task Team

Table A7: Staff Time and Cost

Stage of Project Cycle	Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)	
	No. of Staff Weeks	US$, thousands (including Travel and Consultant Costs)
Lending		
2012	29.73	135,101.09
Total:	**29.73**	**135,101.09**
Supervision/ICR		
2012	4.9	22,132.32
2013	54.71	123,688.20
2014	58.55	191,361.23
2015	17.96	69,849.97
2016	26.18	129,677.77
Total:	**162.30**	**536,709.49**

Annex 5. Stakeholder Workshop Report and Results

1. A series of round table discussions and an overall workshop with all beneficiaries were held during the June 2016 ICR mission to allow the beneficiaries an opportunity to provide feedback on project design and implementation and to highlight achievements, challenges, and lessons learned. The beneficiary workshop included representatives from MIFOTRA, NAEB, the NCBS, the RDB, MINICOM, and the PSF.

All Beneficiary Institutions Workshop

- **Adequate design and ownership.** Beneficiaries noted that TA needs at least six months to a year for preparation to increase ownership in institutions and allow them enough time to become familiar with details of activities and mainstream them into their planning, so that once implementation starts it can kick off quickly. The SPIU noted that ownership and implementation are directly linked, and if ownership is low at the start, by the time it increased, the project is coming to a close, while if it is high at the beginning, procurement can be decentralized and implementation would be more efficient.

- **Challenges with TA.** Participants highlighted that implementing TA is often challenging and particularly, when it is for capacity building, it can take a long time. One manifestation of it is that TA project design does not usually allow enough time for results to manifest. Project-supported activities are mainstreamed into institutions but it will still be a few years before any real results can become evident. Another challenge with the time line is that it did not allow for flexibility. A number of contracts were of inadequate quality but as the project was coming to an end, there was no time to rehire. Representatives from NAEB also mentioned that one of the activities had to be dropped as it involved procuring small equipment for lab testing which at the design stage of the project was approved, but during implementation was deemed ineligible.

- **More TA.** Beneficiaries from various agencies pointed out that the capacity gap in Rwanda is still large and there is a need for more TA and professional training for core staff of the organizations. The PSF noted that they could further benefit from capacity building of member associations, as well as from an information platform for private companies on export requirements. Some sectoral platforms exist, such as through NAEB or in the mining sector, but there is no general one for all exporters.

- **TA linked to investment.** A number of agencies noted that capacity building yields more results when linked to material investments. The knowledge and training are critical but additional funding for equipment or capital for implementation would be essential. Beneficiaries recommended coupling the two types of investment in the future, so that they could implement what has already been identified by TA and generate income for local communities.

- **Consultant quality and pricing.** Participants noted the challenges of finding high-quality consultants in Rwanda and noted that it would be helpful to maintain a roster of qualified consultants with feedback on the individual consultants' past performance, because hiring a big name firm is often appealing but the quality of individual consultants sent to do the work often varies. Many of the beneficiaries recommended teaming up local consultants with international firms to provide the much needed local context, as well as to encourage skills transfer and enhance sustainability. Some beneficiaries even mentioned that some of the activities could have been done entirely by the Government to further enhance local capacity. The pairing, however, needs to be balanced, as in the case of the RDB, it created additional burden on its staff to fill the gap for consultants who did not have a local presence. Another knowledge gap in TA procurement was correct benchmarking of the level of pricing, which in certain cases led to the contract being too low and affected the quality of the deliverables (for example, MIFOTRA career development framework contract).

- **Procurement delays.** The SPIU pointed out that the design of the project was challenging as it combined the coordination and procurement functions. TORs were drafted by the beneficiaries, and then, a no objection from the NCBS, clearance from the SPIU, and no objection by the World Bank had to be obtained before they could be sent back to the beneficiaries. The process itself is thus time-consuming and amplifies procurement delays. The SPIU is now experimenting with a different approach by having beneficiary agencies do their own procurement entirely and only getting a no objection at the end. A procurement officer from the SPIU is embedded with the beneficiaries as part of their evaluation team and the SPIU only needs to request a no objection from the World Bank, which shortens the process, and provides more autonomy to the implementing institutions. The new process is being piloted in the ongoing World Bank Trade Facilitation Project as an MOU with a 'subsidiary entity' which implements on behalf of the SPIU. The SPIU noted that G4C has substantially strengthened its capacity not only to coordinate but also to anticipate problems and respond quickly and proactively.

- **Linkages.** All participants highlighted that the project has been catalytic with regard to creating working relationships between different beneficiaries and developing common goals. The project demonstrated the benefits of working together and stakeholders anticipate that this approach will become the norm in the future.

- **Exchange rate loss.** The participants noted that the losses associated with exchange rate fluctuations during the life of the project led to the dropping of certain activities, and switching to other alternative sources of funding. Options for safeguarding against such risks should be considered in the future.

- **Catalytic support.** Beneficiaries noted that G4C has been catalytic and has opened opportunities in different areas. Other projects with multiple donors are currently being implemented with strategies designed by G4C.

Primate Safari, Tour Operator

- The owner of Primate Safari noted that the leisure subsector has been growing but at a limited rate, and gorillas remain the primary attraction for tourists in Rwanda. Only one in ten bookings includes either of the other national parks, Nyungwe or Akagera. The participants questioned the choice of Asia for the G4C marketing efforts as primates are abundant in the region and there is often a negative association with them. This is indicative of the low level of consultation between the Government and the private sector.

- Primate Safari started a MICE desk before the CB was established. Capacity in the MICE space remains very low in Rwanda, which has led the Government to organize conferences themselves rather than trust the private sector. This has started to change with the CB, which creates an avenue for private operators to get business and builds their capacity. The CB also facilitated the creation of RAPCO, which is in the process of developing a certification for professional conference organizers. Only Cape Town uses a similar approach where private sector operators bid directly on events at the tender stage. There is a university for hospitality in Rwanda but it is entirely oriented toward leisure tourism and has not adapted its curriculum to fit the current trend. Institutional training has not been very dynamic, whether public or private. Available training has been piecemeal and does not cover the full range of services that need to be offered. Private sector leisure operators have been able to capitalize on the growth in business tourism by linking leisure tour packages directly on the conference portal for participants to add to their trip.

Pineapple Cooperative in Kirehe District, Eastern Province

- The cooperative has 133 individual members and individual contracts with each farmer. It is the only cooperative in Rwanda that has a pineapple dryer and even though it also sells fresh pineapple, the majority of its exports are dried and packaged pineapples, exported primarily to France. Exports have already grown to a ton from 400 kg when the cooperative first started exporting last January. Some of its members are certified organic so the current strategy of the cooperative is not to add new members, but to certify more of them organic so they can capture this niche segment of the market. The main services that the cooperative provides are exporting scale, seeds, as well as advances.

- The cooperative received a number of services from NAEB including financial support to build the factory and purchase the dryer, as well as the QMS training funded by G4C. The training focused primarily on proper storage and documentation and in general improved their ability to control the product quality.

- One of the main issues that the participants noted is the ban in Rwanda on polyethylene, which forces the cooperative to use different packaging materials that are more expensive and hurt their competitiveness in the international markets. The short-term strategy of the cooperative is to expand to new markets to alleviate the uncertainty inherent in having one major buyer.

Annex 6. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR

1. The Borrower's ICR was prepared by the SPIU of MINICOM in April 2016.

Executive Summary

2. G4C was a US$5 million project funded by the World Bank, whose implementation was coordinated by MINICOM's SPIU. The overall objective was to strengthen the capacity of selected institutions so as to improve competitiveness in horticulture and tourism sectors in Rwanda, thus boosting export growth and job creation potential. Additionally, the project focused on supporting the human resource capacity-building initiatives in selected institutions of MINICOM, NAEB, and the RDB.

3. G4C was a three-year project and its effectiveness date was April 1, 2012 and was originally scheduled to end on April 30, 2015. However, it was granted a one-year no cost extension so as to close on April 30, 2016. Key project stakeholders and beneficiary institutions include the NCBS, MIFOTRA, the RDB, NAEB, the PSF, and MINICOM.

Findings of the Final Evaluation

Performance against High-level Indicators

- Three priority public sector institutions of MINICOM, the RDB, and NAEB have undertaken functional reviews and organized frameworks aligned to their mandates.

- Ten cooperative farmers associations were supported to adapt quality management standards for export markets and 20 cooperatives were mobilized and consolidated into a federation to boost production of volumes and values for export. Eight were supported with clean planting materials.

- Over 1,220,000 tourists visited Rwanda in 2014 from 1,122,000 tourists in 2013, an increase of 9 percent. In 2015, tourists totaled 627,893 compared to 245,276 in 2011 before the project. MICE implementation alone resulted in an increase in tourist arrival from 15,441 (2013) to 19,084 tourists (2014), an increase of 24 percent thus contributing to US$29 million in revenue earnings to Rwanda in 2014.

- The project benefitted 27,450 total beneficiaries of which 6,500 were female beneficiaries, which accounts for 38 percent, higher than the project target of 10 percent.

4. The project has fully achieved (100 percent) all the high-level indicators. The project outputs have been achieved by about 95 percent with financial performance/absorption attaining 96.89 percent (97 percent).

Project Effectiveness in Facilitating Achievement of Outcomes and Outputs

5. The end of project final evaluation/study shows that the project has been effective in facilitating achievement of outcomes based on some recorded quick wins, including the following:

- The capacity of the selected priority public sector institutions and the private sector (PSF) has been enhanced through the project to better deliver, implement, and monitor activities in the priority sectors of tourism and horticulture.

- The project has been catalytic in helping public sector institutions to leverage on Government resources and also to mobilize additional resources from other donors.

- The role of MINICOM in steering Rwanda's NES implementation and the PSDS agenda has been enhanced and is now much better understood and appreciated as compared to the period of project inception in 2011. A number of public sector and private sector agencies are increasingly collaborating in implementing projects in priority sectors.

- The project facilitated the development of strategic plans and actions plans within the priority institutions which has in turn strengthened capacity to implement activities well aligned with EDPRS II (for example, MINICOM on the NES and PSDS, the RDB on tourism strategy, and NAEB on horticulture strategy). Even the private sector has been enhanced to contribute to implementation of the EDPRS.

- The project has assisted the development and formulation of key policy and strategic frameworks—such as the NES, PSDS, competency framework, Pay and Retention Policy, horticulture strategy, tourism master plan—all of which will assist in implementation of EDPRS II objectives and the establishment of the CB (MICE), which is a big win to the project.

- The project has assisted in the creation of the SPIU at the PSF, which has enhanced the ability of the private sector to drive advocacy, lobby for TA, and financial assistance, and coordinate interventions addressing issues in priority sectors.

- Three priority public sector institutions are already implementing a competency framework agenda in their work plans and budgets and this has also been scaled up to 25 public sector institutions. Thus, the set indicator of three priority sector institutions implementing the competency framework in their work plans and budgets has been achieved.

- By facilitating the review of the NES and the development of the PSDS, the project through MINICOM has facilitated the momentum to promote exports in selected priority sectors through coordinated efforts of selected sector priority institutions (NAEB and the RDB) and the private sector. This has put in place mechanisms for collaborating and implementing strategies with the private sector on the ideal of private sector–led economy because the private sector is identified as a driver of growth under EDPRS II.

- By encouraging the active participation and lead role of the private sector in key project components such as the PPD for competitiveness, reviewing of the NES, and the design of the PSDS, the project has fostered strong commitment and demand-driven interventions that meet the needs of the private operators who are key players in the selected sectors' value chains in horticulture and tourism. This has enhanced job creation, strengthened institutional capacity of value chain operators in clusters of cooperatives, improved incomes of producers in rural areas, and boosted production for export at the farm level.

Project Implementation Arrangements and Efficiency

6. Given the level of expected results, the final evaluation considers that the choice and quantity of the financial, human, and administrative resources deployed for implementation of the project activities were adequate. In this regard, the TA experts have been useful in building capacity of selected priority institutions and in developing action plans and policies. However, the quality of inputs of the TA experts was in some cases affected by delays in delivery of results which accounts for unaccomplished tasks in some selected contracts till date. This reduced the higher extent of project efficiency and the likelihood of timely achievement of planned outputs and outcomes as is the case in the review of the sustainable tourism master plan under the RDB.

7. As at the time of this study (April 2016), the project had spent US$4,844,515 (96.89 percent) of US$5,000,000, the total budget allocated for the planned interventions in four years. This is considerably high and not common with TA projects. All the expenditures reviewed are within the planned project outputs. It is therefore clear that the World Bank financial aid has been efficiently utilized. However, while the project design clearly defined the project governance and management structures involving the Project Steering Committee and the Coordination Unit (MINICOM-SPIU) with clear TOR, there have been some coordination constraints regarding non-adherence to deadlines by the TA experts, hindering implementing institutions to provide timely report on outputs.

8. The quality of M&E was appropriate, including quarterly activity and annual reports, to ensure coordinated follow-ups and project oversight guidance. While the quality of coordination is viewed as considerably high and appropriate with regard to planning and overseeing implementation, the delayed reporting as noted earlier would sometimes complicate the work of the Coordination Unit. This constraint was minimized through more informative reports at quarterly and annual basis.

Project Relevance

9. The project design was informed by wide ranging consultations covering the public and private sector in Rwanda including development partners such as IFC, UNDP, BTC, DFID, and AfDB among others. The quality of needs analysis was appropriate. The project's final assessment shows that the project interventions are still relevant in the context of the goals and aspirations of the Government of Rwanda enshrined in the Vision 2020 and EDPRS II. The objectives also match with the objectives of the World Bank and other development partners working in Rwanda such as the UNDP and BTC, supporting capacity building, while the TMEA and German Technical Cooperation support PPDs. Although the project is ending, stakeholders indicated that the project would have been renewed to ensure continued momentum generated in areas of public service capacity building, agriculture sector capacity building through cooperatives in horticulture, tourism promotion programs, and the rollout of a competency framework and career development plans in public sector institutions. It is therefore necessary for the World Bank to consider a new

project though not focused on TA support, but financial aid to institutions that will be rolling out implementation of key activities initiated by G4C.

Major Outputs Attained and Value for Money

10. On SCBI institutions, the project attained the three priority institutions that undertook functional review and piloted a competency framework. It reached 24,456 beneficiaries of which 6,500 are women. It implemented 34 out of the 35 target contracts for TA experts. Rate of oversight implementation of the project was 99 percent and rate of implementation of project activities was over 95 percent. Entrepreneurship and business management skills training was given to 500 women.

11. **Success stories:** The project was able to realize a number of success stories including a functional review that led to institutional restructuring in public sector, scaling of competency framework to a total of 25 beyond the pilot three target institutions, project assimilation of results through continued funding and implementation, enhancing visibility of Rwanda in conference and destination tourism, establishing of exporter forum, leveraging of Government resources among public sector institutions, and launch of the PSDS and NES in addition to empowerment of women.

Lessons Learned and Key Challenges during the Project Period

12. Regarding lessons learned, TA based on demand-driven interventions are very effective when anchored on a process of change that enables gradual assimilation of knowledge, in addition to reforms that attract stakeholders to play their roles. Second, highly effective projects are based on having target institutions focusing on interventions that are in their core competences. Third, flexibility in project management is necessary to foster decisions that ensure project success. Further, project ownership comes at a cost (efficiency trade-offs). Last, TA project management should be centered on the extent of effective beneficiary update of outputs and institutionalization of results rather than achievement of quantitative indicators.

13. Based on the above findings, the Final Evaluation recommends that activities that have not been completed should be taken up by the target institutions as priority activities for implementation. The competency framework should be implemented across all government institutions to enhance efficiency across the public services sector. There is also need for increased budget through the Government of Rwanda and incremental financial assistance and TA from development partners to rollout most of the strategies and action plans post-G4C. The Government of Rwanda and the World Bank should agree on and design new programs aimed at addressing among others (a) implementation of related institutional strengthening activities, (b) NES implementation, and (c) private sector development strategy implementation. Lastly, the implementation of the PSDS should explore the pros and cons of coordinating decentralization activities across institutions with the highest vested interests in the sector.

Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

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Nielsen, Hannah and Anna Spenceley. 2010. "The Success of Tourism in Rwanda: Gorillas and More." *Africa Success Stories*. Chapter 14.

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World Bank, Governance for Competitiveness TA Project (P127105), *Project Appraisal Document*, December 2011.

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MAP


RWANDA
SELECTED CITIES AND TOWNS
AKARERE (DISTRICT) CAPITALS
INTARA (PROVINCE) CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
AKARERE (DISTRICT) BOUNDARIES
INTARA (PROVINCE) BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
GSDPM
UGANDA
DEM. REP. OF CONGO
TANZANIA
BURUNDI
Lac Kivu
NORTH
EAST
WEST
SOUTH
KIGALI
Nyagatare
Gicumbi (Byumba)
Musanze (Ruhengeri)
Rubavu (Gisenyi)
Karongi (Kibuye)
Rusizi (Cyangugu)
Muhanga (Gitarama)
Nyamata
Rwamagana
Ngoma (Kibungo)
Nyanza
Huye
Nyabihu
Gakenke
Rulindo
Gatsibo
Kayonza
Kirehe
Bugesera
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