Safe and Productive
INTERNATIONAL DE VELOPMENT IN FOCUS
Migration from the
Kyrgyz Republic
Lessons from the
COVID-19 Pandemic
Laurent Bossavie and Daniel Garrote-Sánchez
I N T E R N AT I O N A L D E V E L O P M E N T I N F O C U S
Safe and Productive
Migration from the
Kyrgyz Republic
Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic
L AURENT BOSSAVIE AND DANIEL GARROTE-SÁNCHEZ
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Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic.
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Contents
Acknowledgments vii
About the Authors ix
Executive Summary xi
Abbreviations xxiii
Introduction 1
Note 3
References 3
CHAPTER 1 Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and
Development 5
Characteristics of labor migration from the Kyrgyz Republic 5
Drivers of labor migration from the Kyrgyz Republic 11
Profile of labor migrants 13
Labor market outcomes of migrants 15
Impact of migration and remittances on the home economy and
migrant households 21
Notes 25
References 26
CHAPTER 2 Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by
COVID-19 29
Predecision and predeparture 31
During migration 37
Return migration 43
Impacts on migrant household members and the
home economy 46
Notes 49
References 49
CHAPTER 3 Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the
Migration Life Cycle 51
Strengthening migration systems 51
Predecision and predeparture 53
During migration 57
Postreturn 61
Notes 65
References 65
iii
iv | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Boxes
1.1 Current data limitations in measuring migration flows and stocks from the
Kyrgyz Republic 6
2.1 The limited availability of up-to-date data to assess the impact of COVID-19
on labor migration in the Kyrgyz Republic 30
2.2 The legal protection of Kyrgyz migrants in main destination countries 42
3.1 Global skill partnerships: A potential tool to enhance migrants’ skills 55
3.2 The Eurasian Economic Union 61
Figures
ES.1 Migrants’ decisions, COVID-19 disruptions, and policy options throughout
the migration life cycle xii
ES.2 Impacts of COVID-19 on labor demand for Kyrgyz migrants and on
households with disrupted migration plans, 2018–20 xiv
ES.3 Exposure to COVID-19 employment shocks, by migration status xv
ES.4 Type of contract and legal protection of Kyrgyz emigrants and
nonmigrants xvii
B1.1.1 Trends in migration flows from and to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012–20 6
1.1 Trends in the stock of temporary migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic,
2004–18 8
1.2 Distribution of length of stay abroad among migrant workers 9
1.3 Circularity of migration from the Kyrgyz Republic 10
1.4 Emigration, return rates, and correlation with poverty rates, by region 12
1.5 Trends in net migration in Central Asian countries, 2012–20 13
1.6 Demographic characteristics, by migrant status 14
1.7 Selection patterns in emigration 15
1.8 Migrants’ employment status before and during migration compared to
nonmigrants 16
1.9 Occupational status of emigrants before departure, during migration, and
after return compared to nonmigrants 17
1.10 Type and sector of employment of migrants during and after migration
compared to nonmigrants 18
1.11 Wage premium earned by Kyrgyz migrants overseas compared to
nonmigrants 19
1.12 Wages, by past migration status 20
1.13 Contributions of migration to population changes in the Kyrgyz Republic,
2011–20 22
1.14 Poverty rate at the national poverty line in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2018 24
2.1 Migration life cycle stages and COVID-19 disruptions 31
2.2 COVID-19 cases and deaths per 1,000,000 inhabitants 32
2.3 Changes in mobility to work during the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020–21 33
2.4 Change in the number of visas authorized by the Russian Federation to
Kyrgyz citizens, compared to the same quarter in the previous year,
2018–20 35
2.5 Impact of COVID-19 on the economic and health outcomes of families with
cancelled migration plans 36
2.6 Exposure to COVID-19 employment shocks, by migration status 38
2.7 Share of employment losses among labor migrants in the Russian Federation
across economic sectors 40
2.8 Type of contract and legal protection of Kyrgyz migrants and
nonmigrants 41
2.9 Social protection expenditures as a share of GDP, 2015 42
2.10 Number of return migrants to the Kyrgyz Republic 43
2.11 Share of households with disrupted migration plans 44
2.12 Impact of COVID-19 on economic and health outcomes of households with
or without a past or current migrant 45
2.13 Recent trends in remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016–21 47
Contents | v
2.14 Share of households with reductions in remittances, by income quintile and
region 48
3.1 Stages of migration life cycle, migrants’ decisions, COVID-19 disruptions, and
policy options 53
Tables
1.1 Estimates of the stock of migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic 7
1.2 Correlations between emigration trends and economic development in the
Russian Federation, 2004–18 8
1.3 Annual remittances and household income in the
Republic, 2018 23
Kyrgyz
2.1 Impact of a reduction in remittances on coping strategies 48
Acknowledgments
This book was prepared by a team led by Laurent Bossavie (Economist, Social
Protection and Jobs Global Practice, Europe and Central Asia [HECSP]) together
with Daniel Garrote-Sánchez (Consultant, HECSP) and Manuel Salazar
(Lead Social Protection Specialist, HECSP). It represents the main deliverable of
the task “Policy Options to Address the Vulnerability of Migrants from the
Kyrgyz Republic to COVID-19 and Beyond,” prepared under the overall
supervision of Cem Mete (Practice Manager, HECSP) and Naveed Hassan Naqvi
(Country Manager for the Kyrgyz Republic).
The authors gratefully acknowledge the comments received on an earlier
draft of this report by the Ministry of Labor, Social Development and Migration
of the Kyrgyz Republic and by World Bank peer reviewers: Syed Amer Ahmed
(Senior Economist, Social Protection and Jobs Global Practice, South Asia),
Maddalena Honorati (Senior Economist, Social Protection and Jobs Global
Practice, Jobs Group), and Soonhwa Yi (Senior Economist, Social Protection
and Jobs Global Practice, East Asia and the Pacific). The authors would also like
to thank the broader Social Protection team in the Kyrgyz Republic, in particu-
lar Chinara Ismatova (Consultant, HECSP) and Marina Novikova (Social
Protection Specialist, HECSP), for continuous discussions on the topic that
enriched this book. The authors are also grateful to the National Statistical
Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic for sharing the microdata from their 2020
COVID-19 household survey that was used throughout this study, and to
William Hutchins Seitz (Senior Economist, Poverty Global Practice, Europe
and Central Asia region [ECCPV]) and Saida Ismailakhunova (Senior
Economist, ECCPV) for their collaboration in designing and sharing the
microdata from the survey “Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic.”
The authors would also like to thank Meerim Sagynbaeva (Consultant, Country
Office of the Kyrgyz Republic) for her continuous support. Finally, the authors
owe a special thank you to Cindy Fisher of the World Bank’s Publishing
Program for her great support, professionalism, and patience throughout the
publishing process.
vii
About the Authors
Laurent Bossavie is an economist in the World Bank’s Social Protection and
Jobs Global Practice, Europe and Central Asia Region. His main areas of exper-
tise are labor economics and the economics of migration. His work explores the
role of labor and migration policies in shaping the labor market outcomes of
workers in both advanced economies and developing countries. His research on
these topics has been published in leading peer-reviewed journals in labor eco-
nomics, such as the Journal of Human Resources, and as World Bank books and
reports. He holds a PhD in economics from the European University Institute in
Florence, Italy.
Daniel Garrote-Sánchez is a consultant in the World Bank’s Social Protection
and Jobs Global Practice, Europe and Central Asia Region. His areas of research
include the drivers and impact of labor migration and forced displacement in
sending and receiving countries, integration in host communities, and return
migration. Before joining the World Bank, he worked for the Lebanese Center of
Policy Studies, the Ministry of Labor of Saudi Arabia, and the Central Bank of
Spain. He holds a master’s degree in public administration and international
development from the Harvard Kennedy School and a BA in economics and law
from Carlos III University.
ix
Executive Summary
International migration is a critical source of employment and income for a large
proportion of the Kyrgyz population. Since the 2000s, international migration
has been providing job opportunities for a large number of workers from the
Kyrgyz Republic and their families, in the context of a youth bulge and limited
absorptive capacity of the domestic economy.1 While domestic real wages have
increased at a fast pace during the last decade, wage differentials with countries
such as Kazakhstan and the Russian Federation remain large, as migrants can
earn about twice the wage they would earn in the Kyrgyz Republic by working in
these destinations. Under these circumstances, a large share of the Kyrgyz youth
population, mostly males from rural areas, migrates overseas in search for better
economic opportunities, mainly to the Russian Federation. Estimates of the total
stock of Kyrgyz emigrants range from about 250,000 to 750,000 people, repre-
senting between 4 and 12 percent of the total population in the country. In 2018,
prior to the COVID-19 (coronavirus) pandemic, 16 percent of households in the
Kyrgyz Republic had a member currently overseas, and an even larger propor-
tion had a member who had been overseas in the past. Among households with
a current migrant, 94 percent received remittances, which represented over half
(58 percent) of their total income, more than labor earnings and other sources of
income combined. The Kyrgyz Republic is one of the countries with the highest
dependence on international remittances worldwide: as share of the economy,
remittances represented 29.2 percent of GDP in 2019, the fourth-largest recipi-
ent country in the world in relative terms (as a share of GDP), only after Tonga,
Haiti, and South Sudan.
The COVID-19 pandemic, however, strongly impacted migration from the
Kyrgyz Republic and exposed the limitations of current migration systems
together with migrants’ vulnerabilities. The primary focus of this book is
on identifying the vulnerabilities and inefficiencies associated with the migra-
tion process which have been brought to light by the COVID-19 pandemic, and
on policy options to reduce them and maximize the benefits of migration. While
some of the challenges faced during the pandemic are specific to the COVID-19
context, many migrants’ vulnerabilities already existed prior to it, and will per-
sist in the absence of adequate policy measures. For example, COVID-19 has
exposed the vulnerability of migrants to job loss in destination countries, due to
xi
xii | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
limited access to social protection programs and unemployment benefits both
at origin and at destination, especially among temporary or seasonal migrants.
The pandemic has also exposed the need for support among migrants who
return home after spending time overseas, especially among those that
unexpectedly return due to shocks, such as COVID-19. Therefore, while the pol-
icy recommendations presented in this report are drawn from the COVID-19
pandemic, many of them can be implemented beyond this specific context to
reduce vulnerability to external shocks—such as spillovers from the current
conflict between the Russian Federation and Ukraine—and to increase the
returns of migration for the Kyrgyz Republic.
The book analyzes migrants’ vulnerabilities and system insufficiencies and
proposes policy responses using the migration life cycle as policy framework.
In contexts where temporary migration is widespread, such as the Kyrgyz
Republic, the migration life cycle can typically be divided into four phases
(World Bank 2018; Ahmed and Bossavie 2022): pre–migration decision, prede-
parture, in-service (while migrants are abroad), and return (figure ES.1). The
first stage is predecision, when workers decide whether to migrate based on
their understanding of the costs and benefits of migrating. The second stage is
predeparture, when, after workers have decided to pursue an overseas job, they
can take up measures to improve their employability (for example, undertaking
additional training), look for and find a job, obtain the necessary legal documents
to migrate (clearances from national authorities, visas and passports, inter alia),
and complete the logistical preparations for migration (for example, tickets,
financing). The third stage is during migration, when the migrant is employed
overseas. The final stage is after migration, when a migrant leaves the destina-
tion to return home and, in most cases, is looking to start an economic activity in
home labor markets. At each of these stages, migrants face a set of risks and inef-
ficiencies that have been brought to light by the COVID-19 pandemic and can be
mitigated by adequate policy actions.
FIGURE ES.1
Migrants’ decisions, COVID-19 disruptions, and policy options throughout the migration life cycle
Migration Premigration Premigration During Postmigration
phases decision departure migration (return)
Migration decision Employment, Entrepreneurship
Migrants' Employment search,
based on remittances, savings, investment skill
decisions travel arrangements,
cost-benefit education abroad, enhancement in
and choices training
analysis length of stay the Kyrgyz Republic
Increased Mobility Restrictions in
Border closures,
COVID–19 uncertainty about restrictions, nonessential
impact on Kyrgyz
disruptions costs and benefits limited travel occupations, job
labor market
of migration arrangements losses, health risks
Emergency relief, Facilitate return,
Potential Information Legal counseling, safety nets, legal reintegration policies,
policies interventions orientation counseling, facilitate active labor market
remittances policies
Sources: World Bank, adapted from World Bank (2018) and Ahmed and Bossavie (2022).
Executive Summary | xiii
The COVID-19 pandemic has led to a drastic drop in demand for migrant
labor in the main destination countries, revealing the high exposure of migration
flows to shocks in destination countries. In 2020, following the outbreak of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the Russian Federation granted work visas to 190,000
Kyrgyz citizens, less than half of the work authorizations issued in 2019
(454,000). Compared to the same quarter in 2019, the Russian Federation
approved 78,000 fewer work visas in the second quarter of 2020, 108,000 fewer
in the third quarter, and 72,000 fewer in the fourth quarter (figure ES.2). That is,
between March and December 2020, there were 258,000 fewer visas for Kyrgyz
workers to legally work in the Russian Federation compared to the same period
of 2019. These recent trends point to a drastic limitation of labor migration as a
poverty alleviation tool in the Kyrgyz Republic, putting further pressure on the
domestic Kyrgyz labor market. While migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
picked up again in 2021, statistics from the 2021 Listening to the Citizens of the
Kyrgyz Republic (L2CK) survey show that there were 167,000 temporary
migrants abroad, about 40 percent fewer than prior to the pandemic.
As a result of the pandemic, many potential migrants and their households
had their migration plans cancelled, placing them in a highly vulnerable situa-
tion. The survey on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic run by the Kyrgyz
National Statistics Committee in October 2020 shows a drastic disruption in
emigration plans after the outbreak of the pandemic. About 9 percent of Kyrgyz
households had at least one member who cancelled their travel plans abroad.
Given that there are about 1.57 million households in the country, this implies
that close to 150,000 households had at least one member who could not travel
abroad as planned. Taking into consideration that about 250,000 Kyrgyz work-
ers emigrate every year for a short-term period—based on the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey (KIHS) statistics—the number of disrupted migration plans
was very large. These disruptions took place in a context where the domestic
economy was also strongly hit by negative employment shocks. Furthermore,
the COVID-19 survey in the Kyrgyz Republic shows that households with a
member unable to migrate were twice as likely to report employment losses
during the pandemic compared to those that did not have intentions to migrate
(40 percent versus 19 percent) (figure ES.2). They were also more likely to report
wage-income losses and needing to use harmful coping mechanisms such as cut-
ting food spending due to lack of income. Therefore, the unexpected cancella-
tion of migration plans associated with the pandemic appears to have placed
households in a situation of acute vulnerability.
The COVID-19 pandemic showed that migrant workers from the Kyrgyz
Republic are disproportionately exposed and hit by employment shocks in desti-
nation countries. Kyrgyz migrants hold jobs in occupations that are more vulner-
able to the COVID-19 pandemic, and presumably to other shocks, compared to
Kyrgyz nonmigrants. Panels a and b of figure ES.3 highlight several important
results. In general, mid-educated workers (those who completed secondary edu-
cation) are the most likely to be employed in essential occupations, while the abil-
ity to work from home increases with the level of education. When combining the
two aspects of protection against COVID-19 in the labor market, higher-educated
workers have a larger share of jobs that are safer from dismissal and income
losses (panel c). By migration status, while 64 percent of nonmigrant workers in
the Kyrgyz Republic were employed in income-safe jobs, only 46 percent of emi-
grants were employed in these types of jobs. Therefore, Kyrgyz emigrants are
xiv | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE ES.2
Impacts of COVID-19 on labor demand for Kyrgyz migrants and on households with
disrupted migration plans, 2018–20
a. Change in the number of visas authorized by the Russian Federation
to Kyrgyz citizens (compared to the same quarter in the previous year)
100,000
50,000
0
–50,000
–100,000
–150,000
Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
2018 2019 2020
Total Work
Source: Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service.
b. Impact of COVID-19 on economic and health outcomes
of families with migration plans cancelled
100
90
80
Share of household (%)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Loss job Reduction in Cut food COVID Depression No needed
wages spending symptoms health treatment
Nonmigrant households Households with failed migration plans
Source: National Statistical Committee household survey 2020.
Executive Summary | xv
significantly more vulnerable to supply and demand shocks to the labor market of
sending countries (mainly the Russian Federation).
Surveys of migrants in the Russian Federation corroborate the larger nega-
tive impact of COVID-19 on the labor market outcomes of migrants in the first
months of the pandemic, compared to both native Russians and nonmigrants in
the Kyrgyz Republic. Several surveys conducted in the Russian Federation
report that migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic and other Central Asian coun-
tries suffered from employment losses in the first two months of the pandemic
(Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva 2020; Ryazantsev and Khramova 2020;
Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). About 40 percent of Kyrgyz migrants lost their
jobs during the first two months of the pandemic, and an additional 39 percent
FIGURE ES.3
Exposure to COVID-19 employment shocks, by migration status
a. Share of essential jobs
100
90
80
Percentage
70
60
50
40
30
y
y
y
y
y
y
l
l
l
na
na
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ar
ta
rti
nd
rti
nd
nd
nd
To
tio
tio
Te
Te
co
co
co
co
ca
ca
Se
Se
Se
Se
Vo
Vo
<
<
Total Male Female
b. Share of telework jobs
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
0
y
l
y
y
l
ry
y
l
ry
ta
na
na
ar
ar
ar
ar
tia
tia
To
tio
tio
nd
nd
nd
nd
r
r
Te
Te
ca
ca
co
co
co
co
Vo
Vo
Se
Se
Se
Se
<
<
Total Male Female
continued
xvi | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE ES.3, continued
c. Share of Income-safe jobs
100
90
Percentage 80
70
60
50
40
30 ry
y
y
ry
ry
y
l
l
l
na
r
ar
ar
ta
na
da
da
da
da
rti
rti
To
tio
io
n
n
n
n
Te
Te
t
co
co
co
co
ca
ca
Se
Se
Se
Se
Vo
Vo
<
<
Total Male Female
Nonmigrant Current migrant Returnee Migrant premigration
Sources: World Bank, based on data from the 2015 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey and ad hoc migration
module, following the methodology of Dingel and Neiman (2020), and Fasani and Mazza (2020).
were sent to unpaid leave (Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva 2020). Therefore,
only one in five Kyrgyz migrants was able to keep earning wages. As a compari-
son, about 40 percent of Russian workers were either dismissed or on unpaid
leave during the same period. Other surveys of Central Asian migrants show
similar results. Ryazantsev and Khramova (2020) find that 28 percent of
migrants lost their job and 37 percent were on unpaid leave, and Denisenko and
Mukomel (2020) observe a 30 percent drop in employment of migrants in April
and May of 2020 compared to February of the same year. Across types of labor
migrants, the negative shock was particularly acute among migrants with infor-
mal contracts, lower education levels, and limited Russian language fluency
(Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). In consonance with the fall in employment,
Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva (2020) find that only 15 percent of Kyrgyz
migrants maintained their levels of pre-COVID-19 labor earnings. In the second
half of 2021, when the economic situation had already improved, the Listening
to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic (L2CK) survey shows that 64 percent of
Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation were employed, still significantly
lower rates than premigration when temporary migrants were almost univer-
sally employed.
Kyrgyz migrants not only experienced dramatic job losses, but they also had
limited access to social protection programs to weather the COVID-19 shock.
Kyrgyz labor migrants usually fall through the cracks of social protection sys-
tems in both receiving countries and at home. In the Kyrgyz Republic, spending
on social protection is similar to other benchmark countries in the region.
However, labor migrants are unable to contribute to the Kyrgyz social i nsurance
system, which poses a longer-term threat to the fiscal sustainability of the Kyrgyz
pension systems (OECD 2018). In host countries, even within the Eurasian
Economic Union (EaEU), Kyrgyz emigrants do not have access to services
such as health care or unemployment benefits as natives do (Sharifzoda 2019).
As the 2018 KIHS shows, only 13 percent of Kyrgyz workers abroad have access
to social security benefits (figure ES.4). Overall, Kyrgyz migrant workers have
Executive Summary | xvii
FIGURE ES.4
Type of contract and legal protection of Kyrgyz emigrants and nonmigrants
100 93
89 87
90
80
70 67
Percentage
60
50
40 34
32 31
30
21 19
18
20 13 13
10
0
Verbal Employer Paid disability Furlough Risk of being Risk of being
contract pays social fired if fired without
security pregnant notice
Emigrants Nonmigrants
Source: Kyrgyz Republic Integrated Household Survey (2018).
protection programs either in their own country or
very limited access to social
abroad, which makes them and their families particularly vulnerable to negative
income or health shocks that could push them into poverty. Given the status quo
of informality and limited social protection, many migrants working abroad lost
their jobs without receiving any compensation or protection (Kuznetsova et al.
2020). In the event of contracting the virus, Kyrgyz emigrants also lacked proper
access to health care and were more exposed to layoffs if they required a sickness
leave. The lack of social protection of Kyrgyz migrants has had dramatic conse-
quences during the pandemic, with a vast majority struggling to obtain enough
funding to pay basic expenditures such as rent and food (Ryazantsev and
Khramova 2020).
The labor market reintegration of returnees resulting from the COVID-19
pandemic has been challenging given the limited absorptive capacity of the
Kyrgyz labor market. In addition to disrupting the migration plans of pro-
spective migrants, the pandemic has led to the unexpected return of some
migrants who were already overseas. According to the L2CK survey, more
than 78,000 migrants returned to the Kyrgyz Republic between March 2020
and October 2021. When surveying migrants from Central Asia that returned
home from the Russian Federation after the COVID-19 outbreak, Denisenko
and Mukomel (2020) found that only 40 percent of them were employed by
early June 2020. The 2020 National Statistics Committee COVID-19 survey
also shows a higher degree of economic and health vulnerability of house-
holds with members that were either forced to return or were stranded and
could not return from abroad. While less than 20 percent of nonmigrant
households reported having members who lost their job during the pan-
demic, the rate reached 33 percent for households with a migrant that could
not return and was stranded, and 54 percent for households with a member
that had to return to the Kyrgyz Republic. Households with recent returnees
not only were more likely than nonmigrant families to see a reduction in
xviii | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
wage income since the start of the pandemic, but also in remittances which,
as chapter 1 shows, represent an increasing share of income for migrant fam-
ilies. Given the larger negative shock that families with returnees faced, they
were also significantly more likely to report using strategies such as cutting
food spending to cope with lower incomes. Healthwise, households with
recent returnees also had a higher incidence of COVID-19-related symptoms
and mental health issues, and were more likely to be left without the neces-
sary health treatment.
Overall, the COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need to strengthen insti-
tutions, frameworks, and data collection to enhance safe legal migration from
the Kyrgyz Republic. The existing migration management in the Kyrgyz
Republic is still lacking a centralized data system and intersectoral collabora-
tion throughout the migration cycle—from migration plans and preparations,
to support and protection during the migration experience, to the reintegra-
tion of returning labor migrants in the Kyrgyz Republic. Migration policy has
to be informed by relevant and updated data, beyond aggregate statistics of
border crossings for security purposes and remittances data, in order to elab-
orate effective mechanisms to support migrants and their families (Kuznetsova
et al. 2020). Legal frameworks have yet to be developed and implemented to
put at the forefront of the migration agenda a rights-based approach to protect
migrants and their families. In the absence of a holistic migration framework
with predictable policies, programs to support migrants coping with the
COVID-19 crisis have been fragmented and of limited scope.
Enhancing systematic data collection, monitoring, and evaluation through-
out the migration life cycle is necessary in a context of sizable flows of emigrants
and returnees to better understand migration dynamics and tailor services to
migrants’ needs. As a first step, it is necessary to centralize information from
different governmental bodies—which requires interagency cooperation and
data sharing—and to create a unified registry of all prospective migrants, current
migrants, and returnees, either at reception centers or at different points of exit
or entry in the country. The registry can serve as the starting point to collect data
on the skills and labor market situation of Kyrgyz citizens applying for jobs
overseas—so they can be referred to the appropriate training or premigration
programs. The registry can also be a building block in the reintegration of return-
ees and to create monitoring systems through the adoption of harmonized sets
of indicators (IOM 2018). Different agencies could then more easily access
migrants’ information, avoiding duplicity of procedures and overburdening
migrant returnees, while collecting higher-quality information to tailor services
to their needs. It is essential that this process of data sharing and cooperation
complies with the need to maintain migrants’ privacy.
Policies to address the vulnerability of migrants in the context of the COVID-19
pandemic and in the longer term need to tackle challenges throughout the
migration life cycle. The COVID-19 pandemic has impacted prospective and
current migrants at each stage of the migration life cycle. This book proposes a
set of policies that can be implemented at the predeparture, during-migration,
and after-return stages to reduce the vulnerability of migrants in the context of
the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. Given the expected slow recovery from
COVID-19, both at home and in destination countries, combined with the cur-
rent economic situation in the Russian Federation, the enhanced challenges
faced by temporary migrants in the specific context of the pandemic are expected
to persist in the short and medium runs. This challenging context can be used as
Executive Summary | xix
an opportunity to strengthen the migration system and develop policies and pro-
grams that can equip the Kyrgyz Republic with the adequate tools to support
migrants—through a coherent and comprehensive labor migration policy—and
to be better prepared for future shocks that may affect labor migration and
remittances.
COVID-19, and now the economic downturn in the Russian Federation, have
also evidenced the need for diversification of destinations to reduce volatility.
The Kyrgyz Republic has one of the largest concentrations of emigrants in the
world. Close to 80 percent of total Kyrgyz emigrants in 2019 resided in the
Russian Federation according to UN-DESA, and statistics for short-term
migrants show an even higher proportion (over 90 percent, according to the
Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey or the 2021 Listening to the Citizens of
the Kyrgyz Republic survey). The business cycle of the second main destination
of Kyrgyz migrants, Kazakhstan, is highly synchronized with the Russian
Federation (Jenish 2013), given their economic integration and dependence on
raw materials. The high concentration of Kyrgyz migrants in few and synchro-
nized markets exposes the country to high volatility and vulnerability to eco-
nomic shocks in destination countries. COVID-19, and now the economic crisis
in the Russian Federation, have shown that, as a result of this lack of diversifi-
cation, migration and remittance flows are quite volatile, resulting in significant
welfare losses for Kyrgyz households and for the broader economy.
To reduce the volatility of migration demand and flows, new institutional
frameworks such as bilateral labor agreements (BLAs), government-to-
government (G2G) arrangements, and memoranda of understanding could be
implemented.2 Such arrangements could be put in place with other destination
countries with a potential demand for foreign labor given their demographic
trends or labor needs (for example, in Europe, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the
Republic of Korea, or Malaysia). For example, the Philippines, a country with a
long tradition of emigration and with a well-developed migration system, has
diversified the destination countries over the years by being very active in nego-
tiating new bilateral labor agreements and by building a qualified workforce
with credible credentials (Testaverde et al. 2017). In additional to new destina-
tions, migration diversification can also be enhanced in terms of occupations.
About half of Kyrgyz male migrants work in construction and half of female
migrants in the hospitality sector. This concentration increases vulnerability to
shocks in host economies that affect particular sectors. While the EaEU allows
Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan to work in all sec-
tors, further cooperation might be needed with these countries to fully recognize
foreign credentials. This, combined with the provision of information to migrants
on the types of job opportunities available in destination countries and the pro-
vision of training to prospective migrants when skill mismatches emerge with
what firms demand at destination can expand the employment opportunities
available across sectors and professions.
Training for migrants driven by identified demand for skills in destination
countries is key to complement this diversification effort, and address skill mis-
matches between demand and supply of foreign labor in existing destinations.
Migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic often lack adequate skills for the jobs most
in demand in the Russian Federation or Kazakhstan. Skill mismatches are partly
due to occupational mobility upon migration. For example, a large portion of
male migrants have an agricultural background but are hired as construction
workers in the Russian Federation. Skill mismatches might have been aggravated
xx | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, which could have accelerated a lon-
ger-term shift in tasks and skills demanded in host labor markets. In this context,
training in the skills required for employment openings in the Russian Federation
would benefit all parties involved. However, prior to the pandemic, the Kyrgyz
Household Integrated Survey of 2018 shows that only 1 percent of prospective
migrants took any work-related training courses to improve their chances to
find employment overseas. The Ministry of Labor, Social Development and
Migration is planning to implement several initiatives within the recently cre-
ated Fund for Skill Development. Past experiences with predeparture skill
upgrading programs highlight the need to have a well-endowed program, a pre-
vious analysis of the supply and demand skill gaps and dynamics in the destina-
tion country and at origin in order to tailor the training to the most demanded
skills that migrants do not possess (IOM 2011; Global Forum on Migration and
Development 2020). Cooperation with receiving countries in understanding
skill gaps at destination is, thus, of high value. A particularly promising type of
cross-country collaboration on skill formation are global skill partnerships.
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for better integrating migrants
into safety net programs either at origin or at destination to reduce migrants’
vulnerabilities to shocks like COVID-19. In the Russian Federation, the govern-
ment increased the amount of unemployment benefits,3 and agreed to provide
social services for citizens who lost their job after March 1, 2020, as well as to
families with children and pensioners (Gorlin et al. 2020).4 The Kyrgyz Republic
could coordinate with the Russian Federation and other migrant-receiving
countries, in particular within the framework of the EaEU, to provide financial
support to its citizens stranded abroad and, more broadly, to create a system
where migrant workers make contributions to have equal access to unemploy-
ment benefits and health care as nationals from the countries of residency.
Increasing formal employment channels will improve access to social protection
systems (as the concept for migration policies for 2021–30 suggests), but specific
arrangements need to be implemented beyond the legal status of employment as
currently even migrants with a legal contract barely have any social protection.
The portability of pensions has been shown to not only enhance migrants’ wel-
fare but also to incentivize migrants to return home.
COVID-19 also evidenced the need for shock-resilient migration systems.
The pandemic has been one large shock that significantly disrupted mobility
globally, including from the Kyrgyz Republic. Some of the lessons learned from
the pandemic, however, can also be applied to respond to other shocks, includ-
ing the negative spillovers of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. This large negative
shock affecting the Russian Federation, although different in nature from the
COVID-19 pandemic, is having similar consequences for migrant households
given the limited ability of current systems to respond to shocks. This translates
into a drop in demand for migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic, a drop in remit-
tance volumes and values, reduced emigration flows, and possibly increased
returns. In the absence of measures to strengthen the responsiveness of migra-
tion systems to shocks, other future shocks—such as climate change, new health
threats, or additional conflicts—are expected to have similar impacts on
migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic and their families. In shock-responsive
mobility systems, underlying components ranging from admission channels to
provision of different types of services in receiving and sending countries are
built with the flexibility to adapt to shocks. These systems require coordination
Executive Summary | xxi
between sending and receiving countries to take actions at different stages of
the migration life cycle when unexpected shocks hit (Pavillion and Testaverde
2022). Before ensuring responsiveness, however, underlying migration
systems, as described in the previous paragraphs, need to be in place.
The pandemic has also shown that better linkages of return migrants to active
labor market policies (ALMPs) are required to support reintegration into home
labor markets. While there have been recent legislative and institutional
improvements, the variety and reach of ALMPs in the Kyrgyz Republic remain
limited. The main ALMPs include public works and small training programs to
vulnerable groups, while few resources exist for other programs for entrepre-
neurship and self-employment, wage subsidies, and job counseling, among oth-
ers.5 Overall, these programs are underfunded and use a rather restrictive
definition of beneficiaries—as, for example, farmers with land plots exceeding
0.05 hectares are considered employed and thus ineligible (Gassmann and Timár
2018).6 Given the higher prevalence of return migrants in rural areas and the
high share that used to work as farmers before migration and engage again in
agricultural work upon return—close to half of male return migrants, according
to the KIHS 2015— this policy can de facto limit the ability of return migrants to
access ALMPs. The public employment services (PES) provide free training for
registered, unemployed individuals. However, similarly to unemployment bene-
fits, registration is low, and PES tend to be located and register vacancies in
urban areas (Schwegler-Rohmeis, Mummert, and Jarck 2013). As a result, return
migrants are very unlikely to use those services.
NOTES
1. Job creation in the country has not been able to provide enough opportunities for the rap-
idly expanding number of new, young entrants to the labor market as a consequence of the
demographic youth bulge. While the working age population increased an average of
percent between 2003 and 2013, employment growth only did so at 0.9 percent (Ajwad
2
and Berger-Gonzalez 2018).
2. For more detail on the G2G between Korea and sending countries, for example, see Cho
et al. (2018).
3. Decree No. 8446 of the Government of the Russian Federation, June 10, 2020.
4. Resolution No. 4855 of the Government of the Russian Federation, April 12, 2020.
5. The public works program offers employment by public and private employers with wages
partially covered by the Ministry of Labor, Social Development and Migration (MLSDM).
In 2016, 21,100 people benefited from this program, with an average monthly wage of KGS
1,000-1,5000 (Gassmann and Timár 2018).
6. In 2017, only 1.2 percent of the MLSDM budget was reserved for ALMP (Gassmann and
Timár 2018).
REFERENCES
Ahmed, S. A., and L. Bossavie. 2022. “Towards Safer and More Productive Migration for South
Asia.” World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle
/10986/37444.
Ajwad, M. I., and Sarah Berger-Gonzalez. 2018. “Jobs in the Kyrgyz Republic. World Bank,
Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30105.
Cho, Y., A. Denisova, S. Yi, and U. Khadka. 2018. Bilateral Arrangement of Temporary Labor
Migration: Lessons from Korea’s Employment Permit System. Washington, DC: World Bank.
xxii | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Denisenko, M., and V. Mukomel. 2020. “Labor Migration During the Corona Crisis.” Institute of
Demography and the Institute of Sociology FSRC RAS, June.
Dingel, J., and B. Neiman. 2020. “How Many Jobs Can Be Done at Home?” Journal of Public
Economics 189 (September): 104235.
Fasani, F., and J. Mazza. 2020. “Immigrant Key Workers: Their Contribution to Europe’s
COVID-19 Response.” IZA Policy Paper 155.
Gassmann, F., and E. Timár. 2018. “Scoping Study on Social Protection and Safety Nets for
Enhanced Food Security and Nutrition in the Kyrgyz Republic.” World Food Programme,
United Nations University, and Maastricht University.
Global Forum on Migration and Development. 2020. “The Future of Human Mobility:
Innovative Partnerships for Sustainable Development—Theme 2: Skilling Migrants for
Employment.” Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
Gorlin, Y., V. Lyashok, D. Ternovskiy, A. Bozhechkova, P. Trunin, S. Zubov, A. Kaukin, and
E. Miller. 2020. “Monitoring the Economic Situation in Russia: Trends and Challenges of
Socio-Economic Development.” Institute for Economic Policy, Russian akademyma of the
National Economy and Public Service under the President of the Russian Federation.
IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2011. “IOM Migrant Training Programmes
Overview, 2010–2011.” http://www.iom.int /j ahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite
/activities/facilitating/IOM_Migrant_Training_Programmes_Overview_2010_2011.pdf.
IOM (International Organization for Migration). 2018. “Supporting Safe, Orderly and Dignified
Migration Through Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration.” Global Compact
Thematic Paper, Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration.
Jenish, N. 2013. “Business Cycles in Central Asia and the Russian Federation.” University of
Central Asia, Institute of Public Policy and Administration Working Paper 15.
Kuznetsova, I, R. Mogilevskii, A. Murzakulova, A. Abdoubaetova, A. Wolters, and J. Round.
2020. “Migration and COVID-19: Challenges and Policy Responses in the Kyrgyz Republic.”
CAP Paper 247 (December), Central Asia Program.
Kyrgyz National Statistical Committee. 2020. “The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on
Households.” Government of the Kyrgyz Republic.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). 2018. “Social Protection
System Review of Kyrgyzstan.” OECD Development Pathways, OECD Publishing, Paris.
Pavillion, J., and M. Testaverde. 2022. “COVID-19 and Migration in the Mediterranean Region.”
Washington, DC, World Bank.
Testaverde, M., H. Moroz, C. H. Hollweg, and A. Schmillen. 2017. “Migrating to Opportunity:
Overcoming Barriers to Labor Mobility in Southeast Asia.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28342.
Ryazantsev, S., and M. Khramova. 2020. “Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Position
of Migrants and Remittances in Central Asia.” Institute for Socio-Political Research of the
Russian Academy of Sciences.
Schwegler-Rohmeis, W., A. Mummert, and K. Jarck. 2013. “Labour Market and Employment
Policy in the Kyrgyz Republic: Identifying Constraints and Options for Employment
Development.” Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit GmbH,
Eschborn/Bishkek.
Sharifzoda, K. 2019. “Central Asia’s Russian Migration Puzzle: An interview with Caress
Schenk.” The Diplomat, October 11. https://thediplomat .com/2019/10/central
-asias-russian-migration-puzzle.
Testaverde, M., H. Moroz, C. H. Hollweg, and A. Schmillen. 2017. “Migrating to Opportunity:
Overcoming Barriers to Labor Mobility in Southeast Asia.” World Bank, Washington, DC.
https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/28342.
Varshaver, E., N. Ivanova, and A. Rocheva. 2020. “Migrants in Russia during the COVID-19
Pandemic: Survey Results.” RANEPA 2020 [in Russian]. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3672397.
World Bank. 2018. “A Migrant’s Journey for Better Opportunities: The Case of Pakistan.”
World Bank, Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30272.
Abbreviations
ALMP active labor market policies
EaEU Eurasian Economic Union
G2G government-to-government arrangements
GDP gross domestic product
ILO International Labour Organization
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
KIHS Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey
L2CK Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic (survey)
MLSDM Ministry of Labor, Social Development and Migration
NGO nongovernmental organization
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
PES public employment services
SMS State Migration Services
UN-DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
xxiii
Introduction
Over the last two decades, international migration has been an essential
employment and income-generating strategy for many households in the Kyrgyz
Republic given the limited absorptive capacity of the local labor market. Since
the 2000s, job creation in the country has not been able to provide enough
opportunities to the rapidly expanding number of new, young entrants to the
labor market as a consequence of the demographic youth bulge. While the
working age population increased an average of 2 percent between 2003 and
2013, employment growth only did so at 0.9 percent (Ajwad and Berger-Gonzalez
2018). Beyond job availability, the quality of employment has remained low, with
high degrees of informality, seasonality, and lack of tenure (World Bank 2015).
While real wages have increased at a fast pace during the last decade, wage
differentials remain large compared to countries such as Kazakhstan and the
Russian Federation. Under these circumstances, many Kyrgyz youth, in particu-
lar males from rural areas, migrate overseas in search of better economic oppor-
tunities, in particular to the Russian Federation. Estimates of the total stock of
Kyrgyz emigrants range from about 250,000 to 750,000 people, representing
between 4 and 12 of the total population in the country. While international
labor migration in the Kyrgyz Republic alleviates labor market pressures and
supports domestic income and consumption of migrant households through
remittances, it also produces certain vulnerabilities for migrants given the high
concentration geographically—mostly to the Russian Federation—and in very
specific sectors and occupations and limited social protection coverage. Migrant
families and the country as a whole are also more exposed to shocks to
remittances.
The COVID-19 pandemic, has produced dramatic health and economic
costs, disrupting the Kyrgyz economy and the labor mobility of Kyrgyz
migrants. The spread of the COVID-19 pandemic in the Kyrgyz Republic
caused more than 100,000 diagnosed cases and 1,700 deaths by May 2021. 1
The economic activity was severely affected by mobility restrictions, the
increase in uncertainty and lower demand. According to the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates of April 2021, the Kyrgyz GDP fell by
1
2 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
8 percent in real terms, the largest drop since 1994. In the domestic labor
market, the Kyrgyz National Statistics Committee COVID-19 survey reports
that about one in five households in the country had a family member that
lost their job in the first months of the pandemic. In this context, interna-
tional migration from the Kyrgyz Republic has also been severely impacted.
Mobility disruptions, border closures, and limited travel options have limited
the ability of many prospective migrants to move overseas in search of better
employment opportunities. Kyrgyz migrants who were living abroad at the
time the pandemic hit have been particularly exposed to the large economic
shock in destination countries, as the occupations they work in are less likely
to be amenable to work from home. This resulted in large declines in employ-
ment and earnings (Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva 2020; Ryazantsev and
Khramova 2020; Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). With travel restrictions,
many migrants were stranded without the option to return home and with a
lack of social protection mechanisms.
COVID-19 has put migrants’ vulnerabilities at the forefront, but many of
those existed prior to the pandemic, and they will continue to exist if ade-
quate policies are not put in place. The primary focus of this book is on the
vulnerability of migrants in the specific context of COVID-19, and on policy
options to mitigate the negative impacts on labor migrants, who have been
disproportionately affected. While some of the challenges faced during the
pandemic are specific to the COVID-19 context, many of migrants’ vulnera-
bilities already existed but were made more salient by the pandemic. For
example, COVID-19 has exposed the vulnerability of migrants to job loss in
destination, due to limited access to social protection programs and employ-
ment benefits both at origin and at destination, especially among temporary
or seasonal migrants. The pandemic has also exposed the need for support
among migrants who returned home after spending time overseas, especially
among those that returned unexpectedly due to shocks. Therefore, while the
book recommends policy actions to address migrants’ vulnerability in the
specific context of the pandemic, it also proposes policies that can be imple-
mented to reduce vulnerability more broadly, beyond the specific context of
COVID-19.
This book takes stock of the patterns, vulnerabilities, and inefficiencies of
international labor migration from the Kyrgyz Republic, with a particular focus
on the recent impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on migration flows, migrants,
and their families. It provides policy recommendations to enhance the benefits
of safe international migration and address migrants’ vulnerabilities in the
context of the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond. The scope of the book is limited
to international labor migration. It does not cover mobility within the country, as
well as refugees and the resettlement of ethnic Kyrgyz (Kairylmans), as the set of
policy issues is quite distinct and would require a separate analysis and data
collection. The book is structured as follows. Chapter 1 provides a comprehen-
sive analysis of the trends and profile of migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic in
the run-up to the COVID pandemic, highlighting the important role of migration
and remittances for migrants and their families but also the vulnerabilities and
risks associated with them. Chapter 2 assesses the vulnerability of migrants to
the COVID-19 pandemic at each stage of the migration life cycle: before migra-
tion, during migration, and post migration. Chapter 3 provides policy
Introduction | 3
recommendations to address the vulnerability of migrants and their families in
the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond.
NOTE
1. Based on the COVID-19 Data Repository by the Center for Systems Science and Engineering
(CSSE) at Johns Hopkins University. https://github.com/CSSEGISandData/COVID-19.
REFERENCES
Ajwad, M. I., and Sarah Berger-Gonzalez. 2018. “Jobs in the Kyrgyz Republic. World Bank,
Washington, DC. https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/30105.
Denisenko, M., and V. Mukomel. 2020. “Labor Migration During the Corona Crisis.” Institute of
Demography and the Institute of Sociology FSRC RAS.
Ryazantsev, S., and M. Khramova. 2020. “Influence of the COVID-19 Pandemic on the Position
of Migrants and Remittances in Central Asia,” Institute for Socio-Political Research of the
Russian Academy of Sciences.
Varshaver, E., N. Ivanova, and A. Rocheva. 2020. “Migrants in Russia during the COVID-19
Pandemic: Survey Results.” RANEPA 2020 [in Russian]. https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3672397.
World Bank. 2015. “Labor Migration and Welfare in the Kyrgyz Republic (2008–2013).” Report
99771-KG, Poverty Global Practice Europe and Central Asia Region, World Bank,
Wa s h i n g t o n , D C. h t t p s ://o p e n k n ow l e d g e.wo r l d b a n k .o rg / h a n d l e / 1 0 9 8 6
/22960?locale-attribute=es.
1 Labor Migration as a Major
Source of Employment
and Development
CHARACTERISTICS OF LABOR MIGRATION FROM THE
KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
Despite current data limitations in capturing migration from the Kyrgyz
Republic, available data indicate that emigration from the Kyrgyz Republic is
widespread (see box 1.1). There are currently no centralized administrative
data that capture the full extent of labor migration from the country. Only the
State Border Services have a registry of all Kyrgyz citizens and foreigners that
enter and leave the country, but without clear distinction of the purpose of the
travel, be it tourism, education, labor, or other. The lack of specific registry of
labor migrants can be understood in a context of increasing free mobility of
Kyrgyz nationals to the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, the two main des-
tination countries that are part of the Eurasian Economic Union, and the lim-
services provided by the Kyrgyz government for prospective and current
ited
migrants, as opposed to other migrant-sending countries with more mature
systems, such as the Philippines. Available estimates from other sources, how-
ever, indicate that labor migration from the country is widespread. Estimates
from the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
(UN-DESA) migration database report that about 750,000 Kyrgyz citizens
lived abroad in 2019.
Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic is heavily concentrated in one destina-
tion country. By country of residence, the broad definition of Kyrgyz emigrants
by UN-DESA statistics shows that close to 80 percent reside in the Russian
Federation (slightly below 600,000 people), followed by 10 percent in Germany
(around 77,000, which are mostly ethnic Germans that migrated in the 1990s,
taking advantage of the German nationality law that granted citizenship to
anyone with proof of German ancestry) and 4 percent in Ukraine (about
27,000). The geographical composition of short-term/temporary migrants
found in surveys in the Kyrgyz Republic, such as the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey (KIHS) or the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic survey, is even more concentrated, with about 95 percent working in
the Russian Federation (table 1.1).1 Several reasons explain the predominance
5
6 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
BOX 1.1
Current data limitations in measuring migration flows and stocks from the
Kyrgyz Republic
Statistics on migration in the Kyrgyz Republic, as 2015). The KIHS’s underestimation of migrants is
in many other migrant-sending countries, only also partly explained by the fact that it only focuses
partially capture emigration from the country. on labor migration, so Kyrgyz citizens who left the
There are currently no centralized administrative country for other purposes such as education are
data that capture the full extent of labor migration not included (Dubashov, Kruse, and Ismailakhunova
from the country. Instead, one has to rely on exist- 2017). Estimates of the size of emigration based on
ing nationally representative surveys, which have surveys in the Kyrgyz Republic only account for
their own limitations. The Kyrg yz Integrated one-third of the numbers based on data from
Household Survey (KIHS) collects quarterly infor- receiving countries. Given the restrictive defini-
mation on the labor market in the Kyrgyz Republic. tion of short-term migration used in the KIHS, the
It also collects information on the current place actual size of the Kyrgyz diaspora residing over-
and country of work of all individuals in the house- seas is underestimated. In 2018, there were an esti-
hold. This allows approximating the extent of mated 250,000 working-age Kyrg yz working
short-term and circular migration. Through that abroad according to the KIHS.
survey question, both migrants currently working Aggregate information on migration flows also
abroad ( but officially residing in the Kyrg yz provides a partial picture of the migration phenom-
Republic) and seasonal migrants who currently enon in the country. While migration stocks account
live in the Kyrg yz Republic but spend several for the number of migrants living abroad at a given
months of the year abroad are included. However, point in time, migration flows report the number of
the survey does not capture l onger-term migration, migrants entering or leaving a country during a spe-
as it does not collect information on migrants who cific period of time. Mathematically, the change in
leave the household for a long period of time—even the stock of emigrants in a given year is equal to the
if they receive remittances from them—or entire migration outflows minus the migration inflows in
households that leave the country (World Bank the same period. Official statistics from the National
FIGURE B1.1.1
Trends in migration flows from and to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2012–20
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
–5,000
–10,000
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Arrivals Departures Net migration
Source: Kyrgyz Republic National Statistical Committee.
Note: Net emigration is calculated as the difference between arrivals to and departures
from the Kyrgyz Republic.
continued
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 7
Box 1.1, continued
Statistical Committee, however, report a reduced these statistics still show that, on net, more people
number of migrants leaving or returning to the leave the country than return, thus increasing the
country every year, significantly lower than the stock of the Kyrgyz diaspora, the statistics are
estimates from the Kyrgyz Integrated Household downward biased as they are restricted to individu-
Survey (figure B1.1.1). Both departures and arrivals als who officially register a change in residency,
show a declining trend during the last decade, with which is only a small fraction of the total migrant
numbers in both cases below 10,000 people. While population.
TABLE 1.1 Estimates of the stock of migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic
LIVE ABROAD WORK ABROAD WORK ABROAD
COUNTRY (UN-DESA, 2019) (KIHS, 2018) (L2CK, 2021)
Total 754,969 100% 251,874 100% 166,695 100%
Russian Federation 591,211 78% 242,608 96% 157,360 94%
Germany 77,373 10% 0 0% 291 0%
Ukraine 26,996 4% 0 0% 0 0%
Tajikistan 11,261 1% 0 0% 0 0%
Kazakhstan 7,036 1% 1,995 1% 4,035 2%
United States 6,607 1% 0 0% 195 0%
Other 34,485 5% 7,271 3% 4,815 3%
Sources: UN-DESA (2019), Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey (2018), and Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic (2021).
Note: UN-DESA = United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs; KIHS = Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey;
L2CK = Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic survey.
of the Russian Federation as a destination country in the past decades—includ-
ing the visa-free system, solid migrant networks, low transportation costs, and
Kyrgyz workers’ knowledge of the Russian language—all of which contribute
to reducing migration costs.
Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic has a strong seasonal component
characterized by a peak during the warmer months and a reduction due to
the partial return of migrants to the Kyrgyz Republic during the winter, when
the economic activity of seasonal sectors such as construction, agriculture, or
tourism is lower (figure 1.1). Looking at longer-term trends, there was a rapid
increase in emigration between 2005 and 2009, reaching about 250,000
workers. However, these trends reverted during the financial crisis that
severely affected the price of commodities and the Russian economy. Since
2015, the number of Kyrgyz emigrants has started to increase again, reaching
250,000 by 2018. During the 2004–2018 period, migration flows from the
Kyrgyz Republic and different indicators of the dynamism of the Russian econ-
omy, such as the GDP or the price of gas, show a drastically high correlation
(about 0.8), proving the sensitivity of migration to fluctuations and shocks
affecting the Russian economy (table 1.2).
In terms of incidence in the population of the Kyrgyz Republic, workers over-
seas currently represent about 6 percent of the total working age population and
more than 10 percent of all employed Kyrgyz people, which shows the large
8 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 1.1
Trends in the stock of temporary migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic, 2004–18
a. Working-age population working abroad
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
q3
04
04
05
05
06
06
07
07
08
08
09
09
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15
17
17
18
18
20
b. Share working abroad
8
7
6
5
Percent
4
3
2
1
0
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
20 q3
20 q1
q3
04
04
05
05
06
06
07
07
08
08
09
09
10
10
11
11
12
12
13
13
14
14
15
15
17
17
18
18
20
Stock of emigrants (not seasonally adjusted) Stock of emigrants (4-quarter moving average)
Source: Different rounds of the quarterly Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey.
between emigration trends and economic development in the
TABLE 1.2 Correlations
Russian Federation, 2004–18
LOG (PRICE OF LOG (RUSSIAN GROWTH RATE OF GROWTH RATE OF
RUSSIAN GAS REAL GDP IN PRICE OF RUSSIAN GAS RUSSIAN REAL GDP
IN RUBLES) RUBLES) (IN RUBLES) (IN RUBLES)
Log (emigrants) +0.80 +0.82
Growth rate of emigrants +0.29 +0.42
Sources: World Bank, based on IMF World Economic Outlook database, KIHS (2018), and national statistics.
extent of the migration phenomenon in the country. If one also considers per-
manent migrants based on statistics from the DESA database, an estimated
percent of the population born in the Kyrgyz Republic currently resides
11
abroad. Recent data from the World Bank Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic survey for 2021 (L2CK) show that the stock of temporary labor
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 9
migrants in 2021 remained significantly below pre-COVID-19 pandemic levels
(~167,000, about 40 percent lower than in 2018).
Labor migration from the Kyrgyz Republic is often temporary, with rela-
tively short durations of stay overseas. Beyond regular questions on workers
with jobs overseas in the KIHS, the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic survey includes a more detailed migration module with additional
questions about household members currently abroad and returnees.
According to this survey, the median time since departure of current migrants
is quite low (7 months) and is similar to estimates from the KIHS (9 months)
(figure 1.2, panel a). Close to two-thirds of current emigrants have stayed over-
seas for less than a year, while about 20 percent have stayed overseas for more
than two years. The L2CK also asks respondents whether any member of their
household had worked abroad during the 20 years prior to the survey. Based
on that metric, there were about 650,000 returnees who had migrated in the
previous 20 years and had returned at the time of the survey (10 percent of the
total population and close to 20 percent of the working age population).
Similar to estimates of time since departure of current migrants—which do not
fully capture the whole length of migration as migrants have not yet returned—
the average duration of stay abroad for returnees in 2021 was about one year,
highlighting that a large part of migration in the Kyrgyz Republic is of a very
short-term nature.
The short-term nature of migration episodes in the Kyrgyz Republic is largely
planned by migrants. According to the KIHS, less than 20 percent of returnees
reported unexpected negative supply shocks in their legal and employment sta-
tus at destination as the main reason for returning. On the other hand, close to
20 percent returned in line with their premigration plans or because they had
saved enough money, and close to 60 percent returned for family reasons or
because they were homesick. Therefore, the motivations to return are largely
unrelated to unexpected negative shocks from the destination country and are
FIGURE 1.2
Distribution of length of stay abroad among migrant workers
a. In all destination countries b. In the Russian Federation
100 180,000
10 10
Number of Kyrgyz emigrants in Russia
90 160,000
10 7
80 140,000
18 18
70
120,000
60
Percent
100,000
50
80,000
40
63 64 60,000
30
20 40,000
10 20,000
0 0
Current migrant Returnee <1 1–5 5–10 10–20 20+
Up to 1 year 1–2 years 2–3 years >3 years Years residing abroad
OECD DIOC 2010 KIHS 2010
Sources: L2CK 2021, KIHS of 2010, OECD DIOC 2010 based on the Russian Federation census of 2010.
10 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
rooted on migrant decisions that are either predeparture or related to family
issues.
However, administrative data in receiving countries (mostly the Russian
Federation) provide a more nuanced picture, with a larger share of longer-term
Kyrgyz migrants. Statistics based on questions on household members in the
Kyrgyz Republic about their family members abroad might be biased and cap-
ture an incomplete picture of emigration from the country. For example, entire
families might have left the country, or longer-term emigrants might stop being
considered part of the household in the Kyrgyz Republic. Those migrant house-
holds would not be captured by the KIHS, as it only captures migrants who
have remaining family members in the Kyrgyz Republic. According to the 2010
National Census of the Russian Federation, there were 528,000 Kyrgyz migrants
living in the Russian Federation, while the Kyrgyz Integrated Household
Survey (KIHS) only captured 205,000, which is less than 40 p ercent.
Furthermore, while the KIHS shows short-term migrants (with migration
durations of less than five years), the Russian Federation census estimates that
close to 400,000 Kyrgyz lived in the Russian Federation for more than five
years—so the majority of Kyrgyz migrants stay in the country for a long time
(figure 1.2, right panel). Longer-term migrants also have higher levels of educa-
tion: 23 percent have tertiary degrees, compared to only 10 percent of migrants
found in the KIHS.
Migration in the Kyrgyz Republic also exhibits an important degree of circu-
larity. According to the L2CK (2021), more than half of returnees had migrated
abroad and returned home more than once during the last 20 years. The fluidity
and cyclicality of migration are also observed by the large share of returnees who
intend to migrate in the following year. More than one in four working age
returnees in 2021 had a plan to remigrate within a year, compared to only 8 per-
cent of nonmigrant adults (figure 1.3). These patterns are similar across age
FIGURE 1.3
Circularity of migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
a. Number of migration episodes among returnees b. Intentions to migrate by migration status
60 50
Percentage of population with intentions
to migrate in the following 12 months
45
50 48
Percentage of total returnees
40
35
40
30
30 25
21 20
20
15
13
10
10
5 5 4 5
3
0 0
1 2 3 4 5 6 >6 15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65+
Number of migration episodes Age group
Nonmigrant Returnee
Source: L2CK 2021.
Note: “Intentions to migrate” is the share of the population in each group (returnees and nonmigrants) that responded intending to migrate in
the next 12 months.
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 11
groups, although elder citizens are, as expected, less likely to have migration
plans compared to younger cohorts. All these features of migration patterns in
the Kyrgyz Republic make the distinction between emigrants and returnees
less clear.
DRIVERS OF LABOR MIGRATION FROM
THE KYRGYZ REPUBLIC
Emigration in the Kyrgyz Republic is mainly driven by a lack of economic
opportunities and the search for higher earnings. Past studies based on house-
hold surveys conclude that the vast majority of migrants leave the country
because of economic deprivation, either to obtain higher earnings or due to
limited domestic employment opportunities (Dubashov, Kruse, and
Ismailakhunova 2017; World Bank 2015). The Kyrgyz Republic is currently
experiencing a youth bulge resulting in a large number of new entries into the
labor market every year: between 2004 and 2018, the working age population
increased at an annual average of approximately 62,000 people, according to
the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic Survey. On the other hand,
net employment creation only averaged 30,000 jobs per year during the same
period, with more Kyrgyz, in p articular youth, being unable to find employ-
ment. Beyond job availability, the quality of employment has remained low,
with high degrees of informality, seasonality, and lack of tenure (World Bank
2015). Despite recent strong growth rates in wages in the country, there is still
a large wage gap compared to main migrant-destination countries such as the
Russian Federation.
At the regional level, this economic-based motivation for migration has
resulted in poorer regions having higher emigration rates (World Bank 2015).
According to the 2018 KIHS, the overall emigration rate in the Kyrgyz Republic
(the number of emigrants over the total nonmigrant population) stood at
6 percent among the working-age population (figure 1.1, left panel). However,
emigration rates were significantly higher in more rural and less developed areas
of the western regions of Batken (14 percent), Osh (12 percent), and Jalal-Abad
(8 percent). In contrast, temporary migration of workers located in the capital
city of Bishkek is quite low (figure 1.4, right panel).
Beyond economic drivers, other factors shape migration flows. For example,
the quality of public services in both origin and destination countries also consti-
tute push and pull factors for migration. Evidence from other contexts shows
that more developed education and health care systems and overall social safety
nets in receiving countries attract migration flows (Geis, Uebelmesser, and
Werding 2013; Pedersen, Pytlikova, and Smith 2008). Similarly, a lower quality
and availability of public services increase the intentions to emigrate in sending
countries (Dustmann and Okatenko 2014). More broadly, local amenities affect
migration flows. Climate change and environmental degradation, which reduce
livability of a place, can thus lead to more emigration (Afifi and Turner 2008).
Weak governance is another factor found in cross-country analyses that incen-
tivizes emigration, especially among higher skilled workers, as it hinders
meritocracy and reduces the return to education (Auer, Römer, and Tjaden 2020;
Cooray and Schneider 2016; Dimant, Krieger, and Meierrieks 2013).
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the processes of political and economic integration
in the Eurasian Economic Union (EaEU) has also facilitated the mobility of
12 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 1.4
Emigration, return rates, and correlation with poverty rates, by region
a. Emigration and return rates b. Emigration and poverty rates
16 16
Batken
Percent of working-age population
14 14
12 12
Emigration rate (2018)
Osh
10 10
Jalal-Abad
8 8
Total
6 6
4 4
2 2 Chui Issykul
Talas Naryn
0 0 Bishkek
15 20 25 30 35
ui
ty
ul
d
yn
en
sh
s
k
l
ta
la
ke
ba
yk
ci
Ch
O
r
To
tk
Ta
Na
sh
l-A
Iss
sh
Ba
Poverty rate (2018)
Bi
O
la
Ja
Region of origin
Share of emigrants (2018) Share of returnees (2015)
Sources: KIHS (2018) and KIHS migration module (2015).
Kyrgyz workers to other member countries, in particular the Russian
Federation and Kazakhstan. The impact of the EaEU accession, which took
place in 2015, on migration flows has not been rigorously studied, given data
limitations. Looking at net international migration flows (inflows minus out-
flows), the negative balance (more people leaving than entering the country)
has been reduced over the last years, not just in the Kyrgyz Republic but also in
other neighboring countries, such as Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. However, con-
trary to the situation in the other two countries that have not joined the EaEU,
the reduction in net outflows has been halted in the Kyrgyz Republic since
2016 (figure 1.5). Net outflows in the country, which were following a similar
trend to those in Uzbekistan until the EaEU accession, have started to widen,
which could suggest larger outflows given the reduction in legal mobility
restrictions.
Networks also play a central role in supporting the migration process, from
providing information, to providing financial aid and connecting to economic
opportunities in destination countries. Social networks of relatives and friends
are fundamental in facilitating migration. For example, the presence of a rela-
tive abroad is strongly correlated with a worker’s decision to emigrate (World
Bank 2015). According to results from the KIHS of 2015, close to four in five
prospective migrants obtain the necessary information about the migration
process through their network of relatives and friends, in particular those liv-
ing abroad. Similarly, two-thirds of Kyrgyz migrants choose their country of
destination based on the presence of a relative or friend. Once in the destina-
tion country, social networks also provide assistance in searching for a job.
Previous evidence shows that the use of job referrals and networks by new
immigrants make them more likely to find employment in the same occupa-
tions as older waves of migrants. Beaman (2012) studied the emergence of
immigrant enclaves and networks in the labor market of destination countries
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 13
FIGURE 1.5
Trends in net migration in Central Asian countries, 2012–20
0
–0.05
Net migration (% of population)
–0.10
–0.15
–0.20
–0.25
–0.30
–0.35
–0.40
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Kyrgyz Republic Uzbekistan Tajikistan
Sources: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic, State Committee of the
Republic of Uzbekistan on Statistics, and Tajikistan Agency on Statistics.
Note: Net migration is defined as the difference between the number of immigrants and
the number of emigrants for a given country in a given year, expressed as a percentage
of the total population in the country.
and provides evidence that those networks in the different localities of resi-
dence influenced the occupational choices of different generations of immi-
grants. Similarly, Patel and Vella (2013) find that immigrants from specific
countries cluster in particular occupations across different regions in the
United States. This fact is not due to immigrants’ skills or other characteristics
but rather to the referral from previous cohorts of immigrants. Furthermore,
those who work in occupations with a larger share of countrymen receive
higher wages.
PROFILE OF LABOR MIGRANTS
Temporary migration is concentrated among young males, while females repre-
sent a larger share of longer-term migrants. Data from the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey shows that temporary migration is a male-dominated phe-
nomenon in the Kyrgyz Republic, with 78 percent of international emigrants and
76 percent of returnees being men (figure 1.6). However, as previously men-
tioned, the survey captures labor migration of a shorter or temporary nature.
Broader statistics from the UN-DESA migration database exhibit a rather
gender-balanced composition of migration (48 percent males), which contrasts
with neighboring countries like Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, where migration is
more concentrated among men. The age structure of migrants from the Kyrgyz
Republic also widely differs from the general population. Among the working-
age nonmigrant population, slightly less than 50 percent are between 15 and
34 years old, compared to 74 percent of emigrants and 70 percent of returnees.
It is particularly striking that two in five current migrants are 15 to 24 years old,
often leaving school to migrate and find employment abroad. As a result, the
average age of nonmigrants (37 years old) is clearly higher than that of emigrants
(29.5) and returnees (31).
14 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 1.6
Demographic characteristics, by migrant status
a. Age distribution b. Share of males
45 90
41 41
Percent of the working-age population
Percent of the working-age population
40 80 78 76
35 33 70
30 29 60
25 25 50 47
22
20 19 18 40
16 16
15 15 30
12
10 10 20
5 2 2 10
0 0
15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 Stayer Emigrant Returnee
Age group (2018) (2018) (2015)
Stayers (2018) Working abroad (2018) Returnee (2015)
Sources: KIHS (2018) and KIHS migration module (2015).
Kyrgyz migrants are overrepresented among the middle education levels
compared to the general population in the Kyrgyz Republic. About 63 percent
of Kyrgyz adult migrants (ages 15–64 years old) had completed secondary edu-
cation in 2018, compared to 51 percent of Kyrgyz who stayed in the country
(figure 1.7, left panel). On the other hand, migrants are underrepresented among
low-skilled working-age adults with primary education or less (5 percent com-
pared to 9 percent of nonmigrants) as well as high-skilled workers with tertiary
education (11 percent compared to 17 percent of nonmigrants). As a result, the
prevalence of emigration across education levels is higher for adults with sec-
ondary education (7 percent) and lowest for high- and low-skilled workers
percent). While the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey provides informa-
(4
tion on the education levels of short-term migrants, information from the
Russian Federation’s census shows that longer-term migrants are more likely to
have higher education levels (figure 1.7, right panel). The educational profile of
migrants can be linked to differences in economic returns to education as well
as to financial constraints. Between 2004 and 2018, the average return to
migration—defined as the wage differential between the host and home coun-
try–for a tertiary-educated Kyrgyz was 58 percent, significantly lower than
those with secondary education completed (78 percent) or with lower educa-
tion levels (87 percent).2 The lower emigration rate among those with fewer
years of schooling, in spite of having the largest returns to migration, might be
associated with credit constraints that limit the capacity to finance the upfront
costs of migration for poorer households. Indeed, about half of returnees in the
KIHS of 2015 reported financing migration costs with their savings or asset
sales, and almost another half through financial support of relatives. On the
other hand, access to formal financial instruments is almost nonexistent, hin-
dering the opportunity of poorer households to borrow for financing the cost of
migration.
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 15
FIGURE 1.7
Selection patterns in emigration
a. Distribution of educational attainment by b. Education levels of Kyrgyz immigrants
migration status in the Russian Federation
80 7 8 80
Percent of working-age population
70 7 70
63
60 6 6 60
Share of emigrants
51
50 5 5 50
Percent
40 4 4 40
4
30 3 30
20 17 2 20
12 11
9 11 11 9
10 5 1 10
0 0 0
Primary Secondary Tertiary
e
ss
ry
y
ed
et
ar
le
da
pl
et
rti
or
on
OECD DIOC 2010 KIHS 2010
m
pl
Te
co
m
y
ec
ar
co
in
ls
im
na
y,
y,
Pr
ar
ar
tio
nd
nd
ca
co
co
Vo
Se
Se
Education level
Stayers (2018) Emigrants (2018)
Sources: KIHS rounds of 2018 and 2010 and OECD DIOC based on the 2010 National Census of the Russian Federation.
While education levels are not systematically higher for Kyrgyz migrants,
this population group tends to be positively self-selected in terms of skills.
Many studies use education levels as a proxy for skill levels, given that very few
surveys, in particular in developing countries, collect actual information on
workers’ skills.3 In 2013, GIZ and the World Bank developed the Jobs Skills and
Migration Survey, the first of its sort in the Kyrgyz Republic. Based on it, Ajwad
et al. (2014) show that adults with intentions to migrate as well as those who
returned from abroad possess higher cognitive and noncognitive skills than
adults with no intentions to migrate. The results also suggest that studies
focusing exclusively on education may draw very different (and potentially
biased) conclusions.
LABOR MARKET OUTCOMES OF MIGRANTS
Premigration
Workers who migrate overseas had poorer labor market outcomes in the
Kyrgyz Republic prior to migrating, compared to nonmigrants. The KIHS ad
hoc migration module of 2015 provides further information on the premigra-
tion labor market history of migrants. While two in three nonmigrant male
adults are employed, only 38 percent of emigrants had a job before migrating
overseas (figure 1.8, panel a). On the other hand, while 9 percent of male
16 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 1.8
Migrants’ employment status before and during migration compared to nonmigrants
a. Labor market status by gender and migration status b. Employment rate by age and gender
100 100
Share of working-age population
80 77
80
66
Percentage
60 54
44 43
60
38 38 40
40 38
31
40
20 19
16 14 13 11
9 9 10 9
6 7
3 5
1
0 20
Employed Unemployed Student Other 15–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64
inactive
Male nonmigrants Male migrants before migration Male nonmigrants
Male returnees Female nonmigrants Male migrants before migration
Female migrants before Female returnees Female nonmigrants
migration Female migrants before migration
Source: KIHS migration module and regular employment survey (2015).
stayers were unemployed, this rate reached 44 percent among emigrants
prior to migration. In turn, female migrants were more active in the labor
market than female stayers by the time of migration (81 percent versus
57 percent of stayers), although this did not translate into higher employ-
ment but rather unemployment rates seven times higher. The negative
self-selection of migrants’ predeparture on labor market outcomes is partic-
ularly prevalent among the prime-age population (figure 1.8, panel b). The
lower employment rate of migrants before migration persists after taking
into consideration differences in education levels, gender, age, or oblast of
birth. This indicates that migration is often triggered by “push factors,”
namely, unemployment and poor economic conditions in the home country.
Migrants were also more likely to be studying by the time of migration
(14 percent) compared to nonmigrants.
Migrants also have a different occupational profile than nonmigrants
before migration. Before migration, not only are emigrants significantly less
likely to be employed than nonmigrants, but they are also more likely to have
jobs in lower-skilled occupations (figure 1.9). For example, about 12 percent
of nonmigrant males and 30 percent of nonmigrant females worked in 2015
as managers, professionals, or technicians, occupations that require more
complex tasks and skills, compared to only 1 percent of male and 15 percent
of female prospective emigrants. On the other hand, more than half of male
emigrants who were employed prior to migration were working as agricul-
ture workers. Therefore, migrants self-select among those with poorer
employment outcomes before migration—more unemployed or employed in
lower-skill occupations, mostly in agriculture.
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 17
FIGURE 1.9
Occupational status of emigrants before departure, during migration, and after return
compared to nonmigrants
a. Males
60
Percentage of employed population
52 51
50
42
40
30 27 27
24
23 22
20
16 14
14 11
10 10
10 6
8
6
5 5 6
4 4
1002 11 1 001 1 012
0
s
ls
s
ks
rs
rs
rs
s
tio ary
er
an
or
na
ke
ke
ke
er
ns
ag
pa nt
at
ci
sio
Cl
or
or
or
er
ni
cu e
an
w
w
tw
oc em
es
op
ch
M
de
re
of
af
Te
El
ne
tu
Pr
tra
Cr
ul
hi
ric
il
ac
ta
Ag
M
Re
b. Females
60
Percentage of employed population
53
50
40 36
30
30 26 27
22 23 21
19
20 17
16
13 12
11 11
10 10
6 7 7 7
4 5 5
32 3 2
1 000 1 10 01
0
s
ls
s
ks
rs
rs
rs
s
tio ary
er
an
or
na
ke
ke
ke
er
ns
ag
pa nt
at
ci
sio
Cl
or
or
or
er
ni
cu e
an
w
w
tw
oc em
es
op
ch
M
de
re
of
af
Te
El
ne
tu
Pr
ra
Cr
ul
hi
t
ric
il
ac
ta
Ag
M
Re
Nonmigrant Emigrant before migration Emigrant during migration Returnee
Source: KIHS migration module and regular employment survey (2015).
During migration
While abroad, migrants are employed in different sectors and occupations
abroad compared to nonmigrants, with a general occupational downgrade.
Compared to stayers, the vast majority of migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic
are wage workers during their experience abroad: only 9 percent of men and
2 percent of women are self-employed overseas, as opposed to half of the
employed population in the Kyrgyz Republic (figure 1.10, panel a). The sectoral
gap is even larger, with 30 percent of male nonmigrants employed in the
18 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
agricultural sector in 2015 compared to only 7 percent of migrants abroad
(figure 1.10, panel b). These findings are similar among women. Agriculture
represents 34 percent of employment for nonmigrants, 5 percent for current
migrants, and 43 percent for returnees. While abroad, male international
migrants are highly concentrated in construction and trade sectors and female
migrants in the hospitality and trade sectors. In terms of occupation, about
82 percent of male emigrants and 63 percent of female emigrants worked in
low-skilled occupations as craft workers and elementary o ccupations—mostly
in construction and manufacturing in the case of male migrants—during their
migration experience (figure 1.9). The majority of the remaining workers
abroad had jobs in the retail trade and service sector.
FIGURE 1.10
Type and sector of employment of migrants during and after migration compared
to nonmigrants
a. Type of employment
80 74
Percentage of employed population
70 64
59
60
52 50
50 44
42
40
30 28 26 28
25 24
22
20
12 12
9 9 7
10 5
2 2 2 1 2
0
Employees Laborers Employers Entrepreneurs
b. Sector of employment
50
Percentage of total employment
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
e
n
e
Pu A fes te
ist e
uc n
n
In seh Ot in th
g
g
at s
n a pi n
se nt
l o mp ces
no a y
h ity
tru e
al ial
ad nis al
lo nd
ns
r
r
sp ad
in tiv
io
Ed tio
io
ch on lit
n
El rin
at fo H atio
ns ien
an ye
tu
a
l
n
e
ea
ic
i
Re nc
Fi gy
io
Pr est
ct
te ti ta
at
in
i
m
bl dm sio
m tra
Tr
ra
ul
v
lo
tu
an ctr
Co yg
H
r
M
na
t
ric
or
ac
iz
io rm s
e
rta
o
Ag
f
rn old er
i
d
u
o
e
te
an
an
h
rg
s
En
a
Tr
M
n
s
tio
ic In
ic
na
ta
io
ni
at
sa
ou
un
te
H
er
m
at
m
W
co
Male nonmigrants Male emigrants Male returnees Female nonmigrants
Female emigrants Female returnees
Source: KIHS migration module and regular employment survey (2015).
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 19
Despite the occupational downgrade, Kyrgyz emigrants earn a high wage
premium during migration, in particular those with lower education levels.
Migrants obtain significantly larger wages abroad compared to nonmigrants
across all education levels, even after taking into consideration differences in
sociodemographic characteristics such as age, gender, education, or place of
birth (figure 1.11 and figure 1.12, panel a). Since 2004, returns to migration have
been higher for low-educated workers (87 percent), compared to mid-educated
(78 percent) and highly educated Kyrgyz migrants (58 percent). The gaps are
large despite the fact that migrants suffer some occupational downgrade while
FIGURE 1.11
Wage premium earned by Kyrgyz migrants overseas compared to nonmigrants
a. By year and education level
200
180
160
140
120
Percentage
100
80
60
40
20
0
–20
–40
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
15
18
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Low education Mid-education High education
b. By sector of employment overseas
200
180
160
140
Percentage
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
n
n
re
lth
po de
Pu Ad ess te
uc n
ist on
fa ing
El ring
io r sp n
ch ion ity
se r se nt
h ity
s
es
tru e
Fi ogy d
al
ad ist al
ld ice
io
io
Ed tio
at fo o io
ns ien
tu
ta
l n
ou he me
Re nci
m ion
ic
ea
a
te at al
i
c
ct
at
m rat
ic In H rtat
no a
nu in
an Tr
tio tri
Pr l es
ra
ul
ho rv
rv
u
n m it
Co yg
H
M
na
t in
ct
ric
ec
se
a
rta
in
in
Ag
of
n
s
te
a
En
O
Tr
M
ta
ni
ic
bl
sa
H
d
an
un
m
er
m
at
co
W
Source: Different rounds of the Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey.
Note: Wage premium is the difference in percentage change in earnings between what Kyrgyz workers earn in
the Kyrgyz Republic and what Kyrgyz migrants earn overseas, controlling for differences in gender, age,
education, or region of origin. Dotted lines (bars) represent the standard error bands. Low education = those
with less than upper secondary education; Mid-education = those with upper secondary education; and High
education = those with tertiary education.
20 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
working abroad. Over time, a progressive decline in the returns to migration is
observed, given the faster increase of wages in the Kyrgyz Republic (World
Bank 2015). The reduction in the wage premium has been most pronounced
among low-educated workers, but still in 2018 returns to migration were
25 percent higher for them compared to high-skilled workers. Migrants obtain
a positive wage premium in all sectors of employment that is above 100 percent
(doubling the wages in the Kyrgyz Republic) in the real estate, entertainment
and recreation, and electricity sectors (figure 1.11, panel b).
Postmigration
Despite the worse initial labor market outcomes, migrants are more likely to be
employed upon return to the Kyrgyz Republic than nonmigrants. The positive
gap is particularly large for migrant women (54 percent employment rates versus
38 percent for stayers), but it is also sizable for men (77 percent versus 66 percent)
(figure 1.8, panel a). Larger employment rates for returnees are associated with
higher participation in the labor force. In terms of unemployment, male return-
ees have slightly higher rates than male nonmigrants, while the opposite is true
for female returnees. Differences in labor market outcomes between returnees
and nonmigrants disappear in most cases when controlling for differences in
sociodemographic profiles (such as age, gender, education, and place of birth).
However, given that migrants were negatively selected in terms of labor market
status at the time of migration, a better comparison for returnees is their premi-
gration situation. Using this comparison, and even when controlling for changes
in age and education, there is a significant employment premium associated with
past migration for both genders, as migrants largely improve their labor market
status upon return with higher employment rates and lower unemployment
rates compared to their situation premigration.
Return migrants are often self-employed and work in occupations and sectors
similar to their premigration experience rather than the jobs they had during
migration. Three in five male migrants upon return are self-employed, which is
FIGURE 1.12
Wages, by past migration status
14,000
12,000
Monthly wages in soms
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
0
Primary or less Secondary Vocational Tertiary
Nonmigrants Returnees
Source: KIHS migration module and regular employment survey (2015).
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 21
larger than the share of nonmigrants engaged in self-employment—about
50 percent (figure 1.10, panel a). The higher likelihood of return migrants to be
self-employed also holds when taking into consideration differences in sociode-
mographic characteristics (age, gender, education, region of birth), and it is in
line with results found in different contexts (Wahba and Zenou 2012; Wahba
2015; Batista et al. 2017). In many instances, this result has been used as sugges-
tive evidence of migration promoting entrepreneurship, and in some cases, a
causal link between temporary migration and entrepreneurship has been estab-
lished (Batista et al. 2017, Bossavie et al. 2021; Yang 2006, 2008; Khanna et al.
2022). However, self-employment might be either returnees’ choice or the con-
sequence of limited employment opportunities as employees (the “parking
lot” hypothesis of entrepreneurship of Harris and Todaro 1970). In the
Kyrgyz Republic, Brück, Mahé, and Naudé (2018) p rovide evidence that
self-employment among return migrants is often a temporary occupational
choice, used until a better employment opportunity emerges. Also, they find
that those migrants who were self-employed before migration were less
likely to be so upon return, so migration might not be a financial tool that
credit-constrained entrepreneurial workers use to save money for their
entrepreneurial endeavors. In terms of sectors and occupation of employ-
ment, while many migrants change sectors during the migration experience,
they switch back to their old sectors upon return to the Kyrgyz Republic—for
example, 44 percent of returnees work in agriculture (figure 1.10, panel b). In
the Kyrgyz Republic, returnees’ occupational profile also matches very
closely their premigration experience rather than their occupations abroad,
with a slightly lower share for male agricultural workers while higher for
females. Female returnees are also significantly more likely to be technicians
than before migration.
In terms of earnings, migrants obtain similar wages than nonmigrants upon
return to the Kyrgyz Republic, and there are no clear returns to past migration
as in other countries (figure 1.12).4 Given the small sample size of returnees in
the migration module of the 2015 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey when
dividing them by education levels, the wage estimates are somewhat imprecise.
If anything, returnees earn slightly lower wages in the mid-education level
(which is the vast majority of the migrant population), and higher for the low-
est and highest educated. After controlling for other personal characteristics
like gender, age, or oblast of residence, returnees do not earn wages that are
significantly different from those of nonmigrants. The combined analysis of
the labor market shows that the returns to work experience abroad are more
apparent in the extensive margin—larger employment rates—than in the
intensive margin—wage levels.
IMPACT OF MIGRATION AND REMITTANCES ON THE HOME
ECONOMY AND MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS
The impact of emigration on a sending country varies depending on numerous
factors and the time frame of analysis. Some of the main factors shaping the over-
all impact of emigration include the demographic profile of the country, the edu-
cational profile of migrants, the duration of migration and likelihood of return,
links with the diaspora, the likelihood of remitting, and the human capital and
financial accumulation during the migration period.5
22 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
As in other fast-growing regions, migration has slightly alleviated population
pressures in the Kyrgyz Republic. Given the demographic transition in the
country—where death rates have fallen rapidly while birthrates have increased
since the early 2000s—the population has continued to grow. In the last decade
alone, the population has risen by 20 percent (figure 1.13). While the natural
change in the population contributed to an even larger increase (21 percent), net
migration outflows slightly curbed the overall population increase. However, the
size of emigration (1 percent cumulatively during the decade) was rather minor
compared the rapid increase of the population.6 In other migrant-sending coun-
tries, migration accelerates population aging, but given the youth bulge in the
country and the high rates of migrants’ return, aging is less of a concern in the
Kyrgyz Republic.
There is no evidence of significant brain drain at the macro level, although
emigration of high-skilled workers in certain occupations might create chal-
lenges. The emigration of a segment of the high-skilled population can reduce
the average level of human capital in a country in the short run. However, the
characteristics of emigration in the Kyrgyz Republic, where emigrants tend to
be selected from the mid-education levels (those with upper secondary school)
and a majority return to the country after a relatively short period of time
abroad, alleviate concerns about a potentially sizable “brain drain.” Cross-
country analyses show that the brain drain due to emigration tends to be very
low in countries in Central Asia (Docquier, Lohest, and Marfouk 2007).
However, while there is no large negative impact of emigration on the human
capital in the country overall, the emigration of workers in key occupations can
create challenges such as labor shortages. For example, Adovor et al. (2021)
find rising trends in emigration of medical professionals in Central Asia during
the period of analysis of 1990 to 2014.
FIGURE 1.13
Contributions of migration to population changes in the
Kyrgyz Republic, 2011–20
25
Cumulative change (% population in 2011)
20
15
10
5
0
–5
2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Net migration Natural change in population Change in population
Source: National Statistical Committee of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Note: Net migration is defined as the difference between the number of immigrants to and
the number of emigrants from the Krygyz Republic, in a given year.
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 23
Emigrants contribute to the Kyrgyz economy with a large inflow of remit-
tances, the fourth-largest worldwide relative to the total size of the economy.
Prior to COVID-19, the Kyrgyz Republic was one of the countries with the
highest dependence on international remittances worldwide. Remittances rep-
resented 29.2 percent of GDP in 2019, making the Kyrgyz Republic the
fourth-largest recipient country in the world, only after Tonga, Haiti, and South
Sudan. At the macro level, remittances tend to be countercyclical, exerting a
stabilizing effect on the economy and public finances (Chami, Hakura, and
Montiel 2009; Frankel 2011). The countercyclical pattern also points at the key
role of migration as a household economic diversification strategy to hedge
against income risks like employment losses or underemployment of some of
their members. In the Kyrgyz Republic, remittances have fueled economic
growth, mostly by boosting household consumption, but they have been associ-
ated at the same time with some Dutch Disease–type symptoms such a loss in
competitiveness through real exchange appreciation, an increase in the size of
the nontradeable sector, and a fast growth of real wages (Dubashov, Kruse, and
Ismailakhunova 2017).
In 2018, about one in five Kyrgyz households received remittances from
abroad at least once throughout the year (table 1.3). Remittances are closely tied
to the migration experience of household members. Migrant households can be
defined as those who reported at least one household member whose location
of work is abroad in any quarter from the KIHS (World Bank 2015). Among the
16 percent of Kyrgyz migrant households in 2018, 94 percent received remit-
tances, compared to only 7 percent of nonmigrant households. Not only remit-
tances reach a large share of the Kyrgyz population but, for those receiving
them, they represented more than half (58 percent) of total income, more than
labor earnings and other sources of income combined. In recent years, migrant
households have become more reliant on remittance income, as in 2008 just
over a third of total income in migrant households was from remittances (World
Bank 2015). The higher dependence on remittances renders migrant house-
holds more vulnerable to economic shocks. For example, highly remittance-
dependent migrant households in the Kyrgyz Republic can be pushed into debt
when a migrant household member loses his or her job and stops sending remit-
tances home (Thieme 2014).
TABLE 1.3 Annual remittances and household income in the
Kyrgyz Republic, 2018
In soms
MEASURE NONMIGRANT HH MIGRANT HH TOTAL
HH income per capita 51,195 79,667 55,679
Of which
Nonremittance income 50,311 32,542 47,513
Remittances 884 47,125 8,166
Remittances (% total income) 2% 55% 10%
% HH receiving remittances 7% 94% 20%
Among HH receiving remittances
Remittances (% total income) 29% 58% 50%
Source: KIHS (2018).
Note: Average exchange rate in 2018: US$1 = 68.84 soms. HH = household.
24 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Remittances are a powerful tool to increase household income in the country.
Migrant households have, in the first place, lower income levels than nonmi-
grant families. The average annual per capita preremittance income of migrant
households stood in 2018 at 32,542 soms (US$473), which is 35 percent lower
than nonmigrant households. Taking remittances into consideration, the income
per capita of migrant households increased to close to 80,000 soms (US$1,157),
55 percent higher than nonmigrant households. The higher income provided by
remittances has been associated with better education outcomes (Amuedo-
Dorantes and Pozo 2010) and health (Hildebrandt and McKenzie 2005). In the
Kyrgyz Republic, remittances are mostly channeled to food purchases and hous-
ing improvements (Dubashov, Kruse, and Ismailakhunova 2017). On the other
hand, migrant households spend a low share of remittances in investment and
education. As a result, Akmoldoev and Budaichieva (2012) observe that migrant
households do not spend more on education than nonmigrant households. In
terms of educational outcomes, Kroeger and Anderson (2014) find that remit-
tances do not improve the human capital of children left behind. In particular,
dropout rates of teenagers aged 14–18 and malnourishment of girls in families
that receive remittances are actually higher than for those in families with no
remittances.
In terms of poverty rates, the literature has consistently found a positive
impact of remittances on poverty reduction (Adams and Page 2005). At the
national level, the poverty rate in the Kyrgyz Republic based on the national pov-
erty line stood at 22.4 percent of households in 2018 (figure 1.14). However, in the
absence of remittance income, another 8.2 percent of households would fall
below the poverty line, increasing the share of poor families up to 30.6 percent.
Remittances barely change the share of poor households among nonmigrant
families—from 26.8 percent to 25.4 percent—given their low prevalence among
this group. On the other hand, remittances help to significantly alleviate poverty
among migrant households, reducing the share from 50.2 percent of families
(excluding remittances) to only 6.7 percent.
FIGURE 1.14
Poverty rate at the national poverty line in the Kyrgyz Republic, 2018
60
50
40
Percentage
30
20
10
0
Nonmigrant households Migrant households Total
Poverty rate (including remittances) Poverty rate (excluding remittances)
Source: KIHS (2018).
Labor Migration as a Major Source of Employment and Development | 25
However, remittances may dampen labor supply among Kyrgyz house-
holds with international migrants. Larger disposable income as a result of
remittances can have a negative impact on the incentives to work for nonmi-
grating family members.7 This effect could thus reduce the labor supply and
increase households’ economic dependency on remittances. At the same
time, by sending remittances back home, migrants can help family members
left behind accumulate capital to start working as self-employed. The eco-
nomic literature in other countries has mostly found negative effects of male
migration overseas on women’s labor supply at home, while the impact on
men left in the country is less clear (Lokshin and Glinskaya 2009, for Nepal;
Binzel and Assaad 2011, for Egypt; Mu and van de Walle 2011, for China; and
Mendola and Carletto 2012, for Albania). According to the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey, only 63 percent of heads of households in the Kyrgyz
Republic with migrants abroad worked in 2018, compared to 79 percent of
head of households without international migrants. Controlling for differ-
ences in individual socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, educa-
tion, and the region of residence, heads of migrant households are 11
percentage points less likely to be employed than in nonmigrant households.
This result is similar to findings of past studies in the country (World Bank
2015). When looking at the employment rates of all nonmigrant members of
the household, those who have a family member abroad are 5 percentage
points less likely to have a job. Using a gender dimension, Karymshakov and
Sulaimanova (2017) also find that women in migrant households are more
likely to report having unpaid family work and increase the time for house-
work at the expense of less hours of work outside the home. Overall, there
seems to be a negative correlation between migration and labor supply of
family members in the Kyrgyz Republic, although a causal relationship has
not been established.
NOTES
1. The difference in the estimated stock of migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic between the
two sources is primarily driven by the fact that the KIHS only captures short-term tempo-
rary labor migration by individual households, while excluding migrants that left the coun-
try for a longer period of time or for purposes other than for work, and entire households
that left the country (World Bank 2015; Dubashov, Kruse, and Ismailakhumova 2017). In
contrast, the DESA database considers all migrants from the country that are overseas.
Beishenaly et al. (2013), relying on experts’ evidence, increase the estimates of the stock of
Kyrgyz emigrants up to 1 million (box 1.1).
2. Based on data from the KIHS, and controlling for differences in age, gender, year, and
region of residence.
3. Perhaps the most important survey on adult skills in OECD countries is the Programme for
the International Assessment of Adult Competencies.
4. In Eastern Europe, results show substantive income premia for return migrants, ranging
from 40 percent in Hungary (Co, Gang, and Yun 2000), 10 to 45 percent in a selected group
of EU New Member States (Martin and Radu 2010), to almost 100 percent in Albania
(Coulon and Piracha 2005).
5. For a recent review of the international literature on the topic beyond the Kyrgyz Republic,
see Bossavie and Özden (2022).
6. While migration is a prevalent phenomenon in the country, it is mostly temporary, and the
actual outflows of longer-term migrants that are reflected in the statistics on net migration
flows are rather limited.
7. For example, the wealth effect can increase the reservation wage of household members.
26 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
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2 Risks and Inefficiencies of
Labor Migration Exposed
by COVID-19
The COVID-19 pandemic has severely restricted labor mobility in the Kyrgyz
Republic and in the main migrant destination countries such as the Russian
Federation, affecting both the push and pull factors of migration. From the sup-
ply side, many countries restricted mobility to prevent contagion, including
mobility to work for those occupations not deemed essential. In the Kyrgyz
Republic, the government approved different restricting measures such as estab-
lishing checkpoints in each city, and temporarily closing cafes, shopping malls,
and other leisure events that entailed large gatherings (Dzushupov et al. 2021).
On March 25, a state of emergency was declared in the three major cities of
Bishkek, Osh, and Jalal-Abad, and residents were only allowed to leave their
houses for essential services such as going to grocery stores, pharmacies, and
medical centers. The government also prohibited interregion mobility in areas
under state of emergency and closed the country’s borders to foreigners. While
the state of emergency was terminated on May 10, 2020, quarantine measures
remained in place in the biggest cities of the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore, restric-
tions affecting the capacity to engage in labor activities were more acute in urban
centers than rural areas, where the majority of Kyrgyz migrant households
reside, affecting the balance of pull and push factors of migration.
The COVID-19 pandemic resulted in unprecedented restrictions on inter-
national mobility, with very scarce availability of transportation to prevent the
spread of the virus, derailing many migrants’ plans and leaving them at high
risk in destination countries. In the Russian Federation, the main destination
country of Kyrgyz emigrants, the government also approved different mobility
restriction measures, such as closing restaurants, nonfood retail stores, and
other nonessential services from March to the end of April, depending on the
region (Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). In cities like Moscow, restaurants,
bars and cafes were also closed except for takeaways, and on April 13, 2020, car
rental services, taxi services, and construction were also suspended. This dis-
ruption in the main destination countries reduced the strength of the pull fac-
tors of migration. The Russian Federation closed its borders at the beginning
of the pandemic, with transportation being almost nonexistent. These restric-
tions remained until September 21, 2020, when it resumed international flights
on a reciprocal basis with Belarus, Kazakhstan, and the Kyrgyz Republic
29
30 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
(Russian Government 2020). Many migrants who lost their jobs abroad could
not return home, being stranded in the foreign countries without social protec-
tion. This disruption in the main destination countries also reduced the
strength of the pull factors of migration. On top of these supply-side restric-
tions imposed by governments in the Kyrgyz Republic and migrant-receiving
countries, citizens had also limited their mobility and consumption in a con-
text of higher uncertainty and lower income.
The remainder of this report analyzes recently available databases to under-
stand migrants’ vulnerabilities brought to light by the COVID-19 pandemic and
corresponding policy actions through the temporary migration life cycle frame-
work (see box 2.1 on data availability in the Kyrgyz Republic since the COVID-19
outbreak). In contexts where temporary migration is widespread, such as the
Kyrgyz Republic, the migration life cycle can t ypically be divided into four phases
(World Bank 2018; Ahmed and Bossavie 2021): premigration decision, predepar-
ture, in-service (while migrants are abroad), and return (figure 2.1). The first
stage is predecision, when a worker decides to migrate based on their
BOX 2.1
The limited availability of up-to-date data to assess the impact of COVID-19 on
labor migration in the Kyrgyz Republic
The only nationally representative survey that pro- assessment of the challenges migrant workers and
vides information on different outcomes after the their families faced due to the COVID-19 outbreak
COVID-19 pandemic outbreak for both Kyrgyz emi- (IOM and UNICEF 2020), although the reduced sam-
grants and returnees is Listening to the Citizens of ple size (147 households) and sampling procedure
Kyrgyz Republic (2021). The largest survey post- limit the ability to confidently generalize the results
COVID-19 to date is the one run by the National for the broader Kyrgyz emigrant population.
Statistical Committee of the Kyrg yz Republic In the Russian Federation, there have been several
(National Statistical Committee 2020). This survey post-COVID-19 surveys targeted to migrants, including
was implemented between October 15 and November migrants from the Kyrgyz Republic, although they all
15 of 2020 and interviewed 4,954 households, repre- have problems of representativeness. Perhaps the sur-
sentative of urban and rural areas in all regions of the vey with the largest number of Kyrgyz migrants was run
Kyrgyz Republic. In terms of migration, the survey by Vershaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva (2020), who used
only includes questions on whether households had a advertising targeting on the social media platforms
family member who could not return from abroad, or Vkontakte and Instagram to interview 2,074 migrants
if they lost their job overseas and had to return home. from April 23 to May 19, 2020, both across the Russian
However, it does not provide information on the Federation and in Moscow specifically. Of those, 587
broader impact of COVID-19 on the labor market, or migrants were citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic.
income and health outcomes of current Kyrgyz Denisenko and Mukomel (2020) surveyed 1,400
migrants abroad, nor does it shed light on the current migrants in the Russian Federation as well as 1,300
situation of those who returned to the country. In potential migrants abroad both through social media
2021, the World Bank implemented the Listening to and the telephone, although no specific results are dis-
the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic survey, a nation- aggregated by country of origin. Finally, Ryazantsev and
ally representative survey of 3,203 households (and Khramova (2020) conducted a survey of more than
more than 15,000 individuals), which covered ques- 700 labor migrants from Central Asian countries in the
tions on both current emigrants and returnees. The Russian Federation in April 2020, of which about
IOM and UNICEF conducted a rapid needs 10 percent were citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic.
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 31
FIGURE 2.1
Migration life cycle stages and COVID-19 disruptions
Migration Premigration Premigration During Postmigration
phases decision departure migration (return)
Employment, Entrepreneurship,
Migrants' Migration decision Employment search,
remittances, savings, investment, skill
decisions based on cost- travel arrangements,
education abroad, enhancement in
and choices benefit analysis training
length of stay the Kyrgyz Republic
Increased Mobility Restrictions on
Border closures,
COVID–19 uncertainty about restrictions, nonessential
impact on Kyrgyz
disruptions costs and benefits limited travel occupations, job
labor market
of migration arrangements losses, health risks
Sources: World Bank, adapted from World Bank (2018) and Ahmed and Bossavie (2022).
understanding of the costs and benefits of migrating. The second stage is prede-
parture, when after the worker has decided to pursue an overseas job, they can
take up measures to improve their employability, finding and obtaining a job, and
obtaining the necessary legal documents to migrate (clearances from national
authorities, visas and passports, inter alia), and completing the logistical prepa-
rations for migration (for example, tickets, financing). The third stage is during
migration, when the migrant is employed overseas. The final stage is after migra-
tion, when a migrant leaves the destination to return home and, in most cases,
starts an economic activity in home labor markets. The decisions and outcomes
of temporary migrants in each of these stages have suffered serious disruptions
from the COVID-19 pandemic.
PREDECISION AND PREDEPARTURE
Mobility disruptions, border closures, and limited travel options have affected
the ability of many prospective migrants to move abroad and the costs and ben-
efits associated with this decision. Prospective migrants make the decision to
migrate analyzing the expected costs and benefits. The COVID-19 pandemic
rapidly increased health concerns and mobility restrictions aiming at controlling
the spread of the virus, severely limited the ability to work. While both health
concerns and mobility restrictions were widespread across the globe, they have
shown asymmetric effects across countries and regions, affecting the decision of
prospective migrants by changing the relative costs and benefits of migrating to
different countries. In theory, and other things being equal, a worker would pre-
fer to migrate when the relative economic and health conditions are better in the
destination country compared to their region of origin.
In terms of COVID-19 incidence, the Kyrgyz Republic has recorded a
lower number of cases compared to the Russian Federation, the main
migration-receiving country. The number of COVID-19 cases during the first
wave of the pandemic in the Kyrgyz Republic was limited compared to
32 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 2.2
COVID-19 cases and deaths per 1,000,000 inhabitants
a. Cases
30,000
COVID cases per 1 million inhabitants
20,000
10,000
0
1 Jan 2020 1 Apr 2020 1 Jul 2020 1 Oct 2020 1 Jan 2021 1 Apr 2021
Date
b. Deaths
600
Deaths per 1 million inhabitants
400
200
0
1 Jan 2020 1 Apr 2020 1 Jul 2020 1 Oct 2020 1 Jan 2021 1 Apr 2021
Date
Kazakhstan Kyrgyz Republic Russia Tajikistan Uzbekistan
Sources: Roser, Ritchie, Ortiz-Osina and Hasell (2020).
international standards but increased more rapidly during the summer and
winter of 2020 (figure 2.2). At the beginning of March 2021, the Kyrgyz Republic
reported more than 13,000 cases per one million inhabitants (1.3 percent of the
total population). While still relatively low by international standards, the prev-
alence of the disease was significantly higher than neighboring countries of
Central Asia such as Uzbekistan (2,400 per one million inhabitants) or Tajikistan
(1,400 per one million inhabitants). On the other hand, COVID-19 cases have
been more prevalent in the main destination country of Kyrgyz emigrants. The
Russian Federation, with around 30,000 cases per 1 million, more than double
the rate in the Kyrgyz Republic, while in Kazakhstan, the second-largest recip-
ient country of Kyrgyz migrants, the incidence has been fairly similar. The sta-
tistics of deaths related to COVID-19 show similar cross-country patterns, with
600 deaths per million residents in the Russian Federation, three times more
than in the Kyrgyz Republic and Kazakhstan.
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 33
Both the Kyrgyz Republic and the main host countries of Kyrgyz migrants have
restricted mobility since the onset of the pandemic, limiting the opportunity for
labor migration. According to Google mobility data, there was a drastic reduction
in mobility to the place of work in the Kyrgyz Republic and main destination
countries such as the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan. Both the Russian
Federation and Kazakhstan had a maximum reduction in mobility of about
50 percent during April 2020 and, after a slight deterioration during the summer,
slowly improved to about 20 percent in December 2020 (figure 2.3, panel a). As of
March 2021, mobility to work still had not recovered prepandemic levels,
FIGURE 2.3
Changes in mobility to work during the COVID-19 pandemic, 2020–21
a. Cross-country comparison
20
Changes in mobility vs January, %
0
–20
–40
–60
1 Feb 2020 1 May 2020 1 Aug 2020 1 Nov 2020 1 Feb 2021
Time
Kyrgyz Republic Russia Kazakhstan
b. Regional variation in the Kyrgyz Republic
20
Changes in mobility vs January, %
0
–20
–40
–60
–80
1 Feb 2020 1 May 2020 1 Aug 2020 1 Nov 2020 1 Feb 2021
Time
Bishkek Batken Chuy Issyk-Kul
Jalal-Abad Naryn Osh Talas
Sources: Google LLC, “Google COVID-19 Community Mobility Reports,” https://www
.google.com/covid19/mobility.
34 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
showing a 30 percent reduction. In the Kyrgyz Republic, similar trends are
observed, with commuting to work at the peak of the COVID-19 pandemic in early
April 2020 dropping by 60 percent in the country as a whole. While mobility
trends have been quite similar across these countries, the reduction has been
more acute in the Kyrgyz Republic compared to the Russian Federation. However,
rural regions in the Kyrgyz Republic where most migrant households reside—in
particular in Batken, Jalal Abad, and Osh—showed a more limited reduction in
mobility compared to urban centers such as Osh city of Bishkek (figure 2.3, panel
b). These large variations across regions in the Kyrgyz Republic are the result of
the asymmetric government policy that concentrated the state of emergency in
the main urban centers. Overall, the higher mobility restrictions to work in urban
centers, combined with the prohibition to enter these urban centers under a state
of emergency, might have caused a reduction in internal migration. However,
since autumn 2020, geographic mobility patterns seem to have shifted, with more
rural regions having a progressive deterioration (larger than 40 percent reduction
in March 2021) while remaining stable in Bishkek and Osh (around 30 percent).
The COVID-19 pandemic might have also exacerbated the imperfect informa-
tion prospective migrants have about returns to migration. Recent evidence in
different contexts shows migrants tend to have inaccurate information on the
returns to migration. Some studies find that migrants underestimate potential
earnings (McKenzie, Gibson, and Stillman 2013; Seshan and Zubrickas 2017),
while others observe an overestimation of the economic returns abroad (Shrestha
2020). Migrants also have imperfect information on other migration costs such
as the risks of work-related deaths at destination (Shrestha 2020) or the proba-
bility of obtaining legal status at destination (Bah and Batista 2020). Prospective
migrants heavily rely on reduced informal networks. According to the ad hoc
migration module of the 2015 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey, four in five
return migrants relied on family and friends either abroad or in the Kyrgyz
Republic to obtain information on where to migrate and how to find a job over-
seas. Overall, the consequences of imperfect information are estimated to be very
large, increasing total costs for migrants by about 40 percent (Porcher 2020). The
COVID-19 pandemic not only has lowered employment opportunities abroad but
also has drastically increased the levels of uncertainty and volatility in the global
economy, hindering the capacity of prospective migrants to acquire information
and make informed decisions about the costs and benefits of migration.
Uncertainties remain regarding migration and visa policies in destination coun-
tries, mobility restrictions, or on-the-job safety conditions, to name a few. Also,
COVID-19 has proved to affect the sectoral composition of labor demand not
only in the short term but also potentially in the longer term, with uncertainty
about the strength of the future recovery of occupations with a traditionally high
demand of migrants as tourism and hospitality, while other sectors have rapidly
grown in the new context such as delivery services. Prolonged travel restrictions
may induce additional technological change in certain sectors heavily relying on
migrant labor, reducing future demand (Clemens, Lewis, and Postel 2018).
The COVID-19 pandemic led to a drastic drop in demand for migrant labor in
the main destination countries, revealing the high exposure of migration flows
to shocks at destination. In 2020, the Russian Federation granted work visas to
190,000 Kyrgyz citizens, less than half of the work authorizations issued in 2019
(454,000). Compared to the same quarter in 2019, the Russian Federation
approved 78,000 fewer work visas in the second quarter of 2020, 108,000 fewer
in the third quarter, and 72,000 fewer in the fourth quarter (figure 2.4). That is,
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 35
FIGURE 2.4
Change in the number of visas authorized by the Russian Federation to Kyrgyz
citizens, compared to the same quarter in the previous year, 2018–20
100,000
50,000
0
–50,000
–100,000
–150,000
Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec Mar Jun Sep Dec
2018 2019 2020
Total Work
Source: The Russian Federation Federal State Statistics Service.
between March and December 2020, there were 258,000 fewer visas for Kyrgyz
workers to legally work in the Russian Federation compared to the same period
of 2019. These recent trends point at a drastic limitation of labor migration as a
poverty alleviation tool in the Kyrgyz Republic, putting further pressures on the
Kyrgyz labor market. While migration from the Kyrgyz Republic picked up again
in 2021, statistics from the L2CK survey show that there were 167,000 temporary
migrants abroad, about 40 percent fewer than the peak observed during the
pandemic.
As a result, many potential migrants and their households had their migra-
tion plans disrupted due to COVID-19-related mobility restrictions. The sur-
vey on the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic run by the National Statistics
Committee (2020) in October 2020 shows a drastic disruption in emigration
plans. About 9 percent of Kyrgyz households had at least one member who
cancelled their travel plans abroad. Given that there are about 1.57 million
households in the country, this share means that close to 150,000 households
had at least one member who could not travel abroad as planned. More pre-
cisely, the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic survey of 2021 esti-
mates that 174,000 individuals, which is about 2.6 percent of the population
(and 5.5 percent of the working age population, were planning to migrate in the
previous 12 months (between the summer of 2020 and 2021) but could not do
so due to COVID-19. Taking into consideration that about 250,000 Kyrgyz emi-
grate every year for a short-term period—based on KIHS statistics—the num-
ber of disrupted migration plans was very large and temporary emigration
came to a near complete halt. Furthermore, regions with higher numbers of
migrants currently living abroad tend to have a larger share of households that
could not migrate as planned, although the correlation is far from perfect. For
example, Talas, a region with traditionally low to moderate emigration rates,
had the second-largest share of households with disrupted migration plans (19
percent), only after Jalal-Abad.
36 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Households with members that are forced to cancel their migration plans
remain in a vulnerable situation in the Kyrgyz Republic, with limited employ-
ment opportunities and poorer health conditions. While individual-level
labor market data are not available for 2020, the household survey imple-
mented by the National Statistics Committee in October 2020 shows the siz-
able disruption of the COVID-19 pandemic on employment opportunities,
with 19.7 percent of interviewed households reporting at least one member
who lost their job between March and October. It is hard to estimate changes
in employment rates based on this metric, as it only shows the flows from
employment to unemployment (or out of the labor force) while there is no
information on potential disruptions in the flows in the opposite direction.
Furthermore, there is no straightforward translation of data at the household
level to the individual level that is typically used in labor force surveys. If not
all employed members of households reporting job losses lost their job post-
COVID-19, then the drop in employment at the individual level would be
lower than the 19.7 percent mentioned above. As highlighted by the literature
on job vulnerability in the COVID-19 pandemic across countries, lower-in-
come households in the Kyrgyz Republic suffered significantly larger employ-
ment losses.1 Furthermore, the COVID-19 survey in the Kyrgyz Republic
shows that households with a member unable to migrate were twice as likely
to report employment losses during the pandemic compared to those that did
not have intentions to migrate (40 percent versus 19 percent) (figure 2.5).
They were also more likely to report wage-income losses and needing to use
drastic coping mechanisms such as cutting food spending due to lack of
income. This vulnerable group also faces higher health concerns, with more
COVID-related symptoms, mental health issues, and higher chances of not
receiving the necessary health treatment.
FIGURE 2.5
Impact of COVID-19 on the economic and health outcomes of families with cancelled
migration plans
100
90
80
Percentage of households
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Loss job Reduction in Cut food COVID Depression No needed
wages spending symptoms health treatment
Nonmigrant households Households with failed migration plans
Source: National Statistical Committee household survey 2020.
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 37
DURING MIGRATION
COVID-19 health risks
Migrants abroad have been exposed to significant health risks compared to the
nonmigrant population in the Kyrgyz Republic. There are no official and pub-
licly available data on COVID-19 infections or mortality rates specifically among
migrants in main destination countries such as the Russian Federation or
Kazakhstan. However, there are several reasons to believe that their health
exposure to COVID-19 has been higher than that of nonmigrants in the Kyrgyz
Republic. First, the COVID-19 prevalence in the Russian Federation, the main
destination country, has been more than double that in the Kyrgyz Republic. In
addition, migrants in the Russian Federation were more exposed to health risks
than Russian citizens given their particular legal, economic, and social vulner-
abilities and the barriers they faced to get access to COVID-19 tests and medical
health care in case of having symptoms (King and Zotova 2020). Furthermore,
the housing conditions of Kyrgyz migrants tend to be less amenable for
social distancing, with about half of Kyrgyz migrants living in apartments
with more than five other people (4.5 on average), compared to only 15 percent
of Russians (Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva 2020). This hinders the ability to
self-quarantine in case of contraction of COVID-19 (King and Zotova 2020).
Finally, the substandard living conditions in nonresidential buildings (such as
abandoned factories, basements, or trailers) lack basic amenities, which also
increases the risks of health hazards, in particular respiratory illnesses (Centre
for Migration Research 2014). Under these circumstances there have been fre-
quent outbreaks among migrant groups reported in the media.2
Exposure to employment shocks at destination
In the absence of nationally representative surveys of migrants abroad during
the peak of COVID-19,3 the analysis of occupations prior to the onset of the pan-
demic provides a relevant approximation of the vulnerability of employment to
the COVID-19 crisis. Recent studies have estimated individual ex ante job vul-
nerability to COVID-19 based on the characteristics of the jobs (see, for example,
Dingel and Neiman 2020; Garrote-Sanchez et al. 2020). Using ONET surveys
that provide information on the task content of occupations, the KIHS migration
module of 2015, and the general KIHS survey in 2018, we categorized jobs as
“income-safe” if they are jobs that can be performed from home (teleworkable)
or are deemed essential by governments, so they are protected from supply
restrictions in mobility and dismissals (Fasani and Mazza 2020).
Kyrgyz migrants hold jobs in occupations that were more vulnerable to the
COVID-19 shock than nonmigrants. Panels a and b of figure 2.6 highlight several
important results. In general, mid-educated workers (completed secondary edu-
cation) are the most likely to be employed in essential occupations, while the
ability to work from home increases with the level of education. When combin-
ing the two aspects of protection against COVID-19 in the labor market,
higher-educated workers tend to have a larger share of jobs that are safer from
dismissal and income losses (panel c). By migration status, while 64 percent of
nonmigrant workers in the Kyrgyz Republic were employed in income-safe jobs,
only 46 percent of emigrants were employed in these types of jobs.
Therefore, Kyrgyz emigrants are significantly more vulnerable to supply and
38 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 2.6
Exposure to COVID-19 employment shocks, by migration status
a. Share of essential jobs
100
90
80
Percentage
70
60
50
40
30
ry
y
ry
y
y
y
l
l
al
na
na
ar
ar
ar
ar
tia
tia
t
nd
nd
nd
nd
To
tio
tio
r
r
Te
Te
co
co
co
co
ca
ca
Se
Se
Se
Se
Vo
Vo
<
<
Total Male Female
b. Share of telework jobs
80
70
60
Percentage
50
40
30
20
10
0
l
y
y
y
l
ry
y
l
ry
ta
na
na
ar
ar
ar
ar
ia
ia
To
tio
tio
nd
nd
nd
nd
rt
rt
Te
Te
ca
ca
co
co
co
co
Vo
Vo
Se
Se
Se
Se
<
<
Total Male Female
c. Share of income-safe jobs
100
90
80
Percentage
70
60
50
40
30
ry
y
ry
ry
y
ry
l
l
l
na
ar
ar
ta
na
a
ia
a
ia
nd
nd
nd
nd
To
tio
rt
rt
tio
Te
Te
co
co
co
co
ca
ca
Se
Se
Se
Se
Vo
Vo
<
<
Total Male Female
Nonmigrant Current migrant Returnee Migrant premigration
Sources: World Bank, based on data from the KIHS annual survey and ad hoc migration module (2015) and
following the methodology of Dingel and Neiman (2020), and Fasani and Mazza (2020).
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 39
demand constraints in the labor market in sending countries (mainly the Russian
Federation). Emigrants are not only employed in more vulnerable occupations
compared to nonmigrants, but also relative to their former occupations before
migrating. This increase in vulnerability between migrants and nonmigrants is
particularly large for emigrants with higher education levels.
Surveys of migrants in the Russian Federation corroborate the larger neg-
ative impact of COVID-19 on the labor market outcomes of this population
group, compared to both native Russians and nonmigrants in the Kyrgyz
Republic. Several surveys conducted in the Russian Federation found that
Kyrgyz and migrants from other Central Asian countries experienced large
employment losses in the first two months of the pandemic (Varshaver,
Ivanova, and Rocheva 2020; Ryazantsev and Khramova 2020; Denisenko
and Mukomel 2020). According to Varshaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva (2020)
about 40 percent of Kyrgyz migrants lost their jobs during the first two
months of the pandemic, and an additional 39 percent were sent to unpaid
leave. Therefore, only one in five Kyrgyz migrants was able to keep earning
wages. As a comparison, about 40 percent of Russians were either dismissed
or on unpaid leave during the same period. Other surveys of Central Asian
migrants show similar results. Ryazantsev and Khramova (2020) find that
28 percent of migrants lost their job and 37 percent were on unpaid leave,
and Denisenko and Mukomel (2020) report a 30 percent drop in employ-
ment of migrants in April and May of 2020 compared to February of the
same year. In consonance with the fall in employment, Varshaver, Ivanova,
and Rocheva (2020) find that only 15 percent of Kyrgyz migrants maintained
their levels of pre-COVID-19 labor earnings. The partial economic recovery
in the Russian Federation in the second half of 2020 given the lower mobil-
ity restrictions suggests that part of the migrants’ job loss could have been
restored (Ryazantsev and Khramova 2020), but there are no recent data on
the labor market outcomes of Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation. In
the second half of 2021, when the economic situation had already improved,
the L2CK shows that 64 percent of Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation
were employed, still significantly lower rates than premigration levels when
temporary migrants were almost universally employed.
The impact of COVID-19 on employment of Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian
Federation has been unequal across regions and sectors of activity. Employment
losses among labor migrants in the Russian Federation were significantly
higher in the Moscow metropolitan area (41 percent compared to 21 percent in
other areas of the country), partly due to the stricter mobility restrictions
imposed there (Denisenko and Mukomel 2020). Across types of labor migrants,
the negative shock was particularly acute among migrants with informal con-
tracts, lower education levels, and limited Russian language fluency (Denisenko
and Mukomel 2020). In line with the ex ante analysis of vulnerabilities to
COVID-19 based on occupations, the different surveys show large variations in
employment losses across sectors. According to Ryazantsev and Khramova
(2020), the sectors where labor migrants were strongly hit were tourism, hos-
pitality, hairdressing, and retail trade (see figure 2.7). Employment in construc-
tion, the largest employer of labor migrants, fell by 30 percent, although
Denisenko and Mukomel (2020) show that it recovered in May 2020. On the
other hand, the share of migrants that lost their job in the health care, utilities,
and delivery sectors was minimal. In some instances, there has been an increase
40 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 2.7
Share of employment losses among labor migrants in the Russian Federation across
economic sectors
100 35
90
30
employment pre-COVID
% employment losses 80
70 25
% of total
60 20
50
40 15
30 10
20
5
10
0 0
re
re
s
e
s
s
ry
y
n
s
ism
n
er
xi
nt
tie
er
er
ad
io
io
st
ca
ca
th
Ta
ss
ra
iv
at
ct
ili
ur
du
Tr
O
el
re
ld
lth
au
uc
tru
Ut
To
In
D
ho
rd
st
ea
Ed
ns
ai
Re
se
H
Co
H
ou
H
Share being fired Size in total employment (right-hand side)
Source: Ryazantsev and Khramova (2020).
in demand for home services, courier delivery, utilities (yardmen, disinfec-
tors), and cleaning services. In the medium term, the recovery of the Russian
economy seems to be accompanied by important sectoral shifts, so it is import-
ant for labor migrants to be able to adjust their skills to the sectors most in
demand.
Migrants’ lack of access to employment protection and
social assistance
Part of the reason why the drop in employment during COVID-19 was more
acute among Kyrgyz migrants than the native population is the higher degree of
informality. Prior to the COVID-19 outbreak, more than one in five Kyrgyz emi-
grants in the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan had a verbal contract with
their employer or other informal arrangements as opposed to any written con-
tract in compliance with the national labor laws (figure 2.8). These types of
agreements, which are more prevalent among migrants with low education lev-
els, limit the labor protection of workers, which is particularly harmful when
large negative shocks to the economy like the COVID-19 pandemic hit. In 2018,
only a minority of emigrants benefited from social security benefits (13 percent)
or paid leave (18 percent) or had furlough mechanisms of mandatory temporary
leave instead of layoffs (12 percent). This contrasts with a close to universal
access in the Kyrgyz Republic (93 percent, 89 percent, and 87 percent, respec-
tively). It is not a surprise that surveys carried out during the COVID-19 pan-
demic such as Ryazantsev and Khramova (2020) find that only a very small
minority of migrants in the Russian Federation received social protection from
their employer or Russian authorities (3.5 percent) when the pandemic hit. As
a result, Kyrgyz migrants faced a very dire economic situation, with only 28
percent of respondents in the survey by Vershaver, Ivanova, and Rocheva (2020)
having savings to survive without income for more than a month (and only
9 percent for more than 3 months). The main challenges migrants reported was
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 41
FIGURE 2.8
Type of contract and legal protection of Kyrgyz migrants and nonmigrants
100 93
89 87
90
80
70 67
Percentage
60
50
40 34
32 31
30
21 19
18
20 13 13
10
0
Verbal Employer Paid disability Furlough Risk of being Risk of being
contract pays social fired if fired without
security pregnant notice
Migrants Nonmigrants
Source: Kyrgyz Republic Integrated Household Survey (2018).
the inability to pay rent (64 percent) and pay for food (43 percent) (Ryazantsev
and Khramova 2020). Similarly, a study by IOM and UNICEF (2020) of Kyrgyz
families with migrants abroad highlighted the need of food and essential sup-
plies as the largest concern of two in five respondents. Kyrgyz emigrant workers
were also significantly more likely than Kyrgyz in the Kyrgyz Republic to report
fears of being fired without due notice (67 percent compared to 31 percent) and
for reasons such as being pregnant (34 percent compared to 19 percent).
Migrants also faced barriers to accessing formal grievance redress mechanisms
to file complaints when their labor rights were not met, increasing the risks of
abuses (Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey 2018). Therefore, once the pan-
demic hit and companies had to let workers go, Kyrgyz emigrants were easier to
be dismissed given their low employment protection.
Not only Kyrgyz migrants’ jobs were hit hard, but they also had limited access
to social protection programs while abroad to weather the negative COVID-19
shock. Kyrgyz labor migrants usually fall through the cracks of social protection
systems in both receiving countries (for example the Russian Federation,
Kazakhstan) and the Kyrgyz Republic. In the Kyrgyz Republic, social protection
spending is similar to other benchmark countries in the region (figure 2.9). Social
insurance accounts for the bulk of the Kyrgyz Republic’s social protection spend-
ing, in particular old age retirement pensions, while spending on labor market
policies is very low. However, labor emigrants are still unable to contribute to the
Kyrgyz social assistance system. This poses a longer-term threat to the fiscal sus-
tainability of the Kyrgyz pension system (OECD 2018). In host countries, even
within the EaEU, many Kyrgyz emigrants do not have de facto legal protection
(box 2.2) nor do they have similar access to services such as health care or unem-
ployment benefits as natives (Sharifzoda 2019). As the Kyrgyz Integrated
Household Survey of 2018 shows, only 13 percent of Kyrgyz workers abroad ben-
efit from social security benefits. Overall, Kyrgyz migrant workers are mostly
42 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
BOX 2.2
The legal protection of Kyrgyz migrants in main destination countries
The legal protection of Kyrgyz migrants in the two Uzbekistan. However, Article 96 of the EaEU treaty
main destination countries (the Russian Federation defines employment as “activities performed under an
and Kazakhstan) has been strengthened since the employment contract or in execution of works (ser-
country’s accession to the Eurasian Economic Union vices) under a civil law contract carried out on the ter-
(EaEU) on August 6, 2015.4 The founding treaty ritory of the state of employment in accordance with
enshrines the free movement of labor across member the legislation of that state.” This narrow definition
states as one of the founding principles. As a result, still leaves many Kyrgyz migrants that do not have a
Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation do not formal contract with a Russian or Kazakh employer
need to comply with the patent system created for unprotected and maintains vulnerabilities in their
migrants from other countries such as Tajikistan or legal status.
FIGURE 2.9
Social protection expenditures as a share of GDP, 2015
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
Armenia Georgia Kyrgyz Tajikistan Uzbekistan Mongolia
Republic
Social insurance Social assistance Labor market programs
Source: Social Protection Indicator, Asia Development Bank.
excluded from accessing social protection programs either in their own country
or abroad, which makes them and their families particularly vulnerable to nega-
tive income or health shocks that could push them into poverty. The COVID-19
pandemic has put the vulnerabilities of emigrants in the Russian Federation or
other receiving countries at the forefront in terms of their insufficient access to
social protection in the labor market. Given the status quo of informality and
limited social protection, many migrants working abroad lost their jobs without
receiving any compensation or protection (Kuznetsova et al. 2020). In the case
of contracting the virus, Kyrgyz emigrants lacked proper access to health care
and were more exposed to layoffs if they required sick leave. The lack of social
protection of Kyrgyz emigrants has had dramatic consequences during the pan-
demic, with a vast majority struggling to obtain enough funding to pay basic
expenditures such as rent and food (Ryazantsev and Khramova 2020).
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 43
RETURN MIGRATION
The COVID-19 pandemic had countervailing effects on returns, with interna-
tional mobility restrictions limiting return flows while low employment oppor-
tunities in host countries incentivized them. Many migrants who wanted to
return home could not do so because of the closure of frontiers and lack of
international flights. According to the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Republic survey of 2021, the upward trend in the share of return migrants arriv-
ing observed in previous years came to an halt in 2020 (panel a of figure 2.10), due
to the almost nonexistent return in the first three months of the pandemic (April
to June of 2020) (panel b of figure 2.10). More strikingly, 8 percent of Kyrgyz
households in the National Statistical Committee Household Survey of 2020
reported having a member overseas who was unable to return home, the equiva-
lent of 128,000 households (and at minimum that figure of current emigrants).
FIGURE 2.10
Number of return migrants to the Kyrgyz Republic
a. 2000–21
140,000
120,000
Number of returnees
100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
0
21
00
03
20
02
19
09
12
05
07
18
16
01
11
04
10
13
15
14
17
08
06
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
20
Year
b. 2019–20
25,000
20,000
Number of returnees
15,000
10,000
5,000
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
Month
2019 2020
Source: Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic (2021).
44 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Interestingly, households reporting having a member stranded abroad tend to
have higher income levels, most likely due to the larger size of international
remittances received. The high number of Kyrgyz migrants that intended to
return but were not able to do so based on statistics in the Kyrgyz Republic con-
trast with surveys in the Russian Federation that show a much lower willingness
to return home in the first months of the pandemic despite the economic hard-
ship. Denisenko and Mukomel (2020) found that three in four migrants did not
plan to leave the Russian Federation in the coming six months, while Ryazantsev
and Khramova (2020) estimated this ratio to be about two in three. The discrep-
ancies could be due to the fact that surveys in the Russian Federation included
mostly migrants from Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, countries that, as opposed to
the Kyrgyz Republic, are not part of the Eurasian Economic Union, hindering the
ability to remigrate. As such, migrants from these countries might be less mobile
and unwilling to return home in response to negative shocks, given the higher
cost and barriers to obtain further documents to emigrate to the Russian
Federation.
As mobility restrictions have eased, many migrants have returned to the
Kyrgyz Republic, given limited employment opportunities in destination
countries. In 2021, the pace of return migration resumed its upward trend
(panel a of figure 2.10) fueled by both the return of stranded migrants and of
new emigrants who migrated during 2021. The survey on the impact of the
COVID-19 pandemic implemented by the National Statistics Committee
(2020) estimates that 5 percent of Kyrgyz households had at least one member
who lost their job overseas and were forced to return to the Kyrgyz Republic
(figure 2.11, panel a), which is equivalent to 76,862 returnees or more (depend-
ing on the number of return migrants per household). Statistics from the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs collected by the different embassies reported about
50,000 returnees by the end of the summer, and the State Migration Services
FIGURE 2.11
Share of households with disrupted migration plans
a. By region b. By income quintile
40 14
12.6
35 12
Percentage of households
Percentage of households
10.5
30 9.6 9.6 10.0
10
8.6
25
8 7.4
19 19 6.9
20 6.4 6.2
17 5.7
6 5.5
14 5.1
15 12 13
11 3.7
98 9 9 4 3.6
10 7
6 5 6 3
5 4 43
5 4 3 4 2
2 22 3
0 0 0
0 0
sh
ic
k
ty
s
en
ui
t
n
t
4
d
2
3
l
es
la
es
ke
ku
ry
bl
ba
ci
O
Ch
tk
Ta
or
ch
Na
pu
sh
-
l-A
sh
yk
Ba
Po
Ri
Bi
Re
O
Iss
la
Ja
yz
rg
Ky
Could not return from abroad
Cancelled travel plans overseas Could not return from abroad Cancelled travel plans overseas
Lost job abroad and returned % migrant families (KIHS 2018) Lost job abroad and returned
Sources: National Statistics Committee (2020) and Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey (2018).
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 45
expected the number to reach 100,000, in line with estimates from the National
Statistics Committee survey of October 2020. Actual observed returns from
the L2CK show a total number of 78,000 returns between April and December
of 2021.
The integration of returnees after large negative shocks like COVID-19 can
be particularly challenging given the limited absorptive capacity of the Kyrgyz
labor market. The ex ante measures of vulnerability in the labor market
reported previously in this chapter show a similar level of exposure to the
income-related shock for returnees vis-à-vis nonmigrants, given that the lower
presence in teleworkable occupations is compensated with a higher propen-
sity to be employed in essential occupations (in particular in the agriculture
sector). However, the limited employment opportunities in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, the large number of return migrants and the particular
barriers that some of them might face when navigating local labor markets—
with potentially lower networks and knowledge of the bureaucratic pro-
cesses—suggests that they might be a particularly vulnerable group. When
surveying migrants from Central Asia that returned from the Russian
Federation after the COVID-19 outbreak, Denisenko and Mukomel (2020)
found that only 40 percent of them worked by early June 2020. The 2020
National Statistics Committee COVID-19 survey also shows a higher degree of
economic and health vulnerability among households with members who
were either forced to return or were stranded and could not return from
abroad. While less than 20 percent of nonmigrant households reported having
members that lost their job during the pandemic, the rate reached 33 percent
for households with a migrant who was stranded, and 54 percent for house-
holds with a member who had to return to the Kyrgyz Republic (figure 2.12).
Households with recent returnees not only were more likely than nonmigrant
families to see a reduction in wage income since the start of the pandemic, but
also in remittances, which represent an increasing share of income for migrant
FIGURE 2.12
Impact of COVID-19 on economic and health outcomes of households with or without a past or
current migrant
90
80
70
Share of households
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Loss of job Reduction Reduction in Cut food COVID Depression No needed
in wages remittances spending symptoms health treatment
Nonmigrant households Households with forced returnees
Households with stranded migrants Households with other migrants
Source: National Statistical Committee household survey 2020.
46 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
families. Given the larger negative shock that families with returnees face, they
were also significantly more likely to report using strategies such as cutting
food spending to cope with the lower income. Healthwise, households with
recent returnees also had a higher incidence of COVID-19-related symptoms
and mental health issues, and were more likely to be left without the necessary
health treatment.
IMPACTS ON MIGRANT HOUSEHOLD MEMBERS AND
THE HOME ECONOMY
The global nature of the COVID-19 crisis has defied the historical counter-
cyclical trends in remittance flows. The COVID-19 crisis has simultaneously
hit sending and receiving countries, with ambiguous effects on remittances. On
the one hand, migrants remit more when the needs of relatives and friends in
the country of origin are higher (Gupta 2005). However, remittances are
impacted by the number of emigrants and their ability to remit based on their
savings and earnings (Clemens and McKenzie 2018). Given the reduction in the
stock of Kyrgyz emigrants and their high income-exposure to COVID-19,
remittance inflows to the Kyrgyz Republic saw their largest drops in recent
history, with a year-on-year fall of more than 50 percent in the month of April
(panel a of figure 2.13). However, remittances had bounced back since the
summer of 2020, and the cumulative flows by October 2020 were only
percent lower than in the same month of 2019 (panel b of figure 2.13). In
2.3
light of the continuing reduction of Kyrgyz emigrants to the Russian Federation
until the third quarter of 2020 and the still-dire labor market situation in
receiving countries, the rebound in remittances suggests a higher elasticity of
foreign earnings to remittances of emigrants, perhaps financed by previous
savings, in an increased effort to support the larger needs of household mem-
bers in the Kyrgyz Republic.
At the household level, surveys show a widespread reduction in remittances
in the first months of the pandemic, which had a severe negative impact on the
welfare of migrant households. In the Russian Federation, Ryazantsev and
Khramova (2020) found that 79 percent of migrants who used to send remit-
tances stopped sending any money by the end of April 2020, very similar to the
drop in remittances observed at the macro level during that month. In the
Kyrgyz Republic, the National Statistics Committee survey in October 2020
shows that 16 percent of Kyrgyz households experienced a reduction in the
amount of remittances received. Given that around 20 percent of Kyrgyz
households were receiving remittances before the pandemic (KIHS 2018), this
means that four in five households receiving remittances saw their income
from this source reduced. Households with a family member abroad are par-
ticularly reliant on this source of income. The reduction in remittances affects
households in the highest income quintiles (figure 2.14, panel a). However, as
shown in this chapter, given the high dependency on this source of income
among migrant families, a severe reduction in remittances could cause a rapid
increase in poverty rates for these households. At the regional level, regions
with a higher drop in remittances also reported higher overall income losses
(figure 2.14, panel b), highlighting the role of remittances as a key source of
income. Households that suffered a loss in remittances after the pandemic
were more likely to resort to coping strategies such as cutting food spending,
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 47
FIGURE 2.13
Recent trends in remittances to the Kyrgyz Republic, 2016–21
a. Year-on-year growth in monthly inflows
180
130
80
30
–20
–70
Ju 06
Ja -06
Ju 07
Ja -07
Ju 08
Ja -08
Ju 09
Ja -09
Ju 10
Ja -10
Ju 11
Ja -11
Ju 12
Ja -12
Ju 13
Ja -13
Ju 14
Ja -14
Ju 15
Ja -15
Ju 16
Ja -16
Ju 17
Ja -17
Ju 18
Ja -18
Ju 19
Ja -19
Ju 20
Ja -20
21
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
n-
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
Ja
In USD In Kyrgyz soms
b. Cumulative remittance inflows
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
0
Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Source: National Bank of the Kyrgyz Republic.
not paying utilities, using savings, or requesting a loan to compensate for the
loss of income (table 2.1). These results hold even after controlling for region
(oblast) of residence, household size, self- reported poverty, or changes in
employment or wage earnings.
It is unclear how the decline in labor migration linked to COVID-19 influ-
enced labor force participation rates of migrant households. As discussed,
descriptive evidence for the Kyrgyz Republic suggests a negative correlation
between having a household member overseas and the labor force participa-
tion of members staying behind. Global evidence on this issue is mixed,
although most studies find that inflows of remittances reduce labor participa-
tion of migrant households (OECD 2018). At the same time, the OECD (2018)
suggests that women left behind compensate for the absence of a male
48 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
FIGURE 2.14
Share of households with reductions in remittances, by income quintile and region
25 90
R² = 0.3667
21.0 80 Osh
% of HH with lower total income
20 70
17.6 Osh city
Bishkek
15.5 60
15 14.1 Jalal-Abad
13.5
50
Batken
40 Chui
10
30
Talas
Issyk-kul
5 20
Naryn
10
0
Poorest 2 3 4 Richest 0 10 20 30 40 50
Income quintile % of households with lower remittances
Source: National Statistics Committee (2020).
Impact
TABLE 2.1 of a reduction in remittances on coping strategies
(1) (2) (4) (5)
CUT FOOD DID NOT PAY (3) REQUESTED COULD NOT AFFORD
VARIABLE SPENDING UTILITIES USED SAVINGS A LOAN NECESSARY HEALTH CARE
Lost job 0.230*** 0.220*** 0.130*** 0.206*** 0.109***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.025) (0.028) (0.029)
Loss wages 0.187*** 0.079*** 0.185*** 0.093*** 0.007
(0.023) (0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
Loss remittances 0.105*** 0.071*** 0.183*** 0.095*** 0.154***
(0.026) (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028)
Household size 0.009** 0.006 0.007 0.006 0.011**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Poor 0.207*** 0.196*** -0.002 0.239*** 0.040
(0.028) (0.030) (0.034) (0.033) (0.034)
Constant 0.151*** 0.010 0.291*** 0.255*** 0.146***
(0.024) (0.020) (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)
Observations 4,954 4,954 4,954 4,954 4,954
R2
0.272 0.270 0.183 0.180 0.125
Oblast FE YES YES YES YES YES
Note: Regression analysis with robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
household member (who migrated) with their labor, especially in the event of
no remittances. Thus, one might expect the labor force participation of house-
hold members staying behind to increase as a result of the pandemic, although
evidence to support this is still thin.
Risks and Inefficiencies of Labor Migration Exposed by COVID-19 | 49
NOTES
1. See Garrote-Sanchez et al. (2021) for a review of the literature on the labor market impact
of COVID-19 in other countries.
2. See, for example, https://lenta.ru/news/2020/04/15/sto_migrantov/.
3. The Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz Republic survey provides information on
employment outcomes of migrants during the summer/autumn of 2021, when economic
activity had already partially recovered.
4. Currently, the EaEU is composed of five countries: Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the
Kyrgyz Republic, and the Russian Federation.
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3 Policy Options to Address
Challenges throughout
the Migration Life Cycle
STRENGTHENING MIGRATION SYSTEMS
Migration systems in the Kyrgyz Republic are still maturing compared to the rel-
evance of the migration phenomenon in the country. Despite the large outflows
of Kyrgyz migrants, its role in absorbing part of the “youth bulge” that cannot be
accommodated by local labor markets and the vital importance of remittances to
the country’s macroeconomic stability, and households’ livelihoods, there has
been a lack of coherent, long-term migration policy in the country beyond the
role of managing remittances. The State Migration Services, under the Ministry
of Labor, Social Protection and Migration, leads intergovernmental cooperation
in the area of labor migration. The State Migration Services only has a central
office in Bishkek and a small branch in Osh, while the majority of prospective
migrants and returnees reside in rural areas (for example, Batken, Jalal-Abad, and
Osh provinces). The physical distance to the main beneficiaries hinders their
ability to access offered services. The International Organization for Migration
(IOM) in the Kyrgyz Republic also supports migrants through a network of local
communities, authorities, and NGOs.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to strengthen institutions,
frameworks, and data collection to enhance safe legal migration from the Kyrgyz
Republic. The existing migration management in the Kyrgyz Republic is still
lacking a centralized data system and intersectoral collaboration throughout the
migration cycle—from migration plans and preparations, to support and protec-
tion during the migration experience, to the reintegration of return migrants.
Migration policy has to be informed by relevant and updated data, not just statis-
tics of border crossings for security purposes and remittances data, in order to
elaborate relevant and effective mechanisms to support migrants and their fam-
ilies (Kuznetsova et al. 2020). Legal frameworks have yet to be developed and
implemented to put at the forefront of the migration agenda a rights-based
approach to protect migrants and their families. The COVID-19 pandemic has
highlighted the limitations of the current migration system in protecting
migrants from large negative shocks. In the absence of a holistic migration
framework with predictable policies, programs to support migrants coping with
the COVID-19 crisis have been fragmented and of limited scope.
51
52 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Strengthening systematic data collection, monitoring, and evaluation through-
out the migration life cycle is necessary in a context of sizable flows of emigrants
and returnees to better understand migration dynamics and tailor services to
migrants’ needs. As a first step, it is necessary to centralize information from dif-
ferent governmental bodies—which requires interagency cooperation and data
sharing—and to create a unified registry of all prospective migrants, current
migrants, and returnees either at reception centers or at different points of exit or
entry into the country. The registry can be a starting point in collecting data on the
skills and labor market situation of Kyrgyz citizens applying for jobs overseas so
they can be referred to appropriate training or premigration programs. The regis-
try can also be a building block to facilitate the reintegration of returnees and to
create monitoring systems through the adoption of harmonized sets of indicators
(IOM 2018b). Different agencies could then more easily access migrants’ informa-
tion, avoiding duplicity of procedures and overburdening migrant returnees,
while having better information to tailor services to their needs. It is essential that
this process of data sharing and cooperation comply with the need to maintain
migrants’ privacy.
The concept for migration policy of the Kyrgyz Republic for 2021–30 provides
a more cohesive framework and long-term vision of migration, but it needs to be
effectively implemented. The concept is the main document in the state policy
on migration issues. It recognizes migration as an unavoidable result of the
demographic and socioeconomic specificities of the country, and aims at creat-
ing migration policies to stabilize flows and mitigate its negative effects while
enhancing developmental benefits for migrants, their families, and the country
as a whole (State Migration Services 2021). It also advocates for the centraliza-
tion of a single national system of migration statistics, the diversification of
migration flows, securing coverage of social services for migrants, and enhancing
the interagency cooperation in migration policy. The envisioned implementation
is divided in two phases: 2021–2025 and 2026–2030. An action plan is being
developed for each stage, with the inclusion of measures and tools for the imple-
mentation of the concept by state bodies. However, given the concept’s lack of
details and guidance for implementation, these goals risk remaining untargeted
and not properly secured in specific programs in the implementation phase.
Policies need to address the vulnerability of migrants throughout the migra-
tion life cycle in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and beyond (figure 3.1).
As highlighted in the previous section, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected
prospective and current migrants at each stage of the migration life cycle. In the
remainder of this chapter, we therefore propose policies that could be imple-
mented predeparture, during migration, and after return to reduce the vulner-
ability of migrants in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic and in the longer
term. Given the expected slow recovery from COVID-19, and other future and
recent shocks such as the Russia-Ukraine conflict, both at home and in destina-
tion countries, the enhanced challenges faced by temporary migrants in the
context of the pandemic are expected to persist in the short and medium runs.
This challenging context can be used as an opportunity to strengthen the migra-
tion system and develop policies and programs that can equip the Kyrgyz
Republic with the adequate tools to support to migrants—through a coherent
and comprehensive labor migration policy—to be better prepared for future
shocks that may affect labor migration and remittances.
A more efficient and comprehensive set of migration policies requires
increasing cooperation between actors involved throughout the migration
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 53
FIGURE 3.1
Stages of migration life cycle, migrants’ decisions, COVID-19 disruptions, and policy options
Migration Premigration Premigration During Postmigration
phases decision departure migration (return)
Employment, Entrepreneurship,
Migrants' Migration decision Employment search,
remittances, savings, investment, skill
decisions based on cost- travel arrangements,
education abroad, enhancement in
and choices benefit analysis training
length of stay the Kyrgyz Republic
Increased Mobility Restrictions in
Border closures,
COVID–19 uncertainty about restrictions, nonessential
impact on Kyrgyz
disruptions costs and benefits limited travel occupations, job
labor market
of migration arrangements losses, health risks
Emergency relief, Facilitate return,
Potential Information Legal counseling, safety nets, legal reintegration
policies interventions orientation counseling, facilitate policies, active
remittances labor market policies
Sources: World Bank, adapted from World Bank (2018) and Ahmed and Bossavie (2022).
life cycle. Another important area of improvement in the Kyrgyz migration
system is the cooperation between all involved stakeholders, governmental and
nongovernmental entities, and public and private organizations, to avoid duplic-
ities and ensure the coherence of goals of migration and reintegration programs
of different stakeholders (IOM 2018a). As previously mentioned, there is a need
for a more comprehensive registry of migrants and returnees, which requires a
tighter collaboration between the State Border Services (SBS)—which currently
compile the only registry of people entering and leaving the country but from a
security perspective—and the institutions that provide services for migrants—
the State Migration Services (SMS), Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the
Ministry of Labor, Social Development and Migration (MLSDM). In the premi-
gration phase, the migration system would benefit from a stronger supervision
and regulatory framework of private employment agencies and more data shar-
ing and coordination with MLSDM. As monitoring and support for migrants is
often provided by different institutions depending on the phase of the migration
life cycle (SMS during predeparture; MFA, embassies, and SMS during migra-
tion; and SMS and MLSDM upon return) the migration system would greatly
benefit from an interdepartmental body to coordinate the different institutions
dealing with the different phases of the migration process to avoid duplicities in
bureaucratic procedures, ensure a higher level of knowledge and data sharing,
and a better monitoring of migrants’ journeys.
PREDECISION AND PREDEPARTURE
Kyrgyz citizens who have to cancel their migration plans due to large negative
shocks in the origin or destination country, given their forgone earning poten-
tials and vulnerability in the domestic labor market, should be targeted by safety
54 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
net programs. As shown in chapter 2, households with disrupted migration plans
due to the COVID-19 pandemic have been in a particularly vulnerable economic
situation in the Kyrgyz Republic, with limited employment opportunities and
poorer health conditions. Access to social assistance might help smooth the
adverse impacts of economic shocks on potential migrants’ households while
waiting to be able to migrate, and prevent their savings from drying out, which
could hinder their financial ability to migrate in the near future. To target pro-
spective migrants, it is necessary to put in place a comprehensive registry of
migrants, as recommended in the previous chapter. The registry should include
individuals in the premigration phase; that is, those who had plans to migrate but
are still in the country. Public social assistance does not need to be targeted to
households that have members with disrupted migration plans, but rather need
to ensure that rural regions with a higher concentration of disrupted potential
migrants are well served.
COVID-19 evidenced the need for coordination with private employment
agencies and destination countries to provide up to-date-information on condi-
tions at the destination. In the context of COVID-19, Kyrgyz authorities, in coop-
eration with destination countries, have an essential role to play in providing
information on changes in legal restrictions to migration as well as health condi-
tions in destination countries, so that future migrants do not need to rely on lim-
ited personal networks to obtain this key and volatile information. Prospective
migrants also have higher risks of travel and employment cancellations, so legal
counseling on consumer and labor rights are necessary.
More broadly, providing information about costs and benefits of migration
through different platforms can increase the efficiency of migration from the
Kyrgyz Republic. The concept for migration policies for 2021–30 recognizes that
migrant workers leave without sufficient information about the destination
country (State Migration Services 2021). Past interventions providing informa-
tion to prospective migrants have been effective in aligning migrants’ expecta-
tions with the realities of destination countries (Shrestha 2020) and also in
increasing workers’ chances of getting a job in the formal sector, as shown by
Beam (2016), for the case of the Philippines. Information can be provided in dif-
ferent forms, such as job fairs, government premigration information programs,
and through local NGOs or community leaders. Importantly, the positive impact
of information interventions seems to be larger for prospective migrants with
fewer networks overseas (Barsbai et al. 2020). This means that information is
particularly important for low-skilled migrants who tend to have less connec-
tions, and for workers migrating to more rural areas with fewer co-nationals to
rely on.
There is also a need for greater cooperation with the Russian Federation and
Kazakhstan to identify skills in demand and improve the matching of Kyrgyz
workers to jobs abroad. Beyond COVID-19, the Kyrgyz authorities also have a
central role, in collaboration with employment agencies, in providing up-to-date
information about vacant jobs in growing sectors in destination countries in the
context of COVID-19 recovery and beyond, such as service delivery or agricul-
ture. Such skill gap monitoring systems have been implemented in several desti-
nation countries such as the Republic of Korea or Malaysia for low-skilled
migrants, which are then used to determine needs for migrant labor and commu-
nicated to authorities in sending countries, typically in the context of G2G agree-
ments (Cho et al. 2018; Shrestha, Mobarak, and Sharif 2021).
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 55
Skill training for migrants is another key element for a successful migration
experience when there is a mismatch between the supply of skills that migrants
offer and the demand of firms in destination countries. Migrants from the Kyrgyz
Republic often lack adequate skills for the jobs most in demand in the Russian
Federation or Kazakhstan. Skill mismatches are partly due to occupational
mobility upon migration. For example, a large portion of male migrants have an
agricultural background but are hired as construction workers in the Russian
Federation. Skill mismatches might have been aggravated in the context of the
COVID-19 pandemic, which could have accelerated a longer-term shift in tasks
and skills demanded in host labor markets. In this context, training in the skills
required for employment openings in the Russian Federation would benefit all
parties involved. However, prior to the crisis, the Kyrgyz Household Integrated
Survey of 2018 shows that only 1 percent of prospective migrants took any
work-related training courses to improve their chances to find employment
overseas. The Ministry of Labor, Social Development and Migration is planning
to implement different initiatives within the recently created Fund for Skill
Development. One of the aims is to increase skills for migrants by training them
in fields and skills that are valuable in the international labor market. Past expe-
riences with predeparture skill upgrading programs highlight the need for a
well-endowed program, prior analysis of supply and demand skill gaps, and
dynamics in the destination country and at origin to tailor the content of skill
trainings (IOM 2011; Global Forum on Migration and Development 2020).
Cooperation with receiving countries in understanding skill gaps at destination
is, thus, of high value. A particularly promising type of cross-country collabora-
tion on skill formation are global skill partnerships (see box 3.1).
There is also a need for increasing the legal and financial literacy and migra-
tion preparedness of prospective migrants through orientation courses and
training. Prospective migrants tend to come from rural and more disadvantaged
backgrounds and usually lack a full understanding of migration opportunities. In
many instances, migrants accept employment offers abroad in sectors in which
they do not have previous experience. They are often unaware of their full labor
rights and benefits given the specificities of legislation in destination countries.
Premigration orientation courses for prospective migrants can provide essential
BOX 3.1
Global skill partnerships: A potential tool to enhance migrants’ skills
Global skill partnerships (GSPs) are bilateral arrange- also benefits as part of the trainees, stay in the
ments between migrant sending and receiving coun- country, increasing the supply of skills. Therefore,
tries by which the country of destination agrees to GSPs address the potential loss of human capital in
train people in the country of origin. Among the the country of origin while preparing potential
trainees, some choose to stay and increase human migrants with demanded skills for work in the host
capital in the country of origin while others migrate country (Clemens 2015). One important aspect is the
to the country of destination for a given period of early engagement of the private sector to align the
time. With these arrangements, countries of destina- training to the skills demanded in the labor market.
tion attract foreign workers with the skills they need. Several pilots have been successfully implemented in
By training them before migration in the country of the Australia–Pacific islands corridor and in
origin, costs are lower. In turn, the origin country Germany with Kosovo and Morocco.
56 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
information on their legal rights—in particular with respect to their labor con-
tracts, financial literacy and planning targets for savings, and access to services
at destination, as well as foreign language and soft skills that enhance the migra-
tion experience. They can also include information on health and safety
and travel procedures. One of the most successful programs has been the
Comprehensive Pre-Departure Education Program that the government of the
Philippines runs for prospective migrants with a duration of four to six days
(ILO 2013). While there has been little evaluation of such programs (McKenzie
and Yang 2015), the existing evidence is suggestive of an overall positive impact.
For example, financial literacy programs for migrants and their household
members are very effective in increasing financial knowledge, savings, and
information about remittance methods (Doi, McKenzie, and Zia 2014; Gibson,
McKenzie, and Zia 2014).
The COVID-19 pandemic highlighted the need for improving the regulatory
framework of private employment agencies to promote formal labor migration
in the medium to long run. Private migrant employment agencies serve as the
intermediary between foreign employers and prospective migrant workers.
They provide key information to migrants who tend to have limited knowledge
of the foreign labor market and job opportunities. However, there is a need for
strengthening the regulatory framework and the outreach of employment pro-
grams to address interregional inequalities in accessing foreign job opportuni-
ties as well as ensuring an ethical and safe recruitment process that guarantees
migrants’ rights. To date, there has been a strong concentration of employment
agencies in the main metropolitan areas, leaving rural areas unattended. The
protection of migrants through the recruitment process by private agencies
can be guaranteed by developing regulatory frameworks in accordance with
the Private Employment Agencies Convention, 1997 (No. 181), of which the
Kyrgyz Republic is not yet a signatory. Furthermore, the role of public agencies
as regulators—providing clearance to foreign job opportunities and formal
employment contracts—and as intermediaries to complement private employ-
ment agencies in remote areas has proved successful in other contexts. For
example, a government-to-government program (G2G) between Bangladesh
and Malaysia increased access to migration opportunities for those without
social networks abroad (Shreshtha, Mobarak, and Sharif 2019). The EaEU
treaty states that “Member States shall cooperate… to assist the organized
recruitment of workers of the Member States for employment in the Member
States” (article 96.1). This government-to-government cooperation to regulate
the recruitment process of migrants is essential to g uarantee successful man-
agement of legal labor migration and protection of migrants’ rights. Therefore,
the Kyrgyz Republic can either enhance the regulatory framework through
bilateral agreements with the main destination countries or multilaterally by
further regulating and implementing it within the framework of the EaEU
treaty.
COVID-19 and now the economic crisis in the Russian Federation have
exposed the vulnerability of migrants to shocks and evidenced the need for
diversification of destinations to reduce volatility for migrants and the Kyrgyz
economy. The Kyrgyz Republic has one of the highest concentrations of emi-
grant flows into a single destination country. Close to 80 percent of total Kyrgyz
emigrants in 2019 resided in the Russian Federation according to UN-DESA, and
statistics on short-term emigrants show an even higher concentration (over
90 percent, according to the KIHS or the Listening to the Citizens of the Kyrgyz
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 57
Republic survey). Kazakhstan, one of the other migration corridors, has a high
synchronization of the economic business cycle with the Russian Federation
(Jenish 2013), given their economic integration and dependence on raw materi-
als. The high concentration of Kyrgyz migrants in few and synchronized markets
exposes the country to high volatility and vulnerability to economic shocks in
the Russian Federation or Kazakhstan. COVID-19 and now the economic crisis
in the Russian Federation have shown that, as a result of this lack of diversifica-
tion, migration and remittance flows are severely affected, resulting in signifi-
cant welfare losses for Kyrgyz households and for the broader economy. For
example, exchange rates fluctuated considerably in February and March 2022
after the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, with the ruble at one point falling by
32 percent against the Kyrgyz som. Recent data from the Listening to the Citizens
of the Kyrgyz Republic survey show that many migrants delayed transfers due to
the unfavorable change in exchange rates: the share of Kyrgyz households
receiving any remittance transfer fell from 17.5 to 14.8 (–16 percent) during that
period, and the value of a typical remittance transfer fell by 15 percent. In addi-
tion, migration intentions significantly declined during this period. In the Kyrgyz
Republic, the share of households with a member considering migration fell
from 13 to 8 percent.
To reduce the volatility of migration demand and flows, the government of
the Kyrgyz Republic can explore new institutional frameworks such as bilateral
labor agreements (BLAs), government-to-government (G2G) arrangements, and
memoranda of understanding with other countries with a potential demand
given their demographic trends or labor needs (for example, in Europe, the Gulf,
Korea, or Malaysia).1 For example, the Philippines, a country with a long tradi-
tion of emigration and with a well-developed migration system, has diversified
the number of destination countries over the years by being very active in nego-
tiating new bilateral labor agreements and by building a qualified workforce
with credible credentials (Testaverde et al. 2017). Diversification of migration
can also be enhanced in terms of occupations and not just countries of destina-
tion. About half of Kyrgyz male migrants work in construction and half of female
migrants in the hospitality sector. This concentration increases the vulnerabili-
ties of migrants’ labor market status to shocks in host economies that affect par-
ticular sectors. While the EaEU allows Kyrgyz migrants in the Russian Federation
and Kazakhstan to work in all sectors, further cooperation might be needed with
these countries to fully recognize foreign credentials. This, combined with the
provision of information to migrants on the types of job opportunities available
in destination countries and the provision of training to prospective migrants
when skill mismatches emerge with what firms demand at destination—as pre-
viously mentioned—can expand the employment opportunities available across
sectors and professions.
DURING MIGRATION
During the COVID-19 pandemic, governments in receiving countries have
launched temporary measures to protect the legal vulnerability of migrants. On
April 18, 2020, the government of the Russian Federation issued a decree “On
temporary measures to resolve the legal status of foreign citizens and stateless
persons in the Russian Federation in connection with the threat of further spread
of the new coronavirus infection (COVID-19),” by which all foreigners in the
58 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
country had the validity of their visa documents extended. In addition, work
permit requirements and costs were removed. The executive order also included
the suspension of deportations and court hearings on breaches of immigration
laws (King and Zotova 2020). The time of validity of those measures was pro-
longed until December 15 by another decree on September 23.2 These measures
increased the legal security of migrants from non-EaEU countries such as
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, while Kyrgyz emigrants were already more protected
as citizens of a member of the EaEU. Both the governments of the Russian
Federation and Kazakhstan announced that migrants could have access to free
medical care for COVID-19, even if they were undocumented in the case of the
Russian Federation (Moroz, Shrestha, and Testaverde 2020). In the city of
Moscow, the mayor declared that migrants will not be denied any medical assis-
tance if they need it. Even during the initial period of quarantine, the Russian
government imposed a moratorium on evictions for all people, including undoc-
umented migrants.
On the Kyrgyz government side, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, embassies
(in particular the one in the Russian Federation), and the State Migration
Services created a rapid response task force to manage the migrant crisis between
March and July 2020. This rapid response task was carried out in cooperation
with the IOM and leaders of the Kyrgyz diaspora in the Russian Federation. The
Kyrgyz government allocated over US$188,000 (15 million KG soms) to support
migrants abroad, out of which $127,000 was targeted to migrants in the Russian
Federation, and $62,800 for migrants in the United Arab Emirates (Azattyk
2020). The funds were used to provide accommodation and food for those in
need, in particular those infected with COVID-19, with severe illness, with large
families, single mothers, or pregnant women. The Kyrgyz Embassy in the Russian
Federation, with the help of diaspora groups, targeted the most vulnerable
migrants. The IOM distributed protective supplies and provided food and
accommodation for 282 migrants stranded in Russian airports (IOMb 2020;
Kuznetsova et al. 2020) as well as in specific land borders such as the the Russian
Federation-Kazakhstan one.
However, the reduced funding of these emergency programs limited their
outreach compared to bolder plans for migrants in other countries, such as the
one approved by the Philippines. Considering the high number of migrants from
the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation and in other countries, the
amount of funds for the support operation was insufficient to cushion the large
negative shock suffered by Kyrgyz migrants. Conservative estimates based on
the number of Kyrgyz emigrants at the time of the COVID-19 outbreak (about
250,000, according to the KIHS) and the share who lost their jobs or were sent
into unpaid leave (about 80 percent, according to Vershaver, Ivanova, and
Rocheva 2020) show that at least 200,000 Kyrgyz emigrants might have stayed
during the initial months of the pandemic without any labor income. The alloca-
tion of US$188,000 would have just averaged to less than US$1 per Kyrgyz emi-
grant in need. According to the survey of migrants in the Russian Federation by
Ryazantsev and Khramova (2020), only 1 percent received help and support
from the embassies of their country, and 0.5 percent from the Russian authori-
ties. Even access to more informal support channels, such as networks of com-
patriots, has been limited (5 percent). As an example of a more comprehensive
support for their emigrant population, the government of the Philippines
approved a cash assistance program to provide US$200 to at least 70,000 over-
seas Filipino workers (OFWs) whose employment was affected by the pandemic
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 59
(Moroz, Shrestha, and Testaverde 2020). The government of the Philippines also
raised another 5 billion Filipino pesos to support migrant workers (US$0.1 b illion).
In total, COVID-19-related support for migrants accounted for 0.027 percent of
GDP in the Philippines, compared to 0.002 percent of GDP in the Kyrgyz
Republic (about 12 times more). Therefore, the Kyrgyz government has further
scope to increase the support and protection of affected Kyrgyz emigrants, in
line with other countries with more mature migration systems.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to integrate migrants into
safety net programs, either at origin or at destination, to reduce migrants’ vul-
nerabilities to shocks like COVID-19. In the Russian Federation, the government
increased the amount of unemployment benefits,3 and agreed to provide social
services to citizens who lost their job after March 1, 2020, as well as to families
with children and pensioners (Gorlin et al. 2020).4 The Kyrgyz Government
could coordinate with the Russian Federation and other migrant-receiving
countries, in particular within the framework of the EaEU, to provide financial
support to its citizens stranded abroad and, more broadly, to create a system
where migrant workers make contributions to have equal access to unemploy-
ment benefits and health care as nationals from the countries of residency.
Increasing formal employment channels will improve access to social protec-
tion systems (as the concept for migration policies for 2021–30 suggests), but
specific arrangements need to be implemented beyond the legal status of
employment, as currently even migrants with a legal contract barely have any
social protection. The portability of social rights is a feature developed in other
economic unions such as the European Union—where migrants have access to
health care, social welfare, or pensions, as does any citizen from the host
country—and migrants from countries in the EaEU would greatly benefit from a
similar framework. The portability of pensions has been shown to not only
enhance migrants’ welfare but also to incentivize migrants to return home
(Avato, Koettle, and Sabates-Wheeler 2010). Around the world, there are about
1,500 bilateral portability agreements. Beyond these bilateral and multilateral
cooperation agreements, some sending countries have also created extensive
social protection systems for their emigrant workers. Philippines is again a good
example. Recruitment agencies provide life and personal accident insurance to
foreign workers at no cost. Migrants also have health insurance coverage via
PhilHealth and can voluntarily contribute to a pension system, which is pro-
moted in predeparture training programs (Testaverde et al. 2017). The govern-
ment also has agreements with several receiving countries by which migrants
can file social security claims either at destination or with the Philippines.
Indonesia made it compulsory for all migrants to obtain Indonesian Overseas
Migrant Workers’ Insurance that covers unexpected shocks such as illness, dis-
ability, death, repatriation, and funeral expenses (World Bank 2016).
Temporary relief programs for families in the Kyrgyz Republic with migrant
members abroad could also be implemented. Migrant households heavily rely on
international remittances. Almost all households with a migrant receive remit-
tances (94 percent) that represent more than half of the annual household total
income. The abrupt drop in remittances in the second quarter of 2020 due to the
COVID-19 shock in the receiving countries’ economies left many families with-
out a large part of their disposable income and resulted in growing poverty.
A 50 percent reduction in remittances, as observed in the month of April, could
have pushed more than one in five migrant households into poverty based on
simulations with data from the 2018 Kyrgyz Integrated Household Survey.
60 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
Remittances have gradually bounced back since the summer of 2020, when
mobility restrictions in the Russian Federation were phased out, and more
migrants were able to work and tried to compensate for the fall in remittances in
previous months and the dire situation of their households in the Kyrgyz
Republic. Still, remittances struggled to play their countercyclical role as the
COVID-19 pandemic shock was global and affected both migrant-sending
and -receiving countries, increasing the volatility of income of remittance-
dependent households. This calls for the introduction of welfare policies for
migrant families to counterbalance the drop and volatility of remittances.
Migrants and their families can benefit from policies to facilitate remittance
flows by creating financial incentives and limiting bureaucratic barriers. While,
at the macro level, remittances have recovered a large part of the drop observed
in the first months of the pandemic, any interruption in the flow can be devastat-
ing for migrant families, which are in most instances strongly dependent on
international remittances. In order to facilitate remittance flows, the govern-
ment could consider recognizing remittance service providers as essential ser-
vices if mobility restrictions are to be reintroduced and supporting remittance
providers with instruments to help manage credit and liquidity risks (Moroz,
Shrestha, and Testaverde 2020). Furthermore, while average commissions for
remittance transactions between the Russian Federation and the Kyrgyz
Republic are relatively low, further cooperation to support the digitalization of
processes and to provide financial incentives to reduce further costs can be
highly beneficial, in particular in the current context of liquidity constraints on
migrant households and the subsequent recovery. Past evidence shows that even
small reductions in transaction fees can result in large increases in remittances
(Ambler, Aycinena, and Yang 2014). For example, Aycinena et al. (2010) found in
a randomized field experiment in El Salvador that a US$1 reduction in the remit-
tance transaction fee led to US$25 increases in the average amount of remit-
tances sent per month. The provision of remittance services could be enhanced
by promoting online transfers and mobile payments (through cell phones and
blockchain wallets), and by exempting remittances flows from fees to promote
their transfer through financial systems, enabling providers to operate in com-
pliance with social distancing measures (Honorati, Yi, and Choi 2020). For
example, Bangladesh allocated a central budget (US$361 million) to incentivize
migrants to transfer money through legal financial systems; and Sri Lanka
exempts remittance inflows from some regulations and taxes (Moroz, Shrestha,
and Testaverde 2020).
In the longer term, there is a need to enhance the protection of Kyrgyz emi-
grants’ legal rights through bilateral and multilateral agreements with receiving
countries. Migrants would highly benefit from further dialog with the main
receiving countries to increase Kyrgyz migrants’ rights and to enhance formal
labor migration with regular contracts, while providing alternative protection
for migrants with informal contracts. The EaEU provides a unique platform to
tackle this relevant issue multilaterally (see box 3.2), but bilateral agreements on
this matter with other countries such as Türkiye are also necessary. In parallel,
Kyrgyz emigrants would greatly benefit from an increasing role and capacity of
consular sections (including the deployment of labor attachés in the main desti-
nation countries) in order to provide more efficient and accessible legal counsel-
ling to any Kyrgyz emigrant in need of it.
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 61
BOX 3.2
The Eurasian Economic Union
The accession of the Kyrgyz Republic to the Eurasian in parallel with an increasingly securitized migration
Economic Union (EaEU) has promoted legal migra- rhetoric and policy in the Russian Federation and
tion to some of the main destination countries, but Kazakhstan. In the Russian Federation, the govern-
members need to intensify cooperation. The EaEU ment approved a new regulation according to which
founding treaty approved in 2015 establishes the free migrants are forced to leave the country within
movement of labor across member states—which five days after two administrative law violations
c urrently are Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, the (including traffic fines) or one migration law viola-
Kyrg yz Republic, and the Russian Federation tion (Schenk 2018), and can be banned from reenter-
(Eurasian Economic Commission 2015). Migrants ing the country for up to 10 years. In this context,
from member states also benefit from the recognition challenges remain to enforce the protection of Kyrgyz
of foreign credentials, as well as de-jure equal rights migrants’ rights in the main destination countries,
to social security benefits and emergency medical and further collaboration and cooperation with gov-
services, as do citizens of the host member state ernments are needed. Beyond the EaEU, the Global
(Madiyev 2021). However, the EaEU enforcement Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration,
mechanisms for migrants’ rights remain weak, lead- implemented under the auspices of the United
ing to gaps between de jure and de facto protection Nations in 2018, presents a framework for compre-
of legal rights and to access to social services. The hensive international cooperation on migrants and
EaEU treaty also leaves room for countries to restrict human mobility, contributing to the global gover-
migrants’ access to the host labor market in cases nance and coordination of international migration
“determined by this Treaty and the legislation of the policies. The Kyrgyz Republic will highly benefit
Member States aimed at ensuring their national from signing this treaty, following suit of 164 other
security (including in economic sectors of strategic countries that have already signed it, in parallel with
importance) and public order” (Article 97.2 of the bilateral agreements reached with main destination
EaEU treaty). The entry into force of the EaEU comes countries.
POSTRETURN
The government of the Kyrgyz Republic should continue supporting temporary
migrants at the return stage. During the first semester of the COVID-19 pan-
demic, the government of the Kyrgyz Republic supported the return of citizens
residing abroad who were stranded due to temporary border closures and flight
cancellations, facilitating charter flights for Kyrgyz migrants who wanted to
return home. By August 24, 2020, 35,469 Kyrgyz citizens had returned from 21
regions of the Russian Federation (Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the
Russian Federation 2020b). According to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the
different consulates, another 5,000 and 2,000 Kyrgyz migrants returned from
Türkiye and the United Arab Emirates, respectively, during the same time period.
However, many more migrants were still stranded and unable to find a way to
return home (King and Zotova 2020). During these uncertain times with differ-
ent waves of contagion and restrictions, the Kyrgyz Republic should continue to
cooperate with the governments of the main receiving countries to facilitate the
repatriation of Kyrgyz emigrants who want to return (Lancet 2020). Health con-
cerns and limited employment opportunities in receiving countries mean that
62 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
many migrants may want to return home. Given the dire financial situation of
migrants and the spike in the cost of international air transportation, the govern-
ment should sustain financial assistance for potential returnees and arrange
transportation when needed, which could require further coordination with
host governments.
Given the particular vulnerabilities of return migrants, especially of those
who were forced to return unexpectedly, there is a need to strengthen reintegra-
tion plans and services. The concept for the migration policy of the Kyrgyz
Republic for 2021–30 recognizes the need to launch reintegration programs for
return migrants, although it narrows it to migrants “with negative migration
experiences and with a particular focus on women” (State Migration Services
2021).5 Reintegration programs for return migrants have existed for several years
in the Kyrgyz Republic, but they lack a general government strategy and a cen-
tralized reintegration mechanism and suffer from very limited resources and
outreach. Since the rise in return migration during the COVID-19 pandemic,
IOM in the Kyrgyz Republic has worked with local authorities, community lead-
ers, and NGOs to reach returnees, providing them with information and support
to access social services, but at a small scale. Kyrgyz returnees would greatly ben-
efit from larger-scale support, such as the ones that are in the process of being
implemented in Bangladesh for migrants who returned in the context of
COVID-19. Such interventions will deliver services to eligible and interested
return migrants to be either sustainably reintegrated into the domestic labor
market or to access services to prepare for remigration. The program will also
support an upgrade and integration of migration management systems (data-
bases, services, and systems). In order to implement similar interventions in the
Kyrgyz Republic, it is essential to develop a comprehensive registry of migrants
as recommended in this chapter. Within the broader framework of returnee
reintegration, authorities could create a “rapid needs and plans’ assessment”
form during the registration process at any of the different points of entry (air-
ports, borders), in which, based on returnees’ interests and needs, representa-
tives could provide an overview of the services returnees can access, including
relevant contact details of service providers (IOM 2019). This information on
available support services can help returnees navigate the bureaucratic system.
Migration services could reach out to Kyrgyz return migrants to link them to job
opportunities through, for example, mediation and job-matching measures, as
well as to ensure access to essential services such as health care, shelter, and
education.
The large employment losses due to the COVID-19 pandemic and future
shocks call for expanding the limited unemployment insurance coverage, in par-
ticular to returnees. In the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, unemployment
insurance emerged as an essential policy tool to mitigate the welfare impacts of
a negative employment shock. In the Kyrgyz Republic, returnees, like other
Kyrgyz citizens, have access to unemployment insurance. However, a very small
proportion of the unemployed population currently receives unemployment
benefits in the Kyrgyz Republic (OECD 2018), and the uptake of unemployment
benefits is especially low among return migrants.6 The low number of registra-
tions originates from a combination of low incentives, strict eligibility criteria,
and, more broadly, the limited outreach and capacity of the system. The low
monetary unemployment benefits—amounting to between KGS 250 and 500 per
month—and short duration—up to six calendar months in a year, but for no more
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 63
than 12 months over a period of three years—provide limited incentives for
returnees to register when compared to the significantly higher earnings’ poten-
tial abroad. In addition, there are several eligibility criteria, including a mini-
mum frequency of contributions to the social security system of at least
12 months during the last three years and proof of job searching (OECD 2018).
As a result, returnees might prefer to wait to migrate again until the conditions
for migration improve and mobility restrictions in destination countries have
lessened. There is also a limited outreach of this public service, in particular
among the vulnerable returnee population, given the strong concentration of
centers in urban areas, while migrants tend to come from rural areas. Given all
these limitations and the current context of the COVID-19 pandemic, there is an
urgent need to expand the reach of the unemployment insurance program and
increase the amount of benefits provided, open more centers in rural areas with
a high concentration of migrant families, and facilitate its access to vulnerable
groups such as returnees, including unemployed returnees, to smooth their
income shocks.
Better linkages of return migrants to active labor market policies (ALMPs)
are required to support reintegration into home labor markets. While there have
been recent legislative and institutional improvements, the variety and reach of
ALMPs in the Kyrgyz Republic remain limited. The main ALMPs include public
works and small training programs for vulnerable groups, while few resources
for other programs for entrepreneurship and self-employment, wage subsidies,
job counseling, among others, are available.7 Overall, these programs are under-
funded and use a rather restrictive definition of beneficiaries as, for example,
farmers with land plots exceeding 0.05 hectares are considered employed and
thus ineligible (World Food Programme, United Nations University UNU-MERIT,
and Maastrich Graduate School of Governance 2018).8 Given the higher preva-
lence of return migrants in rural areas and the high share who used to work as
farmers before migration and engage again in agricultural work upon return—
close to half of male return migrants, according to the KIHS (2015)—this policy
can de facto limit the ability of return migrants to access ALMPs. The public
employment services (PES) provide free training for registered unemployed
individuals. However, similarly to unemployment benefits, registration is low,
and PES tend to be located and register vacancies in urban areas (Schwegler-
Rohmeis, Mummert, and Jarck 2013). As a result, return migrants are very
unlikely to use those services.
To better cover return migrants, the endowment to ALMPs should be
increased and the eligibility criteria should be relaxed to also include small farm-
ers and provide services in rural areas. Training programs, in particular, could be
better linked to employers’ demand for skills at destination. In Sri Lanka, for
example, the “Skills Passport” was a program introduced by the Tertiary and
Vocational Educational Commission (TVEC) of the Ministry of Skills
Development, Employment and Labour Relations; the Employers’ Federation of
Ceylon (EFC); and the International Labour Organization (ILO) and designed to
support the successful reintegration of workers returning to Sri Lanka by pro-
viding relevant skills and networks with companies (Global Forum on Migration
and Development 2020).
Support for entrepreneurial activities may benefit return migrants given
their higher rates of self-employment. There are currently no programs in the
Kyrgyz Republic that help start self-employment and business ventures.
64 | Safe and Productive Migration from the Kyrgyz Republic
This void d isproportionately affects return migrants, who are overrepresented
among the self-employed and entrepreneurs. Thus, interventions to support
business s tartups may provide an essential service to many Kyrgyz returnees.9
The government recently recognized this need and included in the 2021–30
concept for migration policies the use of “market mechanisms to local entrepre-
neurs” (State Migration Services 2021). Programs of this sort include a diverse
array of services in a “one-stop shop” type of framework where migrants can
receive in-kind assistance, financial literacy, support to develop a business plan,
and access to banking and microcredit as well as other financial instruments to
make productive use of savings. One of the most comprehensive programs of
this sort is the Overseas Foreign Worker (OFW) reintegration program pro-
vided by the Philippines, which includes training for those who would like to
start up small businesses. In order to improve the success rate of entrepreneur-
ial activities, support programs have started to include analyses of skill gaps in
local labor markets to ensure that returnees have the skills required and that the
entrepreneurial endeavor produces goods or services in high demand in the
region of residence (OECD 2020). The IOM in Switzerland has published sta-
tistics of success rates of certain business projects in different countries to
increase potential returnees’ information on home labor markets. More gener-
ally, removing administrative and institutional barriers to setting up and run-
ning a business can smooth the transition of return migrants to the labor
market.
In the longer term, promoting return migration can lead to brain gain and
transfer of know-how to the Kyrgyz Republic. One of the guiding principles of
the Kyrgyz government’s migration agenda is to enhance the attractiveness of
returning to the Kyrgyz Republic for the diaspora (State Migration Services
2021). As shown on chapter 1, emigration in the Kyrgyz Republic combines
short- and longer-term spells depending on migrants’ characteristics. In partic-
ular, a sizable part of the Kyrgyz diaspora in the Russian Federation has remained
in the country for a long period. These migrants are characterized by relatively
higher education levels. The country would benefit from building stronger links
with this diaspora by providing more information about employment opportuni-
ties in the country and to improve economic conditions in the country to increase
the attractiveness of returning for longer-term emigrants, in particular those
with higher skills for which there are vacancies in the country. Romania offers
one example of engagement with the diaspora through bilateral collaboration
between its public employment services (i.e., the Romania Agency for
Employment) and that of Italy. Starting in 2009, these two PESs created the
MEDIT project with the goal to inform Romanian migrants in Italy about
the labor market opportunities in Romania, and cooperate to provide a bet-
ter institutional support for those migrants who decide to return to Romania
(OECD 2013).
Finally, more detailed data collection on returnees in periodic household sur-
veys or in ad hoc surveys is needed to better track their reintegration and design
adequate policies. Periodic household surveys need to incorporate questions on
return migration in order to better capture the whole extent of the phenomenon
and the trends in economic and social outcomes of this group. The Kyrgyz
Integrated Household Survey (KIHS) only included questions on returnees in
the ad-hoc migration module of 2015, while there is no option to identify return-
ees in the higher-frequency regular data. Even the 2015 KIHS migration module
only captures a small number of return migrants as it asks whether a person
Policy Options to Address Challenges throughout the Migration Life Cycle | 65
residing in the Kyrgyz Republic by the time of the survey had migrated abroad
for at least a month during the previous two years. As such, it excludes returnees
who had previously returned to the country. Available surveys, with the excep-
tion of the 2015 KIHS migration module, do not provide information about the
migration journey of return migrants, their human capital accumulation or labor
market experience, or the motivations behind the decision to migrate and return
(voluntary/involuntary, or planned or unplanned). This lack of information
hampers the ability to better understand the impact of migration and to design
adequate programs to support migrants throughout their journey, including
their reintegration back into the Kyrgyz Republic. Therefore, a longer migration
module including the migration history in regular surveys such as the KIHS
would be highly beneficial. Furthermore, dedicated ad-hoc surveys adminis-
tered to return migrants can provide further information on the whole migration
history of returnees, shedding further light on the entire life cycle of migration,
the interconnectedness of different decisions such as human capital accumula-
tion, entrepreneurship, and savings and migration that could help in implement-
ing better evidence-based policies.
NOTES
1. For more detail on the G2G between Korea and sending countries, for example, see
Cho et al. (2018).
2. Embassy of the Kyrgyz Republic in the Russian Federation (2020a).
3. Decree No. 8446 of the Government of the Russian Federation, June 10, 2020.
4. Resolution No. 4855 of the Government of the Russian Federation, April 12, 2020.
5. Reintegration can be defined as the reintroduction of Kyrgyz emigrants into Kyrgyz society
after their migration experience abroad and concerns not only the individual returnee but
also communities to which migrants return to (IOM 2018a).
6. According to official statistics from the MLSDM, only 283 returnees registered to obtain
unemployment benefits in 2020.
7. The public work program offers employment by public and private employers with wages
partially covered by the MLSDM. In 2016, 21,100 people benefited from this program, with
an average monthly wage of KGS 1,000-1,5000 (WFP 2018).
8. In 2017, only 1.2 percent of the MLSDM budget was reserved for ALMP (WFP 2018).
9. The effectiveness of entrepreneurship programs for return migrants, however, remains to
be rigorously tested (McKenzie and Yang 2015), while existing evidence on the impact of
training programs for entrepreneurs in different settings has been rather mixed (McKenzie
and Woodruff 2014).
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ECO-AUDIT
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http://www.worldbank.org/corporateresponsibility.
T he benefits of international migration for workers from the Kyrgyz
Republic, their families, and the home economy are tremendous. The
migration process, however, comes with a set of vulnerabilities and risks.
Those have been brought to light by the COVID-19 pandemic, which heavily
tested migration systems and strongly impacted labor migration. Relying on
rigorous analysis of the existing microdata, Safe and Productive Migration
from the Kyrgyz Republic: Lessons from the COVID-19 Pandemic shows that
these vulnerabilities are present at each stage of the migration life cycle:
predeparture, during migration, and after return. While COVID-19 has put
these limitations at the forefront, this book highlights that many already
existed before the pandemic and would persist in the long run in the absence
of adequate policy responses.
This book presents policy recommendations to enhance the benefits of
international migration for the Kyrgyz Republic and reduce its risks. Beyond
the COVID-19 context, these recommendations can also help mitigate the
impact of other negative shocks to international migration from the country,
including the adverse spillovers of the recent Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
Given the strong similarities in migration systems and patterns between the
Kyrgyz Republic and other migrant-sending countries, especially those in
Central Asia, the policy lessons drawn from this book are relevant beyond the
Kyrgyz context.
ISBN 978-1-4648-1905-6
SKU 211905