UKRAINE
RAPID DAMAGE
AND NEEDS
ASSESSMENT
AUGUST 2022
UKRAINE
RAPID DAMAGE AND
NEEDS ASSESSMENT
AUGUST 2022
2
© August 2022, the World Bank, Government of Ukraine, European Commission.
Disclaimer: The Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment – August 2022 report was jointly prepared
by the World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, and the European Commission. The report is based on data
as of June 1, 2022, gathered in the timeframe between May 30 and July 30, 2022. The rapid assessment was
produced in a short timeframe to ensure the relevance of the estimations and in-depth efforts have been
made to improve the accuracy of the information that was collected, analyzed, and verified to the extent
possible. Given the ongoing nature of the conflict and the lack of access in territories temporarily not under
government control, the data collection is primarily remote-based but validated through ground-based
information. The remotely sourced data have been triangulated and validated whenever possible against
ground-based information obtained from the Government of Ukraine, local agencies, the United Nations,
and other international partners. Given these constraints, the authors of the report cannot guarantee the
absolute accuracy of the data included in this work. The report uses the exchange rate US$1 = UAH 27.28
from December 31, 2021.
Boundaries, colors, denominations, and other information presented in this report do not imply any judgment
on the part of the World Bank concerning the legal status of any territory or the endorsement or acceptance
of such boundaries.
Design: Sarah Alameddine
Editor: Anne Himmelfarb
Photos: Julia Burlachenko; Ipsos, for the World Bank. Front cover photo: Kharkiv, by Ipsos.
3
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS 8
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 10
FOREWORD 11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
12
Summary of Damage, Losses, and Needs 14
Macroeconomic and Social Impacts 19
Sectoral Assessments 20
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 26
INTRODUCTION 29
Macroeconomic context prior to the war 29
Context of the War 30
Government and International Response 34
RDNA Objectives and Methodology 39
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 43
Macroeconomic Impacts 44
Social Inclusion and Vulnerable Groups 50
Assessment of Impacts 50
DAMAGE, LOSSES, AND NEEDS: SECTOR ASSESSMENTS 62
SOCIAL SECTORS 63
Housing 64
Education 71
Health 80
Social Protection and Livelihoods 88
Culture and Tourism 95
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS 102
Agriculture 103
Irrigation and Water Resources 107
Commerce and Industry 117
Finance and Banking 124
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS 130
Energy and Extractives 131
Transport 148
Telecommunications and Digital 156
Water Supply and Sanitation 163
Municipal Services 168
CROSS-CUTTING AREAS 175
Environment and Natural Resource Management, and Forestry 176
Emergency Response and Civil Protection 193
Justice and Public Administration 201
Land Decontamination 208
TOWARD RECOVERY AND RECONSTRUCTION 217
ANNEXES 236
Annex 1. RDNA Team 236
4
LIST OF TABLES
Table 1. Total damage, losses, and needs by sector (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022 16
Table 2. Damage by oblast for select sectors (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022 17
Table 3. Total recovery and reconstruction needs by sector (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022 18
Table 4. Key RDNA terms 40
Table 5. Damage inventory by asset type as of June 1, 2022 65
Table 6. Damage by oblast as of June 1, 2022 66
Table 7. Losses inventory by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 66
Table 8. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 67
Table 9. Prioritized and sequenced immediate and short-term needs (US$) as of June 1, 2022 69
Table 10. Education sector as of start of 2021/2022 academic year 71
Table 11. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 73
Table 12. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 74
Table 13. Reconstruction and recovery needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 76
Table 14. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million)) as of June 1, 2022 81
Table 15. Damage inventory by oblast and type of provider (number and share) as of June 1, 2022 82
Table 16. Damage inventory by oblast and type of provider (m2 and US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 83
Table 17. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 84
Table 18. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 86
Figure 17. Social protection expenditure share in GDP (%, y axis) compared to GDP per capita
(US$, x axis) (PPP 2011) 89
Figure 18. Composition of social assistance expenditures as percentage of GDP (y axis) 89
Table 19. Damage inventory by asset type (number, US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 90
Table 20. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 91
Table 21. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 92
Table 22. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 97
Table 23. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 97
Table 24. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 99
Table 25. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 104
Table 26. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 104
Table 27. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 105
Table 28. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 106
Table 29. Prioritization categories and corresponding oblasts 109
Table 30. Damage assessment methodology for Category 2 and 3 regions 109
Table 31. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 110
Table 32. Damage by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 111
Table 33. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 112
Table 34. Losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 112
Table 35. Recovery and reconstruction needs Phase 1 and 2 by category (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022 113
Table 36. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 115
Table 37. Summary of key sectoral limitations 116
Table 38. Damage by size/type of firm (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 118
5
Table 39. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 120
Table 40. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 121
Table 41. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 121
Table 42. Financial institutions regulated by National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), end-2021 124
Table 43. Evolution of banking sector soundness 125
Table 44. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 127
Table 45. Loss inventory by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 127
Table 46. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 128
Table 47. Damage by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 136
Table 48. Damage to power transmission by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 136
Table 39. Damage to power generation by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 136
Table 50. Damage to gas transmission network by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 137
Table 51. Damage to district heating networks by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 138
Table 52. Damage to transport fuel infrastructure by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 139
Table 53. Recovery and reconstruction needs per category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 141
Table 54. Recovery and reconstruction needs for power transmission by oblast (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022 142
Table 55. Recovery and reconstruction needs for the power generation sector by oblast
and technology (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 142
Table 56. Recovery and reconstruction needs for gas transmission system operators
per oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 143
Table 57. Recovery and reconstruction needs in district heating sector by oblast and type
of asset (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 143
Table 58. Recovery and reconstruction needs in the transport fuel sector by oblast (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022 144
Table 59. Damage inventory by asset types (units as indicated) as of June 1, 2022 150
Table 60. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 151
Table 61. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 154
Table 62. Damage inventory by asset type (number of facilities) as of June 1, 2022 158
Table 63. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 159
Table 64. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 160
Table 65. Reconstruction and recovery needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 161
Table 66. Damage inventory by asset types (number) as of June 1, 2022 164
Table 67. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 165
Table 68. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 166
Table 69. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 167
Table 70. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 170
Table 71. Loss by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 171
Table 72. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 172
Table 73. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 173
Table 74. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 187
Table 75. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 188
Table 76. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 188
Table 77. Losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 189
Table 78. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 190
6
Table 79. Recovery and reconstruction needs for ancillary assets (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 191
Table 80. Recovery and reconstruction needs by categories (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 192
Table 81. Regional distribution of SESU resources (number) 195
Table 82. Damage inventory by asset types (number) as of June 1, 2022 197
Table 83. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 197
Table 84. Loss by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 198
Table 85. Recovery and reconstruction needs for early warning systems (number)
as of June 1, 2022 199
Table 86. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 199
Table 87. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 200
Table 88. Damage inventory by subsector (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 203
Table 89. Damage inventory by sub-sector and asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 204
Table 90. Damage and losses by oblast (in US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 205
Table 91. Recovery and reconstruction needs by subsector (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022 207
Table 92. Estimated area and needs for land mine and ERW decontamination by oblast
as of June 1, 2022 213
Table 93. Estimated costs for decontamination of land mines and ERW by oblast (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022 214
Table 94. Sectoral highlights and recovery and reconstruction priorities as of June 1, 2022 221
LIST OF FIGURES
Figure 1. Total damage as of June 1, 2022: US$97 billion 14
Figure 2. Total losses as of June 1, 2022: US$252 billion 14
Figure 3. Total needs as of June 1, 2022: US$349 billion 14
Figure 4. Extent of damage by region as of June 1, 2022 15
Figure 5. Combat intensity March–May 2022 (top) and month of June 2022 (bottom) 32
Figure 6. Comparison of March–May period and June in combat (top) and artillery use (bottom) 33
Figure 7. Ukraine Recovery Plan 38
Figure 8. Ukraine’s GDP by oblast in 2020 as share of total (%) 46
Figure 9. Real growth of tax revenue and fiscal expenditure, percent YoY 47
Figure 10. Contributions to expenditure growth (%) 48
Figure 11. Number of registered IDPs in Ukraine (million), March 25–June 1, 2022 51
Figure 12. IDPs registered for the first time since February 24, 2022, by oblast of destination/
registration as of June 1, 2022 51
Figure 13. IOM estimates of IDPs and returnees in Ukraine (million), March–May 2022 52
Figure 14. IOM estimates of IDPs by host macroregion in Ukraine (million), March–May 2022 52
Figure 15. IDPs vs. nondisplaced population by personal ability to earn income (%), May 17–23, 2022 54
Figure 16. Number of IDPs and percentage of damaged education institutions by oblast
as of June 1, 2022 73
Figure 19. Map of total irrigated area by conflict zone prioritization in Ukraine
(including drainage area Volynska) 108
7
Figure 20. Damage by asset type as share of total damage 110
Figure 21. Installed capacity at the end of 2021 (top left), historical trend (top right),
and structure of electricity generation (bottom left) and consumption (bottom right) 132
Figure 22. VIIRS Relative Brightness Levels, January–May 2022 140
Figure 23. Damage by asset category (US$ million) 149
Figure 24. Losses by category (US$ million) 150
Figure 25. Recovery and reconstruction needs by asset type (US$ million) 152
Figure 26. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) 153
Figure 27. Damage, losses, and needs by oblast (US$ million) 153
Figure 28. Environmental incidents by May 5, 2022 178
Figure 29. Environmental risks due to war in Ukraine Environmental risks due to war in Ukraine 179
Figure 30. Nuclear power plants in Ukraine 179
Figure 31. Territories with forest fires in the exclusion zone as of 18:00 on March 28, 2022 180
Figure 32. Tailings storage facilities in Ukraine 182
Figure 33. Prewar forest cover 185
Figure 34. Fire damage records by month during 2022 186
Figure 35. Week-to-week forest fire reports for combat zones (by middle day of reporting period)
showing movement of conflict to different oblasts over the period 187
Figure 36. Estimated areas for non-technical survey 211
Figure 37. Estimated cost of mine action per km2 by type of action as of June 1, 2022 214
Figure 38. Proposed timeline and key activities for mine action 215
LIST OF BOXES
Box 1. RDNA definitions 13
Box 2. Lugano Declaration and Principles 37
Box 3. Damage to the social care institutions for the most vulnerable 91
Box 4. Digital platform Diia: “Country in a Smartphone” 93
Box 5. Needs that may materialize in the social protection sector 93
Box 6. Lessons learned on mine action from international experience 209
8 Abbreviations and Acronyms
ABBREVIATIONS
AND ACRONYMS
bcm billion cubic meters
CBRN chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
CHA Confirmed Hazardous Areas
CHP combined heat and power
CMR cluster munition remnants
CoM Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine
COVID-19 Coronavirus Disease 2019
DaLA Damage and Loss Assessment
DALY disability-adjusted life year
DDos distributed denial-of-service
DGF Deposit Guarantee Fund
DRM disaster risk management
EE energy efficiency
EIB European Investment Bank
ENTSO-E European Network of Transmission System Operators
EOD explosive ordnance disposal
EORE explosive ordnance risk education
ERW explosive remnants of war
EU European Union
FIT feed-in tariff
FX foreign exchange
GDP gross domestic product
GMI Guaranteed Minimum Income
GWh gigawatt hours
HACC High Anticorruption Court
HCJ High Council of Justice
HHI Herfindahl-Hirschman Index
HLO Harmonized Learning Outcomes
HUS Housing Utility Subsidy
I&D irrigation and drainage
IDP Internally Displaced Persons
IMF International Monetary Fund
IOM International Organization for Migration
ISCED International Standard Classification of Education
ISP internet service provider
KSE Kyiv School of Economics
LGBTI lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersex
Mbps megabits per second
M&E monitoring and evaluation
MinRegion Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine
MKIP Ministry of Culture and Information Policy
MoD Ministry of Defence
MoE Ministry of Energy
MEPNR Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources
MoES Ministry of Education and Science
MoH Ministry of Health
MIA Ministry of Internal Affairs
MRTOT Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories
NABU National Anticorruption Bureau of Ukraine
Abbreviations and Acronyms 9
NACP National Agency for Corruption Prevention
NBFI nonbank financial institution
NBU National Bank of Ukraine
NCD noncommunicable disease
NGO nongovernmental organization
NHSU National Health Service of Ukraine
NMAA National Mine Action Authority
NMAC National Mine Action Center
NNP National Nature Park
NPL nonperforming loan
NRC National Recovery Council
NTS nontechnical survey
NUS New Ukrainian School
OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OGP Office of General Prosecutor
OHCHR Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights
OPD organization of persons with disabilities
OSCE Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PHC primary health care
PHC+ primary health care with additional capacity
PIT personal income taxes
PMG Program of Medical Guarantees
POS point-of-sale
PPE personal protective equipment
PV photovoltaic
QoQ quarter over quarter
RDNA Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
RE renewable energy
SAPO Special Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office
SAWR State Agency of Water Resources
SDG Sustainable Development Goal
SESU State Emergency Service of Ukraine
SFRAU State Forest Resource Agency
SGBV sexual and gender-based violence
SHA Suspected Hazardous Areas
SJA State Judicial Administration
SMEs small and medium enterprises
SoB state-owned bank
SoE state-owned enterprise
STEM science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
ToT training-of-trainer
TPP thermal power plant
TRW toxic remnants of war
TS technical survey
TSO transmission system operator
UCPM Union Civil Protection Mechanism
UIP2 World Bank Second Urban Infrastructure Project
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations International Children’s Fund
URC2022 Ukraine Recovery Conference
VET vocational education and training
WEM wholesale electricity market
WRM water resource management
WPP Wind power plant
WSS water supply and sanitation
WUO Water User Organisation
YoY Year over year
10 Acknowledgments
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The Ukraine Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) was jointly prepared by the World Bank, the
Government of Ukraine, and the European Commission, in coordination with government institutions, UN
agencies and development partners, academia, civil society organizations, and the private sector. The RDNA
core team consisted of government representatives, World Bank and European Commission staff and experts.
On the part of the Government of Ukraine, the RDNA was led by the Ministry for Communities and Territories
Development, with support from the Ministry for Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and
the Ministry of Infrastructure. All relevant line ministries have participated in the assessment, in coordination
with the Kyiv School of Economics (KSE).
The report benefited from the contribution of the European Commission led by the Delegation of the European
Union to Ukraine and the Directorate-General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR),
with contributions of other services.
The World Bank’s technical support was provided by the World Bank’s Country Management Unit, the Global
Practice of Urban, Resilience, and Land (GPURL), and other Global Practices and Cross-Cutting areas.
This report benefited from the generous support of the United Kingdom Foreign, Commonwealth and
Development Office’s Good Governance Fund; the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery
(GFDRR); the United States Government, including the State Department; Swiss Secretariat for Economic
Affairs (SECO); and the Swiss Government through the Sustaining Health Sector Reforms in Ukraine Trust
Fund, supported by the Swiss Development Cooperation. Multiple other partners contributed to the report’s
content including the British Foreign Office, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations;
the United Nations International Children’s Fund (UNICEF); the World Health Organization (WHO); the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
The full list of sectoral leads and contributors is included in Annex 1. The RDNA team would like to express its
deep appreciation to all individuals and organizations who contributed to this assessment.
FOREWORD 11
FOREWORD
On February 24, 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine, resulting in civilian casualties, displacement
of millions of people, and widespread and significant destruction to homes, businesses, social institutions,
and productive and economic activity. The impact of the invasion will be felt for generations, with families
displaced and separated, disruptions to human development, destruction of intrinsic cultural heritage and
reversal of a positive economic and poverty trajectory.
The Government of Ukraine, the World Bank Group and the European Commission in cooperation with
development partners, launched a Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA). Following an internationally
accepted methodology, the RDNA aimed to assess the impact of the war on the population, human development,
service delivery, physical assets, infrastructure, productive sectors and the economy. For the purpose of
this assessment, damage from the war between February 24 and June 1, 2022, is included, verified to the
extent possible, and assessed. The RDNA results are preliminary, and damage, losses and needs should be
considered as minimums. As the war continues, the social and economic impact will further increase and
intensify. However, there is a need to start reconstruction and recovery now where it is safe and practical to
do so.
As of June 1, 2022, direct damage has reached over US$97 billion, with housing, transport, and commerce
and industry being the most affected sectors. Damage is concentrated in the frontline oblasts (74 percent),
particularly Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Zaporizka, and in oblasts that were brought back under
government control (22 percent) such as Kyivska and Chernihivska. Disruptions to economic flows and
production, as well as additional expenses associated with the war, are collectively measured as losses
and amount to some US$252 billion. Ukraine’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) shrank by 15.1 percent year
over year in the first quarter of 2022, and poverty is expected to increase from 2 to 21 percent (based on the
poverty line of US$5.5 per person per day).
Reconstruction and recovery needs, as of June 1, are estimated at about US$349 billion, which is more than
1.6 times the GDP of Ukraine in 2021. Integrated into these needs are critical steps toward becoming a modern,
low-carbon, disaster- and climate-resilient, and inclusive country that is more closely aligned with European
Union standards. While the financing envelope is overwhelming, experience from other countries shows that
reconstruction spans many years and a phased approach to reconstruction is critical. The report also details
some US$105 billion needed in the immediate and short term to address the most urgent needs, including
social infrastructure (such as schools and hospitals, especially in areas brought back under government
control), preparation for the upcoming winter through winterization and restoration of heating and energy to
homes, urgent repairs, gas purchases, support to agriculture and social protection, and restoration of vital
transport routes. These actions will lay the groundwork for a safe, prioritized, and efficient reconstruction
and recovery.
The report offers a strong analytical foundation for a comprehensive financial and operational strategy
and plan to support the early recovery and long-term reconstruction of Ukraine, to which we are strongly
committed. This next phase of planning should consider the balancing and prioritization of needs and
investments, absorptive capacity, financing availability, the development of common systems and processes
to ensure maximum efficiency, the development and expansion of the managerial and technical capacity of
implementation units, the mobilization of funds for project preparation, and the development of financial
strategies for different sectors.
The World Bank Government of Ukraine European Commission
12
EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
Kharkiv. Photo by Ipsos for the World Bank.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 13
The Russian Federation’s invasion of Ukraine, which quantified physical damage to infrastructure,
began February 24, 2022, has caused significant buildings, etc.; (ii) quantified indirect losses for a time
civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure and period of 21 months (3 months between February and
has taken a severe human, social, and economic June 2022, and 18 additional months), considering
toll. As a result of the war, which still continues elements such as disrupted services, economic
after more than six months, dwellings and public impacts, costs related to internally displaced
infrastructure have been demolished or damaged, persons (IDPs), debris management, restricted
public services and economic activity have been access and costs due to land contamination,1 etc.;
impeded, and significant numbers of Ukrainians and (iii) corresponding recovery and reconstruction
have been displaced from their homes. needs (Box 1 provides definitions). The RDNA also
outlines general guiding principles for building back
This Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA) better and sequencing investments for a green,
is part of an ongoing effort, undertaken jointly by resilient, inclusive, and sustainable recovery and
the Government of Ukraine, the World Bank, and reconstruction, focusing on immediate and short-
the European Commission and supported by other term needs (18 to 36 months) and medium- to long-
partners, to take stock of Ukraine’s damage and term needs (up to 10 years).
losses from the war—but just as importantly to
assess the scale of economic and social needs An important limitation is that the RDNA presents
for Ukraine’s survival during the war and its the needs at a sector level and does not consider
prospering afterward. Detailed sectoral data for the balancing of one sector’s needs against
the assessment use June 1, 2022, as a cutoff; given those of another sector. Strategic prioritization
the progress of the war since that date, the extent of of reconstruction across all sectors is the next
damage, losses, and needs is clearly larger as of the important step as part of recovery and reconstruction
date of publication. While the calculation of needs planning, with this RDNA providing analytical support
has been done by joint government and World Bank to this critical decision-making. Further work will
teams in each of the sectors covered, the differential involve prioritizing needs based on absorptive
availability of data has meant that the extent of and implementation capacity of different sectors,
coverage varies somewhat across sectors. priorities related to different geographic areas,
humanitarian and IDP needs, institutional capacity,
Still, the RDNA provides the first rigorous overview financing availability, etc. This further work is critical
of the various economic needs that Ukraine and for investment planning and implementation, and
its people have as a consequence of the war. The can form part of an immediate recovery plan for
objective of the RDNA is to deliver a consistent, Ukraine.
validated, and transparent assessment of (i)
Box 1. RDNA definitions
Damage: Direct costs of destroyed or damaged physical assets; valued in monetary terms with
costs estimated based on replacing or repairing physical assets and infrastructure, considering the
replacement price prevailing before the war.
Losses: Changes in economic flows resulting from the war; valued in monetary terms.
Needs: Value associated with the resumption of prewar normality through activities such as repair
and restoration, including a premium linked to building back better principles (e.g., improved energy
efficiency, modernization efforts, and sustainability standards). Needs do not equal the sum of damage
and losses.
1 Land contamination refers to land that may contain land mines and/or explosive remnants of war.
14 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Summary of Damage, Figure 1. Total damage as of June 1, 2022:
US$97 billion
Losses, and Needs
Municipal Environment/
services, $2 bn forestry, $2 bn
Considering the impact of the war between February
24 and June 1, 2022, the damage across sectors
Housing,
covered in the RDNA is estimated at approximately Transport,
$39 bn
$30 bn
US$97 billion (Figure 1 and Table 1). The most
damage-affected sectors are housing (40 percent of
total damage), transport (31 percent), and commerce
and industry (10 percent). The most affected oblasts Energy,
are Donetska, Luhanska, and Kharkivska, followed $3 bn Education,
$3 bn
by Kyivska, Chernihivska, and Zaporizka (Figure 4 Commerce and
and Table 2). industry, $10 bn Agriculture
(Public), $2 bn
Aggregate losses total almost US$252 billion Source: Assessment team.
(Figure 2 and Table 1). It should be noted that losses
in one sector flow into and intersect with those in
Figure 2. Total losses as of June 1, 2022:
other sectors. For example, reduction in agricultural
production affects transportation needs, or loss of US$252 billion
electricity affects commerce and industry in areas Land decontamination, $73 bn Housing, $13 bn
Municipal
that are otherwise unaffected by the war. Losses are services, Health , $6 bn
dominated by land decontamination (demining and $4 bn
Social
clearance of explosive remnants of war) (29 percent), protection , $5 bn
commerce and industry (19 percent), agriculture (11 Culture and
percent), and transport (10 percent). Culture and tourism , $19 bn
tourism (8 percent), housing (5 percent), and energy ,
Agriculture
$28 bn
(5 percent) contribute substantially to the remaining
losses. As data by oblast were not available across Commerce and
industry, $48 bn
all sectors.
Finance and
The total reconstruction and recovery needs are Water/ banking, $8 bn
sanitation, $7 bn
estimated at about US$349 billion. As shown in
Energy, $12 bn
Figure 3 and Table 1, the sectors with the highest Transport, $26 bn
estimated needs are transport (21 percent), land
Source: Assessment team.
decontamination (demining and clearance of
explosive remnants of war) (21 percent), and housing
(20 percent). Other sectors, including commerce and Figure 3. Total needs as of June 1, 2022:
industry (6 percent), social protection and livelihoods US$349 billion
(6 percent), and agriculture (5 percent), contribute
Municipal
, Land decontamination, $73 bn
substantially to the remaining needs. services, $6 bn
Housing, $69 bn
Water/
Education,
All these needs arise from a war that has spanned a sanitation,
$5 bn $9 bn
large geographical area (including urban areas), and
Health, $15 bn
thus their magnitude is considerable. Meeting these Social
needs will be critical for the long-term recovery protection,
$21 bn
from the war. However, specifying these needs does
Culture and
not mean that they can be met immediately. How tourism , $5 bn
soon they can be met will depend on the availability
Agriculture
of financing, but also on the absorptive capacity of (Public), $19 bn
Transport ,
the Ukrainian budget, line ministries, subnational $74 bn Irrigation/
entities, and implementing agencies; the readiness Energy, $10 bn
Commerce and
water, $8 bn
of the private sector to support capital investments; Finance and banking, $8 bn industry , $21 bn
and the trajectory of the war.
Source: Assessment team.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 15
Figure 4. Extent of damage by region as of June 1, 2022
Source: Assessment team.
While the RDNA’s assessment of damaged assets roads), anticipated implicit support for humanitarian
differentiates between public and private assets reasons of private assets (such as housing and
wherever possible, experience in disaster and energy), and the need to kick-start recovery in the
conflict situations highlights the strong and very productive sectors.
necessary role of public finances even for the
restoration of privately owned assets, especially In the immediate and short term (in the next 18–36
in the short term. For housing, for example, there months), about US$105 billion will be needed to
are humanitarian and implicit public obligations address the most urgent needs across the analyzed
associated with ensuring that Ukrainians have sectors (Table 3). These include urgent needs related
safe and warm shelter, and these entail public to the following:
intervention in private assets. Similarly, productive
sectors such as agricultural production may require • Preparation for the upcoming winter (e.g., heating,
significant public financing for recovery; the banking electricity, and winterization of lightly damaged
and financial sector will require capitalization; and buildings) and the purchase of gas
the restoration of commerce and industry will • Transport repairs for connectivity and service
need a certain level of initial funding by the public delivery
sector. Moreover, the public sector will likely play an • Support for the next agricultural planting season
important role in providing guarantees and other de- • Safeguarding of human development, especially
risking instruments (particularly insurance) to enable in education and health, and support to the
private sector participation. This will be particularly poorest and the displaced
important to restore trade and commerce flows. • Immediate actions related to decontamination of
land to enable safe reconstruction and recovery
It is estimated that about 80 percent of the short- in critical areas
term needs, or some US$80 billion, will need to
come from public financing. This includes a range of Beyond the coming winter, the short-term recovery
obligations—recovery and reconstruction of assets and reconstruction needs are dominated by support
owned by the public sector (such as schools and to the social sector (45 percent of the total), though
16 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
cross-cutting issues such as land decontamination in infrastructure (22 percent) are dominated by energy
and environmental protection will need to be and transport sector needs, though measures for
integrated into all investments in social, productive, water supply and sanitation and municipal services
and infrastructure sectors. The large share of needs are also critical. In the productive sectors, the short-
in the social sector reflects the impacts on housing, term needs (22 percent) cover support to agriculture
health, and education services, the expanded social as well as actions to support finance and banking
protection needs, and steps to protect cultural and commerce and industry.
heritage from further damage. The short-term needs
Table 1. Total damage, losses, and needs by sector (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022
Sector Damage Share (%) Losses Share (%) Needs Share (%)
Social sectors
Housing 39.2 40 13.3 5 69.0 20
Education 3.4 3 0. 5 0 9.2 3
Health 1.4 1 6.4 3 15.1 4
Social protection and livelihoods 0.2 0 4.5a 2 20.6b 6
Culture and tourism 1.1 1 19.3 8 5.2 2
Productive sectors
Agriculture 2.2 2 28.3 11 18.7 5
Irrigation and water resources 0.2 0 0.1 0 7.5 2
Commerce and industry 9.7 10 47.5 19 20.8 6
Finance and banking 0.03 0 8.1 3 8.0 2
Infrastructure sectors
Energy 3.0 3 11.7 5 10.4c 3
Extractives 0.1 0 0.3 0 0.3 0
Transport 29.9 31 26.1 10 73.8 21
Telecom and digital 0.7 1 0.6 0 3.3 1
Water supply and sanitation 1.3 1 6.8 3 5.4 2
Municipal services d 2.3 2 4.3 2 5.7 2
Cross-cutting sectors
Environment, natural resource management,
2.5 3 0.7 0 1.2 0
and forestry
Emergency response and civil protection 0.1 0 0.2 0 0.7 0
Justice and public administration 0.1 0 0.03 0 0.2 0
Land decontamination - 0 73.2 29 73.2 21
Total 97.4 100 252.0 100 348.5 100
Source: Assessment team.
a. Under social protection, household income loss valued at US$46.1 billion is not included to avoid potential double-counting in
relation to other sectors.
b. Means-tested social assistance programs and other benefits that depend on the changes in households’ income and the cost of
basic needs (including cost of food and energy) are assessed for the immediate/short term only.
c. The needs for the energy sector also include the short-term need for purchasing natural gas for the upcoming heating season
(around 4.8 bcm), that would generate a financial gap in Naftogaz of around US$5 billion, depending on the weather and evolution
of gas import prices. It is estimated that Naftogaz could need some 4.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of additional gas to reach the
estimated required level 15 bcm. Naftogaz will use its produced gas (up to 1.4 bcm), purchase from domestic producers/private
stored gas (1.3 bcm), and import the remaining amount (2.1 bcm). The value of this volume can vary depending on the import price.
Assuming that the domestic price for the gas from other domestic producers will be around US$1,000 and that imported gas is
purchased at US$ 2,000 per 1,000 cubic meter, the total purchase costs would be US$ 5.1 billion if the import price is US$2,000, and
US$7.2 billion if the import price is $3,000. Considering the selling price of the gas for Naftogaz at the level of US$190 per 1,000 cubic
meters, the financial gap would be US$4.37 billion if the import price is US$2000 and US$6.47 billion if the import price is US$3,000.
d. Municipal governments in Ukraine are responsible for a wide range of municipal services, from own services (e.g., local roads,
municipal transit, solid waste management, housing, urban parks, and utilities) to services delegated by the central government (e.g.,
education, health care, social welfare). In the RDNA, municipal service mainly covers assets related to solid waste management,
urban spaces and facilities (e.g., local parks, community centers, cemeteries, sports, etc.), and local administrative buildings. Utilities
and housing are covered by infrastructure and housing sections, respectively.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 17
Table 2. Damage by oblast for select sectors (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage
Frontline regions, subtotal 71.8
Donetska 26.2
Zaporizka 6.0
Luhanska 16.7
Mykolaivska 3.7
Odeska 0.3
Kharkivska 14.4
Khersonska 4.4
Support regions, subtotal 0.9
Vinnytska 0.1
Dnipropetrovska 0.5
Kirovohradska 0.1
Poltavska 0.1
Cherkaska 0.1
Backline regions, subtotal 0.2
Volynska 0.0
Zakarpatska 0.05
Ivano-Frankivska 0.02
Lvivska 0.07
Rivnenska 0.02
Ternopilska 0.01
Khmelnytska 0.02
Chernivetska 0.00
Regions where government has regained control, subtotal 22.4
Kyiv (city) 1.1
Zhytomyrska 0.8
Kyivska 11.2
Sumska 2.9
Chernihivska 6.4
Not specified, subtotal 2.2
Source: Assessment team.
Note: Regions are grouped according to Government of Ukraine presentations at the Ukraine Recovery Conference in Lugano,
Switzerland, in July 2022. Frontline regions are areas temporarily not under government control and areas of active conflict;
support regions are providing logistics for defense and humanitarian cargo; backline regions are protecting export/import
logistics hubs and evacuated enterprises; and regions where the government has regained control are areas recovering from
sustained damage. Table data are incomplete, as damage data by oblast were not available for the culture and tourism sector;
and for several sectors only nationwide (not oblast-specific) data were available, or only a fraction of available data was
disaggregated by oblast. It is noted that for some sectors (for example, transport), Kyivska oblast also includes damage for
Kyiv city. Losses data by oblast were not available for the following sectors: culture and tourism, finance and banking, energy
and extractives, housing, and health sectors. Needs data by oblast were not available for most sectors and are not included
here.
18 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Table 3. Total recovery and reconstruction needs by sector (US$ billion) as of June 1, 2022
Sector Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Social sectors
Housing 33.1 35.9 69.0
Education 2.8 6.5 9.2
Health 1.2 13.9 15.1
Social protection and livelihoods 8.1 12.5a 20.6
Culture and tourism 1.6 3.6 5.2
Productive sectors
Agriculture 10.0 8.7 18.7
Irrigation and water resource
0.02 7.5 7.5
management
Commerce and industry 6.6 14.2 20.8
Finance and banking 6.4 1.6 8.0
Infrastructure sectors
Energyb 7.3 3.1 10.4
Extractives - - 0.3
Transport 8.9 65.0 73.8
Telecommunications and digital 1.3 2.0 3.3
Water supply and sanitation 3.5 1.9 5.4
Municipal services 1.9 3.9 5.7
Cross-cutting sectors
Environment, natural resource
0.4 0.9 1.2
management, and forestry
Emergency response and civil protection 0.5 0.2 0.7
Justice and public administration 0.08 0.1 0.2
Land decontamination 11.0 62.2 73.2
Total 104.5 243.7 348.5
Source: Assessment team.
Note: - = not assessed.
a. Needs for means-tested benefits, benefits to IDPs, social services, and military social assistance include only estimates for
the immediate/short term, given that a number of additional factors will influence them over the medium/long term, such as
changes in incomes and cost of basic needs, including food and energy.
b. The needs for the energy sector also include the short-term need for purchasing natural gas for the upcoming heating
season, in the amount of US$5 billion.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 19
MACROECONOMIC AND figure is incomplete.3 One-third of Ukrainians have
been displaced by the war. Over 6.8 million Ukrainian
SOCIAL IMPACTS residents have left the country, a large majority of
them women and children.4 An estimated 6.6 million
The damage, losses, and needs presented here people are internally displaced—fewer than in the
contribute to the very significant economic, social, previous month5—with many individuals displaced
and poverty impacts of the war. Estimated gross more than once since leaving their homes of origin.6
domestic product (GDP) losses in 2022 go beyond According to the UN Office for the Coordination
physical asset losses and reflect disruption of of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the humanitarian
economic activities via several channels: damage situation is deteriorating rapidly, as access to critical
to productive assets and infrastructure, logistic services such as clean water, food, sanitation, and
problems, labor force losses, ruined supply-demand electricity declines, and 17.7 million people are left
chains, uncertainty, and elevated risks. Ukraine’s in need of humanitarian assistance.7
GDP shrank by 15.1 percent year over year (YoY) in
the first quarter of 2022 (or 19.3 percent quarter The projected increase in poverty, though large,
over quarter, seasonally adjusted), driven by a 45 is expected to be much larger if existing financing
percent GDP contraction in March YoY. After Ukraine gaps are not addressed by a scale-up in external
regained control of Kyivska oblast, economic activity financing. Since the beginning of the war, tax revenue
in April showed the first signs of improvement, even collection has deteriorated significantly, while
though it remains much below the prewar level. public expenditure has increased sharply to ensure
delivery of key public services during wartime. This
Poverty, based on the upper-middle-income poverty has resulted in a large nonmilitary fiscal deficit. If
line of US$5.5 per person per day, is projected to partners do not continue to provide significant support
increase by tenfold and reach at least 21 percent to finance this deficit, Ukraine will need to further
in 2022; war-affected regions are expected to reduce its now bare-bones social expenditures
experience even higher poverty rates. For instance, and continue to avail itself of deficit monetization.
in Khersonska oblast, which is temporarily not under In a scenario of continued deficit monetization, the
government control, food prices have increased by poverty rate is expected to climb to 34 percent by
62 percent since the start of 2022, compared to 21.5 the end of 2022—a level not seen since the early
percent for Ukraine as a whole.2 Given food’s large 2000s—as rising inflation erodes the purchasing
share in the budgets of low-income households, power of low- and middle-income households. Going
these high rates of inflation are bound to result in a forward, if the extent of monetization is limited to
spiking poverty rate. avoid excessive inflation, sweeping expenditure cuts
will be needed and will affect the most vulnerable
The rise in poverty has been driven by the enormous segments of Ukrainian society. Under this scenario
costs to human lives and livelihoods. As of July 24, of austerity, poverty rates are projected to further
2022, the number of civilians confirmed killed or increase to over 40 percent in 2022 and 58 percent
wounded since February 24 officially stood at 12,272; by 2023. In this worst-case scenario, an additional 18
however, the United Nations (UN) estimates that this million Ukrainians would fall below the poverty line.
2 Data are as of June 2022 and are based on regional Consumer Price Indices published by the State Statistics Service of
Ukraine, Link.
3 Most of the civilian casualties recorded were caused by the use of explosive weapons with a wide impact area, including
shelling from heavy artillery and multiple launch rocket systems, and by missile and air strikes. The Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) believes that actual figures are considerably higher, especially in Mariupol
(Donetska oblast), Izium (Kharkivska oblast), and Popasna (Luhanska oblast). OHCHR, “Ukraine: Civilian Casualty Update
25 July 2022,” Link.
4 The number was 6,865,625 as of August 26, 2022. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; see Operational Data
Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation, Link.
5 IOM, “Regional Ukraine Response: Situational Report–22 August 2022,” Link.
6 OCHA Ukraine, “Situation Report,” August 17, 2022.
7 Ibid.
20 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
SECTORAL ASSESSMENTS Education
As of June 1, 2022, the Ukrainian education sector
Social Sectors has sustained US$3.4 billion in damage and US$0.5
billion in losses, with a particular impact on
Housing students/learners from Eastern Ukraine. A total
of 1,885 education institutions have been impacted
The total damage to the housing sector as of by the war, with 178 buildings destroyed and a
June 1, 2022, is estimated at US$39.2 billion, with further 1,707 partially damaged. The damage to
concentrated damage to urban housing. Around infrastructure is pronounced in the east, especially in
817,000 residential units were impacted by the war, Kharkivska, Donetska, and Luhanska oblasts; nearly
38 percent of them destroyed beyond repair. This 1 million enrolled students (at all levels of education)
number includes apartment units, single family are affected just in these three oblasts. Meanwhile,
houses, and dormitories. Apartment buildings have losses are driven by debris removal costs, unpaid
been the most affected, a finding that highlights the teachers’ salaries, and decreases in private sector
significant impacts of the war on the urban housing revenues, and there have been additional costs
stock and indicates that urban areas carry the associated with the use of education institutions as
bulk of the damage burden in housing. The extent temporary shelters.
of housing damage is spread unevenly across the
oblasts, with the Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, Recovery and reconstruction needs are over
and Kyivska oblasts accounting for over 82 percent of US$9.2 billion in the education sector, with U$2.8
total damage to housing stock in the country. Losses billion urgently needed. These needs include the
in the housing sector are estimated at US$13.2 reconstruction of affected education facilities
billion, which reflects the cost of demolition and following new safety, sustainability, and quality
debris removal, loss of household goods, temporary standards, but also needs related to the restoration
rental and shelter provision by owners, and adjusted of interim and long-term teaching and learning
losses in rental incomes. The loss estimation does services, such as investments to ensure safe access
not reflect bank losses and mortgage defaults. to in-person education where possible (e.g., the
addition of bomb shelters to education institutions,
The recovery and reconstruction needs amount acquisition of temporary learning spaces, and
to US$69 billion, with US$33.1 billion needed in purchase of electronic devices). Recovery needs
the immediate/short term, especially to address also cover educational catch-up programs and
the needs for winter. Addressing housing recovery psychological support that are critical to limiting
needs in postwar Ukraine will require an integrated learning losses, particularly for the most vulnerable
green, resilient, and inclusive approach, with a focus students. At the same time, the reconstruction
on returning families to their homes and restoring and recovery of the sector must coincide with
livelihoods and services. There is an urgent investments in reforms to increase quality and
need to provide temporary rental for displaced efficiency in education, which to a considerable
households, undertake winterization, repair partially extent had already been initiated before the war.
damaged residential buildings, and establish a
housing reconstruction and recovery strategy and
implementation mechanism. In particular, providing
Health
repair and rental subsidies before cold, wet weather
The damage to the health sector is estimated
begins will mitigate the risk of further displacement.
at US$1.4 billion. This represents the monetary
While the situation is fluid, measures for ensuring
estimate of the cost of destroyed and damaged health
safety and adequate housing for households remain
infrastructure included in the inventory of damage
necessary to address the primary needs of IDPs,
compiled by the Ministry of Health. The actual level
returnees, and host communities for safe housing
of damage is likely higher, given that damage reports
options. There is also a need to establish a framework
are incomplete for facilities located in the territories
for housing reconstruction and recovery in the
temporarily not under government control and for
medium term. These actions can begin even during
private sector facilities. The estimated losses of
the war and will allow for appropriate sequencing of
US$6.4 billion include the removal of debris and
key actions and planning of budgets accordingly.
demolition of the destroyed facilities, loss of income
of private providers, losses from the financing of
facilities that have not been fully operational during
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 21
the war, and the additional losses of the population’s Culture and Tourism
health. The needs of the health sector are estimated
to be US$15.1 billion to cover the accumulated The war is estimated to have caused US$1.1 billion in
infrastructure damage and losses to the health damage to the culture sector and a significant loss of
sector, as well as scale-up of critical health services US$19.3 billion. The sector has also sustained damage
for the population of Ukraine. This amount includes to its intangible cultural heritage and intrinsic values
the cost of building new infrastructure using a of spiritual, symbolic, emotional, and existential
building back better approach and the immediate significance, as well as to the creative industries.
recovery of facilities that are partially damaged. It Over US$5.2 billion is needed for safeguarding
also includes a significant expansion of rehabilitation the sector in Ukraine. The value of culture is
and mental health services in Ukraine, which will associated with its authenticity, shared values, and
need to be scaled up to address the impacts of the social connections, which cannot be monetized in
war. The estimate of needs does not include the full market value. Thus, recovering culture does not
cost of recovery for the health care sector. Of these directly translate into reconstructing physical/
total needs, US$1.2 billion is urgently needed in the tangible assets. However, restoring and rebuilding
immediate/short term. the damaged cultural properties and rehabilitating
them would be an initial step to reestablish the lost/
Social Protection and Livelihoods broken cultural and social fabrics and restore their
utility value, the sense of belonging they inspire,
Damage to the social protection infrastructure and people’s affiliation with them, and any recovery
(such as residential care units, social centers, and efforts should lay the foundation for the sustainable,
social services providers) is estimated at US$0.2 green, resilient, inclusive, and smart development of
billion. Overall, 56 such stand-alone buildings were Ukraine. The most urgent needs amount to US$1.6
damaged or destroyed. Damage to the shared billion.
building space used for social protection purposes,
such as offices in administrative buildings of the Productive Sectors
local governments, are included in other parts of
Agriculture
the RDNA. The losses in the social protection and
jobs sector are much more substantial, amounting
to US$50.6 billion. They relate to (i) loss of jobs
and household income from wages, (ii) resulting As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in total
higher poverty and related increased expenditures damage of US$2.2 billion for the agriculture sector,
under existing means-tested social programs, (iii) while the aggregate losses total US$28.3 billion.
additional needs of programs such as survivor’s The damage includes partial or full destruction
benefits or programs related to disability, and finally of machinery and equipment, storage facilities,
(iv) lower affordability of basic needs, including livestock, and perennial crops, as well as lost
energy and food, which will result in the need to inputs and outputs and agricultural land that needs
significantly increase expenditure on a number of recultivation.8 The losses include production loss,
social programs linked to the subsistence minimum, including unharvested winter crops, higher farm
ranging from pensions to means-tested programs. production costs, and lower farm gate prices due to
The estimated social protection and jobs sector the export logistic disruptions, which are significant
needs amounts to US$20.6 billion. Most of these for Ukraine’s export-oriented agriculture. The total
needs consists of recurrent expenditures related to reconstruction and recovery needs from the public
social benefits and services, including payments to sector are estimated at US$18.7 billion, with private
vulnerable populations such as IDPs and the newly farmers having to invest considerably more in
impoverished. Significant expenditures are required terms of their own resources over the next years.
to restore permanently lost jobs. Bringing Ukraine’s The most pressing investments of US$10 billion
workforce back would require additional efforts and include rebuilding the damaged assets, helping
costs, including through mobility grants, settling-in agriculture bounce back by addressing liquidity and
grants, or wage subsidies for the employers. other constraints, and restoring the agricultural
public institutions to effectively support recovery
and reconstruction.
8 The losses from mines on agricultural land and the need for agricultural land’s demining, which is likely to be large, are
not included in the agriculture sector estimates. They are presented separately in the RDNA.
22 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Irrigation and Water Resources costs for demolition and debris removal. The total
reconstruction and recovery needs are estimated
As of June 1, 2022, damage in the irrigation, at US$20.8 billion, with US$6.6 billion needed in the
drainage, and water resource management (WRM) immediate/short term from both public and private
sector for several oblasts is estimated at US$0.2 actors. More than 80 percent of the needs are for
billion, including damage to dams, irrigation canals, rebuilding and modernizing buildings, equipment,
embankments, buildings, and agency premises. and inventory. For industry, the regions with the
This is a partial number representing damage to greatest needs for reconstruction and recovery
areas previously taken by Russian forces and now are Donetska, with almost half of the total amount,
under control of Ukrainian authorities, territories followed by Kharkivska, Luhanska, Chernihivska,
that had damage due to bomb attacks, and areas that and Kyivska oblasts.
were flooded to protect against attack. The initial
aggregate losses accounted for thus far are US$0.1 Finance and Banking
billion. The losses include operational losses based
on lost profit as reported by the different operational The Ukrainian financial sector has been significantly
entities in the Ukrainian water system and collected impacted by the war. The banking system entered the
by the State Agency of Water Resources (SAWR). war in relatively good condition, and banks remain
The total reconstruction and recovery needs in the operational. However, loss of assets, collateral, and
public sector are estimated at US$7.5 billion for revenues will severely affect banks’ profitability and
building back better irrigation, drainage, and flood solvency. During March–May, the banking sector
protection assets. The most pressing investments accounted for US$1.1 billion of loan loss provisions
involve restoration of destroyed hydraulic assets and for expected war-related credit losses. It can be
water storage structures in areas where control has anticipated that the nonbank financial institution
been regained, as well as investments in areas that (NBFI) sector will also suffer significant losses as a
did not face hostilities; these investments will help result of the war on top of prewar vulnerabilities but
the WRM sector rebound by addressing the major given its small size, the NBFI sector is not expected
gap—the lack of water supply and lack of irrigation to have systemic impacts on the overall financial
services to farmers, which must be addressed to system. From the preliminary estimates, the total
increase crop productivity in the agriculture sector. damage is estimated at US$0.03 billion, and potential
They will also protect communities against flood- losses suffered by the banking sector are expected
related risks and restore the public institutions to be US$8.1 billion; however, data on NBFIs are very
involved in irrigation and WRM so they can effectively limited. It will take many months for the true extent
support recovery and reconstruction. These urgent of damage to the financial sector to become fully
needs total US$0.02 billion. apparent/quantifiable. The quantification of losses
also does not recognize the inherent risks posed
Commerce and Industry to the gains made over recent years by reforms to
the financial sector, such as relaxation of prudential
Commerce and industry is one of the sectors and state-owned bank governance rules; nor does it
most affected by the war. As of June 1, 2022, recognize the potential delays to the implementation
approximately US$9.7 billion of damage is estimated of further reforms as a result of the need to
to have been sustained in this sector. Both privately address postwar problems first. The total cost for
and publicly owned enterprises in conflict-affected reconstruction and recovery needs is estimated at
areas have been destroyed or bankrupted. Value estimated at US$8 billion, with US$6.4 billion for
chains have been disrupted through the destruction the immediate/short term and US$1.6 billion for the
of, or damage to, connective infrastructure, the medium term. This primarily includes provisions for
inability to access key inputs, and the severing of banks’ credit losses but also captures the cost of
business links with firms located in affected areas. rebuilding damaged physical infrastructure of banks.
Damage to large factories accounts for most of
the damaged assets, including the destruction of Infrastructure Sectors
steel plants in Donetska that makes up almost 10
percent of the total damage. Approximately 2,900
retail shops, shopping malls, and warehouses have Energy and Extractives
been damaged or destroyed. Estimated aggregate
losses equal US$47.5 billion. The losses are As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in total
estimated based primarily on expected lost income damage of around US$3 billion for the energy sector,
from firms over the course of 21 months and the while the aggregate losses total US$11.7 billion. The
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 23
value of damage includes damage in the power sector and long-term needs reflect the enabling role that
(US$1.4 billion), district heating (US$0.7 billion), gas transport will play across sectors as well as the
sector (US$0.5 billion), transport fuel sector (US$0.4 need to facilitate European Union (EU) integration.
billion), and coal mining (US$0.11 billion). The losses
include lost revenues and production decreases, Transport sector reconstruction is estimated
higher costs, losses due to deterioration of liquidity to require US$73.8 billion, with approximately
positions, and losses due to lost access to energy US$8.9 billion in the immediate/short term along
services. The total reconstruction and recovery needs with an additional US$64.9 billion in the medium-
in the public sector are estimated at almost US$10.4 to long- term. The estimates are approximate and
billion, including US$7.3 billion for the immediate/ are subject to assumptions about the configuration
short term and US$3.1 billion for the longer term. and scope of Ukraine’s transport networks after
Given that the energy sector provides critical services, reconstruction. The nature and level of demands
the above reconstruction and recovery investments on that network may affect the economic viability
are all considered as pressing. In addition, part of of building back to a given set of standards. Under
the losses can also be considered as pressing for assumptions where Ukraine may not build back road
short-term operations of the energy sector. This and rail infrastructure to EU standards, needs could
includes the need to close liquidity gaps in the power be US$ 2.1 billion to US$ 13.2 billion lower than RDNA
sector transmission system operator (Ukrenergo) projections. Conversely, needs may also be higher
and other stakeholders in the amount of US$2.6 than RDNA estimates if actual costs to achieve a
billion. Naftogaz needs at least US$5 billion only for specific set of standards are greater than expected
purchasing gas for the next heating season, assuming (if affordable). At this stage in Ukraine’s recovery, it
average purchasing gas price of approximately is important to note the inherent uncertainty around
US$1,000 per 1,000 m3. For the extractives sector, in the configuration of post-war transport networks
the context of limited data available, US$0.1 billion in and the impact this has on estimated needs. The
damage, US$0.3 billion in losses, and US$0.3 billion highest-priority needs for reconstruction are (i)
in needs were identified in addition to the energy restoration of basic network functionality (road,
sector estimates. In addition to the physical damages rail, and air) for both humanitarian aid flows and
and loses generated by the war, some key energy support to broader reconstruction efforts across
market and governance reforms are suffering delays sectors, as these will rely on transport access; (ii)
due to the need to implement temporary emergency enhancement of westward road and rail linkages
measures to ensure the provision of basic energy to the EU to facilitate economic integration with
services to the population. Europe’s single market and provide resilience
to any potential future disruptions of Black Sea
Transport access; and (iii) transformation of legacy networks
toward EU standards for safety, service quality, and
interoperability as a complement to Ukraine’s stated
Damage (US$29.9 billion), losses (US$26.1 billion),
policy objective of EU accession, which will require
and needs (US$73.8 billion) in Ukraine’s transport
alignment with the EU acquis.
sector are large and indicative of the strategic value
that combatants have placed on transport networks.
Overall damages until June 1, 2022 include: (i) 8,699 Telecommunications and Digital
km of motorways, highways, and other national
roads; (ii) 7,619 km of oblast and village roads; (iii) 3 The damage in the telecommunications and digital
million m2 of bridges on national roads; (iv) 428,470 sector has reached US$0.7 billion. This includes
m2 of bridges on local roads; (v) 1,119 km of railway US$0.6 billion for telecom operators (fixed and
lines; (vi) 93 railway stations; (vii) 63,072 m2 of mobile), US$0.08 billion for postal service companies,
railway bridges; (viii) 392,843 private vehicles; (ix) and US$0.04 billion for Ukraine’s broadcasting
9,473 km of communal roads; (x) 16 airports; and provider. Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and
(xi) 850 units of urban public transport rolling stock. Zaporizka oblasts account for 67 percent of the
Losses include consideration for (i) loss of Black Sea damage to telecom operators. The damage to
transport; (ii) disruptions to road and rail transport postal services is similarly concentrated: Donetska
services due to damaged infrastructure; (iii) losses and Kharkivska oblasts account for 68 percent
associated with closure of Ukraine’s airspace; and of damage to postal infrastructure (post offices,
(iv) the cost of rail transport service provided free of depots, sorting centers, etc.). In broadcasting, there
charge for refugee evacuation as well as import of are 49 damaged and nonoperational TV towers as
humanitarian supplies. Envisaged short-, medium-, of June 1, 2022, 11 of them in Luhanska oblast and
24 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
12 in Zaporizka. Losses of economic value added in with US$1.9 billion needed in the immediate/short
the sector amount to US$0.6 billion for the period term. This includes costs for building back better
between the war’s start and June 1, 2022. The needs and inflation. The most pressing needs in the short
for reconstruction and recovery are estimated at term relate to the maintenance and increase of
US$3.3 billion with an estimated US$1.3 billion service delivery, rapid scaling up of investments in
needed in the immediate/short term. Among the the waste management sector, and the formulation
immediate recovery investments is restoring the of citywide reconstruction and recovery strategies
broadband coverage in territories that have been and action plans. Key guiding principles for recovery
brought back under government control. Internet and reconstruction include the explicit prioritization
coverage and postal service access are of strategic and sequencing of investments based on technical
importance, given the need for connectivity among assessments, and the facilitation of an enabling
the local population. institutional and legal environment for the efficient
implementation of plans.
Water Supply and Sanitation
Cross-Cutting Areas
The estimated damage for the water supply and
sanitation (WSS) sector stands at US$1.3 billion.
Given various challenges in data collection (especially
Environment, Natural Resource
for territories temporarily not under government Management, and Forestry
control), this is a conservative figure; however, it
provides a fair assessment of the magnitude of The war in Ukraine has significantly harmed the
WSS infrastructure damage. Losses have been environment and natural resources of the country.
estimated at approximately US$6.8 billion, noting Multiple air pollution incidents and potentially serious
similar challenges in accessing data. The main contamination of ground and surface waters and
part of the losses (over 50 percent) stems from lost soil have already been observed, and the long-term
revenues from WSS services provision. The total impact of the war could be even more harmful—
reconstruction and recovery needs for the sector not only for the population’s health and safety,
are estimated at around US$5.4 billion, with US$3.5 but also for ecosystems and biodiversity. Most of
billion needed in the immediate/short term. The the environmental risks are linked to the damage
building back better approach has been limited to to industrial installations and houses (asbestos
the reconstruction of the damaged/destroyed WSS release), energy infrastructure (power plants, oil
assets and not geared toward achieving compliance storage tankers, oil refineries, drilling platforms,
with the WSS Sustainable Development Goals. and gas facilities and distribution pipelines), and
However, there is room to further optimize existing ecosystems (forest fires and land mines). The main
WSS systems and facilities (developed before the environmental risks include air pollution, water
war) to meet increased standards and sustainability pollution, and soil pollution, with accumulation of
and climate change requirements. hazardous wastes that affect the health and safety
of the population as well as biodiversity. Losses and
Municipal Services damage in monetary terms are estimated where
feasible, such as for the forest sector. Due to the
active war situation, measuring of key pollutants
As of June 1, 2022, the estimated damage for the
in air, water, and soil was not possible. The RDNA
municipal services sector amounts to US$2.3 billion,
did not estimate damage and needs for these
while the aggregate losses total US$4.3 billion. The
receptors due to the lack of monitoring data on
damage includes partial or full destruction of key
environmental assets. Priority areas for cleanup and
municipal assets (for which data were available)
building back better are identified for a fundamental
as well as damage to goods and equipment. The
transformation of Ukraine toward a green and net-
estimated losses focus on revenue losses, debris
zero economy. The rebuilding process should be
removal, and increased operational costs. Over 90
harmonized with the EU environmental and climate
percent of the total losses valued stem from incurred
goals.
and projected revenue losses of local governments;
this finding indicates that local governments will
The forestry sector has been significantly impacted
continue to face financial burdens and highlights the
by the war. As of June 1, 2022, approximately 3
potential instability of service delivery maintenance
percent has been lost due to forest fires, and 38
in coming months. The total reconstruction and
percent is inaccessible due to the presence of mines.
recovery needs are estimated at US$5.7 billion,
Damage across growing stock, roads, buildings, and
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 25
equipment is almost US$2.5 billion. Lost ecosystem estimated at US$0.07 billion, while losses amount
services value—a result of mines making the to US$0.03 billion. These figures include damage of
forests inaccessible—is estimated at US$0.7 US$0.06 billion for the judiciary and US$0.01 billion
billion over the 21 months beginning in March for law enforcement, comprising partial or full
2022. However, forestry has a slow recovery rate destruction of buildings, furniture, and vehicles used
and these losses may extend much further beyond for judicial or law enforcement purposes. Losses
this period. Sectoral recovery and reconstruction include US$0.01 billion for the judiciary, and US$0.4
needs, including building back with strengthened million for law enforcement. Losses consider items
institutions, equipment, and nursery capacity, are such as demolition and debris removal and loss of
estimated at US$1.2 billion with US$0.4 billion public services/fees. Reconstruction and recovery
needed in the immediate/short term. As part of the needs for the justice sector are estimated at US$0.2
recovery and reconstruction needs, capacity building billion. The most pressing needs include restoration
includes a functional review of the institutions in the of delivery of justice services, specifically through
sector, with a focus on modernized planning and on the availability and training of law enforcement,
the best afforestation and reforestation methods for anticorruption officials, private lawyers, and judges,
climate-smart forestry. Recommended for further as well as the reconstruction of the judiciary and
study is the creation of investor-ready carbon judicial infrastructure.
projects and the potential for mass employment
in afforestation and reforestation via “green wage” Damage of US$0.03 billion is also reported to
schemes. central-level public administration infrastructure
and services. Local-level administrative buildings
are covered under the municipal services sector,
Emergency Response and Civil and relevant line ministry buildings such as
Protection education and health are covered under those
respective sectors. This damage is estimated based
As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in total on government reports. Losses, including debris
damage of US$0.1 billion for the emergency removal, are estimated at US$3.4 million. Recovery
response and civil protection sector, while the and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$0.07
aggregate losses total US$0.2 billion. The damage billion. The recovery and reconstruction of central-
includes partial or full destruction of vehicles, level public administration should prioritize buildings
equipment, and buildings used for the purpose of from which the most-urgent public services are
civil protection and emergency response. The losses provided.
include debris removal and additional operational
costs for increased involvement of first responders
in emergency and rescue operations related to the
Land Decontamination (Demining and
war. The total reconstruction and recovery needs Clearance of Explosive Remnants of
from the sector are estimated at US$0.7 billion,
with US$0.5 billion urgently needed. The most
War)
pressing investments include repair, reconstruction,
Land decontamination, which covers demining
and replacement of damaged, destroyed, and
and clearance of explosive remnants of war, is
seized assets, respectively. Support for scaled-
a precondition to safe rebuilding, resumption of
up emergency response related to the war is also
service provision, and return to normality. The
necessary; this includes preparedness for chemical,
State Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) and
biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents;
Ministry of Internal Affairs estimate that 13 percent
measures related to disaster risk management
of Ukraine’s territory may be contaminated. Based
to prevent, prepare, and respond to disasters; and
on conservative estimates, land decontamination
restoration of institutions to effectively support the
costs are expected to exceed US$73.2 billion. Of
recovery and reconstruction effort.
this, US$0.06 billion needs to be urgently invested in
equipment, training, and salaries to expand the work
Justice and Public Administration force of decontamination authorities in Ukraine.
It will be critical to prioritize areas requiring the
In the justice and public administration sector, a most urgent decontamination, such as areas with
total of US$0.1 billion in damage, US$0.04 billion a high concentration of civilian populations, areas
in losses, and US$0.2 billion in recovery and critical for restoring production and economic flows,
reconstruction needs have been estimated as a etc. In the immediate/short term, close to US$11
result of the war. Related to justice, damage is billion is needed for nontechnical surveys, technical
26 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
surveys, and demining, including US$0.06 billion decontamination. Costs associated with the removal
for procurement of varied equipment (demining of anchored and floating sea mines in the Black Sea
machines, metal detectors, personal protective are yet unquantified. However, until decontamination
equipment, etc.); these efforts will ensure readiness of the Black Sea and Ukraine harbors is completed,
for scaled-up decontamination and allow significant (re)insurers of shipping vessels in the Black Sea will
progress in areas where government control has continue to charge high and even historic levels for
been restored and where active military actions have insurance—a cost that will eventually be passed
ceased. It should be noted that land decontamination on to consumers, a particularly significant issue in
efforts may need to be sustained over decades, relation to grain exports.
considering experience of other countries in land
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
There are already ongoing efforts by the Government data set that can help guide recovery planning as
of Ukraine to lead the country toward recovery and well as monitoring and evaluation (M&E).
reconstruction. In July 2022, Ukraine presented a
US$750 billion Recovery Plan.9 Under the Ukraine Beyond the guiding principles that the government’s
Recovery Vision, US$150–250 billion is envisaged Recovery Plan establishes, the following principles
for restoration and modernization of housing and could be considered based on international
infrastructure. A three-stage reconstruction plan experience related to post-conflict and post-
was presented: Stage 1 is a plan blueprint; Stage disaster recovery and reconstruction:
2 is a plan drill-down and roadmap; and Stage 3 is
implementation. The Recovery Plan has set targets • Balancing urgent needs and medium- to long-
for 2032: it aims to accelerate sustainable economic term goals: The recovery and reconstruction
growth (with a plan for 7 percent annual GDP growth planning will need to address the most urgent
and an increase in investments); to reach the top-25 needs immediately and in the short term,
economies in the Economic Complexity Index and the while ensuring preparations for longer-term
World Bank Human Capital Index; and to achieve a 65 reconstruction and recovery. In the short term,
percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990. The there is a need to ensure safety and security of
key guiding principles of the government’s Recovery people and to address the most urgent and basic
Plan are to start now and ramp up gradually; grow needs (including for vulnerable populations)
prosperity in an equitable way; integrate into the through shelter, public services, and economic
EU; build back better (for the future); and enable restoration activities. In the medium to long term,
private investment and entrepreneurship. The recovery and reconstruction should build on
plan will be implemented in a region-focused and the foundation of green, resilient, and inclusive
parameter-based approach. Within the plan, 15 development; it should also ensure efficiencies
national programs have been developed to support by upgrading access to and quality of services
the achievement of short-, medium-, and long-term and infrastructure and by right-sizing/right-siting
targets.10 service networks and infrastructure.
The RDNA can be instrumental in supporting • Strategic prioritization of reconstruction across
the Government of Ukraine’s Recovery Plan and all sectors: Building on the identified baselines,
implementation efforts. The RDNA provides a damage, losses, and needs across sectors in a
baseline of sectoral and cross-cutting information on consistent manner as done under the RDNA,
recovery and reconstruction needs that is linked to needs should be prioritized based on absorptive
the damage and losses incurred as well as sectoral capacity of different sectors, priorities related
prewar baselines, while considering building to different geographic areas, and humanitarian
back better, right-sizing, right-placing, and overall and IDP needs, as well as financing availability,
modernization efforts. This information creates a institutional capacity, and other elements.
9 URC2022, “Recovery Plan,” 2022, Link.
10 See Government of Ukraine, “Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine (ПЛАН ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ),” 2022, Link.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 27
• Inclusiveness and equity: Recovery and structure will also be key for delivering results
reconstruction need to be closely aligned and preserving a sense of perspective among the
with efforts to decrease poverty, efforts to population.
enhance social inclusion and gender equity, and
investments targeting the most disadvantaged • Local solutions and local development: Recovery
social groups. and revitalization will need to be designed in a
way that strongly supports local economies, with
• Transparency and good governance: The local governments at the helm of the planning
recovery process should be measured against and implementation efforts, especially in cities.
established targets/performance indicators and Recovery and revitalization at the local level
timelines; and it should be monitored within a would necessitate adopting an integrated and
transparent M&E system and process, including place-based approach and ensuring the presence
consultation with the affected stakeholders. of strong intergovernmental, inter-sectoral,
and inter-municipal coordination mechanisms.
• Addressing needs of different (groups of) Any structure or process for recovery and
oblasts: Ukraine will also need to balance its revitalization should make use of the economic
efforts across the different groups of regions and human capital in the country, and local firms
of Ukraine—frontline, recovered, backline, and should be involved in the process. Partnerships
support areas—depending on the progress of between them and firms from other parts of
the war. Specific recovery and reconstruction Ukraine and abroad should be promoted and
plans can help guide the recovery within relevant supported. Building reconstruction should rely
oblasts based on their highest needs. as much as possible on the local industry and on
solutions produced in Ukraine.
• Resilience and building back better: Most of
Ukraine’s infrastructure was built during the • Focus on community needs: Community-driven
Soviet era and has suffered from years of development with strong citizens’ involvement
underinvestment and neglect. The country’s is a crucial element for building ownership
economic infrastructure is in dire need of and ensuring sustainability of recovery and
improvement to be done in alignment with broader revitalization. Innovative approaches for ensuring
climate change and sustainability goals and that the entire local community participates in
targets. For example, the road network suffers recovery and revitalization is instrumental. The
from chronic lack of maintenance and repair needs of the community cannot be identified using
works and requires major upgrading. At the same a top-down approach, and any such attempts can
time, about 40 percent of water supply networks only result in investments disconnected from the
are in critical condition. Social infrastructure is real needs on the ground and unlikely to achieve
likewise deficient; schools, kindergartens, and sustainable results.
basic medical facilities are outdated and need
to be rehabilitated and modernized, while also Related to the implementation of the recovery
being made more energy efficient and climate activities, the following practical considerations
resilient. In addition, the country’s agricultural could be taken into account based on international
assets are increasingly vulnerable to weather- experience:
related events, as most of Ukraine’s small and
medium farm enterprises have not yet adopted • Project identification, prioritization, sequencing,
climate-smart technologies. Ukraine’s industries and commercial strategy: There is a need to
and the energy sector too will need to adapt to identify and frame reconstruction and recovery
more efficient and sustainable good practice and project packages and to sequence them over time.
standards. This should reflect the relative priority of needs, a
logical sequencing of interdependent works, and
• Leadership and coordination: Continuous commercial considerations for bundling contracts
leadership from the highest level of government according to the scale and scope that the market
will be essential, together with strong operational for engineering and contractor services can meet.
support. To keep the momentum for the The commercial strategy for delivering works at
revitalization of the county, the highest levels of the scale envisaged for Ukraine’s reconstruction
central government will need to be involved and would likely require an increase in the number of
strategically lead this process. The operational international construction firms that are active in
28 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Ukraine in parallel with efforts to grow smaller potentially land acquisition processes with public
domestic firms into internationally competitive consultation processes. Alignment with European
firms. Union peers will also require Ukraine to apply
standards that are different or modified from
• Use of common systems and processes: Where those previously used. While it may be possible
feasible, the use of agreed and common systems, to temporarily apply foreign standards, Ukraine’s
processes, and procedures should be promoted own domestic standards would eventually need
for procurement, financial management, amendments to align with the EU acquis. Project
management of environmental and social risks, preparation tasks would reasonably be expected
M&E, etc. across recovery and reconstruction to cost between 2 percent and 10 percent of
activities/investments. This will ensure all total civil works investment. Mobilizing funds
government officials (horizontal and vertical) for these project preparation tasks immediately
are using the same systems, thus maximizing and beginning technical preparations for “no
efficiency, including benefits of training, and regret” investments that are highly likely to fall
avoiding situations where the same implementing into highest-priority categories, is essential to
unit is using multiple different systems of rapid mobilization and Ukraine’s ability to absorb
donor organizations or international financial reconstruction funding across different sectors.
institutions.
• Financial strategy and the roles of international
• Focus on developing institutional capacity funds, sovereign funding, and user charging in
and managerial and technical capacity of specific subsectors: The scale of investment
implementation units: Recovery efforts should needed for Ukraine’s reconstruction is beyond
focus on developing the capacity of institutions the financial capacity of the government and its
across different administrative levels. Moreover, subsidiary institutions in virtually all sectors.
implementation units (or multiple units) that will International assistance in the form of grants,
manage projects in specific sectors, subsectors, loans, and/or guarantees from external sources
and/or regions should be capable of preparing and is expected to augment the fiscal capacity of
managing projects to the requirements of bilateral Ukraine during reconstruction. Beyond these
or multilateral development institutions, with sources, there will also be a role for user
respect to technical, fiduciary, and environmental charging to support investment and long-term
and social requirements. Therefore, capacity sustainability of public services. Each specific
development should start early. Mobilization of sector will accordingly need a financial strategy
external resources to augment capacity will also and indicative expenditure envelope that reflects
be critical. credible funding sources and their role in
supporting direct expenditures or underpinning
• Mobilization of technical project preparation: The different forms of financing (sovereign,
nature of reconstruction projects needed across nonsovereign, commercial, etc.). Providing
many sectors with large infrastructure works will financial strategies for relevant sectors during
be technically complex and engineering intensive. reconstruction is both necessary in the immediate
Beyond debris and waste management and term and likely to prove complementary for
land contamination, many projects will require post-reconstruction efforts to ensure financial
environmental and social assessments and sustainability of critical public services.
Introduction 29
INTRODUCTION
Macroeconomic context prior to the war
Responding to the unprecedented shocks of 2014– economy grew by 3.4 percent in 2021 as COVID
2015, Ukraine undertook a wide range of reforms restrictions eased and a bumper harvest lifted
to stabilize the economy, reduce large imbalances, growth in the last quarter of 2021. Fiscal revenues
and cushion the impact of the shocks on the performed better than anticipated, with a trade and
population. Structural reforms included (i) moving to income tax revenue boost in both 2020 and 2021.
a flexible exchange rate; (ii) undertaking significant The fiscal deficit reached 6 percent of GDP in 2020
fiscal consolidation; (iii) reforming energy tariffs to (versus a pre-pandemic projection of 2.1 percent)
reduce a key quasi-fiscal deficit and strengthening and remained elevated at 4 percent in 2021 due to
the social safety net to cushion the impact on the the added fiscal burden from fixed household gas
poor; (iv) stabilizing the banking sector by putting tariffs (amidst steep increases in international gas
in place a framework to resolve and recapitalize prices). However, 2020 experienced a slight increase
weak banks and strengthen supervision; (v) taking in social vulnerability as 23.2 percent people were
steps to streamline the business environment; recorded to live below the national poverty line (up
and (vi) establishing key anticorruption institutions from 23 percent in 2019).11 Overall, however, the
and requiring asset disclosures for public officials. government’s COVID-19 response measures helped
These reforms helped to stabilize confidence after limit the economic impact on citizens, particularly
two years of sharp economic contraction. Real GDP those below the poverty line. To support the
grew by 3.5 percent in 2018 and 3.2 percent in 2019, economic recovery and address a lack of capital
up from 2.4 percent in 2016–2017. investment, Ukraine deepened reforms in 2020–
2021 in the following areas: (i) de-monopolization
The improved macro-fiscal and financial policy and anticorruption institutions; (ii) strengthening of
fundamentals established after the 2014–2015 crisis land and credit markets; and (iii) financial sector
helped Ukraine weather the COVID-19 crisis better supervision improvements. Recovery began to
than expected. Following a 3.8 percent contraction be materially disrupted by a severe escalation in
in 2020 (versus 7.8 percent initially projected), the geopolitical tensions toward the end of 2021.
11 Measured by the actual subsistence minimum. This amounted to Hrv 3,661 per adult per month in 2019, which translates
to US$14.5 per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2015, one in two people lived below the poverty line.
30 Introduction
Context of the War
2014 Crisis and Its Impacts million people in Eastern Ukraine faced difficulties
in accessing medical care, accommodation, social
services, and benefits, as well as compensatory
The invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is
mechanisms for damaged, seized, or looted
deepening a period of political transition and
property.15
insecurity that began before the outbreak of
hostilities. In 2014, tensions between the Russian
As of November 2014, an assessment by the World
Federation and Ukraine ignited following the
Bank, European Union, and United Nations, Ukraine:
protests that led to the removal of former Ukrainian
Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment for Eastern
president Viktor Yanukovych in February 2014 and
Ukraine, estimated the total recovery needs for
the Crimea crisis in March 2014, resulting in damage
infrastructure and social services at US$1.56
to civil infrastructure and large losses of civilian
billion. An additional US$135.5 million was estimated
lives.12 The country’s overall development prospects
for economic recovery, with an added US$126.8
plummeted, as the conflict between Ukrainian
million assessed for social resilience, peacebuilding,
forces and separatist military formations in the two
and community security.16 In 2020, the COVID-19
eastern territories paralyzed economic activity in
pandemic compounded the shocks associated
the Donetska and Luhanska oblasts.13 Disruptions
with ongoing hostilities, and Ukraine experienced
in industry, transport, and small and medium
a net outflow of investment, sharp increases in
enterprise activity led to widespread job losses
unemployment (affecting women more acutely than
throughout the country, with the greatest impacts
men), and stalled structural reforms. By February
in Eastern Ukraine. Investor confidence dropped to
2022, an estimated 4.4 million Ukrainians had been
record lows. Forced displacement and conscription
infected with COVID-19, resulting in 105,505 deaths17
created significant labor market distortions. Trade
(pandemic-related excess morality deaths were
with Russia declined significantly.
estimated at 160,000–170,000).18
The social and human implications of the 2014
By early 2022, the buildup of Russian forces on the
conflict further exacerbate the socioeconomic
borders of Ukraine had left almost 38 percent of the
consequences of the 2022 invasion. An estimated
Donbas (the combined territories of Donetska and
14,300 people died as a result of the conflict that
Luhanska oblasts) outside of government control,
began in 2014, including nearly 3,500 civilians. It is
separated from the rest of Ukraine by a 457 km line
estimated that over 2.7 million people were displaced
of contact. Together with the impacts of COVID-19
(5 percent of the country’s population) by 2016, with
on the economy and communities, legacies of
1.41 million persons remaining internally displaced
the fighting since 2014 had severely undermined
within Ukraine into early 2022.14 An estimated 2.9
economic recovery prospects in the Donbas and
12 In March 2014, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol each held a referendum on whether to
join the Russia Federation. These referendums were widely criticized, and on March 27, 2014, the UN General Assembly
passed Resolution 68/262 stating that the referendums had “no validity” and “cannot form the basis for any alteration
of the status of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea or the city of Sevastopol.” See UN General Assembly, “Resolution
Adopted by the General Assembly on 27 March 2014 [without reference to a Main Committee (A/68/L.39 and Add.1)],
68/262. Territorial Integrity of Ukraine,” April 1, 2014, Link.
13 These regions accounted for almost one-quarter of Ukraine’s industrial activity and an equal share of its exports before
the 2014 conflict began. World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, Ukraine: Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment:
Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine, Vol. 1: Synthesis Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), Link.
14 Ukraine Ministry of Social Policy, “Ministry Statistics 2022.” See also World Bank, The Economics of Winning Hearts and
Minds: Programming Recovery in Eastern Ukraine (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2021), p.13.
15 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Report on the Human Rights Situation in Ukraine 16 August to 15
November 2015,” Link.
16 See the full report, with a detailed breakdown of figures by sector: World Bank, European Union, and United Nations,
Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment: Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine, Vol. 1: Synthesis
Report (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2015), Link.
17 Source: Our World in Data, Link (accessed on February 25, 2022).
18 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, “The COVID-19 Crisis in Ukraine,” February 25, 2022, Link.
Introduction 31
harmed GDP growth throughout Ukraine at the eve US$12.9 billion to non-residential buildings and
of the invasion.19 US$27.6 billion in damage to infrastructure. Using a
cutoff date of April 11, 2022, the KSE identified direct
2022 War damage from the war of US$80.4 billion.21
As of late May 2022, a 960 km line of military
The invasion of Ukraine began as a full-scale land,
combat extended just west of Kherson, north of
sea, and air campaign, targeting Ukrainian military
Melitopol and Mariupol, northeast of the Donbas
assets and cities across the country. The reaction
cities of Luhanska and Donetska oblasts, continuing
and mobilization of Ukrainian resistance and
northwest near Izyum to the Russian border north
formal military units slowed the Russian advance,
of Kharkiv. Russian ships in the Black Sea continued
eventually reversing the Russian movements along
to conduct a naval blockade of Ukraine, halting
the northern and northeastern fronts toward Kyiv,
commerce at Ukrainian ports. Cruise missiles and
Chernihiv, and Kharkiv. As of June 1, Ukrainian
other standoff weapons from these vessels have
forces have also countered Russian advances
also struck Ukrainian targets. In areas temporarily
toward Slovyansk, Kramatorsk, Izium, and Odesa.
under Russian control, such as Kherson, Ukrainian
As Russian military formations have shifted focus
government personnel have been replaced with pro-
to the east and south of Ukraine, street fighting,
Russian officials.22 On May 30, 2022, it was agreed
artillery bombardments, and long-range missile
that the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment
and air strikes continue, damaging urban residential
would be conducted to assess the damage, loss
areas and communications, administrative, and
and reconstruction and recovery needs considering
transportation infrastructure. Hospitals, educational
the war impacts up until June 1, 2022. Further
and residential complexes, energy production and
assessments of the war impacts could be conducted
distribution infrastructure, public service facilities,
at later dates depending on the trajectory of the war.
commercial and trade assets, and cultural sites
have been heavily damaged. The cities of Mariupol
and Sievierodonetsk in particular have sustained War Intensity Since June 1, 2022
comprehensive destruction.
Since June 1, 2022, the impacts of the war in Ukraine
Rapid and remote assessments of damage were have continued to escalate. The following maps
conducted in April 2022 by the World Bank and the depict the war intensity. Figure 5 shows the monthly
Kyiv School of Economics (KSE). The World Bank combat intensity from March through end of May
assessment was aimed to inform the Approach 2022, and the combat intensity in the month of June
Paper: Relief, Recovery and Resilient Reconstruction- 2022. Figure 6 shows the difference between the
Supporting Ukraine’s Immediate and Medium- combat and artillery use in the March–May period
Term Economic Needs which was prepared for the and June. Since June 1, and the cutoff date for this
Ministerial Roundtable for Support to Ukraine at RDNA, the conflict has intensified in east and south-
the IMF-World Bank 2022 Spring Meetings.20 This east of Ukraine, with significant additional damage
assessment used a cut off for damage of March 31, anticipated in the oblasts of Luhanska, Donetska and
2022, and found US$59.3 billion in direct damage, with Khersonska and Zaporizka.
US$18.8 billion in damage to residential buildings,
19 World Bank, The Economics of Winning Hearts and Minds: Programming Recovery in Eastern Ukraine (Washington, DC: World
Bank, 2021), p. 13.
20 World Bank. 2022. Relief, Recovery and Resilient Reconstruction: Supporting Ukraine’s Immediate and Medium-Term
Economic Needs, Link.
21 Kyiv School of Economics, Link
22 “Kherson: occupiers have appointed their own “head of the regional state administration” and “mayor” Ukrayinska Pravda,
April 26, 2022, Link.
32 Introduction
Figure 5. Combat intensity March–May 2022 (top) and month of June 2022 (bottom)
Source: Remote data assessment for the RDNA.
Introduction 33
Figure 6. Comparison of March–May period and June in combat (top) and artillery use (bottom)
Source: Remote data assessment for the RDNA.
34 Introduction
Government and International Response
Government Response SpivDiia26 has been developed as an official
platform uniting volunteer and state initiatives
for humanitarian aid, guaranteeing the safety of
Since the launch of the invasion of Ukraine, the
both providers and recipients of assistance. This
Government of Ukraine has taken the lead in
platform is coordinated with the support of the
coordinating the humanitarian support to the war-
Office of the President of Ukraine together with the
affected regions and population. Several important
MRTOT, Ministry for Communities and Territories
simplifications to the legislation were introduced to
Development of Ukraine (Minregion), Ministry of
facilitate a rapid response to humanitarian needs
Health, and Ministry of Youth and Sports. The
during the period of martial law. These include (i)
Humanitarian Aid Portal27 for those seeking to help
provision of the separate procedure for passage of
Ukraine was developed jointly by the Office of the
donors’ humanitarian aid through the customs border
President of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers
of Ukraine;23 and (ii) procedure and mechanism for
of Ukraine. This platform provides an interactive
providing humanitarian and other aid to the civilian
map of the humanitarian assistance; accepts online
population (funds received in national or foreign
monetary contributions; explains how to send
currency as charitable donations, humanitarian aid,
humanitarian cargo and how to transfer funds to
grants, or gifts are deposited to the current account of
support the army or help injured civilians; and lists
the Ministry of Social Policy opened for this purpose
foreign and Ukrainian humanitarian hubs. In addition,
at the National Bank of Ukraine).24 The Ministry for
a national portal for temporarily evacuated persons
Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories
looking for temporary housing28 was developed by
(MRTOT) on a weekly basis collects and consolidates
the Office of the President of Ukraine.
the needs of the Regional Military Administrations
for the provision of humanitarian aid, in particular
To support the rapidly growing population of
household items, sanitary and hygienic products,
internally displaced persons (IDPs), a large-scale
and food and medicines. In parallel, MRTOT is in
IDP program under the President of Ukraine29 has
charge of coordinating transportation and delivery of
been launched to coordinate support provided to
humanitarian aid from various charity organizations
IDPs.30 The program includes four main types of
and HelpUkraine.Center to the regions.25
support as determined by the relevant Cabinet of
Ministers resolutions to support both IDPs and host
Efficient online humanitarian aid platforms have
communities: (i) monthly cash transfers to IDPs
been established to provide services, coordination,
to cover living expenses, including housing and
and support to Ukraine. At the initiative of state
utility services;31 (ii) compensation to employers
authorities and volunteers, the volunteer association
for labor costs related to the employment of IDPs;32
23 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 174, “Some Issues of the Passage of Humanitarian Aid through the Customs Border of
Ukraine under Martial Law,” March 1, 2022, Link.
24 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 220, “Procedure of Provision of Humanitarian and Other Aid to the Civilian Population
under Martial Law Conditions in Ukraine,” March 1, 2022, Link.
25 HelpUkraine.Center is the largest logistics hub for humanitarian aid in Eastern Europe, created at the initiative of Ukrainian
businesses (including TIS, Nova Poshta, Rozetka, Ocean.me, and others); see Link.
26 SpivDiia is an initiative of volunteers and state authorities that guarantees the safety of both providers and recipients of
assistance; see Link.
27 Humanitarian Aid Portal; see Link.
28 The national portal for temporarily evacuated persons looking for temporary housing is at Link.
29 Information about the program is at the government portal source, Link.
30 Fourteen war-affected regions determined by the Cabinet of Ministers are supported: Chernihivska, Sumska, Kharkivska,
Khersonska, Mykolaivska, Zaporizka, Donetska, Luhanska, Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Odeska, Volynska, and Dnipropetrovska
oblasts and Kyiv City.
31 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 332, “Some Issues of Payment of Housing Assistance to Internally Displaced Persons,”
March 20, 2022, Link.
32 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 331, “About the Statement of the Order for Providing the Employer with Compensation
for Labor Costs for the Employment of Internally Displaced Persons as a Result of Hostilities During Martial Law in
Ukraine,” March 20, 2022, Link.
Introduction 35
(iii) reimbursement of host communities33 for the European financial institutions have also mobilized
housing and utility costs paid by the community- support for Ukraine. The European Bank for
owned facilities (premises) used to temporarily Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) has
house IDPs; and (iv) reimbursement of owners of established the US$2.2 billion (€2 billion) War
private housing stock related to free temporary on Ukraine–EBRD Resilience Package, which is
accommodation of IDPs.34 aimed at supporting resilience and livelihoods in
Ukraine and affected countries.36 The European
International Response Investment Bank (EIB) has supplied US$2.2 billion
(€2 billion), which, in collaboration with the European
Commission, includes US$0.7 billion (€668 million)
Various international institutions have mobilized
for immediate liquidity assistance to Ukrainian
support for Ukraine and neighboring countries
authorities. Specifically, EIB has committed
affected by the war through emergency support
US$2.1 billion (€1.9 billion) in support to small and
mechanisms. The World Bank Group has earmarked
medium companies, as well as US$3.9 billion (€3.6
a US$4 billion support package for Ukraine, including
billion) in public sector support. In addition, the
fast-disbursing budget support to help the Ukrainian
EIB is accelerating commitment for infrastructure
government continue providing essential services.35
projects through the investment of US$1.4 billion
In addition to this, the World Bank Group set up a
(€1.3 billion). Under its Ukraine Solidarity Package,
Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF) to provide a rapid,
the EIB has prepared a US$14.3 billion (€4 billion)
targeted, and secure mechanism for channeling
package to support EU member states hosting
grant resources from donors to Ukraine; the Multi-
refugees as a result of the invasion in Ukraine and
Donor Trust Fund currently has some US$0.3 billion
to develop critical social infrastructure. Lastly, the
in contributions. Under the Public Expenditures
Council of Europe Development Bank (CEB) has
for Administrative Capacity Endurance in Ukraine
made emergency grants to neighboring countries
project, the World Bank has approved US$1.49 billion
to support immediate needs of refugees, including
in additional financing. The World Bank Group is also
transportation and orientation.
providing support to neighboring countries affected
by the invasion, including support to refugee
In 2022, through the Union Civil Protection
populations, as well as support to the private sector
Mechanism (UCPM), the EU has provided Ukraine with
through trade finance. The International Monetary
over US$716 million (€700 million) in humanitarian
Fund (IMF) has allotted US$1.4 billion under the Rapid
aid and in-kind assistance (including 40,500 tons of
Financing Instrument (RFI), which provides rapid
different types of aid and 653 medical evacuations),
support for urgent balance of payments needs so
and has delivered this aid through logistic hubs
immediate needs, such as measures to alleviate the
established in Slovakia, Romania, and Poland.37 The
economic impact of the war, can be met. Existing IMF
European Union has made US$355 million (€348
financial programs with Ukraine are also continuing,
million) available in humanitarian aid programs to
where appropriate, including the disbursement of
support civilians affected by the war (€335 million for
US$2.7 billion from the Special Drawing Rights (SDR)
Ukraine and €13 million for Moldova).38 The EU has
allocation in August 2021. The IMF also provides
also mobilized €4.1 billion in support for Ukraine’s
policy support in the design and implementation of
overall economic and financial resilience, keeping
effective crisis management measures and provides
the Ukrainian government functional and able to
support to neighboring countries, including Moldova.
33 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 261, “About the Statement of the Order and Conditions of Granting of Compensation
to the Central Executive Bodies and Local Budgets for Payment of the Utility Services Provided During Placement in the
Conditions of Martial Law of Temporarily Displaced Persons,” March 11, 2022, Link.
34 Cabinet of Ministers Resolution No. 333, “Reimbursement of Expenses for Temporary Accommodation of Internally
Displaced Persons Who Have Moved During Martial Law and Do Not Receive Monthly Targeted Assistance to Internally
Displaced Persons to Cover Living Expenses, Including Housing and Communal Services,” March 19, 2022, Link.
35 See World Bank, “World Bank Group Response to Global Impacts of the War in Ukraine: A Proposed Roadmap,” April 12,
2022, Link.
36 Within Ukraine, the resilience and livelihoods framework will focus: (i) payment deferrals, debt forbearance, and
restructuring; (ii) trade finance, including for fuel imports; (iii) emergency liquidity finance, in coordination with partners;
and (iv) emergency reform support, to support the Ukrainian authorities with immediate legislative and regulatory
interventions.
37 European Commission, “ECHO Daily Map of 17 June 2022,” Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
Operations, Link ; European Commission, “Factsheet–The European Union and Ukraine,” June 18, 2022, Link.
38 European Commission, “Ukraine,” Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations. Link.
36 Introduction
cover basic expenditures. Between March and May Ukraine’s Recovery Plan
2022, US$1.2 billion in macro-financial assistance
has been disbursed in budgetary support to Ukraine. In April, the Government of Ukraine established the
The EU is also providing additional grant support of National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from
US$120 million to help state and resilience building.39 Consequences of War, which is co-chaired by the
Council of the Prime Minister and the Office of the
Following Ukraine’s activation of the UCPM and President. Working groups have been formed for
communication with the Emergency Response economic recovery and development, agriculture,
and Coordination Center (ERCC), all 27 EU public infrastructure, private enterprise recovery,
member states, as well as three participating restoration of public services, housing, transport,
states (Norway, Turkey, and North Macedonia) communications, and social service delivery, among
responded with support for Ukraine. Moreover, other sectors. In addition to the collection of data
many nongovernmental organizations, embassies, on damage and needs associated with the war,
companies, and individuals from Ukraine and the National Council is charged with developing
abroad have sent donations. Numerous countries proposals for priority reforms and developing the
expressed solidarity with Ukraine. The United postwar recovery and development plan. The current
Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund assessment is being conducted in collaboration with
(UNICEF), the United Nations High Commissioner the National Council.
for Refugees (UNHCR), the Organization for Security
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), and the World On July 4, 2022, the Ukraine Recovery Conference
Meteorological Organization (WMO), as well as many (URC2022) held its fifth conference in Lugano,
others, have expressed solidarity and readiness to Switzerland, and adopted the Lugano Declaration
provide assistance. and the Lugano Principles (Box 2). The meeting was
attended by various governmental representatives,
In addition, several countries are providing advocacy groups, academic institutions,
humanitarian support through national programs. representatives from the private sector, and
As of May 12, the United States had provided US$688 international organizations, which later endorsed
million in humanitarian assistance for shelter, food, the Lugano Declaration. The Ukraine Recovery
and health supplies to help Ukrainians affected by Conference was structured under five recovery
the war. An additional US$16 billion was committed pillars: smart recovery architecture, infrastructure
for budgetary support for the Ukrainian government, recovery, social recovery, environmental recovery,
economic assistance for small businesses, and energy security. The Lugano Declaration
agricultural sector support, efforts to document highlights the importance of having Ukraine drive
human rights violations, and support to mitigate the the recovery and development plan; the recovery
effects of displacement in the region.40 The United process should be linked to and mutually support
Kingdom has committed US$3.5 billion, and Germany the broader reform agenda, while also being an
announced US$1 billion in macro-economic support inclusive multi-stakeholder process that includes
and humanitarian assistance for Ukraine in May.41 the private sector and civil society organizations.42
39 European Commission, “EU Assistance to Ukraine,” Link (accessed June 22, 2022).
40 Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), “Funding Review,” May 23, 2022, Link.
41 Devex, “Funding Tracker: Who’s Sending Aid to Ukraine?,” June 2022, Link (accessed June 22, 2022).
42 URC2022, “Lugano Declaration,” July 4–5, 2022, Link.
Introduction 37
Box 2. Lugano Declaration and Principles
The seven Lugano principles are presented in full below:
1. Partnership. The recovery process is led and driven by Ukraine and conducted in partnership with its
international partners. The recovery effort has to be based on a sound and ongoing needs assessment
process, aligned priorities, joint planning for results, accountability for financial flows, and effective
coordination.
2. Reform focus. The recovery process has to contribute to accelerating, deepening, broadening and
achieving Ukraine’s reform efforts and resilience in line with Ukraine’s European path.
3. Transparency, accountability and rule of law. The recovery process has to be transparent and
accountable to the people of Ukraine. The rule of law must be systematically strengthened and
corruption eradicated. All funding for recovery needs to be fair and transparent.
4. Democratic participation. The recovery process has to be a whole-of-society effort, rooted in
democratic participation by the population, including those displaced or returning from abroad, local
self-governance and effective decentralization.
5. Multi-stakeholder engagement. The recovery process has to facilitate collaboration between
national and international actors, including from the private sector, civil society, academia and local
government.
6. Gender equality and inclusion. The recovery process has to be inclusive and ensure gender equality
and respect for human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights. Recovery needs to benefit
all, and no part of society should be left behind. Disparities need to be reduced.
7. Sustainability. The recovery process has to rebuild Ukraine in a sustainable manner aligned with the
2030 Agenda for sustainable development and the Paris Agreement, integrating social, economic and
environmental dimensions including green transition.
Source: URC2022, “Lugano Declaration,” July 4–5, 2022, Link.
38 Introduction
Figure 7. Ukraine Recovery Plan
Source: URC2022, “Recovery Plan,” 2022, Link.
At the conference, Ukraine presented a US$750 the World Bank Human Capital Index; and to achieve
billion Recovery Plan.43 Under the Ukraine recovery a 65 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990.
vision, US$150–250 billion is envisaged for restoration The key guiding principles of the Recovery Plan are
and modernization of housing and infrastructure to start now and ramp up gradually; grow prosperity
(more details are in Figure 7). The Ukrainian in an equitable way; integrate into the EU; build back
government presented a three-stage recovery plan: better (for the future); and enable private investment
Stage 1 is a recovery plan blueprint;44 Stage 2 is a and entrepreneurship. The plan will be implemented
recovery plan drill-down and roadmap;45 and Stage in a region-focused and parameter-based approach.
3 is implementation.46 The Recovery Plan has set To bolster Ukraine’s Recovery Plan and support the
targets for 2032: to accelerate sustainable economic achievement of short-, medium-, and long-term
growth (with a plan for 7 percent annual GDP growth targets, 15 national programs have been developed;
and an increase in investments); to reach the top- see Figure 7.47
25 economies in the Economic Complexity Index and
43 URC2022, “Recovery Plan,” 2022, Link.
44 Stage 1 includes defining top-down development targets; collecting development projects and initiatives via inclusive
process; prioritization of projects and initiatives; identifying “catalyst” projects; and consolidation of the priority initiatives
into a holistic recovery plan blueprint.
45 Stage 2 includes specification and elaboration of the plan with the local stakeholders and international partners; setup of
the recovery governance structure to support implementation; synchronization of the plan with the government program;
preparation of a detailed implementation roadmap with clear deadlines and responsibilities; and launch of immediate-
priority projects.
46 Stage 3 includes launch of the plan implementation; regular monitoring of results; and program adjustments as needed.
47 See Government of Ukraine, “Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine (ПЛАН ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ),” 2022, Link.
Introduction 39
RDNA Objectives and Methodology
Objectives, Limitations, and Coverage Methodology, Approach, Scope, and
of the Assessment Timelines
The World Bank, the Government of Ukraine, The Ukraine RDNA provides a broad-brush
and the European Commission, with the support estimate of the effect of the ongoing war on both
of partners, conducted jointly a Rapid Damage infrastructure and service delivery.
and Needs Assessment (RDNA) to provide a
comprehensive inventory of damage, losses, and The RDNA follows a globally established and
needs resulting from the ongoing war; the goal is to recognized DaLA methodology jointly developed
inform reconstruction and recovery planning. The by the European Union, the World Bank Group,
RDNA is in line with the globally recognized Damage and the United Nations, which has been applied
and Loss Assessment (DaLA) methodology, which is globally in post-disaster and conflict contexts to
a credible and robust methodology to systematically inform recovery and reconstruction planning.48 This
and comprehensively assess damage, losses, and transparent and standard assessment methodology
reconstruction needs. The RDNA looks at social, contributes to coordinated and coherent national
infrastructure, and productive sectors as well as and international efforts. In the case of Ukraine, the
cross-cutting sectors and issues (such as land RDNA approach explicitly includes opportunities to
decontamination, environment, social issues, build back better and smarter guided by principles
governance, and debris management). The RDNA of inclusion, resilience, and sustainability.
assesses the impact between February 24 and June
1, 2022. The RDNA uses the following key definitions, which
are described in greater detail in Table 4. Damage
Given the ongoing nature of the war, the damage, is defined as direct costs of destroyed or damaged
losses, and needs presented in this RDNA are physical assets; it is valued in monetary terms with
absolute minimums, with the numbers expected to costs estimated based on replacing or repairing
increase significantly for each month that the war physical assets and infrastructure, considering the
continues. Depending on how the war evolves, the replacement price prevailing before the war. Losses
World Bank stands ready with the Government of are defined as changes in economic flows resulting
Ukraine and the European Commission to repeat from the war; losses are valued in monetary terms.
the analysis at national level or in specific sectoral Together damage and loss constitute the “impacts”
or geographic areas. In parallel to the RDNA of the war. Needs do not equal the sum of damage
process, the Government of Ukraine is preparing and loss. Needs costing draws on the monetary value
the approach and systems for the collection of of damage and losses as well as needs associated
asset-level damage information for these further with the resumption of prewar normality through
assessments—an effort very complementary to activities including repair and restoration. However,
this RDNA. The government, European Commission, needs also include a premium linked to building back
and World Bank will agree on the timing for future better principles (such as improved energy efficiency,
updates to the RDNA, at national, subnational, or modernization efforts, and sustainability standards),
sectoral level, depending on the progression of the with each sector using appropriate standards and
war over coming weeks and months. costing assumptions. Needs also consider issues
such as global inflation, surge pricing due to volume
of construction, higher insurance, and so forth.
Needs are expressed in monetary value according
to market price prevailing as of June 1, 2022.
48 Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), “Damage, Loss and Needs Assessment–Tools and
Methodology, 2022, Link.
40 Introduction
Table 4. Key RDNA terms
Baseline: General and sector-specific prewar data and information to compare with postwar (cutoff)
conditions (presented in “physical numbers” e.g., number of houses, hospitals, schools etc.). Also, where
possible, includes gender disaggregated data —e.g., with number of teachers, students etc.
Damage: Total or partial destruction of physical assets existing in the affected area. Damage incurred as a
result of the war and is measured in physical units (e.g., square meters of housing, kilometers of roads, etc.). In
addition to infrastructure/ buildings, the assets/contents from within those buildings and infrastructures, such
as furnishings and equipment, farm machinery and tools etc., should be quantified.
Damage Replacement Cost: Monetary value, expressed as the replacement costs according to the market prices
prevailing just before the start of the war.
Losses: Temporary changes in the economic flows arising from the war. Losses occur from the time of the
invasion until economic recovery and reconstruction have been achieved, often lasting over many years. In the
case of this RDNA, an 18-month period is assumed. Typical losses include the temporary decline in output and
higher production costs in the productive sectors of agriculture, livestock, fishery, industry, trade and tourism;
lower revenues and higher cost of operation in services (education, health, electricity, water supply and sanitation,
transport, and communications), as well as the expenditures to meet humanitarian assistance needs. Debris
removal and mine clearance is covered here. Losses are expressed in current monetary values.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs: Reconstruction and recovery needs refer to the actions and financing
required to restore Ukraine to prewar levels, including reconstruction of damaged assets, restoration of services
as well as actions to support residents in affected areas, catalyze the economy, build livelihoods, strengthen
governance and decision-making, and to build resilience to disasters and climate change.
Needs Costing: Needs consider damage, losses as well as other needs associated with the resumption of prewar
normality. Monetary value, expressed as the repair, restoration and replacement costs of damaged assets
according to the market price prevailing just after the war—or in this case, replacement costs as of June 2022.
For the calculation of reconstruction costs, postwar price increases as well as improvements associated with
modernization, energy efficiency and other concepts are of build back better are considered. Reconstruction
costs should also consider surge pricing and higher costs of doing business. Costs also include losses such
as debris removal, land decontamination etc. Monetary needs also consider the costs for the resumption of
production, ensuring service delivery, additional costs to service providers to restore basic services; and the
provision of equitable and affordable services to vulnerable groups and affected population.
Immediate measures for basic service provision: Costs related to meeting immediate (temporary) recovery
needs of the affected population, including immediate repair and restoration of urgent public services such as
electricity, heating, water, etc. This costing falls under losses.
Restoration and access to goods and services: Restoration and access to goods and services that fulfill the
basic needs of individuals, families, and communities, such as access to markets, employment, health care, food,
schools, religious and cultural centers, etc. These costs fall under needs.
Reconstruction and Rehabilitation of physical assets and infrastructure: Includes demolition and clearance of
debris (this costing is part of losses, but it is also reflected in needs). Then the design, civil work and supervision
required to rebuild or rehabilitate assets and infrastructure for full functionality (reflected in needs)
Building back better: Relates to measures that the government decides should be integrated into rehabilitation
and reconstruction of damaged assets, including improved functionality, energy efficiency, universal access,
disaster and climate resilience, and critical modernization measures, including right-sizing and right-siting of
infrastructure and services. This costing is added in the needs calculation, and each sector uses appropriate
standards and costing assumptions such as additional cost to improve standards (for example, energy efficiency),
surge pricing, inflation, higher insurance/security costs, and what the current status is.
Intangible costs: Costs that accrue to assets/sectors without an obvious market price which are difficult to depict
in monetary terms such as environmental losses, health and psychological impacts, heritage losses etc.
Source: Assessment team drawing on DaLA guidance.
Introduction 41
Some specific assumptions are made for the presented overall, by sector, by ownership
purpose of this RDNA: (public/private), and by oblast.
• The RDNA does not provide asset-level • Quantify losses such as disrupted services and
information and is not intended for legal or economic impacts, clearance and management
compensatory claims. of debris, mines, and munitions, support to IDPs,
etc. These data are presented overall, by sector,
• Given the ongoing nature of the war, the damage and where appropriate by geographic distribution.
and loss numbers as well as reconstruction and
recovery financing needs will have continued • Identify and quantify corresponding recovery and
to accrue since June 1 and will continue to reconstruction needs overall, by sector, and by
grow as long as the war continues. The nature oblast, based on the damage and losses. These
of data collection within a rapid assessment needs are further broken down into short-term/
is challenging in certain areas, and at times immediate and medium- to long-term.
limited, due to escalations of conflict and a
continued deterioration of the humanitarian • Develop guiding principles and sequencing for
situation in zones where clashes are prolonged; a green, resilient, inclusive, and sustainable
amidst growing conflict deterioration, the report recovery and reconstruction that covers public
recognizes that some regions have sustained and private infrastructure, service provision,
extensive damage after June 1, 2022. and livelihoods across different sectors. The
sequencing should highlight specific immediate
• Since losses are typically measured until and short-term socioeconomic recovery needs
“normality” is restored, an additional 18 months and a roadmap for medium- to long-term
is included in the calculation for losses along with reconstruction.
three months between the start of the war and
the RDNA cutoff date of June 1, 2022. Temporal scope: Damage and losses were calculated
according to actual or estimated pre-February 2022
• Reconstruction needs are based on damage baseline of physical assets. Damage data were
and losses and consider issues such as assessed from February 24, 2022, to June 1, 2022.
increased costs for labor and goods given global
inflationary pressures, surge costs associated Geographic scope: The geographic scope includes
with volume of reconstruction, additional all areas under government control on February
security costs, and inclusion of build back better 1, 2022. Results are presented by oblast and by
principles. Reconstruction and recovery costs sector, and on aggregate level overall.49 There have
are considered for two periods, (i) immediate or been limitations in terms of obtaining data within
short-term, i.e., 18-36 months, and (ii) medium territories temporarily not under government control
to long-term, up to 10 years. The timeline was and within areas where conflict remained intense or
defined in line with the context of the ongoing intensified throughout June and July.
war and high degree of uncertainty, as well as the
Government of Ukraine’s Recovery Plan timelines Sectoral scope: The RDNA covers 20 affected sectors,
(2022–2032). as follows:
The RDNA process involves the collection and • Social: housing; education; health; social
analysis of data from government, local authorities, protection; and culture and tourism
the KSE, as well as satellite imagery, social media
analytics, anonymized cellphone data, and surveys • Infrastructure: energy and mining; transport;
conducted for the following purposes: water supply and sanitation; telecommunications
and digital; and municipal services (public
• Quantify and validate physical damage to buildings/community infrastructure)
infrastructure, buildings, etc. These data are
49 The Ukraine RDNA covers Vinnytska, Volynska, Dnipropetrovska, Donetska, Zhytomyrska, Zakarpatska, Zaporizka, Ivano-
Frankivska, Kyivska, Kirovohradska, Luhanska, Lvivska, Mykolaivska, Odeska, Poltavska, Rivnenska, Sumska, Ternopilska,
Kharkivska, Khersonska, Khmelnytska, Cherkaska, Chernivetska, and Chernihivska, as well as the cities of Kyiv, Vinnytsia,
Lviv, Odessa, Kharkiv, Irpin, Bucha, and Mariupol.
42 Introduction
• Productive: agriculture (crops and livestock); harmonize assessments and reconstruction
irrigation and water resources; commerce and efforts. At a subnational level and upon request, the
industry; and financial and banking. World Bank is providing technical assistance and
advice to municipalities on using the DaLA approach
• Cross-cutting: environment and forestry; justice to assess damage, loss, and reconstruction needs.
and public administration; emergency response,
civil protection, and early warning systems;
land decontamination; social impacts; and
Remote Data
macroeconomic impacts at the aggregate level.
Given the ongoing nature of the conflict and the
lack of access to territories temporarily not
Costing: Damage, losses, and needs are presented in
under government control, this assessment relies
US dollars. The hryvnia to US dollar exchange rate of
primarily on remote-based information that is
US$1 = UAH 27.28 from December 31, 2021,50 is used
validated through ground-based information.
throughout the report.
Remote data sources include 50 cm resolution
satellite imagery, (social) media analytics, and
Coordination: Activities were undertaken with
publicly available information. The remotely sourced
UK Foreign Office, US government, relevant UN
data have been triangulated and validated whenever
agencies, academia, civil society organizations,
possible against ground-based information obtained
and the private sector to draw on the most recent
from the Government of Ukraine, local agencies, the
information available, to validate data, to ensure
UN, and other international partners.
a common understanding of activities, and to
50 This date was selected as it was prior to the significant impact on economic variables associated with the buildup to the
invasion.
43
MACROECONOMIC
AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Borodyanka. Photo by Julia Burlachenko for the World Bank.
44 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
MACROECONOMIC
IMPACTS
Summary environment, including lower global commodity prices.
The economy contracted by a cumulative 16 percent
and the currency depreciated by 70 percent, while
The war in Ukraine has had very substantial
the fiscal deficit, including Naftogaz, reached over
economic, social, and poverty consequences. The
10 percent of GDP in 2014. To address the economic
war has significantly disrupted economic activities
and social challenges, Ukraine implemented a wide
via several channels: damage to productive assets
range the structural reforms, including (i) moving to
and infrastructure, logistic problems, labor force
a flexible exchange rate; (ii) undertaking significant
losses, ruined supply-demand chains, uncertainty,
fiscal consolidation; (iii) reforming energy tariffs to
and elevated risks. Thus, estimated gross domestic
reduce a key quasi-fiscal deficit and strengthening
product (GDP) losses in 2022 go much beyond physical
the social safety net to cushion the impact on the
asset losses, while the medium-term economic
poor; (iv) stabilizing the banking sector by putting
recovery will be affected by human capital reduction
in place a framework to resolve and recapitalize
and the sheer size of reconstruction needs. Over 6.8
weak banks and strengthen supervision; (v) taking
million Ukrainian residents have left the country, a
steps to streamline the business environment; and
large majority of them women and children and an
(vi) establishing key anticorruption institutions and
estimated 6.6 million people are internally displaced.
requiring asset disclosures for public officials. These
Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 15.1 percent year over year
reforms helped to stabilize confidence after two
(YoY) in Q1 (or 19.3 percent quarter over quarter
years of sharp economic contraction. While economic
(QoQ) seasonally adjusted), driven by a 45 percent
growth picked up in 2018–2019, weak investment
GDP contraction in March YoY. After Kyivska oblast
and low productivity continued to undermine strong
was reclaimed, economic activity in April showed
and sustainable economic expansion. Real GDP
the first signs of improvement, even though it
grew by 3.4 percent in 2018 and 3.2 percent in 2019,
remains much below the prewar level. The duration
up from 2.5 percent in 2016–2017. The level of fixed
of the war continues to be uncertain, but assuming
investment averaged around 19 percent of GDP in
that June’s status quo continues until the end of
2016–2019 and was not sufficient to sustain economic
the year, the GDP contraction in 2022 is estimated
growth. Investment was limited by (i) low foreign
to be around 35 percent YoY. If the situation further
direct investment (FDI) of about 3.6 percent of GDP
deteriorates, the decline in economic activities could
on average for 2016–2019; (ii) remaining weaknesses
reach up to 45 percent in 2022. Poverty, based on
in the financial sector (with limited progress made in
the upper-middle-income poverty line of US$5.5 per
resolving nonperforming loans (NPLs)); and (iii) market
person per day, is projected to increase tenfold from
distortions from the lack of a functioning agricultural
a low base, with the share of the population below the
land market, an anticompetitive environment, and
poverty line increasing from 2 percent in 2021 to 21
large numbers of SOEs.
percent in 2022. The pace of the economy’s recovery
in the medium term will depend on the duration of
The improved macro-fiscal and financial policy
the war and availability of financial resources to
fundamentals established after the 2014–2015 crisis
support postwar reconstruction and development.
helped Ukraine weather the COVID-19 crisis better
than expected. Following a 3.8 percent contraction
Background in 2020 (versus 7.8 percent initially projected), the
economy grew by 3.4 percent in 2021 as COVID
Responding to the unprecedented shocks of 2014– restrictions eased and a bumper harvest lifted
2015, Ukraine undertook decisive reforms to stabilize growth in the last quarter of 2021. Fiscal revenues
the economy, reduce large imbalances, and cushion performed better than anticipated, with a trade and
the impact of the shocks on the population. In 2014, income tax revenue boost in both 2020 and 2021.
Ukraine’s economy was hit by the conflict in the east The fiscal deficit reached 6 percent of GDP in 2020
of the country, Crimea crisis, and a weak external (versus a pre-pandemic projection of 2.1 percent)
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 45
and remained elevated at 4 percent in 2021 due to the end of 2021. Beginning in mid-November 2021, a
the added fiscal burden from fixed household gas sustained escalation in geopolitical tensions led to
tariffs (amidst steep increases in international gas a substantial reassessment of risk, with economic
prices). However, 2020 experienced a slight increase stress being propagated to the broader economy
in social vulnerability as 23.2 percent people were and public finances through confidence, trade, and
recorded to live below the national poverty line (up financing channels. Sovereign bond yields rose
from 23 percent in 2019).51 Overall, however, the sharply to nearly 30 percent during mid-November
government’s COVID-19 response measures helped and end-February, comparable to periods in which
limit the economic impact on citizens, particularly countries face considerable crisis risks. Such high
those below the poverty line. external funding costs have effectively eroded
market access for Ukraine. Raising financing on the
To support the economic recovery and address domestic market has also become difficult. Between
a lack of capital investment, Ukraine deepened mid-November and February 18, 2022, nonresident
reforms in 2020–2021 in the following areas: (i) de- investors pulled out nearly US$650 million from
monopolization and anticorruption institutions; (ii) domestic bond markets. Although the central bank
strengthening of land and credit markets; and (iii) had spent some US$2.3 billion in foreign exchange
financial sector supervision improvements. First, to reserves to stem currency depreciation pressures
promote competition and attract investment, Ukraine between mid-November and mid-February, the
unbundled the gas sector that has a footprint of the hryvnia still lost about 8.6 percent of its value
state-owned monopoly and clarified the legislative relative to the US dollar. With the declaration of a
framework for private investment in infrastructure. state of emergency, the central bank has imposed
Second, to improve accountability and promote a restrictions on currency and banking transactions.
level playing field, Ukraine addressed gaps in the
nascent anticorruption architecture. Judicial reform,
which was long overdue and critical for anchoring
Assessment of the Impact
confidence in the rule of law, was initiated, with the of the War
adoption of two laws reforming judicial management
bodies and laying the ground for comprehensive The invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022 has
judicial reforms. Legislation adopted in October had very substantial economic consequences. The
2021 significantly strengthened the governance and war significantly disrupted economic activities via
independence of the National Anticorruption Bureau several channels: damage to productive assets
of Ukraine (NABU). Third, the historic land reform and infrastructure, ruined supply-demand chains,
was adopted to unlock investment in the agricultural logistic problems, labor force losses, uncertainty,
sector. Fourth, amendments to the banking law were and elevated risks. Thus, estimated GDP loses in
passed to improve corporate governance in banks, 2022 go much beyond physical asset losses, while
strengthen capital structure, and introduce capital the medium-term recovery is limited by large, fixed
buffers for banks; these amendments brought the investment needs and human capital reduction.
law into compliance with EU directives. All banks
must now undergo related party diagnostics, must Next to loss of life and human suffering, the war
be continuously monitored for related lending, has crippled Ukraine’s economy with large adverse
and are subject to annual asset quality reviews, social and poverty impacts. Over 6.8 million
with large banks subject to annual stress tests. Ukrainian residents have left the country,52 a large
Regulatory capital adequacy ratios remained high majority of them women and children. An estimated
during the COVID shock, while a high share of legacy 6.6 million people are internally displaced and 17.7
nonperforming loans—mostly held by state-owned million people are left in need of humanitarian
banks—had significantly declined. assistance.53 Food and essential services are severely
constrained in the areas affected by the fighting, and
Ukraine’s recovery began to be materially disrupted a third of displaced households report no income. At
by a severe escalation in geopolitical tensions toward the same time, inflation increased from 10 percent
51 Measured by the actual subsistence minimum. This amounted to Hrv 3,661 per adult per month in 2019, which translates
to US$14.5 per day in 2011 purchasing power parity (PPP). In 2015, one in two people lived below the poverty line.
52 This number was 6,865,625 as of August 26, 2022. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees; see Operational Data
Portal: Ukraine Refugee Situation. Link.
53 International Organization for Migration (IOM) “Regional Ukraine Response: Situational Report–22 August 2022,” Link ; OCHA
Ukraine, “Situation Report,” August 17, 2022.
46 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Figure 8. Ukraine’s GDP by oblast in 2020 as share of total (%)
24.0
9.4
6.1 5.7 5.6
5.2 4.9 4.5
4.0 3.2
2.6 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8 1.8
1.7 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.1 1.0
Kyiv city
Vinnytska
Khmelnytska
Ivano-Frankivska
Khersonska
Chernivetska
Kharkivska
Dnipropetrovska
Chernihivska
Donetska
Zakarpatska
Cherkaska
Zaporizka
Poltavska
Zhytomyrska
Mykolaivska
Sumska
Ternopilska
Odeska
Rivnenska
Kirovohradska
Luhanska
Lvivska
Volynska
Kyivska
Source: Ukraine Statistic Service.
YoY in January 2022 to 21.5 percent in June, while these oblasts in GDP is around 15 percent) (Figure
food and fuel prices surged even higher—by 28.3 8). Importantly in Zaporizka and Kharkivska regions,
and 90.9 percent YoY respectively. The latest World the capital cities and centers of economic activity
Bank estimates suggest that poverty, based on the were not taken.
upper-middle-income poverty line of US$5.5 per
person per day, is projected to increase tenfold from As a result, since April economic activity has shown
a low base, with the share of the population below signs of improvement, even though it remains
the poverty line increasing from 2 percent in 2021 much below the prewar level. Although most high-
to 21 percent in 2022. Poverty rates in regions most frequency economic data are not available, corporate
affected by the war are expected to increase much surveys conducted by the National Bank of Ukraine
more. make it possible to follow business activities in key
sectors. According to these surveys, the number of
Even though the war is entering its sixth month and enterprises that have completely stopped operations
its duration is hard to predict, the active combat is fell by almost half to 17 percent in April compared
currently localized, allowing economic activity in to March. In particular, the increase in economic
other parts of the country to gradually recover. In activity in April–June was reported by companies
March, hostilities engulfed 10 oblasts and the city involved in wholesale and retail trade, transport,
of Kyiv, which together accounted for more than 55 food production, engineering (due to production
percent of GDP in the past. Ukraine’s GDP shrank by of special equipment for defense), pharmaceutical
15.1 percent YoY in Q1 (or 19.3 percent QoQ seasonally production, and construction. The recovery is also
adjusted). The estimated GDP contraction in March evidenced by the increase in electricity production,
alone was around 45 percent YoY. The reclamation though to a large extent this could be a substitution
of Kyivska and Chernihivska oblasts in early April effect due to shortages of and high prices for other
and localization of the active combat in the eastern types of energy, as well as the expansion of export
and southern regions helped economic activities to opportunities. At the same time, the recovery is
recover gradually. As of end-June, Luhanska and uneven and shows signs of stagnating at a low level:
Khersonska were the only oblasts that were almost around 60 percent of companies work below the
fully not under government control (together they prewar capacity utilization level; almost 23 percent
comprise around 2.5 percent of GDP), while parts of work at a capacity that is more than twice lower
Donetska, Zaporizka, and Kharkivska oblasts were compared to their prewar activity. Problems with
experiencing active fighting (total contribution of logistics and the destruction of capacities are holding
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 47
Figure 9. Real growth of tax revenue and fiscal expenditure, percent YoY
50% 43%
40%
40%
30% 24%
20%
20% 13%
10%
0% 7%
-10% - 6%
-20% - 27%
-30% - 33% - 34%
-40%
Jan/22 Feb/22 Mar/22 Apr/22 May/22
Tax revenue Expenditure
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
back the recovery in many sectors. The duration government extended a simplified tax regime to a
of the war is now uncertain, but assuming June’s wide range of businesses, significantly reduced the
status quo would continue until the end of the year, value added tax rate for import of fuel for motor
GDP contraction in 2022 is estimated to be around vehicles, and fully exempted it from excise taxes.
35 percent YoY. If the situation deteriorates further, As a result, the nominal decline in tax revenues of
the decline in economic activity could reach up to the consolidated budget reached 24 percent YoY in
45 percent. The pace of medium-term economic March and April and 14 percent in May. In real terms
recovery will depend on the duration of the war and the annual reduction in tax revenues exceeds 30
availability of financial resources to support postwar percent per month since the beginning of the war
reconstruction and development. (Figure 9). Even if the war was to end relatively soon,
revenues are expected to remain depressed for a
With the war continuing, Ukraine is facing three key considerable period.
macro-critical challenges: (i) high fiscal financing
needs and inability to mobilize domestic revenues; Although nonmilitary public spending has
(ii) increasing reliance on monetary financing and been reduced to the basics, public expenditure
deteriorating asset quality of the financial sector; increased sharply to ensure delivery of key public
and (iii) a weaker external position. services during wartime. Since the war started,
the government made efforts to cut non-essential
Since the beginning of the war, tax revenue current expenditures (by 78 percent YoY) and capital
collection has deteriorated significantly due to spending (by 61 percent YoY). Nevertheless, total
undermined economic activities, tax administration public spending surged by 57 percent YoY in March–
and collection bottlenecks in war-effected areas, May due to higher expenditure on wages and salaries
and tax policy changes. All these factors took (109 percent YoY) including for emergency medical
place simultaneously and thus it is not possible to personnel and first responders, transfers and social
differentiate their individual contribution to overall protection needs (44 percent YoY), and procurement
decline in fiscal revenue. In early March 2022, the of goods and services (79 percent YoY), including for
government introduced changes to customs and tax the restoration of public services such as electricity,
policy and tax administration during martial law. water, and gas. On the functional side, growth of
Some customs clearance procedures were amended expenditures for defense and security by 4.5 times,
to provide deferral on import duty payments for and growth of social protection and social security
food and medical goods. Starting in April 2022, the by 30 percent YoY (amounting to about US$3.5 billion
48 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Figure 10. Contributions to expenditure growth (%)
70%
60%
50% 11%
40%
30% 61%
20% 43% 39%
10%
0% 7%
-7% -3% -9% -3% -9%
-10% -9%
-20% -11%
-30%
Jan/22 Feb/22 Mar/22 Apr/22 May/22
State administration Defense, order and security Social protection and security
Health and Education Other
Source: World Bank staff calculations based on Ministry of Finance data.
Note: Other includes economic activity, environmental protection, housing and communal services, physical development.
a month), contributed the most to total increase (deficit and debt repayments) amounted US$11
(Figure 10). These expenditures are helping, in the billion equivalent in Q2 (around US$3.7 billion per
first instance, to prevent even deeper humanitarian month). The government is making an effort to roll
and social impacts on top of those already inflicted over domestic debt and is already negotiated a two-
by the war, and in the second, to prevent an erosion year deferral on external debt amortization with
of institutional capital and capacity that will be the external commercial and official creditors. Taking
bedrock of any future recovery and reconstruction into account lower debt payments in the second half
efforts. In Ukraine, a quarter of the population of 2022, yet growing needs for gas purchases for
receives old-age pensions, which are a key safety the upcoming hitting season, non-military financing
net. In addition, there are 171,000 public employees needs are estimated at US$15.4 billion (around
at the central, oblast, and rayon levels who are US$2.6 billion per month). These estimates do not
drawing a salary (and thus sustaining local services include military expenditure and current recovery
as well as family members who have lost jobs needs. Total fiscal financing needs may reach
or become displaced) and doing the vital work of US$28.8 billion in the second half of 2022 (around
keeping essential government services running, US$4.8 billion per month).
including medical and health services, coordinating
at the level of the central government, and even However, to help Ukraine meet its current nonmilitary
ensuring the safety of nuclear power plants. financing gap, further significant support from
international financial institutions (IFIs) and bilateral
Despite the cuts in nonpriority areas, the necessity lenders is needed. In the absence of significant flow
to maintain critical public services amid sharply of funds from partners, Ukraine will have to further
declining revenues has opened a large nonmilitary squeeze its now bare-bones social expenditures and
fiscal need of over US$15 billion in the second half of avail itself of domestic financing and monetization
2022. From July 1, import duties were reinstated at of the deficit from the National Bank. The National
the prewar level, which is expected to support fiscal Bank has monetized over US$7.7 billion in fiscal
revenues going forward. At the same time, given the needs as of end June since the beginning of the war.
prolonged war and respective economic challenges, Either of the two options (expenditure cut or deficit
revenues are expected to remain depressed for a monetization) will deeply impact the poor: they could
considerable period. Nonmilitary financing needs push the share of the population living below US$5.5
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 49
a day to nearly 60 percent in 2023, up from 2 percent to US$22.8 billion at the end of June from a prewar
in 2021. Such a steep deterioration in poverty will level of US$29 billion.
take years to reverse.
Ukraine’s financial sector suffers from losses of
The war resulted in immediate balance of payments collateral, assets, and revenues. The banking sector
pressures via several channels. First, due to the had already reported US$253 million in losses in
blockade of the Black Sea ports, Ukraine almost fully the first four months of 2022, mainly caused by
lost its ability to export grain and other agricultural increased provisioning for expected losses from
commodities: since the beginning of the war export the war. Due to the ongoing active military combat
of goods collapsed almost by half (in both month in a significant part of the country, bank losses are
over month (MoM) and YoY terms). To offset the effect expected to be significant. According to the central
of export losses in early March, the government bank, 86 percent of the branches were operational
announced import restrictions for all types of goods, as of July. The share of closed branches highly
with the exception of critical imports defined by the correlates with the advances of troops/areas of
government. The withdrawal of import restrictions fighting. Branches in Western and Central Ukraine
in July may lead to significant broadening of the are almost fully operational, while in the southeast
current account deficit in the second half of 2022, as the situation remains dire. Another important
imports had already started to recover in May–June. vulnerability relates to possible negative feedback
Second, huge outflows of refugees have created loops between Ukraine’s fiscal accounts and the
capital account pressures due to the withdrawal of banking system. Government’s increasing reliance
foreign exchange funds from Ukrainian accounts on the banking system for budgetary financing
to finance refugees’ spending abroad. Since the will further narrow the availability of liquidity for
beginning of the war, the National Bank of Ukraine productive lending to the economy after the war,
has spent around US$12 billion for the currency while the risk of investing in government securities
interventions, including US$4 billion in June alone. is becoming more pronounced due to the volatility of
This eroded international reserves, which declined government securities’ value.
50 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
SOCIAL INCLUSION AND
VULNERABLE GROUPS
Summary ASSESSMENT OF IMPACTS
Displacement
This chapter focuses on assessing social impacts
on vulnerable groups, including those who have
been forcibly displaced, women and children,
persons with disabilities, and LGBTI (lesbian, gay, Since the onset of the invasion, one-third of
bisexual, transgender, and intersex) individuals. Ukrainians have been forced to flee their homes
The war forced over one-third of Ukrainians to flee to locations either within Ukraine or outside it.
their homes, and despite an increasing number However, it is challenging to accurately estimate the
of returnees since early May, many Ukrainians scale of displacement within the country because
remain displaced. According to the International only some of the displaced persons reported their
Organization for Migration (IOM) General Population arrival to local authorities, mainly to get help with
Survey, over 7.13 million people were displaced accommodation or humanitarian aid.57 Similarly,
within Ukraine as of May 23, 2022, compared to over for personal reasons or because they do not need
8 million individuals as of May 3, 2022.54 According assistance from the government, a sizable share
to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, 2.7 million of Ukrainians who have moved within the country
persons with disabilities were registered in Ukraine have not officially registered as IDPs in accordance
as of January 1, 2020. Some of residential facilities with the Law of Ukraine on Ensuring the Rights
for persons with disabilities have been damaged or and Freedoms of IDPs.58 Therefore, information in
abandoned due to fighting, and others are inaccessible the Unified Information Database for IDPs (UIDB)
due to military activity or loss of government control maintained by the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine
in some areas. This has resulted in overcrowding underestimates the true number of IDPs in Ukraine.
and insufficient services in accessible facilities. The
war is expected to exacerbate gender disparities, At the end of 2021, 1,476,148 IDPs (1,211,165
accompanied by increased incidence of sexual and households) from areas temporarily not under
gender-based violence (SGBV) and risk of human government control in Donetska and Luhanska
trafficking, particularly for women, adolescent girls, oblasts, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and
and children.55 With education and health services Sevastopol were in the registry of IDPs.59 A month
disrupted by the war, sexual and reproductive health after the initial invasion, there were 1,537,923 IDPs
outcomes such as the maternal mortality rate and in total, but only 63,306 of them were displaced
adolescent pregnancy rate are expected to worsen after February 24, 2022; and 61,699 individuals
for displaced persons and the rest of the population. were registered for the first time since February 24,
Challenges related to discrimination, exclusion, 2022 (Figure 11). In other words, the overwhelming
and violence based on sexual orientation, gender majority of registered IDPs were those displaced by
identity, gender expression, and sex characteristics the conflict since 2014. However, with an increase
are exacerbated in environments affected by in the intensity of fighting in the east and south of
fragility, conflict, and violence.56 Ukraine on the one hand, and revised rules for
54 IOM, “Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey Round 5 (17 May 2022–23 May 2022),” Link.
55 This was the case in 2014. See World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding
Assessment: Analysis of Crisis Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine, Vol. I: Synthesis Report, World Bank, 2015, Link.
56 World Bank, “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Contexts Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence,” 2020, Link.
57 Cedos – NGO Centre for Society Research, 2022, Link.
58 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine,“Ministry of Social Policy: More than 130,000 People Registered as IDPs after the
Imposition of Martial Law,” March 30, 2022, Link.
59 According to the Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 51
registration of IDPs on the other hand, the number of Dnipropetrovska oblast (8.6 percent), followed
newly registered IDPs has substantially increased: by Lvivska oblast (8.3 percent), Kyivska oblast (7.7
from 312,591 people on April 1, to 2,228,861 people percent), and Kharkivska oblast (7 percent) (Figure
on May 1 and then to 2,495,747 people on June 12). The share of newly registered IDPs in the total
1, 2022. As of June 1, 2022, the total number of number of IDPs within the same oblast varies from
registered IDPs, including those displaced since a low of 1.3 percent in Luhanska oblast and 3.4
2014, amounted to 4,162,327 persons (Figure 11). percent in Donetska oblast to a high of 87.8 percent
in Ternopilska oblast.
As of June 1, 2022, the oblast with the most newly
registered IDPs (since February 24, 2022), is
Figure 11. Number of registered IDPs in Ukraine (million), March 25–June 1, 2022
4.162
3.826
2.776
2.549
2.496
2.229
1.805
1.538
0.322
0.313
0.063
0.062
March 25, 2022 April 1, 2022 May 1, 2022 June 1, 2022
Registered IDPs, total IDPs displaced after February 24, 2022
Registered for the first time since February 24, 2022
Source: Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “Dynamics of Key Indicators That Characterize the State of Registration,
Re‑registration and Record Keeping of Internally Displaced Persons for the Period of Martial Law.”
Figure 12. IDPs registered for the first time since February 24, 2022, by oblast of destination/
registration as of June 1, 2022
Source: Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “Report on the State of registration, Re-registration and Record Keeping of internally
Displaced Persons for the Period of Martial Law (Resolution of the CMU dated October 10, 2014 No. 509), as of 1 June 2022.” Note:
The figure shows the absolute number of persons in each oblast and the oblast’s share of the total number in Ukraine. Since
April 19, Ukrainian citizens are also allowed to record their change of residence through the digital application Diia.
52 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
According to an alternative source of information of the war (in mid-March 2022) made up over 65
about the number of IDPs and their characteristics— percent of the before-war resident population, but
e.g., the IOM General Population Survey in Ukraine their number and share substantially decreased by
conducted regularly since March 2022—over 7 May 17–23, 2022, due to mass return flows.
million people were classified as internally displaced
by the war as of May 23, 2022, compared to about 8 As regards the host regions for IDPs, the West
million individuals on May 3, 2022 (Figure 13). macroregion was the main destination for IDPs in
rounds 1–5 of the IOM General Population Survey
As of May 23, 2022 (Round 5 of the IOM survey), over (Figure 14). The number of IDPs hosted in the East
half of all IDPs had moved from territories located in macroregion (predominantly in Dnipropetrovska and
the East macroregion. The estimated number of IDPs Kharkivska oblasts) increased in April–May, and this
from this macroregion is 3,913,000, or 29 percent of macroregion became the second largest destination
the region’s resident population before the war. For for IDPs as of May 23, 2022 (Round 5), hosting
comparison, IDPs who left Kyiv city at the early stage 1,794,000 people.
Figure 13. IOM estimates of IDPs and returnees in Ukraine (million), March–May 2022
7.707 8.029
7.139 7.134
6.478
4.481
2.775 2.715
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
(March 9–16) (March 24 – April 1) (April 11–17) (April 29 – May 3) (May 17–23)
IDPs Returnees
Source: IOM General Population Survey.
Figure 14. IOM estimates of IDPs by host macroregion in Ukraine (million), March–May 2022
3
2.5
Million IDPs
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
West Center South North Kyiv East
Round 1 (March 9–16) Round 2 (March 24 – April 1) Round 3 (April 11–17)
Round 4 (April 29 – May 3) Round 5 (May 17–23)
Source: IOM General Population Survey.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 53
Displacement outside Ukraine. There are two major To summarize, about 6 million Ukrainians have left
sources of information about the number of people the country and are still residing in other countries.
who moved from Ukraine to other countries because This is equivalent to 14–15 percent of the resident
of the war. First is the UNHCR (the United Nations population of Ukraine as of January 1, 2022. As
High Commissioner for Refugees), which together some of these refugees are likely to become long-
with the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine term emigrants, the population decline observed in
reports about cross-border movements from and Ukraine before 2022 will deepen further. According
to Ukraine.60 The second source is UNHCR statistics to one study, under the low (relatively optimistic)
on the number of individual refugees from Ukraine scenario, in which only 15 percent of refugees and
recorded across Europe and refugees from Ukraine their family members remain abroad once the war
registered for temporary protection or similar ends, the working-age population (15–70 years)
national protection schemes in Europe. However, might experience a strong one-off extra cut of around
these statistics have been provided only since early 400,000 people.66 A substantial decrease in labor
June 2022 (Flash #15)61 and do not cover Ukrainian supply due to both displacement of working-age
refugees in non-European countries. population and civilian casualties since February 24,
2022, will hamper the postwar recovery of Ukraine.
According to the UNHCR, there were 4,712,784
individual refugees from Ukraine recorded across Large-scale displacement of population may also
Europe as of June 3, 2022. About 3 million refugees bring about a huge loss in human capital, especially
from Ukraine have registered for temporary if displaced people of working age cannot find a
protection or similar national protection schemes proper job that uses their qualifications and skills. In
in Europe. The major countries of destination for addition, disruptions in the learning process among
individual refugees are Poland, Germany, and the displaced children—as well as those who stayed
Czech Republic. Over 1.3 million individual refugees in the areas with active fighting—can have large
are also recorded in Russia, but this does not take negative effects on learning outcomes, transformed
into account potential forcible displacement, further later into a loss of human capital and lower earnings
movements, or returns. of young workers. Some research shows that the
combination of extended pandemic-related closures
There are also refugees from Ukraine in the countries and the war has led to learning losses in Ukraine
outside Europe. For example, over 32,000 Ukrainian of over one year.67 As a result, the estimates of
refugees are in Canada.62 The UK government Harmonized Learning Outcomes for Ukraine could
had issued 142,500 Ukrainian visas out of 161,500 fall from 481 to about 451 points, putting Ukraine
applications received, and 86,600 visa holders had below the lowest-performing countries in Europe,
arrived in the UK as of June 28, 2022.63 Although it is such as Moldova and Armenia. Human capital losses
difficult to answer how many Ukrainian refugees are are estimated to be in the order of US$90 billion, or
already in the United States, “a substantial number almost as much as the estimated losses in physical
of them already need support.”64 Japan has accepted capital by the end of May 2022.68
more than 1,300 people fleeing the conflict and
provided social services to help them assimilate.”65 Composition of IDPs compared to nondisplaced
population. According to the IOM General Population
60 This set of statistics has several drawbacks, as it reflects the number of movements rather than individuals, and not all of
the movements from Ukraine are related to the war, e.g., some are movements of people who made use of Law No. 2142-
IX (which exempted foreign transport imported into the country during martial law from the payment of import duties,
value-added tax, and excise duty before July 1, 2022). Besides, movements back to Ukraine may include return of male
migrants in order to join the Armed Forces as well as the return of other categories of population for a short period of
time.
61 UNHCR, “Ukraine Situation Flash Update #15,” June 3, 2022, Link.
62 A. MacIsaac, “Immigration Minister Says Ukrainian Refugees Could Remain in Canada for ‘at Least a few Years,’” CTV News
Atlantic, June 20, 2022, Link.
63 BBC, “How Many Ukrainian Refugees Are There and Where Have They Gone?,” July 5, 2022, Link.
64 E. Davis Jr., “What to Know about Ukrainian Refugees in the U.S.,” U.S. News, May 25, 2022, Link.
65 M. Y. H. Lee and J. M. Inuma, “Japan Has Always Been Refugee-Averse. Then Ukraine Happened,” Washington Post, June 21,
2022, Link.
66 O. Blinov and S. Djankov, “Ukraine’s Deepening Population Challenge,” VoxEU.org, June 28, 2022, Link.
67 N. Angrist, S. Djankov, P. Goldberg, H. Patrinos, “The Loss of Human Capital in Ukraine,” VoxEU.org, April 27, 2022, Link.
68 O. Blinov and S. Djankov, “Ukraine’s Recovery Challenge,” VoxEU.org, May 31, 2022, Link.
54 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Figure 15. IDPs vs. nondisplaced population by personal ability to earn income (%),
May 17–23, 2022
Nondisplaced population
1 18 34 30 16 2
(including returnees)
IDPs 2 8 19 57 14
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
More money than before the war As much as before the war Less money than before the war
Do not earn any money now Did not work before the war Difficult to answer/ Refuse
Source: IOM General Population Survey, Round 5. Note: Answers shown are to the question “How has your personal ability to
earn income changed since start of the war?”
study,69 IDPs have a higher share of women and 70 percent of them had either no household income
younger age cohorts. This is revealed by comparison at all or income less than UAH 5,000.70 This income
of key demographic characteristics of IDPs ages is less than the sum of the statutory subsistence
18 years and above with individuals who stayed in minimum for one work-able person (UAH 2,481 in
their habitual residence or returned to it. In addition, January–June 2022) and for one child between 6 and
substantially more households with IDPs reported 18 years (UAH 2,618 in January–June 2022). These
having at least one child ages 1–5 or 5–17 years, figures show that such internally displaced female-
and at least one chronically ill member. IDPs are headed households with children are particularly
also more likely to be directly affected by current vulnerable to poverty and need additional support
violence and (among those who were already IDPs from the government and donors.
from 2014–2015) more likely to be forced to leave
their homes for the second time. Hence, the ongoing One of the possible reasons for substantial
war has exacerbated existing vulnerabilities. household income decline is that nearly 57 percent
of adult IDPs were not able to earn any income
The comparison of household income prior to the since the start of the war (Figure 15). This is in
war among IDPs and nondisplaced population sharp contrast with nondisplaced adults, over half
shows that IDPs originated from relatively better-off of whom were still able to earn some money, even
households compared to those who stayed. However, if somewhat less than before the war. Most likely,
household income has declined significantly since earning opportunities of IDPs have declined due to job
February 2022, and 18 percent of IDPs reported loss (64 percent of IDPs who were employed before
no household income at all during the fifth round the war lost jobs due to the war) and unsuccessful
of the IOM General Population Survey in May 2022. attempts to find some work in the location of
For comparison, only 9 percent of nondisplaced displacement (9 percent of jobseekers among IDPs
population reported having no household income had managed to find a new job as of May 23, 2022).71
after February 2022. The IOM report adds that among
interviewed IDPs, 13 percent lived in single female– These data suggest that finding a job in the location
headed households (e.g., households with only of destination is a pressing need for work-able
females and children under 18 years), and more than IDPs. However, jobseekers among IDPs rarely use
69 IOM, “Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey Round 5 (17 May 2022–23 May 2022),” Link.
70 Ibid.
71 Ibid.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 55
the Public Employment Service of Ukraine to find a reported making a permanent return, whereas 35
suitable job, to apply for the unemployment benefit, percent did not know the answer, and 16 percent
or to participate in active labor market policies reported the intention to stay in Ukraine for up to
(ALMPs).72 Although the number of registered one month.74
IDPs with the official unemployment status has
substantially increased in January–May 2022 Among current IDPs surveyed by the IOM during
compared to the same period in 2021, it is small in May 17–23, 2022, about 23 percent reported their
absolute terms: 22,075 registered unemployed IDPs intention to return home within the next two weeks.
during January–May 2022 and 16,237 unemployed The majority of them were from Kyiv city and the
IDPs as of May 31, 2022. West and North macroregions. Some IDPs stated
that their potential return would depend on further
Returns and return intentions. The IOM survey– situation development.
based estimates show that the number of returnees
(including IDPs returning from other locations According to the available studies of Ukrainian
within Ukraine, as well as IDPs self-reporting refugees abroad, their return intentions and
returns from abroad) substantially increased in May determining factors of return are the following:
2022 (see Figure 13 above). As of May 23, 2022, 4.481
million people had returned to the place of their At least half of refugees from Ukraine are interested
habitual residence in Ukraine after a period of forced in returning to their places of origin if possible
displacement since February 24, 2022. The North because of home sickness, high living costs abroad,
macroregion is the absolute leader in terms of the problems with renting a long-term apartment, and
number of returnees, accounting for 38 percent of language barriers—making it hard to find a suitable
all returnees by May 17–23, 2022. This can be linked job that would correspond to the level of education
to improvement in individual perceptions of safety in and qualifications in Ukraine and to integrate
this macroregion. children at school and child care. 75
However, it is difficult to determine with certainty With a longer duration of displacement, more
whether the observed return movements are Ukrainians want to settle in their current location
permanent or temporary, as 12 percent of returnees at least for the medium term, as documented by a
in the IOM General Population Survey intend to larger number of Ukrainians accessing permanent
leave their habitual places of residence in the future types of housing and applying documents for
and 12 percent consider leaving their homes once temporary protection or asylum.76
again if the situation deteriorates.73 Similarly, many
interviews with people crossing back to Ukraine from The attitudes of locals toward the newly arrived
Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Moldova, Ukrainian refugees can also influence decisions
conducted between April 3 and May 25, mention about whether to stay abroad or return to Ukraine.
the temporary nature of the visit: temporary visit to Currently, there is strong support among local
home (14 percent), temporary visit to see family (7 populations for Ukrainian refugees.77 However, if
percent), temporary visit to get supplies (5 percent), governments of host countries do not properly
and visit to support family members to evacuate (3 manage the flows of refugees and address their
percent). Answering the question about the intended needs, these positive attitudes can change and push
duration of stay, only 48 percent of respondents refugees back to Ukraine or to other countries.
72 More on the disadvantages of IDPs in host labor markets and their barriers to registration in Public Employment Service
of Ukraine in L. Filipchuk and O. Syrbu, “Forced Migration and War in Ukraine (March 24–June 10, 2022),” June 27, 2022,
Link.
73 IOM, “Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 5 (17 May 2022–23 May 2022),” Link.
74 UNHCR-REACH, “Situation Overview: Movement of Ukrainians Back into Ukraine from Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Romania
and Moldova, Update as of 25 May 2022,” Link.
75 P. Długosz, L. Kryvachuk, and D. Izdebska-Długosz, War Refugees from Ukraine: Their Lives in Poland and Plans for the
Future, Wydawnictwo Academicon, Lublin (in Polish, Uchodźcy wojenni z Ukrainy – życie w Polsce i plany na przyszłość); J.
Isański, M. A. Michalski, M. Nowak, V. Sereda, and H. Vakhitova, “Social Reception and Inclusion of Refugees from Ukraine,”
UKREF Research report 1, 2022.
76 IMPACT, “Six Weeks after Leaving Ukraine: Challenges, Intentions and Movement Trajectories of Ukrainians in
Displacement,” Brief, 2022, Link.
77 European University Institute, “Current Attitudes towards Ukrainian Refugees,” webinar, July 4, 2022, Link.
56 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Duszczyk and Kaczmarczyk (2022) predict that in numbers have clearly risen due to the ongoing war,
the most optimistic scenario, with a quick and lasting shortage of facilities, reduced access to equipment
peace, “the number of Ukrainian citizens staying and supplies, and the displacement of skilled
in Poland would stabilize at around 1.75 million, of professionals who support persons with disabilities.
which 1–1.25 million would be ‘prewar’ immigrants As of May 23, 2022, 26 percent of IDP respondents
(mainly males) and 0.5–0.75 million war refugees indicated that at least one member of the family
transforming into ‘postwar’ immigrants (mainly currently had a disability.84
females, children and the elderly, to a large extent
family members of those staying in Poland before Civil society organizations working with persons
the war).”78 with disabilities in Ukraine are instrumental in
sourcing the data on the war’s impact on persons
Persons with Disabilities with disabilities. These organizations range from
self-established organizations of persons with
disabilities (OPD) to organizations of parents of
As of January 1, 2020, 2.7 million persons with
children with disabilities and the OPDs’ national
disabilities were registered in Ukraine.79 Of these,
unions. Examples include the National Assembly
163,886 were children, of whom 42.7 percent were
of Persons with Disabilities (NAPD), a national
girls. Of 136,300 persons who registered their
cross-disability umbrella organization uniting
disability for the first time in 2019, 44 percent were
126 national and regional organizations from all
women.80 A survey conducted in Eastern Ukraine
over the country, and the Coalition for Persons
in 2020 reveals that 41 percent of older persons
with Intellectual Disabilities, which aims to protect
reported at least one severe disability, but only
the rights of people with intellectual disabilities
4.8 percent had their disability status officially
and their families based on equal rights and
recognized.81 The actual number is surely far higher,
opportunities, deinstitutionalization, social inclusion,
due not only to ongoing military activity, but also
and adaptation to community life.
to limitations in how people with disabilities are
counted; the government counts only persons who
Persons with intellectual disabilities are among
are registered as having a disability, and a number
the most marginalized population in Ukraine. The
of barriers exist to registering, including medical
vast majority of people with intellectual disabilities
examinations and evaluation by a socio-medical
are offered institutionalization if the family can no
commission.
longer provide relevant care. In 2021, the queue for
psychoneurological boarding schools (institutions for
As of July 2020, there were 282 residential care
people with intellectual and psychosocial disabilities)
facilities under the Ministry of Social Policy of
had a total of about 4,000 people. As a result of the
Ukraine.82 Some of these facilities have been
2014 conflict as many as 30,000 children and adults
damaged or abandoned due to fighting, and others
were left in dire circumstances in institutions in
are inaccessible due to military activity or because
the East—many of which had run out of food, fuel,
the areas are not under control of the government.
and medication and were completely dependent on
This has resulted in overcrowding and insufficient
volunteers due to the conflict.85 In many residential
services in accessible facilities. As of October 2021,
institutions for persons with disabilities, most of the
it was estimated that about 4 percent of IDPs in
staff has fled, leaving residents to fend for themselves.
Ukraine are persons with disabilities who encounter
The evacuation process has also discriminated
difficulties accessing support services.83 While there
against persons with disabilities who have been left
is insufficient data to update this estimation, the
78 M. Duszczyk and P. Kaczmarczyk, “War and Migration: The Recent Influx from Ukraine into Poland and Possible Scenarios
for the Future,” April 2022, Link.
79 Acording to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
80 United Nations Ukraine, “Ukraine Common Country Analysis,” 2021, Link. Severe was defined as “a lot of difficulties/
cannot do at all” and “disability” as “functional difficulty.”
81 Ibid.
82 UNHCR and UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, “Briefing Note: Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on Persons
with Disabilities in Ukraine,” 2020, Link.
83 United Nations Ukraine, “Ukraine Common Country Analysis,” 2021, Link.
84 IOM, “Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey Round 5 (17 May 2022–23 May 2022),” Link.
85 Disability Rights International (DRI), “No Way Home: The Exploitation and Abuse of Children in Ukraine’s Orphanages,”
2015, Link.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 57
behind in dangerous conditions, according to the overlooked by major international relief agencies,
Human Rights Ombudsman Office of Ukraine. Many and are receiving little support from abroad.88
institutions where persons are being transferred Telemedicine and other forms of digitalized public
are severely overcrowded and ill-equipped. The services became more common among the general
residents with disabilities in the institutions in the public in Ukraine due to the COVID-19 pandemic and
eastern part of Ukraine were evacuated to similar helped them to stay connected with information
institutions in the western regions of the country, but sources and remote service providers during the war.
the receiving institutions lacked resources, space, However, the low digital literacy among persons with
and caregivers to accommodate the additional disabilities, and the inaccessibility of digital devices,
residents. prevent persons with disabilities from accessing vital
information and warnings related to threats caused
Before the war, Ukraine had the highest number by the war.89 For persons with physical disabilities,
of children in institutional care in Europe—more bombing shelters may be inaccessible.90 Closure
than 90,000 children living in residential care of sheltered job sites due to the war has caused
institutions, including orphanages, boarding more financial and social problems for persons
schools, and other care facilities.86 Nearly half of with disabilities. With the status of IDP on top of the
them were children with disabilities. Since the war disability stigma, the persons with disabilities are
began, tens of thousands of children from boarding perceived as “unstable/temporary” employees in
schools have been returned to families, many of their relocated places and may have trouble finding
them hastily and without the care and protection jobs.91
they require. Thousands more have remained in
institutions or have been relocated inside Ukraine
or evacuated to neighboring countries. Moving
Women and Children
children with disabilities safely has proved difficult,
The size of Ukraine’s population totaled 41.4 million
and in some cases impossible; some children with
persons, including 22.2 million women (53.7 percent)
disabilities have been let behind as caregivers and
and 19.2 million men (46.3 percent), as of January
staff of the institutions attend to their own family
1, 2021.92 Analysis of the sex and age composition
needs and safety. According to the nongovernmental
of the population indicates that men have greater
organization Inclusion Europe,87 Ukrainians with
numbers in younger age groups. As of early 2021,
intellectual disabilities have experienced specific
men accounted for 51.5 percent (3.8 million) and
negative effects caused by the war: loss of social,
women 48.5 percent (3.6 million) of persons under
rehabilitation, educational, and medical services;
18 years. The sex ratio is almost equal among the
lack of psychological assistance and psychiatric
population ages 35–39 years; women dominate in
care; unsuitable premises for their temporary
older age groups of the population. Due to differences
residence; limited or no access to bomb shelters;
in life expectancy at birth, the numerical dominance
and anxiety due to a lack of understanding of the
of women is significantly greater in the elderly
prospect of returning home; inability for people with
population: there are 162 women per 100 men in
autism to be in overcrowded bomb shelters; and the
the population ages 60–79 years, compared to
difficulty—often the impossibility—of evacuation
265 women per 100 men in the population group
from combat zones due to exacerbated behavioral
ages 80 years and older.93
disorders.
Although Ukraine has made progress in reducing
A study from April 2022 finds that among Ukrainian
gender disparities in human endowments,
children with disabilities, those who need the
economic opportunities, and public and private
most support are living in subpar conditions, are
86 UNICEF, “Ukraine War Response: Children with Disabilities,” 2022, Link.
87 Inclusion Europe, “100 Days: Ukrainians with Intellectual Disabilities and Their Families Surviving the War,” 2022, Link.
88 DRI, “New Report: Left Behind in the War: Dangers Facing Children with Disabilities in Ukraine’s Orphanages,” 2022, Link.
89 Interviewee representing Ukrainian OPD, June 2022.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid.
92 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Data exclude the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.
93 State Statistics Service of Ukraine with the support of UN Women in Ukraine, “Monitoring Report: Indicators for the
Monitoring of Gender Equality in Ukraine,” 2021, Link.
58 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
sector leadership over the past two decades,94 of men received additional financial assistance
some reversal of these disparities has been from government, international organizations, and
observed since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic families and friends. Nevertheless, 67 percent of
in early 2020.95 The war is expected to exacerbate women (compared to 57 percent of men) state that
this reversal and to increase the incidence of they lack enough money to afford basic needs (e.g.,
SGBV96 and risk of human trafficking, particularly food and clothes). These financial constraints are
for women, adolescent girls, and children.97 With reflected in the share of women who are not satisfied
education and health services further disrupted by with the availability of basic needs, pharmaceutical
the war—for displaced persons as well as the rest goods and medical treatments. Women are also
of the population—sexual and reproductive health more concerned than men with the accessibility to
outcomes such as the maternal mortality rate and education services for children of preschool and
adolescent pregnancy rate are expected to worsen.98 school age, and psychological help for children and
adults.
To provide more granularity on the unequal impact
of the war in Ukraine on men and women, the Levels of access to comprehensive high-quality
assessment analyzed survey data on a sample of services for victims of SGBV, including domestic
IDPs collected for the RDNA. The survey includes violence, are low, especially in rural areas. There is
detailed information on living standards, access a lack of general and specialized support services,
to services, and economic and financial conditions limited human resources (in particular a lack of social
for 301 (60 percent of whom are women) displaced workers, psychologists, and specialized knowledge
individuals residing in Vinnytsia, Kyiv, and Lviv. and skills professionals), and evident psychological
burnout and displacement impact. To respond to
Comparing the employment status before and these issues and build a network of specialized
after the war shows a sharp drop in the number of support services for victims of domestic violence and
individuals who are employed. This is especially true SGBV, UAH 274.2 million has been allocated from the
for women, whose share of employment fell from 64 2021 state budget for a subvention to local budgets,
percent to 42 percent. Conditionally on having a job allowing 124 communities to establish 30 shelters,
before the war, 55 percent of displaced men are still 38-day care centers, and 58 counseling services
employed after June 2022, while the share is only and to purchase 41 vehicles for mobile social and
39 percent for women. Women also report that they psychological teams assisting victims of domestic
are searching for a job after the displacement less violence and SGBV. The level of social services in 16
frequently than men. existing shelters has also been improved. As of May
6, 2022, 805 specialized support services for victims
Consistent with the lower probability of being of domestic violence and SGBV had been established
employed, women tend to rely less frequently on in Ukraine (including some in 2021 at the expense
income from wages and self-employment activities, of the state subvention), of which 649 perform their
drawing more often from savings accounts than men. functions (43 shelters, 36-day care centers providing
In addition, 86 percent of women versus 79 percent social and psychological assistance, 87 specialized
94 Through 2019, Ukraine had achieved near gender parity in enrollment rates at all levels of education. The rate of female
labor force participation was 47 percent and male labor force participation was 63 percent among the population ages
15 years and above (Source: World Bank Gender Data Portal, from International Labour Organization, ILOSTAT database,
Link ; accessed on June 15, 2021). In 2017, 65 percent of men ages 15+ and 61.3 percent of same-age women reported
having an account at a bank or other type of financial institution, or had personally used a mobile money service in the 12
months prior to the survey (Source: Link).
95 Care, “Rapid Gender Analysis Ukraine,” March 2022, Link.
96 Most recent available nationally representative data prior to the COVID-19 pandemic crisis (the most recent Demographic
and Health Survey was as long ago as 2007) estimate that 13 percent of ever-married women ages 15–49 in Ukraine have
experienced some type of physical or sexual violence perpetrated by their current or most recent husband/partner; 24
percent of same-age, ever-married women have experienced some type of emotional, physical, and/or sexual violence
committed by their current or most recent husband/partner. Ukraine Demographic and Health Survey 2007, Link.
97 This was the case with the conflict in Eastern Ukraine in 2014. See World Bank, Delegation of the European Union to
Ukraine, and United Nations-Ukraine, “Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment: Analysis of Crisis Impacts and
Needs in Eastern Ukraine, Volume I: Synthesis Report,” 2015, Link.
98 In Ukraine in 2019, 22 of every 1,000 girls ages 15–19 gave birth (Source: United Nations Population Division, World
Population Prospects, accessed at Link). Between 2000 and 2017, the maternal mortality ratio improved from 342 to
211 deaths per 100,000 live births (Source: WHO, UNICEF, UNFPA, World Bank Group, and the United Nations Population
Division, Trends in Maternal Mortality: 2000 to 2017. Geneva, World Health Organization, 2019, accessed at l ink).
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 59
services providing primary social and psychological additional barriers to accessing justice, basic
counseling, and 483 mobile social and psychological services, and employment opportunities and have
assistance teams). As a result of the war, 19 percent unique protection needs in situations of forced
of specialized support services for victims of displacement.103
domestic violence and SGBV do not perform their
functions. Of these services, 44 percent are in Since the beginning of the war, there have been
the territories temporarily not under government reports of attacks against LGBTI rights activists,
control, 28 percent have suspended their activities, human rights defenders, and shelters in Ukraine.104
21 percent had not started work before martial law Sexual and gender minorities in Ukraine have also
was imposed, 5 percent perform other functions, been experiencing heightened levels of fear and
and 2 percent cannot use their premises due to anxiety about the exposure to violence and trauma,
damage from shelling.99 related in part to relocation and sheltering. In cases
where LGBTI people had to move in with relatives or
share a small space with family members as a result
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, of the war, tensions and conflict may have increased
and Intersex (LGBTI) People due to family members’ lack of understanding or
acceptance. In parallel, sexual and gender minorities
Ukraine’s interest in stronger ties with the European may face barriers in securing safe housing
Union has resulted in some recent efforts to promote options, while transgender people may experience
the recognition of the human rights of sexual and challenges in accessing shelters and services based
gender minorities. While the Human Rights Strategy on their self-identified gender if their documents do
(2021–2023) has only a few references to the rights not match.105 Limited medical supplies can also have
of LGBTI people, the associated Action Plan contains a detrimental impact on people who are in need of
several concrete steps (e.g., designation of crimes HIV medication or hormone therapy treatments.106
based on sexual orientation and gender identity as LGBTI rights organizations and human rights
hate crimes). Despite these efforts Ukraine ranks defenders are warning that, since the beginning
only 39th out of 49 European countries in ILGA of the invasion, transgender people have not had
(International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and access to hormones because of pharmacy closures
Intersex Association)-Europe’s annual benchmarking and lack of medicines across the country.107 Despite
tool, which assesses countries on their legal and the efforts of LGBTI rights organizations to facilitate
policy practices for LGBTI people.100 access to hormone therapy through assistance from
neighboring countries, the process can be complex,
Discrimination, exclusion, and violence based expensive, and unpredictable.108
on sexual orientation, gender identity, gender
expression, and sex characteristics constituted a
widespread problem in Ukraine even before the
Recovery Needs and
war.101 These challenges, however, are significantly Recommendations
exacerbated in environments affected by fragility,
conflict, and violence.102 The collapse of institutions Internally displaced people. According to the IOM
and safe spaces—and the breakdown of already- General Population Survey, cash (financial support)
weak community and family bonds—will continue remains the most frequently mentioned need of
to exacerbate the vulnerabilities of sexual and IDPs. Furthermore, the share of IDPs who reported
gender minorities in Ukraine, who encounter having this need increased from 49 percent in
99 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine.
100 ILGA-Europe’s Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,Trans and Intersex People in Europe
and Central Asia. Link.
101 Ibid.
102 World Bank, “Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in Contexts Affected by Fragility, Conflict, and Violence,” 2020, Link.
103 ILGA-Europe, Link.
104 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Protection of LGBTIQ+ People in the Context of the Response in Ukraine,” May 2022, Link.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 The Guardian, “‘I will Not Be Held Prisoner’: The Trans Women Turned Back at Ukraine’s Borders,” March 2022, Link.
108 Protection Cluster Ukraine, “Protection of LGBTIQ+ People in the Context of the Response in Ukraine,” Link.
60 MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS
Round 1 (March 9–16) to 77 percent in Round 5 (May identifying and responding to the immediate safety
17–23, 2022).109 Transportation, clothes and other and health needs of children, in particular those
nonfood items, medicines and health services, lack the Ukrainian government deems to have the most
of access to money access (e.g.,no money in ATMs), “severe disabilities.” The postwar interventions to
and food are other important needs mentioned by restore municipalities should prioritize community
at least 25 percent of IDPs surveyed during May integration of people with disabilities over
17–23, 2022. Accommodation is one of the pressing institutionalization upon their return from the place
needs mentioned by 15 percent of IDPs responding of evacuation/relocation. While military activities
to the IOM General Population Survey. If IDPs decide are ongoing in the country, steps should be taken
to return to homes that have been damaged by the for resolving overcrowding issues and ensuring
war (29 percent among IDPs and about 10 percent proper staffing of the special care institutions
among returnees reported some damage to their where disabled persons have been relocated.
homes), they need support in accessing building/ Families that have a child or adult family member
reconstruction materials to repair current shelters.110 with disabilities are in a more vulnerable situation
In addition to the support needed for temporary regarding loss of day care services and personal
accommodation and livelihoods, many IDPs will also care providers due to the war. The risk is that family
need support in reemployment or reestablishing members assuming care for their disabled relative
business activity. may lose their paid jobs. These families should be
considered for more or additional welfare payments.
Social cohesion and inclusion aspects should Disability and family-run organizations in Ukraine
be considered within the recovery/integration exist and are very effective. Humanitarian aid
strategy. The large inflows of IDPs to popular areas planning and delivery workers should be in constant
of destination are likely to lead to overcrowding, coordination and consult with such organizations
strained state resources, and increasing prices for and the OPDs in order to prevent the inadvertent
rented housing, services, and transport. This, in distribution of potentially harmful aid to persons
turn, may cause decline in social cohesion in host with disabilities. For instance, food supplies for
communities. The IOM states, however, that the persons with diabetes or other health problems
attitudes of host communities toward IDPs have should be carefully planned. Long-term support
not changed significantly between Rounds 2, 4, and and training are needed for these organizations to
6 of the General Population Survey, with positive ensure that they are sustainable, that reforms are
attitudes prevailing in all macroregions of Ukraine. responsive to the needs of persons with disabilities,
Yet 9 percent of all surveyed IDPs and 14 percent and that an independent perspective is available
of IDPs residing in the West macroregion reported to hold government authorities accountable if they
cases of discrimination on the basis of originating fail to enforce the rights of children and adults with
from another area, mainly in interactions with the disabilities.112
local population and in access to humanitarian
assistance, public transport, and schools.111 Women and Children. As with the conflict that
erupted in Eastern Ukraine in 2014, the war in
Persons with Disabilities. Displacement influx and Ukraine has different impacts on women, men, and
increase of persons in need of medical rehabilitation children.113 Gender-based differences will need to be
and prosthetics caused by the ongoing war has considered and integrated throughout the response
resulted in the shortage of rehabilitation, medical, and recovery strategy’s design and implementation;
and other special service providers and facilities. responses will need to be tailored to effectively meet
Filling this gap requires allocation of additional the needs of each group and address the risks they
resources to attract more specialists and maintain face. With many adult men separated from their
the provision of services; it also requires upgrading families to fight in the war, a disproportionate share
human skills and technologies, as needed health of women are the caretakers of children and elderly
checkups for persons with disabilities are not always relatives (particularly among IDPs). “Although social
available. Special attention must be focused on reintegration of female IDPs and children is broadly
109 IOM, “Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey Round 5 (17 May 2022–23 May 2022),” Link.
110 Ibid.
111 IOM, “Ukraine Internal Displacement Report – General Population Survey, Round 6, 23 June 2022,” Link.
112 DRI, “New Report: Left Behind in the War: Dangers Facing Children with Disabilities in Ukraine’s Orphanages,” 2022, Link.
113 World Bank, European Union, and United Nations, “Ukraine Recovery and Peacebuilding Assessment: Analysis of Crisis
Impacts and Needs in Eastern Ukraine, Volume I: Synthesis Report,” 2015, Link.
MACROECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPACTS 61
supported, male IDPs can face acute stigma and Europe, has developed a set of recommendations
prejudice in host communities, drastically limiting for humanitarian actors and service providers
their livelihood options and social reintegration working with people affected by the war in Ukraine,
potential and reducing their likelihood of registering so they can better understand and address the
as IDPs. An additional gender dimension relates to risks faced by LGBTI people staying or fleeing the
men who account for the vast majority of volunteer country. Measures will need to be taken to ensure
security and protection forces and the social and inclusive programming, advocacy, and responses to
economic strains their families experience as a address the various vulnerabilities and risks faced
result.”114 An approach that mainstreams and is by LGBTI individuals. Recommendations include
sensitive to gender requires attention to gender- collecting data on specific protection needs, risks,
differentiated needs across the full range of entry and barriers to ensure that specific vulnerability
points for support: access to services and justice factors and risks are considered in further risk
(including for SGBV and for forced recruitment of prevention and mitigation cycles; mapping and
boys and men into armed groups), livelihoods, social engaging LGBTI support organizations; establishing
resilience, and peacebuilding—e.g., gender-sensitive specific reception and registration arrangements
disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, for safe identification and support; ensuring that
psychosocial recovery, and training of women and specialized LGBTI shelters and centers are linked
men to become peacebuilders. It is recommended to the humanitarian system; addressing barriers to
that institutional arrangements are similarly gender- safe and equal access for LGBTI persons to social
sensitive and support “gender-inclusive participation services and program; and raising awareness about
of war-affected populations in decision making and advocating for equitable and nondiscriminatory
around recovery activities, gender-disaggregated provision of services to LGBTI individuals by
recovery data collection, and gender-responsive humanitarian actors, civil society organizations,
institutional capacity for recovery at national, oblast, government, and law enforcement agencies.
and local levels, including gender advisors within Because transgender IDPs may face additional
institutional structures.”115 difficulties accessing services due to discrepancies
between their appearance and identity documents,
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, and humanitarian actors should include this issue in their
Intersex (LGBTI) People. The UNHCR Ukraine trainings for state service providers, and advocate
Protection Cluster, in partnership with ILGA- for the reissuing of documents for transgender IDPs.
114 Ibid, p. 46.
115 Ibid, p. 47.
62
DAMAGE, LOSSES,
AND NEEDS:
SECTOR ASSESSMENTS
63
SOCIAL
SECTORS
Kharviv. Photo by Ipsos for the World Bank.
64 Social Sectors
HOUSING
Summary Background
The total damage to the housing sector as of June Ukraine had a total of around 18 million housing
1, 2022, is estimated at US$39.2 billion. Around units prior to the war. Residential units are located
817,000 residential units were impacted by the war, in both multifamily apartment buildings, in single-
38 percent of them destroyed beyond repair. This family houses, and in dormitories, with considerable
number includes apartment units, single family variation across urban and rural areas. Apartment
houses, and dormitories. Apartment buildings have buildings are predominant in urban areas and cater
been the most affected, a finding that highlights the to almost 67 percent of the urban population. In big
significant impacts of the war on the urban housing cities, this share increases to 79 percent. Single-
stock and indicates that housing urban areas carry family houses, which include individual homes,
the bulk of the damage burden. The extent of housing dachas, garden houses, and country houses, are
damage is spread unevenly across the oblasts, with largely located in rural areas. In cities, single-family
the Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Kyivska housing is limited to individual houses and garden
oblasts accounting for over 82 percent of total houses and can be found in areas zoned specifically
damage to housing stock in the country. Losses for individual and blocked houses.
in the housing sector are estimated at US$13.2
billion, which reflects the cost of demolition and Multifamily apartment buildings in Ukraine were
debris removal, loss of household goods, temporary mostly constructed during the Soviet era and are
rental and shelter provision by owners, and adjusted severely aging; less than 12 percent of Ukraine’s
losses in rental incomes. The loss estimation does housing stock was constructed after 1991. While
not reflect bank losses and mortgage defaults. relatively newer apartment buildings can be found
in larger cities like Kyiv, Lviv, Ivano-Frankvisk,
The recovery and reconstruction needs amount to and Dnipro, a significant share of the multifamily
US$69 billion. Addressing housing recovery needs apartment buildings—also known as Soviet generic
in postwar Ukraine will require an integrated green, housing (SGH)—remains old and in need of urgent
resilient, and inclusive approach, with a focus on upgrades and repairs. The aging building stock in
returning families to their homes and restoring Ukraine has also been contributing to high energy
livelihoods and services. There is an urgent consumption, as older buildings do not incorporate
need to provide temporary rental for displaced energy-efficient structures and codes. While
households, undertake winterization, repair partially some city governments do have strategies for the
damaged residential buildings, and establish a management and upgrading of the building stock,
housing reconstruction and recovery strategy and with Khrushchovka (SGH buildings up to 5 floors
implementation mechanism. Particularly, providing constructed between 1957-71) a priority, progress on
repair and rental subsidies before cold, wet weather this front has been slow due to the lack of financial
begins will mitigate further displacement and fragility and technical capacity at the local level.
risks. While the situation is fluid, measures for
ensuring safety and adequate housing for households Almost 94 percent of the housing in Ukraine is
remain necessary to address the primary need of privately owned, and only 3.5 percent of households
internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and live in private rental housing. In Ukraine, 93.7
host communities for safe housing options. There percent of the housing stock was private as of 2013,
is also a need to establish a framework for housing a reflection of the privatization of housing stock that
reconstruction and recovery in the medium term. took place in the 1990s. As of 2013, only 3.4 percent
These actions can begin even during the war and will of households lived in rental housing. According to
allow for appropriate sequencing of key actions and housing experts and local consultations, however,
planning of budgets accordingly. this official number does not capture the real picture
Social Sectors 65
Table 5. Damage inventory by asset type as of June 1, 2022
Partially Completely
Asset type Baseline Total damaged assets
damaged destroyed
Cost
Share Share Share Share
Units Units Units Units (million
(%) (%) (%) (%)
US$)
Apartment units 8,695,561 46.8 425,639 84.5 266,571 85.4 692,210 84.6 34,569.4
Single-family
8,977,862 48.3 78,822 13.8 41,323 13.2 110,635 13.6 4,558.7
house
Dormitories 910,592 4.9 8,960 1.7 4,352 1.4 13,312 1.6 76.3
Total 18,584,015 100% 503,911 100% 312,246 100% 816,157 100% 39,204.4
Source: Assessment team.
of the rental market. The rental process in Ukraine is percent and 15.07 percent of the total damaged
often informal, and households are seen to rent out housing units.
rooms in apartments as opposed to entire apartment
units. According to estimates, the housing rental Housing damage varies across the three housing
market accounts for almost 13 percent of the total asset classes identified in the RDNA (apartment
residential stock. units, single-family houses, and dormitories).
Apartment units, particularly old Soviet-era
Damage and Loss Assessment apartments, have experienced the bulk of the
damage (84 percent), indicating that the conflict
has mainly impacted dense urban areas. In turn,
The war is estimated to have caused approximately
13 percent of single-family houses (both rural and
US$39.2 billion in damage to the housing sector,
urban) and 3 percent of dormitories were affected
adversely affecting about 2 million residents of
by the conflict.
the country.116 Of around 18 million housing units
assessed, 1 percent were deemed completely
Losses in the housing sector are estimated to total
destroyed, 3 percent partially damaged, and 96
US$13.3 billion, as shown in Table 7. Losses reflect
percent undamaged (see Table 5). The war has
the cost of demolition and debris removal, loss of
disproportionately affected urban areas, where
household goods, temporary rental and shelter
over 80 percent of the total damaged housing units
provision by owners, and adjusted losses in rental
are concentrated. As shown in Table 6, the extent
incomes. The loss estimation does not reflect bank
of housing damage is spread unevenly across
losses and mortgage defaults. It is likely that the
the oblasts. Donetska, Luhanska, Kyivska, and
losses in the sector are higher than estimated,
Kharkivska sustained the most damage, respectively
particularly for rental income losses. Because the
concentrating 28.92 percent, 20.07 percent, 18.13
rental market is mostly informal, it is not possible to
collect precise data at this stage.117
116 This estimate assumes an average 2.58-person household. This is based on an estimate by the State Statistics Service of
Ukraine in 2012.
117 An assessment is proposed to be carried out by the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development together with
the Ministry of Social Policy.
66 Social Sectors
Table 6. Damage by oblast as of June 1, 2022
Damage to housing units
Damage
Oblast Total Total Urban Rural
(US$ million)
(number) (share %) Number Share% Number Share %
Cherkaska 346 0.04 179 52% 167 48 16.6
Chernihivska 52,936 6.49 34660 65% 18,275 35 2,542.6
Chernivetska 0 0.00 0 0% 0 0 -
Dnipropetrovska 4162 0.51 3497 84% 665 16 199.9
Donetska 23,6039 28.92 214476 91% 21,563 9 11,337.5
Ivano-Frankivska 0 0.00 0 0% 0 0 -
Kharkivska 122,992 15.07 99844 81% 23,148 19 5,907.6
Khersonska 4207 0.52 2584 61% 1623 39 202.1
Khmelnytska 0 0.00 0 0% 0 0 -
Kirovohradska 0 0.00 0 0% 0 0 -
m. Kyiv 11,992 1.47 11992 100% 0 0 575.9
Kyivska 147,945 18.13 91820 62% 56,125 38 7,106.2
Luhanska 163,805 20.07 142613 87% 21,191 13 7,867.9
Lvivska 828 0.10 505 61% 322 39 39.7
Mykolaivska 35,815 4.39 24563 69% 11,252 31 1,720.3
Odeska 2190 0.27 1471 67% 719 33 105.2
Poltavska 594 0.07 372 63% 223 37 28.5
Rivnenska 374 0.05 178 48% 196 52 17.9
Sumska 11,787 1.44 8181 69% 3,606 31 566.2
Ternopilska 200 0.02 91 46% 109 54 9.6
Vinnytska 346 0.04 179 52% 167 48 16.6
Volynska 2 0.00 1 52% 1 48 0.9
Zakarpatska 625 0.08 232 37% 393 63 30
Zaporizka 11,382 1.39 8811 77% 2,571 23 546.7
Zhytomyrska 7,704 0.94 4568 59% 3,136 41 370
Total 816,204.40 100.00 650,797.81 80% 165,406.59 20% 39,204.4
Source: Assessment team.
Note: Housing units include single-family houses, apartment buildings, and dormitories.
Table 7. Losses inventory by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Loss category Loss amount (US$ million)
Cost of demolition and rubble removal 3,157.3
Replacement of household goods 4,722.4
Net loss of rental income by landlords 242.8
Temporary rental of housing by owners 5,152.1
Total 13,274.8
Source: Assessment team.
Social Sectors 67
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, through trainings, capacity building, and adequate
including Build Back Better
technical assistance.
Repair, reconstruction, and stabilization are critical
The total needs for the housing sector are US$ 69 to ensure swift return and kick-start recovery:
billion, with US$33.1 billion needed in the immediate
to short-term (Table 8). This amount would allow • Repair support for partially damaged housing
for the design and implementation of more detailed units. As of June 1, it is estimated that 68
assessments of the housing stock affected by percent of the affected housing units have been
the fighting, assist owners of lightly damaged partially damaged and are unlikely to require
residential units to conduct repairs, and establish full demolition and reconstruction. Prioritizing
support systems to facilitate longer-term repair and repair of these units, especially in oblasts and
reconstruction. districts where conflict prevalence is lower, will
rapidly increase the number of housing units
There is an urgent need to provide temporary available in the market to the benefit of potential
rental housing for displaced households, undertake returnees and IDPs (either for homeowners or
winterization, repair partially damaged residential for rental). Modalities of financing partial repairs
buildings, and establish a housing reconstruction include providing cash or material grants for
and recovery strategy and implementation simple repairs (along with technical assistance
mechanism (Table 9). Particularly, providing repair and inspections) directly to homeowners or
and rental subsidies before cold, wet weather begins undertaking larger municipal-level rehabilitation
will mitigate further displacement and fragility risks. and retrofitting projects for superblock repairs.
While the situation is fluid, measures for ensuring
safety and adequate housing for households remain • Reconstruction of fully destroyed housing units.
necessary to address the primary needs of IDPs, Fully destroyed residential buildings account for
returnees, and host communities for safe housing 32 percent of the damaged residential buildings
options. There is also a need to establish a framework in Ukraine as of June 1, 2022, and their complete
for housing reconstruction and recovery in the reconstruction will be slower, as these will require
medium term. These actions can begin even during full demolition, full redesign, and construction.
the war and will allow for appropriate sequencing of While necessary, this is a slower process that
key actions and planning of budgets accordingly. A can take up to five years for full reconstruction
number of actions taken now and in the immediate/ of the destroyed housing stock. Having a phased
short term can safeguard households, kick-start approach and realistic targets while prioritizing
recovery, and provide a base for longer-term areas and households with the most needs
recovery. For example: (i) ensure households’ safety is important. The first months will need to be
and adequate shelter through repairs, provision dedicated to demolition, site clearance, design,
of rental support for IDPs and returnees, and and preparing engineering documents and
establishment of safety nets (cash transfers, urban foundation layouts.
services, etc.); (ii) elaborate a strategic framework
for green, resilient, and inclusive recovery and • Rental subsidies. Rental subsidies aim to provide
reconstruction for the housing sector at the central, access to sustainable rental housing options for
oblast, and district levels, setting the stage for vulnerable households affected by the war in
longer-term recovery and reform of the sector; order to minimize risk of displacement and unsafe
and (iii) ensure support to households/beneficiaries
Table 8. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Needs category Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Infrastructure 32,631.3 31,414.5 64,045.8
Service delivery 438.7 4,496.2 4,935.0
Total 33,070.0 35,910.7 68,980.7
Source: Assessment team.
68 Social Sectors
shelter (in partially damaged buildings). Subsidies and doors are in place and that cracked walls,
can help prolong hosting arrangements and keep openings, and pipes are repaired to reduce risk
the displaced in regular housing while repairs of degradation due to winter freezes. Winterized
of damaged residential buildings are underway. habitable structures, even damaged ones, can
These rental subsidies can be in the form of cash be used for temporary housing. Winterization is
support to allow renting directly in the market and also important for historical assets because they
support to allow host communities and families will deteriorate if the enclosure is not sealed.
to absorb displaced families and individuals. They While historical and heritage housing is a small
can also be structured to incentivize landlord- percentage of the housing stock in Ukraine, its
financed reconstruction against rental income value from a social and cultural perspective
streams when appropriate. remains critical and safeguarding it will need
dedicated support.
• Decontamination, demolition, and debris
removal. Decontaminating, demolishing, and In the medium to long term, complementary
removing debris from destroyed and damaged activities addressing the full value chain of the
buildings are critical to begin safeguarding housing sector should be undertaken to ensure
the population and to ensure quick and safe its full recovery. The following topics can be entry
commencement of repairs and reconstruction, points for longer-term development:
and thus return of households to their places of
residence. This work will likely be undertaken by • Facilitate remittance sending. Develop secure
municipal governments that deliver solid waste arrangements within the banking sector to
management services; hence works to reinforce incentivize remittance sending for housing
waste collection and disposal capacity (e.g., anti- recovery.
hazard gear, collection trucks, a parcel addition to
existing landfill) may also be a part of the scope • Support materials markets. Undertake upstream
of this work. work with suppliers and distributors to ensure
availability of construction material to facilitate
• Repair and rebuilding of key municipal services repair, reconstruction, and retrofitting, and help
to accompany the housing unit repair, as well as to manage bottlenecks in building materials
key service reinforcement for IDP- and returnee- pipelines.
hosting municipalities. In parallel to enabling
vulnerable households to access safe housing • Support green reconstruction. Provide just-
units through the combination of household- in-time technical assistance and advice to
targeted rental subsidies, housing repair, and enable contractors to use green materials and
housing reconstruction, it is critical that basic approaches fitting with the updated green and
communal infrastructures and services (e.g., energy-efficient building regulation.
water, electricity, district heating connection,
and solid waste collection) are fully restored. • Support labor markets. Address labor constraints
Municipal governments will need assistance to in construction and engineering services.
undertake the necessary works to restore reliable
basic municipal service access for the repaired • Protect low-income tenants and owners. This
and/or reconstructed housing units while also protection is necessary in light of the shadow
ensuring adherence to urban plans. In addition, economy and given the lengthy administrative
the municipal governments that are experiencing processes that make tenancy and ownership
increased service delivery burden—due either unclear and difficult to access. It can be provided
to the influx of IDPs or the expected large-scale through specific affordable housing programs.
return of refugees—will need support to invest
in either basic municipal service expansion or • Improve access to housing finance for low-
repair to respond to the extra service needs. income groups. This access can be improved by
As both interventions relate to the network of bolstering credit markets, providing resources to
services, they will benefit IDPs, returnees, and increase the liquidity of both traditional lenders
their hosting communities all together. and microlenders, and mitigating credit risks.
• Winterization. This includes full building- • Promote private sector inclusion through public-
shell winterization to ensure that windows private partnerships.
Social Sectors 69
Table 9. Prioritized and sequenced immediate and short-term needs (US$) as of June 1, 2022
Needs category Immediate term Short term Total
Housing assessments 70,270,440 330,495,760 400,766,200
Conduct in-depth building inspections (to determine
7,558,665 17,636,885 25,195,550
habitability)
Conduct engineering studies of individual
61,211,775 306,058,875 367,270,650
residential buildings
Update safety, building, and energy-efficiency
standards/building permitting system based on the 1,500,000 6,800,000 8,300,000
multi-hazard assessment for the district levels
Organizational arrangements 2,950,000 28,250,000 31,200,000
Establish planning committees (per oblast in the
1,500,000 7,500,000 9,000,000
immediate term, then per district)
Establish coordination body for housing at the
200,000 750,000 950,000
central level
Design monitoring and reporting systems 1,000,000 1,000,000 2,000,000
Implement monitoring and reporting systems
2,000,000 2,000,000
(national level)
Design support and training systems for each
stakeholder group (central and local governments;
homeowners; nongovernmental organizations; 250,000 2,000,000 2,250,000
micro, small, and medium enterprises) for longer-
term repair and reconstruction
Implement support systems by stakeholder group 15,000,000 15,000,000
Coordination and technical assistance 1,750,000 5,000,000 6,750,000
Prepare/validate National Housing Recovery
500,000 1,500,000 2,000,000
Strategy (linked with urban recovery planning)
Design assistance schemes and delivery
250,000 1,000,000 1,250,000
mechanisms
Undertake household enrollment, beneficiary
1,000,000 2,500,000 3,500,000
selection, outreach, and case management
Repair, reconstruction, and stabilization 3,124,374,488 29,506,934,642 32,631,309,131
Provide technical assistance for immediate and
3,750,000 11,250,000 15,000,000
short-term repairs and stabilization
Provide rental subsidies 318,999,032 1,116,496,613 1,435,495,645
Provide for demolition and debris removal 223,362,452 1,578,697,640 1,802,060,092
Provide repair and reconstruction subsidies 2,578,263,004 26,800,490,390 29,378,753,393
Add share for building back better (% of the total) 15%
Total 3,199,344,928 29,870,680,402 33,070,025,331
Source: Assessment team.
70 Social Sectors
Limitations and Recommendations In order to develop differentiated approaches,
housing recovery should recognize the linkages
Development of, and agreement on, a detailed urban between the different typologies of housing damage
housing recovery strategy is critical. Considering and loss and the diversity of affected households
the extensive recovery needs for housing and in the different oblasts. Financial needs will likely
settlements and the limited public resources, it is exceed resources available, so it is critical to
necessary to define a housing recovery strategy and maximize access to existing resources, identify
an operational housing recovery manual that presents opportunities for long-term efficiencies (e.g.,
a set of prioritization criteria for investments. This energy-efficient reconstruction), and ensure that
will allow targeting the most affected population government and donor funding for subsidies targets
and prioritizing vulnerable communities and the most vulnerable. Targeting of available subsidies
households, such as female-headed households. should be transparent and reflect objective criteria
In addition, the housing recovery strategy should for need. This means all vulnerable affected people
define a programmatic approach that can attract should be included in subsidy eligibility. Potential
other funding over time. The development of the vulnerable groups would include owners of
housing recovery strategy must be informed by damaged units, including informally built and other
urban recovery strategies that spatially prioritize key low-income-type old Soviet-era apartment units,
public investments in urban areas, so that housing which were the units most affected by the fighting.
and municipal service recovery are well-integrated The second main type of vulnerable group would
for affected households. Without an agreed strategy, be IDPs and renters, as renters comprise a large
a multitude of ad hoc solutions that lack coordination share of the shadow economy. Subsidies for these
may be pursued and may result in different benefits groups should be accompanied by an integrated
for different beneficiaries depending on the source urban recovery strategy that will allow livelihood
of the solution. The scope of the strategy should regeneration to accompany shelter provision, and
be agreed and the strategy itself developed in provide assistance for the poor, the elderly, and
conjunction with domestic and international people with disabilities as well as the displaced and
stakeholders, drawing from relevant international refugees. Other priorities could include reducing
experience but tailored for the specifics of Ukraine displacement of long-time residents, strengthening
and its vision for sustainable development. The tenure security, or preserving historic and/or cultural
strategy, including further beneficiary identification, assets. These priorities may vary from one city/
is needed to provide an inclusive, transparent, and oblast to another and would determine the design
equitable basis for supporting affected households of the strategy and implementation modalities using
with different tenure status (e.g., owners, tenants), concepts of subsidiarity and based on the strength
and strengthening their economic outlook. Ukraine’s of local competencies.
reform agenda should be strongly aligned with the
institutional and regulatory requirements outlined in
the reconstruction strategy.
Social Sectors 71
EDUCATION
Summary and psychological support that are critical to limiting
learning losses. At the same time, the reconstruction
As of June 1, 2022, the Ukrainian education sector and recovery of the sector must coincide with
has sustained US$3.4 billion in damage and investments in reforms to increase quality and
US$0.5 billion in losses, with a particular impact efficiency in education, which to a considerable
on learners from Eastern Ukraine. A total of 1,885 extent had already been initiated before the war.
education institutions have been impacted by the
war, with 178 buildings destroyed and a further Background
1,707 partially damaged. The war has had deeply
unequal impacts across Ukraine, with damage to Ukraine has an extensive network of education
infrastructure mainly located in the east, especially institutions, and enrollment is high at all levels.
in Kharkivska, Donetska, and Luhanska oblasts. The Ukrainian education system is divided roughly
Prior to the war, there were nearly 1 million enrolled into five levels: preschool education (International
students just in these three oblasts (all levels of Standard Classification of Education [ISCED] level
education). Meanwhile, losses are driven by debris 0), secondary education which in Ukraine covers
removal costs, unpaid teachers’ salaries, and primary, lower and upper secondary education
decreases in private sector revenues, and there (ISCED levels 1–3), vocational education and training
have been additional costs associated with the use (VET) (ISCED levels 3–4), professional pre-higher
of education institutions as temporary shelters. education (ISCED levels 4–5), and higher education
Costs of recovery and reconstruction needs are (ISCED levels 6 and up).118 With a few exceptions,
over US$9.2 billion in the education sector. Needs most institutions are publicly owned and under the
include the reconstruction of affected education Ministry of Education and Science (MoES) and/or
facilities following new safety, sustainability, and local authorities. At the beginning of the 2021/2022
quality standards. They also include the restoration academic year, approximately 60 percent of students
of interim and long-term teaching and learning were enrolled in secondary education (Table 10).
services, such as investments to ensure safe access More than 1.1 million children were attending
to in-person education where possible (e.g., the preschools, with 66 percent of children aged five
addition of bomb shelters to education institutions, participating in voluntary preschool education.
acquisition of temporary learning spaces, purchase Finally, Ukraine also shows very high enrollment
of electronic devices). Recovery needs also cover rates in VET, professional pre-higher education, and
measures to stave off an exodus of teachers from especially higher education.
the profession and educational catch-up programs
Table 10. Education sector as of start of 2021/2022 academic year
Number of Number of students Number of
Level of education
institutions Total Female teachers
Preschool 14,974 1,111,358 533,457 138,772
Secondary school 13,991 4,188,403 2,059,044 434,755
VET 694 250,336 95,673 31,324
Professional pre-higher education 248 282,319 133,983 34,974
Higher education 386 1,046,669 562,998 125,360
Total 30,293 6,879,085 3,385,155 765,185
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
118 Officially, the education system contains other specialized forms of education that are not mentioned here (e.g.,
extracurricular education) but are included as education assets for the RDNA analysis presented later in this note.
72 Social Sectors
Prior to the war, Ukraine’s learning achievement Damage and Loss Assessment
performance was fairly strong, particularly given its
income level; but it had not yet reached the levels of The war has had severe impacts on the education
achievement observed in the European Union (EU). sector and has deeply disrupted the lives of students
According to the Harmonized Learning Outcomes and teachers. Since February 24, 2022, nearly two-
(HLO) data collected by the World Bank,119 in 2018— thirds of Ukrainian children have been displaced
prior to the COVID-19 pandemic and the invasion— either internally within Ukraine or abroad. A survey
Ukraine performed slightly below the average in conducted by the MoES and UNICEF at the local
Europe, but at par with its regional neighbors. This (hromada) level shows that most internally displaced
finding hides strong inequalities, however, especially students settled either in Western or Central
between urban and rural students, and between Ukraine, with Vinnytska, Ivano-Frankivska, and
those from lower- and higher-income households. Kyivska oblasts acting as major hubs for internally
In addition, the World Bank’s Skills Towards displaced persons (IDPs) (Figure 16).121 According to
Employment and Productivity Survey demonstrates this survey, hromadas reported receiving 164,000
that Ukrainian higher education does not guarantee IDP learners since February 24, 2022. Despite large-
the acquisition of basic cognitive skills.120 The low scale displacement, the Ukrainian education system
quality of tertiary education impedes students’ quickly adapted. After two weeks of mandatory
successful labor market integration and creates skill holidays, education progressively resumed online,
bottlenecks in critical sectors. To tackle these issues, relying on the tools developed during the COVID-19
the MoES launched the New Ukrainian School (NUS), pandemic to deliver education inside and outside of
which aims to improve the quality of secondary Ukraine. According to the MoES, around 89 percent
education through the phased introduction of a of secondary schools resumed online classes
child-centered and competency-based curriculum before the summer closure—though there are no
focusing on soft skills. comprehensive measures of the quality of online
learning during this period.
For years, the Ukrainian education sector has
been struggling to adjust to changing demographic Meanwhile, for school-aged children and young
dynamics. In line with the general population trend, the people from Ukraine who fled abroad, the access to
Ukrainian student population has been consistently education varies considerably. As of June 20, there
declining over the past decades. However, education were at least 650,000 secondary students and 22,000
infrastructure and volume of teachers have not educators abroad. Although there are significant
followed: the size of the teacher workforce and challenges in disaggregating data by age group and
the network of institutions are disproportionate education level for displaced children, available data
compared to the student population. In 2020, the as of early June 2022 indicates that up to 1.1 million
average student-teacher ratio in Ukrainian secondary Ukrainian school-aged children and young people
schools was 9.6 to 1 (6.4 to 1 in rural schools), were abroad, with about 70 percent located in either
compared to the Organisation for Economic Co- Poland or Germany.122 As of early June 2022, Poland
operation and Development (OECD) average of 13.1 to reported the largest share of Ukrainian school-aged
1. This leads to large economic inefficiencies as well children and students (over 500,000), followed by
as to lower quality of education provision, especially Germany, Czech Republic, Romania, Italy, Spain, and
in rural areas. To address these imbalances, and Slovakia. However, the share of Ukrainian children
in parallel to ongoing decentralization reforms, the and young people enrolled in local schools in their
MoES initiated a formula-based funding model and host countries varies significantly. For example,
network optimization process to move to a system Spain and Austria report of Ukrainian children
of hub schools and reduce the number of very small and young people that 75 percent and 63 percent
secondary schools. respectively were enrolled in local schools, whereas
these figures are 39 percent in Germany, 37 percent
in Poland, and 8 percent in Romania.
119 N. Angrist, S. Djankov, P. Koujianou Goldberg, and H. Patrinos, “Measuring Human Capital Using Global Learning Data,”
Nature 592 (2021): 403–08.
120 X. Del Carpio, O. Kupets, N. Muller, and A. Olefir, Skills for a Modern Ukraine (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2017), Link.
121 Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and UNICEF, “Final Report: Ukraine Education Needs Assessment Survey: 6
May–24 June 2022,” 2022, Link.
122 European Commission/Eurydice (2022). Supporting refugee learners from Ukraine in schools in Europe.
Social Sectors 73
The war has caused at least US$3.4 billion of damage institutions in particular suffered high levels of
to education institutions across Ukraine. As of June destruction: 16 percent of VET institutions, 28 percent
1, 2022, at least 1,707 education institutions were of professional pre-higher education institutions,
partially damaged and 178 were destroyed (Table and 11 percent of higher education institutions have
11); these represent 5 percent of the total number of been damaged since February 24. The total damage
education institutions in Ukraine. Most of the affected cost does not include the destruction and looting of
facilities are located in Eastern Ukraine: 37 percent educational material, from textbooks to electronic
of all education institutions in Donetska oblast and devices and laboratory equipment. Thus, the actual
27 percent in Luhanska oblast are either damaged cost of damage is expected to be higher.
or destroyed. Vocational and higher education
Figure 16. Number of IDPs and percentage of damaged education institutions by oblast
as of June 1, 2022
40 18
35 16
30 14
25 12
10
20
8
15 6
10 4
5 2
0 0
Kirovohradska
Odeska
Sumska
Chernihivska
Khersonska
Kharkivska
Poltavavska
Khmelnytska
Donetska
Rivnenska
Kyivska
Chernivetska
Vinnytska
Cherkaska
Zhytomyrska
Luhanska
Zakarpatska
Volynska
Lvivska
Zaporizka
Ivano-Frankivska
Mykolaivska
Dnipropetrovska
Ternopilska
Percentage of damaged/destroyed education institutions Number of IDP Students (in thousands)
Source: MoES, Institute for Education Analytics, and Ukraine Education Cluster.
Note: Data on the number of IDP students come from the Ukraine Education Needs Assessment Survey conducted in May-
June 2022. The survey contains data from 79 percent of hromadas in Ukraine, though there were low response rates from
hromadas in some oblasts heavily affected by conflict, including Luhanska, Mykolaivska, and Zaporizka, where response rates
were below 50 percent.
Table 11. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Damaged infrastructure
Baseline Estimated costs of
Institution category Totally Partially
number damage (US$ million)
destroyed damaged
Preschool 14,974 41 604 $606.6
Secondary school 13,991 111 818 $1,701.8
Extracurricular education institution 1,351 3 48 $116.9
VET 694 9 99 $512.8
Professional pre-higher education institution 248 5 64 $140.6
Higher education institution 386 4 38 $201.0
Specialized education institution 5 36 $88.9
Total 31,644 178 1,707 $3,368.6
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine and MoES.
74 Social Sectors
Table 12. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category of losses Estimated losses
Demolition and debris removal $145.8
Loss of income to teachers and institutions $285.4
Losses due to increase in operating costs $76.7
Total $507.9
Source: MoES and the World Bank team’s calculation; estimates of income loss to teachers
focuses on teachers at the secondary education level.
The Ukrainian education sector has sustained at Since the beginning of the war, the MoES has taken
least US$0.5 billion in losses. The World Bank has a leading role in the organization of online classes
worked with the Government of Ukraine to ensure and the coordination of online class scheduling.
continuity of funding to the education sector in It has been closely monitoring the effects of the
order to contain losses. This is particularly the war on education infrastructure and students, and
case for teachers’ salary payments as part of the quickly mobilized international partners around its
Public Expenditures for Administrative Capacity needs. However, there has been a disconnect with
Enhancement (PEACE) project and for students’ local authorities; the MoES was unable to reach
academic and social scholarships in higher education some of them, especially those close to the front
as part of the Improving Higher Education for Results lines. In addition, the education budget for 2022
Project. Even so, losses have been incurred. Because sustained cuts of more than US$1.5 billion,123 which
of the occupation of some communities as well as the are expected to have negative impacts for the
absence of the necessary technical means to transfer recovery process.
salaries from local budgets, many teachers could not
be remunerated. As a result, despite their continued Unpaid teachers’ salaries as well as broader
teaching during that period, at least 10,000 secondary wage reductions could drive education staff to
school teachers were unable to receive their salaries find employment in other sectors and threaten the
in March and April, and 6,000 of them were unable in foundation of the education system. Together with
May, representing a total of US$13 million in salaries. unpaid salaries, recent budget cuts at both central
These figures, however, do not cover preschool, and local levels led to a decrease of 17 percent in
VET, before professional pre-higher education, and secondary teachers’ monthly wages.124 Yet a key
higher education staff, for which data are unavailable. element of the NUS program is the planned increase
The war has also impacted own-source revenues of teachers’ salaries—to four times the living wage
in education institutions for the academic year by 2023—in order to boost the attractiveness of the
2021/2022, with losses expected to grow larger from teaching profession. Meanwhile, there is anecdotal
September 2022 onward. Finally, with classes held evidence that local governments lack the necessary
online, at least 3,400 education institutions have been funds to remunerate preschool teachers, and only
used for humanitarian purposes, which generates around 7 percent of all preschools are currently
additional costs related to overuse. The MoES had also operating. The state of play is less clear for VET,
planned to print textbooks critical to the rollout of the professional pre-higher and higher education
NUS in fifth grade, but the war has created a financing teachers. However, even if salaries are fully paid
gap leading to this loss. Finally, the government has now, the situation could dramatically change by
incurred additional expenses related to the creation the next academic year if enrollments and tuition
of a new university admissions exam and application collection decrease. These pressures on salaries
system, as well as to debris removal and demining of could potentially lead educators to resign from
damaged education facilities. These are summarized teaching, threatening the sustainability of the
in Table 12. Ukrainian education system.
123 Estimates from the Kyiv School of Economics.
124 Education Ombudsman of Ukraine, “Education Ombudsman Appeals to All Levels of Government to Eliminate Rights
Violations Related to Salary Payment for Employees of Educational Establishments” [Освітній омбудсмен звертається до
органів влади усіх рівнів – усунути порушення прав щодо виплати заробітної плати працівникам закладів освіти], June
20, 2022, Link.
Social Sectors 75
The most significant losses in the sphere of capital could be extremely costly. The combination of
education relate to learning outcomes. Recent the COVID-19 pandemic and the war equates to more
studies demonstrate that, although necessary, online than a year of school closures, which could lead to a
learning is less effective than in-person classes decrease of Ukraine’s HLO from 481 to 451 points.
because of reduced participation and lower quality Thus, even though Ukraine used to perform relatively
of instruction.125 According to a survey conducted well, it could fall below the lowest-performing
by Premise126 in May and June 2022, 43 percent countries in Europe.129 This decline would also have
surveyed parents, caregivers and teachers report severe long-term impacts on future earnings, with a
that of Ukrainian students attend online classes loss of more than 10 percent a year per student and
regularly (four to five times a week), but another 34 with the most vulnerable bearing the largest losses.
percent of survey respondents report that students
do not join at all. In addition, while secondary schools
and tertiary institutions have access to various online
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
schooling resources, there is significantly less online including Build Back Better
content available for VET students and preschoolers,
for whom the quality of education depends on live Reconstruction and recovery needs for the education
interaction and practice. These findings suggest that sector are estimated at US$9.3 billion over the
Ukrainian students at all levels are losing significant next 10 years. Reconstruction needs are unequally
amounts of instructional time, which is likely to lead distributed across the country, with eastern
to severe learning losses. In addition, because of oblasts experiencing the largest share of damage.
the lack of electronic devices and adequate parental Meanwhile, service delivery restoration needs are
support, it is expected that online education will be more equally spread across the country, reflecting
more detrimental for vulnerable students. patterns of displacement as well as general system
preparedness. In terms of timeline, it is estimated
The negative impact of school closures is amplified that 30 percent of needs will be addressed within
by the deterioration of students’ mental health since the immediate/short term, with the remaining 70
the start of the invasion. Recurrent and extended percent to be progressively addressed over the next
periods of stress ensuing from the war and 10 years (Table 13). However, in practice the timing
displacement are especially harmful to children. In of responses will vary significantly depending on the
a survey of parents conducted by Gradus Research,127 type of need.
75 percent of respondents reported that their
children had symptoms of psychological trauma, and The reconstruction of damaged education
16 percent declared that their children showed signs institutions is expected to cost US$6 billion, with
of impaired memory, shorter attention span, and most expenses allocated to secondary schools.
decreased ability to learn. Beyond having pervasive The reconstruction must follow the latest safety,
impacts on children’s mental health, trauma has sustainability, and quality standards defined by the
negative effects on school performance and future government. This means that all affected institutions
financial outcomes.128 If not addressed inside and will be equipped with a bomb shelter but also
outside school settings, widespread deterioration rehabilitated with improved educational equipment,
of mental well-being among students will have far- following the New Education Space guidelines, which
reaching consequences. were developed to support the implementation of
the NUS. Modern education material, especially for
The combination of destroyed education science, technology, engineering, and mathematics
infrastructure, lost instructional time, and (STEM) is also needed to help improve educational
deteriorating mental health could negatively impact outcomes, especially in areas that suffered
Ukraine’s human capital. While difficult to estimate significant damage. Finally, in line with the ongoing
at this stage, the deterioration of Ukraine’s human government efforts before the invasion, energy
efficiency must be prioritized during reconstruction.
125 See, for example, R. Donnelly and H. Patrinos, “Learning Loss During COVID-19: An Early Systematic Review,” Covid
Economics 77, no. 30 (2021): 145–53.
126 Premise, “Ukraine & Romania: Children Psychosocial Health and Education,” Situation Report, June 14, 2022.
127 Gradus Research, “Changes in Children’s Lives During the War: Analytical Report,” April 2022, Link.
128 C. L Harter and J. F. R. Harter, “The Link between Adverse Childhood Experiences and Financial Security in Adulthood,”
Journal of Family and Economic Issues 9 (2021): 1–11.
129 H. Patrinos, “Learning Losses in Ukraine Can Amount to Over One Year (News and Research 290),” May 2, 2022, Link.
76 Social Sectors
Table 13. Reconstruction and recovery needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Immediate/short
Category Component Medium- to long-term Total
term
Preschool 279.1 651.3 930.4
Secondary school 918.9 2,144.1 3,063.0
Extracurricular
53.7 125.4 179.1
education institution
VET 275.3 642.5 917.8
Reconstruction
needs Professional pre‑higher
85.9 200.5 286.4
education institution
Higher education
122.6 286.1 408.8
institution
Specialized education
48.0 112.0 160.0
institution
Ensuring safe access to
767.3 1,790.3 2,557.9
education for all
Service delivery
Tackling learning losses 180.4 420.9 601.2
restoration needs
Providing quality
43.5 101.4 144.9
education at all levels
Total 2,774.8 6,474.5 9,249.5
Source: MoES and the World Bank team’s calculation.
The reconstruction of damaged assets will need to institutions will be able to reopen in September
follow demographic trends. While future patterns 2022, in-person classes remain the first step to
of internal migration and returns to Ukraine are mitigate learning losses and ensure high enrollment
difficult to anticipate, it is expected that a non- levels. Accordingly, the MoES has announced that
negligeable number of Ukrainian households will only education institutions in safer regions and
remain abroad and that many more will resettle in equipped with bomb shelters can reopen. At this
a part of the country different from the one they stage, at least 8,500 institutions are expected to
left. For instance, preliminary evidence suggests need a bomb shelter. Since school buses have been
a significant reduction in the number of students mobilized by the Ukrainian army, investments in
in newly recovered areas such as Bucha.130 The school transportation are required in parallel to
education network must adjust to this new reality; enable students to reach schools with bomb shelters.
depending on changes in student population, not all Local authorities and civil society are expected to
damaged assets will be reconstructed. Conversely, take a leading role in these efforts, following the
new institutions will be built in areas hosting large decentralization principles.
numbers of IDPs. These trends warrant careful
consideration during the reconstruction process in Investments in provisional measures are also
order to ensure alignment with previous network crucial while existing education institutions cannot
optimization efforts. reopen. These include the construction of at least
8,000 prefabricated education facilities—especially
The first service delivery restoration needs in areas that suffered heavy destruction and those
concern safe access to education and are close to hosting high numbers of IDPs. At the same time,
US$2.6 billion. A major challenge for the MoES is the provision of electronic devices is necessary to
the resumption of in-person instruction amid the ensure access to online education for all, particularly
war. While it is understood that not all education vulnerable students. Local authorities are best
130 Remote assessment conducted for Bucha City as part of the RDNA.
Social Sectors 77
placed to lead these activities. Finally, to limit long- thinking and problem-solving skills among children.
term emigration and facilitate the reintegration of Moreover, the modernization of Ukraine’s education
Ukrainian students abroad, the government plans management information system will help monitor
to invest in Ukrainian education hubs in neighboring trends and patterns during the reconstruction of the
countries. education sector. Investments in data collection will
enable the MoES to keep track of needs and progress,
A second need is for the Ukrainian education while also helping with the overall allocation of
system to invest at least US$0.6 billion to address support across the system.
the growing learning losses and mental health
deterioration. To offset learning losses accumulated Investments in STEM education and VET are
since March 2020 and ensure that minimal required to avoid skill bottlenecks during the
achievement levels are met, the government needs short- and long-term reconstruction. Investments
to develop large-scale academic catch-up programs. in STEM education as well as VET—both in the
Evidence shows that online, by-phone, or in-person short term and for lifelong-learning purposes—are
tutoring can bring positive results while being cost- required to provide Ukraine’s postwar economy with
effective.131 This tutoring would be coupled with local a skilled workforce. The MoES expects the demand
initiatives, such as community-based and out-of- for selected professions such as electrician and
school youth programs. At the same time, the MoES construction worker (traditionally acquired through
must develop adequate tools to conduct systemic VET) or engineer and IT specialist (obtained in
assessments of student achievement to help identify higher education) to increase significantly for the
the greatest pockets of learning losses. reconstruction of Ukraine. Therefore, modernized
STEM education and VET programs based on dual
Academic catch-up programs can be combined education (combining both traditional vocational
with a comprehensive mental health response. To education and work-based learning) are fundamental
safeguard students’ long-term capacity to learn, to a resilient reconstruction process. At the same
children and teachers must receive adequate time, providing good-quality career guidance in
individual or group psychological support, especially secondary schools will help ensure better alignment
those living in newly recovered areas or where between education and the needs of the labor market
fighting is still ongoing. The provision of large-scale for the short- and long-term reconstruction.
socio-emotional support requires the education
system as a whole to adapt—for example, through While the reconstruction and recovery are expected
curriculum adaptation as well as adequate teacher to be guided by the MoES, significant responsibilities
training to manage children emerging from and resources should be allocated to local
traumatic experiences. Recent interventions as well authorities. Given its central role in education policy,
as evidence from other countries also show the the MoES is likely to lead the reconstruction and
positive impact of academic catch-up programs on recovery strategy. To support its tasks, the MoES
psychosocial well-being and emotional resilience.132 can rely on a network of independent institutions,
This ambitious agenda could be achieved in parallel namely the State Service for Education Quality, the
with and potentially integrated into the progressive Institute of Education Analytics, the Ukrainian Center
rollout of the NUS. for Education Quality Assessment, and the National
Agency for Quality Assurance in Higher Education.
Finally, going forward, reforms related to education At the same time, the reconstruction and recovery
quality must remain a priority; needs are estimated process should go hand in hand with the ongoing
at US$0.1 billion. During the reconstruction process, decentralization reforms in education and thus grant
it will be essential for Ukraine to have a skilled local authorities their autonomy.
workforce with both hard and soft skills. That is why
reforms initiated before the war will remain crucial, International partners are also expected to be heavily
especially those related to education quality. Ukraine involved in the reconstruction and recovery process.
will need to invest in the continued rollout of the NUS The government announced at the Ukraine Recovery
by publishing textbooks and further introducing the Conference that various countries have committed
new curriculum, which should stimulate critical to rebuild different regions (e.g., Germany–Chernihiv,
131 See, for example, M. Carlana and E. La Ferrara, “Apart but Connected: Online Tutoring and Student Outcomes During the
COVID-19 Pandemic,” IZA Discussion Paper 14094, IZA Institute of Labor Economics, Bonn, 2021, Link.
132 Initial evidence from a pilot project led by Teach for Ukraine in April-June 2022 suggests the positive impact of online
academic catch-up programs on socio-emotional skills and well-being among Ukrainian students.
78 Social Sectors
Canada–Sumy),133 with a high possibility that they will initiatives will need to be pursued even during the
employ their national solutions to ensure safe and war to foster resilience and inclusiveness in the
green reconstruction. Hence further consultation reconstruction and recovery process.
between the relevant countries and the government
may be requested to inform the implementers of
losses, damage, and needs. At the same time, the
Limitations and Recommendations
war has accelerated Ukraine’s membership in the
To conduct the analysis of damage and losses, the
EU, providing a “candidate” status to the country.
World Bank team relied on data systematically
This should support greater integration of European
gathered by the MoES. The MoES regularly gathers
principles, approaches, and practices in rebuilding
data on damage and losses and on students’ and
and reforming the education sector.
teachers’ situations. The World Bank also benefited
from insights obtained from a survey conducted
Guiding principles for recovery:
at hromada level by the MoES and UNICEF, as well
as other surveys conducted by private research
• While extremely challenging, the organization
companies and analyses produced by developmental
of in-person classes (at least in safer regions
partners. However, it is important to note that needs
with limited damage to infrastructure) should
at the local level are not well accounted for by the
be prioritized by MoES and local authorities in
MoES, since communication has sometimes been
coordination with the launch of academic catch-
severed during the war. This is especially relevant
up programs. This step will be essential to limit
since many educational activities are coordinated by
learning losses, especially among vulnerable
local authorities.
students.
Based on priorities identified by the MoES, the
• Return to both in-person and online classes in
World Bank team took a broad approach to needs
September will need to be coupled with extensive
in the education sector, leading to high estimates.
psychosocial support to limit the prevalence of
The MoES presented a list of needs to international
trauma among students and teachers.
partners with estimated costs,134 which was
used as a baseline for this analysis. The list was
• Ukraine will need to mobilize its human capital
adapted and adjusted as needed, depending on the
to support its recovery. Investments in high-
latest information available. At the same time, the
quality and labor market–oriented vocational and
team included additional recovery needs, such as
higher education will be key, especially in trades
psychological support for teachers and students,
and fields relevant to the reconstruction and
academic catch-up programs, the construction of
rebuilding process. Putting in place short-term
prefabricated education facilities, and the addition
training and lifelong learning will help ensure
of bomb shelters to education institutions. These
a flexible education, adaptable to the recovery
additional needs are among the costliest, especially
needs.
for the shelters, currently estimated at US$1.85
billion for an estimated 60 percent of undamaged
• Rebuilding hub schools and organizing school
education institutions.
buses should receive a priority, as these are
essential to limiting emigration and safeguarding
The main limitation of the assessment concerns
human capital in hromadas.
the damage and losses estimates, which are likely
underestimates. Data on losses and damage were
• The reconstruction of damaged and destroyed
obtained from the MoES and KSE. However, available
assets will need careful planning to ensure
data and analysis lacks information regarding the
alignment with the needs of new temporary
cost of damaged and destroyed school materials
and permanent demographic shifts and long-
and equipment. The team anticipates these costs
standing need for network optimization.
to be high, especially for the destruction of STEM
equipment. Second, regarding losses, the World
• The reforms initiated before the war are an
Bank did not have access to detailed data on unpaid
opportunity for the MoES to improve the quality
teachers’ salaries across all levels of education;
and the efficiency of the education system. These
133 Focus, “Представили електронну карту відновлення зруйнованих областей України” [Electronic Map for recovery of
destroyed regions of Ukraine was presented], July 5, 2022, Link.
134 Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, “MoES Project Proposals,” 2022, Link.
Social Sectors 79
the available information covers only secondary • Estimated impact on human capital needs to be
teachers. More information in this area would help a key element of future assessments. With more
clarify educators’ situation during the war and the data, analysis could consider elements such
pressures they continue to face. as learning assessments, calculations of lost
instruction time, analysis of enrollment/dropout
To obtain a more accurate picture of costs for the rates, or transition to tertiary education or the
education sector beyond those mentioned above, labor market.
future assessments would need to include the
following: • The reconstruction needs depend on “build back
better” premiums calculated based on the costs of
• A specific analysis of unpaid tuition fees in damage, but better estimates could be produced
extensive cooperation with local authorities is with more detailed plans for modernization of
needed to consider losses sustained by preschools different types of education facilities.
and professional pre-higher and higher education
institutions. This will be especially relevant at the • To ensure better utilization of resources and assist
start of the next academic year in order to assess local communities to the extent possible, future
drops in enrollment as well. assessments must be properly integrated into a
strategy for optimizing the education institution
• In-depth assessments of learning losses are network. As the war is expected to have a strong
important to understand the impact of school impact on the education network, a careful study
closures, considering mental health deterioration, of changes in the student and teacher population
and the related future income losses. Critically, across Ukraine will be key to the reconstruction
these assessments will support the identification process and to network optimization.
of particularly vulnerable students.
80 Social Sectors
HEALTH
Summary purchaser of health services and the public and
private providers. The government financed health
care by allocating approximately 13 percent of total
The damage to the health sector is estimated
government expenditures to health, or 3.7 percent
at US$1.4 billion. This represents the monetary
of projected GDP in 2022, mostly through the
estimate of the cost of destroyed and damaged
NHSU to finance health services. In addition, out-
health infrastructure included in the inventory of
of-pocket expenditures made up about 50 percent
damage compiled by the Ministry of Health (MoH).
of total health expenditures, most of which went
The actual level of damage is likely higher, given
to purchasing medicines and paying informally for
incomplete reports about damaged facilities located
health care.
in territories temporarily not under government
control and about private sector facilities. The
Health services in Ukraine are provided by a large
estimated losses of US$6.4 billion include the
network of public and private providers, including
removal of debris and demolition of the destroyed
nearly 1,900 public general and mono-profile135
facilities, loss of income of private providers, losses
hospitals, 189 specialized polyclinics,136 more than
from the financing of facilities that were not been
22,300 pharmacies, and nearly 7,000 primary care
fully operational during the war, and the additional
providers. In addition, over 19,000 private providers
losses of the population’s health. The needs of the
hold valid medical licenses to provide different
health sector are estimated to be US$15.1 billion
types of health services; of these, approximately 51
to cover the accumulated infrastructure damage
percent are providers of dental care and 6 percent
and losses to the health sector, as well as scale-
providers of primary care. As of May 12, 2022, 930
up of critical health services for the population of
of the 19,000 private providers are contracted by
Ukraine. This amount includes the cost of building
the NHSU to deliver primary health care (PHC) as
new infrastructure using a building back better
private practices. Although the major share of the
approach and the immediate recovery of facilities
infrastructure in the sector is outdated and obsolete,
that are partially damaged. It also includes a
significant investments were made in past years
significant expansion of rehabilitation and mental
to upgrade primary and specialized care facilities
health services in Ukraine, which will need to be
within the program of rural family medicine and the
scaled up to address the impacts of the war. The
“Big Construction” initiative aimed at upgrading the
estimate of needs does not include the full cost of
country’s infrastructure.
recovery for the health care sector. Of the presented
needs, US$1.2 billion is urgently needed in the
Within the PMG, according to the NHSU data, in
immediate/short term.
2021 32.5 million people (or 79 percent of Ukraine’s
population of 41.3 million) were receiving services
Background through enrollment with primary care providers,
including over 2 million people participating in the
The health sector in Ukraine went through major Affordable Medicines Program and over 14 million
financing and service delivery reforms in the last people who received e-referrals for care at the
five years. The flagship health financing reform specialized level. In addition, 4,099,200 patients
initiated in 2017 defined the scope of publicly were treated in hospitals, including 581,725 COVID-19
guaranteed services within the state-financed cases, according to NHSU data. Over 7,421,316
Program of Medical Guarantees (PMG) and visits to patients were performed by pre-hospital
created new relationships between the National emergency medical services; of these, 6,149,530 (or
Health Service of Ukraine (NHSU) as the strategic 83 percent) resulted in hospitalizations.
135 Inpatient facilities that primarily receive and treat patients with a specific health condition (e.g., tuberculosis or psychiatric
hospitals).
136 Outpatient specialized facilities.
Social Sectors 81
Damage and Loss Assessment Overall, as of June 1, a total of 581 health care
facilities were reported as damaged or destroyed,
Shortly after the rapid escalation of the war in including 557 facilities in the public sector. Most
Ukraine in 2022, the MoH initiated the collection of of the reported damage is for primary health care
information about damage to health facilities. Data centers (264 facilities), followed by general and
about damage were provided by owners of facilities mono-profile hospitals (155 facilities). The level of
based on self-assessment. At the time of this RDNA, damage was constructed considering the reported
the MoH data were more complete than other data level of the damage and expert estimates of the
sources. The full list of damage provided by the total area of facilities experiencing damage. For
MoH as of June 1, 2022, was used for the analysis of the monetary estimate of the damage, the unit cost
health infrastructure damage. The damage reported of a square meter by type of facility was applied
to the MoH were selectively verified and confirmed as provided by the MinRegion, adjusted for the
by visits to the facilities in Kyivska oblast. estimated loss of equipment and other medical
materials depending on the scale of damage. Table
14 provides an estimate of the damage by type of
damaged and destroyed health facility.
Table 14. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million)) as of June 1, 2022
Destroyed facility Damaged facility Damage estimate
(level of damage 40–100%) (level of damage < 40%) (US$ million) Share
Type
(%)
Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private
General hospital 30 30 0 56 56 0 446.8 446.8 0.0 32.2%
Mono-profile
27 27 0 42 42 0 352.9 352.9 0.0 25.4%
hospital
Primary health
100 100 0 164 164 0 219.6 219.6 0.0 15.8%
center
Emergency
7 7 0 14 14 0 71.4 71.4 0.0 5.2%
health center
Outpatient clinic 3 3 0 21 21 0 57.0 57.0 0.0 4.1%
Dental clinic 10 10 0 9 9 0 23.4 23.4 0.0 1.7%
Rehabilitation
3 3 0 8 8 0 25.0 25.0 0.0 1.8%
facility
Blood center 2 2 0 3 3 0 6.9 6.9 0.0 0.5%
Autopsy /
0 0 0 5 5 0 32.7 32.7 0.0 2.4%
forensics
Supply chain /
2 2 0 4 4 0 29.3 29.3 0.0 2.1%
warehouse
Education facility
1 1 0 8 8 0 35.4 35.4 0.0 2.6%
(medical)
Orphanage 1 1 0 3 3 0 34.1 34.1 0.0 2.5%
Service / policy
11 11 0 23 23 0 20.6 20.6 0.0 1.5%
institution
Subtotal 197 197 0 360 360 0 1,355.2 1,355.2 0.0 97.7%
Individual
0 0 0 1 0 1 5.7 0 6 0.4%
entrepreneurs
Other private 19 0 19 4 0 4 25.8 0 26 1.9%
Subtotal 19 0 19 5 0 5 31 0 31 2.3%
Total 216 197 19 365 360 5 1,386.7 1,355.2 31.5 100.0%
Source: MoH.
82 Social Sectors
Damage was recorded for approximately 5.6 percent data suggest that at least 437 pharmacies are
of total health facilities in the public sector. Some fully damaged, meaning that 2.1 percent of all
regions had more damage to publicly owned health pharmacies are nonoperational because of war-
infrastructure than others; the most affected regions related destruction.
were Donetska, Kharkivska, and Mykolaivska. The
presentation of the damage by oblast is provided The proposed estimate of the damage to health
in Table 15 (see also Table 16). Damage to private infrastructure at US$1.4 billion is conservative
facilities is reported as less significant: only 0.5 and not complete. It likely underestimates damage
percent of the total reported area in privately owned in territories that are temporarily not controlled by
facilities experienced any kind of damage. These the Government of Ukraine (territories of Luhanska,
estimates are likely incomplete, MoH focused its data Donetska, Khersonska, and Zaporizka oblasts).
collection on publicly owned facilities. A possible Some additional assets were not accounted for, such
proxy to better estimate damage to private facilities as damaged ambulances (60 vehicles were damaged
is to review reported damage to pharmacies, which as of July 10, 2022).
are predominantly privately owned. The available
Table 15. Damage inventory by oblast and type of provider (number and share)
as of June 1, 2022
Share of facilities (%) Share of damaged area (%) Number of facilities
Oblast
Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private
Cherkaska 0.5% 0.7% 0.0% 0.3% 0.4% 0.0% 1 1 0
Chernihivska 13.6% 15.2% 0.0% 15.4% 16.4% 0.0% 47 47 0
Chernivetska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 0.6% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5 5 0
Donetska 20.3% 26.6% 9.1% 23.9% 27.6% 6.1% 137 115 22
Ivano-Frankivska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Kharkivska 11.1% 17.5% 0.0% 12.8% 16.1% 0.0% 109 109 0
Khersonska 12.8% 17.0% 0.0% 1.6% 1.9% 0.0% 51 51 0
Khmelnytska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Kirovohradska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Kyivska 11.1% 16.3% 0.9% 3.1% 4.0% 0.5% 75 73 2
Kyiv (city) 1.4% 9.2% 0.0% 1.6% 3.9% 0.0% 24 24 0
Luhanska 4.4% 5.3% 0.0% 7.9% 8.6% 0.0% 20 20 0
Lvivska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Mykolaivska 14.7% 19.7% 0.0% 9.4% 12.0% 0.0% 42 42 0
Odeska 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1 1 0
Poltavska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Rivnenska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Sumska 2.7% 3.0% 0.0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.0% 13 13 0
Ternopilska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Vinnytska 0.9% 1.1% 0.0% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0% 5 5 0
Volynska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Zakarpatska 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0 0 0
Zaporizka 5.2% 8.2% 0.0% 4.4% 5.2% 0.0% 27 27 0
Zhytomyrska 6.3% 8.0% 0.0% 7.5% 8.7% 0.0% 24 24 0
Average/ Total 3.9% 5.6% 0.5% 3.2% 3.7% 0.3% 581 557 24
Source: MoH. Data for the affected area and baseline constructed using the records of the registry of licensed facilities.
Social Sectors 83
Table 16. Damage inventory by oblast and type of provider (m2 and US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022
Affected area (m2) Cost (US$ million)
Oblast
Total Public Private Total Public Private
Cherkaska 868 868 0 0.1 0.1 0.0
Chernihivska 72,061 72,061 0 89.4 89.4 0.0
Chernivetska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dnipropetrovska 333 333 0 5.8 5.8 0.0
Donetska 273,397 261,557 11,840 452.9 423.3 29.6
Ivano-Frankivska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kharkivska 178,766 178,766 0 231.0 231.0 0.0
Khersonska 9,456 9,456 0 119.3 119.3 0.0
Khmelnytska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kirovohradska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kyivska 21,875 21,061 814 108.8 106.9 1.9
Kyiv (city) 32,435 32,435 0 133.3 133.3 0.0
Luhanska 66,236 66,236 0 94.0 94.0 0.0
Lvivska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mykolaivska 25,108 25,108 0 76.1 76.1 0.0
Odeska 384 384 0 0.6 0.6 0.0
Poltavska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rivnenska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sumska 2,334 2,334 0 4.6 4.6 0.0
Ternopilska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vinnytska 3,427 3,427 0 13.5 13.5 0.0
Volynska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zakarpatska 0 0 0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zaporizka 46,369 46,369 0 22.6 22.6 0.0
Zhytomyrska 36,503 36,503 0 34.7 34.7 0.0
Average/ Total 769,552 756,899 12,654 1,386.7 1,355.2 31.5
Source: MoH. Data for the affected area and baseline constructed using the records of the registry of licensed facilities.
The total conservative estimate of losses using the Losses for private providers of health services
available data is US$6.4 billion, as presented in Table (including pharmacies) were estimated by
17. It includes estimates related to the necessary comparing economic activity and incomes in the
demolition and debris removal at the affected health months preceding the escalation of the war in
infrastructure. Under the standard approach for this February 2022 to those in the following months.
RDNA, estimates for completely destroyed assets The highest losses in this category are estimated for
assign 14.1 percent of the full cost for demolition the city of Kyiv (44 percent), followed by Donetska (13
and 1.875 percent of the full cost for debris removal; percent), Luhanska (7 percent), Kyivska (7 percent),
estimates for partially damaged facilities assign and Odeska (6 percent) oblasts.
1.25 percent of the cost for debris removal. Using
this approach, the total cost of loss associated with A significant amount of losses is associated with
this type of damage comes to US$281.4 million (see the deteriorated health of people and constrained
Table 3 for the summary of estimated losses). access to services. Losses are quantified as
84 Social Sectors
Table 17. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Loss estimates Share
Category Estimate
(US$ million) (%)
Demolition cost Estimated using standardized approach for the present
281.4 4.4
and debris removal RDNA
Private providers’ Estimated by comparing economic activity and incomes in
1,472.1 23.0
loss of income the months before and after the war
Additional health
Estimated as 10% of the Program of Medical Guarantees 549.8 8.6
expenditures
Quantified as additional DALY lost for each specified
class of diseases, including 5% additional DALY lost from
communicable diseases, 3% from neonatal and nutritional
Health losses 4,089.6 64.0
deficiencies, 3% from maternal disorders, 4% from new
NCDs and forgone care, 10% from mental health disorders,
and 5% from self-harm and interpersonal violence
Total 6,392.9 100
Source: KSE for private provider losses estimate. Other estimates by the assessment team. Note: A joint with the World
Health Organization model was used for the estimate of the cost of additional health expenditures.
additional disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) burden was made to estimate immediate losses in
lost for the Ukrainian population by disease class health outcomes. An increase of 10 percent in DALYs
(compared to baseline annual estimates of DALYs was included for mental health and an additional
for Ukraine).137 Losses related to infectious diseases 5 percent for interpersonal violence. Available
are associated with the missed immunizations of literature suggests that the potential losses related
children and adults, lack of access to clean water and to mental health are higher than 10 percent additional
hygiene, crowded settlements of internally displaced DALYs, as reported for other countries.138
persons (IDPs), etc. Increased neonatal and childhood
mortality is associated with additional neonatal In accordance with the RDNA methodology, direct
disorders in view of increased premature deliveries, losses from injuries and accidents for civilians and
some in suboptimal conditions, and increased the military were not quantified.
wartime nutritional deficiencies of infants and
children. Similarly, missed antenatal care, perinatal A share of expenditures under the PMG is quantified
care, and care for labor-related complications are as additional losses. The estimates are based on
quantified as additional maternal mortality losses. the modeling of the payments to providers under
The largest group of losses is potentially associated the PMG that had to continue despite the massive
with missed episodes of care (screening, diagnostic, displacement of people inside Ukraine and abroad.
and follow-up, as well as missed treatment for Approximately US$549.8 million is estimated as
acute conditions) for people with noncommunicable paid within the PMG to health providers to sustain
diseases (NCDs) and additional diseases occurring in their activities and salaries, even if the provision of
this group as a consequence of war and suboptimal services is disrupted. The cost is calculated using
living conditions. actual expenditures for the past months and projected
financing to providers using planned allocations,
A very conservative assumption of additional compared to the output-based modeling of these
mental health burden and interpersonal violence expenditures using actual and projected outputs.
137 DALYs are taken from the Global Burden of Disease database of the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation (https://
www.healthdata.org/ ), using the most recent (2019) estimated DALY for Ukraine. One DALY lost is taken as 1 GDP per
capita, using International Monetary Fund (IMF) projection for GDP for Ukraine for 2022 (prewar projection).
138 See, for example, R. S. Murthy and R. Lakshminarayana, “Mental Health Consequences of War: A Brief Review of Research
Finding,” World Psychiatry 5, no. 1 (February 2006):25–30, Link.
Social Sectors 85
However, the cost of setting up additional capacities Investments in PHC are estimated using the build
(e.g., in the west of Ukraine to cover additional needs back better approach and providing for new
for IDPs) was not included in the PMG payments, functionalities to replace some of the hospital
as the majority of providers continued delivery of capacity. Replacement costs for damaged and
additional services within already allocated PMG destroyed PHCs are calculated assuming that the
financing. construction of one fully equipped PHC facility
with additional capacities to cover the needs of
approximately 8,000 people (PHC+) will cost US$1.25
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, million. Reconstruction of an existing PHC facility as
including Build Back Better a PHC+ facility will cost US$0.6 million. For a small
PHC, the construction cost is US$0.18 million, and
Costs for reconstruction and recovery are estimated the reconstruction cost is US$0.09 million.
based on the projected needs for the health sector.
They include estimates of the necessary investments New investment needs associated with the impacts
to rebuild missing or damaged infrastructure, build of the war include investments in mental health and
new infrastructure to address new or significantly rehabilitation centers. A total of 18 new rehabilitation
increased health needs, and upgrade the existing centers and 59 repurposed facilities will be
facilities. They also include the additional resources necessary to serve the needs of the population. The
that will be necessary within the PMG to address construction and reconstruction costs of these
forgone care needs and additional needs related facilities are estimated for the 20-year horizon, and
to mental health and rehabilitation of direct and only half is included in the 10-year projection of
indirect victims of war. The total estimate of needs needs. Similarly, investments in the construction or
comes to approximately US$15.1 billion; estimates repurposing of 26 new or fully reconstructed mental
are presented in Table 18. health clinics and 544 mental health centers are
estimated for the 20-year horizon; only half the cost
Estimates of the infrastructure recovery and is included in the 10-year projection of needs.
upgrade costs are for replacing destroyed and
damaged primary and specialized care facilities. Additional estimates of the needs cover service
Replacement of hospitals is most expensive as a lot delivery restoration need. Because of the war-
of existing hospital infrastructure is dilapidated, and related disruptions, the provision of basic care
investments will be necessary to modernize hospital was discontinued for many people in Ukraine, and
services in Ukraine. Of the fully destroyed hospitals, a major effort will be needed to reconnect patients
80 percent are planned to be rebuilt as general with health care providers to ensure they catch up
profile (cluster) hospitals with an average capacity of on the missed preventive or curative care. Additional
350 beds and 31,500 m2 in size; the estimated cost investment in PHC will be needed to support this
is US$67 million for the construction and equipping process, and financing of PHC in the PMG is expected
of one such modern hospital. Another 20 percent to scale in the next 10 years, from the current 0.62
of hospitals are planned to be built as specialized percent of GDP to 0.86 percent of GDP, to cover these
general profile hospitals, with specialization (such additional needs. Resources needed to provide
as burn centers, for example) defined by need. The additional mental health and rehabilitation services
cost of a turnkey hospital with a center of excellence are also estimated as increased allocations in the
in defined specialization is estimated at US$133.7 PMG; these resources which will need to increase by
million for a 600-bed hospital that is 60,000 m2 in 0.3 percentage points of GDP for each PMG package
size. Such hospitals do not necessarily need to be covering rehabilitation and mental health services.
built in the same plots where the destroyed hospitals Because financing of health services is already
are located, as each general profile hospital will hospital-centered, additional costs of hospital care
have sufficient capacity to cover the needs of are not included.
250,000 people in hospital care, and the specialist
hospital will have the capacity to serve 750,000 to An ongoing investment within the World Bank–
1 million people. For partially damaged hospitals, financed project Additional Financing to Serving
40 percent of the current MoH estimate for the cost People, Improving Health, which provided US$35
of construction of 1 m2 was applied to calculate the million for additional equipment for emergency
necessary cost of reconstruction. departments, was included in the estimate of the
need.
86 Social Sectors
Table 18. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Immediate/ Medium- to
Category Component Estimate Total
short term long-term
Reconstruction needs (construction and equipment)
For 54 destroyed hospitals, 80%
Investments Secondary
are rebuilt as new general cluster
in secondary care network— 154 7,556 7,710
hospitals, 20% rebuilt as specialized
care—new new facilities
multi-profile hospitals
Investments Secondary For 88 hospitals with damage of
in secondary care network— less than 40%, renovation cost of
132 0 132
care— reconstructed MoH was applied to their affected
reconstructed facilities area (40% of total cost)
For 26 destroyed PHC facilities, 40%
Investments in
are built as PHC+, 60% as smaller
primary care, Primary care
PHC; for 63 damaged PHC facilities, 29 87 116
PHC+/smaller network
40% are reconstructed as PHC+,
PHC
60% reconstructed as smaller PHC
18 new rehabilitation centers
Investments in
Rehabilitation and 59 existing facilities are fully
rehabilitation 23 734 757
centers reconstructed over a period of 20
centers
years
26 new or fully reconstructed
psychiatric hospitals serve as
Investments in mental health institutions; 544
mental health Mental health mental health centers built/ 35 1,143 1,179
centers equipped (as part of PHC/PHC+),
and people trained over a period of
20 years
Mental
Education
health and 10,000 people are trained 17 96 113
needs
rehabilitation
Service delivery restoration needs
Primary Additional costs of the PMG are
Additional
health care— estimated to cover additional needs
primary health 595 3,373 3,969
addressing of people at the PHC level; PHC
care services
forgone care financed as 0.86% of GDP
Additional costs of the PMG are
Additional Mental health—
estimated to cover additional
mental health war-related 83 470 553
mental health needs of people;
needs needs
financed as 0.12% of GDP
Medical Additional costs of the PMG are
Additional
rehabilitation— estimated to cover additional
rehabilitation 78 444 522
war-related rehabilitation services; financed as
services
needs 0.11% of GDP
Immediate support to the health system
Requested equipment procured
Financing of Procured
to strengthen the delivery of
emergency within World 35 0 35
emergency care in hospitals during
care equipment Bank project
the war
Total 1,182 13,905 15,086
Source: Assessment team.
Social Sectors 87
Limitations and Recommendations The estimate of losses tries to include estimates of
losses of health in the Ukrainian population. Such
Several limitations are linked to data source losses were calculated only for 2022 by estimating
limitations. To construct the baseline, the analysis additional losses of health by key classes of diseases
relied on the state registry of medical licenses that are most obviously affected by the impacts
(issued to health facilities). Although the registry of the war. However, such losses will very likely
provides the most comprehensive data, it does not translate into increased morbidity and mortality in
contain information on the area of licensed facilities, the coming years as well.
has incomplete data on types of medical activity, and
has gaps for other essential data. Approximations Since the methodology of the RDNA stipulates
are thus required in the calculations. that only those needs directly related to the
reconstruction of damaged assets and to losses be
For the estimate of the damage in the health sector, estimated, the estimated recovery needs do not fully
the data set provided by MoH was used. It includes cover the need for reconstructing service delivery
information based on self-reported forms submitted in the health sector. The investment required to
by facility owners and local health authorities. Some address health needs more efficiently and through
submissions lack data on facilities’ area and bed better-quality service delivery is much higher than
capacity, which translates into several limitations in indicated here.
assigning a monetary value to the recorded damage.
Another important shortcoming of this data set is In addition, it is expected that the financing of the
that it underreports damage to facilities located PMG in the short term will significantly depend on
in the parts of the country temporarily not under external funding. However, because of the existing
government control and to private sector health uncertainties, such estimates are not included in the
facilities. estimate of the need.
Future assessments should include the damage
inflicted on the health infrastructure since the cutoff
date of the present RDNA.
88 Social Sectors
SOCIAL PROTECTION
AND LIVELIHOODS
Summary While a significant share of social protection
expenditures is due to pension expenditures (9.5
percent of GDP in 2021), a sizable portion comes from
Damage to the social protection infrastructure social assistance programs. In social assistance, an
(such as residential care units, social centers, and important role is played by means-tested programs,
social services providers) is estimated at US$164.4 such as the Housing Utility Subsidy (HUS) and
million. Overall, 56 stand-alone buildings were Guaranteed Minimum Income (GMI); expenditures for
damaged or destroyed. Damage to shared building these depend on the income level of the beneficiaries
space used for social protection purposes, such and thus can fluctuate quite significantly (Figure 18).
as offices in administrative buildings of the local This is important for the context of the assessment,
governments, is included in other parts of the RDNA. as prior to February 2022 Ukraine was projected to
The losses in the social protection and livelihoods have a poverty level below 2 percent as measured by
are substantial, amounting to US$50.6 billion.139 the upper-middle-income poverty line (US$5.5 per day
They relate to (i) loss of jobs and household income in 2011 purchasing power parity). However, depending
from wages, (ii) resulting higher poverty and related on the materialized drop in the private consumption
increased expenditures under existing means-tested and different response scenarios (austerity,
social programs, (iii) additional needs for programs deficit monetization, etc.), poverty could increase
such as survivor’s benefits or programs related to dramatically, with some scenarios envisaging its
disability, and finally (iv) lower affordability of basic growth up to 58 percent.140 This would result in radical
needs, including energy and food, which will require changes to the composition of the social assistance,
a significant expenditure increase in a number of which are discussed later in this chapter.
social programs linked to the subsistence minimum,
ranging from pensions to the mentioned means- In addition, the social protection sector also has
tested programs. The estimated social protection an extensive infrastructure that aims to provide
and livelihoods sector needs amount to US$20.6 social services and administrative services to the
billion. Most of this relates to efforts to restore beneficiaries of various social programs. It includes
permanently lost jobs. Bringing the lost workforce almost 2,200 social welfare units, about 1,200 social
back would require additional efforts and costs services delivery units, and almost 1,900 centers for
(through mobility grants, settling-in grants, or wage administrative service delivery and offices of the
subsidies for employers. Pension Fund, Social Insurance Fund, and Public
Employment Service.
Background
Damage and Loss Assessment
Ukraine has a well-developed social protection
system. About 72 percent of the population directly or Total damage and losses for the social protection
indirectly benefits from at least one social program. and livelihoods sector in Ukraine are estimated
Prior to the war Ukraine also spent a substantially to reach US$50.6 billion, almost entirely through
higher share of gross domestic product (GDP) on losses. Damage in the social protection area
social protection than other countries in the region mostly consists of destroyed or partially destroyed
(Figure 17). infrastructure, such as residential care units,
sanatoriums, or social centers. Overall, 56 such
139 For the calculation of the total losses, household income loss valued at US$46.05 billion is not included to avoid potential
double-counting in relation to other sectors.
140 World Bank, “Relief, Recovery, and Resilient Reconstruction: Supporting Ukraine’s Immediate and Medium-Term Economic
Needs,” World Bank Group, 2022, Link.
Social Sectors 89
Figure 17. Social protection expenditure share in GDP (%, y axis) compared to GDP per capita
(US$, x axis) (PPP 2011)
18%
16% UKR
14% MNE
SRB ROU
UZB POL
12% BGR HRV
KGZ MKD BLR HUN EST
10% LVA CZE
ALB RUS
TUR
8% MDA
6% GEO LTU
KSVARM
AZE KAZ
4% TJK
SVK
BIH
2%
0%
0 5000 10000 15000 20000 25000 30000 35000 40000 45000
Source: World Bank Social Protection Expenditure and Evaluation Database (SPeeD) database.
Note: PPP = purchasing power parity.
Figure 18. Composition of social assistance expenditures as percentage of GDP (y axis)
Source: World Bank staff calculations.
Note: SA = social assistance.
structures were damaged or destroyed, with damage, disrepair, or lack of maintenance. Thus,
damage totaling US$164 million (Table 19).141 some social welfare units that administer benefits,
along with some social care facilities, are closed
Indiscriminate shelling is causing damage to social or have reduced their services. Despite the lower
infrastructure in war-affected areas (especially in levels of damage to critical social infrastructure in
Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Mykolaivska the central and western oblasts of the country, the
oblasts). In the areas of Kyivska, Sumska, and unprecedented displacement crisis has put a burden
Chernihivska brought back under government on local welfare units, which face significantly
control, the fighting affects infrastructure through increased workloads.
141 Damage to the social infrastructure includes stand-alone buildings. Damage to the shared building space, such as offices
in administrative buildings of the local governments (e.g. divisions of the Pension Fund of Ukraine), is included in other
parts of RDNA. Data on damage to the buildings in territories temporarily not under government control, areas where
there is ongoing military actions, and nearby areas were not available as of the time of the RDNA’s preparation.
90 Social Sectors
Table 19. Damage inventory by asset type (number, US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Number of damaged Total value Share of total
Category
or destroyed facilities (US$ million) (%)
Residential institutions for the elderly,
25 57 34.8
persons with disabilities, and children
Sanatoriums, children camps 12 54 32.9
Social centers 19 53 32.3
Total 56 164 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
Attacks against civilian infrastructure have social programs linked to the subsistence minimum,
suspended the operations of the service delivery ranging from pensions to means-tested programs.
centers of the Pension Fund in war-affected areas, The losses add up to US$50.6 billion, the largest
leaving pensioners with limited access to services. share of which comes from the permanent loss of
Of 470 local Pension Fund service centers, 64 have jobs and labor force (Table 20).
suffered extensive damage, as have 19 of 158 local
units of the Social Insurance Fund. The International Labour Organization estimates
that about 4.8 million jobs were lost, equal to 30
Social care facilities in host communities are percent of prewar employment in Ukraine.142 There
receiving growing numbers of internally displaced are even higher estimates of the lost employment: a
elderly, families with children, and persons with national poll conducted at the end of April showed
disability, and their capacities are stretched to the that 39 percent of those who were employed before
limit to ensure the delivery of social services and the war still do not have a job.143
to address the complex needs of the vulnerable.
According to the Ministry of Social Policy, 10 out The resulting increase in poverty will also
of 62 long-term social care facilities for the elderly significantly increase expenditure under existing
and persons with disabilities were damaged (see Box means-tested social programs, such as HUS and
3). Fourteen incidents of damage to the rehabilitation GMI. According to the national statistics, the wage
facilities were reported (9 percent of 154 facilities income comprised 60 percent of total disposable
subordinated to the Ministry of Social Policy), and six income. The projected household losses from the
incidents affecting social service delivery centers. income shock and higher cost of living are estimated
Even one such incident could have a serious impact at around 27 percent of the household budget.
on vulnerable populations, leaving them with limited In addition, the government has implemented a
or no access to social services. Before the war (in blanket energy subsidy by freezing energy tariffs.
2020), the social service system delivered services The average salary in Ukraine before the war (as of
to more than 1.3 million beneficiaries yearly. January 2022) amounted to US$534 (UAH 14,577).144
The amount of losses is assessed for 18 months.
The losses in the social protection and livelihoods
sector are massive and stem from loss of jobs and Some losses result from the service disruptions
household income from wages, higher poverty, that go beyond the damage to the infrastructure.
related increased expenditures under existing For example, some of the pensioners who have been
means-tested social programs, and additional internally displaced or temporarily left the country
needs for programs such as survivor’s benefits may have lost access to their benefits. In particular,
or programs related to disability. Losses also this loss may have affected those who received
stem from the lower affordability of basic needs, benefits through the mail (Ukrposhta) and those who
including energy and food, which will require a lost access to the Ukrainian banking system while
significant expenditure increase for a number of fleeing the country.
142 International Labour Organization, “The Impact of the Ukraine Crisis on the World of Work: Initial Assessments,” ILO Brief,
2022, Link.
143 Rating Group, “The Ninth Nationwide Poll: Socio-Economic Problems During the War (April 26, 2022),” April 28, 2022, Link.
144 Link. The exchange rate of US$1 = Hrv 27.282502 is used hereafter.
Social Sectors 91
Box 3. Damage to the social care institutions for the most vulnerable
• On March 11, in Kreminna (Luhanska oblast), tanks destroyed a residential institution for the elderly.
The action killed 56 persons; the 15 survivors were forcibly deported to the Russian Federation.a
• On March 11, the Oskil residential institution for the elderly and adults with mental disorders
(Kharkivska oblast) was subjected to a barrage of heavy artillery and then destroyed by an airstrike.
Hundreds of residents were evacuated to a shelter.b
• On March 5, forces took control of a residential institution for people with mental disabilities in
the town of Borodianka (Kyivska oblast). They took 670 persons—patients and staff—hostage. The
building, used as a firing point, was heavily damaged, and the area surrounding the facility was
mined. The convoy of vehicles that eventually evacuated patients and staff came under fire.c
• In Chernihivska oblast, 30 children ages 3–18 and their caregiver fled the center for social and
psychological rehabilitation, which was destroyed after 20 days of shelling and missile strikes.d
• During March-April, fighting partially damaged the Kyiv and Bucha (Kyivska oblast) geriatric
social care facilities; in Atynsk (Sumska oblast) and Pushcha-Vodytsia (Kyivska oblast), residential
institutions for persons with mental disorders suffered damage to roofing, facades, windows, doors,
utility networks, and equipment. A few months later, on July 17, Atynsk institution was destroyed by
artillery and mortar fire.
a. Serhiy Hayday, Head of Luhansk Oblast Administration, Link.
b. TSN, 1+1 Media Group, Link.
c. Radio Svoboda, Link ; Bihus.Info, Link.
d. Ukrinform, Link.
Table 20. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total value (US$ million) Share of total (%)
Loss of household income 46,051 91.0
Additional expenditures under means-tested programs 1,178 2.3
[as considered by the
Blanket energy subsidy (tariff freeze) -
energy sector]
Additional expenditures under programs directly linked
3,334 6.6
to the war, such as support for IDPs
Cost of debris removal and demolition 16 0.1
Total 50,579 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
So far, the government has been leveraging digital The government estimated losses related to
means—such as the Diia platform with 17 million support for internally displaced persons (IDPs) at
users—to provide uprooted people with additional UAH 50.5 billion through the end of the calendar
support, including one-off benefits (UAH 6,500, or year, meaning that for 18 months of the estimated
US$222) for loss of business and livelihood to self- loss period, the expenditures will reach UAH 91
employed and insured workers. However, providing billion (US$3.3 billion).
social service benefits, as well as benefits to
vulnerable populations who are unable to use digital
technology, is increasingly challenging.
92 Social Sectors
Table 21. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Total value Share of total
Category
(US$ million) (%)
Restoration of permanently lost jobs 14,432 70.0
Means-tested benefits 4,107 19.9
Benefits to IDPs 259 1.3
Rebuilding of social infrastructure 386 1.9
Restoration of social services 900 4.4
Military social assistance and other long-term
533 2.6
benefits related to the war
Total 20,617 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
Note: Needs for means-tested benefits, benefits to IDPs, social services, and military social assistance only include estimates
for immediate/short-term due to a number of additional factors influencing them over the medium-/long-term, such as,
changes in incomes and cost of basic needs, including food and energy, over the same period.
There are also significant new expenditures directly In the immediate to short term, there is a need to
linked to the war, such as additional benefits for finance the social expenditures that will protect
those who acquired a disability as a result of the vulnerable groups from the additional long-
war, or for families that lost a breadwinner due to term implications such as using negative coping
war, especially in combat. strategies. This includes the support to low-income
families through the GMI-type program that aims to
provide such families with the income to cover basic
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, needs, and through housing and utilities subsidies
including Build Back Better that aim to prevent energy poverty, especially
during the heating season in harsh winters. Costs
Recovery of the jobs and social protection sector associated with these and other social programs
requires concerted actions over different time (such as benefits to IDPs or cost of restoring the
frames. Permanently lost jobs will not be restored social services, but excluding energy subsidies,
together with the reconstruction efforts, as they which will become part of the social expenditures
were lost because businesses ceased to exist and after the freeze of tariffs is lifted) are expected to
because there was a direct loss of the workforce. reach US$8.1 billion. Additional expenditures for
By some estimates, 2.5–3 million people who fled means-tested programs are expected to continue
Ukraine to the EU may not return regardless of how beyond this period but were not assessed as they also
the war situation develops,145 while according to the depend on the change of incomes and cost of basic
Ukrainian government, about 1.2 million people,146 needs, such as food and energy over the medium/
including 211,000 children,147 have been forcibly long term, which are subject to high uncertainty.
deported to Russia and may not be able to come
back. The RDNA assessment estimates that about 14 Across the recovery period, there is a need to
percent of all jobs may be lost permanently. Restoring expand programs that will stimulate employment
these jobs would require additional efforts and costs and prepare for long-term recovery. The cost
(through mobility grants, settling-in grants, or wage of reestablishing a single job can range from
subsidies for employers). The estimated needs in the US$20,000148 to US$60,000; there also seems to
social protection and livelihoods sector amount to be a link between the cost to create a job and the
US$20.6 billion over 10 years (Table 21). average annual salary in the economy149 (in the
145 Washington Post, “Millions of Ukrainian Refugees May Stay In E.U., Top Official Says,” June 6, 2022, Link.
146 Reuters, “Ukraine Accuses Russia of Forcibly Deporting over 210,000 Children,” May 13, 2022, Link.
147 Government of Ukraine, Office of Ombudsman News, May 13, 2022, Link.
148 David Robalino, “How Much Does It Cost to Create a Job?,” World Bank Blog, February 15, 2018, Link.
149 Economist’s View, “How Much Does It Cost to Create a Job?,” November 24, 2008, Link.
Social Sectors 93
Box 4. Digital platform Diia: “Country in a Smartphone”
The Diia platform, launched by the Ministry of Digital Transformation in 2020, includes a website
and mobile application. The Diia mobile app allows citizens to store and access digital national IDs,
taxpayer identification documents, driving licenses, biometric international passports, vaccination
certificates, and other documents on their phones. The Diia currently uses the available information
from the state registries and databases. All data are transmitted and stored in encrypted form; for the
critical data Diia uses distributed data storage with blockchain technology. The Diia connects users to
services using their BankIDs.
Box 5. Needs that may materialize in the social protection sector
One need that may materialize in the social protection sector but is not included in the RDNA
estimates is cash compensation for destroyed housing. While the RDNA assessment assumes such
compensation will be provided through rebuilt housing, the draft law envisages the possibility of cash
compensation. As occurred in other postwar contexts, cash compensation could be linked to the
welfare status of a family, including through additional cash grants to qualifying families. Implementing
cash compensation options not only affects the timeline of the needs (due to the rapid nature of
disbursement) and the volume of the needs (since the cash component may include additional grants)
but also adds components that would effectively be a social protection measure as a cash transfer to
the vulnerable families.
Ukrainian context this is US$6,408). The number social protection infrastructure, the ongoing crisis
of jobs that will not be restored together with the has highlighted the necessity and opportunities for
reconstruction effort is estimated at 2.25 million improving the resilience of social infrastructure
jobs, and their restoration will require additional and developing systems that can respond to shocks
expenditures. Such expenditures may include wage and crises. For example, while the government has
subsidies, mobility grants, lump-sum grants to clearly recognized the importance of community-
stimulate self-employment, and other measures. based social service development, a large share of
Due to the massive losses in employment, even the services is still provided by the ineffective large-
most modest estimate of the job restoration cost scale residential institutions. These care services
results in needs of around US$14.4 billion, which will are excessively focused on institutional care, but
probably be spread over the reconstruction period at the same time, the community-owned social
(up to 10 years). In addition, the public employment infrastructure does not successfully address
services are even more critical now and will need beneficiaries’ needs or ensure their full inclusion
to adapt and strengthen skills matching and labor and participation in the community. Investments
force activation capacities as a key input for aiding in building back better, in further modernizing the
recovery and reconstruction. social service system, and in rebalancing social
care toward user-centered care options provided
In this recovery phase, utilization of new by community-based facilities can all ensure much
technologies, including cloud-based and online more effective support to the population while
solutions, should be expanded to strengthen the consuming fewer fiscal resources. In addition to
adaptability of the overall system. Ukraine has the social infrastructure costs, needs for social
already appreciably invested in digital solutions such services in territorial communities are estimated at
as the Diya platform (Box 4), which has 17 million an additional US$0.6 billion in the immediate period
users and provides IDPs with additional support. and additionally US$2.6 billion over the medium-to-
long term.
In addition, social infrastructure needs to be rebuilt
quickly, but this recovery effort should be aligned Some needs were not included in this assessment
with investment, policy, and behavioral changes. due to the nature of developing legislation. An
Although the war has caused massive damage to example of such needs is presented in Box 5.
94 Social Sectors
For the longer term, the focus should be on 2022, the actual subsistence minimum was UAH
rehabilitation of war-affected groups, such as 4,666,150 while the legislated subsistence minimum
orphans, IDPs, and persons with disabilities. during the same period was UAH 2,393.151 During
This approach is critical for reintegration of war the reconstruction period, temporary measures
veterans into society and could efficiently respond such as blanket energy subsidies, are expected
to the multidimensional challenges faced by these to be abolished and rising tariffs as well as cost
categories. It could include development of a system of other basic needs be reflected in the reviewed
of benefits and pensions to veterans combined updated subsistence minimum, but whether it would
with social and labor activation services (e.g., converge with the actual subsistence minimum
psychological support, physical rehabilitation to remains unclear. Full reflection of the cost of basic
improve functionality, social rehabilitation to ensure needs would affect the expenditures in a major way
inclusion in the community, etc.). since over 70 percent of the population is expected
to have incomes below the actual subsistence
Limitations and Recommendations minimum. As a result, means-tested programs
expenditures in such scenario would raise to US$17.2
billion (US$14.8 billion additionally). In addition, other
Significant shares of the losses and needs depend on
programs will be affected, such as benefits to single
the developments related to the return of refugees
parent families (additional US$2.8 billion), but most
and to the labor market situation. Indirect evidence
notably – additional pensions expenditures because
of such developments (e.g., polls and reports using
the minimum pension is linked to the subsistence
extrapolations from other conflicts) were used to
minimum. Over 80 percent of pensioners receive
estimate the magnitude of the impact.
the benefit below the actual subsistence minimum,152
and the estimate of additional expenditures on
The cost of social programs that depend on the
pension benefits is US$6.6 billion.
change on incomes and cost of basic needs are
subject to high uncertainty beyond the immediate/
Postwar experiences point to a major burden on
short-term. Expenditure for means-tested programs
the national budget related to the military and
may change significantly depending on the change
war veterans’ pension expenditures. In addition to
of household incomes and their dynamics related to
these expenditures, there are benefits to members
the cost of basic needs, expressed by legislatively
of the military and families who lost a relative in
set amount of subsistence minimum.
combat, and loss-of-life compensation for civilian
deaths. Estimating related costs requires careful
A number of social benefits depends on the
quantification of such liabilities with proper financial
subsistence minimum, which no longer reflects the
plans and institutional arrangements. For the
cost of basic needs and will need to be reviewed
purposes of the RDNA, the needs are extrapolated
in the reconstruction phase with potential major
from the current expenditures, taking into account
impact on the needs. This disconnect between the
rapidly increased numbers of people qualifying for
legislated subsistence minimum and the actual cost
such benefits.
of the basic needs (“actual subsistence minimum,”
calculated by the Ministry of Social Policy) was
already substantial before the war. In January
150 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “The Actual Size of the Living Wage in 2021–2022” [in Ukrainian], Link.
151 Law of Ukraine, “About the State Budget of Ukraine for 2022” [in Ukrainian], Link.
152 Ministry of Social Policy of Ukraine, “82 Percent of Ukrainian Pensioners Receive a Pension below the Actual Subsistence
Minimum – Natalia Nenyuchenko” [in Ukrainian], February 20, 2020, Link.
Social Sectors 95
CULTURE AND
TOURISM
Summary modern democratic sovereign state, Ukraine has
undergone numerous cultural transformations. In
addition to its seven UNESCO World Heritage Sites153
The war is estimated to have caused US$1.1 billion
(six cultural and one natural), Ukraine boasts an
in damage to the culture sector and a significant
estimated 15,470 cultural heritage assets,154 most of
loss of US$19.3 billion, as of June 1, 2022. The
which are officially cataloged on the State Register
sector has also sustained damage to its intangible
of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine as of January
cultural heritage and intrinsic values of spiritual,
2022.155 The number of Ukraine’s cultural properties
symbolic, emotional, and existential significance,
likely far exceeds the official lists—the Ministry of
as well as to the creative industries. Over US$5.2
Culture and Information Policy (MKIP) recognizes
billion is needed for safeguarding the culture sector
more than 60,000 buildings of cultural/historical
in Ukraine. The value of culture is associated with
significance, over 44,000 monumental tombs, and
authenticity, shared values, and social connections,
almost 15,000 archives and collections of cultural
which cannot be monetized in market value. For this
significance.
reason, recovering culture does not directly translate
into reconstructing the physical/tangible assets.
Ukraine has a rich intangible culture. Five Ukrainian
However, restoring and rebuilding the damaged
cultural practices are on UNESCO’s intangible
cultural properties and rehabilitating them would be
cultural heritage list, including borscht cooking,
an initial step to reestablish the lost/broken cultural
Cossack songs of the Dnipropetrovska oblast,
and social fabrics and restore the utility value,
Petrykivka decorative painting, Kosiv painted
the sense of belonging they inspire, and people’s
ceramics, and Örnek design. Some 47 other
affiliation with them. Any recovery efforts should lay
intangible cultural practices are inscribed on the
the foundation for the sustainable, green, resilient,
National List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of
inclusive, and smart development of Ukraine.
Ukraine,156 demonstrating Ukraine’s diverse cultural
expressions, knowledge, rituals, and traditions.
Background
Culture and heritage in Ukraine are protected under
Throughout its long and dynamic history, Ukraine’s the Constitution (Article 54), the Law of Ukraine on
people and culture have shaped and strengthened Protection of Cultural Heritage,157 and the authority
its national identity. From the ancient Trypillia of the MKIP, as well as a range of international
culture dating to the Neolithic period, to the ninth conventions and agreements, such as the Convention
century state of Kyivan Rus’, to the 21st-century on the Protection of Cultural Property158 in the Event
153 UNESCO World Heritage Convention, “Ukraine,” Link.
154 Of these assets, 1,134 are of national significance and 14,328 are of local significance. These assets are organized in eight
types: historical, architectural, archaeological monuments, landscape, objects of monumental art, urban planning/city
building objects, objects of landscape art, and objects of science and technology.
155 See the official website of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MKIP) of Ukraine, Link; and the official website
of the Khersonska Oblast Administration, Link. The actual numbers may be higher due to delayed reporting/registration
at the local level.
156 MKIP, “ICPI Added to the National List of Intangible Cultural Heritage of Ukraine by Another 21 Elements,” July 7, 2022, Link.
157 Law of Ukraine on Protection of Cultural Heritage, Link.
158 In accordance with the Article 1 of the 1954 Hague Convention, “cultural property” refers to “(1) movable or immovable
property of great importance to the cultural heritage of every people, which includes monuments of architecture, art or
history, archeological sites, groups of buildings of historical or artistic interest, works of art, manuscripts, books and
other objects of artistic, historical or archeological interest, as well as scientific collections and important collections of
books or archives; (2) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit movable cultural property,
such as museums, large libraries, and depositories of archives; and (3) centers containing a large amount of cultural
property.” Link.
96 Social Sectors
of Armed Conflicts, the Convention for the Protection regional theaters, places of worship, etc.), movable
of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, the European cultural properties and collections, repositories of
Convention on the Protection of Archaeological culture (archives and library collections of cultural
Heritage, and the Convention on the Protection and significance, art galleries, etc.), and touristic
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, facilities. Over 560 are reported to be partially
among others. damaged, including the historic wooden structure
of All Saints Monastery of the Sviatohirska Lavra,
Building on Ukraine’s rich cultural capital, the the Chernihiv Regional History Museum, the
cultural and creative industries and tourism have Popov’s Palace Complex, and the Kharkiv National
emerged as a significant driving force of the Academic Opera and Ballet Theater. Major damage
Ukrainian economy in recent years. Ukraine defines was sustained especially in Kyivska and the
creative industries as “types of economic activity Eastern region, including Kharkivska, Donetska,
aimed at creating added value and jobs through and Luhanska; damaged religious buildings include
cultural (artistic) and/or creative expression,” and Orthodox and Catholic churches as well as mosques
34 types of such economic activities belong to the and synagogues.164 It is noted that the 1954 Hague
creative industries in Ukraine, according to the Order Convention obliges countries to refrain from all
of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 265r.159 acts of hostility against cultural property during
Those activities include visual arts, performing arts, armed conflict,165 and that Resolution 2347 adopted
publishing, audiovisual arts, IT, and folk arts and by the UN Security Council in 2017 condemns the
crafts, among others. According to information from “unlawful destruction of cultural heritage, including
the State Statistics Service of Ukraine and research the destruction of religious sites and artifacts, and
conducted by the KSE in cooperation with the MKIP,160 the looting and smuggling of cultural property from
the creative industries in Ukraine have seen rapid archaeological sites, museums, libraries, archives,
growth; in 2019, turnover was estimated at over UAH and other sites.”166
286 billion and over 351,000 people were employed.
Before the war, tourism and creative industries The war is estimated to have caused US$1.1 billion
served as an economic engine, generating continuous in damage to the culture sector (Table 22). These are
growth in competitiveness and productivity. extremely conservative estimates, as reports of the
damaged cultural properties have been partial and
Damage and Loss Assessment limited, and regular monitoring and verification on
the ground remain challenging, especially for cultural
properties of smaller scale, which hold cultural and
In times of armed conflicts, culture is particularly
historical significance to locals but are less well
vulnerable. It is often deliberately targeted as a means
known to the broader communities. Furthermore,
of eradicating people’s ties to their communities,
tracking the looting/trafficking of various artworks,
cities, and nation and destroying people’s collective
collections, and antiquities has been a challenge.167
and historical memories and identities161 as well as
social capital and people’s livelihoods.162
Significant losses have been registered in the sector,
amounting to US$19.3 billion (Table 23). The war has
Preliminary and conservative estimates confirm
caused the closing of cultural institutions and places
that about 260 cultural properties have been fully
of religious worship, including museums, archives,
destroyed, including buildings and sites imbued
places of culture, churches, and monasteries. It
with recognized cultural/social values163 (museums,
has not only disrupted social practices but also
historic buildings, monuments, archeological
caused significant economic losses, including
sites, houses/palaces of culture, national and
159 The Ukrainian text of the order is available at Link.
160 The resulting report is “Creative Industries: Impact on Development Economy of Ukraine”(in Ukrainian), Link.
161 UNESCO and World Bank, Culture in City Reconstruction and Recovery (Paris: UNESCO, 2018), Link.
162 Suzanne Nossel, “How to Help Ukraine Fight Cultural Erasure,” Foreign Policy, May 16, 2022, Link.
163 Damage to local libraries is covered by the municipal services sector.
164 MKIP, “Ukrainian Cultural Heritage Is under Russian Fire,” July 8, 2022, Link.
165 “Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention The Hague,” May 14, 1954, Link.
166 United Nations Security Council, S/RES/2347 (2017), Link.
167 ICOM is developing an Emergency Red List of Cultural Objects at Risk for Ukraine to combat illicit traffic in collaboration
with the Ukrainian Committee and the MKIP.
Social Sectors 97
Table 22. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total
Historic districts 321
Historic/heritage buildings (by period) 91.7
National monuments 1
Archeological areas 24.5
Buildings and sites imbued with
Monumental tombs 0.04
recognized cultural/social values
Places of worship (of any confession) 226.8
Other assets under religious management (of any confession) 6.8
Cultural spaces (houses/palaces of culture) 48.62
National and regional theaters 183
Museum collections 192
Movable cultural properties and
Archives and library collections of cultural significance 7.84
collections, Repository of culture
Art galleries 0.9
Tourism Hotels and similar accommodation facilities 45.68
Total 1,149.16
Source: Assessment team.
Table 23. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total
Cost of emergency intervention, protection, documentation
387.84
(cost of temporary works for protecting cultural assets and costs of demolition)
Debris treatment 535.17
Buildings and sites imbued with recognized cultural/social values and movable cultural
327.22
Debris treatment by
properties and collections, repository of culture demolition
Buildings and sites imbued with recognized cultural/social values and movable cultural
activity type
204.51
properties and collections, repository of culture debris removal
Demolition for tourism destroyed assets 2.96
Debris removal for tourism assets 0.39
Partially damaged tourism assets: 1.25 percent for debris removal, with the
0.08
understanding that there will be no cost associated with demolition
Revenues lost due to the closure or nonavailability of cultural property 438.24
Loss of revenue
Revenues lost due to the closure of hotels and similar accommodation facilities 2,239
Revenues lost by travel agencies/tour operators 497.27
Revenues lost due to the disruption in the production of goods in cultural and creative
13,000.39
industries
Media revenues lost 2,230.66
Total 19,328.56
Source: Assessment team.
98 Social Sectors
revenues lost because cultural property, hotels, and creative industries. Under the circumstances,
and tourism facilities are closed or unavailable; the MKIP is actively collaborating with various local,
revenues lost because production of goods in the national, and international entities—including the
creative industries has been disrupted; revenues World Bank, UNESCO, ICCROM (International Center
lost in media and advertisement; and revenues lost for the Study of Conservation and Restoration of
by tour agencies and tour operators. The livelihoods Cultural Property), ICOMOS (International Council
of creatives and professionals are immediately of Monuments and Sites), and ICOM (International
affected by the war, and these are also conservative Council of Museums)—to assess the damage,
estimations, given the informal nature of many address the emergency needs, and plan for the
creative and tourism activities and gig work in the recovery. In addition, professionals and volunteers
orange economy (e.g., performances by street artists are heavily engaged in tracking the damage and
and others, tours by self-employed guides, sale of rescuing cultural property on the ground,168 cloaking
souvenir/creative goods in open-air stalls and social monuments in fire-resistant coverings and
media, and renting out of guesthouses/Airbnbs). sandbags, and transporting movable artifacts.
Another major source of loss includes debris
management of cultural property and the cost of Against the daunting challenges, increased risks
temporary emergency intervention, protection, and and vulnerabilities in the sector remain. Given the
documentation to avoid further damage and mitigate often-fragile state of many cultural properties and
increased vulnerabilities. The nature of cultural the difficulty of “rebuilding” what has been disrupted,
property is such that maintaining, conserving, cultural property may face increased physical
preserving, restoring, and reconstructing it are often vulnerabilities from potential new hazards or
complex undertakings and require very specialized inadequate protection and reconstruction measures
equipment, inspections, structural assessments, that do not account for its intrinsic value. The risks
and high capacity. For cultural property of historical of further looting and vandalism remain high as well,
significance, these tasks often involve appreciating in addition to the loss of authenticity or falsification
and adhering to original material and traditional of its value
knowledge, guidelines, and techniques associated
with its original value and cultural and architectural
significance.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
including Build Back Better
The sector has also sustained damage to its
intangible cultural heritage and intrinsic/ Based on the rapid assessment, over US$5.2
nonmarket values of spiritual, symbolic, emotional, billion is needed for safeguarding the culture
and existential significance. While destruction in the sector in Ukraine (Table 24). The value of culture is
intangible dimension is not always readily visible associated with its authenticity, shared values, and
and can happen over time, the war has disrupted the social connections, which cannot be monetized in
Ukrainian way of life in every sense and destroyed market value. For this reason, recovering culture
the country’s cultural and social fabric. The immense does not directly translate into reconstructing
human loss and population displacements caused by the physical/tangible assets, and its value may be
the war have grave implications for the possible loss considered “irreplaceable” once lost. At the same,
of traditional knowledge, craftmanship, performing however, restoring and rebuilding the damaged
arts, social practices, rituals, ceremonies, and cultural properties and rehabilitating them is an
languages; they also have implications for brain initial step to reestablish the lost/broken cultural
drain in the creative industries. The humanitarian toll and social fabrics and restore the cultural property’s
and loss of culture are intertwined and inseparable utility value, the sense of belonging it inspires, and
because intangible cultural assets are intrinsically people’s affiliation with it. Thus, the reconstruction
tied to a sense of people and place. Furthermore, and recovery efforts need to aim at returning people
the war has disrupted various cultural initiatives and and cities harmed by the war to a more sustainable
programs and interrupted the overall conservation and resilient state of normalcy in a broader sense—
and transmission of cultural property and intangible that is, proper assessment of cultural property
heritage; it has also taken a toll on human capital, needs should not focus merely on the rebuilding
including the officials, specialized professional and of the physical form or the appropriate levels of
technical staff, and security involved in the cultural intervention and methods of treatment.
168 Jane Recker, “Inside the Efforts to Preserve Ukraine’s Cultural Heritage,” Smithsonian Magazine, March 30, 2022, Link.
Social Sectors 99
Table 24. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Immediate/ Medium- to
Category Total
short term long‑term
Implement first-aid measures and systems (shoring, propping,
310.3 181.0 491.3
and protection measures)
Carry out emergency management measures, inventories, and
387.8 181.0 568.8
immediate conservation to avoid loss and looting
Repair assets as feasible to restore function 456.4 1,447.9 1,913.3
Implement systems and reinforce capacities to ensure proper
practices of conservation and prevent demolition of sites/ 155.1 724.0 879.1
buildings of cultural significance
Support restoring the creative industry and safeguarding
232.7 1,086.0 1,318.7
intangible heritage
Total 1,551.4 3,619.9 5,171.2
Source: Assessment team.
Given the limited resources—from qualified labor to centers, and arts educational state institutions, to
building materials—priority should be given to the identify, plan, and implement the measures. Under
cultural property that can foster a sense of shared the authority and overall guidance of the NRC and
heritage, though priority should also be based on the MKIP, the responsibilities of each public and private
extent of damage and risk magnitude. Once the basic agency involved could be delineated to operate
emergency measures are taken, communities should independently in a coordinated and complementary
be involved in the process as much as possible in a manner.
meaningful way, as interventions to cultural property
of historical and architectural significance need to Building back better for the culture sector
respect and preserve the integrity, history, identity, encompasses various needs, from restoring,
and shared value and memory of the people. It is repairing, and reconstructing the damaged assets
critical to involve stakeholder groups affected both and infrastructure, to restoring service and access
directly and indirectly, including underrepresented to cultural property, resuming cultural activities
and marginalized groups such as women, youth, and social practices, and mitigating the new risks
minorities, poor, and people with special needs, and vulnerabilities induced by the war. Any recovery
and it is vital that the community groups assess efforts should lay the foundation for the sustainable,
the value of their own culture. The process also green, resilient, inclusive, and smart development
needs to capture the different layers of values of Ukraine. This would require strengthening
and interpretations of the cultural property and be institutional and professional capacities at all levels
carried out transparently, based on consensus and of planning and implementation.
public dialogues.
Restoring, repairing, and reconstructing physical
It is recommended that the reconstruction and cultural property
recovery mechanisms be developed under the
overall authority of the National Recovery Council The first phase is the response phase, focusing on
(NRC) and the MKIP in consultation with the the emergency and relief actions. In terms of physical
respective departments, state agencies, and other structures, there is an urgent need to implement
public, private, and local institutions; selected first aid measures and systems, such as shoring,
international experts in the fields of conservation, propping, winterization, and protection interventions
restoration, archaeology, structural engineering, for stabilization. Small-scale restoration and repair
architecture, and museums; and representatives efforts that are deemed desirable and feasible (and
from major donor agencies, when appropriate. also do not require high expertise, resources, and
The ministry will also work with various cultural lead time) will also be initiated, and remnants of
institutions, including museums, libraries, cultural any cultural property and collapsed structures will
100 Social Sectors
be photographed and inventoried. Furthermore, skills and intangible knowledge, especially those
immediate salvage and conservation of collections who are displaced elsewhere. For this process, the
and movable cultural assets will be carried out to development and use of digital infrastructure is
avoid further loss and looting. After the emergency highly recommended (e.g., e-library, digitization of
response measures have been implemented, records through e-archive, media, online museums,
further assessment and research are required to etc.). The development of the National Digital Platform
support large-scale restoration and reconstruction of the Cultural Heritage of Ukraine is underway, and
efforts. Detailed information on each property— it is expected that UNESCO will provide extensive
such as the location, historical data, architectural support in the arena.170
drawings (floor plan, landscape drawing, installation
drawings, interior and exterior details, elevations, Documenting creative practices and human capital
etc.), elements of cultural/historical significance, is vital, as they are instrumental in maintaining and
and the records of past restoration efforts—would rebuilding the communal and national identities and
contribute to more informed interventions. promoting cultural diversity, as well as restoring
social cohesion after the deliberate attack on
Due to the complexities associated with Ukraine’s culture. Recognizing the importance of
“reconstructing” cultural property of historical tangible and intangible heritage, MKIP is already
significance, the process will require specialized leading efforts to bring together various relevant
labor, expertise, time, and considerable cost. initiatives and funds by launching the United Platform
Longer-term activities should be adjusted based on of Culture and Media.171 The efforts will also entail
the priorities identified by the stakeholders and the promoting Ukraine’s unique history, culture, and
secured funding. In the process, the structures that language.
are not of historical and architectural significance
may be upgraded and modernized, while those that Capacity building for restoration and reconstruction
are located in the historic core could be upgraded of physical assets, the transmission of intangible
in harmony with the historic landscape, following heritage, and documentation and monitoring
the special ordinances, acts, or decrees concerning
historical areas,169 as well as the respective Such recovery efforts require highly specialized
management plans and buffer zones. This is also expertise and skills. Capacity-building programs
a good opportunity to update or revise the existing (workshop and technical training) are necessary
regulations considering the spatial, social, and to implement and accelerate the efforts; these
economic changes to ensure a more resilient, will involve not only the respective staff but also
sustainable, inclusive, and green development path young, new professionals in the heritage field and
(e.g., upgrading infrastructure in line with energy local communities—who can equip them with
efficiency and universal accessibility mechanisms knowledge and skills and also find employment.
and protection of biodiversity and ecosystems). Various capacity-building programs are needed,
including restoring, repairing, and reconstructing
Restoring the creative industry and safeguarding cultural heritage assets, conducting engineering
intangible heritage and structural analysis for construction, providing
skills training on craftsmanship, and surveying,
For the creative industry, the processes for the documenting, and monitoring cultural property and
production, distribution, and sale of creative and intangible heritage.
cultural goods will need to be restored. As a first
step, the affected creatives and industries need to
be mapped along with the impacts—this includes
Limitations and Recommendations
not only the establishments needed for creative
The rapid assessment was conducted based on the
activities (e.g., structures, equipment, raw materials,
data and information shared by the MKIP, the KSE,
etc.) but also the human capital: creatives, including
and the State Statistics Service, supplemented by
artisans and master craftspeople, as well as their
169 For example, Article 32 of the Law on the Protection of Cultural Heritage addresses “the approval of the Procedure for
determining the boundaries and regimes of the use of historical areas of settlements, restrictions on economic activity
on the territory of historical areas of settlement s.” Link.
170 MKIP, “UNESCO Will Support the Digitalization of Culture in Ukraine,” July 12, 2022, Link.
171 The platform is available at Link.
Social Sectors 101
the research undertaken by UNESCO,172 the World number and type of visitors, revenue from the
Monument Fund, and the Conflict Observatory, creative industry); list of creatives; technical
which is a collaborative effort of the Smithsonian experts/organizations; respective ordinances,
Cultural Rescue Initiative and the Cultural Heritage acts, decrees, and regulations
Monitoring Lab.173 The assessment faced several » Postwar: Damage to the structure, physical
challenges, including a lack of data. Given the status (partially damaged, destroyed—e.g.,
dangerous situation with the war still ongoing, it was over 40 percent structural damage), operating
difficult to accurately assess and validate the data status, information on the economic value
on the ground, including the degree of damage and associated with the loss of the cultural
the operating status of different cultural facilities. property’s function, disruptions in cultural and
The lack of baseline data also posed challenges creative practices
in understanding the prewar conditions, as well
as the ownership and the replacement cost of • Develop management/specialized plans,
different cultural properties. Furthermore, the including emergency responses, where
assessment may not have captured the damage and appropriate.
loss sustained by smaller-scale cultural property
or by cultural practices not well known outside • Promote meaningful participation of all relevant
the communities; the same is true for the many stakeholders.
precarious, temporary, informal, part-time, self- » Include underrepresented and marginalized
employed creative activities. groups such as women, youth, minorities, poor,
and people with special needs in the planning,
Based on the assessment, the following steps are decision-making, and implementation process
suggested for further assessment and recovery: as appropriate
• Prioritize cultural property that can foster a • Implement capacity-building programs for staff
sense of shared heritage and based on the extent and also local institutions and communities.
of damage and risk magnitude. » Restoration and reconstruction of physical
assets
• Inventory and map cultural property and » Transmission of intangible heritage
intangible heritage. » Documentation and monitoring
» Baseline: Property type, location, year built, size,
materials, historical information, conditions, • Build back better.
ownership; cultural/historical/architectural/ » A more resilient, sustainable, inclusive, greener,
social significance and attributes; architectural and smarter development path
drawings (floor plan, landscape drawing, » Upgrading infrastructure in line with energy
installation drawings, interior and exterior efficiency
details, elevations, etc.); management plan, » Use of smart technology (enhanced digital
land use plan, building codes, records of past infrastructure)
restorations/repairs/reconstruction; economic » Universal accessibility mechanisms
value (e.g., revenue from the entrance fee, etc., » Biodiversity and ecosystems protection
172 UNESCO, “War in Ukraine,” Link.
173 The Conflict Observatory website is at Link.
102
PRODUCTIVE
SECTORS
Kharkiv, Photo by Ipsos for the World Bank
Productive Sectors 103
AGRICULTURE
174
Summary was already damaged after the first three months
of the war. The 2022 grain and oilseed harvests are
projected to decline by 40 percent on a year-on-
As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in total
year basis. Along with the upward pressure on input
damage of US$2.2 billion for the agriculture sector,
prices, especially fertilizers and diesel, the lower
while the aggregate losses total US$28.3 billion.
agricultural production will significantly reduce farm
The damage include partial or full destruction
incomes. Grain export dropped due to the blockade
of machinery and equipment, storage facilities,
of the Black Sea, which supported 90 percent of the
livestock, and perennial crops, as well as stolen
prewar agricultural export. In March 2022, the export
inputs and outputs and agricultural land that needs
of grain was only 0.3 million tons, compared with
recultivation.175 The losses include production
5.4 million tons in January. Although the alternative
loss, including unharvested winter crops, higher
routes helped increase the grain export to 1.2 million
farm production costs, and lower farm gate prices
tons in April and 2.7 million tons in June 2022, this
due to the export logistic disruptions, which are
was still much below the 5–6 million tons exported
significant for Ukraine’s export-oriented agriculture.
monthly prewar through Black Sea ports. As a
The total reconstruction and recovery needs from
result, the domestic farm gate prices for wheat and
the public sector are estimated at US$18.7 billion.
corn declined by 30–35 percent between January
The most pressing investments include rebuilding
and June 2022, while globally they grew by 42–60
the damaged assets, helping agriculture bounce
percent. The upcoming harvest will put pressure on
back by addressing liquidity and other constraints,
the grain storage infrastructure; the storage deficit
and restoring the agricultural public institutions to
is estimated at 10–15 million tons. The low volumes
effectively support recovery and reconstruction.
of agrifood exports could exacerbate global food
insecurity, triggering the risk that the current crises
Background of food access will become a crisis of food availability
over the next several years.
Prior to the war, Ukraine’s agriculture produced 10
percent of gross domestic product (GDP), employed
14 percent of the labor force, and generated 24
Damage and Loss Assessment
percent of total exports. Together with input supply
Crop and livestock production has suffered
and food processing, the agrifood system generated
significant damage and losses due to the war. The
20 percent of the GDP and total employment. In 2021,
war damage is calculated as the monetary value
the grain and oilseed production reached a historical
of physical assets that were destroyed, stolen, or
109 million tons, and export of these products was
partially damaged (but still suitable for repair and
projected to reach a record 65 million tons. That
recovery) due to the invasion. The assessment is
year, Ukraine was projected to provide 5 percent of
indirect and based on the baseline of assets/fixed
the global export of wheat, 13 percent of the global
capital in the form of machinery and equipment,
export of corn, and 40 percent of the global export
storage elevators, perennials, livestock, and land;
of seed oil.
it also includes the differentiation of territories by
supposed severity of the damage. In the regions
The war came to Ukraine just before the start of the
with little military activity and no loss of government
spring planting campaign, hitting it very hard. The
control, the damage was assumed to be zero. In
total planting area declined by 20 percent compared
the regions of Kyivska, Sumska, Chernihivska, and
to 2021, and 15 percent of agricultural capital stock
174 The agriculture sector includes crops and livestock production. It excludes irrigation and forestry, which are included
in other parts of the Rapid Damage and Needs Assessment (RDNA), and it does not provide estimates for the fishery
subsector due to the lack of data. Given the small size of fishery in the total agriculture sector, however, this does not
significantly affect the overall sector estimates.
175 The losses from mines on agricultural land and the need for agricultural land’s demining, which is likely to be large, are
not included in the agriculture sector estimates. They are presented separately in the RDNA.
104 Productive Sectors
Table 25. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total value (US$ million) Share of total (%)
Farmland requiring recultivation 40 1.8
Machinery and equipment 926 41.4
Storage facilities 272 12.2
Livestock 136 8.0
Perennial crops 89 4.0
Stolen inputs and outputs 732 32.7
Total 2,239 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
Table 26. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total value (US$ million) Share of total (%)
Logistical disruption and lower export prices 15,428 54.6
Lower production of annual crops 11,064 39.1
Lower production of perennial crops 222 0.8
Lower livestock production 706 2.5
Higher farm production costs 859 3.0
Total 28,280 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
Mykolaivska, where government control has been accounting for 54 percent of the total losses,
restored some damage occurred. In the regions that resulted from the decrease in farm gate prices of
were temporarily not under government control or export-oriented commodities such as wheat, barley,
suffered heavy fighting during the sowing season, corn, and sunflower seeds (Table 26). Next largest
e.g., the regions of Kharkivska and Zaporizka, the are the losses from lower production of annual
damage were much larger, increasing with each and perennial crops (40 percent), lower livestock
day of fighting. Lastly, in Khersonska, Donetska, and production (3 percent), and higher farm production
Luhanska regions, the damage was the largest. costs (3 percent).
The damage to machinery and equipment were The total cost of the war for Ukrainian agriculture
the largest source of total damage (41 percent), is estimated to reach US$30.5 billion, with losses
followed by stolen inputs and outputs (33 percent), accounting for 93 percent of the total (Table 27).
damaged storage facilities (12 percent) and livestock Khersonska oblast incurred more than 10 percent of
(8 percent), and farmland requiring recultivation (2 the total cost. Total costs of between 5 percent and
percent) (Table 25). 10 percent were incurred in Chernihivska, Kyivska,
Kharkivska, Donetska, Luhanska, Zaporizka, and
The war losses include the foregone farm income Vinnytska oblasts. Kirovohradska, Mykolaivska,
due to the lower production volume, the lower Dnipropetrovska, Khmelnytska, Odeska, Poltavska,
farm gate prices, and the higher additional farm Sumska, and Cherkaska oblasts incurred between 3
production costs (e.g., fertilizers and fuel). The percent and 5 percent of the total costs.
losses add up to US$28.3 billion. The largest loss,
Productive Sectors 105
Table 27. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage Losses Total Costs Share of total (%)
Cherkaska 0 1,168 1,168 3.8
Chernihivska 62 1,510 1,572 5.2
Chernivetska 0 144 144 0.5
Dnipropetrovska 0 1,299 1,299 4.3
Donetska 618 2,160 2,778 9.1
Ivano-Frankivska 0 214 214 0.7
Kharkivska 216 2,544 2,760 9.0
Khersonska 401 2,744 3,145 10.3
Khmelnytska 0 1,008 1,008 3.3
Kirovohradska 0 1,345 1,345 4.4
Kyivska 87 1,532 1,619 5.3
Luhanska 581 1,491 2,072 6.8
Lvivska 0 416 416 1.4
Mykolaivska 44 1,357 1,401 4.6
Odeska 0 1,123 1,123 3.7
Poltavska 0 1,378 1,378 4.5
Rivnenska 0 363 363 1.2
Sumska 62 1,241 1,303 4.3
Ternopilska 0 668 668 2.2
Vinnytska 0 1,560 1,560 5.1
Volynska 0 314 314 1.0
Zakarpatska 0 65 65 0.2
Zaporizka 168 1,948 2,116 6.9
Zhytomyrska 0 691 691 2.3
Total 2,239 28,280 30,519 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, The principal recovery and reconstruction focus for
including Build Back Better
the first year includes these measures:
• Reconstruction of/building back better the
For the agricultural sector to recover, drive the physical assets damaged by the war
overall economic recovery, and serve as a decent
income source for farmers, the following measures • Provision of direct support to farmers through
need to be taken in different time frames. The a combination of grants and soft-term credit
estimated agriculture sector needs amount to lines to relaunch production activities, while
US$18.7 billion over 10 years (Table 28). also injecting liquidity into the banking system to
recover past nonperforming loans (a result of the
war) and stimulate new agricultural lending
106 Productive Sectors
Table 28. Recovery and reconstruction needs (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Component Immediate/Short-term Medium- to Long-term Total
Physical facilities and
Reconstruction
422.2 227.3 649.5
productive assets
Needs
Farm equipment 602.0 324.2 926.1
Agricultural lands 25.8 13.9 39.6
Outputs & Inputs 476.0 256.3 732.3
Support for the production
Restoration Needs
7,464.2 4,966.6 12,430.8
Service Delivery
recovery
Liquidity support to banks
592.5 319.1 911.6
for agricultural financing
Supporting Agricultural
Public Institutions for 456.3 2,585.8 3,042.2
Service Delivery
Total 10,039.0 8,693.1 18,732.1
Source: Assessment team.
• Clearing of mines and pollution of agricultural Limitations and Recommendations
lands (estimated separately and not included in
Table 28). • Baseline data was provided by the State Statistics
Committee of Ukraine. The data on damage are
The needs estimated for the first year of the postwar indirect, indicative of the estimated effects of
period are US$10.04 billion, or about 54 percent of occupation and/or military activities by region.
the total needs (Table 28). The priority medium-term Losses are estimated using the data on production
and longer-run needs (up to and beyond five years) losses, including for annual and perennial crops
amount to US$8.7 billion or 46 percent of the total and livestock, and output and input prices from
needs, with the emphasis on the following areas: the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, the
Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food, and private
• Completing the reconstruction of the incurred agribusiness data providers such as APK-Inform.
war damage.
• Future assessments would benefit from more
• Scaling up direct support to farmers and accurate data on damage, including those
banks (through liquidity support) during collected by remote sensing; an updated estimate
several production seasons to help agricultural of losses in view of the upcoming 2022 harvest,
production rebound. which puts downward pressure on output prices
and increases the likelihood of additional food
• Scaling up investment in agricultural public stock losses; and the updated needs estimate in
institutions for delivery of agricultural services line with the latest Government plan on recovery
(sanitary and phytosanitary measures, food and reconstruction
safety, land monitoring and registration, soil
testing for precision agriculture, agricultural • Agriculture sector includes also irrigation,
research and extension services, training fisheries, and demining of agricultural land
and retraining of farmers and staff of other which are currently presented in other parts of
agribusinesses, etc.), so institutions can better the RDNA.
support the recovery of the agricultural sector.
This would also require support for adaptation to
climate change.
Productive Sectors 107
IRRIGATION AND
WATER RESOURCES
Summary impact in input supply, processing, and marketing.
Irrigation covers 1 percent of all agricultural land
but is especially important for certain crops (e.g., 15
As of June 1, 2022, damage in the irrigation,
percent of potatoes, almost all tomatoes and rice)
drainage, and water resource management (WRM)
and regions (e.g., 14 percent of Khersonska oblast),
sector for several oblasts is estimated at US$154.4
where it contributes to the rural economy. Drainage
million, including damage to dams, irrigation canals,
covers around 10 percent of agricultural land, mainly
embankments, buildings, and agency premises.
in the north and northwest, and makes a significant
This is a partial number representing damages
contribution to Ukraine’s total production, including
to areas control of the Ukrainian authorities has
the national output of cereals and beef, by ensuring
been restored, territories that were always under
usable pastures and forage land.
government control but had damages due to bomb
attacks, and areas that were flooded to protect
Prior to the war, Ukraine’s delivery of I&D (irrigation
against troop movements. The initial aggregate
and drainage) services faced persistent challenges, as
losses accounted for thus far (data are still not
the irrigation sector had collapsed after independence
complete) are US$75.8 million. The losses include
and required deep structural change to overcome the
operational losses based on lost profit as reported
infrastructure barriers. Ukraine’s I&D system was
by the different operational entities in the Ukrainian
developed for state-run farms, but with the economic
water system and collected by the State Agency of
and political transition after the collapse of the Soviet
Water Resources (SAWR). The total reconstruction
Union, these large structures were broken up, creating
and recovery needs in the public sector are
an ownership and funding vacuum, and leading to
estimated at US$7.5 billion for building back better
widespread deterioration. These changes also had a
irrigation, drainage, and flood protection assets.
dramatic negative impact on irrigated area in Ukraine.
The most pressing investments involve restoration
Out of the present 2.2 million ha of land equipped for
of destroyed hydraulic assets and water storage
irrigation, only around 738,000 ha (33 percent) can be
structures in areas that were recently brought back
irrigated without additional capital investment, and this
under government control and areas that did not
area has shrunk even further with impacts related to
face hostilities; these investments will help the WRM
the war. Prewar estimates (using remote sensing data)
sector rebound by addressing the major gap—the
indicate that only 325,000 ha was irrigated in 2021, as
lack of water supply and lack of irrigation services
shown in Figure 19.176 Consequently, out of the total
to farmers. They will also protect communities
cultivable area that can be irrigated in Ukraine, only 25
against flood-related risks and restore the public
percent is actually irrigated today, posing significant
institutions involved in irrigation and WRM so they
water stress risks to crop yields leading to potential
can effectively support recovery and reconstruction.
negative impacts on the rural livelihoods, climate
resilience, food security, and economic development
Background potential of the country.
Ukraine has 41 million hectares (ha) of agricultural The low level of irrigation system utilization is the
land, of which 33 million is under cultivation. result of poorly maintained systems that are largely
Agriculture directly generates 10 percent of gross not operational, poor drainage conditions, and
domestic product, 20 percent of exports, and 5 increasing energy costs—a function of the decline in
percent of employment, with significant additional state funding.177 As a result, productivity in the sector
176 Forthcoming report by the World Bank Water Global Practice in ECA and Hydrosolutions 2022.
177 World Bank, “Ukraine Irrigation Sector Modernization,” prepared by Olga Zhovtonog, Onno Schaap, and Sam H. Johnson,
World Bank Mission, June 2015.
108 Productive Sectors
Figure 19. Map of total irrigated area by conflict zone prioritization in Ukraine (including
drainage area Volynska)
Source: World Bank/Hydrosolutions 2022.see Link.
is much lower than its potential; there is a need to Environmental Protection and Natural Resources
move the sector toward high-value export crops, but and its activities are coordinated by the Cabinet of
these require irrigation services that are currently Ministers. Reform of the I&D sector will inevitably
not available. The Government of Ukraine, with require substantial reform of SAWR, and this is
support from the World Bank, prepared a strategy currently underway. According to recent dialogue,
for the I&D sector in 2017178 that emphasized the the government will soon establish a new agency for
need for clear roles, clear budget responsibilities, irrigation and fisheries within the Ministry of Agrarian
and the financial sustainability of irrigation systems. Policy and Food, which will soon take over from
It is in the process of implementing the strategy, even SAWR responsibility for main systems construction
during the war. It has recently passed a law on Water and for management, operation, and maintenance.
User Organizations (WUOs), and ongoing reforms to
national institutions are intended to establish a new Ukraine must manage its national water in the
structure for designing, managing, constructing, interests of all users and the environment and in
and maintaining critical irrigation, drainage, and line with the European Union (EU) Water Framework
WRM assets. Directive, which introduces the key concepts of
integrated water resource management and river
The State Agency for Water Resources is responsible basin management.179 Within the frame of the EU
for managing primary irrigation systems. It Directive, Ukraine is developing its river basin
also manages the main drainage systems and management plans, which are important steps
flood defenses. SAWR reports to the Ministry of toward enhancing its WRM potential.
178 World Bank, “Irrigation and Drainage Strategy of Ukraine: Final Draft Proposal,” 2017.
179 World Bank, “Irrigation and Drainage Strategy of Ukraine: Final Draft Proposal,” 2017.
Productive Sectors 109
Table 29. Prioritization categories and corresponding oblasts
Category of prioritization Priority oblasts
1. Territories with highest priority for repair
Kyivska, Chernihivska, Kharkivska (southwestern part), Sumska
works
Khersonska (northern part), Zaporizka (north and eastern
2. Territories with ongoing hostilities parts), Kharkivska (southeastern part), Luhanska, Mykolaivska,
Donetska
3. Territories not under government control Khersonska, Zaporizka, Dnipropetrovska
4. Territories where the Russian army was
not present but where there is damage due to
Kyivska, Zhytomyrska, Rivnenska, Volynska
bomb attacks, construction of fortifications,
and flooding to protect against attack
Vinnytska, Zhytomyrska, Zakarpatska, Ivano-Frankivska,
0. Territories relatively unharmed Kirovohradska, Lvivska, Odeska, Poltavska, Ternopilska,
Khmelnytska, Chernihivska, Mykolaivska
Source: Assessment team, with support of SAWR and IWPLR.
Table 30. Damage assessment methodology for Category 2 and 3 regions
Irrigated area is estimated based on satellite images from 2021, using the geographical
Irrigated area coordinates provided by SAWR. Because an important part of the original command area is no
longer functional, this is considered the most reliable approximation of irrigated areas.
Damage is taken as a coefficient of the irrigated area, following the method used by the
Kyiv School of Economics. This method entails assuming that the volume of damages is
a linear function of the length of period the region is either an active war zone (Category
2) or is occupied (Category 3). For active war zones, it is assumed that the volume of
damages increases linearly with time at a rate of 0.274 percent a day. If the region is not
under government control, the pace of increase in the volume of damages is half of this
coefficient (0.137 percent). Both Donetska and Luhanska regions are active war zones,
meaning that the volume of damages in these regions increase by 0.274 percent linearly
with time. For the entire period (up to June 1, 2022) this entails a total share of damage
Damage
of 27 percent. In Kharkivska, only about half of the oblast is an active war zone. Thus the
calculation
pace of growing destruction is halved as well. Currently, the entire Khersonska oblast is not
using KSE
under government control, as is most of Zaporizka (where most of the irrigation and storage
methodology
infrastructure is located). The coefficient of estimated damage for these oblasts grows with
time, albeit at a halved rate, as regions temporarily not under government control are likely
to have less damage than active war zones. Therefore, to take into account that regions
not under government control are likely to have less damage than active war zones where
fighting is happening, the coefficient for these regions is half of the damage coefficient used
for war zones (0.274) and is estimated to be 0.137 percent a day (leading to a total share
of damage of 13 percent up to June 1, 2022 which comes from multiplying the coefficient
with the number of days in conflict (0.137*97)). Mykolaivska oblast, for which the damage
coefficient is set to 5 percent, is an exception.
Degree of The degree of damage is adjusted based on the data from remote assessment prepared for
damage the RDNA related to the number of incidents.
According to the KSE formula, the costs for restoration of complete destruction and partial
damage is respectively US$3,000/ha and US$600/ha. This tallies with the rehabilitation costs
for tertiary systems (only) calculated as part of the Irrigation and Drainage Policy (2017), set
Cost of damage at US$2,000–2,200/ha. For this assessment, the assumption was made that one-third of all
damage is totally damaged and two-thirds is partially damaged. This assumption leads to
the combined number of US$1,400/ha.a The costs obtained by the oblast inventory and KSE
method were added up for Category 2 and 3 areas.
Source: Assessment team based on information from KSE.
a. 1/3*$3,000 + 2/3*$600 = $1,400.
110 Productive Sectors
The I&D infrastructure in Ukraine has been severely Figure 20. Damage by asset type as
affected by the war. Hostilities have targeted share of total damage
storage reservoirs, I&D systems, pump stations,
flood embankments, and key water resource agency
buildings and equipment. There are examples of
targeted destruction of dams, whereas other damage
has occurred due to intense fighting around the 12% Flood protection
19%
water systems, vandalization of structures during & water storage
occupation, construction of barricades with material Irrigation
from the water systems, defensive inundations, and
the placement of mines around vital infrastructure. 18% Drainage
Buildings and
Damage and Loss Assessment
51%
equipment
In consultation with the Ministry of Agrarian Policy
and Food, the Ministry of Environmental Protection
and Natural Resources, and the SAWR, the RDNA
prioritizes oblasts in Ukraine according to four Source: Assessment team.
conflict zone categories (as described in Table 29).
Oblasts are categorized depending on the degree of
Table 31. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Baseline Completely Partially Estimated damage
Asset type
number destroyed damaged (US$ million)
Flood protection & water storage 4.72
Dams 232 2 18 4.63
Embankments 775 0 13 0.90
Irrigation 19.30
Main canals (km) 10,238 0 43 5.86
Secondary canals (and water
164,218 0 0
transportation pipes) (km)
Operational pump stations 1,312 6 42 10.30
Other hydraulic constructions 18,033 6 22 3.13
Drainage network (km) 1,177 0 0
Drainage 6.76
Main collectors (km) 7,639 0 0
Lower collectors (km) 91,566 0 0
Operational Pumping Stations (PSs) 170 0 5 0.38
Other hydraulic constructions 17,489 12 5 6.39
Buildings and equipment 7.04
Administrative buildings and garages 49 5 22 2.47
Repair shops and production sites 62 1 8 0.76
Other buildings, including bridges 0 3 8 0.69
Cars and other machinery 1,606 9 57 3.13
Total 314.566 44 243 37.82
Source: Assessment team & SAWR, Government of Ukraine.
Productive Sectors 111
Table 32. Damage by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category of Damage using oblast Damage using Total infrastructure damage
Oblast
prioritization inventory method KSE method using hybrid method
Cherkaska 0 0 0 0
Chernihivska 0 1.47 0 1.47
Chernivetska 0 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 3 0.05 0 0.05
Donetska 2 5.50 45.51 51.00
Ivano-Frankivska 0 0 0 0
Kharkivska 1, 2 6.96 0.06 7.02
Khersonska 2, 3 0.07 42.93 43.00
Khmelnytska 0 0 0 0
Kirovohradska 0 0 0 0
Kyivska 1, 4 11.07 0 11.07
Luhanska 2 4.40 20.13 24.53
Lvivska 0 0 0 0
Mykolaivska 2 6.61 1.48 8.09
Odeska 0 0.02 0 0.02
Poltavska 0 0 0 0
Rivnenska 4 0.37 0 0.37
Sumska 1 0.37 0 0.37
Ternopilska 0 0 0 0
Vinnytska 0 0 0 0
Volynska 4 0.55 0 0.55
Zakarpatska 0 0 0 0
Zaporizka 3 0.01 6.42 6.44
Zhytomyrska 4 0.37 0 0.37
Total 37.82 116.52 154.35
Source: Assessment team and SAWR, Government of Ukraine.
exposure to the war. A fifth category (labeled “0”) RDNA has adopted a hybrid method that combines
concerns those oblasts that are so far not affected initial estimates with the approach of the KSE (see
by the war. For the areas in Category 2 (ongoing Table 30 for more detail).180 The records of SAWR
hostilities) and Category 3 (not under government however only cover the public infrastructure, not of
control), the inventory reporting is for obvious reasons the private on-farm infrastructure which however
incomplete; there is no (reliable) communication represents an important part of the asset base. As
with the operating agencies. For these areas, the there are no records of this, for the four oblasts in
180 The calculation on damage to infrastructure comes partly from an inventory of damage to all irrigation, drainage, and
flood protection assets, carried out by SAWR for all regions on a constant basis. The period covered is from the start
of the war (February 24, 2022) up to June 1, 2022. The calculation also draws on the KSE’s damage methodology. The
assumption made is that the longer an irrigated area is an active war zone, the more damage it experiences.
112 Productive Sectors
Table 33. Losses by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Loss estimate Share of
Category
(US$ million) total (%)
Loss of profit: Management Department of Dnieper Reservoirs 0.01 0.0
Loss of profit: Melitopol Technical School 0.06 0.1
Loss of profit: Regional Offices of Water Resources 2.16 2.8
Loss of profit: Reservoirs 2.63 3.5
Loss of profit: Management Departments 7.12 9.4
Loss of profit: Management Department of Main Kakhovsky Canal 17.01 22.4
Loss of profit: Basin Water Resources Departments 46.84 61.8
Total 75.83 100%
Source: Assessment team.
Table 34. Losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Category of prioritization Loss estimate (US$ million) Share of total (%)
Cherkaska n.a. n.a. 0
Chernihivska 0, 1 0.12 0
Chernivetska 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 3 1.74 2
Donetska 2 0.47 1
Ivano-Frankivska 0 n.a. 0
Kharkivska 1, 2 0.54 1
Khersonska 2, 3 54.10 71
Khmelnytska 0 0.01 0
Kirovohradska n.a. n.a. 0
Kyivska 1, 4 2.87 4
Luhanska 2 0.15 0
Lvivska 0 n.a. 0
Mykolaivska 2 5.79 8
Odeska 0 n.a. 0
Poltavska 0 n.a. 0
Rivnenska 4 0.12 0
Sumska 1 0.30 0
Ternopilska 0 n.a. 0
Vinnytska n.a. n.a. 0
Volynska 4 0.10 0
Zakarpatska 0 0.16 0
Zaporizka 3 9.58 13
Zhytomyrska 4 0.04 0
Total 75.83 100%
Source: Assessment team.
Note: n.a. = not applicable.
Productive Sectors 113
Category 1 (territories with high priority for repairs) SAWR oblast inventory method and show total
field investigations are planned in July 2022, as part damage of US$37.8 million. Of this amount, US$4.7
of an agricultural survey through remote/survey million is attributed to flood protection and water
means. Another cost item that is not assessed are storage, US$19.3 million to irrigation structures,
the smaller privately developed systems. Figure 19 US$6.76 million to drainage, and US$7.04 million to
shows a breakdown of the categories by oblast in buildings and equipment (Table 31, see Figure 20).
Ukraine. The map also illustrates that as of 2021, However, as this method largely underreports the
all of the irrigated command areas of Ukraine are damage inflicted to structures in the Category 2 and
currently located in areas that are in active conflict 3 oblasts, final damage figures for these oblasts are
zones. calculated by the hybrid method described in Table
30. The RDNA assumes that the same proportion is
Table 30 provides a summary of the methodology an indication of the distribution over asset categories.
used by the KSE, which is used for Category 2 and This still omits the damage to the tertiary systems
3 regions as part of the RDNA assessment in the that are usually operated by enterprises or individual
context of data limitations. farmers and hence do not appear in the records
of the SAWR. With this caveat, Table 31 shows the
The results of the damage assessment according damage to each main asset type as a share of total
to asset type were determined according to the damage.
Table 35. Recovery and reconstruction needs Phase 1 and 2 by category (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022
Component Phase 1 Phase 2 Total
(Immediate/short term) (Medium- to long-term)
Public reconstruction needs
Reconstruction, overhaul,
Modernization modernization, and new construction
of irrigation of irrigation and drainage systems:
& drainage Securing irrigation on 756,400 ha and
infrastructure additional new irrigation on 353,900 ha
& associated to address damage and profit losses
pumping stations in Category 0 and Category 1 oblasts
(when applicable)
1,254.94 1,254.94
Construction of water supply networks
in settlements of Lvivska oblast,
group water pipes on the territory
Centralized water
of Odeska and Khersonska regions;
supply and group
reconstruction of group water pipes
water pipes
due to damage in the territory of
Mykolaivska oblast (Category 0, 2)
oblasts)
91.63 91.63
Reconstruction of hydraulic protection
Hydraulic structure around Dnipro reservoirs,
structures protecting 197,000 ha of land,
and protective including 131 settlements (in 10 cities
assets of Dnipro in 5 regions), housing 600,000 people
reservoirs in Category 0 and Category 3 oblasts
(where applicable)
76.97 76.97
Expansion of irrigation and storage
structures for restoration of services
Irrigation system
and compensation measures in case
expansion
of continued occupation of the main
irrigation systems in Category 2 and 3
1,254.73 1,254.73
114 Productive Sectors
Component Phase 1 Phase 2 Total
(Immediate/short term) (Medium- to long-term)
Service delivery restoration needs
Ecological restoration of drainage
and water management systems,
Modernization Restoration of damaged hydraulic considering nature-oriented solutions
of water facilities and water management and economic validity of measures
management systems and buildings considering to address damages and profit
infrastructure martial law losses, mostly in Category 1 oblasts
(territories where government control
is restored)
19,06 1,099.61 1,118,67
Relocation of the Eastern Region
Water Monitoring Laboratory,
arrangement of laboratory premises
Restoration of Restoration of water monitoring
and communications, purchase of
damaged water laboratory in Sloviansk, Donetska
auxiliary equipment.
monitoring system oblast
Accreditation of the Eastern Region
Water Monitoring Laboratory,
purchase of equipment
0.86 1.10 1.96
Protection and
Kozarovytsia protective dam and
restoration of
operational section, overhaul of Irpin
floodplains of Irpin
pumping station covering Kyivska
River affected by
oblast in Category 1 and 4
inundation
3,742.33 3,742.33
Total 19.92 7,521,31 7,541,24
Source: Assessment team.
Table 32 shows the damage for each oblast. The Table 34 displays losses by oblast. Most of the losses
total infrastructural damage is calculated according are attributed to the Khersonska oblast, where they
to the hybrid method, which takes the damage as a total US$54.1 million.
coefficient of the irrigated area.
The sector has suffered substantial operational
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
losses among the different state entities. A major including Build Back Better
factor is that in many areas, payment for water
services by water users (which equals 60 percent of Table 35 provides an overview of the needs for
all operational costs) is hampered. These operational each category for three phases. A short description
losses also reflect the damage to government and of the relation of these programs to the war
management of the water systems, as the financial recovery is given: some investments are needed
basis is having a serious setback. The total losses to repair damaged systems, where possible under
were found to be US$75.8 million. The largest share a build back better approach. Other programs
of losses was found in the Basin Water Resources are compensatory—that is, designed to maintain
Departments (61.8 percent). Losses do not yet and improve production levels through improved
account for the cost of making emergency repair drainage and expanded irrigation in the parts of
works to damaged assets, as damage data are still the country that are under government control.
being collected by the SAWR. Thus, losses figures The total needs for Phase 1 immediate/short-term
presented are preliminary and will rise as the data needs were found to be US$19.92 million. The needs
on repair costs are received. See Table 33 for an for Phase 2 medium/long-term needs were found
overview of the losses by category. to be US$7.5 billion. This includes a nationwide
component for irrigation and water storage
infrastructure expansion to allow for flexibility in
measures, given the possibility of continued loss of
Productive Sectors 115
Table 36. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Cherkaska 0 12.83 12.82
Chernihivska 1.83 183.27 185.10
Chernivetska 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 0 326.56 326.56
Donetska 1.34 1.10 2.44
Ivano-Frankivska 0 0 0
Kharkivska 1.34 0 1.34
Khersonska 1.34 349.47 350.82
Khmelnytska 0 0 0
Kirovohradska 0 0 0
Kyiv (city) 0 0 0
Kyivska 1.83 3,938.42 3,940.25
Luhanska 1.34 0 1.34
Lvivska 0 22.91 22.91
Mykolaivska 1.34 336.64 337.99
Odeska 0 336.64 336.64
Poltavska 0 12.83 12.82
Rivnenska 1.83 183.27 185.10
Sumska 1.83 183.27 185.10
Ternopilska 0 0 0
Vinnytska 0 0 0
Volynska 1.83 183.27 185.10
Zakarpatska 0 0 0
Zaporizka 1.34 12.83 14.17
Zhytomyrska 1.83 183.27 185.10
Nationwide (no specific region) 0.86 1,254.73 1.255.59
Total 19.92 7,521.31 7,541.24
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The restoration needs for some of the regions are assumed under the nationwide costs to allow for some flexibility.
government control of the main irrigation systems modernization, or a combination of both. However,
of Ukraine, which supply 90 percent of the entire today there is a pressing need to address some
irrigated area (located in Khersonska and Zaporizka, urgent priorities first, as the destruction, damage,
or mostly Category 2 and 3 oblasts). Table 36 shows and even larger risk of loss of access to the main
the breakdown of needs per oblast. Among the I&D infrastructure for the Ukrainian government
overall needs for recovery, an initial preliminary has severe social and economic impact, besides
prioritization was done by SAWR and Institute of jeopardizing food production across thousands of
Water Problems and Land Reclamation (IWPLR), and farms in Ukraine.
this is to be further updated and refined.
There is also a clear need for improved operations,
Even before the war started, the I&D sector, both in on-farm water application methods (for
flood protection sector, and WRM sector were in instance, transition to low-pressure systems) and
transition. Some irrigation systems were no longer in retailoring of energy operations for the pumping
viable, and irrigated areas had reduced considerably. systems: increasing energy costs are threatening
Other systems were singled out for enhancement, the operational cost-effectiveness of the systems.
116 Productive Sectors
The recovery plan might consider assessing the It is critical to note that information on access to
energy needs by conducting a detailed energy audit, goods and services will coincide with the RDNA for
financing energy-efficient pumping systems and agriculture and environment. The severe disruption
modernized pumping, and conversion to gravity- of water infrastructure is one of the drivers of the very
based systems. high losses in agriculture, which can be corroborated
by matching the oblast/regional breakdowns once
Infrastructure modernization and reconstruction the complete damage and loss data are added to the
needs to be coupled with ongoing institutional template for the I&D sector.
reform. The Irrigation and Drainage Policy (World
Bank, 2017)181 sets a medium-term target for Due to increasing climatic stress to existing rain-
irrigation modernization, rehabilitation, and fed areas in Ukraine, as well as the potential loss of
expansion to result in effective irrigation of 810,000 access to 90 percent of the most important irrigation
ha. The possibility for further expansion of up to 1.5 systems (located in oblasts temporarily not under
million ha of irrigated land was discussed where government control), Ukraine may need to consider
future analysis shows it to be practical and economic. sustainable expansion of its water storage and I&D
In addition, drainage targets would be set following systems in oblasts that are currently producing
detailed review, considering both the 3 million ha food under rain-fed conditions. The World Bank
that are currently drained and the possibility of is conducting analysis using remote sensing and
adding another 1 million ha. crop water modeling for present and future climate
scenarios to identify possible areas for sustainable
Limitations and Recommendations irrigation expansion, with the aim of building back
better from the war impacts on the irrigation and
WRM sectors in Ukraine, with early results available
In this preliminary overview, some important
in September 2022.
components of the RDNA are not yet addressed.
These are summarized in Table 37.
Table 37. Summary of key sectoral limitations
Category of assessment Details of limitations
Assessment of war effect
Disruption of access Loss of agricultural production capacity or change in cropping systems due to
to goods and services war, considering restoration/demining time (although this is covered by the losses
& costs of emergency section of the agriculture sector’s template). Loss of secondary functions of I&D
repairs to key irrigation system, in wetland protection or source water. Costs incurred to conduct emergency
and WRM assets a repair works to damaged assets.
Governance and
Effect on service delivery due to war, availability of key staff in operation and I&D
decision-making
system planning, loss of expertise, undermining of financial institutional basis
processes
Increased risks and Effect on overdue deferred investment (see Irrigation and Drainage Policy, World
vulnerabilities Bank, 2017), water quality degradation, and pollution risks.
Assessment of war impact
Economic impact at Disruption of the economy, as part of the systems under occupation, backward and
macro and micro levels forward linkages (to relate to agricultural surveys).
Absence of records on private on-farm infrastructure, which represents an
Damages and losses important part of the asset base. As there are no records for private infrastructure,
to private on-farm field investigations are planned in July 2022 for the four oblasts in Category 1
irrigation systems (government control restored) as part of the RDNA Agricultural Survey. Another cost
item not assessed is the smaller privately developed systems.
Source: Assessment team.
181 World Bank, “Irrigation and Drainage Strategy of Ukraine: Final Draft Proposal,” 2017.
Productive Sectors 117
COMMERCE AND
INDUSTRY
Summary agro-industry from the processing stage. Services
related to culture, tourism, finance, and creative
industries, such as hotels, tour operators, and
Commerce and industry are one of the most war-
advertisers, are also excluded. Restaurant and food
affected sectors. As of June 1, 2022, approximately
services are included under industry and services.
US$9.7 billion of damage is estimated to have been
Commerce covers wholesale and retail trade and
sustained in this sector. Both privately and publicly
warehousing. This section includes impacts on both
owned enterprises in conflict-affected areas have
public and private firms.
been destroyed or bankrupted. Value chains have
been disrupted through the destruction of, or
Among Ukraine’s top exporting industries are metal
damage to, connective infrastructure, inability to
and machinery, including electrical and computer
access key inputs, and the severing of business
machinery. Metal exports even exceeded grain
links with firms located in affected areas. Damage
exports in 2021. Of approximately 700,000 active
to large factories accounts for most of the damaged
enterprises in Ukraine in 2021, the vast majority
assets, including the destruction of steel plants in
are micro and small, with less than 50 employees.183
Donetska that make up almost 10 percent of the
The biggest concentration of firms (19 percent) is
total damage. Approximately 2,900 retail shops,
in Kyiv city. Based on the 2019 Labor Force Survey,
shopping malls, and warehouses have been
wholesale and retail trade had the most employees,
damaged or destroyed. Estimated aggregate losses
followed by agriculture and industry.184
equal US$47.5 billion. The losses are estimated
based primarily on expected lost income from firms
Given Ukraine’s location, human capital, and physical
over the course of 21 months and the costs for
assets, the competitiveness of its commerce
demolition and debris removal. Total reconstruction
and industry had unrealized potential prior to the
and recovery needs are estimated at US$20.8
war. Reforms had been underway to improve the
billion. More than 80 percent of the needs are for
business and investment climate and specifically
rebuilding and modernizing buildings, equipment,
to allow greater competition, reform state-owned
and inventory. For industry, the regions with the
enterprises, and allow firms to move into higher-
greatest needs for reconstruction and recovery
value-added segments of markets.
are Donetska, with almost half of the total amount,
followed by Kharkivska, Luhanska, Chernihivska,
Institutionally, the Ministry of Economy is the
and Kyivska oblast.
main government counterpart on many key
business issues, including trade, business climate,
Background innovation, and development of small and medium
enterprises (SMEs). The government has identified
Industry and commerce accounted for about one- the importance of facilitating business continuity
third of Ukraine’s gross domestic product (GDP) in and operation during the conflict. To that end, it has
2021 and about 7.2 million jobs in 2020.182 Industry, announced or passed legislation to ease burdens
as defined by this section, covers manufacturing on businesses and facilitate operations. Active
and services not covered elsewhere in the report. business associations are also key actors in the
This excludes manufacturing associated with institutional structure.
transportation, military, and energy, but includes
182 Estimates are based on data from the State Statistical Service of Ukraine.
183 Data from State Statistical Service of Ukraine. Of the 700,000 firms, almost half were not classified by size in the data, but
most are likely individual entrepreneurs or small firms.
184 State Statistics Service of Ukraine. “Labor force of Ukraine 2019: Statistical Publication.” 2020. LInk.
118 Productive Sectors
Table 38. Damage by size/type of firm (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Asset type Damage (US$ million) Share (%)
Large and medium-size private enterprises 4,454.4 46.1
Industry Small private enterprises 2,223.7 23.0
State enterprises 762.2 7.9
Shops 1,493.4 15.5
Warehouses 160.2 1.7
Commerce Gas stations 157.6 1.6
Pharmacies 31.2 0.3
Shopping centers 381.2 3.9
Total 9,663.9 100%
Source: Data as reported to the KSE. Adjustments in calculations made by World Bank to large and medium-size private
enterprises and to state enterprises to subtract damage to firms that should not be covered in this section.
The impact of the war on businesses has been Damage in industry totaled US$7.4 billion. When
significant through various channels, such as available, damage was included as reported for
revenues, costs, availability of supplies, material medium/large private firms and for state-owned
damage, disrupted trade routes, and displaced enterprises. If exact damage amounts were not
customers. It is estimated that the economy has lost available, assets were defined from the latest
30–50 percent of its productive capacity, with losses financial reports as gross capital stock, inventory,
concentrated in Eastern Ukraine. Recent numbers and unfinished goods; 100 percent of the value
from the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) noted was used if the asset was reported destroyed and
that 14 percent of businesses completely stopped 40 percent if reported partially damaged. These
operations in May, compared to 17 percent in April. assets include buildings, equipment, machinery,
However, the level of capacity utilization is still 40 and intermediate and final goods. For small private
percent below the prewar level. Major challenges enterprises, not including those covered under
to operating are (i) difficulties with logistics; (ii) commerce, direct reported damage was not available
interrupted supply of inputs and goods; (iii) displaced given the large number of such enterprises. Instead,
labor force; (iv) frozen contracts with foreign and local an indirect method was used to calculate impacts
clients; (v) low purchasing power of local customers; on small firms, based on the percentage of damage
(vi) damaged facilities and infrastructure; and (viii) to housing in major cities as reported by local
lack of financial resources. authorities. This approach was used to estimate
damage because many small firms are located in
Damage and Loss Assessment residential buildings.185
As noted above, firms in industries covered
Total damage to the industry and commerce
elsewhere, such as transportation, military
facilities is estimated at US$9.7 billion. Most of the
equipment production, energy, and agriculture,
damage (77 percent) was to industry, with the rest
were not included in these calculations. Medium/
under commerce. Much of the destruction occurred
large industry in this assessment covers 51 medium
to large and medium-size private enterprises (46.1
and large firms (35 private firms and 16 state-owned
percent) (Table 38). About 80 percent of the damage
enterprises). Of these, manufacturing firms were the
estimate to those firms (US$4.5 billion) was due
most impacted, accounting for more than half of the
to the destruction of two steel plants in Donetska
damaged and destroyed firms, with metallurgy and
oblast, the Azov Steel Plant and the Ilyich Iron and
machine-building firms accounting for 10 of the 29
Steel Works in Mariupol, which destroyed about half
damaged and destroyed firms.
the country’s steel production capacity.
185 Assets were aggregated by city from financial reports. Destroyed and damaged assets were calculated using the housing
damage percentages and allocated across destroyed (60 percent) and damaged (40 percent) and aggregated across
oblasts.
Productive Sectors 119
For commerce, damage was reported from the As expected, commercial and industrial damage
Retail Association of Ukraine, Ukrainian Council and losses are concentrated in oblasts in Eastern
of Shopping Centers, and other open sources. Ukraine. Commerce and industry in Donetska oblast
Approximately 2,900 retail shops, shopping malls, suffered the most, with almost US$5 billion in
and warehouses have been damaged or destroyed. damage and US$16.5 billion in losses. This is followed
The damage assessment was performed according by Kharkivska oblast, with US$2.2 billion in damage
to standardized interviews and online surveys of and US$12.7 billion in losses; and then by Luhanska,
owners and top managers of retail companies, with US$0.8 billion in damage and US$3.7 billion
considering the area and nature of damage to the in losses (Table 39). An assessment that verified
buildings and based on the cost of construction, damage to commerce and industry establishments
equipment, and inventory. The surveys were in certain cities found the following: in Mariupol in
administered to 295 leading network companies that Donetska, 32 percent of 901 establishments were
represent about 1,000 brands and have 28,500 outlets destroyed and 67 percent had partial damage; in
with a total area of 15.4 million m2. Calculations Bucha in Kyivska, 13 percent of 127 establishments
do not include enterprises with fewer than three were destroyed and 50 percent had partial damage;
outlets, merchants in street markets, warehouses in Irpin in Kyivska, 18 percent of 231 establishments
of wholesale goods, and stores that suffered minor were destroyed and 74 percent had partial damage;
damage. Of the US$2.2 billion of damage reported and in Kyiv city, 0.8 percent of 2,858 establishments
by commerce businesses, over two-thirds of the were destroyed and 5 percent had partial damage.
damage was suffered by shops (see Table 38). Most damage and losses across regions were to
private industry, with state-owned enterprises
Total losses across commerce and industry equal accounting for 7.9 percent of the total damage and
US$47.5 billion. Losses for industry were calculated 1.4 percent of the total losses. Damage to state-
based on sales data from the latest available financial owned enterprises were concentrated in Kharkivska
reports and increased by 10 percent to account for oblast, where the destruction of two manufacturing
inflation. Losses are calculated as sales losses plants totaled almost US$0.5 billion, accounting for
for 21 months, including the three-month period about 63 percent of the total damage to productive
measured from the start of the war (February 24 to state-owned enterprises.
June 1) and an additional estimated 18 months for
continued losses. Sales losses were also calculated Many firms, in addition to suffering damage to
for subsectors that experienced nationwide impacts, assets and loss of revenue, have experienced other
such as specific services like car rental agencies and costs, such as employees being displaced or killed
employment services.186 Losses also include agreed and customer bases shrinking or disappearing.
calculations for demolition and debris removal, Many firms have borne the costs of relocation to
based on the damage. Total losses for industry safer areas in Ukraine or outside of Ukraine. Firms in
are about US$23.2 billion. These calculations likely commerce and industry are also intrinsically linked
overestimate sales losses for these firms, given to other sectors. Electricity, water, and fuel supplies
that in many areas where there is no active conflict have been disrupted in many areas, affecting
firms are returning to work. However, sales losses production costs. Damage and impeded access to
are being used as a proxy for other losses such as transportation and logistics are hurting access to
productivity and need for rental fees where no data markets, both domestically and internationally. Some
were available. Also, the estimates assume that all firms have dwindling financial reserves but cannot
damaged and impacted firms nationwide are not easily access needed credit. The full disruption of
captured in the sales losses. value chains through connective infrastructure,
access to needed inputs, and decreased demand in
For commerce, losses were also estimated as markets will continue to affect firms as the conflict
sales losses as reported by the relevant business continues and likely after it ends. The uncertainty of
associations. Retail stores estimated an average the duration and severity of the conflict also deters
decrease in income of 25 percent over 21 months. planning and longer-term investments.187
Total estimated losses for commerce, including
debris removal, are equal to US$24.3 billion, with
US$23.1 billion from shops.
186 This does not include creative services or industries covered elsewhere, such as cinemas and advertising.
187 Based on interviews with industry and commerce experts in Ukraine conducted in June and July 2022.
120 Productive Sectors
Table 39. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage Loss
Cherkaska - 41.1
Chernihivska 522.2 4,779.6
Chernivetska - 9.0
Dnipropetrovska - 251.3
Donetska 4,989.5 16,536.4
Ivano-Frankivska - 16.8
Kharkivska 2,274.9 12,729.2
Khersonska 0.2 89.3
Khmelnytska - 22.1
Kirovohradska - 9.6
Kyiv (city) 43.9 2,177.6
Kyivska 458.8 2,308.4
Luhanska 758.4 3,678.6
Lvivska - 173.2
Mykolaivska 238.2 1,291.8
Odeska - 203.2
Poltavska - 71.3
Rivnenska - 10.3
Sumska 255.9 2,417.1
Ternopilska - 11.4
Vinnytska - 32.2
Volynska - 2.1
Zakarpatska - 9.2
Zaporizka 84.1 171.0
Zhytomyrska 37.9 165.8
Nationwide (no specific region) - 264.3
Total 9,663.9 47,472.1
Source: World Bank calculations based on data provided by the KSE.
Note: - = not available or no damage reported.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, equipment, and inventory. Recovery needs to restore
including Build Back Better
service delivery and to build back better total US$3.9
billion, with US$1.5 billion in the short term and
US$2.4 billion in the longer term (Table 40).188
Total reconstruction and recovery needs for the
commerce and industry sector are US$20.8 billion, Regionally, the oblast with the highest reconstruction
estimated over 10 years. Reconstruction needs for and recovery needs is Donetska, followed by
infrastructure and assets under a build back better Kharkivska, Luhanska, Chernihivska, and Kyivska
approach are estimated in total as US$16.9 billion, oblasts (Table 41). Short-term construction needs in
with US$5.1 billion in the immediate/short-term the three Eastern oblasts of Donetska, Kharkivska,
and US$11.8 billion in the longer term. This means and Luhanska total US$4.2 billion, or 84 percent
that over 80 percent of the estimated needs for this of the total short-term reconstruction needs. The
sector are for rebuilding and modernizing buildings,
188 Reconstruction needs were calculated as a multiplier of damage to account for “building back better.” Recovery needs
were calculated as a proportion of that multiplier, allocated between the short and long term.
Productive Sectors 121
Table 40. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Component Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Reconstruction Industry 3,906.2 9,114.4 13,020.5
needs Commerce 1,167.4 2,723.9 3,891.3
Service delivery Industry 1,171.8 1,822.9 2,994.7
restoration needs Commerce 350.2 544.8 895.0
Total 6,595.6 14,205.9 20,801.5
Source: World Bank calculations based on data provided by the KSE .
Table 41. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Needs category Short-term Medium- to long-term needs Total
Infrastructure 23.05 53.78 76.83
Kyiv (city)
Service delivery 6.91 10.76 17.67
Infrastructure 2,619.49 6,112.15 8,731.64
Donetska
Service delivery 785.85 1,222.43 2,008.28
Infrastructure 19.89 46.41 66.29
Zhytomyrska
Service delivery 5.97 9.28 15.25
Infrastructure 44.13 102.97 147.10
Zaporizka
Service delivery 13.24 20.59 33.83
Infrastructure 240.87 562.03 802.90
Kyivska
Service delivery 72.26 112.41 184.67
Infrastructure 398.15 929.02 1,327.18
Luhanska
Service delivery 119.45 185.80 305.25
Infrastructure 125.06 291.82 416.88
Mykolaivska
Service delivery 37.52 58.36 95.88
Infrastructure 134.33 313.44 447.77
Sumska
Service delivery 40.30 62.69 102.99
Infrastructure 1,194.32 2,786.75 3,981.07
Kharkivska
Service delivery 358.30 557.35 915.65
Infrastructure 0.00 0.00 0.00
Khersonska
Service delivery 0.03 0.05 0.08
Infrastructure 274.14 639.67 913.81
Chernihivska
Service delivery 82.24 127.93 210.18
Total 6,595.51 14,205.69 20,801.20
Source: World Bank calculations based on data provided by the KSE.
122 Productive Sectors
rebuilding of destroyed and damaged factories in this needs during reconstruction, such as construction,
region accounts for the bulk of the reconstruction food industry businesses, and key manufacturing.
needs. The following are priority recommendations to
support commerce and industry in the short term:
Principles for addressing the needs of commerce
and industry are incorporated into the Government • Provide financial support to firms in the form
of Ukraine’s plans for revitalizing the economy and of loans, grants, and guarantees to allow viable
building back better. They include recognition of key firms to survive and reconstruct and modernize
sectors that have contributed significantly to the assets, and to allow new entrants to emerge.
economy but have been hurt by the conflict, such Trade finance instruments could help firms
as metallurgy and machine-building. Agriculture access new markets.
is of course identified as a critical sector, with
agro-industry as a key component. Priorities for • Rebuild the logistics infrastructure needed for
reconstruction should include facilities involved in access to inputs and markets.
these industries, including manufacturing factories,
food-processing facilities, and warehouses. • Streamline business regulations to make it easier
Construction is also crucial since it has suffered to start and restart businesses and to enter into
losses during the conflict and will be critical for new product lines and delivery models.
rebuilding. Strengthening the business climate,
facilitating access to funding, rebuilding and • Facilitate domestic and foreign investment to
upgrading logistics, and boosting human capital rebuild key industries.
will help businesses build back better and are all
identified as needs by the government. Additionally, • Ensure private sector participation in
greater integration with the European Union (EU) reconstruction efforts and promote linkages
and unlocking of access to new markets will require with SMEs in priority sectors for recovery and
businesses to adapt greener, more sustainable investment, such as construction, transport, and
technologies. logistics.
Options to support businesses, as confirmed In the medium to long term, efforts to build back
through qualitative interviews with sector experts, better should continue, emphasizing green and
should include soft loans, grants or matching digital technologies to build resilient businesses.
grants to address the liquidity needs for micro Financial support to firms, including efforts to
and small enterprises in the short run, financing facilitate access to credit, should also continue.
to sustain employment, financing for production Addressing business, investment, and trade climate
equipment/machinery, credit guarantee schemes obstacles that were present before the conflict—
to restore warehouses, support for exporting firms such as trade harmonization with the EU, competition
through product certification, and restoration of issues, and state-owned enterprise reform—should
linkages with foreign investors. Given the huge be a priority. Direct technical assistance to firms—
numbers of employees in retail and wholesale trade potentially focused on sectors critical to growth
(approximately 3.6 million in 2020), reigniting the like agribusiness, metallurgy, machine-building,
growth of shops is a vital need. Lastly, in the medium and IT—could help them enter new markets, move
term, government should facilitate the growth of the into higher-value-added products, and adapt
private sector by undertaking structural reforms more sustainable practices. Women-owned and
that increase competition, ease business operation, -managed firms could be targeted for financial and
and enable firms to work transparently. nonfinancial support.
Limitations and Recommendations Given that the conflict is ongoing, prioritization of
needs is difficult and will continue to change. A more
extensive survey of firms, with regional and cross-
Revitalizing the commerce and industry sector
sector coverage, would provide a fuller picture of
is a priority, given that millions of employees
damage and losses. Verification is also difficult with
and employers depend on this sector for their
ongoing conflict,189 but possible in areas where the
livelihoods, and given its contribution to critical
conflict has subsided.
189 Damage to larger firms was verified to the extent possible with media reports and occasionally satellite imagery.
Productive Sectors 123
This analysis faced several limitations. It was assumptions used were based on financial
informed by qualitative interviews with sector experts reporting and led to best estimates.
that also helped to back up recommendations. This
analysis also built on information collected from • Losses were calculated based only on sales
several business associations, but information on losses, although inflated to account for other
damage and losses was not regionally specific and losses. For large and state-owned enterprises,
often not sector specific. Specific limitations in the the sales losses likely did not cover the full scope
data and analysis for this section that can hopefully of losses, since firms that did not suffer any
be addressed in subsequent analyses include the physical damage likely still suffered economic
following: losses. Ideally, data for estimating losses in
productivity and other indirect costs, like rental
• Regional data were unavailable for some oblasts fees, could be collected for subsequent analyses.
that likely suffered from the conflict.
• Sector breakdowns of small firms were not
• For commerce, no regional breakdowns of the available and could not be indirectly estimated.
data were available. An indirect method was
used to assign damage and loss proportions • Needs calculations were based on calculated
based on the impacts on small firms, since most damage to the sector. Given the immense
commerce outlets are small firms. nationwide losses faced by this sector, these
calculations may be underestimated.
• Damaged assets and values were not available
for most firms, especially smaller ones. The
124 Productive Sectors
FINANCE AND
BANKING
Summary reconstruction and recovery needs is estimated at
US$8 billion, with US$6.4 billion for the short term
and US$1.6 billion for the medium term.
The Ukrainian financial sector has been significantly
impacted by the war. The banking system entered
the war in relatively good condition and banks remain Background
operational. However, loss of assets, collateral and
revenues will severely affect banks’ profitability and Ukraine’s financial system is dominated by banks,
solvency. During March-May, the banking sector with significant state ownership. Banks account
accounted for US$1.1 billion of loan loss provisions for 88.6 percent of total financial system assets;190
for expected war-related credit losses. It can be around 47 percent are state-owned, 31 percent are
anticipated that the nonbank financial institution foreign, and 22 percent private banks (see Table
(NBFI) sector will also suffer significant losses as a 42). The Ukrainian banking sector lacks depth,
result of the invasion on top of prewar vulnerabilities. with a private sector loan-to-GDP (gross domestic
Given its small size, NBFIs are not expected to have product) ratio at 28.2 percent in 2020, compared to
systemic impacts on the overall financial system. a 57.5 percent average in the Europe and Central
From the preliminary estimates, the total damage Asia region (excluding high-income countries).
is estimated at US$26.3 million and potential losses Furthermore, the nonbank sector is underdeveloped
suffered by the banking sector are expected to and requires further strengthening of the regulatory
be US$8.1 billion; however, data on NBFIs is very and supervisory framework and financial system
limited. It will take many months for the true extent infrastructure.
of damage to the financial sector to become fully
apparent/quantifiable. The quantification of losses Following measures adopted in the aftermath of
also does not recognize the inherent risks posed the 2014–2015 crisis, the Ukrainian banking system
to the gains made over recent years by reforms to entered the war in relatively good condition; but
the financial sector, such as relaxation of prudential it faces heightened operational, credit, market,
and state-owned bank (SOB) governance rules; profitability, solvency and liquidity risks as a result of
nor does it recognize the potential delays to the the war. Due to stringent regulatory and supervisory
implementation of further reforms as a result of the measures, systemwide capital adequacy stood at 18
need to address postwar problems first. Based on percent and the aggregate nonperforming loan (NPL)
current conditions as of June 2022, the total cost for ratio at 30 percent at end-2021 (down 11 percentage
Table 42. Financial institutions regulated by National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), end-2021
Financial institutions Number Total assets (UAH billion) Share of total (%)
Banks 71 2,054 88.6
Credit unions 278 2.3 0.1
Financial companies 935 195.2 8.4
Pawnshops 261 3 0.1
Insurance companies 155 63.6 2.7
Sources: NBU; World Bank staff calculations.
190 This figure does not include collective investment institutions and pension funds.
Productive Sectors 125
Table 43. Evolution of banking sector soundness
2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021
Capital adequacy ratio (%) 18.3 15.6 12.3 12.7 16.1 16.2 19.7 22.0 18.01
NPLs as share of total loans (%) 12.9 19.0 28.0 30.5 54.5 52.9 48.9 41.0 30.0
Liquid assets to total assets (%) 20.6 26.4 33.0 48.5 53.9 51.1 72.3 69.1 69.2
ROA (%) 0.3 -4.2 -5.5 -12.5 -1.8 1.6 4.7 2.8 4.5
ROE (%) 1.7 -32.0 -65.5 -122.2 -15.3 14.6 37.6 21.7 37.9
Customer deposits to total
73.3 64.5 71.2 80.5 84.6 81.8 103.1 139.0 140.3
(non‑interbank) loans (%)
FX-denominated loans to total
34.7 47.7 57.9 51.4 47.5 46.5 41.2 39.1 32.0
loans (%)
Share of state bonds in bank
7.0 7.9 7.0 19.4 26.1 29.9 24.5 31.7 28.6
assets (% of total assets)
Sources: NBU; World Bank staff calculations.
Note: ROA = return on assets; ROE = return on equity.
points compared to a year earlier). Bank profitability The insurance sector, although small in size, already
and liquidity were high; all 13 systemically important faced issues prior to the war. The National Bank of
banks had liquidity coverage ratios (LCRs) of more Ukraine (NBU)—the regulator of the insurance sector
than 150 percent (as of January 1, 2022), at least since mid-2020—started activities to strengthen the
50 percent above the required minimum. About sector, but the war interrupted this work. By the end
a third of the loan portfolio and deposit liabilities of 2021, the number of insurers was reduced by
are denominated in foreign exchange (FX), a key 25 percent (from 210 in 2020 to 155 in 2021). As of
source of vulnerability in case of sustained currency end-2021, the number of insurance companies that
depreciation and/or economic contraction. Another violated solvency requirements was significantly
important vulnerability relates to possible negative lower than in previous periods,191 but vulnerabilities
feedback loops between Ukraine’s fiscal accounts remain. Ukraine’s insurance penetration (the
and the banking system given its large exposure ratio of premiums written to GDP) remains low by
to the government sector. See Table 43 for detailed international standards at just 1.14 percent in 2021.
information. Life insurance companies account for only 0.13
percent of the market as measured by net premiums.
The payment infrastructure continued to develop
while the number of branches declined. Compared
with 2020, the number of point-of-sale (POS)
Damage and Loss Assessment
terminals in retail and service networks grew by 13.7
While the electronic payment system infrastructure
percent to 426,500, of which 393,600 (92.3 percent)
has remained fully operational since the start
were contactless terminals. Overall, the number
of the war, banks face a number of operational
of POS terminals in retail and service networks in
challenges. According to NBU, about 85 percent of
the last five years almost doubled, from 232,100
bank branches operated as of mid-June, while online
to 426,500. At the same time, there was a gradual
financial services are fully available to all bank clients
annual drop in the number of banking devices (ATMs,
with internet connectivity. Banks are gradually
self-service kiosks etc.). With clients switching to
resuming operations in the recently recovered
online transactions, banks were able to optimize their
northern regions, while in the southeast the safety
branch networks. The number of branches declined
situation remains dire. NBU has taken measures to
by 21 percent, from 8,271 to 6,607 branches, over
safeguard its operations to the extent possible. The
the last four years.
operation of the electronic payments system has
191 As of January 1, 2022, only four insurers violated at least one of the two solvency standards (source: Link), versus 44
insurers as of January 1, 2021 (source: Link).
126 Productive Sectors
been transferred to a contingent location, and thus license of two Ukrainian subsidiaries of Russian
the local wholesale payment system is currently banks (Sberbank and Prominvestbank) and sent
fully operational. them into liquidation. These subsidiaries accounted
for only 2 percent of the total banking sector assets,
Liquidity remains at sufficient levels, given a since their activities had been curtailed after 2014.
relatively stable deposit base and refinancing A decision of the National Security Council (vetted
support from the NBU. Outflows of hryvnia retail by the president and the Parliament) was taken to
deposits were short-lived. The deposit base has expropriate the shares and a part of the assets and
grown since the start of the war due to regular wage liabilities of these two subsidiaries. The National
and social payments to bank accounts and limits on Investment Fund of Ukraine will become a de facto
deposit withdrawal, but primarily due to customer public asset management company for these assets.
trust in banks. Overall, since the beginning of the war Megabank (a private bank accounting for 0.5 percent
until mid-June, retail hryvnia deposits surged by 20 of total assets) was declared insolvent in June, 2022.
percent, while FX deposits declined by 4.9 percent. Bank Sich (a private bank, accounting for 0.3 percent
At the same time, corporate hryvnia deposits rose by of total assets) was declared insolvent in August
4.1 percent, while corporate FX facilities declined by 2022.
4.9 percent. Anticipating possible future withdrawals,
NBU introduced an unsecured refinancing facility.192 The NBFI sector is also expected to be impacted
As of mid-June, outstanding NBU refinancing loans significantly, although data are still very scarce.
amounted to US$4.5 billion (UAH 132 billion), or Operations of nonbank financial services providers
approximately 10 percent of liabilities, which is only have been seriously affected by the war. The sector
US$170 million (UAH 5 billion) more than on the day has shown itself to be vulnerable to operational risk,
before the war. and a large number of companies either suspended
their activities or had to close. Further on, NBFIs
Loss of business revenues and household incomes might face the materialization of liquidity and credit
as well as collateral will significantly impact the risks and an eventual deterioration of their financial
quality of banks’ loan portfolios. The size of such performance. Insurance premiums of reporting
credit losses is very hard to estimate at this stage of insurance companies declined sharply in the first
the war and economic crisis. Banks offered “credit quarter of 2022 (14 percent for life and 25 percent
holidays” for almost all borrowers in spring and for non-life). The effective suspension of reinsurance
also waived fees and commissions while making services raises risks for Ukrainian insurers. In the
full and timely interest payments on deposits. The meantime, some international companies refuse to
crisis has already started to take its toll on banks. enter into reinsurance agreements with Ukrainian
During March-May, the banking sector accounted for insurers due to high risks. The quality of credit
US$ 1.1 billion (UAH 33 billion) of loan loss provisions unions’ loan portfolio is deteriorating; consumer
for expected war-related credit losses. About a third loans dominate the portfolio, and activities of finance
of the loan portfolio is denominated in FX, which is companies, pawnshops, and lessors have slowed
another source of vulnerability. At the same time, since the start of the war. Only two-thirds of insurers
several significant anti-crisis regulatory forbearance and even fewer credit unions, finance companies,
measures have been introduced, including deferral of pawnshops, and lessors managed to report on their
sanctions on banks that breach minimum regulatory performance in the first quarter of 2022. Some of the
requirements (except for related party lending) institutions that failed to provide reports have closed
during martial law. Audits of banks’ statements for their business. The condition of the sector can be
2021 and regular annual stress tests/asset quality assessed accurately only after reporting resumes.193
reviews (AQRs) have been postponed.
Based on current conditions as of June 2022 as
Since the start of the war, four banks have been well as available data, the total cost for damage is
declared insolvent—two subsidiaries of Russian estimated at US$26.3 million and losses is estimated
state-owned banks and one private bank. On at US$8.08 billion (see Table 44 and Table 45).
February 25, 2022, NBU decided to revoke the banking Damage was estimated using data on banks’ fixed
192 The maximum amount of support available for banks is capped at 30 percent of prewar retail deposits.
193 NBU, “Financial Stability Report,” June 2022, Link.
Productive Sectors 127
Table 44. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Temporarily not Other Total
Bank type Asset Baseline
under governmenta territories cost
National Bank
NBU premises - - - -
of Ukraine
SOBs 470.5 17.4 0.8 18.1
Banks Private banks (foreign
589.5 5.2 3.0 8.2
and domestically owned)
Total damage 1,060.0 22.6 3.8 26.3
Sources: NBU; World Bank staff calculations.
a. The territories temporarily not under government control include the Cabinet of Ministers’ list of territorial communities
located in the areas of current military operations, close to them, or temporarily not under government control. They do not
include recently reclaimed Kyivska, Chernihivska, and Sumska oblasts.
Table 45. Loss inventory by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Bank type Loss Baseline Total cost
Loan losses (estimated as ~29% of net loans) 9,904 2,872
Cash 1,315 8.2
Public
Due from banks in Russia 0 0
(SOBs)
Investment property 136 0.1
Property received by the bank as a pledgee 158 0.6
Loan losses (estimated as ~29% of net loans) 17,624 5,111
Private Cash 1,418 9.0
(Foreign and Due from banks in Russia 80 80
domestically
owned) Investment property 89 1.5
Property received by the bank as a pledgee 85 1.5
Total loss 8,084
Sources: NBU; World Bank staff calculations.
assets as well as a recently conducted NBU bank is estimated at US$6.4 billion in the short term
survey on damage.194 Credit losses were estimated at and US$1.6 billion in the medium term (Table 46).
29 percent in line with NBU’s upper range estimates In aggregate, total sector needs are US$8 billion.
outlined in its 1H Financial Stability Report. Infrastructure needs were calculated based on a
recently conducted NBU bank survey on damage
and estimates for territories where banks are not
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, currently able to conduct proper assessments
including Build Back Better of damage to their infrastructure.195 Additional
provisions for banks’ credit losses were calculated
Based on current conditions as of June 2022, the by estimating overall credit losses at 29 percent in
total cost for reconstruction and recovery needs
194 Using fixed assets data as of June 1st as a baseline, an assumption was made on the amount of damages in territories
temporarily not under government control. For other territories, data on damages from a bank survey conducted by NBU
(as of end April) was used for the calculations.
195 Using fixed assets data as of June 1st as a baseline, an assumption was made on the amount of damages in territories
temporarily not under government control. For other territories, data on damages from a bank survey conducted by NBU
(as of end April) was used for the calculations.
128 Productive Sectors
Table 46. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Public/private Immediate / short term Medium / long term Total
Central bank infrastructure - - -
SOB infrastructure 16.3 10.9 27.2
Additional provisions for SOB credit losses 2,298 574 2,872
Public total 2,314 585 2,899
Private bank infrastructure 7.4 4.9 12.3
Additional provisions for private banks
4,089 1,022 5,111
credit losses
Private total 4,096 1,027 5,123
Total 6,410 1,612 8,023
Sources: NBU; World Bank staff calculations.
Note: - = not available. All costs shown are for restoration of service delivery.
line with NBU’s upper range estimates outlined in its assessment of individual institutions’ viability on
1H Financial Stability Report. a forward-looking basis should be conducted.
Critical actions are required to safeguard the • Develop a financial sector restructuring strategy.
financial system, maintain confidence, and minimize This should include modalities of governance,
fiscal costs. At the same time, a solvent, liquid, and transparency, and financing.
operationally sound financial sector will be key to
provide financing to the economy during and after • Ensure the financial sustainability of the Deposit
the war. Financial sector policy reforms should focus Guarantee Fund (DGF). Ensure that the DGF has
on (i) preserving financial stability and maintaining sufficient funds to cover insured deposits at
public confidence, (ii) strengthening readiness banks with the highest likelihood of becoming
for resolution, (iii) safeguarding institutional insolvent.
frameworks, and (iv) enhancing the financial sector’s
contribution to addressing fiscal and private sector • Plan, adjust, and implement further time-bound
needs. Coordinated efforts by all financial market policy and regulatory responses to the changing
players—financial institutions, NBFIs, the NBU, environment. The goal is to ensure undisrupted
National Securities and Stock Market Commission functioning of the critical operations of the
(NSSMC), and other market regulators—along banking sector.
with the effective support of public authorities, in
particular the Ministry of Finance, are needed to • Develop a carefully calibrated plan for phasing
ensure financial stability during the war and in the out special measures put in place during the war.
recovery/reconstruction phase. These should be gradually replaced with standard
measures or refined laws and regulations to
In the short term, authorities will need to closely address the current situation.
monitor the situation and get an early understanding
of the impact of the war on the financial sector. • Reform NPL resolution mechanisms and create
They will also need to plan steps to be taken in the markets/mechanisms for distressed assets.
recovery/reconstruction phase, as follows:
• Provide financial support to corporates that have
• Undertake an initial assessment of the losses been affected by the war but remain viable if going
of financial institutions (in particular banks and through a comprehensive and orderly corporate
insurance companies). Financial institutions restructuring program. Such funding would need
should be required to present plans on how they to have a transparent and clear governance
will recapitalize to meet prudential requirements. mechanism and would need to be well integrated
Using the results as a starting point, an with the restructuring proceedings.
Productive Sectors 129
• Develop assistance programs for insured facilitating sustainable development of the banking
parties. These will be needed by those who sector, and promoting sustainable financial system
have suffered significant losses, and where the diversification and inclusion. Benefits surrounding
obligations of insurers are uncertain or force the creation of a development finance institution
majeure clauses have been enacted. should be assessed which would allow for a
single institution to coordinate the utilization of
• Provide financial support to corporates that have reconstruction funds and assure proper controls are
been affected by the war but remain viable if going in place so that both the government’s priorities are
through a comprehensive and orderly corporate met as well as those of the donors.
restructuring program. Such funding would need
to have a transparent and clear governance
mechanism and would need to be well integrated
Limitations and Recommendations
with the restructuring proceedings.
This financial sector needs assessment is based
on a wide range of inputs and data from diverse
• Develop well-designed, time-bound financial
sources, including NBU and surveys of financial
support programs that target affected
sector institutions. The assessment also used
borrowers and sectors using transparent
expert opinions and secondary data where possible.
rules and governance mechanisms. Policy
However, these estimates are based on currently
responses will need to minimize opportunities
available information, which is largely anecdotal and
for moral hazard and rent-seeking and adhere
unsupported by the data needed for precision. It will
to sound credit risk management practices and
take many months for the true extent of damage to
independent governance arrangements at SOBs,
the financial sector to become fully apparent. The
while facilitating the effective allocation of new
quantification of losses also does not recognize the
credit. A special war insurance pool should be
inherent risks posed to the gains made over recent
developed and the Partial Credit Guarantee Fund
years by reforms to the financial sector, such as
for small farmers operationalized.
relaxation of prudential and SOB governance rules;
nor does it recognize the potential delays to the
In the medium term, implementation of critical
implementation of further reforms as a result of the
reforms in the financial sector should be continued
need to address postwar problems first.
in line with international standards and EU
Directives, aimed at enhancing financial stability,
130
INFRASTRUCTURE
SECTORS
Irpin. Photo by Julia Burlachenko for the World Bank.
Infrastructure Sectors 131
ENERGY AND
EXTRACTIVES
Summary losses, and US$0.3 billion of needs were identified in
addition to the energy sector estimates. In addition to
the physical damages and loses generated by the war,
As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in the total
some key energy market and governance reforms
damage of around US$3 billion for the energy sector,
are suffering delays due to the need to implement
while the aggregate estimated losses total US$11.7
temporary emergency measures to ensure the
billion. The value of damage includes damage in the
provision of basic energy services to the population.
power sector (US$1.4 billion), district heating (US$0.7
million), gas sector (US$0.5 billion), transport fuel
sector (US$0.4 billion), and coal mining (US$0.1 billion). Background
The losses include lost revenues and production
decreases, higher costs, losses due to deterioration Before the onset of the war, the energy sector played
of liquidity positions, and losses due to lost access to a key role in Ukraine’s economic growth as well as
energy services. The total reconstruction and recovery its national security, and increasingly supported
needs in the public sector are estimated at US$10.4 the country’s goal to modernize the economy.
billion, including US$7.3 billion for the immediate/ The energy supply sector represented 17 percent
short term and US$3.1 billion for the longer term (up of gross domestic product (GDP), with gas transit
to 10 years). Given that the energy sector provides fees from Russia representing about 0.3 percent of
critical services, the above reconstruction and GDP.197 Fossil fuels accounted for about 66 percent
recovery investments are all considered as pressing. of the total primary energy supply in 2020, with the
In addition, part of the losses can also be considered remainder covered by nuclear power (~27.5 percent)
as pressing for short-term operations of the energy and renewables and waste-to-energy (~6.5 percent).
sector. This includes the need to close liquidity gaps in Ukraine has traditionally relied on energy imports,
the power sector transmission system operator (TSO) which accounted for 31 percent of its natural gas,
(Ukrenergo) and other stakeholders in the amount of 48 percent of its coal, and 84.5 percent of its oil and
US$2.6 billion. Naftogaz needs at least US$5 billion oil products in 2020.198 Ukraine was also entirely
only for purchasing gas for the next heating season.196 dependent on Russian imports for nuclear fuel.
For the extractives sector, in the context of limited data Prior to the war, the largest share of final energy
available, US$0.1 billion of damage, US$0.3 billion of consumption was in the residential and industrial
196 The needs for the energy sector also include the short-term need for purchasing natural gas for the upcoming heating
season (around 4.8 bcm), that would generate a financial gap in Naftogaz of around US$5 billion. It is estimated that
Naftogaz could need some 4.8 billion cubic meters (bcm) of additional gas to reach the estimated required level 15 bcm.
Naftogaz will use its produced gas (up to 1.4 bcm), purchase from domestic producers/private stored gas (1.3 bcm), and
import the remaining amount (2.1 bcm). The value of this volume can vary depending on the import price. Assuming
that the domestic price for the gas from other domestic producers will be around US$1,000 and that imported gas is
purchased at US$ 2,000 per 1,000 cubic meter, the total purchase costs would be US$ 5.1 billion if the import price is
US$2,000, and US$7.2 billion if the import price is $3,000. Considering the selling price of the gas for Naftogaz at the level
of US$190 per 1,000 cubic meters, the financial gap would be US$4.37 billion if the import price is US$2000 and US$6.47
billion if the import price is US$3,000.
197 Gas transit via the territory of Ukraine has undergone substantial changes since independence. The construction of
pipelines (Blue Stream in 2003, Nord Stream 1 in 2011, and TurkStream in 2020), gas disputes between Ukraine and
Russia, and the development of the liquefied natural gas (LNG) market have contributed to further reduction of gas transit
through Ukraine over the last few years.
198 In 2021, Ukraine imported anthracite coal from Russia, Spain, Belarus, Germany, and Poland; petroleum products from
Belarus, Russia, and Germany; and crude from Azerbaijan, Libya, the United States, Latvia, and Lithuania. Natural gas is
imported from Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, which are essentially purchases of portions of Russian gas volumes sold
to European buyers through netting.
132 Infrastructure Sectors
Figure 21. Installed capacity at the end of 2021 (top left), historical trend (top right), and
structure of electricity generation (bottom left) and consumption (bottom right)
30
3% 0%
25
Installed Capacity (GW)
Nuclear
3% 11% Nuclear
25% Thermal 20
TPP
CHP CHP
8% 15
Hydro HPP
Pumped Hydro 10 PSHP
11% Solar SPP
5 WPP
Wind
39% Biomas
Biofuel 0
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
2018
2019
2020
2021
Year
Source: Elaborated based on Energy Map. Link.; own elaborations.
Note: CHP = combined heat and power; HPP = hydropower plant; NPP = nuclear power plant; PSHP = pumped storage hydropower
plant; RES = renewable energy source; SPP = solar power plant; TPP = thermal power plant; WPP = wind power plant.
sectors, representing 28 percent and 33 percent, 441 GWh (0.3 percent) from oil TPPs. Nonrenewable
respectively.199 Before the war, Ukraine’s electricity sources accounted for over 91 percent of the total
network operated in a synchronized way with electricity production. Renewable energy (RE)
the Integrated Power System (IPS)/Unified Power resources accounted for 14,500 GWh, composed
System of Russia (UPS), even if the country had been as follows: 7,487 GWh from hydropower, 2,933 GWh
working since 2016 toward synchronization with the from solar photovoltaic (PV), 1,932 GWh from wind,
European network. 384 GWh from bioenergy, and 129 GWh from other
types of RE resources. The amount of solar PV and
Electricity: Of the total installed power generation wind production has been increasing rapidly due to
capacity, estimated at 56.2 GW, about half (27.9 the attractive feed-in tariff (FIT) program. In 2022,
GW) consists of thermal power plants (TPPs) generation amounts are expected to reach 8,020
(Figure 21). Coal-fired power plants account for 80 GWh from solar PV and 5,750 GWh from wind.
percent of the TPPs. Nuclear power plants account
for 24.6 percent (13.8 GW) of the installed capacity, Generous FITs for renewables resulted in the
while hydropower plants, including pumped storage addition of significant privately owned RE assets
hydropower plants, represent 11.2 percent (6.3 GW) to the generation mix in the last few years, but an
of the total installed capacity. Of the total electricity inadequate tariff system led to high accumulated
production of 130,753 GWh in 2020, 76,203 GWh (58 large arrears among the RE developers in 2020
percent) was generated by nuclear power plants, and 2021. Most of the arrears to RE developers were
while 42,852 GWh (33 percent) came from coal TPPs, settled after eurobond issuance by Ukrenergo (the
11,257 GWh (9 percent) from natural gas TPPs, and transmission system operator) in December 2021, but
199 Ukrainian Statistics Agency, “Ukrainian Energy Balance for 2020.” Link.
Infrastructure Sectors 133
the transmission tariff is not yet fully cost-reflective, efficiency law. The potential for energy saving is
and new arrears kept accumulating.200 On August greatest in industry (33 percent) and the residential
26, 2021, the Ministry of Energy (MoE) announced sector (30 percent), but there are also significant
the publication of the draft Law on Amendments opportunities in the efficient provision of public
to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Stimulating the sector services. The building stock is in dire need of
Production of Electricity from Alternative Energy renovation: energy consumption per square meter of
Sources on a Market Basis, which introduced a feed- government buildings built between 1978 and 1988
in-premium support scheme for renewable projects, is on average more than three times consumption
to replace the FITs. for class B energy-efficient buildings; if built during
the same period, hospitals consume more than
Gas: Ukraine has 36,700 km of fully automated twice and schools more than three times the energy
gas pipelines to deliver Siberian gas to Germany, of class B energy-efficient buildings.
the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania, Hungary,
and Poland. While gas transit has continued after Ukraine’s electricity system has maintained stable
independence, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and operations since the beginning of the war. Amidst
the Revolution of Dignity in 2014 led to a reduction the war, Ukraine reached a historical milestone in
of transit volumes. The construction of Nord Stream relation to its power system by starting synchronized
1 and 2 and other pipelines, gas disputes between operations with the European network (European
Ukraine and Russia, and the development of the Network of Transmission System Operators,
liquefied natural gas (LNG) market have contributed or ENTSO-E) on March 16, 2022. Emergency
to further reduce gas transit through Ukraine in the synchronization was authorized by ENTSO-E upon
last few years. However, before the war, transit fees the successful completion of isolated test modes
still represented about 0.5 percent of GDP. (required as part of the synchronization protocol).
This allowed Ukraine to benefit from automatic
District heating: Ukraine has a relatively well- reserves that help stabilize the electricity grid.
developed but highly inefficient district heating Since then, the transmission grid has maintained
infrastructure fueled by gas and coal that relies its stability despite local disturbances incidental
on heat-only boilers (60 percent) and combined to indiscriminate shelling. However, the take-over
heat and power plants (40 percent). Decades of of nuclear power plants (Chernobyl and Zaporizka)
underinvestment have led to very high losses. For and hydropower plants has created episodes of very
example, Ukraine requires an average of 250–400 high security risks for Ukraine and Europe.
kWh per m2 per year in heating, compared with
180 kWh in Germany, 150 kWh in Scandinavia, and Electricity exports: The drop in electricity demand
60–80 kWh in buildings constructed with energy- in Ukraine has created an attractive opportunity
saving technologies. Most district heating systems to generate revenues for the sector and partially
are inefficient and operating beyond their lifetime, compensate for sectoral deficits through electricity
and boilers are typically oversized and with limited exports. Exports to Europe would be particularly
temperature controls.201 Most customers also lack profitable for Ukraine given high market prices
metering and temperature controls, providing and the cheap generation available in Ukraine.
limited incentives to avoid wasting energy. Preliminary estimates indicate that around US$140
million could be generated per month. Ukraine was
Energy efficiency (EE) in energy demand (productive) allowed to initiate export to ENTSO-E and currently
sectors: Among countries in Europe and Central is working to gradually increase the capacities for
Asia, Ukraine has the fourth lowest EE score electricity export, which would allow increased
(47), according to the Regulatory Indicators for revenues. Additional technical measures, including
Sustainable Energy (RISE) 2020 report.202 Until very STATCOMS and other requirements are required
recently (November 2021) it was the only member of by ENTSO-E to maximize exports without creating
the European Energy Community without an energy stability issues. By the end of 2022, Ukraine expects
200 Outstanding debt of Guaranteed Buyer to renewables for the electricity supplied in 2021 stands at UAH 9.6 billion.
201 According to the State Statistics Service of Ukraine, there were about 31,000 boiler houses with a total installed capacity
of 111.8 GW at the end of 2014. No further assessments were performed. The experts of the Partnership for Market
Readiness (PMR) project in Ukraine (2016–2021) have estimated 1,000+ boiler houses with installed heat generation
capacity that would fall under the mandatory reporting of the Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV) system within
territories under the government’s control.
202 World Bank. Link.
134 Infrastructure Sectors
to be able to export 800 MW a day, but this would Other institutions responsible for the formation
need to be authorized by ENTSO-E.203 In addition, and implementation of national energy and climate
Energoatom is in negotiations with Poland on policies include the Ministry of Environmental
additional electricity export to Poland once the Protection and Natural Resources. This ministry is
electricity line for this export is restored (within responsible for geological study and rational use
1 –1.5 years). It must be noted that at the end of of subsoil; protection of the natural environment;
March, on an exceptional basis, some commercial geological control and control in the sphere of
exchanges with Poland had been already accepted ozone layer protection; regulation of the negative
on an isolated line linking the 510 MW Dobrotvir TPP anthropogenic impact of climate change and adaption
(owned by DTEK company) in Western Ukraine to to climate change; and fulfillment of requirements
Zamost in Poland, with flows mutually beneficial to under the United Nations Framework Convention
Ukraine, as well as to Ukrainian and Polish companies. on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In addition, the State
In addition, on May 12, Ukraine started electricity Agency on Energy Efficiency and Energy Saving is a
exports to Moldova through a bilateral contract central executive authority and operates under the
between Ukrhydroenergo (the state-owned hydro coordination of the MoE. It implements the state policy
generator) and Moldovan Energocom (providing 30 for efficient use of fuel and energy resources, energy
percent of consumption in Moldova). More recently, saving, renewable and alternative fuels, and the RE
initial electricity exports were permitted by ENTSO-E and EE policies. The Ministry for Communities and
in June 2022 (initially only around 100 MW, then Territories Development is responsible for creating
increased up to 250MW after July 30). Ukrenergo is policies and technical regulations related to EE in
working on necessary measures, as requested; the buildings and energy certification. The Ministry of
full set of grid measures can be completed only by Infrastructure is responsible for national policy, action
mid-2023. However, the war has created a financial plans, and strategies related to the development of
gap in the sector, which needs an injection of liquidity infrastructure to encourage the use of alternative
to continue services till revenue collections and fuels and EE measures in transport. The Ministry
export revenues materialize. for Development of Economy, Trade and Agriculture
oversees the state-owned energy companies;
Institutional arrangements: The key players in provides support for the technological renewal of the
Ukraine’s energy sector governance and regulatory agricultural production industry and the development
framework are the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine of machinery for the agricultural complex, including
(CoM), the MoE, and the National Energy and Utilities energy conservation; assists the agricultural complex
Regulatory Commission (NEURC). CoM is the highest in implementing biofuels production projects;
executive body responsible for collective decision- and supports the improvement of EE agricultural
making. MoE forms and implements state policy enterprises and development of raw material base
within the energy sector, and it reports to the CoM as for biofuels production. At the implementation level,
well as to the Parliament (Verkhovna Rada) and the the Energy Efficiency Fund plays an important role
Presidential Administration. MoE is also responsible in supporting EE in buildings and energy-saving
for developing the energy strategy of Ukraine measures, particularly in the residential sector.
until 2035, tracking and monitoring results while
submitting annual progress reports. In addition, Energy reforms and governance: Since the 1990s,
MoE measures economic incentives, monitors and Ukraine has aimed to reform its electricity sector,
reports on energy demand and forecasts, and defines becoming one of the first countries in the region
strategy and methodology for constructing facilities to begin working toward the liberalization of the
for energy generation. MoE is one of the main bodies market. However, progress has been slow. The
responsible for the management and oversight power sector was profoundly affected by the
of energy state-owned enterprises (SOEs).204 The severe recession of the 1990s, which followed the
third player along with CoM and MoE is the National dissolution of the USSR.205 In 1996, the government
Energy and Utilities Regulatory Commission, which proceeded to work toward the creation of a
remains central to regulating the country’s energy wholesale electricity market. However, it retained
sector, particularly in setting tariff policies and in SOEs in the sector, set up a single-buyer model, and
implementing relevant pricing formulation. established regulated tariffs within the industry. In
203 Kosatka Media. Link.
204 MoE is responsible for approximately 130 companies, with the power to manage the corporate rights of the state, including
Ukraine’s hydropower plant operator UHE. CoM is also responsible for SOE governance in the sector.
205 Electricity generation fell by 38 percent between 1991 and 1999 as the economy contracted.
Infrastructure Sectors 135
combination with fossil fuel subsidies for electricity based pricing. Moreover, the law sets goals to
generation, cross-subsidies in the electricity promote efficiency within the energy sector, including
market, and weak payment discipline, this situation the energy market. The WEM, which was operated by
resulted in limited incentives for energy efficiency the state-owned company Energorynok as the sole
or new investments. Thus, Ukraine has continued wholesale trader, finally switched to a model with
to experience inefficiency in electricity production a more competitive power market in mid-2019, as
and distribution, with annual losses exceeding 10 required by the law.
percent. Moreover, this situation was complicated by
the partial privatization of regional power companies The Government of Ukraine has continued to provide
before the restructuring of the sector was complete. state support for market players and consumers. To
Privatization proved problematic in the absence of maintain low energy tariffs for end users, Ukraine
any clear plans for further restructuring the power has imposed price controls and adopted generous
sector. The partial privatization in some segments subsidy schemes. With the launch of the electricity
of the industry created both opportunities to exploit market, nuclear and hydro producers of electricity
market imperfections and other opportunities sell a portion of their output at lower rates for
arising from the partially reformed nature of residential consumers. Furthermore, Ukraine
the sector. Some of the unbundled assets were provides an additional layer of support for vulnerable
subsequently “rebundled” into a large state-owned consumers through housing subsidies based on
holding company, and the wholesale power market household income and the number of individuals
by the mid-2000s was so heavily regulated and so per household. Since government policies have
distorted by cross-subsidy mechanisms that it was resulted in supplying energy at below-cost-recovery
defined as a quasi-market. levels, the government has also developed schemes
to compensate energy producers, distributors,
Despite these challenges and barriers, reform and suppliers for their losses by offering budget
has continued. Along with launching initiatives to transfers to cover part of the costs of production,
privatize distribution companies, Ukraine introduced among other initiatives. Additionally, tax exemptions
market players within the industry alongside SOEs, have been applied. Despite efforts, Ukraine’s power
and in February 2011 it acceded to the European sector continues to suffer from lack of transparent
Energy Community. In 2013, the Parliament adopted pricing mechanisms, and rules are set by legislation
a law to liberalize the wholesale electricity market rather than independent regulation.206 As a result,
(WEM) and promote competition in compliance with electricity market rules before the war were
European Union (EU) regulations. The Ukrainian suboptimal, and low competition leads to market
electricity market operated in a state of emergency power concentration and increasing perceived risks
caused an economic and energy blockade outside by potential new investors in the sector.
the government’s control. Nevertheless, Ukraine
has continued to restructure the electricity market
with the aim of achieving energy efficiency and
Damage and Loss Assessment
security. In 2014, the country signed an Association
Preliminary estimates based on information
Agreement with the EU, which requires increased
shared by the government, SOEs, and the World
energy efficiency and the promotion of market-
Bank indicate that damage to power, gas, and
oriented reforms. To meet these requirements,
fuel infrastructure and coal mining is close to
Ukraine has sought to pursue its efforts to comply
US$3.1 billion (including estimated damage to
with the EU’s Third Energy Package and to integrate
assets located in territories temporarily not under
into the ENTSO-E. To promote competition within
government control 207). Please see Table 47 with
the sector, it introduced the Law on the Electricity
the breakdown by subsector. The largest share of
Market in 2017. The law replaced the single-buyer
damage is in the transmission segment within the
model with more competitive elements, including
power sector, district heating infrastructure, and gas
the establishment of bilateral contracts, creating an
sector. The gas sector damage estimates are around
ancillary services market while adopting market-
US$500 million, which comprises US$330 million in
206 The large SOEs that supply 60 percent of electricity are not allowed to participate in the WEM and are obliged to provide
power at low prices; these requirements increase their financial stress, particularly as higher-priced renewable power
puts a squeeze on their volumes.
207 Assets located in territories temporarily not under government control are estimated to be partially damaged (50 percent).
It is likely that some of the assets are completely destroyed while others are almost intact. There is limited ability to verify
those damages at this point.
136 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 47. Damage by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Subsector Damage (US$ million)
Power sector 1,400a
District heating 700
Gas sector 500
Oil/transport fuel 400
Coal mining 110b
Total 3,110
Source: Assessment team.
Notes: a. The US$1,400 figure includes damage recorded by the transmission system operator Ukrenergo (US$700 million);
damage to distribution companies, which have been estimated at approximately US$600 million by the KSE based on indirect
calculations; and damage to some power plants, estimated at around US$100 million. World Bank estimations are in the same
order of magnitude. b. Aggregate figure received from Ministry of Energy.
Table 48. Damage to power transmission by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage
Chernihivska 1.50
Dnipropetrovska 7.87
Donetska 102.00
Kharkivska 24.87
Khersonska 82.29
Kyiv (city) 82.75
Kyivska 3.32
Luhanska 85.14
Mykolaivska 10.39
Odeska 0.11
Rivnenska 0.30
Sumska 6.88
Zakarpatska 0.19
Zaporizka 292.34
Zhytomyrska 0.04
Total 699.96
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
Table 39. Damage to power generation by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Nuclear Solar Wind Total
Kharkivska 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.48
Khersonska 0.00 0.00 23.52 23.52
Kyivska 57.00 0.00 0.00 57.00
Zaporizka 0.00 8.00 0.00 8.00
Grand total 57.00 8.48 23.52 89.00
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available as of June 1.
Infrastructure Sectors 137
damage to gas distribution infrastructure reported Power generation assets: As of the beginning of
by the largest operator of gas distribution networks, June, the damage to power generation assets
the Regional Gas Company, as well as almost US$150 totaled US$89 million (Table 49). Given ongoing
million reported by the Gas Transmission System and new damage in June, including damage to the
Operator. Damage to 28 fuel depots is estimated at thermal power plants in Eastern Ukraine and other
around US$250 million and to fuel stations at around power generation assets, the total damage will be
US$150 million. much higher.
Electricity sector. It is estimated that US$0.9 billion Gas transmission network: On May 10, 2022, the
in damage and losses was incurred at the largest gas TSO claimed that forces were interfering with
Zaporizka nuclear power plant during its occupation. a compressor station in in Novopskov, which is
The Okhtyrka, Chernihivska, Kremenchuk, and temporarily not under government control, and
Azovstal combined heat and power plants were diverting gas. This line supplied 33 percent of gas
destroyed. Control over DTEK’s coal power plant in piped through Ukraine to Europe. Consequently,
the Luganska region was lost.208 In Donetska and Ukraine’s gas TSO stopped shipments through
Luhanska regions, the combined heat and power Sokhranovka, offering to reroute though another
plants in Lisichansk and Sievierodonetsk were point (which Gazprom considered unfeasible). This
recently destroyed, as was the Vyglegirska TPP in shutdown is not expected to substantially affect gas
Svitlodarsk. Only around 50 percent of renewable transit but has contributed to increasing uncertainty
energy capacity is working; 73 percent of wind energy in European gas markets. The damage to gas
capacity is not operating or is located in regions distribution networks continue; for example, on
temporarily not under government control. The June 14, 2022, in the Zaporizka oblast, the medium-
transmission sector has suffered damage in some pressure pipes were damaged.209 Damage to gas
substations, but most damage is at the distribution networks has also been occurring in Khersonska,
level. The damage to the power transmission Donetska, Luhanska, Kharkivska, and Mykolaivska
networks across the regions is given in Table 48. oblasts. As of the end of May, overall damage is
estimated to be not less than US$330 million.210
Table 50. Damage to gas transmission network by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Gas TSO (excluding regional
Oblast
distribution networks)
Chernihivska 0.04
Dnipropetrovska 3.67
Donetska 23.35
Kharkivska 5.90
Khersonska 1.65
Kyivska 0.26
Luhanska 2.38
Mykolaivska 0.07
Sumska 31.78
Zaporizka 78.15
Total 147.24
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
208 Ukrainian thermal power plants rely on local coal, with mining and supply at risk.
209 Kosatka, Link.
210 RGC, Link.
138 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 51. Damage to district heating networks by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Boiler Central heating Combined heat Heating
Oblast Total
house points and power networks
Chernihivska 11.51 14.50 29.44 8.03 63.47
Dnipropetrovska 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.15
Donetska 7.70 0.17 0.00 471.16 479.04
Kharkivska 30.33 8.14 3.70 5.51 47.67
Kyiv (city) 0.20 0.00 - 0.00 0.20
Kyivska 14.53 0.00 - 0.00 14.53
Luhanska 6.63 0.00 - 0.00 6.63
Lvivska 0.20 0.00 - 0.00 0.20
Mykolaivska 6.92 1.61 0.05 0.00 8.58
Odeska 0.59 0.00 - 0.00 0.59
Poltavska 0.20 0.00 16.03 0.00 16.23
Sumska 3.02 3.31 11.79 0.04 18.16
Zhytomyrska 3.12 0.00 - 0.18 3.30
Total 84.93 27.73 61.15 484.92 658.72
Source: Assessment team. Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
Note: The data on the damages on CHPs can be bigger (up to US$100 million) since not all damages were documented. Given
that, the grand total for damages the district heating (US$658.72 million) is rounded up to US$700 million.
Gas transmission operators have also received may need to start during the active war period to
significant damage to their systems, as described ensure adequate reserves. However, while gas
in Table 50. prices have skyrocketed, revenue collection has
dropped, and Naftogaz has requested donor support
Gas needs in preparation for the next heating season: to purchase gas.
Ukraine’s gas reserves were almost depleted during
the last heating season. At the beginning of August District heating network: A large part of district
2022, Naftogaz had around 10.2 billion cubic meters heating infrastructure in war-affected areas is
(bcm) of natural gas available in storage.211 From damaged beyond recovery and will need to be
this amount, only 5.5 bcm may be used for the next built back to modern, more efficient standards, or
heating period because there is a need to keep a gas replaced by other sustainable heating solutions,
reserve for operational reasons. Current domestic combined with more energy-efficient reconstruction
gas production is around 1.5 bcm per month (about of buildings. The estimations of the damage to the
4 percent less than the prewar level), making it district heating network are given in Table 51.
possible (i) to cover the summer consumption, and
(ii) to pump about 3 bcm into storage by the next Repairs of energy networks during the war: In the
ongoing war, energy sector companies have been
heating season.212 This means that around 5 bcm will
playing an essential role in maintaining the provision of
need to be imported to reach the historical average
electricity, gas, and heating services to the population,
level of gas storage by the start of the next heating
but they are facing shortages of fuel, spare parts, and
season.213 Actual needs for the next heating season tools. The need for emergency repairs of equipment
could be lower in the event of a mild winter and is increasing every day, but the most urgent needs
considering lower demand and destroyed district for electricity and gas networks amount to around
heating infrastructure. In any event, gas purchases US$100–150 million. Emergency repairs for district
211 Data on the gas stored by Naftogaz was accessed in August 2022 through this link.
212 BIZ, Link.
213 UA Energy, Link.
Infrastructure Sectors 139
Table 52. Damage to transport fuel infrastructure by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Fuel stock Gas station Oil depot Total
Chernihivska 0 18.19 0.00 18.19
Donetska 0 12.63 0.00 12.63
Kharkivska 0 40.99 0.00 40.99
Kyivska 0 19.47 15.00 34.47
Luhanska 0 11.93 0.00 11.93
Lvivska 0 0.00 12.00 12.00
Mykolaivska 0 7.58 0.00 7.58
Nonspecified 0 0.00 60.60 60.60
Poltavska 0 0.00 18.00 18.00
Sumska 0 21.02 0.00 21.02
Vinnytska 0 0.00 12.00 12.00
Zakarpatska 0 0.00 14.40 14.40
Zhytomyrska 0 2.02 0.00 2.02
Nationwide 120.00 0.00 0.00 120.00
Total 120.00 133.83 132.00 385.83
Source: Assessment team. Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
heating focused on safety are estimated at around (Pivdenodonbaska G3) mine has been closed due to
US$100 million according to the information provided heavy shelling. A preliminary estimate of damage to
by Ministry of Regions. The Energy Community coal mining operations shared by the MoE states a
Secretariat is helping coordinate donor support for figure of US$111 million. Data on other mine types
electricity sector repairs. The World Bank has raised could not be obtained. The cost of environmental
awareness about the needs of gas companies with the impacts resulting from damage to mining
Ministry of Finance to secure budget for critical repairs. infrastructure (e.g., groundwater contamination due
to interruption of water management systems) is not
Fuel for transport: Ukraine’s current fuel needs included in this estimate.
amount to approximately 100,000 tons of petroleum,
250,000 tons of diesel, and 70,000 tons of LPG Losses: Effects on Production and Access to Goods
(liquified petroleum gas) every month. After the and Services
destruction of refineries and depots, the government
is negotiating with the EU to provide Ukraine with In total, losses in the energy sector due to war are
“green corridors” for fuel supply through the ports estimated at US$11.7 billion, without considering the
of Gdansk, Gdynia, Constanța, Świnoujście, and increase in gas import prices.
Burgas, and to create a new protected fuel reserve.
Estimated damage to transport fuel infrastructure is Access to energy services: As of June 1, energy
shown in Table 52. sector companies had managed to maintain energy
services for most consumers. While damage to
Mining. Many important mines are in areas at the core energy transmission infrastructure has
risk. Some mines have already been flooded in the been limited, there is increasing damage to the
Luhanska oblast; Zolote and Toshkovska were flooded distribution infrastructure, which has left many
and are no longer recoverable. Two other mines consumers without access to electricity, gas, or
(Gorskaya and Karbonit) are also being gradually fuel supply. As of July 11, 765 settlements and over
flooded. In the Donetska oblast, the Pivdenodonbaska 580,000 consumers have been disconnected from
G1 mine has been heavily damaged. The Surgai the electricity supply, primarily due to damage
140 Infrastructure Sectors
Figure 22. VIIRS Relative Brightness Levels, January–May 2022
120%
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
January February March April May
Bucha Irpin Kyiv Odesa Mariupol Kharkiv
Source: Based on link.
Note: VIIRS = Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite.
in transmission and distribution networks, while In addition, about 244,000 consumers remain
immense efforts to restore power continue. Outages without gas supply, although recent efforts managed
significantly decreased in the Kyivska oblast since to reconnect a significant number of consumers.216
mid-March (when 1 million consumers were The regions most impacted by gas supply disruptions
disconnected), allowing for reconnections in that are Luhanska, Donetska, Zaporizka, Chernihivska,
area. However, outages are increasing in the east. Mykolaivska, and Kharkivska. Ukraine is also
While in this case nightlight brightness is not a direct experiencing a fuel deficit after canceling supplies
indicator of access to electricity services (since many from Belarussian oil refinery plants and suffering
citizens hide in their basements at night), in some attacks on local oil refinery plants (the Kremenchuk
cities it remains an indication of the loss of access plant in Poltava was destroyed by shelling, while the
to electricity. As shown in Figure 22, streetlights Shebelynsk plant in Kharkiv was closed because of
completely disappeared in most of Bucha and Irpin the active war in February 2022 and shelled by in
during March and April. In Kyiv, the decline was more June 2022).
gradual and has remained stable after the end April.
Due to the impacts described above, the war has also
The provision of electricity services has also considerably deteriorated the electricity sector’s
been threatened by recurring cyberattacks on the financial situation, jeopardizing the sustainability of
grid central operation center, making electricity energy provision throughout the country. In March
services widely vulnerable to frequent outages; and April 2022, electricity consumption decreased
during the first 40 days of the war, there were about significantly—by 35 percent in comparison to the
200,000 cyberattacks on energy infrastructure,214 previous year, and the collection rate dropped
compared with 900,000 for the whole of 2021, and by around 40 percent, on average. Electricity
cyberattacks have increased since then. On June consumption for the first half of 2022 is expected to
9, 2022, Ukrenergo reported that the number of be 20 percent lower than in 2021, while the collection
DDos (distributed denial-of-service) attacks during rate might be improved to 85 percent depending
three months of the war (March–May) was 10 times on the situation. Ukrenergo estimates the total
greater than the number of such attacks during the financial deficit for the electricity sector could reach
previous three years (2019–2021).215 US$2.6 billion by the end of 2022. While all sector
stakeholders would be affected, Ukrenergo and
Energoatom would accumulate the highest deficits,
214 ePravda, Link.
215 According to Ukrenergo’s announcement on its official Facebook page: Link.
216 According to the government update on the situation in the energy sector as of July 11, 2022: Link.
Infrastructure Sectors 141
Table 53. Recovery and reconstruction needs per category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Sector Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Power 960 1,440 2,400
District heating 540 810 1,350
Gas 5,340 510 5,850
Oil 320 480 800
Total 7,160 3,240 10,400
Source: Assessment team, based on various data.
Note: The needs for the gas sector also include the short-term need for purchasing natural gas for the upcoming heating
season, at the amount of US$5 billion. The rest of the amount includes the needs of reconstruction.
even if some of their financial obligations could Disrupted electricity services can lead to lootings of
be deferred. Ukrenergo in particular, as a center commercial businesses, while the inability to use a
of the sector’s financial settlements, is expected mobile phone (whether because there is no network
to accumulate financial debts deficits to various or because it cannot be charged) causes high levels
players, including Energoatom, Ukrhydroenergo, of stress in areas under attack, which must deal with
and RE producers. Its financial deficit is expected high violence levels and need emergency reporting
to increase to US$1.2 million (UAH 35.1 billion) by channels.
the end of 2022, even taking into account gradual
improvements in collection and consumption as well Broader effects in the sector and sectoral reforms:
as expected electricity export revenues.217 Beyond the direct war impacts, the lack of
maintenance in the network infrastructure, and
Gas sector: The KSE has estimated the loss of reduction of technical and managerial capabilities
revenues from gas production and gas supply as in the energy companies due to the war, increases
US$2 billion. In addition, due to the war, Russian the probability of new countrywide blackout events.
Gazprom has not fully paid transit payments to the In addition, some of the electricity and gas reforms
Ukrainian gas TSO. The transit payments for the under implementation before the war, aimed to
whole of 2022 come to about US$1.2 billion. improve the financial sustainability of the sector
and its governance have been put on hold due to
Coal mining sector: Data on losses could be obtained the need to ensure affordable energy prices for the
for mines located in Donetska and Luhanska population through the temporary introduction of
oblasts. According to the MoE, coal production from price caps, new public service obligations for SOEs
state mines located in the conflict-affected areas and difficulties to implement corporate governance
dropped by 37 percent from a pre-invasion baseline processes during war.
production of about 625,000 tons/month (snapshot
from January 2022). This translates into cumulative
losses of US$305 million over the duration of the
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
conflict. Assuming a linear loss scenario, every including Build Back Better
additional month of conflict will add US$75 million
to the losses. Data on other types of mines could not Preliminary estimates based on information shared
be obtained. by the government, SOEs, and the World Bank
indicate that reconstruction needs of power, gas,
Effects on living standards: The specific impact and fuel infrastructure are close to US$5.5 billion,
of electricity blackouts and district heating and as described in Table 53.
gas shortages is difficult to distinguish from the
other impacts of the war, but it is clear that lack Electricity sector: It is estimated that US$1,240
of heating or electricity in some impacted areas million are the needs related to the power
has aggravated the suffering of the population. transmission network, with indicative regional
217 Electricity export to ENTSO-E is expected to gradually increase with grid stability measures implemented in Ukraine.
142 Infrastructure Sectors
breakdown given in Table 54. As of the beginning of damage to the thermal power plants in Eastern
June, needs for power generation were estimated at Ukraine and to other power generation assets, the
more than US$157 million, as indicated in Table 55. total amount of these needs will be much higher.
Given ongoing and new damage in June, including
Table 54. Recovery and reconstruction needs for power transmission by oblast (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Chernihivska 1.06 1.59 2.65
Dnipropetrovska 5.58 8.36 13.94
Donetska 72.29 108.44 180.73
Kharkivska 17.62 26.44 44.06
Khersonska 58.32 87.48 145.80
Kyiv (city) 58.65 87.98 146.63
Kyivska 2.35 3.53 5.88
Luhanska 60.34 90.52 150.86
Mykolaivska 7.36 11.05 18.41
Odeska 0.08 0.12 0.19
Rivnenska 0.21 0.32 0.53
Sumska 4.87 7.31 12.18
Zakarpatska 0.13 0.20 0.33
Zaporizka 207.19 310.79 517.98
Zhytomyrska 0.03 0.04 0.07
Total 496.10 744.14 1,240.24
Source: Assessment team. Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
Table 55. Recovery and reconstruction needs for the power generation sector by oblast
and technology (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Nuclear Solar Wind Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Kharkivska 0.00 0.85 0.00 0.34 0.51 0.85
Khersonska 0.00 0.00 41.68 16.67 25.01 41.68
Kyivska 101.00 0.00 0.00 40.40 60.60 101.00
Zaporizka 0.00 14.18 0.00 5.67 8.51 14.18
Total 101.00 15.03 41.68 63.08 94.62 157.70
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
Infrastructure Sectors 143
Gas: Minimal needs of the gas transmission network District heating network: A large part of district
are estimated at US$260.89 million (Table 56); heating infrastructure has been destroyed in Eastern
however, it is expected that the final value of the Ukraine, where the share of urban population is the
needs will be much higher due to new damage as highest. As of June 1, the total needs were estimated
well as higher costs. to be about US$1.4 billion (Table 57). Given that
further destruction in Eastern Ukraine is likely, this
figure will be bigger.
Table 56. Recovery and reconstruction needs for gas transmission system operators
per oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Immediate/short term Medium- to long‑term Total
Chernihivska 0.03 0.04 0.07
Dnipropetrovska 2.60 3.90 6.50
Donetska 16.55 24.82 41.37
Kharkivska 4.18 6.27 10.46
Khersonska 1.17 1.75 2.92
Kyivska 0.18 0.27 0.46
Luhanska 1.69 2.53 4.22
Mykolaivska 0.05 0.08 0.13
Sumska 22.52 33.79 56.31
Zaporizka 55.39 83.08 138.46
Total 104.35 156.53 260.89
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available. The needs do not include regional gas distribution networks.
Table 57. Recovery and reconstruction needs in district heating sector by oblast and
type of asset (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Central Combined
Boiler Heating Immediate/short Medium- to
Oblast heating heat and Total
house networks term long‑term
points power
Chernihivska 23.41 29.49 59.88 16.34 49.66 79.46 129.12
Dnipropetrovska - - 0.30 - 0.12 0.19 0.30
Donetska 15.67 0.34 0.00 958.43 374.79 599.66 974.45
Kharkivska 61.69 16.56 7.53 11.20 37.30 59.67 96.97
Kyiv (city) 0.40 - - - 0.15 0.24 0.40
Kyivska 29.55 - - - 11.37 18.19 29.55
Luhanska 13.49 - - - 5.19 8.30 13.49
Lvivska 0.40 - - - 0.15 0.24 0.40
Mykolaivska 14.08 3.28 0.09 - 6.71 10.74 17.45
Odeska 1.19 - - - 0.46 0.73 1.19
Poltavska 0.40 - 32.61 - 12.69 20.31 33.00
Sumska 6.15 6.73 23.98 0.08 14.21 22.73 36.93
Zhytomyrska 6.35 - - 0.36 2.58 4.13 6.71
Grand total 172.76 56.40 124.39 986.42 515.37 824.60 1,339.97
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available. In the text, the total is rounded up to US$1,350 million.
144 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 58. Recovery and reconstruction needs in the transport fuel sector by oblast
(US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Immediate/short Medium- to
Oblast Fuel stock Gas station Oil depot Total
term long-term
Chernihivska 0 37.01 0 14.80 22.20 37.01
Donetska 0 25.70 0 10.28 15.42 25.70
Kharkivska 0 83.38 0 33.35 50.03 83.38
Kyivska 0 39.60 30.51 15.84 23.76 70.11
Luhanska 0 24.26 0 9.70 14.56 24.26
Lvivska 0 0 24.41 9.76 14.65 24.41
Mykolaivska 0 15.42 0 6.17 9.25 15.42
Nonspecified 0 0 123.27 61.51 92.27 123.27
Poltavska 0 0.00 36.62 14.65 21.97 36.62
Sumska 0 42.76 0 17.10 25.66 42.76
Vinnytska 0 0 24.41 9.76 14.65 24.41
Zakarpatska 0 0 29.29 11.72 17.58 29.29
Zhytomyrska 0 4.11 0 1.65 2.47 4.11
Nationwide 244.10 0 0 97.64 146.46 244.10
Total 244.10 272.23 268.51 313.94 470.91 784.85
Source: Assessment team.
Note: The table includes only regions for which data were available.
Transport fuel sector: In this sector, the needs were Guiding principles during
estimated at US$784 million, as shown in Table 58.
reconstruction
Coal mining sector: Based on the estimated damage
of US$110 million, the reconstruction needs will Resilient Reconstruction Phase the Government
probably be at least US$275 million. This figure is should prioritize measures in line European
based on the assumption that the damaged coal security and climate priorities, while promoting fast
infrastructure is generally aged and not up to modern economic recovery.
standards. Without having specific details on what
features and components of the coal sector have been Diversifying gas supply and integration with
damaged, it is probably safe to assume that quality European gas markets, including:
improvement and modernization to global standards
would cost at least twice the value of the damage, • Completing the gas sector reform and
equaling another US$110 million. There is an additional accelerating gas market integration with
factor to consider: many of the domestic production Europe. Proper governance and transparency
facilities for mining equipment, facilities for servicing should be high priorities to ensure a resilient
and repair, and contractors for mining-related works reconstruction. The independence and proper
(shaft sinking, underground construction) will have governance of the GTSO and gas regulator are
suffered damage and have gone out of business or prerequisite for integration with European gas
been plundered/dismantled. There is an expectation markets.
that a large share of reconstruction works, goods,
and services will be foreign-supplied, increasing • Optimizing gas (including biogas) production
the cost by another 50–100 percent (a “constrained and supply infrastructure (including to facilitate
market premium”). In summary, the investment imports of LNG) given the substantial reduction
needs for reconstruction are composed of US$110 in gas transit from Russia to Europe.
million (damage), US$110 million (quality upgrades),
plus US$55 million (market premium).
Infrastructure Sectors 145
• Optimizing power sector investments based term, although politically sensitive, an effective
on an indicative least cost expansion plan taxation scheme has to be introduced that favors
that maximize energy security, meet climate the uptake of small, efficient cars over inefficient
commitments, and build to modern standards. cars. Moving forward, European fuel economy
Hydro, variable renewables, and storage could standards for light- and heavy-duty vehicles are
help achieve higher energy security. set to increase significantly in the next decade,
which suggests that the EU policy framework
• Accelerating green hydrogen deployment. will continue to provide a sound foundation for
For Ukraine, the development of hydrogen Ukraine to gradually increase demand restraint
opportunities offers a wide set of benefits: (i) new and EE in the transport sector.
diversified exports; (ii) an opportunity to replace
natural gas transit revenue streams; (iii) an • Rebuilding public transportation with efficient
opportunity to leverage existing infrastructure; systems stimulating behavioral shift towards
and (iv) the potential of hydrogen to support public transport can help reduce energy demand.
Ukrainian decarbonization efforts.
• In the mid to long term, promoting adoption
Boosting energy efficiency during reconstruction of electric vehicles (EVs) in private and public
and electrifying energy demand when possible: transport.
• Operationalizing the EE law approved in October Consolidating integration with EU energy markets
2021. Secondary legislation should be enacted and boosting operational efficiency of the sector:
to operationalize the EE law, including create
enabling operating framework for Energy Service • Improving governance and regulation of
Companies (ESCOs) and defining subsector electricity markets in alignment and integration
strategies and targets. The role of regulators and with European markets
power sector players can be very important for
energy efficiency programs. • Rebuilding obsolete and damaged energy sector
using modern and efficient technologies.
Implementing large scale programs for efficient
reconstructions of residential and public buildings, • Reducing physical and regulatory barriers for
with focus on municipal and residential. Energy- energy imports from the EU electricity market,
efficient buildings are not only necessary for and increased supervision would help increase
decarbonization – they also provide higher thermal competition and sectoral governance in Ukraine.
comfort, better health, and lower energy costs (IEA, The integration of electricity markets offers
2019). Technologies that use fossil fuels (e.g., gas mutual benefits for Ukraine and EU countries.
furnace) should be replaced with technologies that
use electricity (e.g., heat pump) in existing buildings. • Mitigating Cybersecurity risks ensuring full
transposition of European directives.
• Replacing district heating infrastructure,
damaged beyond recovery, in accordance with • Accelerating scale-up of renewables:
modern sustainable heating standards more Decarbonizing electricity generation will
adapted to the needs of citizens as part of the require: (i) a significant expansion of solar and
building back better effort. The use of heating wind power; (ii) Confirming the potential of off-
pumps in multifamily buildings could be scale- shore wind and the preparation the regulatory
up in regions with relatively mild winters. Other framework to enable its deployment in the
sustainable heating options could replace gas in long term, and potential application for green
the mid-long term in areas where heating pumps hydrogen generation;(iii) Supporting energy
would be inefficient. storage (battery and pumped hydro) development
is needed to enable the integration of higher
• Green reconstruction of industrial sector. shares of variable RE. (iv) Promoting distributed
Measures aimed to reduce and electrify energy REs to reduce consumption. Distributed RE
consumption could help greening surviving can contribute to providing decentralized clean
industries. energy supply and reduce the demand to the
grid; and (v) Rethinking the value chain of nuclear
• Accelerating the alignment with European power and the need for future investments
fuel quality in transport sector. In the short
146 Infrastructure Sectors
Phasing out coal and promoting climate smart full inventory in areas controlled by Ukraine
mining, including: where inspections are feasible. Ukrenergo has
operational data on damage to the network and
• Rethinking Coal transition strategy. The drivers conducts inspections and repairs of damaged
for phasing out coal remain relevant in a post- assets. Thus, there are six categories of assets
war scenario. Moreover, so far three coal mines for Ukrenergo: (i) damaged, physically inspected,
and two coal power plants have been damaged, and reported (detailed damage assessment); (ii)
likely beyond repair. damaged and repaired; (iii) damaged and not
repaired; (iv) probably damaged according to the
• Promoting Climate-smart mining. Ukraine is operational data of the network system (or data
well-positioned to supply the minerals and metals on shelling for nonproductive assets), but not
needed for low-carbon technologies, including inspected; (v) located in areas that are partially
wind, solar, and batteries. controlled by the armed forced of Ukraine; and
(vi) located in territories temporarily not under
Limitations and Recommendations government control.
• Damage to assets in areas temporarily not
The assessment considers a range of assumptions
under government control has been reestimated
in addition to the general RDNA assumptions of
assuming partial damage instead of 100 percent
geographic scope and timeline:
damage (assumed by Ukrenergo). This should be
better quantified at a later stage.
• Damage and needs include both damage in
territories fully or partially controlled by Ukraine,
• The preliminary calculation of the energy sector
and damage in territories temporarily not under
investment needs uses generalized coefficients of
government control. Damage in territories
replacement costs based on data on investment
temporarily not under government control is
and repair programs and purchases of recent
estimated based on information available to the
years from World Bank projects in the region. In
government and other sources on actual damage
case of repeated damage to the same asset, the
to facilities. Assets in territories temporarily not
cost of preliminary repairs is used.
under government control are not considered as
definitely lost unless there is certainty that they
• For simplicity at this stage, needs are calculated
have been completely destroyed.
using a multiplier of 1.75 over damage. Needs
include demolition and cleaning works for
• The damage to power generation is based
partially and total damaged assets and are
on information from several sources, which
calculated using the multipliers agreed with the
sometimes highlight damage and needs based
government: for destroyed assets, 14.1 percent
on their own interests. Some assets have been
of the full cost of fully destroyed assets should
damaged and repaired multiple times. Given
be added for demolition and 1.875 percent for
the restrictions on data sharing imposed by the
the removal of debris; and for partially damaged
government, it was not possible to obtain direct
assets, 1.25 percent should be added for debris
detailed information on damage to distribution
removal, with the understanding that there will
networks. In the future, it will be necessary to
be no cost associated with demolition.
assess on the ground the actual extent of damage,
and a power sector model will be needed to refine
• Short-term needs include US$5 billion required
the needs estimates.
by Naftogaz to purchase gas in the short term
and liquidity needs in the electricity sector since
• The calculation of the transmission damage is
both are considered increased by the war.
based on estimates from Ukrenergo that included
a combination of two types of estimates: (i)
The main shortcoming of the analysis is that it is
preliminary estimates, which are applicable until
based on limited information in some subsectors
the end of hostilities and are based on available
and regions:
information from technical personnel (witnesses)
on the condition of the asset, the degree of its
• Power sector damages in areas controlled by
damage, and the possibility of recovery; and (ii)
Ukraine are considered accurate. Power sector
actual estimates, which are based on the results
damages in areas totally not under government
of actual inspection, technical inspection, and
control are estimated as 50 percent, but this could
Infrastructure Sectors 147
be overestimated. In areas partially controlled by generation facilities, as well as supply to related
Ukraine, the accuracy of estimates varies. transportation infrastructure (roads allowing
access to electric system infrastructure),
• Damage in electricity distribution is estimated connected main productive uses (large industry),
based on calculation by the KSE given that no water pumping stations, airports and seaports,
available data were found. and large urban centers.
• Damage in the power sector is estimated • Analysis of night lights. This could help verify
as replacement cost (with similar quality of damage to assets and access to electricity in
equipment). some areas of main cities.
• Needs in the power sector are estimated • Assessment of current operational status of
as replacement cost (with similar quality of key electricity generation infrastructure. For
equipment). this, the rapid assessment may be able to use
remote temperature sensing to identify plants
• Damage in the gas transmission sector is in operation, among other techniques. The
estimated as the value on the books provided by key infrastructure includes (i) hydroelectric
the gas TSO. generation plants, in particular those reporting
structural damage and leakages; (ii) thermal
• Damage in the gas distribution sector is estimated generation plants, prioritizing thermal power
as US$330 million, based on public statements plants larger than 300 MW, located in key network
of the private corporation that operated regional nodes and close to highly populated areas; (iii)
distribution networks till May 2022. high-voltage transmission lines; (iv) high-voltage
substations associated with key power plants
• Damage in the district heating sector was provided and transmission grid nodes; and (v) natural gas
by the government and compared with previous pipelines supplying thermal power plants.
estimations in some cities. Further verification
would be needed for greater precision. • Assessment of current operational status of the
distribution supply service. This analysis should
The following studies/analysis would help in the provide information on interruptions, number
future to provide a more detailed understanding of of hours of supply, scheduled and unscheduled
the sector: load shedding, etc., for the main large urban
areas, with particular focus on service delivery in
• Georeferenced database of the power grid assets hospitals, schools, key transport infrastructure
and power system facilities. This database (airport and seaports), and residential areas.
should include high-voltage transmission
lines, the location of main substations in those • Satellite imaging of key assets for validation
lines, transformers, and the location of power purposes, to estimate damage more accurately.
148 Infrastructure Sectors
TRANSPORT
Summary Background
Damage (US$29.9 billion), losses (US$26.1 billion), The transport network is extensive across every
and needs (US$73.8 billion) in Ukraine’s transport subsector by virtue of Ukraine’s scale, geographical
sector are large and indicative of the strategic position, and population distribution. Ukrainian
value that combatants have placed on transport transport networks include 46,600 km of government-
networks. Overall damages include: (i) 8,699 km of controlled highways, approximately 200,000 km of
motorways, highways, and other national roads; (ii) local roads, 19,800 km of railways (of which 9,300 km
7,619 km of oblast and village roads; (iii) 3 million are electrified), 25 civil airports, 27 river ports, and 15
m2 of bridges on national roads; (iv) 428,470 m2 of seaports. Prior to the war, approximately 70 percent
bridges on local roads; (v) 1,119 km of railway lines; of Ukraine’s population lived in urban areas. This is a
(vi) 93 railway stations; (vii) 63,072 m2 of railway relatively high urbanization rate when compared to
bridges; (viii)) 392,843 private vehicles; (ix) 9,473 other European countries such as Poland (60 percent),
km of communal roads; (x) 16 airports; and (x) Romania (54 percent), and Moldova (42.7 percent).
850 units of urban public transport rolling stock. Ukraine had five cities near or above 1 million people,
Losses include consideration for (i) loss of Black Sea four cities between 500,000 and 1 million people, and
transport; (ii) disruptions to road and rail transport at least 15 cities between 250,000 and 500,000 people.
services due to damaged infrastructure; (iii) losses Urban transport systems in major cities include
associated with closure of Ukraine’s airspace; and metro, public buses, trolleybuses, trams, and privately
(iv) the cost of rail transport service provided free of owned small and medium-size buses locally called
charge for refugee evacuation as well as import of “marshrutka.”
humanitarian supplies. Envisaged short-, medium-,
and long-term needs reflect the enabling role that The Ministry of Infrastructure is the lead oversight
transport will play across sectors as well as the and policy institution for Ukraine’s transport
need to facilitate European Union (EU) integration. sector, and the ministry’s subsidiary institutions,
Transport sector reconstruction is estimated to and the ministry’s subsidiary institutions, along
require approximately US$73.8 billion, with US$8.9 with municipal governments, are the primary
billion in the immediate/short-term, along with an implementing bodies. Authorities and state-owned
additional US$64.9 billion in the medium to long- enterprises under the Ministry of Infrastructure
term. The estimates are approximate and are subject implement service provision, investment, and
to assumptions about the configuration and scope of asset management for the national road network,
Ukraine’s transport networks after reconstruction. national railways network, aviation, maritime,
The nature and level of demands on that network and inland waterways subsectors. In the case of
may affect the economic viability of building back to urban transport, municipal governments (and their
a given set of standards. The highest-priority needs municipal enterprises or departments) deliver
for reconstruction are (i) restoration of basic network services, implement investments, and manage
functionality (road, rail, and air) for both humanitarian assets, while the Ministry of Infrastructure retains
aid flows and support to broader reconstruction the lead role in policy formulation. The most notable
efforts across sectors, as these will rely on transport funding flows in the transport sector prior to the
access; (ii) enhancement of westward road and rail war occurred in the road sector through a national
linkages to the EU to facilitate economic integration road fund. In 2022 alone, the national road fund was
with Europe’s single market and provide resilience expected to support more than US$2.5 billion in
to any potential future disruptions of Black Sea maintenance and investment spending on roads.
access; and (iii) transformation of legacy networks
toward EU standards for safety, service quality, and
interoperability as a complement to Ukraine’s stated
Damage and Loss Assessment
policy objective of EU accession, which will require
The war has directly affected up to 26 percent of the
alignment with the EU acquis.
area of Ukraine within nine oblasts. Muddy terrain
throughout the winter and spring of 2022 has focused
Infrastructure Sectors 149
Figure 23. Damage by asset category (US$ million)
381
1%
Road bridges (national roads)
3,143 4,020 Road bridges (local roads)
11% 428
13%
1% Motorways, highways, and other national roads
3,469 Oblast and village roads
12% Communal roads
1,631 Airports
5% 7,831 Railways track, bridges, stations, and electrical
26%
463 Railway rolling stock, equipment, & other assets
2% 4,736
Private vehicles
16%
3,810 Urban public transport
13%
Source: Assessment team based on Ministry of Infrastructure data.
heavy armor movements and fighting along critical Russian Federation has heavily relied on railway
road and rail axes. Airport infrastructure has been a transport for logistical support of its invasion forces.
primary target for aerial attacks since initial fighting Ukraine has relied heavily on its railway network
occurred, and airspace closure has shut down the for military operations as well as for evacuation
entire civilian air travel industry for Ukraine. Bridges of civilians, import of humanitarian aid, and export
have been destroyed either deliberately to deny of goods that would normally have transited via
access or as collateral damage. Urban settlements the Black Sea. A particularly noteworthy element
have been deliberately targeted with associated of transport infrastructure damage has been road
damage to urban transport networks that are nodes and railway bridges (3.5 million m2 and 63,000 m2
of civilian activity. More recently, the protracted damaged respectively). The extent of damage to
nature of fighting and intensive use of artillery has bridge assets aligns with the critical role that bridges
required extensive logistics and supply efforts, with play in enabling maneuvers, supply, evacuation, and
associated increase in targeting of transport nodes export/import as well as their inherent vulnerability
in eastern oblasts. In addition, the loss of Black Sea as readily identifiable critical points that can sever
access has increased the strategic significance of access. Damages by asset category are shown in
westward road and railway linkages via the European Figure 23. Table 59 provides damage inventory by
Union, and these linkages have also attracted strikes asset type; and Table 60 provides damage by oblast.
aimed at disrupting supply lines.
While transport networks have suffered extensively,
Overall transport sector damages are estimated institutional capacity in the transport sector has
at US$29.9 billion. The largest concentrations of proven remarkably robust. Ukraine’s national road
damages are (i) local oblast, village and communal authority (Ukravtodor) and its national railway
roads combined (29 percent); (ii) motorways, company (Ukrzaliznytsia or “UZ”) have continued
highways, and other national roads (26 percent); (iii) to undertake emergency repairs, deliver services,
road bridges on national roads (15 percent); and (iv) and inventory damaged assets in reclaimed
railways rolling stock, equipment, and other assets territory. The data used to assess transport damage
(12 percent). The extensive damages estimated for were sourced primarily from these entities. The
Ukraine’s road and bridge network reflect both institutional capacity of municipal entities involved
damages due to combat and estimated damage due in urban public transport has fared considerably
to overloading of roads and bridges with armored worse in areas that suffered heavy fighting, likely
vehicles and supply convoys. Experience from past due to less redundancy in staffing and potential
conflicts (e.g., Iraq, former Yugoslavia) has shown simultaneous damage to both home and work
that movements of heavy armor along road networks locations for employees. Considering this, it is likely
degrade road structure as well as pavement surfaces, that urban transport damage (currently US$381
which subsequently requires full rehabilitation. The million) reflects underreporting.
150 Infrastructure Sectors
Losses in the transport sector are estimated at which adds direct transport cost to shipping via
US$26.1 billion and are dominated by the effects alternative routes. Actual losses are likely to exceed
of losing Black Sea access (US$17.6 billion or estimates due to factors such as inventory carrying
67 percent). Prior to Russia’s war on Ukraine, costs, additional chance of spoilage or loss during
ports along the Black Sea and Azov Sea handled transit, and greater complexity in coordinating the
approximately 135–150 million tonnes of cargo per logistics chain to more distant ports.
year. This included approximately 70 percent of all
exports and specifically about 95 percent of all grain The full shutdown of Ukraine’s airspace has created
exports from Ukraine. In lieu of Black Sea access, extensive loss to the aviation sector (US$4.5 billion
Ukraine’s shippers are reliant on longer road and or 17 percent of all losses). Aviation has historically
rail routes to ports on Danube River, and the Baltic, contributed approximately 1.1 percent to Ukraine’s
Adriatic, Atlantic, or Romanian/Bulgarian Black Sea gross domestic product through employment,
coast. The additional distance required to reach aviation supply chains, and indirect impacts on
alternative ports is approximately 1,200–1,500 km, tourism, according to the International Air Transport
Figure 24. Losses by category (US$ million)
4,534 Loss of Black Sea port access
148 17%
1% Loss due to damaged road connectivity
1,962 Losses due to damaged rail connectivity
8% Losses due to free rail transport of refugees and aid
331
1% 1,552 Aviation - overflight revenue losses
6%
17,587 Aviation losses due to industry shutdown
67%
Source: Assessment team based on MOI data.
Table 59. Damage inventory by asset types (units as indicated) as of June 1, 2022
Partially Completely Total damaged
Baseline
Asset type Damaged destroyed assets
Public Private Public Private Public Private Public Private
Road bridges
17,936,293 n.a. n.a. n.a. 3,035,177 n.a. 3,035,177 n.a.
(national roads) [m2]
Road bridges
10,686,760 n.a. n.a. n.a. 984,347 n.a. 984,347 n.a.
(local roads) [m2]
Motorways, highways,
and other national 46,600 n.a. n.a. n.a. 8,699 n.a. 8,699 n.a.
roads [km]
Oblast roads, village
roads, and other local 200,000 n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,422 n.a. 18,422 n.a.
roads [km]
Residential roads
n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 9,473 n.a. 9,473 n.a.
(cities and towns) [km]
Airports [each] 25 n.a. 9 n.a. 14 n.a. 14 n.a.
Railways track [km] 19,800 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,119 n.a. 1,119 n.a.
Private Cars [each] 10,811,850 n.a. n.a. n.a. 392,843 n.a. 392,843
Urban public transport
80,909 n.a. n.a. n.a. 850 n.a. 850 n.a.
[# rolling stock units]
Source: Assessment team. Note: no information on partially damaged. Note: n.a. = not applicable.
Infrastructure Sectors 151
Association (IATA). Closure of Ukrainian airspace provided for evacuation/import of humanitarian
to civilian traffic has created a complete loss in aid. Road-related disruptions (6 percent of losses)
this subsector. A secondary source of loss related reflect assumptions on the need for detour routes
to aviation is the loss of overflight revenues and higher vehicle operating costs on damaged
(US$149 million) from long-haul flights transiting roads due to degraded conditions. Estimated losses
between Europe and Asia via a common route for for the railway sector across different categories are
circumnavigation. It is important to note that the estimated at US$2.3 billion (9 percent). These reflect
RDNA considered only the impact of lost overflight (i) estimates of forgone gross profits due to network
revenue on Ukraine without considering the losses disruptions (1 percent); and (ii) losses from free
endured by international airlines no longer able to transport of humanitarian supplies and refugees (8
transit Ukrainian (and potentially Russian) airspace percent). While these losses appear small relative to
due to the war. For an “average” Europe-Asia the scale of losses attributable to severed Black Sea
connection, the additional distance required can access, it should be noted that their combined total
result in losses between US$20,000 and $50,000 exceeds US$3.8 billion.
per flight due to additional fuel and other aircraft
operating costs. Losses by category are shown in
Figure 24. Losses by oblast are in Table 60.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
including Build Back Better
Disruptions to road and rail networks have created
important losses due to increased road user costs, Total transport sector needs are estimated to be
forgone rail revenues, and free transport services US$73.8 billion. The largest category of need includes
Table 60. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Total damage Total losses
Oblast
Public Private Public Private
Cherkaska 59.2 0.0 531.4 107.2
Chernihivska 1,891.3 119.4 538.3 138.0
Chernivetska 0.0 0.0 204.4 41.2
Dnipropetrovska 190.4 0.0 2,003.7 404.6
Donetska 5,186.4 1,016.0 1,159.3 255.9
Ivano-Frankivska 5.0 0.0 449.6 90.7
Kharkivska 3,447.3 266.7 1,432.0 326.4
Khersonska 3,122.3 35.5 457.6 122.0
Khmelnytska 12.5 0.0 429.2 86.6
Kyivska 1,507.6 506.6 6,089.3 1,247.3
Kirovohradska 40.0 0.0 367.9 74.2
Luhanska 4,552.7 989.3 303.2 83.6
Lvivska 4.7 0.0 1,103.6 222.7
Mykolaivska 1,002.4 0.0 570.1 137.8
Odeska 154.6 0.0 1,022.7 206.6
Poltavska 0.0 0.0 960.5 193.9
Rivnenska 2.0 0.0 347.4 70.1
Sumska 1,414.0 101.1 492.5 123.0
Ternopilska 0.0 0.0 286.1 57.7
Vinnytska 55.5 0.0 674.4 136.1
Volynska 1.4 0.0 388.3 78.4
Zakarpatska 0.0 0.0 306.6 61.9
Zaporizka 3,946.1 108.2 967.9 234.1
Zhytomyrska 174.3 0.0 437.3 90.1
Total 26,769.6 3,142.7 21,523.1 4,590.4
Source: Assessment team.
152 Infrastructure Sectors
Figure 25. Recovery and reconstruction needs by asset type (US$ million)
468
0%
643 Road bridges (national roads)
5,893 1%
7,427 Road bridges (local roads)
8% 10%
Motorways, highways, and other national roads
Oblast and village roads
13,023
18% Communal roads
Airports
27,177 Railways track, bridges, stations, and electrical
7,235
37% Railway rolling stock, equipment, & other assets
10%
5,684 Private vehicles
1,694 8% Urban public transport
2% 4,571
6%
Source: Assessment team based on Ministry of Infrastructure data.
(i) motorways, highways, and other national roads fully recaptured by the Government of Ukraine,
(37 percent); (ii) railway rolling stock, equipment, and contain approximately 23 percent of transport
other assets (18 percent); (iii) road bridges on both sector needs. The balance of needs (about 3 percent)
national and local roads (11 percent combined); and reflects damage in oblasts that have been subject to
(iv) railway track, bridges, and electrical equipment aerial bombardment (e.g., missile attack) targeting
(10 percent). The large portion of needs for road- airports, rail nodes, road bridges, and locations
and railways-related investments reflects both the within urban population centers that also represent
level of damages in these subsectors as well as the nodes in urban transport networks. Needs by oblast
large cost differentials between legacy Ukrainian are shown in Figure 26; see also Figure 27.
standards and the standards that Ukraine would
eventually target during reconstruction as an EU The Ministry of Infrastructure is expected to lead
candidate country. In the case of national roads, reconstruction efforts in the transport sector and
this specifically means reconstruction to modern to structure implementation arrangements within
standards of road safety and service quality that its network of subsidiary institutions. There are four
characterize recently constructed motorways and priority areas where the Ministry of Infrastructure
highways in the European Union. Similarly, for is expected to focus attention in preparing
railways Ukraine’s needs were assumed to include reconstruction:
implementation of the European Railway Traffic
Management System (ERTMS) and compliance with 1. Project identification, prioritization, sequencing,
Technical Standards for Interoperability (TSI). Unit and commercial strategy: There is a need
costs from neighboring EU states informed the to identify and frame reconstruction project
calculation of needs accordingly. The need to rebuild packages and to sequence them over time. This
to European Union standards explain the majority process should reflect transformation strategies
of differences in scale between damage and needs to “build back better” in specific subsectors, the
(approximately 2.5 times). Needs by asset type are relative priority of needs, a logical sequencing
shown in Figure 25. of interdependent works, and commercial
considerations for bundling contracts according
Needs are highest in the eastern and southern to the scale and scope that the market for
oblasts that have seen protracted ground fighting, engineering and contractor services can meet.
intensive artillery use, and deliberate destruction The commercial strategy for delivering works at
of transport networks to deny access. Specifically, the scale envisaged for Ukraine’s reconstruction
Donetska, Luhanska, Khersonska, Kharkivska, would likely require an increase in the number of
Mykolaivska, and Zaporizka oblasts (which still have international construction firms that are active in
active fighting) together account for approximately Ukraine in parallel with efforts to grow smaller
74 percent of transport reconstruction needs. domestic firms into internationally competitive
Kyivska oblast (including the city of Kyiv), Sumska firms.
oblast, and Chernihivska oblast, which have been
Infrastructure Sectors 153
Figure 26. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million)
14,000
12,000
10,000
USD million
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-
Cherkasy
Chernihiv
Chernivtsi
Dnipropetrovsk
Donetsk
Ivano-Frankivsk
Kharkiv
Kherson
Khmelnytskyi
Kyiv
Kirovohrad
Luhansk
Lviv
Mykolaiv
Odessa
Poltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Vinnytsia
Volyn
Zakarpattia
Zaporizhzhia
Zhytomyr
Zakarpatska
Source: Assessment team based on Ministry of Infrastructure data.
Figure 27. Damage, losses, and needs by oblast (US$ million)
14,000
12,000
USD million
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-
Kyiv
Lviv
Cherkasy
Chernihiv
Chernivtsi
Dnipropetrovsk
Donetsk
Ivano-Frankivsk
Kharkiv
Kherson
Khmelnytskyi
Kirovohrad
Luhansk
Mykolaiv
Odessa
Poltava
Rivne
Sumy
Ternopil
Vinnytsia
Volyn
Zakarpattia
Zaporizhzhia
Zhytomyr
Damage [USD m.] Loss [USD m.] Needs [USD m.]
Source: Assessment team based on Ministry of Infrastructure data.
2. Implementation structures for individual recruit international-caliber staff. Replicating this
subsectors: The Ministry of Infrastructure’s model for railways, aviation, maritime, and urban
implementing bodies would potentially need to transport subsectors could offer the way forward
establish specialized implementation units (or for structing implementation arrangements
multiple units) to manage projects in specific across the transport sector.
subsectors. Given the likelihood of international
support, these units should be capable of 3. Mobilizing technical project preparation: The
preparing/managing projects to the requirements reconstruction projects needed in the transport
of bilateral or multilateral development sector are technically complex and engineering
institutions with respect to technical, fiduciary, intensive. Some will require environmental
and environmental/social requirements. Ukraine assessments and/or land acquisition processes
has experience of mobilizing such a unit under along with public consultation processes.
the national roads company, which was known as Alignment with European Union peers will also
Ukradorinvest (UDI) and previously implemented require Ukraine to apply standards that differ
projects financed by the World Bank, European from or modify those previously used. While it
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and may be possible to temporarily apply foreign
European Investment Bank. A key advantage of standards (e.g., Polish motorway standards),
UDI was its ability to pay market-competitive Ukraine’s own domestic standards will eventually
salaries (above the standard civil service) and to need amendments to align with the EU acquis.
154 Infrastructure Sectors
Project preparation tasks would reasonably public transport services was never defined
be expected to cost between 2 percent and 10 systemically. Providing financial strategies for
percent of total civil works investment. Initiating transport subsectors during reconstruction is
these tasks immediately and beginning technical both necessary in the immediate term and likely
preparations for “no regret” investments that are to prove complementary for post-reconstruction
highly likely to fall into highest-priority categories efforts to ensure financial sustainability of critical
is essential to rapid mobilization and Ukraine’s transport services.
ability to absorb reconstruction funding in the
transport sector. Envisaged short-, medium-, and long-term needs
reflect the enabling role that transport will play
4. Financial strategy and the roles of international across sectors as well as the need to facilitate
funds, sovereign funding, and user charging EU integration. Transport sector reconstruction is
in specific subsectors: The scale of investment estimated to require approximately US$8.9 billion in
needed for Ukraine’s reconstruction is beyond the the immediate/short term along with an additional
budgetary capacity of the Ministry of Infrastructure US$64.9 billion in the medium- to long-term (Table
and its subsidiary institutions in virtually all 61). The highest-priority needs for reconstruction are
subsectors. International assistance in the form (i) restoration of basic network functionality (road,
of grants, loans, and/or guarantees from external rail, and air) for both humanitarian aid flows and
sources is expected to augment what fiscal support to broader reconstruction efforts across
capacity Ukraine may have during reconstruction. sectors, as these will rely on transport access; (ii)
Beyond these sources, there will also be a role for enhancement of westward road and rail linkages to
user charging to support investment and long- the European Union to facilitate economic integration
term sustainability of transport services. Each with Europe’s single market and to provide resilience
specific subsector will accordingly need a financial to any potential future disruptions of Black Sea
strategy and indicative expenditure envelope that access; and (iii) transformation of legacy networks
reflects credible funding sources and their role in toward EU standards for safety, service quality, and
supporting direct expenditures or underpinning interoperability as a complement to Ukraine’s stated
different forms of financing to structure payment policy objective of EU accession, which will require
over time (sovereign, nonsovereign, commercial, alignment with the EU acquis.
etc.). Prior to the war, Ukraine’s national road
sector had secured international financing and
commercial finance using user charges that
Limitations and Recommendations
flowed into the national road fund (along with
The RDNA considers assets including roads,
sovereign guarantees). However, Ukraine had
railways, aviation, ports, and urban public transport
yet to mobilize analogous mechanisms in other
as part of the assessment. Specific limitations in the
subsectors and had yet to fully implement financial
approach used to assess damage, losses, and needs
planning for the road fund itself. In addition, the
include the following:
national government’s financial role in urban
Table 61. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Short term Medium to long term Total needs
Road bridges (national roads) 891 6,536 7,427
Road bridges (local roads) 77 566 643
Motorways, highways, and other national roads 3,261 23,916 27,177
Oblast roads, village roads, and other local roads 549 4,023 4,571
Residential roads (cities and towns) 682 5,002 5,684
Airports 203 1,490 1,694
Railways track, bridges, stations, and electrical 868 6,366 7,235
Railway rolling stock, equipment, & other assets 1,563 11,460 13,023
Private cars 707 5,186 5,893
Urban public transport 56 412 468
Total 8,858 64,957 73,815
Source: Assessment team.
Infrastructure Sectors 155
• Data sets and completeness: Damage to road, • Continuation of lost Black Sea access and
rail, aviation, and urban transport assets reflected airspace closure: Loss calculations assume that
data provided through Ukraine’s Ministry of Ukraine’s Black Sea access will remain impeded
Infrastructure. The accuracy of these data varies by and that Ukraine’s airspace will remain closed
oblast according to the security situation—that is, throughout the “recovery” (loss) time considered
according to whether Ministry of Infrastructure staff under the RDNA assessment (3+18 months). This
or the ministry’s implementing subsidiaries can may prove overly pessimistic and depends on
access sites and validate (at least approximately) the development of the war and international
locations and actual levels of damage. Where diplomacy efforts to re-open the Black Sea.
precise data on damaged assets are unavailable
due to ongoing fighting, RDNA analysis has relied The foremost recommendations to address the
on area-based calculations using GIS tools and/or above are as follows: (i) once security conditions
the Ministry of Infrastructure’s indicative estimates allow, intensify field-level investigations and
for the extent of damage. engineering work needed to identify and classify
damage; and (ii) in parallel with improved damages
• Indirect losses: With the exception of aviation, data following field validation, expand consideration
losses calculations do not currently consider for indirect losses, which will require additional
indirect losses. This limitation may be most complexity in the calculation methodologies used
relevant in the case of lost Black Sea access, for assessment.
where specific industry clusters near port
agglomerations were likely predicated on The estimates for the substantial investment needs
transport via the Black Sea and would not are approximate and are subject to assumptions
otherwise be competitive without such access. about the configuration and scope of Ukraine’s
Disruptions to specific road or rail linkages transport networks after reconstruction. In addition,
may have similar effects on industries with the nature and level of demands on that network
ridged mode requirements, where switching may affect the economic viability of building back to
to alternative forms of transport may not be a given set of standards. Postwar Ukraine’s eastern
possible. The effect of these limitations is likely and northern borders with Russia and Belarus are
an underestimate in the scale of losses suffered particularly relevant in this regard. For example,
due to transport sector disruptions, though if borders remain closed or impeded, motorways
some of these effects would likely be captured in may be downgraded to national roads and railway
analysis by other sectors. lines may be simplified (e.g., through track closures,
single tracking, or simplified signaling), either
• Cost estimates: Cost estimates for reconstruction because they lack economic viability or because
needs reflect the use of unit costs or the government has made a policy decision to
approximations for specific assets (e.g. airport prioritize resources for westward linkages. In a
terminals). This approach is approximate and hypothetical case where 50 percent of damaged
actual costs would vary by location within Ukraine motorways would be downgraded to national roads
due to different geographical factors as well as (“H” category), total transport sector needs would
market factors that may affect pricing of works. decrease by approximately US$2.1 billion. It is also
Unit costs also reflect assumptions regarding possible that Ukraine may choose to build back to
the nature of works required for reconstruction, standards lower than the EU standards due to fiscal
which may be inaccurate, particularly where or other constraint. In a hypothetical scenario where
technical solutions would be different from reconstruction costs are 20 percent lower than the
those assumed (e.g., a different route or mode currently assumed cost of investment in both local
alternative developed to meet a transport need). and national roads/bridges and rail infrastructure,
transport sector needs would decrease by US$13.2
• Assumptions regarding extent of damage: The billion overall (US$9.1 billion less for roads and
assessment of damages has not included detailed US$4.1 billion less for rail). Conversely, increases in
engineering work or testing that would eventually needs are also possible if the amount of investment
be necessary to definitively assess levels of required to achieve higher standards is greater than
damage and determine appropriate mitigation assumed. At this stage in Ukraine’s recovery, it is
strategies. Such assessments would clarify important to note the inherent uncertainty around
whether assets assumed to be fully damaged the configuration of transport networks and the
require may only require repairs or whether full impact this has on estimated needs.
replacement/rehabilitation is needed.
156 Infrastructure Sectors
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
AND DIGITAL
Summary Partnership (EaP) countries, comparable to that of
Poland (127 percent) and Bulgaria (134 percent).218
In terms of coverage, 36 million Ukrainians (out of
The damage in the telecommunications and digital
a population of 41.9 million) had mobile coverage
sector has reached US$0.7 billion. This includes
prewar, according to Ukrcensus data. The mobile
US$0.6 billion for telecom operators (fixed and
telecommunications market was competitive, and
mobile), US$0.08 billion for postal service companies,
mobile internet generally affordable to an average
and US$0.04 billion for Ukraine’s broadcasting
Ukrainian. The wireless market in Ukraine displayed
provider. Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, and
levels of competition similar to comparable European
Zaporizka oblasts account for 67 percent of the
markets: the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) of
damage to telecom operators. The damage to
0.38 (Ukraine has three major operators controlling
postal services is similarly concentrated: Donetska
97 percent of the market) was comparable to that
and Kharkivska oblasts account for 68 percent
of Poland (0.2), Bulgaria (0.33), and Romania (0.28).
of damage to postal infrastructure (post offices,
On the cost of mobile cellular tariffs, the World
depots, sorting centers, etc.). In broadcasting, there
Economic Forum (WEF) ranked Ukraine 48th out of
are 49 damaged and nonoperational TV towers as
139 economies in 2016.219 A 2019 survey by Factum
of June 1, 2022, 11 of them in Luhanska oblast and
Group, a consultancy, found that 64 percent of
12 in Zaporizka. Losses of economic value added in
Ukrainians used internet (fixed or mobile) at least
the sector amount to US$0.6 billion for the period
once a month.220
between the war’s start and June 1, 2022. The needs
for reconstruction and recovery are estimated
Fixed broadband penetration was 32 percent as
at US$3.3 billion over the medium term within 10
of 2019, according to TeleGeography; this is below
years. Among the immediate recovery investments
the European Union average of 55 percent. One of
is restoring the broadband coverage in territories
the developmental challenges was that 12 percent
that have been brought back under government
of the population lacked broadband access in 2020
control. Internet coverage and postal service access
(mostly in rural and less densely populated areas),
are of strategic importance, given the need for
according to the World Bank and Ookla estimates. Of
connectivity among the local population.
those using fixed broadband, only 53 percent did so
via modern fiber-optic connections. The Ookla 2020
Background Speedtest Global Index ranked Ukraine 59th out of 176
countries on internet speed. Ukraine’s average fleet
Ukraine’s telecom and digital sector plays an broadband speed was 50.51 Mbps (megabits per
outsized role in enabling Ukraine’s service sector, second), comparable to that of Bulgaria (53.98 Mbps),
particularly the IT industry and the start-up scene. but below the global average of 76.64 Mbps. The fixed
Widespread access to mobile and fixed broadband broadband market in Ukraine was highly competitive
was one of the key drivers of the country’s economic (HHI of 0.12), and the prices generally affordable (a
growth prewar. 100 Mbps connection would cost around 1–2 percent
of average household income in 2020).
Wireless communications were widespread
in Ukraine. As of December 2019, the wireless Ukraine’s postal service was instrumental to
penetration was 131 percent per capita, which was the growth of e-commerce in Ukraine; in 2021 it
the second highest performance among the Eastern handled 450 million parcels (domestically and
218 The figures on prewar internet access in Ukraine are from the World Bank: Link.
219 Source: Link.
220 See Factum Group (2019): Link.
Infrastructure Sectors 157
across borders), reflecting growth of 15–20 percent to the invasion. They reflect lost profits to internet
per year.221 The two dominant players in the market service providers (ISPs) during the first three
were Nova Poshta (65 percent market share) and months of war, and the service restoration period
Ukrposhta (25 percent market share). Domestic of 18 months. Estimates suggest that 22 percent of
parcels accounted for 90 percent of the market, and ISPs’ income has been lost due to subscriber loss
of this share 75 percent was driven by domestic and unpaid service provision. Mobile operators have
Ukrainian e-commerce. been hit even harder in the short run (the first three
months), as unpaid service provision and subscriber
Damage and Loss Assessment loss in territories temporarily not under government
control had already materialized in March and
continued through May. ISPs’ costs also increased
As of June 1, 2022, the estimated accumulated
due to debris removal, unplanned repair works, staff
damage to Ukrainian fixed broadband providers are
relocation expenses, and more. The loss estimate
US$0.3 billion; for mobile providers they are US$0.2
is conservative, as it considers only the profit
billion. The detailed breakdown of damage and
margin part (17 percent, the average for European
losses by oblast is provided in Table 62 and Table
ISPs) of the 22 percent revenue lost. The increased
63. These damage account for the value of damaged
operating costs, repair works, demining, and other
and destroyed internet lines due to military actions
extra operating costs have not been quantified at
in the territories temporarily not under government
this stage.
control, as well as damaged infrastructure in those
territories that were brought back under government
As of June 1, 2022, the damage to the two largest
control before June 1, 2022. Overall, 1,767,269 fixed
postal service providers is US$0.07 billion (private
lines have been damaged or destroyed, limiting
assets of Nova Poshta) and US$0.07 billion (public
access to broadband internet and telecommunication
assets of Ukrposhta). The damaged assets include
services for the local population. The damage has
postal depots, service centers, sorting centers,
been concentrated in the country’s Eastern regions:
and post offices. Nova Poshta provided a detailed
Kharkivska oblast accounts for 22 percent of telecom
settlement-level breakdown of damage by oblast,
damage, Zaporizka for 18 percent, Donetska for 17
while Ukrposhta provided overall countrywide
percent, Khersonska for 10 percent, Luhanska for 7
figures. This assessment the same proportional
percent, and Chernihivska for 6 percent. The extent
estimates as for Nova Poshta to obtain oblast- level
of damage in the territories temporarily not under
damage of Ukrposhta. For Nova Poshta, a confirmed
government control can only be estimated. The
18 postal depots and 51 postal service centers have
true damage in parts of the country not controlled
been damaged or destroyed (see Table 62). The
by the Ukrainian government cannot be quantified
damage has been highest in Donetska (34 percent),
until those territories have been brought back under
Kharkivska (34 percent), Mykolaivska (10 percent),
government control. The frontline cities of Kharkiv,
and Chernihivska (7 percent) oblasts. These damage
Sumy, Chernihiv, Dnipro, and Zaporizhzhia are likely
to postal service providers has adversely affected
to sustain extended damage to infrastructure as
supply chains across the country, limiting access to
the missile strikes on residential areas continue.
consumer goods, medicine, and food. Some frontline
The damage to broadband infrastructure adversely
settlements rely entirely on humanitarian support
affects information access, and also limit the capacity
for everyday food and consumer staples.
of governmental institutions to reach the local
population. Because the Ukrainian e-government
Losses to the post sector as of June 1, 2022, are
app Diia is used by many Ukrainians to access
US$0.4 billion (comprising private sector losses of
humanitarian payments and other government
Nova Poshta and public sector losses of Ukrposhta).
services, the absence of broadband connectivity
Postal service providers’ losses are due to lost postal
may severely impair governance and social welfare.
parcels, employee relocation, and other war-related
operational expenses.
As of June 1, 2022, the accumulated losses of
Ukrainian fixed broadband providers are at least
The accumulated damage to Ukrainian broadcasters,
US$0.05 billion; for mobile providers they are
as of June 1, 2022, are US$0.04 billion. The damage
US$0.1 billion. These losses are a lower-bound
stem from the destruction of 49 TV broadcasting
estimate of economic value added (profits) lost due
towers over a three-month period.
221 Forbes: Link.
158 Infrastructure Sectors
The economic consequences of the war-related stay behind in areas with destroyed infrastructure
damage to the telecom and digital sector include (broadband, etc.), and to suffer from adverse effects
effects on economic growth and employment in the of having no internet access and hence no access
service sector (the main beneficiary of stable and to government services provided via internet. The
reliable broadband coverage), e-commerce (the adverse educational effects for students forced to
main beneficiary of the efficient postal network), study online are also more likely to be felt by those
and IT and the start-up scene (both of which require who remain in territories temporarily not under
internet connectivity as the very precondition for government control or in areas of active fighting.
existence). Jobs and productivity growth are likely The effects of destroyed digital infrastructure are
to suffer as a result of service disruptions in the second order compared to the direct impacts of the
telecom and digital sector. war on livelihoods, but lack of information access,
postal logistics, and internet are nevertheless non-
The social impacts of the war-related damage to negligible. Finally, any opportunities that previously
the telecom and digital sector include effects on existed for women due to easy internet access (e.g.,
inequality, educational attainment, and gender social protection, online work) are also less likely to
equality. Inequality is likely to increase, as the least materialize for those remaining in territories with
protected parts of the population are more likely to damaged or destroyed digital assets.
Table 62. Damage inventory by asset type (number of facilities) as of June 1, 2022
Baseline Total damaged Total damaged Total damaged postal Total damaged
Oblast (internet lines) internet lines postal depots service centers TV stations
Private Private Private Private Public
Cherkaska 205,339 0 0 0 0
Chernihivska 193,318 136,343 0 3 2
Chernivetska 117,612 0 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 717,441 15,440 0 0 0
Donetska 364,867 364,867 7 9 3
Ivano-Frankivska 238,751 0 0 0 0
Kharkivska 467,649 459,173 3 31 4
Khersonska 236,721 236,721 0 1 8
Khmelnytska 268,325 0 0 0 0
Kirovohradska 159,477 0 0 0 0
Kyiv (city) 0 0 0 0 0
Kyivska 1,520,962 79,287 1 1 3
Luhanska 120,916 120,916 3 3 11
Lvivska 573,502 0 0 0 0
Mykolaivska 232,136 176,100 0 1 4
Odeska 619,566 0 0 0 0
Poltavska 287,983 0 0 0 0
Rivnenska 209,474 0 0 0 0
Sumska 236,440 176,794 0 0 2
Ternopilska 198,246 0 0 0 0
Vinnytska 293,093 0 0 0 0
Volynska 210,039 0 0 0 0
Zakarpatska 151,936 0 0 0 0
Infrastructure Sectors 159
Baseline Total damaged Total damaged Total damaged postal Total damaged
Oblast (internet lines) internet lines postal depots service centers TV stations
Private Private Private Private Public
Zaporizka 428,472 900 4 2 12
Zhytomyrska 228,116 728 0 0 0
Total 8,280,381 1,767,269 18 51 49
Source: Assessment team.
Note: For the telecom sector, all fixed broadband lines are private assets; for the post sector, only information on private assets
is available; for the broadcasting sector, there are only public assets (TV broadcasting towers).
Table 63. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Total damage Total losses
Oblast
Public Private Public Private
Cherkaska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Chernihivska 2.035 40.410 16.810 12.299
Chernivetska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dnipropetrovska 0.000 4.160 0.000 1.301
Donetska 3.853 121.845 75.741 31.684
Ivano-Frankivska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kharkivska 4.770 150.492 77.803 42.876
Khersonska 7.153 56.887 4.820 16.713
Khmelnytska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kirovohradska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kyiv (city) 0.000 0.000 0.000 205.575
Kyivska 2.924 29.337 17.042 9.241
Luhanska 9.941 42.642 13.314 14.205
Lvivska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mykolaivska 3.904 49.407 23.094 12.185
Odeska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Poltavska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rivnenska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sumska 1.778 41.706 0.538 11.693
Ternopilska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vinnytska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Volynska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Zakarpatska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Zaporizka 10.731 101.082 7.320 29.047
Zhytomyrska 0.000 0.285 0.000 0.109
Total 47.089 638.254 236.481 386.927
Source: Assessment team.
Note: Damage and losses in this table are for telecom, post, and broadcasting subsectors. Public damage and losses pertain
to broadcasting and Ukrposhta (the public postal services provider); private damage and losses pertain to mobile operators,
fixed broadband providers, and Nova Poshta (the private postal services provider).
160 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 64. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Fixed operators 478.2 - 478.2
Reconstruction Mobile operators 314.5 314.5
Needs Post 100.9 33.0 133.9
Broadcasting - 406.5 406.5
Fixed operators 50.0 - 50.0
Service Delivery Mobile operators 121.4 - 121.4
Restoration
Needs Post 215.5 1,488.6 1,704.2
Broadcasting - 87.9 87.9
Total 1,280.5 2,016.0 3,296.5
Source: Assessment team.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, Restoring postal service provision by the private
including Build Back Better
provider Nova Poshta, which accounted for 65
percent market share of postal deliveries prewar,
is also critical in the short term. Anecdotally, Nova
The priority short-term recovery needs amount Poshta already operates postal delivery services
to US$1.3 billion; of this amount, US$0.9 billion to the front lines, which should make the service
is for infrastructure recovery and restoration of recovery speedier. The recommendation to prioritize
broadband, private postal service, and mobile private providers (in both telecom and post) for
coverage where damage was incurred, while US$0.4 the short-term recovery is driven by the economic
billion is for service delivery needs, including higher argument that profit-maximizing entities are more
service costs for the duration of the recovery period efficient at allocating resources than public entities.
(one to two years) (Table 64). These estimates This recommendation should ensure that the
incorporate the build back better premium of 40 broadband and postal services are restored fast, at
percent above the damage estimates (see Table 65). scale, and with the build back better principle in mind.
The immediate-term solution of providing Starlink
terminals can ameliorate the adverse effects of the Prioritizing the broadband recovery is also in line
military actions on internet access but restoring with the National Broadband Development Plan
broadband in the war-affected areas is still a priority of Ukraine and the country’s Digital Agenda. The
action for the one- to two-year horizon. Because fast, affordable, and inclusive connectivity will
internet connectivity for educational institutions, enable faster growth in sectors like e-commerce
hospitals, and government institutions cannot be and IT services, which are critical for the country’s
sustained through Starlink terminals alone, restoring economic growth as Ukraine rebuilds.
broadband connectivity is critical for the effective
functioning of the public sector (education, health The priority long-term recovery needs amount
care, government services), and also for the return to US$2 billion; of this amount, US$0.4 billion is
of the private sector (especially service-oriented for infrastructure recovery and restoration of
firms), which will drive the recovery in war-affected broadcasting infrastructure and the public postal
regions. service where damage was incurred, while US$1.6
billion is for service delivery needs, including higher
service costs for the duration of the recovery period.
Infrastructure Sectors 161
Table 65. Reconstruction and recovery needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Short term (up to 18 months) Long term (18 months–10 years)
Total needs
Oblast Private Public
(10 years)
Infrastructure Service delivery Infrastructure Service delivery
Cherkaska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Chernihivska 56.575 12.299 18.996 112.064 199.9
Chernivetska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Dnipropetrovska 5.823 1.301 0.000 0.000 7.1
Donetska 170.583 31.684 35.960 504.941 743.2
Ivano-Frankivska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kharkivska 210.689 42.876 44.520 518.683 816.8
Khersonska 79.642 16.713 66.762 32.132 195.2
Khmelnytska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kirovohradska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Kyiv (city) 0.000 205.575 0.000 0.000 205.6
Kyivska 41.072 9.241 27.287 113.610 191.2
Luhanska 59.699 14.205 92.785 88.760 255.4
Lvivska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Mykolaivska 69.170 12.185 36.437 153.960 271.8
Odeska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Poltavska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Rivnenska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Sumska 58.388 11.693 16.592 3.587 90.3
Ternopilska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vinnytska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Volynska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Zakarpatska 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Zaporizka 141.515 29.047 100.156 48.803 319.5
Zhytomyrska 0.399 0.109 0.000 0.000 0.5
Total 1,280.482 2,016.035 3,296.5
Note: The recovery needs in this table are for telecom, post, and broadcasting subsectors. Public damage and losses pertain
to broadcasting and Ukrposhta (the public postal services provider); private damage and losses pertain to mobile operators,
fixed broadband providers, and Nova Poshta (the private postal services provider).
162 Infrastructure Sectors
Limitations and Recommendations The assessment team cross-checked the
assumptions of the KSE with those of the World
The key data used for these estimations are from Bank team and detailed any differences in
the Government of Ukraine (sourced from post assumptions (for losses and needs calculations)
providers, public broadcasters, and internet service where differences exist. The qualitative information
providers) and from the KSE. The telecom providers on damage in Kyiv was verified vis-à-vis remote-
(fixed broadband ISPs) provided the damage data data analysis. Verification of data faced several key
by settlement, and the mobile providers supplied limitations: (i) there is an absence of multiple data
overall estimated damage. Where data are not providers for the same data points (except for Kyiv,
available by oblast (e.g., for mobile operators), the for which data are available from remote analytics
assessment team extrapolates the extent of damage conducted as part of the RDNA; (ii) ongoing military
by calculating the proportional damage per oblast actions and loss of government control over some
from the available fixed broadband data. The damage territories prevent accurate information collection;
data provided by ISPs assume that the book value of (iii) the service restoration period of 18 months is a
equipment damaged is approximately the same as simplifying assumption, and may underestimate the
its market value. This assumption is conservative, as true extent of reconstruction needs, if the military
it likely underestimates rather than overestimates actions continue beyond the one-year horizon; and
the extent of damage. (iv) the debris removal estimates for the telecom
sector service recovery were not explicitly quantified.
Infrastructure Sectors 163
WATER SUPPLY
AND SANITATION
Summary access (86 percent versus 26 percent), and sewer
connections (75 percent versus just 8 percent).
The estimated damage for the water supply
The WSS sector governance framework is highly
and sanitation (WSS) sector stand at US$1.3
fragmented, with administrative and legislative
billion. Given various challenges in data collection
shortcomings that limit coordination and efficiency
(especially for territories not under government
between national and local administration efforts.
control), this is a conservative figure; however, it
At the national level, Minregion is the institution in
provides a fair assessment of the magnitude of
charge of developing countrywide WSS policies
WSS infrastructure damage. Losses have been
to ensure improvement and sustainability of WSS
estimated at approximately US$6.8 billion, noting
services; however, municipalities are in charge of
similar challenges in accessing data. The main
WSS service provision (through their own WSS
part of the losses (over 50 percent) stems from
utilities) at local level, and there is no specific
lost revenues from WSS services provision. The
mechanism to pass down policy targets and
total reconstruction and recovery needs for the
obligations. A national economic regulator is in
sector are estimated at around US$5.4 billion.
charge of approving prices for WSS services for
The building back better approach was limited to
utilities serving more than 100,000 people, but in
the reconstruction of the damaged/destroyed WSS
recent years it has been isolated in its efforts to
assets and not geared toward achieving compliance
improve the sector performance.
with the WSS Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
However, there is room to further optimize existing
In the early 2000s, the country was developing a
WSS systems and facilities (developed before the
National Water Supply and Sanitation Strategic
war) to meet increased standards and sustainability
Plan, which was not approved or implemented. The
and climate change requirements.
strategic plan estimated investment needs at about
US$4.3–6.5 billion (€4–6 billion) to bring the water
Background and sanitation systems in Ukraine to operational
safety, and at US$23.8–28.1 billion (€22–26 billion) to
Before the war, the Ministry of Communities and achieve international WSS service standards. Since
Territories Development of Ukraine (Minregion) then, there has been no detailed national assessment
estimated the access to centralized piped water or WSS master-planning exercise to update the
supply in the country at 70 percent, and access to figures. However, the fact that WSS utilities have
centralized wastewater collection and treatment suffered from underinvestment for more than three
services at around 50 percent.222 For a country decades—a situation that persists today, with only
like Ukraine that seeks to align the WSS sector 8 percent of WSS sector expenditures dedicated
requirements with the European Union (EU) Water to investments—would suggest that the needs just
Directives requirements, this level of WSS services before the war were even more substantial than
is relatively low; approximately 10 million people those estimated for the strategic plan.
lack access to safely managed water services
and 20 million people lack access to centralized
wastewater collection and treatment services. There
Damage and Loss Assessment
are significant inequalities between urban and rural
The destruction of the hydroelectric power center of
areas in piped water access (80 percent in urban
the Oskil reservoir in the Kharkivska oblast occurred
areas versus 34 percent in rural areas), flush toilet
early in the war. Around 355.5 million m3 of water
222 According to Governmnet of Ukraine. National report on the quality of drinking water and the state of drinking water
supply in Ukraine for 2020. 2021. Link.
164 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 66. Damage inventory by asset types (number) as of June 1, 2022
Asset type Partially damaged Completely destroyed Total damaged assets
Water treatment facilities (no.) 8 2 10
Sewage treatment plants (no.) 10 4 14
Water pumping stations (no.) 20 18 38
Sewage pumping stations (km) 32 19 41
Water supply networks (km) 0 816,314 816,314
Sewer networks (km) 0 241,665 241,665
Wells (no.) 11 13 24
Laboratories (no.) 3 2 5
Clean water tanks (no.) 4 12 16
Water towers (no.) 8 24 32
Source: Minregion data.
Note: All WSS assets listed are public assets.
were released, which negatively affected municipal Table 67 provides information on the assessment of
enterprises that provide water supply services WSS damage and losses by oblast; due to the limited
in Luhanska and Donetska regions; as a result, data availability, most of the WSS sector losses have
significant portions of the population in these regions been estimated at national level. As of June 1, 2022, the
have limited or no access to water supply. Based on estimated damage in the WSS sector stand at US$1.3
information from UNICEF, due to the war, about 6 billion. Given that this exercise is a rapid assessment
million Ukrainians were encountering problems with and given the challenges in data collection (especially
access to drinking water in May 2022. UNICEF data in the territories not under government control), this
reveal that around 13.6 million Ukrainians suffer figure is not precise and could underestimate damage;
from a lack of water for sanitary and hygienic needs, but it provides a fair assessment of the magnitude of
a situation that can cause infectious diseases to damage to the WSS infrastructure. With most of the
develop and spread throughout the country. WSS infrastructure underground, it is difficult to do
a good assessment while fighting is ongoing, but the
Active military operations and/or cases of missile team relied on data collected by Minregion, reports
strikes (in particular, air strikes and bombardment of issues related to access to WSS services, surveys
with a multiple launch rocket system) have affected on access to WSS services, and limited terrain work
access to drinking water in many cities and towns. and observation (including satellite images) of visible
Among the most affected have been Druzhkivka, damage to drinking and wastewater treatment plants,
Donetsk, Kostiantynivka, Berdiansk, Mariupol, pumping stations, etc.
Mykolaiv, Popasna, Prymorsk, Izium, Rubizhne,
Sumy, Lysychansk, Trostianets, Sievierodonetsk, The WSS sector loss estimations are based
Kharkiv, and Chernihiv. Based on information on assumptions and limited information from
received from Minregion, as of June 1, the most vodokanals (WSS utilities) and oblasts. The sector
affected infrastructures were water supply networks losses are calculated at around US$6.8 billion. The
(31 percent), wastewater collection networks (28 main losses—53 percent of total losses—are from
percent), wastewater treatment plants (18 percent), the lost revenues from WSS services provision and
and drinking water treatment facilities (10 percent). the significant drop in the collection rate. The second
Most networks are usually located under roads, big loss category is additional costs for WSS services
which have been heavily damaged during the war, provision due to increased energy costs; energy is
while treatment facilities are above ground and easy the second biggest cost component for Ukrainian
to target. A breakdown of asset type and damage is vodokanals after salaries (30 percent). The rest of
presented in Table 66. The information presented is the economic losses are associated with increased
not exhaustive, given that data from the territories fuel consumption, increased prices, and required
not under government control is very difficult to demolition and debris management. Most of these
obtain and might notreflect the actual situation on losses have been estimated at national level and
the ground. cannot be broken down based on reported damage
Infrastructure Sectors 165
Table 67. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Total damage Total losses
Cherkaska - -
Chernihivska 304.3 45.5
Chernivetska - -
Dnipropetrovska - -
Donetska 133.2 5.8
Ivano-Frankivska - -
Kharkivska 73.3 6.4
Khersonska - -
Khmelnytska - -
Kirovohradska - -
Kyiv (city) - -
Kyivska 146.7 16.7
Luhanska 499.8 79.7
Lvivska 8.4 1.3
Mykolaivska 41.3 2.1
Odeska 30.0 4.8
Poltavska - -
Rivnenska - -
Sumska 15.2 0.4
Ternopilska - -
Vinnytska - -
Volynska - -
Zakarpatska - -
Zaporizka 51.4 7.9
Zhytomyrska 0.0 0.0
Nationwide (no specific region) - 6,600.0
Total 1,303.6 6,770.6
Source: Minregion data. Note: - = not available.
Note: All WSS assets listed are public assets.
since the losses are not always related to damage temporary solutions put in place might not hold for
but rather reflect how many people are served at more than a few months. Presently, the utilities are
oblast level, etc. relying on international support and donations for
small emergency investments. The major challenge
In terms of impacts on populations, millions for the WSS sector is to continue to provide WSS
of Ukrainians are experiencing interrupted, services; this is currently possible in the most
limited, or no access to safe water and sanitation affected oblasts because the central government
services because of the war. Local WSS utilities is stepping in and paying directly for salaries and
are doing their best to address the problems, but other critical operational costs. If the national budget
with decreasing revenues (due to consumers’ cannot cover the accumulating losses in the sector,
nonpayment for delivered services) and increasing these vital and critical services could stop, leading to
costs, they lack equipment and resources, and the disastrous social impacts.
166 Infrastructure Sectors
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, The needs assessment considers a limited building
including Build Back Better
back better approach to the reconstruction of the
damaged/destroyed WSS assets and does not seek
to achieve the WSS SDGs. However, there is room
Needs in the WSS sector build on the damage and for further optimization of systems and facilities,
loss assessments and are estimated at around which were developed in the past for a different
US$5.4 billion. Partially damaged and destroyed reality and projections. Reconstruction of the WSS
WSS infrastructure needs rebuilding in a prioritized sector in Ukraine needs to take into account the
manner. It is proposed that the reconstruction of broader water challenges in the country (such as
critical WSS assets at oblast level should come first, water resources availability, climate change effects
along with support for utilities’ operational costs and resulting droughts and floods) and ensure that
to ensure provision of WSS services. The required the new WSS services are properly sized and easy to
investments are split into immediate to short term operate and maintain (like nature-based wastewater
and medium to long term (up to year 10); see Table 68. solutions) to ensure sustainability of services.
Table 68. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Cherkaska - - -
Chernihivska 114.1 456.3 570.4
Chernivetska - - -
Dnipropetrovska - - -
Donetska 47.1 188.4 235.5
Ivano-Frankivska - - -
Kharkivska 26.6 106.3 132.9
Khersonska - - -
Khmelnytska - - -
Kirovohradska - - -
Kyiv (city) - - -
Kyivska 54.0 215.8 269.8
Luhanska 188.4 753.6 942.0
Lvivska 3.2 12.7 15.8
Mykolaivska 14.6 58.6 73.2
Odeska 11.3 45.2 56.6
Poltavska - - -
Rivnenska - - -
Sumska 5.3 21.2 26.5
Ternopilska - - -
Vinnytska - - -
Volynska - - -
Zakarpatska - - -
Zaporizka 19.3 77.2 96.5
Zhytomyrska 0.0 0.0 0.0
Nationwide (no specific region) 3,000.0 - 3,000.0
Total 3,483.9 1,935.4 5,419.3
Source: Assessment team.
Note: - = not available. Note: All WSS assets listed are public assets.
Infrastructure Sectors 167
Table 69. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Component Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Water treatment facilities 39.0 156.0 195.0
Sewage treatment plants 72.0 288.0 360.0
Water pumping stations 13.7 54.6 68.3
Sewage pumping stations 28.6 114.5 143.1
Reconstruction Water supply networks 122.4 489.8 612.2
needs Sewer networks 108.7 435.0 543.7
Wells 0.6 2.4 3.0
Laboratories 0.3 1.2 1.4
Clean water tanks 4.1 16.3 20.4
Water towers 1.6 6.5 8.2
Demolition and debris
34.1 136.5 170.6
Service delivery management
restoration needs Facility operational costs 58.7 234.6 293.3
Energy/fuel costs support 3,000.0 0 3,000.0
Total 3,483.9 1,935.4 5,419.3
Source: Assessment team.
Note: All WSS assets listed are public assets.
Table 69 presents a breakdown of types of WSS the RDNA demonstrates that Minregion is facing
assets to be reconstructed. To ensure WSS services significant challenges as a policy maker for the sector;
provision in the immediate/short term, there is an there is no national information system or database
urgent need to continue supporting (subsidizing) the on WSS assets, their condition, services quality, etc.
additional energy and fuel costs until WSS utilities The ongoing decentralization in Ukraine should not
recover their prewar revenue levels. The energy/fuel mean that all WSS responsibilities are transferred
cost support is based on calculations at national level to local level, but rather that a mechanism is devised
and phases out this additional cost (or subsidy, which to ensure that national policies trickle down and are
is currently covered mostly by the state budget) in implemented at local level.
the immediate/short term. This approach takes into
consideration that WSS sector revenues equal costs, In 2021, the World Bank developed a WSS sector
that the national average for electricity/fuel costs out Policy Note,223 which recommended reform efforts
of total operating costs is around 30 percent or more, to tackle three key sector issues simultaneously:
and that utilities financed by the World Bank Second (i) improving governance to increase access,
Urban Infrastructure Project (UIP2) have reported a transparency, and accountability; (ii) enhancing
40 percent increase in monthly electricity/fuel costs regulation to improve performance and service
since the beginning of the war. quality; and (iii) reforming the funding approach
to ensure cost recovery and sustainability, as well
Limitations and Recommendations as to diversify funding options. These WSS reform
efforts should be combined with the building back
better approach to WSS infrastructure and services
The WSS sector requires reform to develop and
in order to deliver significant improvements and
improve WSS service delivery so that it meets EU
results and ensure assets and services sustainability.
requirements. The difficulty in obtaining data for
223 World Bank, “Ukraine Water Supply and Sanitation Policy Note,” World Bank, Washington, DC, 2021, Link.
168 Infrastructure Sectors
MUNICIPAL
SERVICES
Summary across all regions was irregular and had low coverage
rates. According to the Ministry of Communities and
Territories Development of Ukraine (Minregion),
As of June 1, 2022, the estimated damage for the
coverage of household waste management services
municipal services sector amounts to US$2.3 billion,
is only an estimated 79 percent,224 repairs for local
while the aggregate losses total US$4.3 billion. The
roads are commonly delayed,225 and only around
damage includes partial or full destruction of key
50 percent of public green spaces are actively
municipal assets (for which data were available)
maintained.226 Out of the total length of street and
as well as damage to goods and equipment. The
road network in Ukraine (per Minregion, the total
estimated losses focus on revenue losses, debris
exceeded 270,950km as of end of 2021), only 60
removal, and increased operational costs. Over 90
percent of the road network is estimated to be
percent of the total losses valued stem from incurred
serviced by streetlights, and the coverage and quality
and projected revenue losses of local governments;
of sidewalks in cities remains wanting. With most
this finding indicates that local governments will
public buildings and communal infrastructure dating
continue to face financial burdens and highlights the
from the Soviet era, and with minimal upgrades to
potential instability of service delivery maintenance
infrastructure over time, municipal assets have
in the second half of 2022. The total reconstruction
remained highly energy inefficient and do not reflect
and recovery needs are estimated at US$5.71
demographic trends and associated needs. For
billion. This includes costs for building back better
example, despite the aging population, accessibility
and inflation. The most pressing needs in the short
of public spaces, including sidewalks, remains
term relate to the upkeep and increase of service
limited. The high urbanization rate of 70 percent
delivery, rapidly scaling up of investments in the
means that cities especially face a continuous strain
waste management sector, and the formulation of
on their infrastructure and have struggled to keep
citywide reconstruction and recovery strategies
up with the increasing demand for essential utility
and action plans. Key guiding principles for recovery
services and urban amenities and land. This point is
and reconstruction include the explicit prioritization
well illustrated by the burial sector: only around 12
and sequencing of investments based on technical
percent of all cemeteries are in cities, and Minregion
assessments, and the facilitation of an enabling
states that 500 additional cemeteries are needed in
institutional and legal environment for the efficient
urban areas.227
implementation of plans.
The household waste management sector is
Background especially in need of urgent investment and
reforms. About 500 million tons of waste is
Communal infrastructure and services in Ukraine generated annually, of which household waste
have been impacted by decades of underinvestment, accounts for more than 10 million tons. Nearly
poor maintenance, and low coverage. Prior to the all household waste (93 percent) is disposed in
war, service provision of utilities and infrastructure landfills or in ad hoc dumping grounds; 6 percent is
224 Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, “State of the field of household waste management
in Ukraine for 2021,” Link.
225 Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, “Analysis of the state of the road and bridge industry
in 2021,” Link.
226 Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, “State of the field of the green economy for 2021,”
Link.
227 Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, “ State of the burial industry in Ukraine in 2020,” Link.
Infrastructure Sectors 169
processed, and 1 percent is burned for energy.228 The local administrative boundaries, and sustainable
waste sector accounts for a significant 4 percent of urban development planning and practices are also
national greenhouse gas emissions.229 Ukraine has yet to be adopted. The decentralization reform that
6,000 landfills across the country covering a total began in 2014 resulted in 2020 in the amalgamation
area of 9,000 ha, but 99 percent of the operational of over 11,509 old (pre-reform) hromadas into around
landfills do not comply with European Union (EU) 1,470 hromadas (except the territory of Crimea).230
standards, and 15 percent do not meet national The creation of the territories was proposed at
environmental safety requirements. Moreover, due the national level during 2014-2019 was voluntary.
to inadequate waste management infrastructure Among 11,509 rural and urban communities, only
and networks across settlements, annually around around a third of urban municipalities have had
26,000 unauthorized dump sites are reported. their boundaries recorded and agreed upon. None
The predominance of unregulated and uncertified of the village communities had recorded and agreed
disposal sites has major implications for health, boundaries. The ambiguous status of boundaries
ecosystems, and safety. Waste collection is carried has several implications for planning, land
out by either private entities or utility companies management, and sustainable development. Without
that provide services at relatively low tariffs boundaries, any urban or spatial plan or cadaster
are therefore unable to incorporate upgrades to information is not considered legally binding and
equipment and technologies unless the costs are can be challenged. Land registries and cadaster
recouped from service users or from local budgets. information is incomplete, and spatial planning,
zoning, and so on cannot be undertaken efficiently at
Local governments in Ukraine, although responsible the local level without knowledge of city boundaries.
for delivering a wide range of services and The result is inefficiencies in subsequent capital
infrastructure, face numerous capacity constraints. planning, infrastructure and service delivery, land
Local governments deliver “hard” municipal services management, etc. In addition, despite Ukraine’s high
(like local roads, solid waste management, utilities, urbanization rate, it has yet to formulate a national
public facilities, and urban amenities) along with urban development strategy that provides guidance
social services (e.g., education, health), while also to the local levels for planning and developing urban
fulfilling their civil and environmental protection areas in line with sustainability and climate goals.
duties. Overall regulatory functions are at the local Prior to the war, local and regional urban master
level in Ukraine and directly impact the quality plans remained considerably outdated in terms of
of life of citizens, local economic development, reflecting current population needs and built-up
and sustainability. However, the weak financial area changes.
position of some local governments, exacerbated by
inconsistent cash flows, has impeded the delivery of
critical local functions. Continuing underinvestment
Damage and Loss Assessment
in communal infrastructure and services has
Damage to communal infrastructure and breakdown
resulted in rapid deterioration of assets and steadily
of municipal service delivery are among the most
worsening service delivery. In addition, there are
pronounced implications of wars, and they span
gaps between the legal mandate of municipalities
a wide range of communal facilities and service
and the requisite technical and resource capacities
functions concentrated in a specific place. For the
and institutional arrangements for delivering
purpose of the RDNA, the municipal infrastructure
municipal services; these gaps have severely limited
and services sectoral assessment covers mainly
the influence and performance of local governments,
five categories of assets: household waste
especially in small communities (hromadas).
management, public infrastructure and facilities,
local administrative buildings, sports facilities, and
Efficient land management and spatial planning
local mobility assets.231 Within each asset category,
have been severely impacted by the uncertainty of
asset types included do not cover the exhaustive set
228 Ministry of Development of Communities and Territories of Ukraine, “ State of the field of household waste management
in Ukraine for 2021” Link.
229 Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources of Ukraine, “Ukraine’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory 1990–
2019,” 2021.
230 As part of decentralization and the entry into force of the Law “On Voluntary Unification of Territorial Communities,” as of
2019, 892 amalgamated territorial communities (the «ATCs») were already established. Those ATCs were composed of
about 4500 former local councils. Available at Link.
231 All other utilities and housing are covered by infrastructure and housing sectoral assessments respectively.
170 Infrastructure Sectors
Table 70. Damage inventory by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Damage estimate
Category Asset type Share (%)
(US$ million)
Containers for household waste collection 10.22
Trucks for garbage collection 32.63
Solid waste Container site 0.23
4.1%
management Sorting line 4.50
Landfill 42.67
Biogas plant 5.11
Public squares 15.75
Urban parks, gardens, and outdoor green and
94.51
recreational areas
Public spaces and Cemeteries 80.18 28.5%
public facilities
Crematoriums 0.00
Libraries 49.19
Recreation centers 424.36
Local government administrative buildings and
552.22
Administrative offices
24.0%
buildings Local government administrative service centers
8.15
and spaces
Sidewalks 555.48
Local mobility 39.0%
Streetlights 354.80
Stadiums 20.92
Swimming pools 6.98
Sports facilities 4.4%
Sports halls and sports schools 73.03
Ice rinks 2.75
Total 2,333.7 100%
Source: Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine data.
because of data limitations, but they do reflect the and centers that house municipal service functions
diverse range of infrastructure and services that and operations faced US$0.6 billion in damage (24
fall under the remit of local governments. percent), of which 75 percent was derived from
completely destroyed buildings.232
The war is estimated to have caused at least US$2.3
billion in damage to the municipal infrastructure The solid waste management sector sustained
and services sector as of June 1, 2022. A breakdown significant damage. Total damage across the sector
across asset type, category, and damage is presented was valued at US$95 million, which constitutes a big
in Table 70. Local mobility assets (sidewalks and dent in the already strained sector. Some 5 percent of
streetlights) had the highest share of damage at 39 all existing collection trucks, 17 percent of all biogas
percent, followed by the public spaces and facilities plants, and 9 percent of sorting lines have been
category, which accounted for 28.5 percent of destroyed or damaged, indicating a disruption of the
the total damage. Within this category, parks and entire service network, especially in the Donetska
public squares incurred damage amounting to 5 and Luhanska oblasts, where 75 percent of damage
percent of the total. Local administrative buildings in the waste sector was localized.
232 Administrative buildings do not include health and education facilities.
Infrastructure Sectors 171
Table 71. Loss by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Loss estimates (US$ million) Share (%)
Costs of rubble/ debris removal 320.7 7.4
Local government estimated revenue losses 3,912.5 90.6
Increase in expenditures incurred by local governments 74.6 1.7
Loss of revenue of waste management entities 11.9 0.3
Total 4,319.7 100%
Source: Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine data; KSE local budget analysis.
Damage is estimated to be highest in the Donetska, months; they included both local shares of personal
Kharkivska, Kyivska, Luhanska, Chernihivska, and income taxes (PIT)234 and own-source revenues
Zaporizka oblasts. Table 72 provides the damage (OSR).235 Revenue losses of household waste
across all oblasts. Significant damage was also management entities (public utilities and private
estimated in the Mykolaivska and Sumska oblasts. companies) were estimated for the period March–
The accuracy and coverage of regional damage May and amounted to US$11 million, while the
data is different across various asset types and additional service delivery burden incurred by local
across regions due to limitations in on-ground data governments during the same period accounted for
collection and verification, the evolving occupation US$74.6 million. The sectoral loss estimates relied on
of territories, and a host of disruptions created by available local budget data and assumptions derived
the ongoing war. Wherever possible and reasonable, from analysis of conflict intensity, the new military
data gaps have been addressed by leveraging budget code, and prewar baseline information on
informed assumptions and extrapolations, based household waste collection and disposal tariffs and
on reports of prewar baseline information, limited volumes.
satellite imagery of visible damage, data on location
of conflict events, and anecdotal evidence from Access to waste collection and disposal has severely
local experts and authorities. The estimated value deteriorated due to the war, and damage to local
of damage should not be regarded as precise but infrastructure and communal facilities has had
rather as indicative of the magnitude of damage. significant impacts on the quality of life of residents.
The waste sector, which was already suffering from
Sectoral loss was estimated at a significant US$4.3 a lack of investment and low operational capacity
billion, with losses across Kyiv city, Donetska, and and coverage, has been strained even further. The
Kharkivska together accounting for more than increase in burden to the sector stems from two
50 percent of the total. Estimated losses include fronts: first, the increase in waste servicing demands
demolition and debris removal (7 percent), revenue in cities and settlements acting as IDP hubs and
losses, and increased expenditures incurred by local hosting around 17 percent of the national population;
governments and waste collection entities (Table and second, the need for continued service delivery—
71).233 More than 90 percent of the total loss value despite major breakdowns in the delivery networks—
is registered as municipal revenue loss, highlighting in areas subjected to multiple battles. Many private
the need to fiscally equip local governments so that waste collection companies have temporarily
they can continuing to deliver municipal services. ceased operations due to significant losses to
Estimations of revenue losses for local governments capital and revenues, and local governments do
were approximated for the months of March, April, not have sufficient capacities and infrastructure to
and May and then projected over the subsequent 18 supplement this gap. Moreover, due to limitations
233 Loss estimates do not account for the increased costs related to increased costs of fuel.
234 During the period March–May, local revenues from PIT registered an increase in 20 oblasts and as such registered no
loss in PIT revenues. This increase can be attributed to the substantial increase in salaries in the defense sector and a
corresponding increase in military enrollment. Only six oblasts—Kyivska, Donetska, Kharkivska, Khersonska, Kyiv city,
and Mykolaivska—registered losses in PIT income.
235 Municipal own-source revenue is composed of local taxes (e.g., single tax, land and property tax and fees), non-utility user
fees, administrative fees, and any local capital revenue.
172 Infrastructure Sectors
(and in many cases absence of) waste pickup, ad hoc in cities and towns, which in turn has limited the
open dump sites are being created for the disposal timely procurement of critical household goods
of damaged assets and household waste, which may and services and has also dampened employment
pose significant risks to the community. Availability opportunities for IDPs. Furthermore, in regions
of a reliable household waste management system not currently witnessing fighting, the significantly
is fundamental for the safety and health of residents reduced functionality of public facilities and spaces
and IDPs in urban areas; it is also essential for debris due to local operational capacity constraints has led
removal in critical sites and for the commencement to a decline in residents’ quality of life and slowed
of reconstruction activities. Damage to local roads, the process of integrating IDPs into the community.
sidewalks, and streetlights has constrained mobility
Table 72. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage (US$ million) Loss (US$ million) Damage share Loss share
Cherkaska 10.2 14.5 0.4% 0.3%
Chernihivska 216.7 74.5 9.3% 1.7%
Chernivetska n/a 7.1 0.0% 0.2%
Dnipropetrovska 15.4 343.0 0.7% 7.9%
Donetska 336.4 819.4 14.4% 19.0%
Ivano-Frankivska 0 11.0 0.0% 0.3%
Kharkivska 287.1 811.1 12.3% 18.8%
Khersonska 76.8 195.4 3.3% 4.5%
Khmelnytska 1.9 15.3 0.1% 0.4%
Kirovohradska 36.3 16.2 1.6% 0.4%
Kyiv (city) 34.8 656.6 1.5% 15.2%
Kyivska 215.6 203.0 9.2% 4.7%
Luhanska 213.6 221.4 9.2% 5.1%
Lvivska 3.8 35.5 0.2% 0.8%
Mykolaivska 149.7 97.4 6.4% 2.3%
Odeska 13.2 180.5 0.6% 4.2%
Poltavska 3.8 44.2 0.2% 1.0%
Rivnenska n/a 12.6 0.0% 0.3%
Sumska 162.1 68.3 6.9% 1.6%
Ternopilska n/a 8.8 0.0% 0.2%
Vinnytska 2.5 16.7 0.1% 0.4%
Volynska n/a 9.1 0.0% 0.2%
Zakarpatska 8.3 9.8 0.4% 0.2%
Zaporizka 208.9 373.7 9.0% 8.7%
Zhytomyrska 64.6 31.2 2.8% 0.7%
No specific region 271.9 43.4 11.6% 1.0%
Total 2,333.7 4,319.7 100.00% 100.00%
Source: Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine data; KSE
Note: Bolded numbers depict regions having a significant share of the damage or losses; Damage = “n/a” means there were no
estimated damage based on the available data for assets included in this sectoral assessment.
Infrastructure Sectors 173
Table 73. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Upkeep and increased service
594.54 69.75 664.29
delivery in IDP hubs
Coordinated and efficient debris
removal, treatment, and disposal
592.58 148.14 740.72
and enhanced waste management
capacity and infrastructure
Repair, reconstruction, and
stabilization of prioritized public and 672.10 2,688.38 3,360.48
service delivery infrastructure
Full-service restoration - 945.13 945.13
Total 1,859.21 3,851.41 5,710.63
Total share 33% 67% 100%
Source: Ministry of Communities and Territories Development of Ukraine data.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, local level the “Smart recovery architecture” outlined
Including Build Back Better
during the Ukraine Recovery Conference237—e.g.,
defining guiding principles of the recovery process
and building from conducive operational, legal,
When it comes to recovery and reconstruction, the financial, and institutional arrangements from the
role of local governments—especially cities—goes start. In the immediate term, examples of suggested
beyond just municipal assets. Local governments actions across key components are outlined below.
are critical for the implementation, coordination, To translate the estimated needs to the actual
and planning of measures stipulated by individual implementation of recovery and reconstruction work,
functional sectors and line ministries. This reality existing debt obligations of municipal governments
necessitates adopting an integrated and place-based will need to be assessed and the potential approach
approach at the local level and ensuring the presence to attract further credits and grants will need to be
of strong intergovernmental, inter-sectoral, and inter- considered.
municipal coordination mechanisms. In addition,
to overcome the likely challenges of resource 1. Upkeep and increase in service delivery:
constraints and unstable cash flow during the Maintaining current levels of service
recovery period, city governments will at the outset delivery citywide while increasing delivery in
need to undertake evidence-based identification neighborhoods catering to large IDP populations
of prioritized needs and associated sequencing of
recovery and reconstruction measures. • Strengthen monitoring, reporting, and
verification systems for data collection for
For the municipal sector to recover and in turn understanding evolving location and profile
help facilitate local reconstruction and recovery, of the population, identifying critical service
the estimated needs amount to US$5.7 billion. delivery bottlenecks, recording damage, and
The estimated needs factor in necessary costs gauging citizen needs.
associated with inflation and building back better, • In areas servicing large IDP populations,
in alignment with Ukraine’s reconstruction strategy increase service coverage and undertake
that prioritizes decarbonization as well as the EU’s repairs of partially damaged service delivery
Green Deal.236 The priority immediate/short-term infrastructure and critical facilities (e.g.,
needs are detailed in Table 73; they account for a cemeteries/ crematoriums).
total of US$1.8 billion and emphasize building at the
236 National Recovery Council, “Ukraine’s National Recovery Plan,” July 2022.
237 Policy Briefs on Ukraine’s Recovery,” Ukraine Recovery Conference, July 4–6, Lugano, Switzerland, 2022, Link.
174 Infrastructure Sectors
• Secure financing from external stakeholders prioritizing needs and sequencing planned
and from the national government to ensure reconstruction activities.
maintenance of services and to increase • Update building codes and safety and energy-
operational capacity (personnel, goods, efficiency standards.
technology, and equipment). • Update local cadasters and land registries in
coordination with the national-level ministry
2. Debris removal and waste management: and conduct cadaster activities (systematic
Coordinated and efficient debris removal, survey and property registration processes)
treatment, and disposal with simultaneous in urban areas.
enhancement to waste management capacity • Undertake repairs of partially damaged
and infrastructure prioritized assets.
• Conduct assessments in sample sites for
understanding debris composition and
Limitations and Recommendations
prepare a citywide plan for debris removal,
Data on the number and status of the wide range
sorting, treatment, and processing that also
of locally maintained and owned assets should be
identifies priority locations for demolition and
aggregated and documented regularly at the national
debris removal.
level; the same should be done for data on service
• Identify and treat ad hoc dump sites used for
delivery. This would allow for better monitoring of
debris and make temporary provisions for
local service delivery, cross-regional comparisons
the disposal of debris ensuring safety and
for benchmarking, and identification of infrastructure
environmental standards.
needs and gaps—essential for national-level policy
• Prepare and adopt a short- to medium-
makers seeking to design evidence-based policies
term waste management plans aligned with
and regulations and to channel investments. For this
population movements and household waste
assessment, although Minregion provided baseline
management infrastructure gaps (both at
data and data on unit costs and damage, the data
national and local level).
were in most cases either incomplete or not verified,
• Procure necessary and critical assets, like
suggesting data-reporting systems for communal
collection trucks, to ensure timely waste
assets could be improved. The damage and losses
collection and effective and efficient waste
are therefore to a large extent extrapolated from
management in the short term.
analyzing the severity of the war across regions and
based on informed assumptions and information
3. Repair, reconstruction, and stabilization of
from multiple sources. The estimated numbers are
prioritized assets
indicative and are not to be taken as precise values.
• At the national level, incentivize agreement and
Future data collection efforts and assessments
finalization of local government boundaries,
would benefit from the segregation of infrastructure
including rapid conflict resolution arising from
asset data across urban and rural settlements.
boundary disputes.
Infrastructure and service needs, delivery
• Conduct engineering studies for individual
approaches, and costs in urban areas widely
buildings and multi-hazard assessments at the
differ from those in rural areas. More importantly,
city level to determine structural integrity and
local capacities are substantially different when
risks and specific needs for reconstruction.
comparing cities with other smaller, settlements or
• Prepare and adopt integrated immediate-to-
rural areas. Categorizing data across the degree of
medium-term citywide urban recovery and
urbanization would yield a better understanding of
reconstruction action plans identifying and
context-specific policy and financing requirements.
175
CROSS-CUTTING
AREAS
Borodyanka. Photo by Julia Burlachenko for the World Bank.
176 Cross-cutting Areas
ENVIRONMENT AND
NATURAL RESOURCE
MANAGEMENT,
AND FORESTRY
Summary buildings, and equipment is almost US$2.5 billion.
Lost ecosystem services value—a result of mines
making the forests inaccessible—is estimated at
The war in Ukraine has significantly harmed the
US$739 million over the 21 months from March
environment and natural resources of the country.
2022. However, forestry has a slow recovery rate,
Multiple air pollution incidents and potentially
and these losses may extend much further beyond
serious contamination of ground and surface waters
this period. Sectoral recovery and reconstruction
and soil have already been observed, and the long-
needs, including building back with strengthened
term impact of war could be even more harmful—
institutions, equipment, and nursery capacity, are
not only for the population’s health and safety,
estimated at US$1.2 billion. As part of the recovery
but also for ecosystems and biodiversity. Most of
and reconstruction needs, capacity building includes
the environmental risks are linked to the damage
a functional review of the institutions in the sector,
to industrial installations and houses (asbestos
with a focus on modernized planning and on the best
release), energy infrastructure (power plants, oil
afforestation and reforestation methods for climate-
storage tankers, oil refineries, drilling platforms,
smart forestry. Recommended for further study is
and gas facilities and distribution pipelines), and
the creation of investor-ready carbon projects and
ecosystems (forest fires and land mines). The main
the potential for mass employment in afforestation
environmental risks include air pollution, water
and reforestation via “green wage” schemes.
pollution, and soil pollution, with accumulation of
hazardous wastes that affect the health and safety
of the population as well as biodiversity. Losses and Environment and Natural
damage in monetary terms are estimated where
feasible, such as for the forest sector. Due to the
Resource Management
active war situation, measuring of key pollutants in
air, water, and soil was not possible. Priority areas Background
for cleanup and building back better are identified for
a fundamental transformation of Ukraine toward a Ukraine’s National Environmental Strategy–2020238
green and net-zero economy. The rebuilding process identifies several key environmental challenges:
should be harmonized with the European Union (EU) air pollution; quality of water resources and land
environmental and climate goals. degradation; solid waste management; biodiversity
loss; and human health problems.
The forestry sector has been significantly impacted
by the war. As of June 1, 2022, approximately 3 Air pollution. Since 2016 there has been a partial
percent has been lost due to forest fires and 38 rise in pollutant emissions as a result of growth
percent is inaccessible due to the presence of in output in agriculture, energy, and industrial
mines. Damage across growing stock, roads, production and waste generation.239 Thus, nearly
238 Government of Ukraine, “National Environmental Policy 2011–2022,” Link; see also FAO Aquastat, “Country Profile:
Ukraine,” 2015, Link.
239 Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural Resources, “Ukraine´s Informative Inventory Report,” 2020 Submission
under the UNECE CLRTAP, Kyiv, 2021.
Cross-cutting Areas 177
all big Ukrainian cities exceed the World Health considered less harmful and, in practice, represents
Organization standards for specific pollutants.240 The the total accumulation of solid waste in Ukraine.
annual average Plume Labs Air Quality Index (AQI) In 2020, Ukraine generated about 500,000 tons of
for the 10 biggest Ukrainian cities ranges between the most harmful wastes and disposed of about
31 and 36, which indicates a moderate level of air 25 percent.244 Large accumulations of such wastes
pollution.241 The largest annual average AQI value increase the risks of ecological accidents from
in the 10 largest cities was recorded in Odessa disposed heavy metals, oil products, pesticides,
(36 AQI), whereas the lowest in Kharkiv (31 AQI). In and other materials. The war in Ukraine is a direct
addition, Krivyi Rih was the city with the most of and indirect cause of many accidents, and it also
days with high air pollution, while Mariupol was the leaves hazardous waste that requires cleanup and
city with the most days with very high or excessive reclamation of significant areas exposed to the war.
or extreme air pollution. Other cities that recorded
days with very high air pollution include Kharkiv, Ukraine has a total of 663 protected areas of national
Dnipro, Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Mykolaiv. Due to importance and 7,633 areas of local importance. The
the presence of heavy industry, the cities of Dnipro, beech forests of Ukraine—located within the Gorgany
Donetsk, Kharkiv, Kyiv, Mariupol, and Zaporizhzhia Nature Reserve, the Roztochya Nature Reserve, the
are commonly identified as air pollution hotspots National Nature Park (NNP) Podilski Tovtry, NNP
for NO2 and SO2 concentrations.242 The air pollution Synevyr, and NNP Zacharovany Krai—are listed as
effect of industrial production disruption due to a UNESCO World Heritage site; these “Ancient and
war has yet to be determined. At the same time, Primeval Beech Forests of the Carpathians and
a significant amount of air pollution is associated Other Regions of Europe” are among the oldest forest
with forest fires that are also concentrated in the areas of Europe.245 In 2017, the Standing Committee
war zone. to the Bern Convention designated and approved a
list of 271 Emerald Network sites in Ukraine, whose
Quality of water resources: Ukraine’s total renewable total area is 10 percent of the country. Ukraine’s 39
water resources are estimated at 175 billion m3 Ramsar sites (wetlands of international importance)
per year and were 3,980 m3 per capita per year cover over 825,000 ha. Many protected areas and
in 2018.243 While this level puts Ukraine in the “no habitats in the east are affected by war, with many
stress” category (defined as below 1,700 m3 per biodiversity hotspots located in the exposed area.
capita per year), there is disparity in distribution of
the water resources between different regions. The The Ministry of Environmental Protection and Natural
area affected by the war is in the arid zone already Resources of Ukraine (MEPNR) is responsible for
affected by water shortages. Almost 70 percent of the state policy in several fields: environmental
the drinking water supply relies on surface water pollution control; sustainable use of water and
sources, which increases the population’s exposure subsoil resources; climate policy; environmental
to water pollution linked to the conflict, with and (within the limits of the powers provided
significant risk to health, especially in vulnerable by law) radiation, biological, and genetic safety;
groups. fisheries and fishing industry, protection, use, and
reproduction of aquatic biological resources; and
Solid waste management: Ukraine identifies four biodiversity protection, forestry, and hunting. At the
classes of industrial waste, grouped according to oblast level, the Departments of Ecology and Natural
hazardous properties and physical, chemical, and Resources under each oblast administration are
biological characteristics. The first, second, and also accountable to the MENR. These departments
third classes—considered most harmful—represent ensure implementation of environmental policy at
3 percent of the annual generation of waste, or 1 the oblast level.
percent of waste accumulation. The fourth class is
240 World Bank, “Ukraine Country Environmental Analysis,” January 2016, Link.
241 Plume Labs, “Ukraine,” Link.
242 Satellite data from Copernicus Atmosphere Monitoring Service (CAMS), Link ; United Nations Development Programme’s
Accelerator Lab, Link.
243 World Bank, Clear Water Dashboard.
244 Ukrstat (State Statistics Service of Ukraine), Link.
245 “Sixth National Report of Ukraine on the Implementation of the Convention on Biological Diversity,” December 2018, Link.
178 Cross-cutting Areas
Figure 28. Environmental incidents by May 5, 2022
Source: Ecoaction, “Potential Environmental Impacts Caused by Russian Aggression In Ukraine,” May 5, 2022, Link.
Damage and Loss Assessment partner organizations248 that follow the conflict in
the areas with nuclear power plants and facilities,
From the first days of the war, the Government energy infrastructure (including oil storage tankers,
of Ukraine and nongovernmental organizations oil refineries, drilling platforms, and gas facilities
(NGOs) launched several tools to document the and distribution pipelines), mines and industrial
environmental damage—for example, a dashboard, sites, and agro-processing facilities. There are
EcoZagroza, with data on the war’s impact on the about 360 critical facilities in the war zone, some
environment.246 In addition, the State Environmental of them already damaged. Multiple air pollution
Inspection recorded over 250 cases of environmental incidents and potentially serious contamination
incidents and over 1,200 cases of damage to the of ground and surface waters have already been
environment from the war. Special units have been observed. Environmental risks due to war in Ukraine
collecting evidence, including photos, videos, and are presented in the map (Figure 29). Among the
satellite images and, where possible, air and soil industrial facilities that have major pollution risks
samples for laboratory tests. Work has begun to are Zaporizhzhia and Chernobyl nuclear power
develop methodologies for calculating the monetary plants, Avdiivka Coke and Chemical Plant, the Toretsk
values of the damage to the environment. By May 5, Ferroalloy Plant, metallurgical plants in Mariupol,
2022, 377 cases of environmental incidents had been and all ports, oil storage facilities, and coal mines.
reported in the media.247 The most frequently affected The map below (Figure 29), prepared by the ZOI
regions are in the east and southeast and in Kyivska Environmental Network, presents the level of risk
oblast. Kharkivska oblast was the one most affected for different industrial and infrastructural facilities
by environmental incidents. Other heavily affected in Ukraine.
oblasts are Luhanska, Donetska, Dnipropetrovska,
Mykolaivska, Kyivska, and Zaporizka (Figure 28). Environmental and safety hazards in the exposed
areas. Nuclear and radiation safety threats are
The RDNA’s assessment of the areas most exposed looming, since the security of Ukrainian nuclear
to environmental risks is very similar to that of power plants continues to be threatened. Every
the United Nations Environment Programme and accident could lead to a radiation leak (see Figure 30).
246 MENR, Eco-threat, Link.
247 Ecoaction, “Potential Environmental Impacts Caused by Russian Aggression in Ukraine,” May 5, 2022, Link.
248 United Nations Environment Programme, “UN Warns of toxic Environmental Legacy for Ukraine, Region,” July 4, 2022,
Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 179
Figure 29. Environmental risks due to war in Ukraine Environmental risks due to war in Ukraine
Source: ZOI Environmental Network, “Ecodozor Platform for Monitoring War-Related Environmental Damage and Risks in
Ukraine,” Link.
Figure 30. Nuclear power plants in Ukraine
Source Bloomberg, “Mariupol Has Fallen,” May 18, 2022, Link.
180 Cross-cutting Areas
Figure 31. Territories with forest fires in the exclusion zone as of 18:00 on March 28, 2022
Source: MNER, “Key Environmental Issues, Associated with Russian Invasion in Ukraine 24–31 March 2022,” April 1, 2022, Link.
The Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant continues in natural complexes and abandoned villages on an
to operate outside of government control since area of about 10,287 ha, in particular on March 28,
March 4. The Russian army uses the territory of the 2022, when after two days without fires, new fires
nuclear power plant as a military base. According were identified that passed over an additional 176 ha
to the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, the forces of natural ecosystems (see Figure 30 and Figure 31).
are endangering the safe operation of the facility,
which has almost no spare parts and consumables. Currently, only large fires are being detected by
According to Energoatom, several employees of the satellite imagery (VIIRS, MODIS), but there may be
facility are displaced. a significant number of smaller and low-intensity
fires that are not recorded. Such fires, under
In the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone, an inventory favorable weather conditions and delayed detection
and assessment of the amount of damage caused and extinguishing, are able to spread over large
are underway. During his visit to the Chornobyl areas. With the increase in temperature in summer
nuclear power plant on June 2, Ukraine’s minister and lack of control over the fire situation, fire risks
of environmental protection and natural resources, are expected to increase.
Ruslan Strilets, noted that according to preliminary
estimates, the damage caused by troops in the Air pollution and public health risk: Fires, smoke, and
Exclusion Zone amounted to UAH 2.5 billion. The fumes caused by shelling, including fires in residential
forces destroyed almost 100 units of valuable areas, have significant impact on air quality. As
analytical equipment that have no analogs in Europe. a result of fires at oil depots, oxides of nitrogen,
Total lost equipment is estimated at US$135 million.249 ammonia, sulfur dioxide, benzopyrene, carbon oxides,
hydrogen cyanide vapor, formaldehyde, metals, and
Forest fires in the Chernobyl Exclusion Zone toxic organics and their compounds are released into
are consuming forests and fallow lands that the air. These substances also cause acidification
accumulated a significant amount of radionuclides of soil, wood, sod, and metal constructions such as
after the 1986 accident.250 During the occupation of bridges. While carbon dioxide and water vapor are
the Exclusion Zone, fires have already been recorded not toxic and are dangerous only for climate change
249 MNER, “Briefing on the Environmental Damage Caused by the Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine (2–8 June
2022),” June 10, 2022, Link.
250 MNER, “Key Environmental Issues, Associated with Russian Invasion in Ukraine 24–31 March 2022,” April 1, 2022, Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 181
(both of them are greenhouse gases), sulfur and have no access to safe water, and a further 4.6
nitrogen oxides may cause acidic rains, changing the million people have only limited access.252 For
pH of soils, causing vegetation burns, and creating example, the water supply system from the Dnipro
respiratory problems for mammals and birds. After River to the city of Mykolaiv was severely damaged
the fires/explosions, sulfur settles on the ground, by shelling, cutting access to drinking water for
which turns into sulfuric acid after rain. Continuous three weeks until basic needs were met by water
exposure to these pollutants has a cumulative effect. transported from neighboring regions. As of June 1,
The pollutants significantly affect air quality and pose 2022, Ukraine had begun enhanced epidemiological
a threat to human health, and they can be carried by surveillance of cases displaying cholera symptoms.253
winds over long distances. Air pollution effects of Children under the age of 15 living in countries
industrial production disruption due to war have yet to affected by conflict are almost three times more
be determined. At the same time, a significant amount likely to die from diarrheal diseases caused by a lack
of air pollution is associated with forest fires that are of safe water, sanitation, and hygiene, than by direct
also concentrated in in the war zone. At this time the violence; the greatest risk is among children under
public health impact of air pollution associated with five, who are more than 20 time more likely to die.254
the war has not been assessed in Ukraine. Health damage from the lack of access to clean
water (additional diarrheal mortality) is estimated
Damage to water infrastructure and public health in the range US$138–257 million.255 This damage
risk: Water infrastructure, including pumping is not included in the total damage due to potential
stations, purification plants, and sewage facilities, double counting with the losses associated with
has also suffered significant damage. All cities of the deteriorated health of people and constrained
the Luhanska oblast in the territory controlled by access to services estimated in the health sector.
Ukraine lack water supply and treatment. Water
supply and sewerage facilities in the Donetska, Hazardous waste problem: Highly hazardous
Zaporizka, Kharkivska, and Mykolaivska regions wastes as a result of war will likely exceed the
have been significantly damaged. The greatest total amount of annual wastes in Ukraine. They will
environmental damage is due to the destruction of pose a significant challenge for both cleanup and
treatment facilities and dams and decommissioning decontamination efforts. The cost of cleanup has to
of service organizations involved in water supply be estimated and is expected to be quite significant.
and wastewater treatment. Water now ends up in The costs vary by type of waste and technology for
reservoirs without treatment, especially where safe disposal.256
active hostilities have taken place. For example, after
the shelling of the Vasylkiv Operational Department Tailing storage facilities: Multiple industrial facilities,
of Water Supply and Sewerage Treatment facilities, warehouses, and factories have been damaged,
the forces destroyed the building of the sewage some storing a range of hazardous substances.
pumping station.251 As a result of such actions, the The war in the Donetska and Luhanska oblasts in
return water enters the Dnipro River without any Eastern Ukraine threatens around 4,500 mining,
treatment, which could spread infectious diseases metallurgical, and chemical enterprises. The Donbas
among the population consuming this water and lead region was polluted before and is home to “Europe’s
to the eutrophication and algal blooms, resulting in most significant man-made environmental burden.”
water de-oxygenation and fish kills. In addition, the Among these industries, 80 percent have hazardous
destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities installations that pose a threat to the environment.
can lead to the ingress of pollutants into water The region hosts 200 of Ukraine’s 465 tailing storage
bodies, resulting in significant water pollution. facilities (Figure 32)—large ponds storing the
industrial waste and toxic substances of the region’s
As a result of damage to water supply infrastructure, heavy mining, chemical, and energy industries. Well
an estimated 1.4 million people in Ukraine currently over half (60 percent) of these facilities are old, some
251 Rubryka, “Water Theft: How the Russians Are Depriving Us of Water Resources,” June 27, 2022, Link.
252 MENR, “Briefing on the Environmental Damage Caused by the Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine (4–10 May
2022),” May 12, 2022, Link.
253 OECD, “Environmental Impacts of the War in Ukraine and Prospects for a Green Reconstruction,” Link.
254 World Health Organization, “Ukraine Crisis. Public Health Situation Analysis–Refugee-Hosting Countries,” 2022, Link.
255 Value of statistical life is estimated using the standard World Bank methodology as presented in U. Narain and C. Sall,
“Methodology for Valuing the Health Impacts of Air Pollution,” 2016, Link.
256 See Profitableventure.com, “How Much Does It Cost to Dispose Hazardous Waste Per Ton?,” Link.
182 Cross-cutting Areas
Figure 32. Tailings storage facilities in Ukraine
Source: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe, “Donbas Tailings Storage Facilities,” Link.
are abandoned by their owners or in disrepair, and and allow dangerous substances into the Black and
almost three-quarters are considered potentially Mediterranean Seas. The situation is so critical that,
dangerous.257 They store about 6 billion tons of according to Mariupol’s mayor, Vadym Boychenko,
waste from various industries, and potential failures international experts and the UN must be admitted
could lead to the pollution of Ukraine’s major rivers, to the site to study the state of affairs and prevent a
such as the Dniester, Dnipro, and Siverskyi Donets, worldwide environmental catastrophe.260
which flow through Russia, Moldova, and Belarus.
Tailing storage facilities damaged by war have not Asbestos: In many urban areas, the cleanup
been assessed yet. of destroyed housing will confront hazardous
materials, particularly asbestos. The asbestos still
A 2019 study by the Organization for Security and presents in the structure of buildings that are being
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) showed that potential torn apart by bombardments can cause a series
threats posed by damage to these facilities include of diseases, ranging from breathing difficulties to
risks of floods and explosions as well as chemical, cancers of the lungs, stomach, ovaries, and other
environmental, and fire hazards. More than 40 organs. The waste problem has become critical.
industrial sites have already been attacked.258 For Each destroyed house generates about 50 m3 of
example, the Azovstal bombing threatens cross- waste. A recent source in Ukraine suggests that
border global hydrogen sulfide poisoning. The up to 60 percent of roofs used asbestos-reinforced
destruction of the steel plant could damage a slate.261 With about 240,000 houses destroyed (per
technical facility that holds back tens of thousands the RDNA), about 5–10 tons of asbestos262 could
of tons of hydrogen sulfide solution. According to the have been released into the air. In comparison, the
Mariupol City Council, the leak of this liquid could collapse of the World Trade Center on September
completely kill the flora and fauna of the Sea of Azov259 11, 2001, released a plume containing 400 tons of
257 VoxEurope, “What Impact Will the War in Ukraine Have on the Environment?,” April 20, 2022, Link.
258 Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, “Scorched Earth: The Catastrophic Environmental Costs of Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine,”
June 28, 2022, Link.
259 Rubryka, “War and Environment: Russia’s Ecological Crimes and How to record Them,” June 2, 20222, Link.
260 Newsweek, “Leak at Bombed Mariupol Steel Plant Risks Environmental Catastrophe—Ukraine,” May 18, 2022, Link.
261 UNDRR, “Rebuilding Ukraine: The Imminent Risks from Asbestos,” (blog), June 7, 2022, Link.
262 MNER, “Briefing on the environmental Damage Caused by the Russia’s War of Aggression against Ukraine (2–8 June
2022),” June 10, 2022, Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 183
pulverized asbestos and other hazardous materials or 30 percent of all protected areas in Ukraine, have
across lower Manhattan.263 Of the half million people been affected by shelling, bombing, oil pollution, and
exposed to the toxic plume, about 4,500 died from military maneuvers.268 According to Oleksii Vasyliuk
lung and other types of cancer. of the Ukrainian Conservation Group, an NGO, a fifth
of the country’s 377 Emerald network sites protected
Toxic remnants of war:264 Pollution from the extensive under the Bern Convention have been degraded by
use of weapons, including in populated areas, and military action. These include many unique steppe
the large volumes of military waste, including habitats of the highest nature value as well as the
destroyed military vehicles, creates a major cleanup dense forests growing along the Siverskyi Donets
challenge. Such pollution and waste materials found River, which provide shelter, food, and nesting sites
in war zones are called toxic remnants of war (TRW). for protected birds of prey. As troops concentrate
They arise from military herbicides, emissions from here, they jeopardize the integrity of this biodiversity
military bases, debris during the conflict, military hotspot.269 Additionally, as farmlands are being
waste management such as burn pits, and munitions threatened with land mines, the country is forced
disposal during and after conflict. According to one to move into converting unique steppe areas into
expert, “TRW are also created after the fighting has agricultural lands. This is an indirect impact of the
ceased through abandoned military materiel, critical war on biodiversity and ecosystem services.
infrastructure usage, industrial site usage, military
activity in populated locations, governance collapse
(which leads to a lack of control over environmental
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
regulation), loss of assessment capacity, and the including Build Back Better
collapse in waste management.”265 The war already
has created more than 200,000 tons of hazardous On April 21, Ukraine’s President established by
waste and scrap metal.266 decree the National Council for the Recovery
of Ukraine from the War. A working group on
Damage to nature reserves and protected environmental safety has been created within the
ecosystems: As a result of the war, about 20 percent council. Its proposal for environmental restoration
of the area of all protected areas in Ukraine is in and action plan for postwar reconstruction and
danger. The threatened areas include 17 Ramsar development of Ukraine were presented on July 4,
sites (wetlands of international importance) with 2022.270 It identified five priority areas: (i) reform
a total area of 627,300 m2; about 160 territories of of public environmental administration; (ii) climate
the Emerald Network with an area of 2.5 million ha; mitigation and adaptation policy; (iii) environmental
and four biosphere reserves. This situation poses safety and effective waste management; (iv)
a threat to strategic goals for the conservation of sustainable use of natural resources; and (v)
biodiversity, leads to a decrease in the potential for conservation of natural ecosystems, preservation of
absorption of greenhouse gases, and strengthens biological diversity, and restoration and development
the desertification process. The disappearance of protected areas. These approaches outlined by the
of endemic species of plants and animals would government provide very useful broad principles for
significantly harm biodiversity at planetary addressing multiple types of environmental damage.
scale.267 The potential damage is greater because
the conflict began near spring, when animals move The working group’s plan includes short- and
in search of mates and food, and when they are long-term priorities, which reflect inputs from an
rearing their young. According to the MENR, at least extensive process of stakeholder consultations. As
900 protected areas together covering 1.2 million ha, summarized by the OECD:
263 Asbestos, 9/11 and the World Trade Center Link.
264 T. Persico, “On Russia’s Invasion and Environmental Devastation of Ukraine: An Introduction to the Toxic Remnants of War,”
April 26, 2022, American Bar Association, Link.
265 Ibid.
266 MENR, “9 Urgent Reforms and Dozens of New Environmental Protection Objects: Ruslan Strelets Presented the regional
Component of the Recovery Plan of Ukraine” [in Ukrainian], July 4, 2022, Link.
267 Ibid.; WWF, “Assessing the Environmental Impacts of the War in Ukraine,” June 13, 2022, Link.
268 MENR Facebook page, April 30, 2022, Link.
269 WWF, “Assessing the Environmental Impacts of the War in Ukraine,” June 13, 2022, Link.
270 MENR, “9 Urgent Reforms and Dozens of New Environmental Protection Objects: Ruslan Strelets Presented the regional
Component of the Recovery Plan of Ukraine” [in Ukrainian], July 4, 2022, Link.
184 Cross-cutting Areas
• “In the short term, Ukraine should focus on measures to avoid further deterioration, and
eliminating and reducing immediate risks to restore ecosystems for people and for wildlife
human health and the environment from the • Sustainable use of natural resources
impacts of the war. Preparing and carrying out • Biodiversity conservation and restoration;
a comprehensive environmental clean-up effort, development of protected areas
especially related to collection, safe disposal and • Implementation of the European standards
treatment of the vast amount of military and other of public administration in the environmental
waste, will help to reduce immediate health risks. management.
At the same time, there will be an urgent need to
repair and re-build more efficient environmental Secondary hazards and environmental risks that
infrastructure to ensure the supply of safe drinking result from the war need to be fully assessed and
water, adequate sanitation and appropriate appropriate plans and procedures put in place
collection, storage and treatment of waste. The to ensure they are dealt with adequately and
existing and potential impacts on human health carefully. The key element of this environmental risk
should guide the prioritization of actions. assessment system is environmental monitoring
of air, water, and land pollution that is focused on
• “In the longer term, the post war economic the main threats described above. This monitoring
development process should be used for system should be accessible and transparent,
a fundamental transformation of Ukraine available for analysis, and form the information base
towards a green and net-zero economy. The for future actions. After cleanup, rebuilding should
reconstruction should not recreate the prewar follow the principles as described above. Regardless
economy, which was fossil fuel based, energy of competing and urgent recovery needs, strategic
inefficient and pollution intensive. Priority should planning around pollution cleanup must begin
be given to adjusting the economic structure by immediately to ensure a better, safer recovery for
building more energy-efficient and less polluting Ukraine and its people.
industries and transport systems. Rebuilding
of the housing stock, schools and hospitals As part of the recovery and reconstruction needs
should also improve their energy efficiency and in the forest sector, reconstruction efforts include
use low-carbon materials. It will be important a functional review of the institutions in the sector,
to clearly formulate and explicitly pronounce with a focus on modernized planning and on the
these objectives of moving away from the best afforestation and reforestation methods for
reliance on fossil fuels and incorporating long- climate-smart forestry. These include the creation of
term green transition and sustainability as the investor-ready carbon projects and the potential for
key approaches for all aspects of the postwar mass employment in afforestation and reforestation
economic development. This vision should cover and in the downstream wood-processing industries.
not just the areas most affected by war, but the
entire territory of Ukraine.”271
Limitations and Recommendations
The Government of Ukraine’s strategic goal of
Most of the environmental risks are linked to the
postwar recovery in a clean and safe environment
damage to industrial installations and houses
includes organization of recovery efforts in
(asbestos release), energy infrastructure (power
compliance with the EU environmental legislation.
plants, oil storage tankers, oil refineries, drilling
The goal entails the following:272
platforms, and gas facilities and distribution
pipelines), and ecosystems (forest fires and land
• Integration of climate goals into development and
mines). The main environmental risks include air
reconstruction goals
pollution, water pollution, and soil pollution with
• Minimization of long-term risks to environmental
accumulation of hazardous wastes that affect
safety (chemical and radiation)
the health and safety of the population as well as
• Reduction and prevention of industrial pollution
biodiversity. Losses and damage in monetary terms
and introduction of the “polluter pays” principle
are estimated where feasible, such as for the forest
• Effective waste management
sector. Due to the active war situation, measuring of
• Effective environmental monitoring to evaluate the
key pollutants in air, water, and soil was not possible.
overall environmental damage, take necessary
Therefore, the RDNA did not estimate damage and
needs for these receptors. Only forest fire areas
271 OECD, “Environmental Impacts of the War in Ukraine and Prospects for a Green Reconstruction,” Link.
272 Ibid.
Cross-cutting Areas 185
were verified, with a cutoff date of June 1, 2022, The European average is over 70 percent, indicating
according to the RDNA methodology. Ukraine’s potential for further sustainable production
growth. See Figure 33 for an indication of the prewar
spatial distribution of forests by oblast.
Forestry
The forest sector normally employs a large number
Background of people: the State Forest Enterprises retain about
49,000 staff, and overall employment in forestry
Ukraine is considered a sparsely forested country, and logging—including all State Forest Enterprises
as just 15.9 percent of its territory has forest cover. and private entities—was 68,000 in 2018. When
However, Ukraine’s 9.6 million ha forest area ranks wood processing (75,700) and the furniture industry,
ninth among European countries and is equivalent including artisanal enterprises (55,500), are also
in area to the forests of Germany or Italy. According counted, direct employment in the sector was nearly
to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 200,000.275 It may be safe to assume that this figure
United Nations,273 total growing stock is 2.28 billion would be much higher if employment in nature-
m3, equivalent to average growing stock of 235.29 based tourism, hunting, and the pulp and paper
m3 per hectare, and the road network extends over industry was also included.
6,000 km. Average annual increment per hectare is
approximately 4 m3 per hectare per year.274 From a The sector is estimated to contribute about 0.5
low of about 16 million m3 in 2009 to current levels percent to the GDP. In 2018, the value of Ukraine’s
of over 22 million m3, the overall timber harvest had forest product exports (roundwood, timber, pulp and
been rising significantly in the last decade and now paper, and wooden furniture) was US$1.9 billion.
equates to about 60 percent of annual increment. Average annual unit sales price, adjusted to 2022
Figure 33. Prewar forest cover
Source: State Statistics Service of Ukraine.
273 FAO, “Global Forest Resources Assessment 2020: Report—Ukraine,” Link.
274 FAO, “Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015: Report—Ukraine,” Link.
275 World Bank, “Ukraine Country Forest Note: Growing Green and Sustainable Opportunities,” 2020, Link.
186 Cross-cutting Areas
Figure 34. Fire damage records by month during 2022
February-March April
May June
Source: Regional Eastern Europe Fire Monitoring Center (REEFMC), Fire Damage Bulletins
(Інформаційний бюлетень: пожежі на території україни), Link.
prices, was UAH 1,218, or US$41.20 per m3. The sector Damage and Loss Assessment
was slow in its transition to a market-based system
and, in addition, was negatively impacted by the Fires haves been the principal source of war-related
economic downturn of 2014–2015. It is noteworthy damage in forests.276 During the first half of 2022,
that despite these setbacks, overall forest cover was multiple fire incidents were recorded, as shown
maintained and economic activity continued. in Figure 34. For the RDNA analysis, Fire Damage
Bulletins (Інформаційний бюлетень: пожежі на
The State Forest Resources Agency (SFRAU) території україни) 1 to 14 were consulted, covering
manages 73 percent of the forest area, with the the period February 24, 2022, to June 2, 2022 (see
remaining 27 percent managed by other central Figure 35). These government-published bulletins
government bodies and municipalities. Less than 1 are supported by data from ZOI Environment
percent of forests are privately owned. Since 2019, Network,277 based on original analysis by Ororatech
the activities of SFRAU have been coordinated by the Gmbh using its Wildfire Detection and Monitoring
Ministry of Energy and Environment. Regional Forest Service. The mapping system aggregates near-real-
Directorates, one for each oblast, serve as the time multispectral, hotspot, and auxiliary data from
SFRAU’s regional bodies, with 310 state enterprises up to 20 different geostationary and low-earth-orbit
subordinated to them.
276 After harvest, metal inclusions may be found in forest timber due to discharge of armaments, thus devaluing the timber
in areas that were not subject to fire damage; this source of additional damage is not analyzed here.
277 ZOI Environmental Network, “War on Ukraine,” Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 187
Figure 35. Week-to-week forest fire reports for combat zones (by middle day of reporting
period) showing movement of conflict to different oblasts over the period
80,000
70,000 Zaporizhya
60,000 Sumy
Mykolayiv
50,000
Hectares
Luhansk
40,000
Kyiv
30,000 Kherson
20,000 Kharkiv
10,000 Donetsk
- Chernihiv
27 7 14 21 28 4 11 18 25 2 9 16 23 30 Cherkasy
February March April May
Source: Assessment team estimates based on Regional Eastern Europe Fire Monitoring Center (REEFMC), Fire Damage
Bulletins (Інформаційний бюлетень: пожежі на території україни), Link.
Table 74. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Asset class Values US$ million
Burned area inside war zone 249,237 ha -
Growing stock damage 58,643,000 m3 2,416
Roads requiring repair 374 km 7
Ancillary assets damage Various (see Table 75) 73
Total 2,496
Source: Assessment team. Note: - = not available.
satellite data sources to detect areas producing high Growing stock damage: The value of standing timber
levels of infrared radiation to identify potential fire that has been destroyed is calculated as US$2.4
locations.278 The progression of damage following billion, based on an area damaged inside conflict
the development of the war can be seen in Figure 34. zones of 249,237 ha, average timber sales value
The baseline used to establish the prewar vegetation (adjusted to 2022 price) of UAH 936 per m3,280 and
cover was the “Vegetation and Energy” mapping by growing stock density of 235.29 m3 per hectare. The
Copernicus Global Land Operations, which provides a unit price used reflects the average sales revenue
detailed description with a resolution of 100 m as of achieved in 2018 by the SFRAU, adjusted to 2022.
2019.279
Damage to ancillary forest assets: Additional damage
Forest sector damage was calculated for growing was suffered by other assets and equipment used in
stock, forest management–related assets (buildings, forestry for which a national estimate was available
equipment), and forest roads (see Table 74). (see Table 75).281 This damage was allocated by
oblast on the basis of fire damage suffered by each
oblast as a proportion of the total (see Table 76).
278 OroraTech GmbH, “Service Description for the Wildfire Detection and Monitoring Service Version 1.15.0,” April 14, 2022,
Link.
279 “Copernicus Global Land Operations: ‘Vegetation and Energy’ ‘CGLOPS-1’—Algorithm Theoretical Basis Document
Moderate Dynamic Land Cover Collection 100 M Version 2 Issue I2.00,” August 26, 2019, Link.
280 Bioenergy Association of Ukraine, “Forestry Activities in Ukraine 2019” [in Ukrainian], Link.
281 Based on draft analysis by national forestry consultants.
188 Cross-cutting Areas
Losses were calculated based on (i) ecosystem Ecosystem service losses: The combined economic
services that no longer flow from burned forests, value of five ecosystem services—recreation,
and (ii) economic impact of restricted access to hydrological services, habitat protection for
forests due to the presence of mines. Losses by biodiversity, non-wood forest products (NWFPs),
oblast are described in Table 77. and greenhouse gas removal—is estimated at
US$431 per hectare per year (in 2022 constant US
dollars).282 This formula was applied to the fire-
damaged area only.
Table 75. Damage by asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Asset type Destroyed Damaged Total
Buildings 29.97 21.10 51.07
Equipment 10.34 3.45 13.79
Office equipment 3.45 4.49 7.94
Total 43.76 29.03 72.79
Source: Assessment team.
Table 76. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Total forest Total forest losses, Sector losses over
Oblast
damage annual equivalent 21 months
Cherkaska 0.74 0.03 0.06
Chernihivska 222.05 16.99 29.74
Chernivetska - 21.06 36.86
Dnipropetrovska - - -
Donetska 452.88 21.96 38.43
Ivano-Frankivska - 50.81 88.92
Kharkivska 526.10 22.64 39.62
Khersonska 102.56 4.41 7.72
Khmelnytska - - -
Kirovohradska - 6.25 10.93
Kyivska 668.06 28.75 50.31
Luhanska 474.53 20.42 35.74
Lvivska - 55.28 96.74
Mykolaivska 11.99 0.52 0.90
Odeska - 2.18 3.81
Poltavska - 3.06 5.36
Rivnenska $ - -
Sumska 18.37 0.79 1.38
Ternopilska - 16.30 28.53
Vinnytska - - -
Volynska - 55.58 97.27
Zakarpatska - - -
Zaporizka 18.97 6.11 10.69
Zhytomyrska - 89.13 155.98
Total 2,496.26 422.29 739.01
Source: Assessment team.
282 J. Siikamäki, F. J. Santiago-Ávila, and P. Vail, “Global Assessment of Nonwood Forest Ecosystem Services,” PROFOR
Working Paper, December 17, 2015, Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 189
Losses relating to forest inaccessibility due to mines: percent of the Allowable Annual Cut has been cut
The normal production cycle will be disrupted in in recent years,284 and this adjustment is applied;
forests that are undamaged but are inaccessible finally, the value loss is calculated by applying the
for timber harvest and haulage vehicles. The area same average market price figure as for the damage
affected in each oblast is the product of the area assessment. No further impacts are expected on the
of forest in the oblast and the proportion of the overall revenue-generating capacity of the forests,
oblast requiring nontechnical mine survey. Where e.g., activity in the undamaged and accessible forest
the nontechnical survey area exceeded the area is expected to increase output to compensate for the
of the given oblast, the areas were decreased to burned and inaccessible areas. The relatively low
equal the oblast areas. The annual increment of 4 proportion of Allowable Annual Cut that is harvested
m3 per hectare per year is applied to estimate the annually (50–60 percent) indicates there is latent
gross increment of these lands.283 Nationally, 54 capacity in the accessible forests.
Table 77. Losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Share of oblast Area for mine Forest area inaccessible Total forest losses,
Oblast that is forest (%) nontechnical survey (km2)a due to mines (ha) annual equivalent
A B A x B x 1,000 (US$ million)
Cherkaska 15 - - 0
Chernihivska 21 4,000 83,601 17
Chernivetska 29 8,094 236,700 21
Dnipropetrovska 6 - - -
Donetska 7 4,000 27,783 22
Ivano-Frankivska 41 13,894 571,000 51
Kharkivska 12 - - 23
Khersonska 4 - - $4
Khmelnytska 13 - - -
Kirovohradska 6 12,000 70,202 $6
Kyivska 27 - - 29
Luhanska 11 - - 20
Lvivska 28 21,824 621,200 55
Mykolaivska 4 - - 1
Odeska 6 4,000 24,496 2
Poltavska 9 4,000 34,438 3
Rivnenska 36 - - $-
Sumska 18 - - $1
Ternopilska 13 13,817 183,200 16
Vinnytska 13 - - -
Volynska 31 20,135 624,600 56
Zakarpatska 51 - - $-
Zaporizka 4 16,000 59,481 $6
Zhytomyrska 34 29,819 1,001,600 89
Total 151,583 3,538,300 422
Source: Assessment team.
Note: a. The area for the nontechnical survey is adjusted as explained in the paragraph preceding the table.
283 FAO, “Global Forest Resources Assessment 2015: Report—Ukraine,” Link.
284 World Bank, “Ukraine Country Forest Note: Growing Green and Sustainable Opportunities,” 2020, Link.
190 Cross-cutting Areas
Table 78. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Ancillary Harvest
Oblast Reforestation Roads Nursery Overhead Total
assets equipment
Cherkaska 0 0 0 5 0 1 6
Chernihivska 64 1 8 10 4 18 106
Chernivetska - - - 4 - 1 4
Dnipropetrovska - - - 3 - 1 3
Donetska 131 2 17 3 9 32 194
Ivano-Frankivska - - - 9 - 2 11
Kharkivska 152 2 20 6 11 38 229
Khersonska 30 0 4 2 2 8 45
Khmelnytska - - - 4 - 1 5
Kirovohradska - - - 3 - 1 3
Kyivska 193 3 25 10 13 49 293
Luhanska 137 2 18 5 10 34 205
Lvivska - - - 10 - 2 12
Mykolaivska 3 0 0 2 0 1 7
Odeska - - - 3 - 1 4
Poltavska - - - 4 - 1 5
Rivnenska - - - 11 - 2 14
Sumska 5 0 1 7 0 3 16
Ternopilska - - - 3 - 1 3
Vinnytska - - - 5 - 1 6
Volynska - - - 10 - 2 12
Zakarpatska - - - 10 - 2 12
Zaporizka 5 0 1 2 0 2 10
Zhytomyrska - - - 16 - 3 19
Nation-wide
- - - - - - 5
(capacity building)
Total 721 10 95 144 50 204 1,229
Source: Assessment team.
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, for a World Bank project in Bosnia and Herzegovina
including Build Back Better
(direct costs of using a mixture of forest enterprise
and seasonal staff). The reference sites require
removal of shrub vegetation, not unlike the sites
Reconstruction needs are listed as reforestation, likely to be encountered in reforesting burned areas
reinstatement of ancillary assets and forest roads, in Ukraine, which will have snags and semi-burned
added nursery capacity, and realignment of timber areas that need clearance.285
production through targeted mechanization (see
Table 80; by oblast see Table 78). Reinstatement of ancillary assets: These are the
damaged assets assessed above, with a rebuilding
Reforestation needs: The area damaged by fire is premium of 30 percent added to build back better
assumed to be reforested. A unit cost of US$2,894 and to reflect the likely increased cost of materials,
is proposed based on recent analysis undertaken labor, etc. (Table 79).
285 World Bank, Bosnia and Herzegovina–Forest Economy Development Project, internal document, 2022.
Cross-cutting Areas 191
Table 79. Recovery and reconstruction needs for ancillary assets (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022
Asset type Destroyed Damaged All
Buildings 38.97 27.43 66.39
Equipment 13.44 4.48 17.92
Office equipment 4.48 5.84 10.32
Total 56.89 37.74 94.63
Source: Assessment team.
Realignment of timber harvesting efforts: Building rather than bare-rooted, can extend the planting
back better and seeking to achieve prewar levels season and support better survival outcomes.
of output within a short time frame will require a Reforesting the fire-damaged area will require
substantial investment in harvesting machinery. large quantities of different species. The existing
The investment in harvesting machines outside of capacity is not sufficient to meet the needs of such
damaged areas is justified; without it, the damage a large area of damage. At an estimated 20,000 ha
caused by the conflict and the effects of mine laying of reforestation a year, 12 years and new nurseries
could have a major systemic impact on the sector. with annual capacity of 50 million seedlings will
Over one-third of the forest has been damaged or be required. New nurseries of 12.5 million annual
made inaccessible, and thus 200,000 jobs could production each could be placed strategically in
be at risk. Whatever remaining, usable harvesting Kyivska, Kharkivska, Donetska, and Luhanska.
machines cannot be moved from damaged areas
or where mines have made forestry inaccessible. Transitional maintenance and overhead costs:
Production in the areas that are still accessible These costs are associated with managing the
should be intensified in order to maintain production, reconstruction phase and supporting staff during
at least until such time as demining can have an this time. They are applied as 20 percent of total
effect. Thus, modern harvesting equipment is needed reconstruction needs.
throughout the country to conduct low-impact felling
over large areas. Capacity building: Capacity building should focus on
the following:
In terms of building back better, such machinery
will use less fuel and have lower emissions. • Studies for reforestation and afforestation:
Small agile models will be capable of harvesting Forest ecosystem losses, especially natural and
in an environmentally sensitive manner under the semi-natural forests, are increasingly difficult, if
“continuous cover” silviculture favored in Ukraine. not impossible, to replace in the context of climate
An added benefit of this equipment is the ability to change, where growing conditions are harsher
apply telemetry to remotely monitor the volumes and reestablishing tree cover more challenging. A
being harvested and the locations being worked. holistic approach involving afforestation (planting
This could be a major improvement in security and of lands that never had forest previously) and
could reduce the risk of log and revenue losses, thus habitat restoration, peatland rewetting, etc.,
benefiting the build back better agenda regarding will be a more sustainable mix of activities,
improved work processes. To equip the forest sector applied at landscape level. There may also be a
so that 20 percent of the harvest would be achieved strong market for afforestation—of abandoned
by these machines, an investment of approximately agricultural lands, for example—in favor of
US$144 million is needed for 180 teams of one carbon credits under voluntary carbon trading
harvester and one forwarder. schemes. Studies are required to inform climate-
smart reforestation and afforestation strategies
Added nursery capacity: Current afforestation at landscape level, including proof of concept for
rates are low (c. 5,000 ha a year). Modern precision carbon-credit forestry projects.
nurseries with highly efficient use of water and
minimal chemical inputs can raise many millions of • Functional review and reform roadmap. Prior
seedlings very effectively. Quality control and cold- to the conflict, the Ministry of Ecology and
chain delivery of seedlings to site containerized, Natural Resources had already embarked on an
192 Cross-cutting Areas
ambitious institutional reform agenda. Building have been commandeered, destroyed, or damaged
back better should include a careful rebuilding during the conflict.
of forestry institutions to align with potential
EU accession and with the EU Green Deal, It should be noted that the recovery period to
specifically by targeting illegal logging under the again reach ecosystem service levels of $431 per
FLEGT (Forest Law Enforcement, Governance hectare in the fire-damaged areas will require 10
and Trade) program and promoting sustainable years or more. Reforestation of 250,000 ha will
forest management and sustainable fiscal also take much longer. The current rate is about
policies for natural resources management as 5,000 ha a year. Even if 20,000 ha were achieved
outlined in the recommendations of the World annually, this would still require over 12 years. Such
Bank Country Forest Note.286 A functional review a replanting target will require new forest nurseries
of forest institutions and their funding is needed with an annual capacity of 50 million seedlings. Such
during this phase, together with a roadmap for capacity will require at least four years to establish
reform. and produce their first usable crop.
• Modernization of forest management planning. For future assessments, the following could be
The use of big data, AI, and mathematical taken into consideration:
optimization is underutilized in forest • Development of standards for carbon projects
management in Ukraine. Disasters such as under voluntary carbon certification or Public
wars, fires, or storms place a significant strain Employment Services (PES) schemes to
on forest authorities faced with pivoting entire maximize the attractiveness of investing in the
management plans to align with the new green recovery of Ukraine
constraints being imposed. As part of recovery, • “Green wage” program for mass employment in
significant capacity building is needed in high- large-scale afforestation under carbon projects
technology stand-level forest inventory and in and others
optimization of forest management planning • Improved private sector access to finance for the
to allow deeper “what if” scenario analysis and wood-processing industry, emphasizing the need
rapid realignment of stand-level decisions. to concentrate on long-lived, high-value products
using solid wood, with chips and pellets as by-
All activities are to be organized under the MENR. products (in alignment with new EU Renewable
Energy Directive strategy and reduction in whole
Limitations and Recommendations tree biomass)
• Building back better by amending construction
specifications to allow use of long-lived timber
There is limited baseline data on the harvesting
products in multistory buildings and other
fleet prior to the conflict. It is likely that a large
structural applications (bridges, etc.)
number of machines and vehicles, including trucks,
Table 80. Recovery and reconstruction needs by categories (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Values Total (US$ million)
Reforestation 721
Roads 10
Ancillary assets 95
Harvest equipment 144
Reconstruction overhead/maintenance 204
Nurseries 50
Subtotal for capital investments
Capacity building (nation-wide) 5
Total 1,229
Source: Assessment team.
286 “World Bank, “Ukraine Country Forest Note: Growing Green and Sustainable Opportunities,” 2020, Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 193
EMERGENCY RESPONSE
AND CIVIL PROTECTION
Summary flooding can have a devasting impact. For example,
the 2008 floods on the Siret and Prut Rivers caused
damage estimated at US$675 – US$909 million (€624–
As of June 1, 2022, the war has resulted in total
840 million). Droughts in Ukraine lead to water deficits
damage of US$0.1 billion for the sector, while the
that particularly impact the agricultural sector in the
aggregate losses total US$0.2 billion. The damage
southern regions. In 2009, a drought reduced wheat
includes partial or full destruction of vehicles,
production by 30 percent, and more recently, in 2020,
equipment, and buildings used for the purpose of
a drought resulted in the loss of 234,000 ha of winter
civil protection and emergency response. The losses
crops. In general, there is a high probability of partial
include debris removal and additional operational
or near-total loss of grain crops every four to five
costs related to increased involvement of first
years, and catastrophic losses that lead to a complete
responders in emergency and rescue operations
loss of yield every 20 to 30 years. Large wildfires are
related to the war. The total reconstruction and
becoming more frequent and are causing economic
recovery needs from the sector are estimated at
damage of US$109–291 million annually. The wildfires
US$0.7 billion, with US$0.5 billion urgently needed.
of 2020 are considered the most catastrophic in
The most pressing investments include repair,
the country’s modern history. Climate change may
reconstruction, and replacement of damaged,
further increase the intensity and/or severity of these
destroyed, and seized assets, respectively. There
extreme weather events. Finally, the south of Ukraine
is also a need to support scaled-up emergency
is also exposed to seismic risk.
response needs related to the war, including
preparedness for chemical, biological, radiological,
An important driver of risk relates to the country’s
and nuclear (CBRN) incidents; measures related to
aging infrastructure stock. Ukraine’s infrastructure
disaster risk management to prevent, prepare, and
quality is deteriorating in absolute terms and
respond to disasters; and restoration of institutions to
compared to other countries. Ukraine ranked
effectively support the recovery and reconstruction
66th of 160 countries on the World Bank Logistics
effort.
Performance Index in 2018. 288 Specifically on
infrastructure, it ranked 74th in the world in 2009 and
Background 119th in 2018.289
The 2022 war in Ukraine has tested Ukraine’s civil Ukraine’s DRM system is centralized and primarily
protection capacities, as Ukraine is already exposed focused on the prevention of and response to
to various adverse natural hazards, including floods, disasters, rather than proactive management of
droughts, and wildfires. According to EM-DAT, 749 risks. The most important legislation that guides the
disaster events were registered in Ukraine between system is the Civil Protection Code of Ukraine (2013),
2012 and 2021.287 Flooding occurs predominantly in which defines roles and responsibilities of system
the summer in the Carpathian region. It is partially participants.290 Under the Civil Protection Code, the
driven by uncontrolled deforestation and increased main institution responsible for DRM is the Ukraine
construction in floodplains. Recent extreme flooding State Emergency Service (SESU). Established in
events in 2008, 2010, and 2020 demonstrate that 2012, SESU is a central executive body that is led
287 Based on EM-DAT data for 1900–2019. “Global Occurrences from Natural Disasters,” EM-DAT: The Emergency Events
Database, Université Catholique de Louvain–CRED (EM-DAT, CRED / UCLouvain), D. Guha-Sapir. Brussels, Belgium, Link.
288 World Bank. 2018. LPI – Country Score Card: Ukraine 2018. Link.
289 Ibid.
290 Other critical legislation and regulations include, among others, the Law on the Legal Regime of a State of Emergency, the
Law on Major Hazard Facilities (2001), the Law on the Nature Reserve Fund (1992), the Forest Code (1994), the Rules of Fire
Safety in the Forests (2004), the Rules of Fire Safety in the Agro-Industrial Complex (2006), Regulations on State Forest
Protection (2009), the Classification of Emergency Situations (2018), and the Law on Hydrometeorological Activity (1999).
194 Cross-cutting Areas
and coordinated by the Cabinet of Ministers through At the regional and local level, SESU’s regional
the Ministry of Internal Affairs. The SESU’s areas of departments collaborate with local governments on
engagement include, among others, civil protection, risk assessments and emergency response. In the
emergency response, search and rescue, firefighting, event of an emergency, SESU’s response efforts are
and hydrometeorological services. Within SESU, complemented by other agencies under the Ministry
there are civil protection units at each level of of Internal Affairs, such as the National Police. The
public administration (national, regional, and local), SESU also engages with educational institutions,
with 25 territorial bodies, 13 units under central including the National University of Civil Defense of
subordination (in particular, an interregional rapid Ukraine; Cherkasy Institute of Fire Safety named
response center and a special aviation unit of the after the Heroes of Chernobyl, part of the National
operational and rescue service of the civil protection University of Civil Defense of Ukraine; Lviv State
of SESU of the Central Department of SESU), two University of Life Safety; Higher Vocational School
higher education institutions, and two research of Lviv State University of Life Safety; Lyceum of
institutions. In total, the number of SESU personnel Civil Defense of Lviv State University of Life Safety;
stands at 59,039 (civil servants and freelancers and Institute of Public Administration and Research
included), of which 12,469 (21 percent) are female in Civil Defense. The regional distribution of SESU
and 46,570 (79 percent) are male. resources is portrayed in Table 81.
The structure of the 25 territorial offices include: The speed and effectiveness of Ukraine’s emergency
the technical service squads, state fire and rescue response activities have been negatively impacted
services squads, state fire and rescue posts, by a myriad of challenges, including outdated
technical service departments, support centers, facilities. Lack of funding has resulted in aging and
and operational and coordination centers, special poorly maintained facilities and outdated technical
purpose emergency-rescue squads, etc. The equipment for emergency response. Inadequate
subdivisions of central subordination include, in emergency response facilities, warehouses, and
particular, the Interregional Rapid Response Center storage buildings create challenges related to
of the SESU; Mobile Rescue Rapid Response Center storage of equipment and supplies, which in turn
of the SESU; Interregional Center for Humanitarian compromise effective distribution of relief in the
Demining and Rapid Response of the SESU; event of a disaster. While the government has made
Interregional Center for Humanitarian Demining efforts as part of the country’s decentralization
and rapid response of the SESU; two Special Rapid process to construct local emergency facilities
Response Centers of the SESU; and the Special (e.g., professional fire brigades, volunteer fire
Aviation Unit of the Operational and Rescue Service brigades, and security centers equipped for
of the Civil Protection of the SESU. The Ukrainian emergency medical aid), the buildings constructed
Hydrometeorological Center (UkrGMC), and the in recent years are highly energy inefficient. This
hydrometeorological organizations subordinate to it, results in high costs for local governments, which
that are included in the sphere of management of the further reduces availability of resources to support
SESU and are represented in all regions of Ukraine emergency operations.
s, perform functions associated with systematic
observations of the parameters of the environment, Ukraine’s first responders are overstretched and
analysis and forecasting of hydrometeorological equipped with inadequate equipment and technology.
conditions of the state of weather, rivers, reservoirs Ukraine has around 36,000 first responders to provide
and marine areas, growing season conditions emergency services to a population of 42 million. These
crops and yields, monitoring the state of the rescue workers are frequently exposed to high risks
atmosphere, environmental pollution, modeling during rescue operations because they lack protective
and forecasting of pollutant transfer substances equipment like helmets, safety shoes, and breathing
in nuclear and environmental accidents, forecasts equipment. In terms of communication technologies,
and warnings about dangerous and spontaneous the interoperability of radio communication poses
hydrometeorological phenomena. The data is then another challenge during emergency response
shared with the Office of the President of Ukraine, the operations. Radio communication to connect search-
Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, the National Security and-rescue aircrafts with ground-based search-
and Defense Council of Ukraine, the Armed Forces and-rescue forces is not always possible, which puts
of Ukraine, ministries and others central executive first responders at risk and results in less efficient
bodies, local governments, enterprises, institutions response.
and organizations of all forms of ownership, as well
as the population.
Cross-cutting Areas 195
Table 81. Regional distribution of SESU resources (number)
Rescue service/ Hydrometeorology/
SESU main department
Oblast response center geophysics
Buildings Vehicles Buildings Vehicles Buildings
Cherkaska 433 305 0 0 0
Chernihivska 353 347 0 66 0
Chernivetska 271 224 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 905 562 56 148 105
Donetska 290 458 0 0 67
Ivano-Frankivska 266 292 0 0 0
Kharkivska 374 621 0 0 108
Khersonska 293 350 0 0 94
Khmelnytska 316 329 0 0 0
Kirovohradska 560 292 0 0 0
Kyiv (city) 200 290 0 0 153
Kyivska 427 574 135 187 0
Luhanska 315 384 0 0 60
Lvivska 449 447 44 60 0
Mykolaivska 453 354 0 0 81
Odeska 496 471 196 106 0
Poltavska 380 450 0 0 0
Rivnenska 190 356 0 0 0
Sumska 228 288 129 112 43
Ternopilska 165 248 0 0 0
Vinnytska 306 332 0 0 0
Volynska 240 242 0 0 0
Zakarpatska 225 280 0 0 0
Zaporizka 270 425 0 0 59
Zhytomyrska 305 341 0 0 0
Total 8,710 9,262 560 679 770
Source: Assessment team.
Note: To avoid double counting, universities, research centers, and institutes are covered under the education sector; the
humanitarian demining center is covered under the demining sector; and medical rehabilitation centers are covered under
the health sector.
196 Cross-cutting Areas
SESU’s involvement in war rescue operations so far goods and services (namely increased operational
has been extensive; for instance, it has extinguished activities); these are divided according to level of
9,721 fires caused by shelling and supported rescue damage/destruction (all assets are publicly owned).
operations in 36,092 instances related to shelling This approach covers the economic value of total/
damage. It has also provided immediate support partial destruction of infrastructure and assets. In
to vulnerable populations, and so far has delivered that regard, data were collected on the size of the
11,870 tons of drinking water and 2,427 tons of food. partially damaged and fully destroyed buildings
Most importantly, SESU participated in the evacuation within the emergency response and civil protection
of a total of 1,878,000 people and thus far provided sector, and unit costs (US$/m2) were applied to
psychological support to 137,368 persons. All in all, estimate the damage, which was divided according
since the war began, the number of emergency calls to ownership (e.g., between SESU main departments,
to Ukrainian rescuers has increased dramatically. rescue/response centers, and hydrogeological/
Unfortunately, 37 SESU personnel have been killed, geophysical institutions), and then divided by oblast.
112 wounded, and 8 imprisoned while taking part in In terms of firefighting/rescue vehicles, book value
rescue operations. of a total of 669 either destroyed or seized vehicles
was applied, resulting in an estimate of US$9 million
Damage and Loss Assessment in damage. Such a low estimate is due to the vehicles’
obsolescence and old age, as most of them originate
from Soviet times (1950 to 1990s).
As of June 1, 2022, the aggregate quantitative and
qualitative damage to civil protection infrastructure
Almost 99 percent of damaged/destroyed buildings
and physical assets amounts to US$98 million.
were recorded with SESU main departments at
Damage includes SESU main departments and
oblast level (Table 82). Of affected buildings, 80
rescue/response centers; the hydrometeorological
percent suffered damage and 20 percent were
and geophysical organization infrastructure was
destroyed (US$70.1 million is estimated for damaged
partially damaged and/or completely destroyed, and
buildings versus US$18.2 million for destroyed
vehicles have been damaged, destroyed, and seized.
buildings). The largest number of damaged buildings
A total of 49 buildings in the emergency response and
is recorded in Kharkivska oblast (32), followed by
civil protection sector were completely destroyed and
Kyivska oblast (15) and Donetska and Chernihivska
147 buildings were partially damaged. The emergency
(12 each). The highest number of destroyed buildings
response and civil protection sector also lost control
is recorded in Zaporizka oblast (35), followed by
of an additional 453 buildings in territory temporarily
Luhanska (9) and Kharkivska (3). Concerning seized
not under government control.291 All in all, 6 percent
SESU buildings in territory temporarily not under
of the buildings owned by the emergency response
government control, the largest number recorded
and civil protection sector were either damaged,
is in Luhanska oblast (all 315 buildings were seized)
destroyed, or seized. Another major asset that was
and Donetska oblast (101 out of 290 buildings were
either destroyed or seized was the specialized civil
seized). Concerning hydrometeorology/seismology
protection/firefighting vehicles; as a result, 669 of
buildings, 13 were damaged in Donetska oblast
9,941 vehicles are now out of service. Finally, some
and 10 in Zaporizka. In terms of vehicles, by far the
hydrometeorological instruments and equipment
largest number of destroyed vehicles is recorded
were damaged or destroyed, while some with points
in Odeska oblast (67 out of total of 79 vehicles
of hydrometeorological observations remained in the
destroyed nationwide). The largest number of seized
territories temporarily not under government control.
vehicles is reported in Zaporizka oblast (303 out of
384), followed by Donetska oblast (169 out of 458).
A major loss sustained by the emergency response
and civil protection sector relates to the extra time
The total effects of the war as of June 1, 2022,
put in by the rescue/response operatives due to
are estimated at US$338.81 million, with damage
increased demands for emergency operations. As
accounting for US$98.26 million (29 percent) and
a result, additional expenses amounting to US$241
losses accounting for US$240.54 million (71 percent)
million were recorded as a loss. The damage and
of the total (Table 83). The Donetska oblast incurred
losses were calculated by taking into account
the most significant costs (US$45.38 million, or
the damage and destruction of physical assets
13.4 percent), followed by Zaporizka (8.5 percent),
(buildings, equipment, and vehicles) as well as losses
Kharkivska (7.8 percent), and Kyivska (7.2 percent).
due to changes in financial flows related to access to
291 Those seized buildings were not calculated under damage.
Cross-cutting Areas 197
Table 82. Damage inventory by asset types (number) as of June 1, 2022
Partially Completely Seized Total
Asset type Baseline
damaged destroyed assets damage
SESU main departments by oblast (buildings) 8,710 117 48 453 618
Rescue Service/Response Centers (buildings) 856 0 1 0 1
Hydrogeological/Geophysical institutions
770 30 0 0 30
(buildings)
Total buildings 9,336 147 49 453 649
Vehicles (firefighting / rescue vehicles) 9,941 0 80 589 669
Source: SESU reports. Note: All assets referenced are public.
Table 83. Damage and losses by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Damage Losses Total costs Share of total (%)
Cherkaska - 6.7 6.7 1.98
Chernihivska 9.8 0.2 10.0 2.95
Chernivetska - 5.1 5.1 1.51
Dnipropetrovska 3.4 17.1 20.5 6.05
Donetska 21.8 23.6 45.4 13.40
Ivano-Frankivska - 7.8 7.8 2.30
Kharkivska 11.1 15.3 26.4 7.79
Khersonska 0.2 5.8 6.0 1.77
Khmelnytska - 7.1 7.1 2.10
Kirovohradska - 5.2 5.2 1.53
Kyiv (city) 1.5 17.0 18.5 5.46
Kyivska 14.0 10.5 24.5 7.23
Luhanska 6.4 13.1 19.5 5.76
Lvivska - 14.3 14.3 4.22
Mykolaivska 5.5 6.4 11.9 3.51
Odeska 0.0 13.6 13.6 4.01
Poltavska 0.8 7.8 8.6 2.54
Rivnenska - 6.6 6.6 1.95
Sumska 5.2 6.0 11.2 3.31
Ternopilska - 5.9 5.9 1.74
Vinnytska - 8.7 8.7 2.57
Volynska - 5.9 5.9 1.74
Zakarpatska 0.0 7.2 7.2 2.13
Zaporizka 17.5 11.3 28.8 8.50
Zhytomyrska 1.1 6.8 7.9 2.33
Nationwide (no specific region) - - - -
Total cost 98.3 240.5 338.8 100.0
Note: In the regions with little military activity and always under government control, the damage were assumed to be zero.
198 Cross-cutting Areas
Table 84. Loss by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Total value (US$ million) Share %
Debris removal 3.88 1.6
Increased operational costs 236.66 98.4
Total losses 240.54 100.0
Source: Assessment team.
The aggregate quantitative and qualitative losses the war and the country’s unpreparedness for
to DRM/emergency management/civil protection CBRN events
services amount to US$241 million (Table 84).
Losses include SESU’s increased operational costs • Establishment and organization of oblast-level
of US$237 million, and debris removal costs of US$4 mobile command control points and four major
million. The losses were estimated considering logistics hubs at a cost of US$24.65 million;
increased operational activities and salary increases required to support citizens in need of rescue
of UAH 30,000 applied to all SESU response/rescue
staff according to requirements under martial law (a • Construction of platforms and hangars for
total of six months since beginning of the war) and helicopters at oblast level costing US$45.82
the debris removal costs applied to the area (m2) of million; required to allow SESU to respond to
either partially damaged or fully destroyed buildings. increased demands, given the large territory
that is being covered by rescue and immediate
response operations
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
including Build Back Better • Establishment of sea and river rescue units
costing US$39.32 million; required to address
There are two major considerations related to the the problem of mined area in waters and general
reconstruction and recovery strategy within this lack of related preparedness
sector. First, as the war is still ongoing, citizens are
still in need of immediate support provided by the • Construction of bomb shelters at oblast level
first responders. This means that priority short- within local fire and rescue units costing US$5.57
term measures have to be aligned with those needs. million; required to provide safety to citizens and
Second, there is a substantial need to address the SESU staff in the case of shelling
inadequate and outdated facilities and obsolete
technical equipment and to provide training. In • Development of three nationwide training
this context, emphasis should be on providing facilities costing US$12.09 million; required to
quick solutions that will enable safe and adequate provide training for additional SESU staff and
protection of citizens as part of rescue operations. provide specialized education for existing staff
The immediate/short-term actions should consist of
the following: Specific needs for the Ukrainian early warning
system are related to the items and quantities
• Procurement of 669 modern and fully equipped shown in Table 85.
firefighting/rescue vehicles at a cost of
US$395.96 million; required to replace those In the medium to long term, SESU buildings—
either destroyed of seized including main departments at oblast level,
rescue/response centers, and buildings of
• Procurement of mobile decontamination hydrometeorological organizations—are to be
units (system and vehicles), heavy load CBRN reconstructed; the amount needed is estimated
(chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear) at US$178.68 million (Table 87). The recovery and
vehicles, and mobile CBRN laboratories at a cost reconstruction needs by oblast are displayed in
of US$65.76 million; required given the nature of Table 86.
Cross-cutting Areas 199
Table 85. Recovery and reconstruction needs for early warning systems (number)
as of June 1, 2022
Item Quantity (pcs)
Automated meteorological station 28
Automated hydrological station / post 20
Aerological station for atmospheric sounding 2
Automated meteorological aviation complex 10
Marine automated post 10
Automated radar system 2
Servers with power supply 20
Personal computers complete with monitor and power supply 40
Source: Assessment team.
Table 86. Recovery and reconstruction needs by oblast (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Oblast Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Cherkaska 6.6 - 6.6
Chernihivska 6.7 19.7 26.4
Chernivetska 3.0 - 3.0
Dnipropetrovska 15.9 6.3 22.1
Donetska 119.6 30.2 149.8
Ivano-Frankivska 2.7 - 2.7
Kharkivska 14.6 22.2 36.8
Khersonska 6.7 0.5 7.2
Khmelnytska 2.8 - 2.8
Kirovohradska 6.7 - 6.7
Kyiv (city) 8.9 2.9 11.8
Kyivska 10.1 25.8 35.9
Luhanska 202.2 12.8 215.0
Lvivska 8.4 - 8.4
Mykolaivska 8.4 10.5 18.9
Odeska 9.0 0.0 9.0
Poltavska 6.6 1.5 8.1
Rivnenska 4.0 - 4.0
Sumska 5.5 10.3 15.9
Ternopilska 2.7 - 2.7
Vinnytska 2.8 - 2.8
Volynska 2.7 -
Zakarpatska 2.9 0.0 2.9
Zaporizka - 33.8 114.6
Zhytomyrska 2.8 2.1 4.9
Nationwide (no specific region) - - -
Total 542.9 178.7 721.6
Source: Assessment team.
200 Cross-cutting Areas
The invasion has exacerbated existing challenges Limitations and Recommendations
in the sector. The machinery and vehicles prior to
February 2022 were reported to be outdated; such This assessment recognizes the ongoing nature of
equipment has been pushed to its limit while also the invasion and the continued attacks on critical
facing the effects of the war. Continuous efforts need infrastructure, including in the civil protection
to be made to strengthen Ukraine’s civil protection sector. The baseline data were provided by the SESU.
service. For example, Ukraine’s application to the
Union Civil Protection Mechanism is a positive Further analysis of Ukraine’s risk landscape and
projection, particularly for the exchange of expertise vulnerabilities is imperative for preparing targeted
and international cooperation. If measures are not and effective investments in the recovery and
taken to strengthen civil protection capacities in reconstruction phase, through the lens of resilient
the short and long term, Ukraine will face the risks recovery. It is recommended that existing civil
of man-made emergencies nature, occurrence of protection capacities across Ukraine be assessed,
natural disasters, such as floods, fires, etc. specifically with an analysis of outdated capacities
and investments into enhancing capacities.
Additionally, the repurposing of donated equipment
for civil protection could also be analyzed.
Table 87. Recovery and reconstruction needs by category (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Category Immediate/short term Medium- to long-term Total
Reconstruction Buildings - 178.7 178.7
Needs Debris Removal 3.9 - 3.9
Service Delivery Vehicles 396.0 - 396.0
Restoration Needs Service restoration 143.1 - 143.1
Total 543.0 178.7 721.6
Source: Assessment team.
Cross-cutting Areas 201
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Summary The justice sector is led by the Ministry of Justice, the
judiciary and its courts, and the Office of the General
Prosecutor (OGP). The judicial system consists of the
In the justice and public administration sector, a
courts of different jurisdictions, the High Council of
total of US$0.1 billion in damage, US$0.03 billion
Justice (HCJ), the High Qualification Commission for
in losses, and US$0.2 billion in recovery and
Judges (HQCJ), the National School of Judges, the
reconstruction needs have been estimated as a
Judicial Protection Service, and the State Judicial
result of the war. Related to justice, damage is
Administration (SJA). The key institutions involved
estimated at US$69.30 million, while losses total
in preventing and combating corruption include the
US$32.11 million. These figures include damage
National Agency for Corruption Prevention (NACP),
of US$61.33 million for the judiciary and US$7.97
the National Anticorruption Bureau (NABU), and the
million for law enforcement, comprising partial or
Special Anticorruption Prosecutor’s Office (SAPO).
full destruction of buildings, furniture, and vehicles
The High Anticorruption Court (HACC) tries the
used for judicial or law enforcement purposes.
corruption and civil forfeiture cases submitted by
Losses include US$9.09 million for the judiciary, and
SAPO.
US$0.4 million for law enforcement. Losses consider
items such as demolition and debris removal and
Prior to the war, the OGP had 845 buildings at the
loss of public services / fees. Reconstruction and
lowest or circuit level, including those for specialized
recovery needs for the justice sector are estimated
services such as quasi-military prosecutions, and
at US$152.89 million. The most pressing needs
104 buildings at the oblast level for a total of 949
include restoration of delivery of justice services,
buildings. The OPG owns or rents 10 buildings in
specifically through the availability and training of
Kyiv, and these have been unaffected by the war.
law enforcement, anticorruption officials, private
Prior to the war the judiciary had 783 courthouses,
lawyers, and judges, as well as the reconstruction
32 buildings in the SJA’s territorial departments, 45
of the judiciary and judicial infrastructure. Related
buildings in the territorial departments of the Judicial
to central-level public administration infrastructure
Protection Service, and nine buildings in the regional
and services (local-level administrative buildings
departments of the National School of Judges.
are covered under municipal services sector),
US$0.3 billion in damage is estimated based on
Prior to the war, both the judicial and law enforcement
government reports; estimates of losses, including
subsectors were functioning normally, with ongoing
debris removal, are US$3.36 million, while recovery
criminal and corruption investigations, prosecutions,
and reconstruction needs are estimated at US$0.07
and cases before Ukraine’s courts, including the
billion.. The recovery and reconstruction of central-
HACC. Ukraine’s courts were also functioning, hearing
level public administration should prioritize the
civil, administrative, family, and other matters. While
most-urgent public services.
each of the institutions was fulfilling its mandate, the
judiciary was subject to a high level of public scrutiny
Background and criticism due to the widespread public belief that
Ukraine’s judicial sector suffered from corruption and
State power in Ukraine is exercised based on its extensive political influence. In addition, SAPO and
legislative, executive, and judicial branches. NABU were both in the middle of leadership changes.
The institutions that lead the judiciary, the HCJ and
Justice HQCJ, had either stopped functioning (HQCJ) or faced
a wholesale change in membership (HCJ) due to the
The justice sector in Ukraine consists of several implementation of judicial reforms. In the case of the
subsectors and institutions that are involved in the HCJ and HQCJ, international experts were selected to
management of the criminal and civil justice systems help with the vetting and selection of candidates for
as well as the fight against corruption in the country. each institution—processes that began in early 2022.
202 Cross-cutting Areas
In the spring of 2019, an ambitious reform program meaningful role in the decision-making process of
was launched in several areas of the justice this body.
sector in Ukraine. Some of these reforms were not
completed for different reasons and stalled well With Ukraine’s recent acceptance as a candidate
before the war. Between the fall of 2019 and the country to the EU, reform of the justice and rule of
winter of 2020, an attempt was made to reform the law sector will take on a renewed urgency. Creating
General Prosecutor’s Office. an independent, efficient, and effective judiciary is a
key condition of the EU accession process. Ukraine
During the same period, the judicial system faced will need to redouble its efforts to complete the top-
a number of false starts in the government’s down reform of the HCJ and HQCJ that were started
efforts to implement a top-down reform of the before the war. A new, independent HQCJ will have to
governing institutions in order to increase judicial quickly move to fill the approximately 2,000 judicial
independence and eliminate corruption. Initial vacancies that currently exist across Ukraine’s
reform efforts faced opposition from judicial judiciary. These challenges existed before the war
leadership as well as from some members of the and are likely to be even more important as Ukraine
Rada (Parliament). With the termination of the HQCJ begins the EU accession negotiations.
in November 2019, the judiciary has faced a staffing
shortage across Ukraine. As many as 2,000 judicial Ukraine will also need to continue its long struggle
positions remain vacant (nearly three vacancies against corruption as another key condition of
per court), which has had a direct negative impact EU accession. This will require the identification
on service delivery. A European Union (EU)-funded and appointment, as quickly as possible, of a new
regional survey conducted by the World Bank in Director of NABU. The selection process should
2020 found that only 29 percent of citizens and 30 be competitive, merit-based, and transparent, and
percent of businesses perceived Ukraine’s courts should be based on the continued international
as efficient. However, these results jumped to 62 vetting of candidates. Strong and collaborative
percent for citizens and 66 percent for businesses leadership is required at both agencies for Ukraine’s
when the survey focused on those groups that had anticorruption architecture to function effectively.
had recent, direct experience with courts.292 It was Anticorruption efforts will also require continued
not until early 2022 that broad judicial reforms were political support for the operation of the HACC and
implemented with the creation of an Ethics Council, the enforcement of its decisions.
whose purpose was to vet existing HCJ members and
HCJ candidates, and a Selection Commission, whose Public Administration
purpose was to vet candidates for a new HQCJ.
Each of these bodies, with international experts as According to the constitutional and legal model, three
members, began its respective vetting and interview levels of executive authorities operate in Ukraine:
processes in late January and February 2022. Both higher, central, and local. Local executive bodies
processes were paused at the start of the war. are responsible for a particular area represented by
24 oblasts, 135 districts, and two cities with special
One of the most problematic issues in the field of status. Higher and central executive power consist
combating corruption in Ukraine was the deliberate of 20 ministries with 12 subordinate bodies, 24 state
delay in appointing a new head of SAPO, without or national services, 16 agencies, four inspections,
which NABU could not function efficiently. The nine central executive bodies with the special
selection process for a new head of SAPO lasted status, three collegial bodies, and five other central
for over a full year. On July 28, 2022, the Prosecutor executive bodies.
General appointed the new head of the SAPO.293 In
addition, shortly after the war began, the NABU Public administration in the RDNA relates to various
director stepped down at the end of his term. As a services provided at central, oblast, and local
result, both of the key corruption-fighting agencies levels. Central-level state administration is also
have been working with interim or temporary represented at the local level through departments/
leadership. The competition for the new Director services and is present in the oblasts in a
of NABU has started. The selection commission supervisory capacity. Generally, state administration
includes three international experts who have a buildings are located in the oblast centers (except
292 World Bank, “Regional Experiences and Perceptions of Justice Survey: Cross-Country Report for Armenia, Georgia,
Moldova and Ukraine,” June 2021.
293 Office of Prosecutor General. 2022. News. “Prosecutor General introduced the new head of the SAPO”. Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 203
Table 88. Damage inventory by subsector (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Partially Totally Total damaged
Subsector
damaged destroyed assets
Judiciary 2.83 58.50 61.33
Courthouse (building) 2.49 58.48 60.97
Territorial Department of State Judicial Administration 0.15 0.02 0.17
Territorial Department of Judicial Protection Service 0.19 0.00 0.19
Law enforcement 6.20 1.77 7.97
Territorial Prosecution Services 6.20 1.77 7.97
Subtotal 9.03 60.27 69.30
Public administration (buildings) 19.6 12 31.6
Subtotal 19.6 12 31.6
Total 100.90
Source: Assessment team. Data on public administration are from Minregion.
for in the Donbas region). Buildings may include to these assets amounts to US$9,890. Accurate data
oblast council buildings and national commissions on the amount of damage is limited by the significant
buildings of large sectoral ministries (like education, number of assets in areas temporarily not under
energy, communications, etc.). Oblasts either have government control; the status of many assets is
one building housing different line departments or unknown according to OGP. The infrastructure of
different buildings for each line department. It can SAPO and NABU was not damaged as a result of the
also be the case that a central level department of war.
a particular line ministry is located within the local
building providing the same service. Judiciary: Damage to courthouses has been
recorded. Forty-six courthouses have been partially
Damage and Loss Assessment damaged and 20 have been completely destroyed
during the war. In addition, another three buildings
from the SJA and the Judicial Protection Service
Prosecution Service: As of June 1, the war has
have been partially damaged. The Donetska oblast
caused damage to the OGP mainly in the form
suffered the greatest number of destroyed buildings
of destroyed and damaged buildings at the level
with the loss of 11 courthouses. The Kharkivska
of circuit (local) prosecutor’s offices. Among
oblast suffered the greatest number of partially
oblast prosecutor’s offices, only the building of
damaged courthouses at 14. The total damage for the
the prosecutor’s office of Chernihivska oblast was
judiciary is US$61.33 million. This includes US$59.4
damaged. A total of 20 buildings have sustained
million in damage to buildings and US$1.90 million
significant damage, and 7 in the prosecution service
in damage to equipment, furniture, and vehicles.
have been destroyed since the beginning of the war.
Completely destroyed buildings account for US$58.5
The total damage for the OGP amounts to US$7.97
million and partially damaged buildings for US$2.83
million. The damage cost for completely destroyed
million (Table 90). Across the judiciary sector, the
buildings was about US$1.75 million (US$1.77 million
Donetska oblast suffered the greatest damage to
including vehicles and furniture), and about US$6.2
equipment, furniture, and vehicles. This e total for
million for partially damaged buildings (Table 88
this damage was estimated at US$706,000.
and Table 89). The regions most affected in terms
of damage to buildings are Donetska, Kharkivska,
Public Administration: For central-level public
Sumska, and Kyivska oblasts (Table 90). Damage in
administration infrastructure and services, damage
terms of movable assets (inventory/furniture) was
of US$31.6 million was estimated, as a fraction of
recorded in Kyivska and Sumska oblasts, for a total
the estimate from Minregion of all damage to public
of US$8,919. A total of five vehicles were lost—three
administration. Local-level administrative buildings
in Zaporizka oblast (seized by Russian occupiers)
are covered under the municipal services sector.
and one each in Kyivska and Chernihivska regions
The cost of goods and equipment is considered in
(destroyed or seriously damaged). The total damage
the damage costs.
204 Cross-cutting Areas
Table 89. Damage inventory by sub-sector and asset type (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Asset type Partially damaged Completely destroyed Total damaged assets
Judiciary 2.83 58.50 61.33
Buildings 2.83 56.60 59.43
Vehicles n.a. 0.00 0.00
Furniture n.a. 1.90 1.90
Law enforcement 6.20 1.77 7.97
Buildings 6.20 1.75 7.95
Vehicles n.a. 0.01 0.01
Furniture n.a. 0.01 0.01
Subtotal 9.03 60.27 69.30
Public administration
Buildings 19.6 12 31.6
100.90
Source: Assessment team. Data on public administration is from Minregion.
Note: n.a. = no clear information available.
The total losses in the justice sector are US$32.85 anticorruption investigation and prosecutions have
million. This includes US$32.1 million for the been able to continue. For example, while some of
judiciary and US$0.75 million for law enforcement. the judges of the HACC joined the local territorial
In the judiciary, total losses include US$5.9 million defense structures, they have all returned to the
for the cost of immediate repairs to assets damaged HACC as of June 1, 2022. As a result, while hearings
in the war and US$16.4 million for the loss of court were postponed at the beginning of the war, at this
fees/public service fees in those parts of Ukraine point in time, the HACC is functioning at its prewar
where the courts have ceased to function. For the level; however, the intensity of HACC hearings has
prosecution service, these losses include the costs of decreased because of the reduction in cases and
demolition and rubble removal. In law enforcement, issues brought to the court by SAPO and NABU.
among others, losses include US$0.11 million for
the cost of immediate repairs to assets damaged in Given the nature of the damage to the infrastructure
the war, US$0.01 million for the temporary rental of of the OGP, and despite the personnel losses of
vehicles to replace damaged vehicles, and US$0.21 the SAPO, the OPG system was able to continue
million for costs due to staffing changes. its daily work in the territories that remain under
government control and where active combat
Related to central-level public administration operations are not conducted. Thus, in the larger
infrastructure, the losses are estimated at US$3.31 territory of Ukraine, prosecutors continue to perform
million, including debris management. their ordinary functions. In addition, the OGP has
taken on the additional task of the prosecution of war
Despite the war, all the justice/rule of law crimes. OGP prosecutors are closely cooperating
institutions have quite quickly resumed their work with international colleagues and the Office of the
on the territory controlled by Ukraine almost at the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
prewar level, with some limitations and exceptions. in this effort, and a joint investigative group (JIT)
For example, the National Agency for the Prevention was created to investigate these crimes.294 SAPO
of Corruption (NACP) is not conducting verifications prosecutors also continue to perform their functions,
of asset declarations of public officials, and the not only in the field of criminal prosecutions, but
Unified State Register of Court Judgments and other also in the civil forfeiture cases, for example, by
state-owned databases have been closed or inactive participating in HACC hearings on civil lawsuits that
for months. However, other justice services and SAPO prosecutors filed before the war.
294 Eurojust, “Eurojust Supports Joint Investigation Team into Alleged Core International Crimes in Ukraine,” 2022, Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 205
Table 90. Damage and losses by oblast (in US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Judiciary Law Enforcement Total
Oblast
Total Damage Total Loss Total Damage Total Loss Total Damage Total Loss
Cherkaska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chernihivska 2.93 0.43 0.52 0.01 3.45 0.43
Chernivetska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Dnipropetrovska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Donetska 21.81 3.33 0.59 0.06 22.40 3.39
Ivano-Frankivska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kharkivska 25.68 3.91 5.95 0.26 31.63 4.17
Khersonska 0.40 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.00
Khmelnytska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kirovohradska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Kyiv (city) 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00
Kyivska 0.92 0.12 0.32 0.02 1.24 0.14
Luhanska 2.90 0.32 0.00 0.00 2.90 0.32
Lvivska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Mykolaivska 3.42 0.53 0.00 0.00 3.42 0.53
Odeska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Poltavska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rivnenska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Sumska 0.15 0.00 0.43 0.04 0.58 0.04
Ternopilska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Vinnytska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Volynska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zakarpatska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Zaporizka 0.24 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.24 0.00
Zhytomyrska 2.79 0.43 0.16 0.00 2.95 0.43
Nationwide (justice) 22.60
Nationwide (public administration) 31.6 3.36
Total 61.33 32.1 7.97 0.745 100.90 35.45
Source: Assessment team.
After a pause at the beginning of the war, the reform and recommending new judges to fill the nearly
processes for selecting new judicial leaders in the 2,000 vacancies that exist across Ukraine’s courts.
HCJ and the HQCJ were recently relaunched. In
late April and early May 2022, the Ethics Council
continued its review and interviews of sitting
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs,
members of the HCJ and found only three who including Build Back Better
were ethically qualified to continue as members.
The Ethics Council also continued its process of The total reconstruction and recovery needs for the
vetting and interviewing new candidates for the HCJ. sector are estimated at US$222.2 million. A total of
Optimistically, it is possible that the HCJ will have US$135.66 million would be needed for reconstruction
an operational core of 15 members by September/ and recovery of the judiciary, including US$47.15
October 2022. The Selection Commission met on million in short-term needs (Table 91). Needs for
July 13, 2022, to formally announce the resumption central-level public administration are estimated
of the competition for members of the HQCJ—a at US$69.32. Based on the available information
process that will play the critical role of identifying on damage, a minimum of US$17.1 million would
206 Cross-cutting Areas
be needed for reconstruction and recovery for the Reconstruction and recovery of the justice sector
OGP. As shown in Table 91, this would be US$16.7 must be done in line with the principles and
million in reconstruction needs and US$0.4 million objectives of the judicial reform laws that were being
in service delivery restoration needs. implemented as the war began. It will be critical
that the judicial governance bodies, the HCJ and the
With regard to recovery needs, the recovery of HQCJ, are composed of qualified people who have
justice sector services will be contingent on the passed the integrity and ethical reviews of the Ethics
availability of Ukraine’s trained and experienced Council (for the HCJ) and the Selection Commission
law enforcement and anticorruption officials, (for the HQCJ). In addition, the government must
private lawyers, and judges. The justice sector is exhibit the political will to ensure both the genuine
more dependent on human resources than physical independence of SAPO with its newly appointed head
resources to deliver services, so priority should be and transparent, competitive selection of new NABU
given to ensuring that the OGP, SAPO, NABU, NACP, director based on merit. Each of these anticorruption
HACC, and Ukraine’s other courts are fully staffed bodies requires leaders with expertise, experience,
with trained prosecutors, investigators, judges, and and above all ethical integrity to lead the investigation
other key personnel. Where the sector has suffered and prosecution of corruption offenses during the
losses due to the war or emigration, new judges, reconstruction phase.
prosecutors, investigators, police, customs and tax
officers, and other justice sector staff will need to be Practically, each of the justice subsectors will likely
recruited and trained after the war. need to coordinate its own reconstruction and
restoration process: the OGP for the prosecution
With regard to reconstruction needs, in order services; the SJA, HCJ, and HQCJ for the judicial
to restore the delivery of justice services in services; and the Ministry of Justice for those
Ukraine, the reconstruction and repair of Ukraine’s institutions within its competence. These institutions
courthouses should be a priority. While it is likely will need to coordinate closely with the authority in
that the OGP and other law enforcement services charge of supervising the overall reconstruction
will be able to recover relatively quickly (due to efforts. Justice/rule of law institutions, particularly
limited infrastructure losses), the delivery of civil those with the mandate to prevent, investigate,
and criminal justice will depend on there being and combat corruption (e.g., NACP, NABU, SAPO,
courthouses where Ukraine’s judges can hear and and HACC) will need to play a prominent role
decide cases. The delivery of justice in corruption in the overall reconstruction process to ensure
cases will be particularly important in light of the that the reconstruction and recovery efforts are
pressing need to ensure that Ukraine’s postwar implemented with transparency and integrity and
reconstruction is done with integrity and with that reconstruction funding is put to its intended use.
safeguards to prevent corruption and prosecute
it when it occurs. Since the HACC has not suffered Approximately one-quarter of the SAPO’s
damage or losses, it should be able to continue prosecutors joined the Armed Forces between
operating at its prewar levels. February and March 2022 and are still serving
there. Moreover, at the end of 2019, the SAPO was
Law enforcement and judicial services will need to empowered to engage in civil forfeiture without
be prioritized once the war is over to ensure proper increasing the number of prosecutors. In view of this,
governance, law and order, and integrity during it seems appropriate to consider both the prompt
reconstruction and rebuilding. The damage inflicted filling of previously existing vacancies in SAPO and
on the justice/rule of law sector may inevitably lead the reasonable increase of the staff.
to a disruption in the state’s ability to investigate and
prosecute crimes, ensure accountability through the The recovery and reconstruction needs of central-
judicial system, and provide the displaced population level public administration are estimated at
with access to critical government legal and judicial US$69.32 million, including US$20.8 million in the
services. One possible option is to consider short- immediate/short term. The estimation of the needs
term temporary solutions such as mobile courts is directly linked to the identified damage. Activities
or temporary court locations for priority cases. related to most-urgent public services should be
Delivery of judicial services through e-justice tools prioritized by respective level authorities.
should also be considered as a solution to the
lack of physical courthouses or other damaged
infrastructure.
Cross-cutting Areas 207
Table 91. Recovery and reconstruction needs by subsector (US$ million) as of June 1, 2022
Immediate/short
Category Component Medium- to long-term Total
term
Judiciary 37.44 87.36 124.79
Reconstruction Ministry of Justice 0.00 0.00 0.00
Needs Law enforcement 5.01 11.69 16.70
Public administration 20.8 48.5 69.32
Judiciary 9.71 1.16 10.87
Service Delivery
Ministry of Justice 0.00 0.00 0.00
Restoration Needs
Law enforcement 0.40 0.00 0.40
Total 74.6 147.6 222.2
Source: Assessment team.
Limitations and Recommendations This may become possible and easier as the war
concludes.
There are limitations related to damage and loss
data for a number of justice/rule of law entities, • Human resources: It will be useful at some point
including the Ministry of Justice and its various to try to identify the human resources lost by the
regional and affiliated buildings. There is limited justice sector during the war in order to better
information available on damage to Ukraine’s various understand the likely staffing and training needs
law enforcement agencies other than the OGP. SAPO that will be faced during the reconstruction
does not have territorial departments, so the team phase.
presumes that there is no damage to buildings
or inventory in relation to SAPO. As for the NABU, • Areas temporarily not under government
there has not been direct damage so far. The RDNA control: As the war progresses and the lines of
does not include information on Ukraine’s Custom engagement change, it will be necessary to get
Service, and future assessments could be expanded damage and loss assessments from those areas
to include new data. Key recommendations for that were not under government control as of
further (future/more in-depth) assessments include June 1, 2022, the cutoff date for this RDNA.
the following:
• Public administration buildings. There is a need
• Coordination of information: Access to damage, to improve data and specifically to disaggregate
loss, and needs information across the sectors central administration data by function and
will likely need to be better coordinated in order location.
to improve the accuracy of future assessments.
208 Cross-cutting Areas
LAND
DECONTAMINATION
Summary consumers, a particularly significant issue when it
comes to grain exports.
Land decontamination, which covers demining and
clearance of explosive remnants of war (ERW), is Background
a precondition to safe rebuilding, resumption of
service provision, and return to normality. The State Decontamination, mine action and recovery.
Emergency Service of Ukraine (SESU) and Ministry Explosive hazards inhibit freedom of movement, put
of Internal Affairs (MIA) estimate that 13 percent civilian infrastructure at risk, and limit access to food,
of Ukraine’s territory is contaminated. Based on water, schools, hospitals, and shelters; ultimately,
conservative estimates, land decontamination they jeopardize the resumption of activities and the
costs are expected to exceed US$73.2 billion, with safe return of displaced persons. Humanitarian mine
US$58.5 million to be urgently invested in equipment action helps people survive, for instance, by clearing
(demining machines, metal detectors, personal vital access routes and making arable land available
protective equipment [PPE] etc.), training, and salaries for farmers to safely grow and harvest crops. Mine
for the expanded land decontamination workforce in action also improves the quality of life, for instance,
Ukraine. It will be critical to prioritize areas requiring by providing education and helping to meet the
the most urgent decontamination, such as areas immediate and long-term needs of explosive hazard
with high concentrations of civilian populations and survivors and affected families and communities.
areas critical for restoring production and economic
flows. In the immediate/short term, close to US$11 Effective and efficient mine action efforts, in
billion for equipment and training, non-technical and particular nontechnical survey (NTS),295 technical
technical surveys, and clearance to ensure readiness survey (TS),296 and clearance,297 are an essential
for scaled-up decontamination efforts and to make part of land release. So too are the “Five Pillars of
significant progress in areas brought back under Mine Action” described by the United Nations Mine
government control and areas where military actions Action Service (UNMAS):298
have ceased. Costs associated with the removal of
anchored and floating sea mines in the Black Sea • Mine clearance. This activity includes surveys,
are unquantified. However, until decontamination of mapping, and minefield marking, as well as
the Black Sea and Ukraine harbours are completed, the actual clearance of mines from the ground
(re)insurers of shipping vessels in the Black Sea will (“demining”).
continue to charge extremely high and even historic • Explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). These
prices for insurance; these costs may exceed ship are educational and awareness-raising activities
hiring costs and will eventually be passed on to that seek to lower the risk of injury from mines
295 NTS is the starting point for identifying, accessing, collecting data on, reporting, and using information to define where
mines/ERW are to be found, as well as where they are not, and for identifying Suspected Hazardous Areas (SHA) and
Confirmed Hazardous Areas (CHA) where further investigation and/or clearance need to take place.
296 TS techniques and methods involve a physical intervention, using survey or clearance assets to enter a hazardous area
to do the following: (i) confirm the presence, or absence, of mines/ERW and identify the type of hazards present; (ii)
better define the boundaries of the SHA/CHA that require clearance; and (iii) collect information to support land release
decision-making. Technical surveys can be broadly characterized as either targeted or systematic depending upon the
information gathered about hazard and threat. Technical survey assets must provide a high probability (near certainty)
that the presence of expected hazard items will be indicated by the equipment and methodology in use and that TS
personnel are safe to conduct the activity.
297 The most familiar and visible part of mine action is the clearance of mines and ERW. It is also the most expensive.
Clearance refers to an intrusive information-gathering and threat removal process that fully defines a hazardous area
while removing explosive hazards.
298 Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 209
Box 6. Lessons learned on mine action from international experience
It is not uncommon for countries to have to deal with the threat of mines that were laid decades
earlier. France and Belgium are still clearing land mines and ERW remaining from World War II, and
Croatia is still clearing land mines and ERW from its War of Independence, which ended in 1995. Croatia
started its Mine Action Program in 1998, and has decreased contaminated land from the initial estimate
of 14,000 km2 to some 1,800 km2 through NTS and TS. In 2022, Croatia still faces contamination of less
than 200 km2 illustrating that mine action is a long process. Croatia was the first country to pass a Law
on Mine Action; it also established a National Mine Action Authority and Croatian Mine Action Center
and has conducted and completed NTS, TS, and orthophoto mapping. Yet 24 years after beginning the
Mine Action Program, and having met all its preconditions, including securing funding, Croatia still
has an issue of land mines. This experience suggests that clearing mines and ERW is a daunting and
lengthy task—but also that progress in land mine and ERW decontamination depends on meeting key
technical, organizational, funding, and other preconditions well in advance.
and unexploded ordnance and to promote and other areas were contaminated with explosive
behavioural change. items from past wars covered 1,500 km2.299
• Victim assistance. An obligation of the Anti-
personnel Mine Ban Convention signatories, All mine action in the Donetska and Luhanska
victim assistance is provided for mine accident regions, including CMR survey and clearance, has
survivors, their families, mine-affected been overseen and coordinated by the MoD, which
communities, and persons with disabilities. operates the Kamyanets-Podilsky Demining Center.
• Advocacy. Advocacy efforts by United Nations Due to the open conflict in the period 2014–2022 and
and others seek to achieve universal participation to the war beginning in February 2022, operators
in international agreements that ban or limit the have submitted annual plans on mine action for MoD’s
use of land mines. approval. Other national bodies involved in the sector
• Stockpile destruction. Article 4 of the Anti- include the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA), the
personnel Mine Ban Convention requires SESU (under the MIA), the Ministry for Reintegration
signatories to destroy stockpiled mines within of the Temporarily Occupied Territories, the State
four years of joining the Convention. Special Transport Services (SSTS) of the MoD, the
National Police, and the State Border Service. The
The extent of contamination from cluster munition MoD had organizational control of operations, while
remnants (CMR) in Ukraine was not quantified prior SESU was generally responsible for conducting
to the 2022 war but was considered extensive. It clearance. Box 6 presents international experience
has been reported that unexploded submunitions related to decontamination relevant to Ukraine.
contaminated the Donetska and Luhanska regions,
and that the most intensive use of cluster munitions Ukraine’s national mine action legislation (Law No.
in and around the city of Debalcevo in Donetska 2642) was adopted in 2018 and signed into law by the
oblast. In 2020, the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense president in 2019. Prior to its adoption, Ukraine did
(MoD) estimated that total contamination by mines not have any comprehensive legal act regulating the
and ERW (including CMR) could extend over 7,000 complex set of issues regarding mine action. The law
km2, although international operators estimated foresaw the establishment of special governmental
that the size could be twice as large. Large parts institutions to lead the national mine action response
of Ukraine were considered contaminated by in the country. However, the law was not implemented
considerable quantities of other ERW, as well as by because of inconsistencies with other legal acts. None
anti-personnel and anti-vehicle mines used prior to of the institutions it called for were created, and as
the 2022 invasion. Ukraine has unexploded ordnance a consequence coordination of national mine action
(UXO) and abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) response in Ukraine needs significant improvement.
remaining from the two World Wars and from Soviet The law also had gaps and weaknesses in its
military training and stockpiles. In February 2016, it regulation of victim assistance and the safety of (and
was reported that 32 former military firing ranges insurance for) mine action operators.
299 SESU presentation, February 17, 2016.
210 Cross-cutting Areas
In June 2020, proposed amendments to the Law on Demining Center. The two NMACs were tasked to
Mine Action in Ukraine passed their first reading. share information management, quality assurance,
Following this, the United Nations Development monitoring, planning, and certification of the
Programme (UNDP), the Organization for Security operators, whose responsibility was envisaged to be
and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) Project divided territorially. Before the war, the SESU NMAC
Coordinator in Ukraine (PCU), the HALO Trust, and was in charge of all humanitarian demining across
the Danish Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group Ukraine with the exception of MoD infrastructure
(DRC/DDG) formed a working group to prepare and railways, which were and remain under SSTS.
suggested amendments. These included comments The decision to create two NMACs as opposed to one
on the status of mine victims and their rights; the comes as a compromise that allows both MoD and
training and insurance of deminers; handover MIA to take the lead on mine action. However, in other
procedure and liability of actors after handover; and countries that tried to divide mine action across two
the importation of dual-use goods, such as demining or more governmental institutions (e.g., Colombia,
machines. They also commented on the possibility of the Arab Republic of Egypt, Iraq), this approach did
allowing international operators to use explosives to not promote efficient or effective mine action.
destroy items found during demining. Currently, only
MoD and SESU can perform that task. The NMACs are coordinated by the NMAA, an
interagency body made up of the Cabinet of Ministers
The amendments to the Law on Mine Action in (CoM), today Secretariat of Mine Action Authority,
Ukraine were signed off on by the president in which due to the conflict during 2014–2022 and
December 2020, and the recommendations of the to the 2022 war is chaired by the MoD, which is
working group were broadly considered. Yet the designated the chair while “special conditions”
new law fell short of addressing two major concerns exist in Ukraine; during peacetime it is chaired
of the mine action community: operators’ license by the MIA. The National Mine Action Standards
to carry out disposal, destruction, and transport and the national mine action strategy were to be
of explosive items for explosive ordnance disposal adopted by the NMAA. In May 2021, the Humanitarian
(EOD) procedures, and operators’ permits for the Demining Center (under SESU) was established
import and use of so-called dual-use items, namely in Merefa, Kharkivska oblast; the MoD NMAC was
demining machines of varied types. Additional in an advanced stage in Chernihiv, Chernihivska
legislative amendments were required to resolve oblast. Due to the intensified contamination of the
these concerns. These issues have not been territory with unexploded explosive ordnances, the
resolved yet, and given the ongoing war, they are Government of Ukraine approved the Operational
highly unlikely to be resolved soon. Lifting the ban to Action Plan for Mine Action on April 15, 2022.
import the dual-use items (e.g., demining machines)
would allow operators to deploy machinery during TS
and clearance operations, which would significantly
Assessment
lower the primary risks for deminers when entering
Some key current and past producers and users
Suspicious Hazardous Areas (SHA) and Confirmed
of land mines, including the United States, China,
Hazardous Areas (CHA). Furthermore, machines
India, Pakistan, and the Russian Federation, have
would increase the speed of demining and ERW
not signed the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention.
removal dynamics and thus lower the price and time
Ukraine has signed both the Convention on Certain
needed to clear mines and ERW.
Conventional Weapons300 and Anti-personnel Mine
Ban Convention,301 but it claimed before the war that
The approved law established a framework for
it could not fulfill its obligations because it did not
humanitarian demining, divided responsibilities
control significant parts of the country—and this
among state institutions, and foresaw the creation
situation has worsened since the invasion. There is
of a National Mine Action Authority (NMAA).
no credible information that Ukrainian government
However, a peculiarity of the law envisages the
forces have used anti-personnel mines in violation
creation of two National Mine Action Centers
of the Mine Ban Treaty since 2014 and into 2022.
(NMACs), one under the MoD and one under SESU
Russian forces have used at least seven types of anti-
(which sits under the MIA) called the Humanitarian
300 The purpose of the Convention is to ban or restrict the use of specific types of weapons that are considered to cause
unnecessary or unjustifiable suffering to combatants or to affect civilians indiscriminately. Link.
301 This is the Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on
Their Destruction (also known as Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Ottawa Convention, or Mine Ban Treaty). Link.
Cross-cutting Areas 211
Figure 36. Estimated areas for non-technical survey
Source: Government of Ukraine.
personnel mines in at least four regions of Ukraine: also be seen in the denial of access to civilian
Donetska, Kharkivska, Kyivska, and Sumska.302 homes, infrastructure, transportation routes,
and agricultural lands. Evidence indicates that
Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have extensively agricultural production is being affected due to land
used anti-tank mines (also called anti-vehicle mines) mines in fields and on rural paths and roads.
in at least seven regions: Donetska, Chernihivska,
Kharkivska, Kyivska, Odeska, Sumska, and As of June 1, 2022, SESU estimates that NTS
Zaporizka. Hand-emplaced TM-62 series anti- should be conducted over 272,000 km2 of Ukrainian
vehicle mines appear to be the type most frequently territory (Figure 36). This number is based on ground
used. All manner of land mine delivery methods have and aerial military activities. However, by application
been documented: hand-emplaced, mechanically of lessons learned from Croatia, which experienced
laid, and remotely delivered. Several new types of a similar war (conventional army conflict, without
land mines have been used for the very first time any guerrilla or similar paramilitary warfare), the
in the war, including some produced as recently as RDNA assessment team has estimated that the total
2021. Russian forces also emplaced many victim- area foreseen for NTS, TS, and clearance is 267,638
activated booby traps and improvised explosive km2, with a breakdown of 194,647 km2 for NTS, an
devices (IEDs) as they retreated from positions taken additional 48,661 km2 for TS, and 24,330 km2 for
during the initial phase of the invasion. A booby trap the actual clearance operations. The assessment
can function as an anti-personnel mine when the further estimates that it would take 10 years to
fuse is activated unintentionally by a person. complete NTS, 15 years to complete TS based on
the NTS results, and 30 years to complete clearance
Land mine casualties have been reported in the based on TS findings and definition of SHA and CHA.
war in Ukraine. The impact of new mine use can These estimates assume that war activities stop,
302 Consultations with SESU in 20217 as apr of OSCE Building Ukrainian Humanitarian Mine Action Capacity” programme.
212 Cross-cutting Areas
that additional needs and requirements are met lower the primary risks for deminers when entering
(e.g., additional staff and equipment, including dual- SHA and CHA. Furthermore, machines would
use items), and that there are available funds. increase demining and ERW removal speed and thus
lower the price and time needed to clear mines and
Damage: Most of the mine action data are classified ERW. The advantage of demining machines is that
but based on the information provided for this RDNA in peacetime, they can be used in forestry (tiller),
by both the Mine Action Center and the Humanitarian agriculture (tiller), quarries (flail), and construction
Demining Center, it was established that as of June (dozer blade).
1, 2022, there was no structural damage to actual
buildings and training facilities. Related to capacity-building, adequate training
to at least EOD Level 3 of all additional staff is
required. The Croatian Mine Action Center–Center
Reconstruction and Recovery Needs, for Testing, Development and Training has the
including Build Back Better capacity, knowledge, and experience in varied
types of training, and it has signed a Memorandum
For several reasons, detailed land mine and ERW of Understanding with SESU. Furthermore, EORE
contamination information is not available: courses are needed to prevent civilian casualties:
the statistics show that 92 percent of mine casualties
• Information on minefields is too sensitive for and fatalities are from anti-vehicle (anti-tank) mines
sharing during the ongoing war. mostly activated by tractors, combine harvesters,
• NTS across the country was not completed and other agricultural equipment used by civilians
before the war. entering suspicious hazardous areas to harvest
• Because of the war, NTS can be carried out crops. Appropriate education would include EORE,
only in oblasts that have been brought back mine victims assistance, and training-of-trainer (ToT)
under government control (currently it is being courses. For example, the Croatian nongovernmental
conducted in Kyivska oblast and Chernihivska organization Hrvatska pomaže (Croatia Helps) has
oblast by SESU, the Halo Trust, and Danish experience in EORE and mine victims assistance
Refugee Council/Danish Demining Group). and has a partnership agreement to provide EORE
• Because of increased contamination, there is a education with the Ukrainian Deminers Association.
need to hire, train, and equip an additional 400
staff, which is currently not possible. Other needs include assistance in elaborating
efficient legislation by organizing study trips to
Total needs related to land decontamination amount other mine-affected countries, organizing varied
to US$73.2 billion. This considers contamination per workshops in country and abroad, and generally
oblast and needs related to training of additional supporting Ukraine’s efforts to decontaminate
staff, procurement of equipment, conducting NTS its land. OSCE, Geneva International Centre for
and TS, and actual demining/clearance. It is noted Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), relevant UN
that further investigation would be needed to agencies, and other international and national
determine the NTS and TS and the actual clearance stakeholders would play a crucial role in meeting
area which, as well as the current prices for the this need.
above, both of which will affect the estimated needs.
NTS activities are currently being conducted in
In order to have safe, efficient, and high-quality Kyivska and Chernihivska oblasts. If financing was
mine action, first and foremost there is a need available, these two regions should be focused on
to provide proper training to additional staff for NTS, TS, and clearance in the highest priority
and procure reliable, modern, and high-quality areas. Priority areas could be considered as areas
equipment, especially metal detectors, demining most crucial for safety, such as urban areas and
machines, and PPE. The two Ukrainian centers have villages undergoing reconstruction, key transport
confirmed the need for the CEIA CMD metal detectors links to ensure safe connectivity and then areas
(900 for their current and additional staff) and PT- critical for the resumption of services, productive
300 D:Mine remote controlled mechanical demining and economic activity.
machine (with flail, tiller, and dozer blade), along
with training and one-year supply of consumables Table 92 provides an overview of estimated area
and critical parts (initially 21 pieces and later an per oblast. Figure 37 provides an overview of
additional 14). Use of demining machines would needs costs by type action; and Table 93 provides
allow operators to deploy machinery during TS and information on estimated costs.
clearance operations, which would significantly
Cross-cutting Areas 213
Table 92. Estimated area and needs for land mine and ERW decontamination by oblast as of
June 1, 2022
Estimated area for Estimated area for Estimated area for
Oblast Area m2
nontechnical survey (km2) technical survey (km2) clearance (km2)
Cherkaska 20,891 0 0 0
Chernihivska 31,851 23,888 5,972 2,986
Chernivetska 8,094 0 0 0
Dnipropetrovska 31,901 4,000 1,000 500
Donetska 26,506 26,506 6,626 3,313
Ivano-Frankivska 13,894 0 0 0
Kharkivska 31,402 16,000 4,000 2,000
Khersonska 28,449 28,449 7,112 3,556
Khmelnytska 20,636 0 0 0
Kyivska 28,119 12,000 3,000 1,500
Kirovohradska 24,578 0 0 0
Luhanska 26,673 26,673 6,668 3,334
Lvivska 21,824 0 0 0
Mykolaivska 24,587 4,000 1,000 500
Odeska 33,296 4,000 1,000 500
Poltavska 28,736 0 0 0
Rivnenska 20,039 0 0 0
Sumska 23,824 16,000 4,000 2,000
Ternopilska 13,817 0 0 0
Vinnytska 26,502 0 0 0
Volynska 20,135 0 0 0
Zakarpatska 12,772 0 0 0
Zaporizka 27,169 27,169 6,792 3,396
Zhytomyrska 29,819 5,963 1,491 745
Ukraine 575,510 196,647 48,661 24,330
Total area for mine action 267,638
$/km2 1,000 500,000 2,000,000
Total per phase (US$) 196,647,000 24,330,500,000 48,660,000,000
Total (US$) 73,185,146,700
Source: Assessment team.
214 Cross-cutting Areas
In the context of the planned 10-year span under clearance; and an additional US$63 billion will be
the RDNA, some US$10.1 billion will be needed required to complete NTS, TS, and clearance over
in the immediate/short term for procurement of the next 10 years (noting that actual timeline will
equipment, training of additional staff, NTS, TS, and take decades; see below).
Figure 37. Estimated cost of mine action per km2 by type of action as of June 1, 2022
2.000.000$/sq.km
500.000$/sq.km
4%
8%
No action
Non-Technical Survey
1.000$/sq.km 0$
33% 55% Technical Survey
Clearence
Source: Assessment team.
Table 93. Estimated costs for decontamination of land mines and ERW by oblast (US$ million)
as of June 1, 2022
Estimated US$ need for Estimated US$ need Estimated US$ need
Oblast Total
Non-Technical Survey for Technical Survey for Clearance
Cherkaska 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Chernihivska 23.9 2,986.0 5,972.0 8,981.9
Chernivetska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Dnipropetrovska 4.0 500.0 1,000.0 1,504.0
Donetska 26.5 3,313.0 6,626.0 9,965.5
Ivano-Frankivska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kharkivska 16.0 2,000.0 4,000.0 6,016.0
Khersonska 28.4 3,556.0 7,112.0 10,696.4
Khmelnytska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Kyivska 12.0 1,500.0 3,000.0 4,512.0
Kirovohradska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Luhanska 26.7 3,334.0 6,668.0 10,028.7
Lvivska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Mykolaivska 4.0 500.0 1,000.0 1,504.0
Odeska 4.0 500.0 1,000.0 1,504.0
Poltavska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Rivnenska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Sumska 16.0 2,000.0 4,000.0 6,016.0
Ternopilska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Vinnytska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Volynska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zakarpatska 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Zaporizka 27.2 3,396.0 6,792.0 10,215.2
Zhytomyrska 6.0 745.5 1,490.0 2,241.5
Ukraine 196.4 24,330.5 48,660.0 73,185.1
Nationwide Procurement of Equipment 58.6
Total 73,243.7
Source: Assessment team.
Cross-cutting Areas 215
Limitations and Recommendations not-already-available hardware. Other limitations
involve training an additional 400 persons in the
All mine action activities will take much longer specifics of EOD, since this training cannot be
than the above-planned 10 years. As noted in Table conducted in Ukraine (unlike EORE, Mine Victims
93, these activities can take decades (e.g., up to 30 Assistance, and ToT courses, which can be relatively
years). For the purpose of the RDNA, the financing easily conducted in Ukraine).
was adjusted to 10 years. It is recommended that
authorities also prepare a realistic timeline that can Further and more in-depth assessments are needed
guide actions in this field. A proposed timeline is as more reliable information becomes available.
included in Figure 38. When possible, it will be critical to conduct interviews
with key national and international stakeholders,
Key limitations of this assessment are the lack meet with all interested parties, and hold on-site
of reliable data and the unpredictability and inspections in Kyivska oblast, with frequent field
uncertainty of the course of war. In addition, lack visits to “safe” oblasts. It is necessary to maintain
of physical contact with Ukrainian stakeholders and contact and relationships with all national and
the lack of interviews on site also created difficulties international stakeholders.
in conducting the assessment.
Finally, as a means of quality assurance and quality
Concerning the procurement of equipment needed, control, it is necessary to establish monitoring
it will likely take up to four years until all of it is and evaluation arrangements related to the use of
available and delivered to Ukraine; delays are funds for mine action (such as for equipment and
especially likely for demining machines and other trainings) and for the provision of EOD courses.
Figure 38. Proposed timeline and key activities for mine action
Source: Assessment team.
216
Irpin. Photo by Julia Burlachenko for the World Bank.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 217
TOWARD RECOVERY
AND RECONSTRUCTION
There are already ongoing efforts by the 1. Strengthen defense and security: secure defense
Government to lead the country toward recovery sector modernization; build up the defense
and reconstruction. industry
In April 2022, the Government of Ukraine established 2. Strive for European Union (EU) integration, in
a National Council for the Recovery of Ukraine from part by ensuring synchronization of Ukrainian
Consequences of War co-chaired by the Office of the regulation with Copenhagen criteria; secure
President and Council of the Prime Minister. Working access to markets
groups have been formed for economic recovery 3. Rebuild clean and safe environment and ensure
and development, agriculture, public infrastructure, sustainable development in line with the EU
private enterprise recovery, restoration of public Green Deal
services, housing, transport, communications, and
social service delivery, among other sectors. In 4. (i) Strengthen integrated energy system resilience:
addition to the collection of data on damage and increase European Network of Transmission
needs associated with the war, the National Council System Operators (ENTSO-E) interconnects, link
is charged with developing proposals for priority EU oil refineries with storage in Western Ukraine,
reforms and developing a postwar recovery and build up gas storage; (ii) support the EU zero-
development plan. The current assessment is being carbon energy transition: develop zero-carbon
conducted in collaboration with the National Council. power generation (nuclear and renewable),
increase gas and biofuels production, develop H2
In July 2022, at the Ukraine Recovery Conference ecosystem linked with EU
(URC2022) held in Lugano, Switzerland, Ukraine
presented a US$750 billion Recovery Plan with 5. Boost business environment: streamline
three stages (blueprint, detailed roadmap, and regulation, transform tax and customs services
implementation).303 The Recovery Plan sets to be service- and compliance-focused, develop
ambitious targets for 2032: it aims to accelerate effective labor market and at-scale reskilling
sustainable economic growth, with a plan for 7 program, strengthen Investment Promotion
percent annual gross domestic product (GDP) Agency to attract foreign direct investments
growth and an increase in investments; to reach the 6. (i) Ensure emergency funding (grants,
top-25 of the Economic Complexity Index and the guarantees, interest rate compensation); (ii)
World Bank Human Capital Index; and to achieve a ensure competitive access to funding: provide
65 percent reduction in CO2 emissions from 1990. access to funding with competitive cost of capital
Within the Recovery Plan, the following 15 national by supporting growth of loans, establishing
programs will support the achievement of short-, targeted state/donor guarantees, introducing
medium-, and long-term targets: 304 war insurance
303 URC2022, “Recovery Plan,” 2022, Link.
304 See Government of Ukraine, “Plan for the Recovery of Ukraine (ПЛАН ВІДНОВЛЕННЯ УКРАЇНИ),” 2022, Link.
218 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
7. Secure macro-financial stability: ensure stability rebuild clean and safe environment and ensure
of budget deficit and banking system while sustainable development in line with the EU
maintaining healthy debt level Green Deal
8. Grow value-adding sectors of economy on 15. Secure targeted and effective social policy:
the back of global trends, Green Deal, and upgrade targeted subsidies system, introduce
Ukraine’s competitive position: include steel, second level (accumulative) for pensions
machine building (defense and aerospace), agro- system, develop comprehensive ecosystem for
processing and wood processing, construction child protection, develop support programs for
sector, and IT integrating refugees and veterans, streamline
immigration regulation.
9. Eliminate logistics bottlenecks for integration
with EU: (i) eliminate logistics bottlenecks with EU The key guiding principles of the Government’s
for supply chains’ resilience, including in railway, Recovery Plan are to start now and ramp up
river, and roads; (ii) strengthen interconnectivity gradually; grow prosperity in an equitable way;
of Ukraine by developing 1435 gauge railway, integrate into the EU; build back better (for
rebuilding roads and bridges, expanding corridor the future); and enable private investment and
to EU entrepreneurship. The plan will be implemented in a
10. Recovery and upgrade of housing and regions region-focused and parameter-based approach.
infrastructure: (i) launch housing upgrade
program with priority focus on at-scale energy At the Ukraine Recovery Conference,
efficiency program and new urban planning pilots representatives from the international community
(e.g., Bucha, Chernihiv); (ii) ramp up new housing adopted the Lugano Declaration with a commitment
construction and infrastructure upgrades in line to 12 actions, 305 including these:
with the urban planning and sustainability best
practices (including transport); upgrade utilities, • Support the establishment of an effective
including electrification, heating and water coordination platform between the Government
systems, digital of Ukraine and bilateral and multilateral
partners, organizations, and international
11. Recovery and modernization of social financial institutions for the preparation and
infrastructure: rebuild destroyed social objects implementation of Ukraine’s Recovery Plan,
(education, health care, culture, sport); ramp building on existing structures and establishing a
up public-private partnership projects in social clear link with the broad reform agenda.
infrastructure in line with system reforms of
• Affirm that integrity, transparency, and
education, health care, culture, and sport
accountability are essential for the successful
12. Improve education system with focus on key implementation of the national Recovery Plan.
competencies and innovation: New Ukrainian • Stress the importance of fair and transparent
School (NUS) and core school reform, development finance, lending, and borrowing
harmonization of university standards with EU; practices in accordance with international rules,
develop R&D at universities, reform vocational standards, and recognized principles.
education, boost IT education, create science
parks • Welcome innovative approaches to recovery, such
as digital transformation, green energy transition,
13. Upgrade health care system: pursue universal and national and international innovative and
health coverage and financing reform, develop sustainable financing, including harnessing of
efficient health care network, develop and possible reparations and contributions by private
promote digital health, conduct targeted donors and the private sector.
intervention campaigns
• Invite the private sector, academia, and civil
14. Develop culture and sport systems to enable society as well as actors at subnational level,
human capital growth (“strategic imperative”); such as cities, hospitals, and others, to enter into
partnerships with Ukrainian counterparts.
305 URC2022, “Lugano Declaration,” 2022, Link.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 219
The Lugano Declaration for the Reconstruction efforts. This information creates a data set that can
of Ukraine also outlines the following Guiding help guide recovery planning as well as monitoring
Principles: and evaluation (M&E).
• Partnership: The recovery process is led and Beyond the guiding principles that the government’s
driven by Ukraine and conducted in partnership Recovery Plan establishes, the following could be
with its international partners. The recovery considered based on international experience
effort has to be based on a sound and ongoing related to post-conflict and post-disaster recovery
needs assessment process, aligned priorities, and reconstruction:
joint planning for results, accountability for
financial flows, and effective coordination. • Balancing urgent needs and medium- to long-
term goals: The recovery and reconstruction
• Reform focus: The recovery process has to
planning will need to address the most urgent
contribute to accelerating, deepening, broadening,
needs immediately and in the short term,
and achieving Ukraine’s reform efforts and
while ensuring preparations for longer-term
resilience in line with Ukraine’s European path.
reconstruction and recovery. In the short term,
• Transparency, accountability, and rule of law: there is a need to ensure safety and security of
The recovery process has to be transparent and people and to address the most urgent and basic
accountable to the people of Ukraine. The rule needs (including for vulnerable populations)
of law must be systematically strengthened and through shelter, public services, and economic
corruption eradicated. All funding for recovery restoration activities. In the medium to long term,
must be fair and transparent. recovery and reconstruction should build on
• Democratic participation: The recovery process the foundation of green, resilient, and inclusive
has to be a whole-of-society effort, rooted in development; it should also ensure efficiencies
democratic participation by the population by upgrading access to and quality of services
(including those displaced or returning from and infrastructure and by right-sizing/right-siting
abroad), local self-governance, and effective service networks and infrastructure.
decentralization. • Strategic prioritization of reconstruction across
• Multi-stakeholder engagement: The recovery all sectors: Building on the identified baselines,
process has to facilitate collaboration between damage, losses, and needs across sectors in a
national and international actors, including from consistent manner as done under the RDNA,
the private sector, civil society, academia, and needs should be prioritized based on absorptive
local government. capacity of different sectors, priorities related
to different geographic areas, and humanitarian
• Gender equality and inclusion: The recovery and IDP needs, as well as financing availability,
process has to be inclusive and ensure gender institutional capacity, and other elements.
equality and respect for human rights, including
economic, social, and cultural rights. Recovery • Addressing needs of different (groups of)
needs to benefit all, and no part of society should oblasts: Ukraine will also need to balance its
be left behind. Disparities need to be reduced. efforts across the different groups of regions
of Ukraine—frontline, recovered, backline, and
• Sustainability: The recovery process has support areas—depending on the progress of
to rebuild Ukraine in a sustainable manner the war. Specific recovery and reconstruction
aligned with the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable plans can help guide the recovery within relevant
Development and the Paris Agreement, oblasts based on their highest needs.
integrating social, economic, and environmental
dimensions including green transition. • Inclusiveness and equity: Recovery and
reconstruction need to be closely aligned
The RDNA can be instrumental in supporting the with efforts to decrease poverty, efforts to
government’s recovery plan and implementation enhance social inclusion and gender equity, and
efforts. The RDNA provides a baseline of sectoral investments targeting the most disadvantaged
and cross-cutting information on recovery and social groups.
reconstruction needs that is linked to the damage • Resilience and building back better: Most of
and losses incurred as well as sectoral prewar Ukraine’s infrastructure was built during the
baselines, while also considering building back better, Soviet era and has suffered from years of
right-sizing, right-placing, and overall modernization underinvestment and neglect. The country’s
220 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
economic infrastructure is in dire need of • Transparency and good governance: The
improvement to be done in alignment with broader recovery process should be measured against
climate change and sustainability goals and established targets/performance indicators and
targets. For example, the road network suffers timelines; and it should be monitored within a
from chronic lack of maintenance and repair transparent M&E system and process, including
works and requires major upgrading. At the same consultation with the affected societies and
time, about 40 percent of water supply networks stakeholders.
are in critical condition. Social infrastructure
is likewise deficient; schools, kindergartens, Related to the implementation of the recovery
and basic medical facilities outdated and need activities, the following practical considerations
to be rehabilitated and modernized, while also could be taken into account based on international
being made more energy efficient and climate experience:
resilient. In addition, the country’s agricultural
assets are increasingly vulnerable to weather- • Project identification, prioritization, sequencing,
related events, as most of Ukraine’s small and and commercial strategy: There is a need to
medium farm enterprises have not yet adopted identify and frame reconstruction and recovery
climate-smart technologies. Ukraine’s industries project packages and to sequence them over time.
and the energy sector too will need to adapt to This should reflect the relative priority of needs, a
more efficient and sustainable good practice and logical sequencing of interdependent works, and
standards. commercial considerations for bundling contracts
according to the scale and scope that the market
• Leadership and coordination: Continuous
for engineering and contractor services can meet.
leadership from the highest level of government
The commercial strategy for delivering works at
will be essential, together with strong operational
the scale envisaged for Ukraine’s reconstruction
support. To keep the momentum for the
would likely require an increase in the number of
revitalization of the county, the highest levels of
international construction firms that are active in
central government will need to be involved and
Ukraine in parallel with efforts to grow smaller
strategically lead this process. The operational
domestic firms into internationally competitive
structure will also be key for delivering results
firms.
and preserving a sense of perspective among the
population. • Use of common systems and processes: Where
feasible, the use of agreed and common systems,
• Local solutions and local development: Recovery
processes, and procedures should be promoted
and revitalization will need to be designed
for procurement, financial management,
and led in a way that strongly supports local
management of environmental and social risks,
economies. Any structure or process for
M&E, etc. across recovery and reconstruction
recovery and revitalization should make use of
activities/investments. This will ensure all
the economic and human capital in the country.
government officials (horizontal and vertical)
Local firms should be involved in the process, and
are using the same systems, thus maximizing
partnerships between them and firms from other
efficiency, including benefits of training, and
parts of Ukraine and abroad should be promoted
avoiding situations where the same implementing
and supported. Building reconstruction should
unit is using multiple different systems of donor
rely as much as possible on the local industry
or international financial institutions.
and on solutions produced in Ukraine.
• Focus on developing institutional capacity
• Focus on community needs: Community-driven
and managerial and technical capacity of
development with strong citizens’ involvement
implementation units: Recovery efforts should
is a crucial element for building ownership
focus on developing the capacity of institutions
and ensuring sustainability of recovery and
across different administrative levels. Moreover,
revitalization. Innovative approaches for ensuring
Implementation units (or multiple units) that will
that the entire local community participates in
manage projects in specific sectors, subsectors,
recovery and revitalization is instrumental. The
and/or regions should be capable of preparing and
needs of the community cannot be identified using
managing projects to the requirements of bilateral
a top-down approach, and any such attempts can
or multilateral development institutions, with
only result in investments disconnected from the
respect to technical, fiduciary, and environmental
real needs on the ground and unlikely to achieve
and social requirements. Therefore, capacity
sustainable results.
development should start early. Mobilization of
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 221
external resources to augment capacity will also • Financial strategy and the roles of international
be critical. funds, sovereign funding, and user charging in
specific subsectors: The scale of investment
• Mobilization of technical project preparation: The
needed for Ukraine’s reconstruction is beyond
nature of reconstruction projects needed across
the financial capacity of the government and its
many sectors with large infrastructure works will
subsidiary institutions in virtually all sectors.
be technically complex and engineering intensive.
International assistance in the form of grants,
Beyond debris and waste management and
loans, and/or guarantees from external sources
land contamination, many projects will require
is expected to augment the fiscal capacity of
environmental and social assessments and
Ukraine during reconstruction. Beyond these
potentially land acquisition processes with public
sources, there will also be a role for user
consultation processes. Alignment with European
charging to support investment and long-term
Union peers will also require Ukraine to apply
sustainability of public services. Each specific
standards that are different or modified from
sector will accordingly need a financial strategy
those previously used. While it may be possible
and indicative expenditure envelope that reflects
to temporarily apply foreign standards, Ukraine’s
credible funding sources and their role in
own domestic standards would eventually need
supporting direct expenditures or underpinning
amendments to align with the EU acquis. Project
different forms of financing (sovereign,
preparation tasks would reasonably be expected
nonsovereign, commercial, etc.). Providing
to cost between 2 percent and 10 percent of
financial strategies for relevant sectors during
total civil works investment. Mobilizing funds
reconstruction is both necessary in the immediate
for these project preparation tasks immediately,
term and likely to prove complementary for
and beginning technical preparations for “no
post-reconstruction efforts to ensure financial
regret” investments that are highly likely to fall
sustainability of critical public services.
into highest-priority categories, is essential to
rapid mobilization and Ukraine’s ability to absorb
Key highlights and priorities by sector are included
reconstruction funding across different sectors.
in Table 94.
Table 94. Sectoral highlights and recovery and reconstruction priorities as of June 1, 2022
HOUSING
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$39.2 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$69 billion
Losses: US$13.3 billion Immediate/short term: US$33.1 billion
Medium-long term: US$35.9 billion
• Apartment buildings have been most
affected – Of 692,210 units damaged, Immediate needs:
266,571 have been completely destroyed • Ensure the provision of temporary rental housing and rental
and 425,639 have been partially subsidies for displaced households
damaged. • Establish a housing reconstruction and recovery strategy and
• Single-family houses – Of 110,635 units implementation mechanism
damaged, 41,323 have been completely
destroyed and 78,822 have been partially Repair, reconstruct, and stabilize to ensure swift return and kick-start
damaged. recovery:
• Dormitories – Of 13,312 units damaged, • Support repair of partially damaged housing units and winterization
4,352 have been completely destroyed • Reconstruct fully destroyed housing units.
and 8,960 have been partially damaged. • Organize decontamination, demolition, and debris removal.
• 817,000 residential units impacted by • Repair and rebuild key municipal services to accompany the housing
the war – 38% destroyed beyond repair unit repair, as well as key service reinforcement for internally
• The Donetska (28.92%), Luhanska displaced persons (IDPs) and returnee-hosting municipalities.
(20.07%), Kyivska (18.13%), and
Kharkivksa (15.07%) oblasts account for
majority of total damage to housing in
the country.
222 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
EDUCATION
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$3.4 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$9.2 billion
Losses: US$0.5 billion Immediate/short term: US$2.8 billion
Medium-long term: US$6.5 billion
• A total of 1,885 education institutions
impacted by the war, with 178 buildings Reconstruct damaged education institutions (US$5.9 billion)
destroyed and 1,707 partially damaged: • Reconstruction is to align with demographics, patterns of
• Damage to education infrastructure resettlement, and network optimization, along with modern safety,
mainly located in the east, especially quality and environmental standards.
in Kharkivska, Donetska, and Luhanska • Prioritize hub schools and organize school buses.
oblasts.
• Nearly two-thirds of Ukrainian children Invest in service delivery restoration needs and safe access to
have been displaced either internally education (US$2.6 billion).
within Ukraine or abroad. Vinnytska, • Prioritize the organization of in-person classes (at least in safer
Ivano-Frankivska, and Kyivska oblasts regions).
are acting as major hubs for IDPs. • Retrofit existing education institutions with shelters to speed up
As of June 20, there were at least provision of in-person classes in safe conditions.
650,000 secondary students and • Invest in provisional measures such as prefabricated education
22,000 educators abroad. 164,000 IDP facilities and electronic devices.
learners have joined schools in their
Protect Ukraine’s human capital and continue with education reforms
place of temporary residence in Ukraine,
(US$0.7 billion)
with many registered in neighboring
• Launch academic catch-up programs to limit learning losses,
countries.
especially among vulnerable students.
• Education progressively resumed
• Couple return to both in-person and online classes in September
online, relying on the tools developed
with extensive psychosocial support to limit the prevalence of
during the COVID-19 pandemic to deliver
trauma among students.
education inside and outside of Ukraine.
• Invest in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics)
• Losses accrued so far include demolition
education, VET (vocational education and training), and short-term
and debris removal, loss of income to
skills training programs to avoid skill bottlenecks during the short-
teachers and institutions, and losses due
and long-term reconstruction and to ensure a flexible education,
to increase in operating costs.
adaptable to the recovery needs.
• Pursue reforms initiated before the war to improve the quality,
efficiency, and resilience of the education system.
HEALTH
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$1.4 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$15.1 billion
Losses: US$6.4 billion Immediate/short term: US$1.2 billion
Medium-long term: US$13.9 billion
• 581 health care facilities were reported
as damaged or destroyed, including 557 Rebuild lost or damaged infrastructure and build new infrastructure
facilities in the public sector. Most of the to address new or significantly increased health needs and upgrade
reported damage is for primary health the existing facilities.
care centers (264 facilities), followed by • Provide additional resources within Program of Medical Guarantees
general and mono-profile hospitals (155 (PMG) to address forgone care needs and additional needs related to
facilities). mental health and rehabilitation of direct and indirect victims of war.
• Damage was recorded for approximately
5.6% of total health facilities in the public Infrastructure investments
sector. The most affected regions were • Use build back better approach and provide for new functionalities.
Donetska, Kharkivska, and Mykolaivska. • Invest in mental health and rehabilitation centers. A total of 18 new
• Damage to private facilities is reported rehabilitation centers and 59 repurposed facilities will be necessary
as less significant. to serve the needs of the population.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 223
• Losses for private providers of health Service delivery restoration
services, calculated by comparing • Reconnect patients with health care providers for catch-up
economic activity and incomes in preventive or curative care.
the months before and after the war, • Provide additional investment in primary health care (PHC) to
were highest in the following oblasts: support this process; financing of PHC in the PMG is expected to
Kyiv city (44%), followed by Donetska scale in the next 10 years, from the current 0.62% of GDP to 0.86%
(13%), Luhanska (7%), Kyivska (7%), of GDP, to cover these additional needs.
and Odeska (6%) oblasts. Losses also • Investments in additional mental health and rehabilitation services
include deteriorated health of people are also estimated as increased allocations in the PMG; these
and constrained access to services, as resources will need to increase by 0.3 percentage points of GDP for
well as additional mental health and each PMG package covering rehabilitation and mental health services
interpersonal violence burden.
SOCIAL PROTECTION AND LIVELIHOODDS
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.2 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$20.6 billion
Losses: US$4.5 billion Immediate/short term: US$8.1 billion
Medium-long term: US$12.5 billion
• 56 stand-alone buildings, such as
residential care units, sanatoriums, Recovery of jobs and social protection sector requires concerted
or social centers, were damaged or actions over different time frames:
destroyed; estimated cost of war damage • In the immediate term, finance the social expenditures aiming to
is US$164 million. protect vulnerable groups from the additional long-term impacts.
• 64 out of 470 local service centers of the Support low-income families through the Guaranteed Minimum
Pension Fund, as well as 19 out of 158 Income (GMI) program to provide families with the income to cover
local units of the Social Insurance Fund, basic needs and with housing and utility subsidies to prevent energy
have suffered extensive damage. poverty, especially during the heating season in harsh winters.
• 10 out of 62 long-term social care Costs for such programs (excluding subsidies) are expected to
facilities for the elderly and persons reach US$8.1 billion.
with disability were damaged. • In the short-term period, there is a need to expand programs aiming
• 14 rehabilitation facilities were to stimulate employment and prepare for long-term recovery. The
damaged. use of new technologies should be expanded to strengthen the
• The losses add up to US$50.1 billion; the adaptability of the overall system.
largest share comes from the permanent • In addition, social infrastructure needs to be rebuilt quickly, but
loss of jobs and labor force. this recovery effort should be aligned with investment, policy, and
• The International Labour Organization behavioral changes.
(ILO) estimates that about 4.8 million • For the longer term, focus on rehabilitation of war-affected groups
jobs were lost, equal to 30% of prewar such as orphans, IDPs, and persons with disabilities.
employment in Ukraine. A national poll
conducted at end-April showed that 39%
of those who were employed before the
war still do not have a job. About 14% of
all jobs may be lost permanently.
CULTURE AND TOURISM
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$1.1 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$5.2 billion
Losses: US$19.3 billion Immediate/short term: US$1.6 billion
Medium-long term: US$3.6 billion
• Some 260 cultural properties have
been confirmed as fully destroyed, Over US$5.2 billion is needed for safeguarding the sector.
including buildings and sites imbued • Prioritize cultural property that can foster a sense of shared heritage
with recognized cultural/social values, and also based on the extent of damage and risk magnitude. Consult
and movable cultural properties and a wide range of stakeholders, as it is vital that the community groups
collections, repositories of culture, and assess the value of their own culture.
touristic facilities.
224 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
• Over 560 cultural properties are The first phase should focus on emergency and relief actions to
reported to be partially damaged, protect and reduce further damage. Given complexities associated
including the historic wooden structure of with “reconstructing” cultural property of historical significance, the
All Saints Monastery of the Sviatohirska process will require specialized labor, expertise, time, and considerable
Lavra, the Chernihiv Regional History cost.
Museum, the Popov’s Palace Complex,
and the Kharkiv National Academic Restore the creative industry and safeguard intangible heritage
Opera and Ballet Theater. Major damage • Restore the processes for the production, distribution, and sale of
was sustained especially in Kyivska and creative and cultural goods.
the eastern region, including Kharkivska, • Document creative practices and human capital to maintain and
Donetska, and Luhanska, and in religious rebuild communal and national identities, promote cultural diversity,
buildings, including Orthodox and and restore social cohesion.
Catholic churches, as well as mosques • Invest in capacity-building programs, as recovery efforts require
and synagogues. highly specialized expertise and skills.
AGRICULTURE
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$2.2 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$18.7 billion
Losses: US$28.3 billion Immediate/short term: US$10 billion
Medium-long term: US$8.7 billion
• The damage to machinery and
equipment was the largest source of Immediate needs can be addressed through these measures:
total damage (41%). • Reconstruct/build back better the physical assets damaged by the
• The war losses include the forgone farm war.
income due to the lower production • Provide direct support to farmers through a combination of grants
volume, the lower farm gate prices, and and soft-term credit lines to relaunch production activities, while
the higher additional farm production also injecting liquidity into the banking system to recover past
costs (e.g., fertilizers and fuel). nonperforming loans (NPLs) and stimulate new agricultural lending.
• The largest loss, accounting for 54% • Clear mines, explosive remnants of war (ERW), and pollution from
of the total losses, resulted from the agricultural lands.
decrease in farm gate prices of export-
oriented commodities such as wheat, The priority medium-term and longer-run needs measures:
barley, corn, and sunflower seeds. • Complete the reconstruction of the incurred war damage.
Losses also included lower production • Scale up direct support to farmers and banks (through liquidity
of annual and perennial crops, lower support) during several production seasons to help agricultural
livestock production, and higher farm production rebound.
production costs. • Scale up investment in agricultural public institutions for delivery
of agricultural services, so institutions can better support the
recovery of the agricultural sector. This would also require support
for adaptation to climate change.
IRRIGATION AND WATER RESOURCES
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.2 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$7.5 billion
Losses: US$0.1 billion Immediate/short term: US$0.02 billion
Medium-long term: US$7.5 billion
• Damage of US$4.7 million is attributed
to flood protection and water storage, • Repair damaged systems, under a build back better approach.
US$19.3 million to irrigation structures, • Design compensatory programs to maintain and improve production
US$6.76 million to drainage, and US$7.04 levels through improved drainage and expanded irrigation in the
million to buildings and equipment. parts of the country that always remained under government
control.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 225
• There were substantial operational Immediate needs
losses among the different state • Restore damaged hydraulic facilities and water management
entities. In many areas, payment for systems and buildings.
water services by water users (which • Relocate, prepare and accredit the Eastern Region Water Monitoring
equals 60% of all operational costs) Laboratory.
is hampered. Operational losses also
reflect the damage to government and Medium- to long-term needs
management of the water systems, as • Reconstruct, overhaul, modernize, and construct new irrigation and
the financial basis is having a serious drainage systems and if needed expand irrigation and storage in
setback. The largest share of losses case of continued loss of control by government over certain areas.
was found in the Basin Water Resources • Construct water supply networks in settlements of Lvivska oblast,
Departments. group water pipes on the territory of Odeska and Khersonska
regions; reconstruct group water pipes due to damage in the territory
of Mykolaivska oblast; reconstruct hydraulic protection structure
around Dnipro reservoirs; invest in Kozarovytsia protective dam
and operational section; overhaul Irpin pumping station covering
Kyivska oblast.
• Restore drainage and water management systems, through nature-
oriented solutions and economic validity of measures to address
damage and profit losses, mostly in territories brought back
under government control. Restore water monitoring laboratory in
Sloviansk, Donetska region.
COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$9.7 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$20.8 billion
Losses: US$47.5 billion Immediate/short term: US$6.6 billion
Medium-long term: US$14.2 billion
• Most of the damage (77%) was to industry,
with remainder under commerce. Principles to revitalize the economy and build back better:
• Much of the destruction occurred • Recognize and prioritize key sectors hurt by the conflict, such as
to large and medium-size private metallurgy, machine-building, and construction.
enterprises. About 80% of the damage • Strengthening the business climate, facilitating access to funding,
to those firms (US$4.5 billion) was due rebuilding and upgrading logistics, and boosting human capital will
to the destruction of two steel plants in help businesses build back better.
Donetska oblast that destroyed about • Greater integration with the EU and unlocking of access to new
half the country’s steel production markets will require businesses to adapt greener, more sustainable
capacity: the Azov Steel Plant and the technologies
Ilyich Iron and Steel Works in Mariupo.
• Approximately 2,900 retail shops, In the short term:
shopping malls, and warehouses have • Provide financial support to firms in the form of loans, grants, and
been damaged or destroyed. guarantees as described in the finance and banking section.
• Commercial and industrial damage and • Rebuild the logistics infrastructure needed for access to inputs and
losses are concentrated in oblasts in markets.
Eastern Ukraine. • Streamline business regulations to make it easier to start and
• Many firms, in addition to suffering restart businesses and to enter into new product lines and delivery
damage to assets and loss of revenue, models.
have experienced other costs, such as • Facilitate domestic and foreign investment to rebuild key industries.
employees being displaced or killed • Ensure private sector participation in reconstruction efforts and
and customer bases shrinking or promote linkages with small and medium enterprises in priority
disappearing. sectors for recovery and investment.
In the medium term:
• Offer financial support to firms. Direct technical assistance to firms
to enter new markets, move into higher-value-added products, and
adapt more sustainable practices.
• Address business, investment, and trade climate obstacles present
before the conflict.
226 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
FINANCE AND BANKING
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.03 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$8 billion
Losses: US$8.1 billion Immediate/short term: US$6.4 billion
Medium-long term: US$1.6 billion
• While the electronic payment system
infrastructure has remained fully Take actions to safeguard the financial system, maintain confidence,
operational since the start of the war, and minimize fiscal costs:
banks face a number of operational • Ensure a solvent, liquid, and operationally sound financial sector
challenges. • Coordinate efforts among financial market players with support of
• Liquidity remains at sufficient levels, public authorities to ensure financial stability during the war and in
given a relatively stable deposit base and the recovery/reconstruction phase.
refinancing support from the National
Bank of Ukraine. In the short term, closely monitor the situation and get an early
• Loss of business revenues and understanding of the impact of the war on the financial sector:
household incomes as well as collateral • Undertake a further assessment of the losses of financial
will significantly impact the quality of institutions (in particular banks and insurance companies) and
banks’ loan portfolios. develop a financial sector restructuring strategy.
• Since the start of the war, three banks • Ensure the financial sustainability of the Deposit Guarantee Fund
have been declared insolvent—two (DGF).
subsidiaries of Russian state-owned • Plan, adjust, and implement time-bound policy and regulatory
banks and one private bank. responses to the changing environment.
• Develop a carefully calibrated plan for phasing out special measures
put in place during the war, assistance programs for insured parties,
and financial support programs that target affected borrowers and
sectors using transparent rules and governance mechanisms.
• Reform NPL resolution mechanisms and create markets/
mechanisms for distressed assets.
In the medium term, resume implementation of critical reforms:
• Strengthen bank and nonbank regulation, supervision, and
resolution frameworks; enhance institutional and financial capacity
of the DGF.
• Resume flow of credit into the economy, in part by strengthening
governance in state-owned banks and enhancing the NPL resolution
framework.
• Enhance financial sector diversification and financial inclusion;
build modern financial system infrastructure.
• Introduce a special war insurance pool, which could cover some
war risks during and after the war with the help of external donors.
ENERGY AND EXTRACTIVES306
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$3 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$10.4 billion
Losses: US$11.7 billion Immediate/short term: US$7.3 billion
Medium-long term: US$3.1 billion
• The power sector sustained the highest
damage (US$1.4 billion), followed by Emergency repairs to restore energy provision:
district heating (US$0.7 billion), gas • Conduct emergency repairs of equipment with the most urgent
sector (US$0.5 billion), transport fuel needs for the electricity and gas networks (around US$100–150
sector (US$0.4 billion), and coal mining million)
(US$0.1 billion). • Conduct emergency repairs for district heating focused on safety
(around US$100 million).
306 The above damage covers the damage incurred this year, and the figures do not represent cumulative damage since 2014.
The cutoff date of this assessment is early June 2022. The estimations do not include the costs of overcoming logistical
or safety challenges during reconstruction that may delay and impede recovery and reconstruction, nor the need to
coordinate and phase reconstruction efforts among the sectors.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 227
• Damages cover the damage incurred this Immediate needs for the upcoming season:
year and does not represent cumulative • Close the liquidity gaps in the power sector TSO (Ukrenegro) for
damage since 2014. The cutoff date US$2.6 billion and Naftogaz for at least US$5 billion to purchase the
is June 1, 2022. The estimations do gas for the next heating season.
not include the costs of overcoming • Prepare the country for the coming winter heating season in the
logistical or safety challenges during current context, beyond gas purchases (including using modular
reconstruction that may delay and boilers that use coal, firewood, or straw).
impede recovery and reconstruction, • Ensure availability of power/heating backup solutions at the
nor the need to coordinate and phase hospitals, schools, centers housing internally displaced people, etc.
reconstruction efforts among the Solutions like pre-assembled distributed solar in combination with
sectors. battery storage could become helpful.
• Financial losses: In March and April • Provide fuel for internal transport in the very short term.
2022, electricity consumption decreased
significantly—by 35% compared to the Estimated recovery and reconstruction needs as of June 1, 2022
previous year, and the collection rate • Electricity: power transmission network needs estimated at
dropped by around 40%, on average. US$1,240 million.
• A similar situation can be observed in • Gas: Minimal needs of the gas transmission network estimated at
other energy subsectors. Many large US$260 million.
Ukrainian companies face a liquidity crisis, • District heating network needs estimated at US$1.4 billion (short
including Naftogaz, DTEK, Ukrenergo, term: US$515 million).
public generation companies, renewable • Transport fuel network needs estimated at US$784 million (short
energy developers, and others. Naftogaz term: US$313 million).
has very recently missed payments to • Coal mining reconstruction needs estimated at US$275 million.
bondholders. The liquidity problems of
Building Back Better principles
the energy companies will negatively
• Damaged or destroyed infrastructure will need to be built back to
impact the sector’s creditworthiness,
modern, more efficient standards or replaced by other sustainable
creating significant operational risks
solutions, combined with more energy-efficient reconstruction.
that will arise as the war continues.
• Even if temporary solutions are adopted in the immediate future,
• The liquidity gaps in the system
there is a need for more comprehensive reconstruction, such as
important companies have developed
regulations to ensure both safety and environmental sustainability
significantly. TSO Ukrenegro has a deficit
(e.g., in the case of biomass-based boilers to ensure that the policies
of US$2.6 billion in the power sector,
are in place to prevent deforestation).
and Naftogaz lacks at least US$5 billion
• Reconstruction should be based on the latest good practice
for purchasing gas for the next heating
standards, including building back better principles, and be aligned
season. As a consequence, Renewable
with the European acquis, acceleration of energy efficiency,
energy developers and others, are
renewable energy sources and sustainable heating solutions, etc.
currently facing a liquidity crisis and
whose Fitch credit ratings were recently
decreased. (Remark: Naftogas has
very recently missed the deadline of
payments to bondholders due to a
recent government moratorium freezing
foreign debt repayments for two years.)
• Cumulative losses from reduced
production of mines are estimated at
US$305 million since the start of the
conflict.
228 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$29.9 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$73.8 billion
Losses: US$26.1 billion Immediate/short term: US$8.9 billion
Medium-long term: US$65 billion
• The largest concentrations of damage are
in (i) local oblast, village and communal • The largest category of need includes (i) motorways, highways,
roads combined (29%); (ii) motorways, and other national roads (37%); (ii) railway rolling stock, equipment,
highways, and other national roads and other assets (18%); (iii) road bridges on both national and local
(26%); (iii) road bridges on national roads roads (11% combined); and (iv) railway track, bridges, and electrical
(15%); and (iv) railways rolling stock, equipment (10%).
equipment, and other assets (12%). • A large portion of needs for road- and railways-related investments
• This includes (i) 8,699 km of motorways, reflects both the level of damage in these subsectors and large
highways, and other national roads; (ii) cost differentials between legacy national standards and the EU
7,619 km of oblast and village roads; candidate standards.
(iii) 3 million m2 of bridges on national • Needs are highest in the eastern and southern oblasts (Donetska,
roads; (iv) 428,470 m2 of bridges on local Luhanska, Khersonska, Kharkivska, Mykolaivska, and Zaporizka
roads; (v) 1,119 km of railway lines; (vi) oblasts).
93 railway stations; (vii) 392,843 private
vehicles; (viii) 9,473 km of communal The highest priority needs for reconstruction are
roads; (ix) 16 airports; and (x) 850 units • To restore basic network functionality (road, rail, and air) for both
of urban public transport rolling stock. humanitarian aid flows and support to broader reconstruction
• Losses in the transport sector are efforts across sectors, as these will rely on transport access
estimated at US$26.1 billion and are • To enhance westward road and rail linkages to the EU to facilitate
dominated by the effects of losing Black economic integration with Europe’s single market and provide
Sea access (US$17.6 billion or 67% resilience to any potential future disruptions of Black Sea access
• Other losses includes: (ii) disruptions • To transform legacy networks toward EU standards for safety,
to road and rail transport services due service quality, and interoperability as a complement to Ukraine’s
to damaged infrastructure; (iii) losses stated policy objective of EU accession
associated with closure of Ukraine’s
airspace; and (iv) the cost of rail transport
service provided free of charge for
refugee evacuation as well as import of
humanitarian supplies
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND DIGITAL
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.7 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$3.3 billion
Losses: US$0.6 billion Immediate/short term: US$1.3 billion
Medium-long term: US$2 billion
• Damage includes US$0.6 billion for
telecom operators (fixed and mobile), In the short term, incorporate a build back better premium of 40%
US$0.08 billion for postal service above damage estimates:
companies, and US$0.04 billion for • US$0.9 billion is needed for the short-term recovery needs for
Ukraine’s broadcasting provider. infrastructure and for restoration of broadband, private postal
• 67% of the damage to telecom operators service, and mobile coverage; US$0.4 billion is for service delivery
occurred in the Donetska, Kharkivska, needs, including higher service costs for the duration of the recovery
Khersonska, and Zaporizka oblasts. period.
Most impacted postal services are in • Internet coverage and postal service access are of strategic
Donetska and Kharkivska oblasts. importance.
• The damage to broadcasters is US$0.04
billion. The damage stems from the Restore broadband connectivity for effective functioning of the public
destruction of 49 TV broadcasting towers sector and for the return of the private sector to drive the recovery in
over a three-month period, 11 of them in war-affected regions:
Luhanska oblast and 12 in Zaporizka. • Restore the broadband coverage in territories that have been
brought back under government control.
TRANSPORT
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 229
• Damage to Ukrainian fixed broadband • Provide Starlink terminals to ameliorate the adverse effects of the
providers is US$0.3 billion; it is US$0.2 military actions on internet access. Restore broadband in the war-
billion for mobile providers. affected areas for the one- to two-year horizon; however, internet
• Overall, 1,767,269 fixed lines were connectivity cannot be sustained through Starlink terminals alone
damaged or destroyed, predominantly in educational institutions, government institutions, and hospitals.
in Kharkivska, Zaporizka, Donetska, • Prioritize broadband recovery, in line with the National Broadband
Khersonska Luhanska, and Chernihivska. Development Plan of Ukraine and the country’s Digital Agenda, to
• The losses of fixed broadband providers enable faster growth in sectors like e-commerce and IT services,
are at least US$0.05 billion; for mobile which are critical for the country’s economic growth as Ukraine
providers they are US$0.1 billion. 22% rebuilds.
of internet service providers’ income
has been lost due to subscriber loss Restore postal service provision by the private provider Nova Poshta,
and unpaid service provision. Mobile which accounted for 65% of market share of postal deliveries prewar.
operators have been hit even harder.
Invest in priority long-term recovery needs:
• For Nova Poshta, a confirmed 18 postal
• US$0.4 billion is needed in the long term for infrastructure recovery
depots and 51 postal service centers
and restoration of broadcasting infrastructure and the public postal
were damaged or destroyed.
service where damage was incurred.
• US$1.6 billion is needed for service delivery needs, including higher
service costs for the duration of the recovery period.
WATER SUPPLY AND SANITATION (WSS)
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$1.3 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$5.4 billion
Losses: US$6.8 billion Immediate/short term: US$3.5 billion
Medium-long term: US$1.9 billion
• The destruction of the hydroelectric
power center of the Oskil reservoir in the Reconstruct partially damaged and destroyed WSS infrastructure and
Kharkivska oblast occurred early in the rebuild in a prioritized manner
war. Around 355.5 million m3 of water
was released, which negatively affected • Prioritize build back better reconstruction of critical WSS assets
municipal enterprises that provide at oblast level, along with support for utilities’ operational costs to
water supply services in Luhanska and ensure provision of WSS services.
Donetska regions; significant portions • Optimize further systems and facilities considering future growth
of the population in these regions have projections.
limited or no access to water supply. • Take into account the broader water challenges in the country (such
• According to UNICEF, around 13.6 million as water resources availability, climate change effects, and resulting
Ukrainians suffer from a lack of water droughts and floods) and ensure that the new WSS services are
for sanitary and hygienic needs. properly sized and easy to operate and maintain (like nature-based
• Among the most affected areas have been wastewater solutions) to ensure sustainability of services.
Druzhkivka, Donetsk, Kostiantynivka,
Ensure WSS services provision in the immediate/short term:
Berdiansk, Mariupol, Mykolaiv, Popasna,
Prymorsk, Izium, Rubizhne, Sumy, • Continue supporting (subsidizing) the additional energy and fuel
Lysychansk, Trostianets, Severodonetsk, costs until WSS utilities recover their prewar revenue levels. The
Kharkiv, and Chernihiv. energy/fuel cost support is based on calculations at national level
• 53% of total losses relate to lost and phases out this additional cost (or subsidy, which is currently
revenues from WSS services provision covered mostly by the state budget) in the immediate/short term.
and the significant drop in the collection
rate. Additional costs for WSS services
provision were due to increased energy
costs; energy is the second biggest cost
component for Ukrainian vodokanals
after salaries.
230 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
MUNICIPAL SERVICES
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$2.3 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$5.7 billion
Losses: US$4.3 billion Immediate/short term: US$1.9 billion
Medium-long term: US$3.9 billion
• Large damage to communal
infrastructure and breakdown of • There is an urgent need to ensure upkeep and increase of service
municipal service delivery estimated at delivery, and the formulation of citywide reconstruction and
least US$2.3 billion with highest level recovery strategies and action plans.
of damage estimated in the Donetska, • Key guiding principles for recovery and reconstruction include
Kharkivska, Kyivska, Luhanska, prioritization and sequencing of investments based on technical
Chernihivska, and Zaporizka oblasts. assessments, and facilitation of an enabling institutional and legal
• Scope of damage in the solid waste environment for the efficient implementation of plans.
management sector indicates a • Strengthen monitoring, reporting, and verification systems for data
breakdown of the entire service collection.
network. Around 5% of all existing • In areas with many IDPs, increase service coverage and repair
collection trucks, 17% of all biogas partially damaged service delivery infrastructure and critical
plants, and 9% of sorting lines have been facilities (e.g., cemeteries/ crematoriums).
destroyed or damaged.
Coordinate debris removal and disposal while enhancing waste
• Local mobility assets (sidewalks and
management capacity and infrastructure.
streetlights) had 39% of damage, followed
• Conduct assessments in sample sites for understanding debris
by the public spaces and facilities
composition and prepare a citywide plan for debris removal, sorting,
category (28.5%). Local administrative
treatment, and processing
buildings and centers sustained 24%
• Procure necessary and critical assets to ensure timely waste
of the total damage, of which 75% was
collection and effective and efficient waste management in the short
derived from fully destroyed buildings.
term.
• Losses across Kyiv city, Donetska, and
Kharkivska together account for more Repair, reconstruct and stabilize prioritized assets based on local
than 50% of the total. technical studies and strategic plans
• Over 90% of the total losses valued • Prepare and adopt integrated immediate-to-medium-term citywide
stem from incurred and projected urban recovery and reconstruction action plans identifying and
revenue losses of local governments prioritizing needs and sequencing.
indicating the huge fiscal burden on local • Update local cadasters and land registries in coordination with the
government and the likely instability of national-level ministry and conduct cadaster activities (systematic
service delivery in the second half of survey and property registration processes).
2022. Between March-May the additional • Conduct engineering studies for specific sites and multi-hazard
service delivery burden incurred by local assessments to determine structural integrity and risks and specific
governments was US$74.6 million. needs for reconstruction.
• Damage to local infrastructure and • Undertake repairs and reconstruction
communal facilities has had significant
impacts on access to critical and basic
services and the overall the quality
of life of residents. Access to waste
collection and disposal has severely
deteriorated due to the war.
ENVIRONMENT, NATURAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT, AND FORESTRY
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$2.5 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$1.2 billion
Losses: US$0.7 billion Immediate/short term: US$0.4 billion
Medium-long term: US$0.9 billion
• Lost ecosystem services value—a result
of land contamination making the forests Adopt strategic goals of postwar recovery in a clean and safe
inaccessible—is estimated at US$739 environment, in compliance with EU law:
million over the 21 months from March • Set up effective environmental monitoring to evaluate the overall
2022. These losses may extend much environmental damage, and take necessary measures to avoid
further beyond this period. further aggravation and recover ecosystems.
• Promote sustainable use of natural resources, biodiversity
conservation, restoration, and development of protected areas.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 231
• Over 250 environmental incidents and In the short term:
over 1,200 cases of damage to the • Prepare and carry out a comprehensive environmental cleanup
environment have been reported from effort, especially related to collection, safe disposal, and treatment
the aggression. of the vast amount of military and other waste.
• Damage to natural reserves and
protected ecosystems: As a result Related to the assessment of environmental risks:
of the war, about 20% of the area of • Ensure monitoring system are accessible and transparent.
all protected areas of Ukraine is in • Commence with strategic planning around pollution cleanup.
danger, 17 Ramsar sites (wetlands of
Related to forestry sector recovery:
international importance) are under
• Reinstate forests in burned areas, ancillary assets, realign timber
threat of destruction, and about 160
harvesting efforts
territories of the Emerald Network
• Expand forest nursery capacity to increase forest cover thus
with an area of 2.5 million ha and four
providing large scale labor opportunities in short term and an
biosphere reserves have been degraded.
opportunity for investment (including international) in forest-carbon
At least 900 protected areas together
projects in Ukraine
covering 1.2 million ha, or 30% of all
• Align with European Green Deal to maximize sustainable production
protected areas in Ukraine, have been
and export of long-lived forest products.
affected by the war.
• Fires have been the principal source
of war- related damage in forests.
The value of standing timber that has
been destroyed is calculated at US$2.4
billion, based on an area damaged inside
conflict zones of 249,237 ha.
EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND CIVIL PROTECTION
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.1 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$0.7 billion
Losses: US$0.2 billion Immediate/short term: US$0.5 billion
Medium-long term: US$0.2 billion
• 6% of the buildings owned by the
emergency response and civil protection • With the war ongoing, priority short-term measures need to be
sector were either damaged, destroyed, aligned with citizens’ need for immediate support provided by the
or seized. 49 buildings were destroyed first responders.
and 147 buildings were partially • There is a need to address the inadequate and outdated facilities
damaged. 453 buildings were seized and obsolete technical equipment and to provide training. Priority is
in territory temporarily not under to provide quick solutions to enable safe and adequate protection of
government control. The most-affected citizens as part of rescue operations.
regions include Donetska, Zaporizka,
Restore the capacities of civil protection and emergency response
Kharkivska, and Kyivska.
forces:
• 13 hydrometeorology/seismology
• Reconstruct and equip severely and moderately damaged buildings
buildings were damaged in Donetska
and conduct emergency repairs on slightly and moderately
oblast and 10 in Zaporizka. 30
damaged buildings.
hydrometeorological instruments and
• Procure the necessary and improved equipment to replace
pieces of equipment have been either
damaged equipment.
damaged or destroyed.
• The largest number of destroyed Immediate actions:
vehicles is recorded in Odeska oblast. • Procure 669 modern and fully equipped firefighting/rescue vehicles
The largest number of seized vehicles is (US$395.96 million) to replace those either destroyed of seized and
reported in Zaporizka oblast, followed by procure mobile decontamination units (system and vehicles), heavy
Donetska. load chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) vehicles,
• A major loss sustained relates to and mobile laboratories (US$65.76 million).
the extra time put in by the rescue/ • Establish oblast-level mobile command control points and four
response operatives due to increased major logistics hubs (US$24.65 million) required to support rescue.
demands for emergency operations; Construct platforms and hangars for helicopters at oblast level
additional expenses amount to US$241 (US$45.82 million) to allow SESU to respond to increased demands.
million. Losses include State Emergency • Establish sea and river rescue units (US$39.32 million) to address
Service of Ukraine’s (SESU’s) increased the problem of mined area in waters and general lack of related
operational costs of US$237 million, and preparedness.
debris removal costs of US$4 million.
232 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
• Construct bomb shelters at oblast level within local fire and rescue
units (US$5.57 million) to provide safety to citizens and SESU staff
in the case of shelling.
• Develop two nationwide training facilities (US$12.09 million) to
provide training for additional SESU staff and specialized education
for existing staff.
In the medium to long term, invest in SESU buildings—including
main departments at oblast level, rescue/response centers, and
hydrometeorology/geophysics buildings (US$178.68 million).
JUSTICE AND PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Highlights Priorities
Damage: US$0.1 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$0.2 billion
Losses: US$0.03 billion Immediate/short term: US$0.08 billion
Medium-long term: US$0.1 billion
• Prosecution service: 20 buildings have
sustained significant damage, and 7 Train legal professionals:
in the prosecution service have been • New judges, prosecutors, investigators, police, customs and tax
destroyed since the beginning of the war. officers, and other justice sector staff will need to be recruited and
The most affected areas were Donetska, trained after the war.
Kharkivska, Sumska, and Kyivska
oblasts. The total damage for the Office Restore judicial and law enforcement services:
of the General Prosecutor amounts to • Prioritize the reconstruction and repair of courthouses, as this
US$7.97 million. subsector sustained the highest damage. Prioritize law enforcement
• Judiciary: 46 courthouses were partially and judicial services once the war is over to ensure proper
damaged and 20 were completely governance, law and order, and integrity during reconstruction.
destroyed during the war. 3 buildings • Consider short-term temporary solutions such as mobile courts
from the State Judicial Administration or temporary court locations for priority cases, or the delivery of
and the Judicial Protection Service judicial services through e-justice tools.
have been partially damaged. The most • Justice/rule of law institutions, particularly those with the mandate
impacted oblasts were Donetska and to prevent, investigate, and combat corruption will need to play
Kharkivska. The total damage for the a prominent role in the overall reconstruction process to ensure
judiciary is US$61.33 million. that the reconstruction and recovery efforts are implemented with
• Public administration: For infrastructure transparency and integrity and for intended use.
and services, damage of US$31.6 million
Repair and reconstruction of key public administration buildings
was estimated.
should be prioritized in line with specific ministry requirements.
LAND DECONTAMINATION
Highlights Priorities
Losses: US$73.2 billion Total recovery needs (10 years): US$73.2 billion
Immediate/short term: US$11 billion
• An estimated 13% of Ukraine’s territory Medium-long term: US$62.2 billion
is contaminated.
• Based on conservative estimates, land Ensure the safety of the population:
decontamination costs are expected • Evacuate the population living in the areas at risk of remnants of
to exceed US$73.2 billion; US$58.5 war.
million needs to be urgently invested • Prioritize areas requiring the most urgent decontamination, such
in equipment, training, and salaries for as those with high civilian populations, areas critical for restoring
expanded workforce for decontamination production and economic flows, etc.
authorities in Ukraine.
• Russian forces have used at least seven In the short term:
types of antipersonnel mines in at least • US$11 billion are needed for nontechnical and technical survey
four regions of Ukraine: Donetska, and demining, including US$58.5 million for procurement of varied
Kharkivska, Kyivska, and Sumska. equipment to scale up decontamination efforts and make significant
progress in areas that have been brought back under government
control and where active military actions have ceased.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 233
• Both Russian and Ukrainian forces have • Quantify costs associated with the removal of sea mines in the
extensively used anti-tank mines (also Black Sea.
called anti-vehicle mines) in at least • Provide training to additional staff and procure reliable, modern, and
seven regions: Donetska, Chernihivska, quality equipment, especially metal detectors, demining machines,
Kharkivska, Kyivska, Odeska, Sumska, and personal protective equipment.
and Zaporizka. Hand-placed TM-62 • Scale up ongoing efforts, including NTS activities currently
series anti-vehicle mines appear to be conducted in Kyiv and Chernihiv.
the type most frequently used.
• SESU has estimated that nontechnial Invest in equipment:
survey (NTS) should be conducted over • Invest in 900 CEIA CMD metal detectors and PT-300 D:Mine remote-
272,000 km2 of Ukrainian territory. By controlled mechanical demining machines, with training and one
applying international experience, the year supply of consumables and critical parts
total area foreseen for NTS, technical • Use of demining machines would allow operators to deploy
survey (TS), and clearance is 267,638 machinery during TS and clearance operations and lower the
km2, with a breakdown of 194,647 km2 primary risks for deminers. Machines would increase demining and
foreseen for NTS, an additional 48,661 ERW removal speed and lower the price and time. In peacetime,
km2 foreseen for TS, and 24,330 km2 they can be used in forestry, agriculture, quarries, and construction.
foreseen for actual clearance operations.
Provide training to at least explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 3
• According to RDNA estimates, it would
of all additional staff:
take 10 years to complete NTS, 15
• Reach out to partners/other mining centers to support efforts.
years to complete TS based on the
• Provide explosive ordnance risk education courses to prevent
NTS results, and 30 years to complete
civilian casualties.
clearance based on TS findings and
definition of Suspected Hazardous Areas Elaborate efficient legislation to improve efficiency.
and Confirmed Hazardous Areas. This is
providing that war activities stop, that
additional needs and requirements are
met (e.g., additional staff and equipment,
including dual-use items), and that there
are available funds.
MACROECONOMIC IMPACTS
Highlights Priorities
• The war has significantly disrupted • Estimated GDP losses in 2022 go beyond physical asset losses, while
economic activities by damaging the medium-term economic recovery will be affected by human
productive assets and infrastructure and capital reduction and the sheer size of reconstruction needs. The
causing logistic problems, labor force pace of the economy’s recovery in the medium term will depend on
losses, ruined supply-demand chains, the duration of the war and availability of financial resources.
and uncertainty and elevated risks. • Economic activity has shown signs of improvement, with increases
• Ukraine’s GDP shrank by 15.1% year over in economic activity; but the recovery is uneven and shows signs of
year (YoY) in Q1 (or 19.3% quarter over stagnating at a low level. Problems with logistics and the destruction
quarter seasonally adjusted), driven by a of capacities are holding back the recovery
45% GDP contraction in March YoY.
• After the reclamation of Kyivska oblast, Ukraine is facing three key macro-critical challenges:
economic activity in April showed the • High fiscal financing needs and inability to mobilize domestic
first signs of improvement, even though revenues
it remains much below the prewar levels. • Increasing reliance on monetary financing and deteriorating asset
• The duration of the war continues to quality of the financial sector
be uncertain, but assuming that June’s • A weaker external position
status quo continues until the end of
Increased public expenditure in critical services
the year, the GDP contraction in 2022
• Current expenditures are helping to prevent even deeper
is estimated to be around 35% YoY. If
humanitarian and social impacts, and to prevent an erosion of
the situation further deteriorates, the
institutional capital and capacity, which will be the bedrock of any
decline in economic activities could
future recovery and reconstruction efforts. One-quarter of the
reach up to 45% in 2022.
population receives old-age pensions, which are a key safety net.
• Inflation increased from 10% YoY in
January 2022 to 21.5% in June, while food
and fuel prices surged even higher—by
28.3% and 90.9% YoY, respectively.
234 Toward Recovery and Reconstruction
• Since the beginning of the war, tax Impacts on the most vulnerable must be monitored
revenue collection has deteriorated • The government is making an effort to roll over domestic debt and is
significantly, tax administration and negotiating a two-year deferral on external debt amortization with
collection bottlenecks in war-effected external commercial and official creditors. To help Ukraine meet its
areas, and tax policy changes. The current nonmilitary financing gap, further significant support from
nominal decline in tax revenues of the international finance institutions and bilateral lenders is needed;
consolidated budget reached 24% YoY otherwise Ukraine will have to squeeze social expenditures and
in March and April and 14% in May. In avail itself of domestic financing and monetization of the deficit
real terms the annual reduction in tax from the National Bank. The National Bank has already monetized
revenues exceeds 30% per month since over US$7.7 billion in fiscal needs since the beginning of the war.
the beginning of the war. This could deeply impact the poor: they could push the share of the
• Although nonmilitary public spending population living below US$5.5/day to nearly 60% in 2023, up from
has been reduced, public expenditure 2% in 2021. Such a steep deterioration in poverty will take years to
increased sharply to ensure delivery reverse.
of key public services during war time.
The government has made efforts to cut Balance of payments
nonessential current expenditures (by • To offset the effect of export losses in early March, the government
78% YoY) and capital spending (by 61% announced import restrictions for all types of goods, with the
YoY). Nevertheless, total public spending exception of critical imports defined by the government. The
surged by 57% YoY in March–May due to withdrawal of import restrictions in July may lead to significant
higher expenditure on wages and salaries broadening of the current account deficit in the second half of 2022,
(109% YoY), including for emergency • Huge outflows of refugees have created capital account pressures
medical personnel and first responders, due to the withdrawal of funds from Ukrainian accounts to finance
transfers and social protection needs spending abroad. Since the beginning of the war the National Bank
(44% YoY), and procurement of goods has spent around US$12 billion for the currency interventions,
and services (79% YoY), including for including US$4 billion in June alone. This eroded international
the restoration of public services such reserves, which declined to US$22.8 billion at the end of June from
as electricity, water, and gas. On the a prewar level of US$29 billion.
functional side, expenditures for defense
Restore collateral, assets, and revenues
and security grew by 4.5 times and
• Bank branches in Western and Central Ukraine are almost fully
social protection and social security by
operational while in the southeast the situation remains dire.
30% YoY (amounting to about US$3.5
• Government’s increasing reliance on the banking system for
billion a month), contributing the most to
budgetary financing will further narrow the availability of liquidity
total increase.
for productive lending to the economy after the war, while the risk of
investing in government securities is becoming more pronounced
due to the volatility of government securities’ value.
SOCIAL INCLUSION AND VULNERABLE GROUPS
Highlights Priorities
Displacement Displacement
• 1/3 of Ukrainians have fled their homes. • Cash (financial support) remains a pressing need of IDPs (increasing
Over 7.13 million people were displaced from 49% to 77%).
within Ukraine as of May 23, 2022. • Transportation, clothes and other nonfood items, medicines
As of June 1, 2022, the total number and health services, lack of access to money, and food are other
of registered IDPs, including those important needs mentioned by at least 25% of IDPs surveyed.
displaced since 2014, amounted to Accommodation is a pressing need mentioned by 15% of IDPs.
4,162,327 persons. • Support in accessing building/reconstruction materials to repair
• About 6 million Ukrainians have left current shelters is needed for IDPs if they decide to return to homes
the country (14-15% of the resident that have been damaged by the war (29% among IDPs and about
population as of January 1, 2022). There 10% among returnees reported some damage to their homes).
were 4,712,784 individual refugees from • Many IDPs will need support in reemployment or reestablishing
Ukraine recorded across Europe as of business activity.
June 3, 2022. • Social cohesion and inclusion aspects should be considered within
• 64% of IDPs who were employed before the recovery strategy.
the war lost jobs. Only 9% of IDPs had
found a new job as of May 23, 2022. Persons with Disabilities
• Allocate additional resources for rehabilitation, medical, and
other special service providers and facilities and to attract more
specialists and addressing overcrowding issues, with upgrading
human skills and technologies.
Toward Recovery and Reconstruction 235
Persons with disabilities • Identifying and responding to the immediate safety and health
• As of May 23, 2022, 26% of IDP needs of disabled children.
respondents indicated that at least one • Consider additional support to families to care for disabled.
member of the family currently had a • Implement long-term solutions for the care of persons with
disability. disabilities, including transition to community integrated care.
• Damage to care facilities reduces access
to facilities, resulting in overcrowding Women and children
and insufficient services in accessible • Integrate gender-based differences throughout the response and
facilities. recovery strategy with tailored responses to meet the needs of
• Persons with intellectual disabilities are each group and address the risks they face.
very marginalized. • Support women as caretakers of children and elderly relatives
• Tens of thousands of children from (particularly among IDPs).
boarding schools have been returned to • Promote an approach that mainstreams and is sensitive to gender,
families. with gender-differentiated needs across the full range of entry
points for support: access to services and justice (including for
Women and children SGBV and for forced recruitment of boys and men into armed
• As of May 6, 2022, 805 specialized groups), livelihoods, social resilience, and peacebuilding.
support services for victims of domestic • Promote gender-sensitive and inclusive institutional arrangements
violence and sexual and gender-based in decision making.
violence (SGBV were established in
Ukraine. LGBTI
• 19% of specialized support services for • Ensure inclusive programming, advocacy, and responses to address
victims of domestic violence and SGBV the various vulnerabilities and risks.
do not perform their functions as a • Establish specific reception, registration arrangements for safe
result of the war. identification and support.
• Women’s share of employment fell from • Ensure that specialized LGBTI shelters and centers are linked to the
64% to 42%. humanitarian system.
• 86% of women vs 79% of men received • Address barriers to safe and equal access for LGBTI persons to
additional financial assistance from social services/program.
different sources. 67% of women vs • Raise awareness and advocate equitable and nondiscriminatory
57% of men state that they lack enough provision of services to LGBTI individuals.
money to afford basic needs (e.g., food • Transgender IDPs may face additional difficulties accessing
and clothes). services due to discrepancies between their appearance and
identity documents, this issue should be advocated for the reissuing
Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and of documents.
intersex (LGBTI)
• There are reports of attacks against
LGBTI rights activists and human rights
defenders and shelters in Ukraine.
• Access to medical care, such as
HIV medication or hormone therapy
treatments, is limited.
• Tensions and conflict may have
increased due to family members’ lack
of understanding or acceptance.
• Sexual and gender minorities may
face barriers in securing safe housing
options, while transgender people may
experience challenges in accessing
shelters and services based on their
self-identified gender if their documents
do not match.
236 Annexes
ANNEXES
ANNEX 1. RDNA TEAM
The RDNA team would like to express its deep appreciation to all individuals and organizations who contributed
to this assessment.
From the Government of Ukraine, support was provided under the guidance of Minister Oleksiy Chernyshov,
Ministry for Communities and Territories Development.
From the European Commission, support was provided under the guidance of Katarina Mathernová, Deputy
Director-General.
From the World Bank, support was provided under guidance of Arup Banerji, Regional Country Director for
Eastern Europe; Sameh Wahba, Regional Director for Sustainable Development; Fadia Saadah, Regional
Director for Human Development; Charles Cormier, Regional Director for Infrastructure; Lalita Moorty,
Regional Director for Equitable Growth, Finance and Institutions; Christoph Pusch, Practice Manager, Urban,
Disaster Risk Management, Resilience & Land; Baher El-Hifnawi, Infrastructure and Sustainable Development
Program Leader; Karlis Smits, Lead Country Economist; Caryn Bredenkamp, Lead Economist and Human
Development Program Leader; Tom Farole, Lead Economist Sustainable Development and others.
CORE COORDINATION TEAM
Ivan Lukeria (Deputy Minister of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Anna Nyzhnyk
(Acting Director General of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration of the Ministry for
Communities and Territories Development); Marta Bukhtiyarova (Director General of the Directorate of Strategic
Planning and European Integration of the Ministry for Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories);
Alanna Simpson (Lead Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Zuzana Stanton-Geddes (Senior Disaster Risk
Management Specialist); Baher El-Hifnawi (Program Leader, IECDR); Krunoslav Katic (Senior Disaster Risk
Management Consultant); Oleksandra Shatyrko (Social Development Specialist); Joy Aoun (Disaster Risk
Management Specialist); Jae Kyun Kim (Operations Officer); Ghizlane Aqariden (Disaster Risk Management
Consultant); Soraya Ridanovic (Disaster Risk Management Consultant); Nadia Kislova (Program Assistant)
Chloe Allio (Head of Section– Operations, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Agnieszka Skiba (Program
Officer - Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Panagiotis Stamoulis (Policy Officer, Delegation of the
European Union to Ukraine); Marta Sadel (Policy Officer, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement
Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA))
Annexes 237
Housing
Anna Nyzhnyk (Acting Director General of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration of the
Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Oleksandr Petroshchuk (State Expert of the Strategic and
Budget Planning Expert Group of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration of the Ministry
for Communities and Territories Development); Vakhovich Inna (Head of the Department of Pricing, Economics
and Contractual Relations in Construction of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Dmytro
Panshin (Deputy Director of the Department of Housing Policy and Improvement of the Ministry for Communities
and Territories Development)
Karima Ben Bih (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Ellen Hamilton (Lead Urban Development
Specialist); Noriko Oe (Senior Urban Development Specialist); Debashree Poddar (Urban Development Specialist);
Xueman Wang (Senior Urban Development Specialist); Oleksandr Dovbnia (Urban Expert); Simon Walley (Urban
Development Specialist); Paul Scott Prettitore (Senior Land Management Specialist)
Krzysztof Gierulski (Policy Officer, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG
NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)); Olga Borodankova (Cooperation Officer at the Delegation of the
European Union to Ukraine); Andriy Bandura (Sector Management Energy (Gas, Oil, and Energy Efficiency),
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Christian Ben Hell (Sector Manager for Land, Agriculture, Forestry,
and Food Safety, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Education
Yuriy Kovalchuk (Head of the Investment Activity and International Projects Sector of the Ministry of Education
and Science)
James Gresham (Education Specialist); Svitlana Batsiukova (Education Specialist); Adrien Samuel Julien Olszak
Olszewski (Education Expert)
Vira Rybak (Education and Science Sector Manager at the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Fernando
Fonseca (Policy Officer, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support
Group for Ukraine (SGUA))
Health
Bohdan Borukhovskyi (Deputy Minister of Health); Oleksii Yaremenko (Deputy Minister of Health), Tetyana
Hotsuenko (Advisor to the Minister of Health), Oleksandr Yemets (Director General of eHealth Agency under
MoH), Yulia Mazur (Business Analyst at eHealth Agency under MoH); Yurii Gaidai (Senior Economist, Center for
Economic Strategy)
Olena Doroshenko (Senior Health Economist); Oleksandr Zhyhinas (Health Expert); Khrystyna Pak (Health
Specialist), Arthur ten Have (International Health Expert), Vladyslav Smirnov (Medical Engineer, Head of
Medconstructor)
Alexandra Janovskaia (Policy Officer, Delegation of European Union to Ukraine); Mira Didukh (Project Officer
– Health and Social Policies, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Fernando Fonseca (Policy Officer,
Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine
(SGUA)), Jarno Habicht (WHO Representative in Ukraine) and World Health Organization team, Ben Zinner (Deputy
Director, USAID)
Social Protection and Livelihoods
Yevhen Kotyk (First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Social Policy; Serhiy Sobchuk (State Expert of the Expert
Group on Social Budget Issues of the Directorate of Strategic Planning, Policy Coordination and European
Integration of the Ministry of Social Policy);
Roman Zhukovskyi (Social Protection Specialist); Katerina Petrina (Senior Social Protection Specialist); Anna
Baranova (Consultant); Iryna Kalachova (Consultant); Volodymyr Sorioglo (Consultant)
Mira Didukh (Project Officer – Health and Social Policies, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Fernando
Fonseca (Policy Officer, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support
Group for Ukraine (SGUA))
Culture and Tourism
Anastasia Bondar (Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy); Rostyslav Karandeyeev
(First Deputy Minister of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy); Kateryna Chuyeva (Deputy Minister
of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy); Maryana Oleskiv (Head of the State Agency for Tourism
Development); Luiza Moroz (State Expert of the Expert Group of Creative Industries of the Directorate of Culture
and Arts); Yaroslav Petrakov (General Director of the Directorate for Strategic Planning and European Integration);
Yuliya Nechyporenko (head of the main department for the protection of cultural heritage and museums of the
Directorate of Cultural Heritage)
238 Annexes
Karima Ben Bih (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Yuna Chun (Urban Development Analyst);
Oleksandr Dovbnia (Consultant, SCAUR)
Tetiana Shulha (Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Fernando Fonseca (Policy Officer,
Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine
(SGUA))
PRODUCTIVE SECTORS
Agriculture
Oleksiy Pinchuk (Head of the Department of International Policy of the Ministry of Agrarian Policy and Food)
Sergiy Zorya (Lead Agriculture Economist)
Christian Ben Hell (Sector Manager for Land, Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Safety, Delegation of the European
Union to Ukraine); Markus Klingler
Irrigation and Water Resources
Oleksandr Bon (Deputy Director of the Department, Head of the Marine Policy Department of the Ministry of the
Environment)
Ranu Sinha (Irrigation and Drainage Specialist); Frank van Steenbergen (Irrigation and Drainage Consultant)
Christian Ben Hell (Sector Manager for Land, Agriculture, Forestry, and Food Safety, Delegation of the European
Union to Ukraine) (for irrigation)
Commerce and Industry
Oleksandr Maksymov (Director of Property Policy Department of the Ministry of Economy)
Sunita Varada (Senior Private Sector Development Specialist); Stefka Slavova (Lead Economist); Alberto
Criscuolo (Senior Economist); Blerta Qerimi (Senior Private Sector Expert)
Iryna Hubarets (Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Stanislav Toshkov (Program Officer,
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Financial Sector/Banking
Alina Pogribna (Head of the Department of Cooperation with the World Bank Group of the Department of
International Financial Projects of the Ministry of Finance); Pervin Dadashova (Director of Financial Stability
Department)
Johanna Jaeger (Senior Financial Sector Specialist); Yevhen Hrebeniuk (Financial Sector Specialist); Klym
Naumenko (Consultant)
Vitaliya Mudruk; (Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Olga Chilat (Project Officer,
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS
Energy and Extractives
Olena Biryukova (Director of the Department of Finance and Public Property Management of the Ministry of
Energy); Andarak Roman (General Director of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European integration of
the Ministry of Energy); Sofiya Serhiyivna Ugryumova (Head of the Main Department for Ensuring the Functioning
of Oil and Gas Markets of the Directorate of the Oil and Gas Complex and Development of Oil, Natural Gas and
Petroleum Products Markets of the Ministry of Energy); Oleksandr Kropot (Acting Director of the Industry
Department of the Ministry of Strategy and Industry); Farid Safarov (Ministry of Energy, Deputy Minister on
Digitalization); Alexander Kharchenko (Advisor to Minister of Energy); Oleksandr Petroshchuk (State Expert of the
Strategic and Budget Planning Expert Group of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration
of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Oleksandr Tron (Deputy Director of Department
of Life–Support Systems Economics of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Vladyslav
Filipov (Senior Expert on district heating of the Reform Support Office under the Ministry for Communities
and Territories Development); Project Management Unit’s team for “Ukraine District Heating Energy Efficiency
Project” – Konstantin Stanitsky and Stanislav Terletskyi; Ministry of Regions, Project Management Unit’s team
for “Ukraine District Heating Energy Efficiency Project” – Konstantin Stanitsky and Stanislav Terletskyi; Olena
Biryukova (Director of the Department of Finance and Public Property Management of the Ministry of Energy);
Roman Andarak (General Director of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European integration of the
Ministry of Energy); GAS TSO’s working group on damage assessment: Kateryna Kovalenko; Olga Belkova; Ksenia
Nazarenko; Mykyta Slobodyan; Ukrenergo: Oleh Pavlenko; Olha Pershyna
Annexes 239
Silvia Martinez Romero (Senior Energy Specialist); Koji Nishida (Senior Energy SpecialistSepcialist); Roman
Novikov (Energy Specialist); Odile Ivette Johnson Naveo ((Senior Energy Consultant); Anders Pedersen (Senior
Energy Specialist); Ashish Shrestha (Energy Consultant); Sandu Ghidirim (Senior Energy Specialist) Operations
Officer)
Wolfhart Pohl (Lead Specialist for Environment Specialist and Geosciences); Alexander Johannes Huurdeman
(Senior Oil and Gas Specialist Expert); Roman Novikov (Energy Specialist)
Torsten Woellert (Team Leader Energy and Environment, Support Group for Ukraine, European Commission);
Denys Prusakov (Sector Manager, Energy, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Andriy Bandura (Sector
Manager Energy- Gas, Oil and Energy Efficiency, the Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Ruta Baltause
(Energy Expert Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group
for Ukraine (SGUA)); Krzysztof Gierulski (Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations
(DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)) (district heating, CHP); Marcus Lippold (Advisor, Directorate
General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)) European
Commission)
Transport
Anna Yurchenko (Deputy Minister of Infrastructure of Ukraine for European Integration); Iryna Kucheruk (Director
International Department Cooperation and Investment Policies of the Ministry of Infrastructure); Pechochnyk
Taras (Deputy Director of the Department International Cooperation and Investment Policy, Head of the Investment
Department Policies of the Ministry of Infrastructure)
Dominic Pasquale Patella (Senior Transport Specialist); Yevhen Bulakh (Transport Specialist); Anna Vazhnenko
(Transport Consultant); Anton Hagen (Transport Consultant); Andriy Koretsky (Transport Consultant); Yuliana
(Julia) Havryliuk (Transport Consultant); Yurii Lozovenko (Transport Consultant); Artem Poliukh (Transport
Consultant); Oleksandr Karnachev (Transport Consultant)
Agnieszka Skiba (Program Officer, Infrastructure, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Svitlana
Didkivska (Project Manager – Transport, Digital issues, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Daniel
Jacques (Policy Officer, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support
Group for Ukraine (SGUA))
Telecommunications and Digital
Marianna Kaninets (Chief Specialist of the Department of Implementation of Financial SSD in the Regions of
the Fixed and Mobile SSD Directorate of the Ministry of Digital); Mykola Kozlov (Acting General Director of the
State Enterprise “Information Court Systems”); Volodymyr Popov (Advisor to the General Director of the State
Enterprise “Information Court Systems”, Judicial Expert); Ihor Starodubov (Director of the Separate Structural
Subdivision of the State Enterprise “Information Judicial Systems,” “Center for Forensic Examination and Expert
Research,” President of the All-Ukrainian Public Organization “Union of Experts of Ukraine,” Judicial Expert,
Patent Attorney, Appraiser, Candidate of Legal Sciences)
Natalija Gelvanovska Garcia (Senior Digital Development Specialist); Mykhailo Koltsov (Consultant); Marta
Khomyn (Consultant)
Svitlana Didkivska (Project Manager, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Sergiy Ladnyy (Project
Manager, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Jenni Lundmark (Head of the Public Finance Management,
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Water Supply and Sanitation
Prykhodko Roman (Senior Expert on Water Supply and Drainage of the Reform Support Office under the Ministry
for Communities and Territories Development); Oleksandr Petroshchuk (State Expert of the Strategic and Budget
Planning Expert Group of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration of the Ministry for
Communities and Territories Development); Oleksandr Ilinskyi (Deputy Director of Department of Life–Support
Systems Economics of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Viktor Cherevko (Head of the
Department of State Environmental Supervision (Control) of Natural Resources of the Ministry of the Environment);
Victor Doroshenko (Head of UIP2 CPMU, the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development)
Ivaylo Kolev (Senior Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist)
Olga Simak (Sector Manager, Environment, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Gregory Tsouris (Green
Deal Counsellor, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
240 Annexes
Municipal Services
Oleksandr Petroschuk (State Expert of the Strategic and Budget Planning Expert Group of the Directorate of
Strategic Planning and European Integration of the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development);
Anna Nyzhnyk (Acting Director General of the Directorate of Strategic Planning and European Integration of
the Ministry for Communities and Territories Development); Didenko Lesya (Deputy Director of the Department
of Implementation of Priority Regional Development Projects of the Ministry for Communities and Territories
Development), Diana Novikova (Chief Specialist of the Department of Household Waste Management and
Communal Services of the Department of Communal Services and Communal Services of the Ministry for
Communities and Territories Development); Yuliia Tarakanova (Deputy Head of Division of International Projects
of the Department of Implementation of Priority Regional Development Projects of the Ministry for Communities
and Territories Development); Kateryna Pechonchyk (Chief Specialist of the Expert Group for Monitoring the
Provision of Administrative Services of the Directorate for System Development of the Provision of Administrative
Services of the Ministry of Digital); Mykola Kozlov (Acting General Director of the State Enterprise “Information
Court Systems”); Volodymyr Popov (Advisor to the General Director of the State Enterprise “Information Court
Systems,” Judicial Expert); Ihor Starodubov (Director of the Separate Structural Subdivision of the State
Enterprise “Information Judicial Systems,” “Center for Forensic Examination and Expert Research,” President of
the All-Ukrainian Public Organization “Union of Experts of Ukraine”, Judicial Expert, Patent Attorney, Appraiser,
Candidate of Legal Sciences); Matsyk Yuriy (Director of the Fixed and Mobile SHSD Directorate)
Debashree Poddar (Urban Development Specialist) and Noriko Oe (Senior Urban Development Specialist);
Oleksandr Dovbnia (Senior Urban Consultant, SCAUR); Ellen Hamilton (Lead Urban Development Specialist)
Krzysztof Gierulski, (Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support
Group for Ukraine (SGUA)); Natalia Starostenko (Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
CROSS-CUTTING SECTORS
Environment and Forestry
Anastasia Drapalyuk (Head of the Department for the Protection and Use of the Nature Reserve Fund of the
Department of the Nature Reserve Fund and Land Resources of the Ministry of the Environment); Oleksandr
Skakalskyi (Deputy Head of the Department – Head of the Department of State Environmental Supervision
(Control) of Industrial Pollution of the State Environmental Inspection); Yury Katsagorov (Deputy Head of the
Department of State Ecological Supervision (Control) of Biological Resources – Head of the Department of State
Ecological Supervision (Control) of Forests and Flora – Senior State Inspector for Environmental Protection)
Oksana Rakovych (Environmental Specialist); Funke Asaolu (Senior Environmental Specialist); Elena Strukova
Golub (Senior Environmental Economist); Madhavi M. Pillai (Senior Natural Resources Management Specialist);
Myles Mac Donncadha (Senior Forest Consultant)
Olga Simak (Sector Manager, Environment, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Gregory Tsouris (Green
Deal Counsellor, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Emergency Response and Civil Protection
Vaskovskyi Oleksandr (Deputy Director of the Resources Department, State Emergency Service (SESU)); Ihor
Sheliuk (Senior Specialist of the Resources Department, State Emergency Service (SESU)); Semenets Svitlana
(State Emergency Service (SESU)); Petro Kropotov (State Emergency Service (SESU))
Zuzana Stanton-Geddes (Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Krunoslav Katic (Senior Disaster Risk
Management Consultant); Alanna Simpson (Lead Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Maksym Dovhanovskyi
(Consultant, SCAUR)
Alejandro Eggenschwiler (Program Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Martin Schroeder
(Head of Section – Operations, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Justice and Public Administration
Zurab Adeishvili (Office of the Prosecutor General); Gizo Uglava (Acting Director, National Anti-Corruption Bureau);
Andrii Daniliuk (Head of Section of Construction and Reconstruction, State Asset Management Department, State
Judicial Administration); Anna Tyshchenko (Director of the International Disputes Department of the Ministry of
Justice)
Laura Pop (Senior Financial Sector Specialist); Iryna Shcherbyna (Senior Public Sector Specialist), David S.
Bernstein (Lead Public Sector Specialist), Vitalii Kasko (Consultant); Daniela V. Felcman (Senior Governance
Specialist); Oleksii Balabushko (Lead Governance Specialist); Klaus Decker (Senior Public Sector Specialist)
Annexes 241
Clemens Mueller (Policy Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Manfredas Limantas (Program
Manager – Justice, Anti-Corruption, and Rule of Law, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Ruta Baltause
(Deputy Team Leader, Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support
Group for Ukraine (SGUA); Markijan Zelak (Senior Adviser on Public Finance, Good Governance Team, European
Union Advisory Mission)
Land Decontamination
Dmytro Yurchuk (State Emergency Service (DSNS)); Dmytro Saltykov (State Emergency Service (DSNS)); Dmytro
Valentinovych Yurchuk, Dmytro Olegovich Saltykov
Alanna Simpson (Lead Disaster Risk Management Specialist); Zuzana Stanton-Geddes (Senior Disaster
Risk Management Specialist); Tomislav Vondracek (Demining Expert); Krunoslav Katic (Senior Disaster Risk
Management Consultant)
Alejandro Eggenschwiler (Program Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Martin Schroeder
(Head of Section – Operations, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine), Barbara Rotovnik (Program Officer,
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Macroeconomic Impact, Poverty
Tetyana Borshchenko (State Expert of the Expert Group on Socio-economic Forecasting of the Directorate of
Strategic Planning, Policy Coordination and European Integration of the Ministry of Social Policy)
Anastasia Golovach (Senior Economist); Maryna Sidarenka (Economist); Tom Bundervoet (Lead Economist);
Kristina Noelle Vaughan (Economist)
Panagiotis Stamoulis (Policy Officer, (Directorate General for Neighborhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG
NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA))); Julda Kielyte (Team Leader Directorate General for Neighborhood
and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)); Olga Chilat (Program Officer,
Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Marcus Lippold (Advisor, Directorate General for Neighborhood
and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR) Support Group for Ukraine (SGUA)) European Commission)
Social inclusion and vulnerable populations
Tetyana Borshchenko (State Expert of the Expert Group on Socio-economic Forecasting of the Directorate of
Strategic Planning, Policy Coordination and European Integration of the Ministry of Social Policy);
IDPs: Olena Kolchyk (Head of the Expert Group on Issues of Social Support of Certain Categories of the Population
of the Directorate of Targeted Social Support of the Population and Development of Social Inspection)
Gender: Nataliia Bohdanova (State Expert of the Expert Group on Combating Human Trafficking, Domestic
Violence and Gender Equality of the Directorate for the Development of Social Services and Protection of
Children’s Rights)
Disability: Roman Pylypenko (State Expert of the Expert Group on Rehabilitation of the Directorate of Social
Protection of the Rights of Persons with Disabilities of the Ministry of Social Policy)
Erik Johnson (Senior Social Development Specialist), Oleksandra Shatyrko (Social Development Specialist), Ray
Salvatore Jennings (Consultant), Olga Kupets (Consultant)
Gender: Jennifer Solotaroff (Senior Social Development Specialist), Dominik Koehler (Junior Professional Officer)
Disability: Mirjahon Turdiev (Consultant)
Martin Schroeder (Head of Section – Operations, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Tetiana Shulha
(Project Officer, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine); Mira Didukh (Project Officer – Health and Social
Policies, Delegation of the European Union to Ukraine)
Cross-cutting issues considered across chapters
Debris management: Diana Novikova (Chief Specialist of the Department of Household Waste Management
and Communal Services of the Department of Communal Services and Communal Services of the Ministry for
Communities and Territories Development); Nataliya Zaitseva (Senior Expert on Household Waste Management
of the CPR of the Ministry of Regions); Roman Stepanovych Filonenko (Deputy Director of the Department – Head
of the Environmental Safety Department of the Department for Waste Management and Environmental Safety
of the Ministry of the Environment)
Krunoslav Katic (Senior Disaster Risk Management Consultant)
242 Annexes
Data and analytical support was also coordinated by World Bank’s Data team with contributions from Keith
Patrick Garrett (Manager, DECAT), Holly Krambeck (Program Manager, DECAT), Gabriel Stefanini Vicente
(Consultant, DECAT), Claudia Calderon Machicado (Consultant, DECAT), Sahiti Sarva (Consultant, DECAT),
Oleksandra Postavnicha (IT Officer/Engineering, ITSTI), Stela Mocan (Manager, ITSTI), Robert Mansour
Harrison (IT Analyst, Business Solutions, ITSES), Rochelle Glenene O’Hagan (Senior Data Scientist, DECIS),
Benjamin P. Stewart (Senior Geographer, DECAT), Clara Ivanescu (Geographer, DECAT), Jose Manuel Delgado
Blasco (Consultant, DECAT), Andres Fernando Chamorro Elizondo (Geographer, DECAT), Benny Istanto
(Consultant, DECAT), Min Jaegal (Consultant, DECAT), Natalija Gelvanovska-Garcia (Senior Digital Development
Specialist, IDD01), Han Wang (IT Officer, Engineering, ITSTI), Chitra Balasubramanian (Consultant, DIME 4),
Maria Ruth Jones (Survey Specialist, DIME 3), Robert Andrew Marty (Research Analyst, DIME 4), Mykhailo
Kolstov (Consultant, IDD01), Nick Jones (Data Scientist, GFDRR), Sam Blackwell Heroy (Consultant, GFDRR),
and Harriet Mugera (Senior Data Scientist, DECAT). The World Bank gratefully acknowledges the support of
Laura Cline (Program Manager, US State Department, Humanitarian Information Unit) for the timely access
to satellite imagery.
Data and information were also exchanged with a range of experts from the Kyiv School of Economics:
• Overall and process coordination: Daryna Marchak, Karina Korol
• Social sphere: Inna Studennikova, Olexandra Kolomiets
• Culture, sport, tourism: Yuliya Markuts, Dmytro Andriyenko
• Transport: Taras Marshalok
• Housing, assets of enterprises, industry, utilities, administrative buildings: Dmitry Goryunov
• Education, health care: Yuri Gaidai
• Energy: Nataliya Shapoval, Denis Sakva
• Trade, malls: Max Gavryshin
• Infrastructure (Roads, Railway): Andrey Bezpyatov
• Infrastructure (Avia): Vladislav Radikovich, Alla Bykovska
• Agriculture and land resources: Roman Neyter, Natalia Shpygotska
• Municipal services: Yuriy Holynskyy