Document of The World Bank FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY Report No: ICR00005808 IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT TF A4977 ON A SMALL GRANT IN THE AMOUNT OF USD 800,000 TO THE Search for Common Ground (SFCG) FOR Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) July 27, 2022 Social Sustainability And Inclusion Global Practice, Africa West Region Regional Vice President: Ousmane Diagana Country Director: Coralie Gevers Regional Director: Simeon Kacou Ehui Practice Manager: Aly Zulficar Rahim Task Team Leader(s): Kaori Oshima, En Hui Elaine Chee ICR Main Contributor: Matuna Mushfeqa Mostafa ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS AGUIDE Guinean Association for Development (Association Guinéenne pour le Développement) COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019 CSOAP National Civil Society Organizations Accountability Platform CSOs Civil Society Organizations EVD Ebola Virus Disease FCV Fragility, Conflict and Violence FM Financial Management GNF Guinea Franc GPSA Global Partnership for Social Accountability IDA International Development Association IEC Information, Education and Communications INGO International Non-governmental organization IR Intermediate Results Indicator NGO Non-governmental organization OI Outcome Indicator PACV3 Third Village Community Support Project (Programme d'Appui aux Communautés Villageoises-3ème Phase) PAGL Guinea Support to Local Governance Project (Projet d’Appui a la Gouvernance Locale) PAPP Post-Ebola Priority Action Plan PDO Project Development Objective PNDES National Development Plan for Economic and Social Development PREMA State Reform and Modernization Program (Programme de Réforme et de Modernisation de l’Administration) PSAP Prefectural Social Accountability Platform PTA Parent Teacher Association RCSOAP Regional CSO Accountability Platform RETF Recipient Executed Trust Fund SFCG Search for Common Ground TEP Public Expression Forums (Tribunes d’expression populaire) TSC Technical Support Committee TTL Task Team Leader TV Television TABLE OF CONTENTS DATA SHEET ....................................................................... ERROR! BOOKMARK NOT DEFINED. I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES ....................................................... 4 II. OUTCOME .................................................................................................................... 11 III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME ................................ 20 IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME .. 24 V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS .............................................................. 28 ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS ........................................................... 31 ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT ........................................................................... 37 ANNEX 3. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND CIVIL UNREST THAT IMPACTED IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES ............................................... 38 ANNEX 4. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS .................................................................................. 41 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) DATA SHEET BASIC INFORMATION Product Information Project ID Project Name Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform P162171 Programs Country Financing Instrument Guinea Investment Project Financing Original EA Category Revised EA Category Not Required (C) Not Required (C) Organizations Borrower Implementing Agency Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Search for Common Ground (SFCG) Project Development Objective (PDO) Original PDO to increase transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services, through collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces and at the central level of government. Page 1 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) FINANCING FINANCE_TBL Original Amount (US$) Revised Amount (US$) Actual Disbursed (US$) Donor Financing TF-A4977 800,000 749,474 749,474 Total 800,000 749,474 749,474 Total Project Cost 800,000 749,474 749,474 KEY DATES Approval Effectiveness Original Closing Actual Closing 25-Apr-2017 14-Jun-2017 28-Apr-2021 31-Oct-2021 RESTRUCTURING AND/OR ADDITIONAL FINANCING Date(s) Amount Disbursed (US$M) Key Revisions 14-Dec-2020 0.62 Change in Loan Closing Date(s) Change in Implementation Schedule KEY RATINGS Outcome Bank Performance M&E Quality Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory Modest RATINGS OF PROJECT PERFORMANCE IN ISRs Actual No. Date ISR Archived DO Rating IP Rating Disbursements (US$M) 01 25-Aug-2020 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.42 ADM STAFF Role At Approval At ICR Regional Vice President: Makhtar Diop Ousmane Diagana Page 2 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Country Director: Paola Ridolfi Coralie Gevers Director: Deborah L. Wetzel Simeon Kacou Ehui Practice Manager: Asmeen M. Khan Aly Zulficar Rahim Josef S. Trommer, Robert A. Kaori Oshima, En Hui Elaine Task Team Leader(s): Yungu, Safiatou Lamarana Diallo Chee ICR Contributing Author: Matuna Mushfeqa Mostafa Page 3 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) I. PROJECT CONTEXT AND DEVELOPMENT OBJECTIVES Context at Appraisal Country Context 1. The Republic of Guinea is one of the poorest countries in the world, with basic public services suffering from limited capacity and funding gaps. Following the country’s transition to democracy in 2010, numerous public sector reforms were introduced1. The government, however, was unsuccessful in promoting reforms and policies or broad- based and sustained development across the country. Subsequently, poverty rates increased from 40.3 percent to 55.2 percent between 1995 and 2012, disproportionately affecting rural populations. The country ranks amongst the lowest performers in the United Nations Development Program Human Development Index, particularly on health and education outcomes. In 2012, funding for the health sector was estimated at 2.7 percent of the national budget, well below the 15 percent target set by the Abuja declaration. Approximately 60 percent of children aged between 8–14 years were out of school. 2. At appraisal in 2017, the already weak public service sector was stretched beyond capacity by the rapid spread of the Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) from early 2014 to February 2015. Over 3,000 EVD related deaths were reported across the country. The spread of the disease also adversely impacted socio-economic development, and led to reduction in agricultural production2, investments in natural resource exploration and development, trade with regional neighbors, tourism revenues, as well as commerce and services. The weak global economic outlook and plummeting commodity prices put further pressure on the economy. The government’s inability to rapidly contain the EVD outbreak reduced confidence in the public sector and deteriorated living standards, particularly in the worst affected regions of Basse Guinée, Guinée Forestière and Guinée Maritime. Sectoral and Institutional Context 3. Institutional constraints and challenges contributed to the rapid spread and slow containment of EVD. Even before the EVD crisis, the provision of health and education services suffered from significant capacity limits, and funding was limited and unpredictable, with weak control mechanisms. Health services deteriorated further during the EVD crisis due to the high number of deaths among local health staff. The poorly equipped and prepared health facilities failed to adequately respond to the large-scale emergency; and health and education workers were insufficiently trained and supervised, particularly outside of the capital, Conakry, resulting in high absenteeism rates and low productivity. Alongside significant capacity constraints at all levels of government, these resulted in inefficiencies and bottlenecks in coordinating, executing, and monitoring of the EVD outbreak, and eroded the effectiveness of the government’s response. On the demand side, the public faced multiple constraints in accessing health services due to high service fees, long distances to health facilities, and cultural and social barriers. There was 1 The public sector reforms contributed to reaching the completion point of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC). 2 Guinea has vast natural wealth and a great potential for hydroelectric power and agriculture production. Page 4 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) also widespread reluctance to seek health services out of fear of contamination, misperception of the disease, and lack of trust in service providers that led to a further decline in reproductive health services and prenatal visits. 4. To address citizen’s needs, manage and prevent future epidemics, as well as boost and sustain economic recovery and growth, the government introduced major reforms, as identified in the National Health Development Plan 2015-2024 (NHDP) and the Post-Ebola Socio-Economic Resilience and Recovery Strategy 2015-2017. The Post- Ebola Priority Action Plan (PAPP) was also developed to address the immediate needs of citizens in the aftermath of the Ebola epidemic. The PAPP was launched in an environment characterized by a general lack of trust between the government and citizens regarding the management of the Ebola crisis and the management of public funds. It focused on improving and expanding key social services to better address citizens’ needs after the crisis by strengthening health systems at all levels, building resilience of the education sector, targeting families affected by the EVD, and building government capacity to implement public sector reforms, improve service delivery, and effectively manage the post-Ebola recovery, among others. 5. Prevalent government inefficiencies and lack of trust in governments regarding the management of the Ebola crisis and public funds were weakening the effectiveness of the post-Ebola recovery process, and devastating families and communities. In this context, the international non-governmental organization (INGO), Search for Common Ground in Guinea (SFCG-Guinea), sought to build a constructive engagement between different groups of citizens to foster trust and improve government transparency and accountability at all levels for effective post EVD recovery. Rationale for World Bank Assistance 6. The World Bank sought to address governance challenges that were undermining the implementation of the PAPP and hindering effective delivery of basic health and education services in the aftermath of the Ebola crisis. The Global Partnership for Social Accountability (GPSA) Multi-Donor Trust Fund (GPSA Trust Fund) can provide direct financing to Civil Society Organization (CSOs) to strengthen social accountability mechanisms. Guinea had opted in for this funding, with the SFCG preparing the winning bid for a total Recipient Executed Trust Fund (RETF) grant financing of US$800,000. Through this Project, ‘Building Civil Society Capacity To Engage In State Reform Programs’, SFCG aimed to address governance challenges that undermined the effective implementation of the PAPP and delivery of basic health and education services, and improve transparency and accountability at both national and local levels by fostering collaborative dialogues and joint actions between government, service providers and citizen groups. Specifically, the Project supported SFCG’s “Build Back Better — Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programsâ€? that aimed to strengthen transparency in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds in targeted districts and at the national level, as well as comprised four objectives: (i) Strengthen the capacity of government and civil society to design, implement and monitor budget allocation and expenditure, and basic service delivery; (ii) Create opportunities for government and civil society actors to leverage budget and service delivery monitoring results to improve basic services; (iii) Generate and disseminate credible and accurate information on the recovery process to those most affected by the crisis; and (iv) Knowledge and learning to improve project outcomes. 7. The Project aimed to contribute to the country’s higher-level objectives, as specified in the 2016-20 National Development Plan for Economic and Social Development (PNDES), the Program for State Reform and Modernization of the Public Administration (PREMA), and the PAPP. Specifically, the Project aimed to support the implementation Page 5 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) of PAPP pillar one focusing on social sector support to improve and expand key social services to better meet the needs of citizens after the crisis, and pillar four focusing on governance support to build government capacity to implement public sector reforms, improve service delivery, and effectively manage the post-Ebola recovery. To support this framework, the Project aimed at strengthening the capacity of citizens and CSOs to implement social accountability tools to monitor budget allocation and spending, and health and education services provided under the recovery plan; and creating spaces for collaborative solutions between government and CSOs. The Project also supported the implementation of the government’s PREMA program that aimed to streamline public administration, support decentralization processes, and enhance government coordination and effectiveness to ensure the effective implementation of public sector reforms and programs adopted in the aftermath of the EVD crisis. It also sought to inform PREMA program adjustments to improve public sector reforms and strengthen the health system. 8. The Project was closely aligned with the World Bank’s Country Partnership Strategy for Guinea FY2014–FY17 at time of appraisal, which has a focus on improving development outcomes in the education, health, and social protection sectors. The project continues to remain aligned with the present Country Partnership Framework (CPF) for Guinea FY2018–FY233 that supports improved public management, service delivery and human development. The Project activities also aimed to complement implementation of the World Bank’s Ebola Recovery and Reconstruction Trust Fund (ERRTF) by generating information to help monitor service delivery at the local level, strengthen government capacity to implement the post-Ebola recovery, and enhance transparency and accountability in the use of recovery funds. Project Development Objectives (PDOs) 9. The objective of the Project was to increase transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services, through collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces and at the central level of government. 10. The Project was implemented by the INGO, Search For Common Ground – Guinea (SFCG- Guinea), in partnership with: (i) a local NGO, Guinean Association for Development (AGUIDE) to convene and monitor Regional CSO Accountability Platforms (RCSOAPs) within the two targeted regions; (ii) the Radio Télévision Guinéenne (RTG) to lead national media production; and (iii) Radio Rurale Guinea (RGG) to facilitate local radio discussions. The Project targeted a total of eight vulnerable districts - four vulnerable districts/communities in each of the two regions most affected by the Ebola virus, Basse Guinée (Lower/Maritime Guinea)4 and Guinée Forestière (Forest Guinea)5. A Technical Support Committee (TSC) was established in June 2018, meeting on a quarterly basis, to guide and support the Project. The TSC comprised of representatives from the Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of Budget, Ministry of Planning and Economic Development, the National Assembly, PREMA, National Council of CSOs (CNOSC); the National Council of Civil Society Organizations (CNOSCG), the Union of Free Radios and Television of Guinea (URTELGUI), and National Network of Traditional Communicators (RENACOT). Primary beneficiaries included: traditional authorities, women and youth associations, parents’ clubs, teacher and medical staff associations, as well 3 Report No. 125899–GN 4 The four target districts in the Basse Guinée region were: BokeÌ?, Kindia, DubreÌ?ka and ForeÌ?cariah. 5 The four target districts in the Guinée Forestière region were: Gueckedou, Macenta, NzeÌ?reÌ?koreÌ? and Lola. Page 6 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) as government authorities at the community and national level to enhance coordination and collaboration mechanisms among different stakeholders. Key Expected Outcomes and Outcome Indicators 11. The aim was to improve governance structures, transparency and accountability, by strengthening collaborative social accountability mechanisms for the effective implementation of the PAPP and delivery of basic health and education services. The achievement of the PDO was to be measured against the following outcome indicators: i. Targeted regional and local civil society accountability platforms and government counterparts with increased skills to monitor budget allocations and spending ii. Decisions adopted by PREMA and Government agencies that leverage information generated by the project to improve the implementation of the PAPP Components 12. The Project was designed with the following three components: Component 1: Strengthen government and civil society capacity to design, implement and monitor budget allocation and spending, and basic service delivery (RETF US$ 485,000) 13. Component 1 included two parts: a. Designing a capacity development plan to facilitate the improvement of skills and capacities of all stakeholders involved. This focused on overcoming capacity constraints of key government and civil society actors to improve the effectiveness of the post-Ebola recovery, and emphasized: at the national level, strengthening the National CSO Accountability Platform (National CSOAP)6 to implement advanced budget analysis techniques to evaluate post-Ebola recovery budgets; and at the regional level, the creation of an inclusive platform – the Regional CSOAP (RCSOAP) – similar to the CSOAPs in each of the two targeted region. The main activities included: i. Conducting a participatory capacity-gaps assessment of the CSOAPs, CSOs, and government actors in target regions; ii. Training CSOAPs, CSOs, and government actors in advanced budget analysis techniques for assessing post-Ebola recovery budgets at the national level; iii. Establishing integrated RCSOAPs in each of the two regions to guide project activities at the regional level7; and 6The platform was developed under the World Bank’s “Governance and Accountability in the Public Sectorâ€? Program . 7Activities as part of the RCSOAP included (but not limited to): organizing meetings for committee members; implementing community scorecards and budget monitoring tools; and organizing quarterly social accountability meetings with partners. Page 7 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) iv. Providing tailored capacity building to RCSOAPs and relevant government actors to implement budget monitoring tools and community scorecards to assess budget allocations and service delivery in health and education facilities at the local level. b. Developing an information, education and communications (IEC) strategy in a participatory manner and disseminate the information to the wider population to raise awareness about the recovery process at both the community and national level. The main activities included: • Implementing a participatory IEC campaign; • Producing and broadcasting a TV Series named “Questions with the Ministryâ€? and partnering with local radio stations to disseminate information on the recovery process; and • Developing and disseminating simplified budget guides to the public to raise awareness about the post- Ebola recovery and elicit participation, including announcing location and time of upcoming events and invite citizens to participate in project activities at the community level. Component 2: Create opportunities for government and civil society actors to leverage findings of budget and service delivery monitoring to improve basic services (RETF US$ 220,000) 14. Component 2 aimed to create spaces for dialogue and constructive engagement between citizens, government authorities, and focused on implementing social accountability tools to assess the performance and quality of service delivery in health and education facilities in targeted regions to inform and influence the implementation post-Ebola recovery. It included provision of support for the following activities: a. Organizing public meetings in targeted areas to discuss community scorecards and budget analysis findings, reviewing implementation progress, and agreeing on measures to improve service delivery at the local level; b. Facilitating the participation of local groups to use scorecards findings to inform local communal budgets; and c. Mobilizing citizens and gathering support to increase health spending. Component 3: Knowledge and learning for improved project results and Project Management (RETF US$ 95,000) 15. Component 3 aimed to strengthen the implementing CSOs’ capacities for adaptive project management and learning and social accountability through operational learning and sharing lessons learned with other stakeholders working in social accountability initiatives in fragile contexts. It included provision of support for the following activities: a. Setting-up a monitoring, evaluation and learning system; b. Organizing multi-stakeholder learning and evaluation meetings; c. Preparing case studies and organizing peer learning exchanges with CSOs and practitioners from other countries in the region; d. Supporting a youth-led participatory study on youth priorities in the education and health sectors; and e. Commissioning an independent Project evaluation (with baseline, mid-term and final reports). Significant Changes During Implementation Page 8 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) 16. Realignment of the Project due to the abatement of the Ebola crisis in mid-2017. By the time the Grant Agreement was finalized in May 2017, the EVD crisis had virtually ended and a new National Economic and Social Plan (PNDES 2016-2020), which was in line with the PAPP, had been developed. The first implementation support mission in June 2017, prior to the disbursement of any financing, thus agreed to shift activities from focusing on Ebola to more broadly supporting the implementation of the governance component of the PNDES 2016-20, following recommendation from the government and with the agreement of the World Bank. Specifically, the revised focus aimed to improve governance, transparency and accountability by strengthening the capacity of government, citizens, CSOs and social accountability platforms. This was highly relevant to the country context given significant capacity constraints and bottlenecks (particularly in the delivery of health and education services), weak control mechanisms for monitoring public funding, and widespread public mistrust of government. The PDO, outcome and intermediate indicators remained the same. 17. In December 2020, project restructuring was approved to extend the closing date by six months (disbursements stood at US$ 415,000, or 50 percent of the total grant). The restructuring entailed extending the project closing date by six months from April 28, 20218 to October 30, 2021, as well as changes to disbursement estimates and the implementation schedule. The extension was required to complete the planned activities, as there was a six-month delay in the first disbursement to the recipient’s account due to challenges in setting up a bank account and adequate financial management (FM) systems. Implementation has further hindered by the high turnover of SFCG staff throughout the duration of the project, and also external factors like the COVID-19 pandemic and related precautionary measures/restrictions, and the persistent political turmoil and unrest in the country. 18. Following a coup d'état and dissolution of the constitution and government, the World Bank suspended all project activities across the portfolio in September 2021. On September 5, 2021, President of Guinea Alpha Condé was captured by the country's armed forces in a coup d'état in the capital, Conakry. All activities under this Project remained suspended, until the Project closed, as planned, on October 30, 2021, with 94 percent (US$ 749,389) of the funds disbursed and 90 percent of planned activities completed. Theory of Change (Results Chain) 19. A theory of change was not developed at appraisal. The theory of change below (Figure 1) has been derived from the Project Appraisal Document and restructuring paper. 8 The Project was approved on April 25, 2017 and became effective on April 14, 2017, with an original closing date of April 28, 2021. Page 9 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Figure 1: Theory of Change Intermediate Activities Outputs PDO Outcomes Outcomes Conducting baseline study & Baseline study & capacity assessment capacity-gaps assessment reports Training/capacity building of civil Capacity-building plan, communication society & public servants on strategy, training materials & budget budget analysis analysis tools Improved capacity of civil society and platforms to develop & monitor Establishing inclusive regional & Inclusive RCSOAP and prefectural CSOs health & education budget process local social accountability platform established; RCSOAP forums in participatory manner platforms & Townhalls/Public Expression Forums (Tribunes d’expression Populaire–TEP) held regularly Civil society & platforms trained Increased awareness, participation & Training regional & local platforms oversight of civil society in local to monitor & implement Scorecards deployed; local priorities health & education budget process & community scorecards identified for improved service service delivery delivery; & joint action plans developed 1) Increased collaborative social Implementing IEC campaign for TV & radio programs aired accountability public oversight of local budget mechanisms processes & service delivery, health & education reforms 2) Increased Organizing public meetings to Inclusive RCSOAP forums and TEPs Increased consideration/ transparency and improve service delivery at the local implementation of accountability in the level recommendations from forums & use of post Ebola Communal budgets integrating TEPs recovery funds for Facilitating local groups to use recommendations from local meetings health and education scorecards findings to inform local Increase integration of services communal budgets recommendations from local Mobilization of local resources for meetings into communal budgets Mobilizing citizens and gathering health facilities support to increase health Increased funding for health facilities spending Page 10 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) II. OUTCOME Assessment and Rating of Relevance of PDO 20. The relevance of PDO is rated as High as the project remained highly relevant to Guinea’s national and local priorities. Despite the abating of the Ebola crisis in 2017, increasing transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services - using collaborative social accountability mechanisms - remained critical. This is especially for improvements in the delivery of quality health and education, as well as supporting an effective response to future epidemics/pandemics. This proved particularly timely in addressing the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak. Thus, the Project remained current and relevant to the country’s emerging needs and development priorities as identified in the 2015-2017 PAPP, PNDES 2016-20 and the 2015-2024 National Health Development Plan. The Project also remained closely aligned with the World Bank's 2018-2023 Country Partnership Framework9, for Guinea, specifically Objective 1 (Improved public fiscal and financial management); Objective 2 (Decentralization of service delivery including health and education, and better engagement of citizens) with a key indicator being the “Number of communes participating in local development decisions in selected areasâ€?; and Objectives 4 and 5 that prioritizes improved basic health, education and social protection, especially in rural areas. Thus, the relevance of the PDOs is rated High. Assessment of Achievement of Each Objective/Outcome 21. The achievement of the PDO can be assessed based on two outcomes: a. Build/increase collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces10 and at the central level of government. b. Increase transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services. 22. The assessment is based on SFCG’s partial updating of the Results Framework in March 2020 for the independent Mid-term Evaluation, as well as the independent Final Evaluation of the program (henceforth, “Final Evaluationâ€?) completed in June 202211. As such, quantitative data for the assessment of efficacy is based on March 2020 data, and complemented with qualitative findings, mainly from the Final Evaluation. It is important to note that due to continued political uncertainties, social and often violent unrest that ultimately led to a coup in September 2021, and the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions, the evaluators for the Final Evaluation had difficulty finding interlocutors who were willing to exchange information or were familiar with the project. This was further complicated by the fact that the SFCG had closed their offices in Guinea in April 202212 and relevant staff were not 9 Report No. 125899-GN 10 Guinea is not sub-divided by provinces, but rather regions, prefectures and sub-prefectures. 11 Citation for the Final Evaluation: Mamadou Saliou Kalifa Diallo and Jean-Benoit Falisse. Final Evaluation of the Search for Common Ground’s Build Back Better Project: Building Back Better, Strengthening Civil Society's Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs in Guinea, Conakry. June 2022. 12 SFCG worked in Guinea between 2001 and 2022. At the end of which, SFCG handed over its activities to a local organization in Guinea that it had helped create in 2003, Talking Drum Studio. Page 11 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) readily contactable. Thus, the project’s achievements may not have been fully captured, due to a lack of clarity on the definition and measurement of certain result indicators and/or limited information documented as well as available at completion. 23. The achievement of PDO targets is summarized in Table 1 below. Details are in Annex 1 Table 1: PDO Results Indicators, Targets and Achievement Baseline Achieved at Rate of Target Results Indicators (April Target Completion Achievement 2017) (Nov. 2021) PDO A: Build/increase collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces/regions and at the central level of government Outcome Indicator (OI) 1.0: Targeted regional and local civil society 0 65% 82% 126% accountability platforms and government counterparts with increased skills to monitor budget allocations and spending Intermediate Results Indicator (IR) 1.1: Percent RCSOAPs forums at 0 80% 75% 94% the local level that are inclusive, accessible, and open IR 1.2: Percent of trained civil society and government actors using TBD in 60% 69% 115% advanced budget analysis techniques Baseline * PDO Outcome B: Increased transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services OI 2.0: Decisions enacted by PREMA, central and sub-national TBD in 4 2 50% agencies that leverage information generated by the project to Baseline* improve the implementation of the National Development Plan including the Post-Ebola Priority Action Plan (PAPP). IR 2.1: Percent of population targeted in the advocacy campaign 0 50% 46% 92% aware of 10% budget mandate to be dedicated to health IR 2.2: Percent of public in targeted area that feels well informed on TBD in 60% 62% 103% the level of progress towards improved budget allocation, spending Baseline* and improved basic services delivery in their locality IR 2.3: Number of service points demonstrating improvements, 0 20 25 125% based on findings from Participatory Score cards IR 2.4: Percent of targeted communal budgets integrating TBD in 60% Not ---- recommendations from local meetings Baseline* Available IR 2.5: Percent of recommendations from Public Expression Forums 12% 60% Not ---- (Tribunes d’expression Populaire, TEP) actions plans implemented Available IR 2.6: Percentage of public in targeted areas that feels that they TBD in 60% 79% 132% have the opportunity to provide input into the National Baseline* (Exceeded) Development Plan including the Ebola recoverty and reform process Other indicators IR 3.1: Number of examples where learning from monitoring and 100% 0 6 613 evaluation has contributed to improvements of operational strategy 13This was increased to 6 out of the reported 4, as there was evidence of the following learning from M&E that improved the project: (i) reducing the number of prefectures supported by the project from eight to five; (ii) implementation of new activities that involved local populations, such as the forums for popular expression (TEP); (iii) production of participatory theater to distill information about the reforms and social accountability mechanisms; (iv) the production of radio and TV programs in Page 12 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) of the project IR 3.2: Increase knowledge about politically informed social accountability strategies in contexts of fragility: Number of 50% 0 4 214 knowledge products about political economy analysis and dynamics produced by the project *The Baseline study was to collect this data but did not. PDO Outcome A: Build/increase collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces/regions and at the central level of government 24. The Project built and enhanced platforms for social accountability - not only at the national level and the two targeted regions, but also at the prefectoral levels. The National CSOAP, established in 2017 with representatives from key ministries (i.e., health, education, civil service) was revitalized and expanded with two additional representatives from each regional platform, which enhanced coordination and collaboration between these various levels in the governance of public services. In the two targeted regions of Basse Guinée and Guinée Forestière, two regional (RCSOAPs) and eight prefectural CSOs platforms were established at the district/community level with similar structures. The CSO platforms were reduced to five15 in mid-2020, following the mid-term evaluation, due to limited funding and inability of SFCG/AGUIDE to intervene in all eight previously targeted localities. These platforms have led public authorities to be more transparent and accountable to the population in the five localities in the provision of health and education services at the local level. Nine RCSOAPs forums were organized in the target regions and Conakry in which 166 people participated, including 30 women and persons with disabilities. About 75 percent of RCSOAPs forums were found to be inclusive, accessible, and open (achieving 94 percent of the IR target of 80 percent).16 Drawing from learnings from the mid-term, Town hall meetings or Public Expression Forums (Tribunes d’expression Populaire, TEP) were also held at the community level in target areas as part of the platform activities, and brought together key actors from the relevant localities and district authorities with citizens to engage in constructive dialogue on service delivery and foster trust. 25. Nonetheless, this objective was not fully achieved as these social accountability platforms were limited in terms of sustainability. Extenuating circumstances – such as persistent and mounting political unrests and protests, often violent and prolonged (throughout the entire duration of the project) and COVID-19 related mobility/safety restrictions – diverted the focus and bandwidth of stakeholders away from the project. This had a detrimental impact on project implementation with activities significantly reducing in frequency and intensity from March 2020 (Final Evaluation) and eventually suspended following the military coup of September 5, 2021. While SFCG sought innovative ways that progressed implementation of project activities, as follows: organizing meetings via local languages (instead of only French); and (v) teaching the parents’ association “how to organize educational discussion sessions in the neighborhoods and sectors with all of the existing actors in the communitiesâ€? that lead to good governance in the school environment and transparency in actions; and (vi) improvements in health service delivery. 14 According to the Mid-term and Final Evaluations, two out of the four planned knowledge products about political economy analysis and dynamics were produced by SFCG. However, it is arguable if even the two knowledge products (including the semi- annual/ monitoring and evaluation reports) had a sufficiently explicit focus on analyzing the political economy or were widely shared to promote learning among other partners and stakeholders. 15 The five CSOs were in the communities of GueÌ?ckeÌ?dou, Macenta, Lola, Kindia and ForeÌ?cariah. 16 Results are derived from attendance lists for the RCSOAP forums, including participants' affiliations and reports from the forums. Page 13 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) videoconferencing or face-to-face meetings with appropriate social distancing requirements; provision of technical support via telephone/email communication; temporary shift from face-to-face training to using pre-recorded online training; development of self-learning manuals; and facilitating training in small groups and ensuring social distancing. WhatsApp groups were also set up by the RCSOAPs to promote networking between the prefectures of the project. This enabled the timely exchange information when problems arose, organization of meetings, and supported an effective informal manner of collaboration. However, these platforms could not fully replace the richness of in-person dialogue and the building of effective relationships; and were insufficient to prevent the fall in platform activities and the stalling of the earlier momentum gains of the platforms in garnering influence and active stakeholder participation,17 limiting their potential for sustainability. SFCG was also ultimately unable to secure support of the supervisory authority, SERACCO (Service Regional d'Assistance aux Coopératives et Coordination des ONG18) to provide formal accreditation of these platforms (envisioned at the start of the Project) at the national and regional level for sustainability. Nevertheless, a form of accreditation via local administrators was achieved for the majority of the prefectural CSOs platforms by the closing of the project. There were also missed opportunities to build in sustainability in the project design by developing clear linkages and integration (e.g. of tools and capacity building efforts) as well as strengthening coordination with other related World Bank operations in Guinea on decentralization and participatory local development, such as the 2016-2020 third phase of the Village Community Support project (Programme d'Appui aux Communautés Villageoises-3ème Phase, PACV3, P156422) which was followed by the 2019 Guinea Support to Local Governance Project (Projet d’Appui a la Gouvernance Locale, PAGL, P167884). 26. The Project also contributed to the increased use, knowledge and skills of government and civil society in using social accountability tools, like budget monitoring tools and community scorecards to assess budget allocations and service delivery in health and education facilities at the local level.19 Informed by a baseline study20 and capacity gaps assessment21 undertaken in early 2018, the project prepared and implemented a capacity building plan and training materials. Trainings were conducted on advanced budget analysis techniques; scorecards; governance; as well as roles and responsibilities of education and health and hygiene committees' participation in budget development process; amongst others. By project closing, 82 percent of targeted regional and local civil society accountability platforms members and government counterparts trained had increased skills to monitor budget allocations and spending (achieving 126 percent of the OI target of 6 percent). Based on the end of training reports and participant’s results from the pre- and post-test on the tools, participants’ knowledge about the scorecard, its use and benefits increased to an average of 89 percent, compared to 33 percent prior to the training; and they developed a better appreciation of the links between transparency, trust and efficiency of public services.22 17 Final Evaluation 18 In English, Regional Service of Assistance to Cooperatives and Coordination of NGOs. 19 Separate capacity building efforts on participatory budgeting and citizen monitoring for local government/communities were also undertaken across the country under PACV3 and PAGL, during the period of this project. 20 A Baseline Study of local citizens and key informants in early 2018 assessed target communities’ involvement in developing budgets for community health and education services, identified community priorities for basic services, and gauged local authorities’ level of accountability to their communities on the use of health and education budgets. 21 A capacity assessment was undertaken during April –May 2018 that gauged CSOs’ level of inclusiveness, operational and organizational capacity development needs in terms of social accountability and governance, as well as motivation, knowledge and familiarity with using social accountability tools. 22 Based on interview findings of the Final Evaluation. Page 14 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) 27. The social accountability platforms also provided an avenue for stakeholders to put in practice their learning on the social accountability tools (like budgeting analysis and scorecards). This also allowed them to hone their skills with practical application to facilitate discussions around low budget allocations and lack of quality equipment/staff absenteeism in health facilities and schools. Around 69 percent of civil society and government actors reported using the advanced budget analysis tools in the preparation of local budgets and/or to evaluate draft government budgets at least once in the course of their work, (achieving of 115 percent of IR target of 60 percent). The simplified budget analysis guide was disseminated, and members of the prefectural CSOs platforms had begun developing and deploying scorecards in the target communities in May 2019, including through the TEPs. Hence, overall, the project helped to established collaborative social accountability mechanisms – by building social accountability platforms and promoting the skilled use of social accountability tools (budget analysis, scorecards) – to foster understanding, dialogue and trust between state and civil society (CSOs/citizens) at various levels (national, regional, prefectural and community) at the two targeted regions. PDO Outcome B: Increase transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services. 28. The Project contributed to increasing transparency and accountability on the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services by increasing the flow of information to civil society. This included enhancing community awareness of State reforms, and their rights and the State’s duties relating to public services. Findings of the 2018 capacity assessment informed the development of the IEC strategy, which included radio and television (TV) programs on health and education reforms that were broadcasted for almost the entire duration of the Project to boost transparency. The strategy was also further adapted to respond agilely to health emergencies like COVID-19. Public awareness raising activities under the project included: (i) Terrain d’entente (Common Ground) – two 30- minutes roundtable programs focusing on issues related to peace, governance and democracy to strengthen understanding and promote peace and social cohesion; and (ii) Guinea Forum “Large Publicâ€? – two 50–minutes TV programs with representatives of ministerial departments discussing health and education sector reforms; (iii) three radio spots aired in four local languages focusing on preventing the spread of COVID-19 and facilitating understanding of the role and responsibility of Government and CSOs in the COVID-19 response; and (iv) 18 participatory theater performances during 2021 focusing on increasing citizens’ and service providers’ awareness of social accountability for improved health and education service delivery. 46 percent of the population targeted in the advocacy campaign was aware of the 10 percent budget mandate to be dedicated to health (achieving 92 percent of the IR target of 50 percent). This is aligned with experiences around the world show that the level of information among the general population is often low, even in societies with a high level of transparency and information, and it is unlikely that half of the people are aware of budget commitments.23 29. The platforms were also instrumental in how the project promoted transparency and accountability by enhancing community voice and participation in budget monitoring and basic service delivery. Platform activities promoted awareness and educated stakeholders, such as through educational talks conducted on the utilization of health facilities, importance of schooling for young girls, and the rights and duties of citizens in the management of public services. Citizen concerns and feedback on health/education, along with key governance information, were 23 Final Evaluation Page 15 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) shared with key decision makers (such as Mayors, Prefects, Governors, and representatives of sector ministries and the National Assembly) during the semi-annual Technical Committee meetings, including through WhatsApp and Facebook. The minutes of the monthly social accountability platform meetings were also disseminated with stakeholders at all levels to inform priorities and implementation. The TEPs held at community level were also found to have promoted role clarity and a better appreciation of both citizen’s concerns/expectations and the constraints of service providers.24 Thus, overall, the IEC strategy and platforms, alongside the training and deployment of the social accountability tools, contributed to increase citizen’s knowledge of health and education reforms, and increased citizens’ inclusive participation in the implementation of reforms at the local level and the mobilization of local resources (i.e., taxes, levies, and parental contributions) for health facilities. The Project contributed to the 62 percent of local populations in the targeted areas reported that they have increased knowledge of budget allocations, spending and basic services delivery issues (achieving 103 percent of IR target of 60 percent), thereby contributing to increasing transparency on the use of funds health/ education services.25 30. The social accountability tools under the project allowed for the gathering of citizens’ feedback to inform recommendations to improve delivery of education/health services, especially at the local level. The participatory scorecards helped to capture community perceptions of social services, identifying shortcomings in service delivery and serve as a tool for service providers to improve and self-assess. The tools also informed recommendations that were translated into a joint action plan at the prefecture level for improving the delivery of public services. Each prefecture had also established committees comprised of seven members (including representatives from the relevant service providers, beneficiaries, and local/administrative authorities) that met on a quarterly basis to monitor implementation progress of the joint action plans. This led to the following service points demonstrating improvements, based on findings from Participatory Score cards: 25 urban health centers26 and schools’ facilities from each prefecture, (achieving 125 percent of the IR target of 20)27, including reducing absenteeism of health providers and teachers. However, the escalation on insecurity and COVID-19 restrictions impeded implementation of project activities and affected the completion of the development of local development plans (LDPs), which were supposed to inform communal budgets. Thus, no data was collected on the percent of targeted communal budgets integrating recommendations from local meetings. There were difficulties in measuring and tracking data at completion on the percentage of recommendations from TEP actions plans implemented, due to the challenging country. Nonetheless, the project was beneficial in providing platforms, tools and meetings to facilitate exchange between local stakeholders and citizens, which have led to several decisions at the local level where positive change in service delivery were driven by project-generated information" and citizen feedback- especially in 2019-2020, such as ensuring teachers’ attendance at schools, and conducting an audit to improve transparency on the billing of patients in the health care facilities.28 For example, campaigns led by the platforms and through community radio stations led to 95 percent of health facilities displaying the prices of drugs and medical care, and significantly reducing school fees. 24 Final Evaluation. 25 This is alongside the efforts of other government programs and World Bank programs (e.g. PACV3) that sought to build awareness and knowledge on budgeting and basic services delivery more broadly across the country. 26 Improvements in health facilities included the manner in which patients were welcomed, orientating them in the premises of the hospital or health facility, particularly to avoid contamination from other patients, provision of moderately priced billing and through donations solicitated by the platforms for computers and generators. 27 Results are derived from scorecards and assessment of education and health facilities. 28 Final Evaluation. Page 16 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) 31. The project also supported the implementation of the National Development Plan (NDP), including the Post- Ebola Priority Action Plan (PAPP) related to promoting social accountability and transparency focusing on the health and education sectors. 79 percent of the public in targeted areas felt that they had the opportunity to provide input into the NDP, including the Ebola recovery and reform process (exceeding the IR target of 60 percent). PREMA, central and sub-national agencies leveraged information generated by the project to improve the NDP and PAPP by enacting the following decisions: (i) a ministerial act instituting the establishment of a “Technical Support Committeeâ€? on behalf of the Project;29 and (ii) a local level decision of the Macenta platform concerning the revision of school fees. Thus, social accountability was achieved, though primarily at the local level, as there was little evidence of project generated information affecting policy decisions at the national level and the IR target (i.e., two out of the target of four decisions) was not achieved. That said, expecting to directly influence national policy might be overly ambitious for the grant size, scope of targeted prefectures, the country’s volatile context and capacity constraints, and thus the outcome indicator/results framework could have been better been adjusted/clarified, particularly given the escalating political unrest and health crisis. 32. The overall efficacy rating is thereby Substantial. The project has built/enhanced social accountability platforms, supported the trainings and practical use of social accountability tools among authorities and civil society, and undertaken mass media awareness programs that have helped promote transparency and accountability of the use of post-Ebola recovery funds. Though primarily limited to the local level, the project has nonetheless achieved its objectives for transparency and accountability by directly influencing citizen-informed action in improving basic services (e.g. improved billing in healthcare facilities). Thus, the PDO outcomes have been assessed to be reasonably achieved, especially taking into account the small grant size and challenging country context of deteriorating political instability and severe health emergencies - which resulted in the constant change of government officials, hindered movement and in-person interactions, diverted attention and commitment of stakeholders to address more pressing safety (and even life-threatening) issues, and unavoidably impacted project implementation and sustainability. Nonetheless, sustainability challenges from the fragile country context could be better anticipated and built into project design by ensuring stronger integration with government structures/ systems and the broader country’s World Bank operational portfolio on decentralization (like PACV3 and PAGL) from the onset. Efficiency 33. An economic analysis was not conducted at the start or conclusion of the Project. The total project administration cost (SFCG’s operating and administrative costs) was around 45 percent of total disbursement, which is within a reasonable range for such projects. However, cost effectiveness was affected by the high turnover of SFCG management and staff, which included three different Country Directors, four Project Managers and multiple staff changes, within the project duration. The high turnover necessitated repeated provision of training on World Bank Financial Management procedures and processes and handholding to build knowledge about project activities. Additionally, of the total budget, 14 percent was allocated to the local NGO, AGUIDE, and to local consultants for 29However, as the indicator was not well defined, it is unclear whether the establishment of a “technical committee for the projectâ€? used information generated by the project or is simply a technical step in the implementation of the Project, which would imply achieving 25 percent of the target Page 17 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) implementation, monitoring and evaluation. This low funding and procedural challenges for timely fund transfers30 to AGUIDE posed a limiting factor, as some CSOs reported during the Mid Term Evaluation that AGUIDE did not provide sufficient support, guidance, supervision or following of activities at the community level. The six-month delays in the first disbursement (and subsequent six-month extension of the project) and the reduction in the project scope in reducing the number of project districts and platforms supported by the project from eight to five (based on the Mid-Term Evaluation) pointed to lower inefficiencies as initially envisioned. External factors beyond the control of the project team also affected efficiency. These included frequent turn-over of government officials that reduced commitment to the project, persistent political unrest with demonstrations, fighting and clashes delayed planned activities throughout implementation and resulted in little implementation progress after April 2020, as well as COVID-19 related restrictions. The political unrest culminated in the September 2021 coup which led to project suspension, with 90 percent of activities completed. 34. The World Bank task team facilitated cost efficiencies. The first TTL after the GPSA approval was based in Washington DC headquarters but was supervising a World Bank funded operation in Guinea, which allowed him to lead the first year of implementation. The second TTL led the team from mid-2018 to completion. The transition of TTLs were smooth, did not adversely impact administrative costs, and each brought relevant expertise to project activities at different points of the project’s evolution and provided close supervision of project activities. Despite the lack of dedicated funding, the second TTL was also based in Washington DC headquarters and took advantage of quarterly missions to supervise other decentralization-related World Bank projects in Guinea (PACV3 and PAGL), and facilitated learning exchanges across these projects. The second TTL also conducted monthly virtual video conferencing, emails and phone calls to closely monitor and supervise progress of Project activities. This resulted in greater efficiencies, including reduced travel expenses and administrative costs. The GPSA social accountability advisor supported these monitoring activities and facilitated learning and other GPSA projects initiatives to inspire the team. These factors facilitated the transfer and sharing of knowledge on stakeholder dynamics and implementation issues, and realized time and cost savings, especially as the Bank team had not been provided supervision funds by the CMU. 35. Thus, efficiency is overall rated as Substantial. The rating is given that the overall budget/cost was reasonable for the sector and similar projects; the actions taken to increase efficiencies (such as World Bank Supervision), and the reduced efficiency (including implementation delays) was what would be expected, especially given the highly challenging country context of persistent political instability and pressing health crises. 30Based on the Final Evaluation, SFCG's presence in the field was limited due to travel/mobility challenges (and the disbursement of even small amounts of money was linked to their presence). Page 18 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Overall Outcome Rating 36. The Overall Outcome rating for the project is Moderately Satisfactory (see table 4). This rating stems from the ‘High’ Relevance of the Project throughout implementation, and ‘Substantial’ ratings for efficacy and efficiency whereby there were moderate shortcomings in its efficacy and efficiency. This is also in view that the implementation progress of the project (especially at the later stage) and the full achievement of outcomes were unavoidably affected negatively by extenuating and destabilizing circumstances throughout the project duration. This included persistent political unrest and crises (see Annex 3 for further details) - that resulted in protests, violent clashes, curfews – even cumulating to a military coup in September 2021 (and suspension of Bank activities in Guinea); as well as safety concerns arising from health emergencies of Lassa fever and COVID-19 pandemic. Yet, in spite of these challenges, the project did make substantial contributions to build and enhance collaborative social accountability mechanisms as well as enhance transparency and accountability in the use of funds for health and education services, particularly at the local level. The project was also quick to adapt to the changing circumstances, including helping to prevent the spread of COVID-19 through public awareness efforts conducted in parallel to the planned project activities targeting the local population, particularly through radio campaigns in local languages. Table 2: Summary of Key Project Ratings Relevance Efficacy Efficiency Overall Outcome Rating High Substantial Substantial Moderately Satisfactory Other Outcomes and Impacts 37. Gender. The impact on women was positive but limited. The Project emphasized the involvement of women (and youth and marginalized groups) in all capacity building activities and social organizations, which was the desired impact for equitable participation, representation and accountability. The Project found that in general there is a lack of representation of women in the national institutions and CSOs associated with the Project. As noted by the 2018 Participatory Assessment, only seven women, amongst 643 people, worked in the 58 health and education services and 69 CSOs. The Baseline Study provided insight into women’s perceptions, needs and challenges and informed project design and activities. Participation of women in project activities however remained less than ideal, demonstrating a lack of gender equity. While the project sought to increase gender representation, female participation remained low, with only 44 percent of participants in the Baseline Study were women; 29.5 percent of participants in the roll-out of the scorecards (training and implementation) were female against a target of 40 percent; and only 25 percent of members of the prefectural CSOs set up in May 2019 were women. In response, in 2020, SFCG organized two exchange forums exclusively for women to enable them to effectively share their opinion and concerns. Women did benefit from participating in the Project, as demonstrated by a testimonial from a female member of the Forécariah's CSO, who stated “thanks to the training sessions on accountability, its tools such as the "scorecard", I managed to gradually establish a culture of accountability within my organization. Currently, all managers, including myself, have become accustomed to being accountable for their actions to all members of the organizationâ€?. However, Page 19 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) women continued to remain underrepresented in the delivery of health and education services and participation remained low through to project closing. 38. Unintended positive impacts. The initial meetings/collaboration of the social accountability platforms had generated interest and was a positive influence on some government staff from other sectors, notably agriculture and mining, who subsequently also started to consult and explore building similar platforms to promote accountability in their respective sectors. Furthermore, in N'Zérékoré, some platform members were also sometimes trained as "actors for peace" by SFCG, and sometimes worked with other platform members to intervene to resolve local communal/ethnic conflicts, with some anecdotal evidence that these "peace lessons" have been internalized by the platform members who now present themselves as mediators31. III. KEY FACTORS THAT AFFECTED IMPLEMENTATION AND OUTCOME Key Factors During Preparation 39. Lessons learned from previous country and Bank-wide experience. In designing the Project, the World Bank emphasized building on the results and experiences of the US$ 10 million “Governance and Accountability in the Public Sectorâ€? program, which focused on strengthening citizen engagement in the monitoring of budget and civil service reforms, and to leverage the capacity developed and the lessons learned from the Project to inform the implementation of public sector reforms that were underway as part of the post-Ebola recovery. The Bank team also incorporated findings of analytical studies and the World Bank’s wide experience with building/enhancing governance and the social accountability approach in Africa and in fragile states in the design of the Project. This informed a relatively well conceptualized project design at project appraisal, with simple project objectives supported by three components that clearly defined activities. 40. Early reorientation of the Project’s focus helped ensure continued alignment with the country’s changing needs and long-term governance and development objectives. The shift in the Project’s focus to support the PNDES 2016-20, specifically to improve social cohesion, was appropriate and timely as the Ebola epidemic was over by the time the Financing Agreement was signed. This enabled the effective use of project time, effort and resources towards the broader objective of building/strengthening social accountability platforms to effectively handle current and future health and education needs of local communities, which proved timely with the COVID-19 crisis that followed in 2019. However, from the onset, further strategic alignment and discussions with key stakeholders could have been sought with other WB operations supporting decentralization and participatory local development to further enhance project impact. 31 Findings of the Final Evaluation. Page 20 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Key Factors During Implementation 41. Early engagement with relevant ministries led to effective commitment and collaboration. Following effectiveness, the project team met with the relevant ministries, such as health, education, budget and planning, the National Assembly (Parliamentary Clusters for Budget and Finance), and the National Council of Civil Society Organizations (CNOSC). They were then invited to form a Technical Support Committee. These strategies helped to secure government’s and CSO’s buy-in and commitment to the Project and facilitated collaboration in disseminating information on the post Ebola recovery process, including the simplified budget guides about post-Ebola recovery and encouraging citizens to participate in health and education decision making activities at the community level. 42. Limited supervision budget for the Project made it challenging for the World Bank to supervise implementation32. This limited the World Bank team’s presence in Guinea and to effectively engage with SFCG and other stakeholders, as well as to monitor and assess the quality of the IEC strategy, including how often and where the radio/TV programs were aired, as programs were not recorded and as SFCG did not maintain such records. Nonetheless, the World Bank team sought to circumvent this limitation by riding on the supervision missions of other World Bank projects in Guinea to meet with the SFCG team and undertake Bank supervision for this project. 43. Multiple changes in staffing in the SFCG project team challenged project implementation and supervision. The high turnover within the SFCG team (at all levels – country director, project manager and project team members), inadequate in-house hand-overs, and poor records management resulted in lack of project ownership and understanding of the project’s objectives, activities, and Results Framework (including how to calculate and monitor project indicators), which led to delays, inefficiencies and loss of momentum, thereby lessening development impact. The World Bank33 spent considerable time and effort to build collaborative relationships with new SFCG team members, foster their buy-in to project objectives and implementation and monitoring activities, and train SFCG management and staff who were not experienced working with World Bank projects, or familiar with World Bank fiduciary management processes. Changes in the SFCG team also adversely affected implementation in the Nzérékoré Region. With no staff permanently posted in the regional office, combined with its far proximity from Conakry made the selection of local CSOs, implementation and supervision challenging. Moreover, in the months nearing the closing of the Project, the Project Assistant ended up as Project Manager for the entire Project without any permanent staff. 44. The multiple SFCG staff changes diminished the credibility and impact of the Project. The high turnover meant that relationships with stakeholders, such as the Technical Support Committee had to be repeatedly rebuilt. This "sub-optimal" functioning and constant changes in the project leadership has an impact both on the possibility of systemic change related to the project (e.g. advocacy for new laws and regulations) but also on the overall dynamics of the approach (Final Evaluation). The high staff turn-over, exacerbated the implementation challenges from the unstable country context, and further contributed to the uneven ground implementation, with nothing happening for up to five months at certain times. This might also have inadvertently led to a loss of confidence in stakeholders on the importance and SFCG’s commitment to the 32 Project supervision was provided by the Country Management Unit and limited to US$ 20,000 per year, with no additional funding provided by GPSA. 33 On the World Bank side, there was one change in the Task Team Leader during the life of the Project, in mid-2018. Page 21 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) sustainability of the project activities like the social accountability platforms. Furthermore, staff changes also exacerbated the lack communication between SFCG and AGUIDE which affected implementation, monitoring of project activities, including the utilization of social accountability tools. This led people to believe that the Project had been abandoned and undermined its credibility34. 45. Changes in high level government officials and SFCG management reduced commitment to the Project and undermined sustainability. The initial high commitment of authorities to the project activities soon declined due to the growing instability in the country that disrupted activities and also led to a series of changes of national executives (e.g. heads of national agencies), who either needed to acquire awareness of the Project, were not replaced, or replaced with/ delegated to representatives with less commitment/decision-making authority.35 Furthermore, the multiple changes in SFCG senior management for the Project meant that relationships had to be constantly rebuilt. These factors also undermined sustainability by hindering the regional platforms from acquiring formal status/ accreditation, in combination with other challenges in securing sustained resourcing, possible resistance from the shifts in the balance of power in formalization, and changes in SFCG priorities (with the closure of SFCG’s local office in Guinea). 46. Effectiveness of implementing the IEC strategy improved over time. Initially, the majority of TV and radio programs/campaigns were produced by the Project were exclusively made in French, and the programs were not broadcasted during peak listening hours on local radio stations. Findings of the mid-term evaluation showed that as a result, information about the reforms and citizen’s role in accountability were not understood by many locals. This was then corrected, especially for COVID-19 awareness raising in early 2021 conducted in local languages and utilizing unused funds. Subsequently, by the end of the Project, citizen testimonials demonstrate that reforms undertaken by the State, especially in the health and education sectors, are better understood by the majority of the populations and there has been a gradual increase in people’s involvement in the implementation of these reforms at the local level. 47. Furthermore, external challenges such as civil unrest/ violence and health emergencies throughout the Project life hindered collaborations with government and stakeholders and delayed activities. Implementation of project activities were affected by demonstrations, violence and clashes with authorities. These civil unrest took place periodically arising from civil protests demanding increases in teachers’ salaries (2017 and 2018); around local elections (2018); increases in fuel prices (2018); forceful evictions in Conakry and NzeÌ?reÌ?koreÌ? (2019); and around the national elections and revisions to the Constitution to extend a third term in office to the incumbent President in 2020 which were widely perceived as unconstitutional and rigged, and ultimately led to the September 2021 military coup (a summary of the key socio-political events is provided in Annex 4). Amidst this, a small outbreak of Lassa Fever in early 2019, and was followed by the COVID-19 pandemic with Government setting restrictions on travelling and gatherings in Conakry on March 13, 2020 and soon thereafter extended to the entire country, which disrupted planned activities such as RCSOAP forums and TEP meetings. The numerous protests and violent clashes (including curfews), combined with COVID-19 restrictions, also severely disrupted mobility in the capital and in other cities over safety concerns, hindered project planning and implementation and consumed the time of staff, partners/CSOs and other stakeholders as they also attended to the pressing needs of the crisis (e.g., COVID-19). Protest and delays around local elections also resulted in prolonged absence of local level government representatives to work with, stalling the progress and momentum of the project activities and organization of the platforms and 34 Based on findings of the Final Evaluation. 35 Final Evaluation. Page 22 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) forums. 48. Implementing quarterly meetings of the CSO platforms and RCSOAPs became increasingly challenging . The Project strived to ensure all the members of the platforms attended the meetings, as full participation would help ensure the platforms were inclusive and effective. However, it was difficult to find suitable meeting slots when all or a sufficient number of members of the platforms were available. This was exacerbated by the repeated civil strikes, demonstrations and violence that made travelling difficult and diverted the focus away from the project. The political environment also disincentivized government officials from participating in public forums such as the platforms and TEPs for fear of political fallout. These challenges also made it difficult to reach and engage state representatives and public administration executives who were unavailable or reluctant to take part in activities, such as participating in media (television programs) or public events for fear of political fallout or potential reprisals, necessitating repeated rescheduling and implementation delays. Nonetheless, the project adopted new communication and training strategies to enable the continuation of some activities during COVID-19 restrictions – such as WhatsApp and video conferencing – though it was ultimately insufficient to prevent the decline in platform activities and influence (induced by the increasingly fragile country context). 49. The project was also relatively agile and responsive in adapting its activities to meet the emerging and pressing needs of the country: • Project prefectures were reduced from eight to five in the two targeted regions. This was based on the recommendation of the Mid-term Evaluation given the project’s limited financial capacity and limited M&E capacity within SFCG. Communities with more dynamic social accountability platform members were selected to continue participation, namely Guéckédou, Macenta, Lola, Kindia and Forécariah. • Support to forcefully evicted households. Forceful evictions in suburbs of Conakry and NzeÌ?reÌ?koreÌ? during February–March 2019, affected many families, including children as the Government did not take any measures to provide health facilities and schools. Many children had to change schools, faced increased school fees, or dropped out. In this context, in April 2019, the Project, in collaboration with the national platform for social accountability, held meetings with the school authorities of the Ratoma commune to draw attention to the issues. • Promoting social cohesion. From December 2019 to December 2020, several community conflicts erupted in the project areas of Koyamah and Macenta resulting in casualties and considerable destruction of private properties. Although SFCG faced difficulty carrying out activities in these areas, it took advantage of meetings with the prefectural CSO platforms to address the inter-community conflicts and invited members to become more involved in sensitizing their fellow citizens to promote social cohesion. • Collaboration with health services. The identification of a case of Lassa fever in the regional hospital in Mamou raised fear among the population of a new epidemic as serious as Ebola. In total, 114 people were found to have contracted Lassa fever. SFCG, local partners and the national social accountability platform invited health services providers to be active members of local social accountability platforms. This facilitated collaboration between state and non-state health service providers on Project activities that strove to prevent crisis similar to Ebola. • Raising COVID-19 awareness. The first case of COVID-19 was registered in the country on March 12, 2020. To support COVID-19 awareness raising, SFCG established a crisis response committee at their Page 23 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) national office with participation of field office staff, which met on a weekly basis to adopt COVID-19 recommendations into their programs, and used the communication mechanisms developed with radio associations to raise public awareness /sensitizing communities on Ebola to effectively raise awareness about COVID-19 preventive measures and support social cohesion. 50. Nevertheless, very little progress was made after the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic around March 2020, and the momentum of the project activities was adversely affected and activities largely came to a halt. The project had a good start but struggled to take-off. While communities were committed and started to work, there was limited follow-up provided by SFCG and AGUIDE as they were hindered by the persistent violent political and social unrest, as well as Government restrictions on travel and gatherings related to COVID-19 further hindered town hall meetings, RCSOAP forums, as well as monitoring of project activities in the field. Thereafter, violence protests and unrests over outcomes of the presidential election of October 18, 2020 (perceived to be rigged and unconstitutional), led to a military coup on September 5, 2021, headed by Mr. Mamady Doumbouya, following which he dissolved the government and constitution, and was sworn in as interim president on October 1, 2021. The World Bank subsequently suspended Project activities (as well all other projects in the Guinea portfolio in compliant with the World Bank’s operations policy 7.30) until it closed, as planned, on October 31, 2021. The halted planned activities included advocacy at the national level for improvements in the health and education sectors, the final project reflection session, and meetings for sharing and exchanging experiences between the platforms and other Guinean civil society actors. 51. The Final Evaluation36 was delayed but completed by June 2022. Procuring the services of an evaluator was initially delayed by COVID-19 restrictions and thereafter due to suspension of Project activities following the military coup, although the Terms of Reference for the Final Evaluation was ready and the task was about to begin, when the coup happened and the activity was put on hold. As the evaluation was considered an activity by the World Bank’s Legal Team, and as the remaining Project activities were suspended after the coup, contracting the evaluator by SFCG was not possible before closing of the project in October 2021. The GPSA decided to launch the final evaluation after project closing to ensure that lessons could be drawn from this Project, especially given its contextual factors. In addition, it took some time to find a French speaking evaluator who could follow GPSA guidance and be able to travel to Guinea to complete the field work and meet directly with project stakeholders. The evaluators faced obstacles in conducting a rigorous evaluation as SFCG had closed their offices in Guinea after the completion of the Project and could not be contacted, and as many participating beneficiaries were reluctant to participate in the survey having felt that support to the platforms and communities had largely come to an end. IV. BANK PERFORMANCE, COMPLIANCE ISSUES, AND RISK TO DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME 36Jean-Benoit Emmanuel P Motte Dit Falisse and Mamadou Saliou Kalifa Diallo. Final Evaluation of the Build Back Better Project: Building Back Better, Strengthening Civil Society's Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs in Guinea, Conakry. June 2022 Page 24 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Bank Performance 52. The quality of Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) was Modest. The Project’s Results Framework linked project activities to measure project development objectives. However, overly ambitious indicators (i.e., outcome indicator 2), as well as the lack of clarity/ subjectivity in the indicator definition37, the lack of documentation or complexity38 on how certain indicators was to be measured, the failure of the Baseline Evaluation to collect baseline data, the many changes to SFCG management and staffing, and poor records management of project activities led to a lack of understanding of how to collect, define, measure and track the results indicators. Consequently, although SFCG regularly submit semi-annual and annual progress reports using the GPSA template, it did not monitor progress through the agreed indicators, or communicate updates to the Results Framework throughout the life of the project. This was due in part to having only one M&E officer responsible for multiple projects, and the high turnover of their staff which led to a lack of understanding of critical Project design and monitoring aspects. In addition, given the fragile and conflict affected context, the monitoring arrangements were not ideal given limited accessibility, especially to regional, remote and violent affected areas, and the limited role of local partners (AGUIDE and NGOs) in monitoring of activities on the ground. This resulted in significant shortcomings in the implementation and utilization of the M&E system, as SFCG did not update the Results Framework and data on some of the indicators at completion was not available39. Nonetheless, the findings of the independent mid-term Evaluation provided some level of monitoring with corrective adjustments to be made. This included: (i) reducing the number of prefectures supported by the project from eight to five; (ii) implementation of new activities that involved local populations, such as the forums for popular expression (TEP); (iii) production of participatory theater40 to distill information about the reforms and social accountability mechanisms; (iv) the production of radio and TV programs in local languages (instead of only French); and (v) teaching the parents’ association “how to organize educational discussion sessions in the neighborhoods and sectors with all of the existing actors in the communitiesâ€? that lead to good governance in the school environment and transparency in actions; and (vi) improvements in health service delivery. 53. Bank Performance was rated Moderately Satisfactory. In terms of quality of entry, the Bank facilitated the preparation of the project design that was strategically relevant in supporting the engagement of stakeholders for improved health and education service delivery; though the Bank could better support strategic alignment with the broader World Bank operational portfolio and integration with the government system/ formalization of envisioned structures for greater sustainability. Due diligence assessments (FM and Procurement) were also completed during preparation. The Bank also supported the timely adjustments to the project to respond to the 37 E.g. what type of knowledge products were qualify to contribute to the indicator on “Number of knowledge products about political economy analysis and dynamics produced by the projectâ€? 38 The following indicators were complex and difficult to monitor: “Percent of targeted communal budgets integrating recommendations from local meetingsâ€?; and “Percent of recommendations from Public Expression Forums (Tribunes d’expression Populaire, TEP) actions plans implemented.â€? 39 Indicators without data at completion include: “Percent of targeted communal budgets integrating recommendations from local meetingsâ€?; and “Percent of recommendations from Public Expression Forums (Tribunes d’expression Populaire, TEP) actions plans implemented.â€? 40 These involved, health and education staff, NGOs and associations and students from Conakry. Page 25 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) changes in the country context (e.g., shift of focus to supporting governance more broadly upon the abatement of Ebola, COVID pandemic) and results from the Mid-Term Evaluation (e.g. reducing project districts). 54. In terms of quality of supervision, the Bank was diligent in undertaking supervision and promoting synergies and learning within the country. Despite the lack of dedicated budget for Bank supervision including for missions, the second TTL proactively leveraged quarterly missions funded by two other World Bank operations in Guinea (PACV3 and PAGL) to conduct in-person supervision and meetings with SFCG. However, documentation was sometimes lacking and the Bank faced challenges in terms of ensuring quality performance reporting from SFCG, exacerbated by the unstable country context and high SFCG staff turnover. Nonetheless, the TTLs provided ongoing programmatic support, establish links to similar World Bank projects in other countries, conducted site visits at SFCG premises in 2017 and assessed the capacity of the organization (software, management tools, etc.) to support the project, and provided guidance on the drafting of periodic reports. 55. The Bank also took the initiative to facilitate learning exchanges and synergies. The Bank supported participation by SFCG staff in the GPSA forum in Washington DC, during October 30, 2017 – November 1, 201741, which reinforced capacity on social accountability through the various conferences, peer-learning opportunities, and training on grant management and World Bank procedures, particularly in conflict/ post conflict countries. Moreover, the TTLs emphasized integration/collaboration on the social accountability approach within SFCG across all projects being implemented, and with other CSOs and NGOs working in the governance sector. The TTLs also facilitated learning exchanges between SFCG staff with government stakeholders and NGOs/CSOs at two workshops42, as well as with other World Bank funded programs, such as the PREMA and the PACV3. The aim was to explore synergies and opportunities, particularly with other health and education projects to collaborate and complement each other’s program. This was to continue strengthening impact in terms of governance and social accountability and ensure program sustainability. Implementation support focused on maximizing development impact and resulted in adjustments, including a project restructuring to extend the closing date by six-months to enable completion of planned activities. 41Participation in the GPSA's 2019 Global Forum was planned, but because of visa related difficulties at the US Embassy in Guinea, the staff designated were not able to attend. 42Information on the two workshops are available at: https://blogs.worldbank.org/governance/live-conakry-its-citizen- engagement-brainstorm and https://blogs.worldbank.org/nasikiliza/civil-society-and-government-agencies-guinea- collaborate-fight-against-covid-19 Page 26 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Compliance Issues 56. Environmental and Social. No safeguard policies were triggered for this project. 57. Fiduciary. There were initial fiduciary challenges, such as the six-month delay in the first disbursement to the recipient’s account due to challenges in setting up a bank account and adequate FM systems, which led to the six-month extension of the project’s closing. However, subsequent fiduciary aspects are elaborated below. 58. Procurement. Overall procurement implementation was satisfactory. The many changes in SFCG staff impacted procurement and caused delays, as repeated training was needed on World Bank’s system which took some time to organize. There were also difficulties in recruiting the independent evaluators of the Final Evaluation as budgetary limits did not allow for international tenders, and insufficient number and qualifications of the local applicants were received, especially with the challenging country context. Thus, the procurement process took 15 months to complete, in October 2021. 59. FM. The overall FM was rated as Moderately Satisfactory. SFCG was adequately staffed with an experienced FM manager. Financial records were continuously, and regularly updated, and financial reports/statements were periodically shared with the World bank FM specialist and in the appropriate format. The Project had a proper monitoring and control mechanism for budget execution. However, some weaknesses were identified regarding the financial reporting format in Excel, the high turnover in the FM staff, and the lack of the recruitment of an external auditor. To mitigate the risks related to the non-recruitment of the external auditor, an in-depth financial review was conducted in May 2022. The audit waiver was requested under the World Bank financial management manual. The disbursement ratio at the time of the final mission was 94 percent. Risk to Development Outcome 60. The sustainability of the social accountability platforms and activities is uncertain, for several reasons: a. The National CSOAP’s "compact" is crumbling with political changes and with less frequent meetings, in the fragile and instable environment. As such, the effectiveness of the National CSOAP has weakened and its sustainability is uncertain. b. These platforms never reached their full capacity during the life of the Project and local NGOs were not "empowered" to supervise them. According to the Final Evaluation, the platforms “[ran] out of steam over time and become nothing more than a relatively loose network of actors.â€? By the en d of the Project, the only tool remaining in use was the community newsletter. There is very little evidence that beyond the process of platform discussion and TEPs, that recommendations and ideas Page 27 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) were implemented in any substantial way. Moreover, following Project closure, the frequency of meetings reduced/stopped, also due to the ongoing political/health crises in the country. c. Due to a change in government, there was very little support for the national platform as many of the original staff associated with the Platform have been replaced and it is no longer functioning. d. Despite efforts made, the regional platforms have no legal status and are not embedded within any government structures, and the prefectural platforms have no resources to implement decisions taken. e. The process of developing local development plans (LDPs), purposed to turn discussions into action and lead to development of communal budgets, was suspended with the coup. f. The Project failed to establish effective synergies with other organizations (e.g., CSOs) and social accountability platforms, and/or engage others on the governance and social accountability platforms established by the Project. This is despite the Bank team communicating to SFCG throughout the implementation the importance of activating measures to ensure the sustainability of the program by engaging local health and education committees, representatives of the line ministries, municipalities and provinces to become part of these platforms. g. The uncertain socio-political context characterized by major changes within the public administration and municipal councilors, lack of financial support for the social accountability platforms, poor application of laws by some public administrators, and failure by the local authorities to take on board some of the major recommendations from the various forums are other significant barriers to sustaining the Project's achievements and development outcomes. h. Lastly, SFCG did not have a substantial exit strategy for the project to ensure sustainability. The organization of an advocacy meeting, with prefectural and regional platforms before the Project closed, never took place despite recommendations and facilitative efforts made by the World Bank team on linking to existing institutions and public agencies43. Sustainability could also have been better built into project design through closer integration with government systems and the World Bank operational country portfolio. Additionally, as the SFCG office has closed in Guinea, the internal capacity built up within the organization is lost. The capacity building of local actors has been limited. Nonetheless, according to the Final Evaluation, AGUIDE has been involved in almost all Project activities and has developed capacity including in social accountability tools and facilitation. V. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 61. Organizational stability and staff continuity of the implementing agency are key to effective and sustainable implementation. Limited capacity and high turnover of SFCG management resulted in information gaps, implementation delays, and conveyed a lack of commitment that affected the credibility and sustainability of the project activities. The history of staff turnover and continuity planning procedures could be reviewed as part of the process of selecting and evaluating implementing partners, with handover practices discussed and This includes National Agency for Local Government Financing (ANAFIC), their regional offices and local 43 development agents whose mandate are to support local-level citizen engagement activities Page 28 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) agreed upon (e.g., proper documentation, early notice to the World Bank, minimum handover period or having maximum no. of changes in staff team). Especially in a fragile, conflict and violence (FCV) context, it is critical to select NGO implementing partners with a strong, longstanding and stable local presence in the country and are able to demonstrate a long-term commitment to the country’s development and the local communities (such as reputable local NGOs). 62. Emphasizing strategic alignment and integration of GPSA projects with World Bank’s operational portfolio in the country from the onset, to enhance project impact and synergistic dividends for greater sustainability. Impact and sustainability of the project outcomes could be better achieved by promoting closer alignment with the broader World Bank’s operational strategy in the country, as well as leveraging activities/networks/ tools and building in collaborative mechanisms with relevant World Bank operations in the country - from project design and throughout project implementation - in particular with decentralization and citizen engagement flagship programs undertaking similar efforts.44 63. Ensuring or institutionalizing adequate yearly CMU allocation of resources dedicated to World Bank supervision from the onset is critical for effective project monitoring and implementation. Limited budget for the project made World Bank field implementation supervision and in-person engagement with SFCG and other relevant stakeholders challenging, even before COVID-19. 64. The broader NGO modus operandi in Guinea limited sharing of tools, materials, and mechanisms for monitoring budget allocation and spending developed by the Project. Despite the Bank team’s efforts to ensure sustainability of project activities, NGOs in Guinea did not have the practice of sharing the tools, materials and mechanisms they develop with other organizations/agencies, including due to the lack of strong incentives for collaboration (such as competition for limited resources/funding). This limited establishing synergies with other government, organizations and the World Bank projects, which were also supporting social cohesion, participatory monitoring, or social accountability committees. 65. Citizens need to be educated on their rights to effectively participate in social accountability activities. At the start of the Project, SFCG believed it was mainly the public service providers and the decision-makers who refused to be transparent with citizens. Implementation revealed that citizens were not taking any initiatives to demand information and accountability as they did not know their rights, while some administrators also tried to influence citizens on the rating of the scorecards due to their low levels of education. Training and communication improved stakeholder knowledge of their rights and duties with regard to the management of public affairs, and in the best interest of the whole community. 66. Establishment of the social accountability platforms should start bottom-up and can also serve to promote conflict resolution. SFCG initially engaged with the National CSOAP, established in 2016, to support capacity building of the lower-level platforms. However, given the limited capacity and insular nature of the National CSOAP, establishment of these platforms should start bottom-up starting with the communes, sub- prefectural, prefectural and regional levels and then the national level in order to build/enhance trust between 44 E.g. PACV3 and PAGL. Page 29 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) governments and public service providers. Furthermore, the prefectural CSO platforms under the project have also shown to be more effective in informing improvements in service delivery at the local level (compared to the national level) as well as effective in resolving inter-community conflict, which can also build trust and credence to pave the way for establishing accredited and sustained higher level platforms. After credibility is built at the lower-level platforms, this will also provide stronger impetus and political will for the establishment of higher-level platforms (at regional and national levels) that would require more formal accreditation for sustained credibility and convening power in bringing key decision makers to influence broader policy and sector strategies. 67. On-going training, engagement and follow-up is crucial for ensuring sustainability of platforms. As the members of the platforms changed/transferred, the training acquired within the platform members was gradually depleted. There was also a strong need for repeated/ regular training, as these newly acquired skills were not cultivated due to the sporadic nature of the platform meetings. The project’s exit and sustainability strategy should have been more proactively planned and implemented – for example, by coordinating with other more permanent public agencies or posts at the local level, so that capacities built, and lessons learned by the project would not be lost. 68. A well-developed M&E and robust record keeping is essential for implementing social accountability mechanisms in FCV context. In the volatile and dynamic FCV context, rigorous M&E was crucial for monitoring progress, making timely course corrections, and for ensuring project sustainability. The Mid-Term and Final Evaluations provided the only independent assessment and results, as SFCG did not maintain good records, and the World Bank team were not required to produce Aide Memoires and ISRs to document results, issues and decisions. The Result Framework indicators (and how they are measured) should also be clearly defined to avoid ambiguity (e.g. indicating the envisioned scale of a recommendation or criteria on what constitutes a knowledge product). Subsequently, findings of the Final Evaluation, provided seven months after project closing, were hampered by very limited contact with SFCG, but was the only source of results, which pose challenges to the preparation of the ICR. . Page 30 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) ANNEX 1. RESULTS FRAMEWORK AND KEY OUTPUTS A. RESULTS INDICATORS A.1 PDO Indicators Objective/Outcome: Increased transparency and accountability in the use of post-Ebola recovery funds for health and education services Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Decisions enaceted by PREMA, Number 0.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 central and subnational agencies that leverage info 31-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 generatioed by the project to improve the implementation of NDP including the Post Ebola Priority Action Plan (PAPP) Comments (achievements against targets): Target was not met. Objective/Outcome: Build/increase collaborative social accountability mechanisms in targeted provinces and at the central level of government. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Page 31 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Targeted regional and local civil Percentage 0.00 65.00 65.00 82.00 society accountability platforms and gov counterparts with 31-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 incrased skills to monitor budget allocations and spedning Comments (achievements against targets): Target was exceeded. A.2 Intermediate Results Indicators Component: Strengthen government and civil society capacity to design, implement and monitor budget allocation and spending, and basic service delivery Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of service points Number 0.00 20.00 20.00 25.00 demonstrating improvements, based on findings from 31-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 Participatory Score cards Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Page 32 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Percent of trained civil society Percentage 0.00 60.00 60.00 69.00 and gov actors using advanced budget analysis techniques 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Percentage of RCSOAPs forums Percentage 0.00 80.00 80.00 75.00 at the local level that are inclusive, accessible, and open 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Target not met. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Percentage of public in Percentage 60.00 60.00 60.00 62.00 targeted are that feels well informed on the level of 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 27-Jun-2019 progress towards improved budget allocation, spending and imroved basic services delivery in their locality Comments (achievements against targets): Page 33 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Target met. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Percentage of public in Percentage 0.00 60.00 60.00 79.00 targeted areas that feels that they have the opportunity to 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 27-Jun-2019 provide input into the National Devvelopment Plan including the Ebola recoverty and reform process Comments (achievements against targets): Target exceeded. Component: Create opportunities for government and civil society actors to leverage findings of budget and service delivery monitoring to improve basic services Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Recommendations from TEP Percentage 0.00 60.00 60.00 0.00 actions plans implemented 31-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 Comments (achievements against targets): Data not available. Target not met Indicator Name Unit of Baseline Original Target Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Page 34 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) Measure Target Completion Percentage of targeted Percentage 0.00 60.00 60.00 0.00 communal budgets integrating recommendations from local 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 31-Mar-2021 27-Jun-2019 meetings. Comments (achievements against targets): Data not available. Target not met. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Percentage of population Percentage 0.00 50.00 50.00 46.00 targeted in the advocacy campaign aware of 10% budget 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 27-Jun-2019 mandate to tbe dedicated to health Comments (achievements against targets): Target not met. Component: Knowledge and learning for improved project results and Project Management Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Examples where learning from Number 0.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 monitoring and evaluation has contributed to improvements 31-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 14-Jul-2020 Page 35 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) of operational strategy of the project. Comments (achievements against targets): Target not met. Unit of Formally Revised Actual Achieved at Indicator Name Baseline Original Target Measure Target Completion Number of knowledge Number 0.00 4.00 4.00 2.00 products about political economiy analysis and 30-Mar-2017 25-Apr-2017 30-Mar-2021 27-Jun-2019 dynamics produced by the project Comments (achievements against targets): Target not met. Page 36 of 42 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) . ANNEX 2. PROJECT COST BY COMPONENT Amount at Approval Actual at Project Percentage of Approval Components (US$M) Closing (US$M) (US$M) Strengthening government and civil society capacity to design, implement and 485,000 477,129.49 98% monitor budget allocation and spending, and basic service delivery Creating opportunities for government and civil society actors to leverage findings of 220,000 197,893.49 90% budget and service delivery monitoring to improve basic services Sharing knowledge and lessons learned and project 95,000 74,365.78 78% management Total 800,000.00 749,388.76 93.67% Page 37 of 41 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) ANNEX 3. CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF SOCIO-POLITICAL DYNAMICS AND CIVIL UNREST THAT IMPACTED IMPLEMENTATION OF PROJECT ACTIVITIES Throughout the life of the Project, on-going multidimensional political and economic challenges impacted the country resulting in civil unrest, violent demonstrations and clashes. This made project planning and collaboration with CSOs and state representatives difficult, and delayed implementation of activities. A summary of the key socio-political events is provided below. Socio-Political crises • September to November 2017—Student protests demanding teachers’ salary increase. Students protested demanding that government respect the 2016 agreement with and teachers’ unions to raise teachers’ salary. This prevented holding of regular classes, and the protests turned violent with several casualties and loss of lives. • February to March 2018 — Protests and school strikes. Protests and clashes between students and three weeks of strikes led to the closure of many public and private schools, particularly in Conakry. In mid-March, citizens mobilized to pressure government, with government agreeing to increase teachers’ salaries by 40 percent. Thereafter, other trade unions asked for improvements for their employees, particularly in the health sector and were granted by the government. • February – March 2018 — Political tensions and violence surrounding local elections. Local elections that took place in February 2018 were preceded by months of political tensions and violence. Several months after the elections, the results were still being widely contested by the opposition parties. On February 26, 2018 and March 12, 2018, the leaders of the opposition parties declared Conakry a ‘ghost city’ and incited the population to stay at home to protest the results of the local elections. In some neighborhoods, such as Koloma, young people took to the streets and engaged in violence against the local police, which confined people to their homes for days. As an act of protest, representatives of the opposition parties left their positions at the Monitoring Committee (as per the political accords of October 12, 2016). To appease the situation, the government announced the establishment of 330 (out of 342) non-contentious municipal councils. However, this created a gap between the mandates of the councils elected in the February 2018 elections and the subsequent delays in appointing the elected councils generated several months of tensions in Conakry from late 2018. • May 2018 — The President of Guinea made the executive decision to reshuffle his cabinet, appointing Mr. Kassory Fofana as the new Prime Minister, and 34 new ministers formed the new government, which included only four women and two members from opposition parties. The appointing of only four women was criticized by many in the online community, as this did not reach the 15 percent quota of women’s representation. • June – July 2018 — On June 20, 2018, the government announced a 20 percent increase in fuel prices at petrol/gas stations, from 8,000 GNF ($0.89) to 10,000 GNF ($1.11), in line with recommendations Page 38 of 41 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) from the IMF and the World Bank. The decision was sharply criticized for its lack of consultation and impact on the population, as more than 57 percent of citizens live on less than US$1/day. Citizens, trade unions, and representatives of the opposition took to the streets in July in protest, which paralyzed many areas of the country. • July 2018 — The government adopted a new law regarding the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI) that redefined the CENI composition to 17 members: one from the MATD and 14 members from political parties (7 from the President’s party, 7 from the opposition), with the participation of civil society reduced from three to two members. This law was seen to further promote the politicization of the CENI and increased the authority of the Ministry of Territorial Administration and Decentralization (MATD) in the organization of elections in Guinea. The law was viewed as a direct violation of the political agreement of October 12, 2016, and was not unanimously accepted. The 17 new commissioners of the CENI took the oath of office on January 21, 2019. • January 2019: Memorandum agreement signed between the trade union SLECG and Government to allow the resumption of classes following the new teachers strike that began in October 2018. • February – March 2019 — Forceful evictions in the suburbs of Conakry and in NzeÌ?reÌ?koreÌ?. Despite many warnings, the Government launched forceful evictions in the suburbs of Conakry and in NzeÌ?reÌ?koreÌ?, with the aim to develop the Koloma directional center and decongest the administrative and business district of Kaloum, which were illegally occupied by shopkeepers. This action provoked strong reactions, and in the absence of a relocation program, increased tensions in the two localities. As the Government did take any measures to provide health and schooling for these children, many children had to change schools, faced increased school fees, or dropped out. • April 2019 — From early 2019, political discussions focused on giving President Alpha Condé a third term in office by amending the Guinean Constitution. In response, on April 4, 2019, the main Guinean opposition parties and CSOs created a coalition called the National Front for the Defense of the Constitution (FNDC) to prevent President Condé from seeking a third term in office in 2020. From October 14 2019 to January 2020, the FNDC launched a series of protests, resulting in several deaths and serious injuries, and significant property damage throughout the country. • March 2020 — Following the double parliamentary and constitutional referendum of March 22, 2020, several demonstrations were organized by FNDC and resulted in many casualties and significant damage to property. • October 2020 — The date for the presidential elections was set (by presidential decree) for October 18, 2020, however several political parties refrained from participating in this presidential race, which they felt was neither free, constitutional or transparent. When Cellou Dalein Diallo, the main opponent to Alpha Conde, declared himself the winner on the morning of October 19, 2020, well before the proclamation of the results by the CENI, tensions erupted in almost every city, resulting in several deaths and significant property damage. Page 39 of 41 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) • November 2020 — On November 7, 2020, the Constitutional Court confirmed the re-election of President Alpha Condé, reporting nearly 60 percent of the votes cast were in his favor and far ahead of his challenger Cellou Diallo, who received only 33.49 percent of the votes. Clashes broke out in several cities, and was repressed by the defense and security forces, causing many deaths and serious injuries. • October 2021. The revisions to the Guinean Constitution to extend a third term in office to the president, and outcomes of the presidential election of October 18, 2020, were widely perceived as unconstitutional, rigged and in transparent and resulted in widespread protests and violence. This led to a military coup on September 5, 2021, headed by Mr. Mamady Doumbouya, following which he dissolved the government and constitution, and was sworn in as interim president on October 1, 2021. Health crises • February 2019 — Health authorities announced the identification of a case of Lassa fever in a 35- year-old man admitted to the regional hospital in Mamou. This created fear of a new epidemic as serious as Ebola. The government took immediate measures to prevent further contamination, which contained the breakout to a total 114 people, including 92 people in Mamou and 22 in Kissidougou. • March 2020 — The country registered its first case of COVID-19 on March 12, 2020. The number of cases in Conakry and in the interior of the country steadily increased in the following months. In response, on March 13, the Governor of Conakry announced limitations on gatherings, and later that month, the country declared a state of emergency: Conakry's airport closed on March 23; the country closed its land borders; imposed travel restriction; reopening of exam classes and universities were delayed to June 29, 2020, and wearing of masks was made mandatory. Some of the government restrictions triggered sporadic and violent protests. Page 40 of 41 The World Bank Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs (P162171) ANNEX 4. SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS World Bank documents • World Bank. Grant Agreement. March 2017 • World Bank. April 2017. Project Paper: Building Civil Society Capacity To Engage In State Reform Programs. Report No. PP2251. • World Bank. April 2017. Restructuring Paper: Building Civil Society Capacity To Engage In State Reform Programs. Report No. RES44592 Search For Common Ground documents • Search For Common Grounds. March 2016. Project Proposal: Building Civil Society Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs SFCG: GPSA Grantee Semi-Annual and Annual Progress Reports (in chronological order) • Reporting Period: 1st Annual Report: June 14, 2017 – December 31, 2017. Date Submitted: February 15, 2018. • Reporting Period: June 2017 – June 2018. Date Submitted: October 16, 2018. Revised version October 30, 2018. • Reporting Period: Quarterly Report April 1, 2018 – June 30, 2018. Date submitted; July 30, 2018 • Reporting Period: January 01, 2019 – December 31, 2019. Date submitted February 07, 2019 • Reporting Period: December 2019 – December 2020. Date submitted February 15, 2021 • GPSA Grantee Mid-Term Technical Progress Report. Reporting Period: January 01, 2020 – June 30, 2020. Date submitted; July 13, 2020 • GPSA Grantee Mid-Term Technical Progress Report. Reporting Period: January 01, 2021 – June 30, 2021. Date submitted; August 15, 2021 • GPSA Grantee Final Completion Report; Date Submitted: February 15, 2022 SFCG: Evaluations and assessments • SFCG: Report On The Level Of Community Involvement In Monitoring The Provision Of Health And Education Services. March 2018 • Report of the training mission of regional social accountability platforms on the Scorecard coupled with exchanges between them and the national platform for their institutional capacity building: February 26 to March 8, 2019 • Mamadou Saliou Kalifa Diallo. Mid-Term Evaluation of the Search for Common Ground’s Build Back Better Project: Building Back Better, Strengthening Civil Society's Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs in Guinea, Conakry. June 2022 • Mamadou Saliou Kalifa Diallo and Jean-Benoit Falisse. Final Evaluation of the Search for Common Ground’s Build Back Better Project: Building Back Better, Strengthening Civil Society's Capacity to Engage in State Reform Programs in Guinea, Conakry. June 2022 Page 41 of 41