Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review
GA - Infras. and Local Dev. Project II (P151077)
Report Number: ICRR0022753
1. Project Data
Project ID Project Name
P151077 GA - Infras. and Local Dev. Project II
Country Practice Area(Lead)
Gabon Urban, Resilience and Land
L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD)
IBRD-85640 31-Jan-2021 39,535,036.10
Bank Approval Date Closing Date (Actual)
10-Dec-2015 31-Jan-2021
IBRD/IDA (USD) Grants (USD)
Original Commitment 100,000,000.00 0.00
Revised Commitment 100,000,000.00 0.00
Actual 39,535,036.10 0.00
Prepared by Reviewed by ICR Review Coordinator Group
Cynthia Nunez-Ollero J. W. van Holst Victoria Alexeeva IEGSD (Unit 4)
Pellekaan
2. Project Objectives and Components
DEVOBJ_TBL
a. Objectives
According to the Financing Agreement (FA, p. 5) and the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, paragraph 16),
the Project Development Objective (PDO) for the Infrastructure and Local Development Project II (ILDP II) in
Gabon was "to improve access to urban infrastructure and services in underserviced neighborhoods, and to
build basic capacities for municipal management in Target Cities."
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This review will assess the extent to which ILDP II achieved the PDO against the following separate
objectives:
Objective 1: "to improve access to urban infrastructure and services in underserviced neighborhoods
Objective 2: "to build basic capacities for municipal management in Target Cities"
b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
No
c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
No
d. Components
1: Improving urban infrastructure to increase access to services (US$85.5 million, including US$1.5
million for Project Preparation; revised to US$77.5 million at restructuring; US$31.5 million actual). This
component would finance infrastructure investments such as access roads, water and sanitation works,
secondary drainage systems, health centers and schools, and local markets to benefit nine cities, later
reduced to 6 cities at restructuring (Koulamoutou, Libreville, Makokou, Mouila, Port-Gentil, and Tchibanga)
and target neighborhoods and financial resources for this component were reduced accordingly.
2: Building institutional development to strengthen the capacity of the urban sector (US$10 million at
appraisal, revised to US$15.0 million at restructuring, US$4.5 million actual). This component would finance
training and technical assistance for the following segments of the urban sector:
Support local governments in establishing priority investments in city and
neighborhood development plans, updating urban master plans for communes; improving local tax
collection; and establishing municipal technical services such as asset management.
Support central government entities delivering devolved local functions through equipment and
goods, establishing systems to implement decentralization, public consultation, and preparing local
government financial management manual, conduct training to in the implementation of these
processes; and developing national urban and solid waste management strategies.
Support small and medium enterprise (SME) sector by conducting a sector assessment, training in
areas such as bid preparation, general company finances, labor intensive construction methods,
environmental and social safeguards management, social awareness responsibilities, and
establishing a professional organization.
Support civil society by hiring community facilitators, conducting training in neighborhood planning
and implementation, and designing regulation to govern the municipal - civil society relationship. In
addition, this component would finance a municipal solid waste management strategy and training in
environmental management, infrastructure implementation and communication.
3: Project management, coordination, monitoring and evaluation (M&E). (US$4.25 million at appraisal,
revised to US$7.25 million at restructuring, US$3.5 million actual). This component would finance project
coordination, supervision, financial management, procurement, M&E, communication, audits, and surveys.
Fixed costs will be shared among three simultaneously implemented Bank-financed projects implemented
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by the National Commission for Labor Intensive Small-Scale Public Infrastructure Works (Commission
Nationale des Travaux d'Interet Public pour la Promotion de l'Entreprenariat et de l'Emploi, or CN-TIPEE).
e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project Cost: The original project cost was US$100.0 million, which consisted of US$98.5 million plus
US$1.5 million for project preparation. The actual total cost was US$39.5 million.
Financing: The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) fully financed the US$100
million loan for this project. US$39.5 million was disbursed from the loan. The balance was cancelled.
Borrower Contribution: None.
Dates: The project was approved on December 10, 2015 and made effective on April 25, 2016. The Mid-
Term Review (MTR) was conducted on June 3, 2019. The project closed as planned, on January 31, 2021.
One level 2 restructuring on June 29, 2019 addressed slow progress due to the economic downturn, social
unrest, lack of government commitment, weak capacity, and procurement issues. Funds for infrastructure
investments in three cities (Franceville, Lambaréné, and Oyem) were reallocated to "finance new activities
and scale up existing ones" in the other target cities (Project Paper, paragraph 4).
Split Rating: No split rating of the outcome was undertaken in this review for the following reasons. The
PDO statement was unchanged. While the outcomes targets were revised through a restructuring in 2019,
these were revised according to the reallocation of resources. The restructuring was primarily done in
Component 1, i.e., removing infrastructure investments in three cities (Franceville, Lambaréné, and Oyem),
but retaining activities under Component 2 in all originally planned cities. The available amount (US$18
million) associated with the drop of activities under Component 1 in two cities was distributed between
Components 1, 2 and 3 (ICR, paragraphs 20, 21). Accordingly, this review will assess the extent to which
this project achieved its objectives based on the revised coverage and revised financing for six Target
Cities.
3. Relevance of Objectives
Rationale
Country Context: Gabon is a small (about 2 million people), middle income (US$10,660 income per
capita), oil-dependent country in Africa. According to the United Nations Urbanization data,
Gabon's urbanization rate increased from 79 to 88 percent in 2015, making it one of the most urbanized
countries in Africa. This urbanization took place without planning policies in place to guide the process.
Unplanned, high density settlements in flood-prone areas, unsuitable for habitation, made of makeshift
materials, on land without titles, without access to basic urban services such as storm drains, wastewater
systems, and poor mobility were features of these underserviced neighborhoods. According to the PAD,
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more than three-fourths of the urban population and 60 percent of economically disadvantaged households
live in these neighborhoods. Gabon's cities lacked infrastructure investments. The oil industry funded most
of these without following planning or budget procedures and were implemented in a haphazard manner.
The 2020 International Monetary Fund (IMF) technical assessment (also cited below) noted that the
government did not use infrastructure investment planning tools. The rapid rate of urbanization meant
increasing pressure on existing infrastructure, increasing costs to provide basic services, with limited
access for its urban residents. The government pursued decentralization (see below) but did not implement
it. Line ministries were assigned decentralized functions instead. A few large enterprises dominated the
construction sector, limiting competition. Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) had limited participation in
the sector because they were unfamiliar with procurement and sound management practices and had
minimal access to financial services. These factors generated diseconomies of scale in delivering
public services and increased costs (Systematic Country Diagnostic, 2020, paragraph 3).
Country Plans: The Emerging Gabon Strategic Plan (PSGE) was implemented beginning in 2012. This
plan established priority strategic guidelines to transform Gabon into an emerging economy by
2025. Infrastructure development was a pillar of this plan. According to the 2020 IMF assessment, public
investments grew but did not result in asset accumulation due to weaknesses in investment
planning. Multiple actors with unclear roles drew up uncoordinated investment lists that were not informed
by studies. Projects that were implemented were not supervised or monitored. A Decentralization Law was
enacted in 1994 but remained unimplemented because of three factors. One, the central government
delayed in transferring power and resources to local governments. Two, local governments had low
institutional capacity. Three, cities failed to enforce unclear urban policies such as in land use regulations
and management of public investments. By 2015 the law was promulgated. Its implementation was
anticipated to improve the capacity of cities to achieve their functional potential with better resource
allocation and more effective local government management. This project conducted studies that found
provincial capitals with substantial revenues but spent only 10–30 percent of their budgets on investments
and 54–87 percent on payrolls, indicating cities with overstaffed personnel who were inadequately
qualified to deliver services and invest in infrastructure.
World Bank Partnership Framework: The Bank conducted a Systematic Country Diagnostics in June
2020 (SCD, Report No. 150048-GA) to inform the next Country Partnership Strategy. The last one, ending
in 2016, guided appraisal. The Gabon country diagnostic found that strategic planning for urban
development, land use, and transport was lacking, ineffectual, or ignored. A New Country Partnership
Framework, under preparation would focus on two areas: promoting diversified growth and
competitiveness; and Increasing the efficiency of social programs and strengthening social protection.
Foundational and transformational policies such as improving urban management, and transparent
resource management among others, would be included in the forthcoming strategy. The project
contributed to the preparation of this strategy by providing information on how cities were investing their
resources (see above) as part of the urban sector assessment.
Prior World Bank Operations in the Country and in the Sector: This project was preceded by an earlier
phase 1 project, which closed in 2011. Phase 1 covered six provincial capitals of Libreville, Port Gentil,
Franceville, Oyem, Lambarene, and Mouila. It was built on the Bank-financed Pilot Community
Infrastructure and Capacity Strengthening Project, which focused on building community infrastructure in
selected underserved neighborhoods and supporting small and medium enterprises (SMEs) (ICR,
paragraph 57).
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Overall, the relevance of objectives is rated Substantial. The PDOs were in principle highly relevant to
both government and World Bank development strategies. The objectives were, however, limited in their
strategic contribution, namely to "improve access." This might have been compensated for by strong
indicators, but the relevance of objectives is downgraded to substantial because of weak PDO indicators,
which did not measure "improved access to urban infrastructure and services in underserviced
neighborhoods." This undermined the relevance of the PDOs to address the core development problem.
Nor were the PDO indicators strong enough to capture longer term results of the project (see Section 4
Efficacy for a discussion of the Theory of Change, and Section 9 M&E for a discussion of PDO indicators).
Rating Relevance TBL
Rating
Substantial
4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)
EFFICACY_TBL
OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
To improve access to urban infrastructure and services in underserviced neighborhoods
Rationale
Theory of Change (TOC): While there was no TOC at appraisal, a results framework provided the probable
causal logic that linked the inputs and outputs to outcomes (PAD, Annex 1). Figure 1 in the ICR provided a
reconstructed TOC based on the project's activities and results. To achieve Objective 1 inputs (embodied in
the project's activities) were to include the upgrading of roads, and other infrastructure investments such as
drainage, water, and sewerage. Outputs would be expressed as the length of improved roads, number of
needed neighborhood investments to be made, and the number of jobs to be created in target cities. These
outputs would be expected to result in giving target neighborhoods improved access to urban infrastructure
expressed as the number of additional persons who were to benefit from the infrastructure investments to be
made. This TOC did not provide sufficient detail on expected outcomes associated with "improved access"
beyond the number of beneficiaries and did not include service delivery attributes such as reliability,
adequacy, and quality. This review notes that the expected results were closer to outputs rather than
outcomes. The TOC did not indicate any assumptions that would ensure that inputs would achieve the
expected outcomes.
Outputs: The ICR reported that the project achieved the following outputs but did not provide original access
targets for some of the infrastructure investments. However, the following were mentioned.
12.10 km (original target 8.80 km, target exceeded) of non-rural roads were paved and rehabilitated in
six cities These included 1,703 m in Oyem, 2,601 m in Libreville, 1,063 m in Port-Gentil, 1,885 m in
Mouila, 1,848 m in Tchibanga, and 2,360 m in Makokou (ICR, paragraph 38 - all units for road
length should have been meters in this paragraph).
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1,097 meters (no target provided) of a water drainage canal was constructed in Port Gentil
Outcomes:
The completed all-season roads benefitted 18,301 people within a 500 meter range (original target
21,000, target almost achieved). An additional 10,000 people (original target 23,000, target partially
achieved) were provided with access to other infrastructure services. According to the Bank Task
Team, these infrastructure services were drainage, water, and sewerage. Direct beneficiaries
numbered 44,604 persons (original target 44,000, target achieved). 49 percent (original target 48
percent, target achieved) of these direct beneficiaries were female. The Bank Task Team did not
clarify how the number of beneficiaries was calculated. As noted in the TOC, these indicators were
more at the output than at the outcome level and did not capture the economic and social
development impact of the project.
The ICR stated that infrastructure investments contributed to reducing urban poverty (but without
evidence) by providing a better access to urban infrastructure and services (expressed as
beneficiaries of the roads and drainage above) to improve living and health conditions (without
evidence) of the poor. The ICR also asserted that project interventions contributed to reducing the
gap in service delivery between wealthy and low-income neighborhoods but again without supporting
evidence (ICR, paragraph 55).
Overall, the infrastructure investments were completed, as planned. However, since the Theory of Change
did not include any indicators on the extent to which equal access to services in underserved neighborhoods
was achieved or improved, no evidence was reported along these lines in the ICR. The efficacy with which
the project achieved Objective 1 is therefore rated Modest.
Rating
Modest
OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
To build basic capacities for municipal management in Target Cities
Rationale
Theory of Change (TOC): As noted earlier the PAD was not required to present a TOC, but a results
framework established the probable causal link between inputs and outputs to project outcomes (PAD, Annex
1). Figure 1 in the ICR provided an ex post reconstruction of the TOC. Objective 2 would contribute to the
government’s decentralization efforts by strengthening the institutional, planning, technical, financial, and
management capacity of the target cities to execute decentralized service delivery (PAD, paragraph 29).
However, the TOC at closing did not address this aspect of the objective. Instead, training and technical
assistance inputs were designed to strengthen the municipal management capacity of the following four sets
of stakeholders: (i) local governments, (ii) the central government agencies with devolved local functions;
(iii) civil society, and (iv) the small and medium scale enterprise (SME) sector. Capacity building activities
directed at the SME sector were expected to lead to an assessment of the SME sector and create jobs
using labor-intensive contracts for investments planned as part of achieving Objective 1 above. Inputs
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directed at local government entities were expected to lead to improved city and neighborhood development
plans, urban master plans, improved revenue and tax collection systems, and the establishment of municipal
services such as asset management. Inputs directed at central government entities were expected to lead to
plans for training in municipal management; rules and procedures on decentralization; a local government
financial management manual, a feasibility study on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, and national strategies
for the urban and solid waste management sectors. Inputs directed at civil society were expected to lead to
the hiring of facilitators to help neighborhoods use participatory and transparent means to develop plans and
implement investment priorities and to promote accountability through collaboration mechanisms between
local governments and civil society organizations. Outcomes would be expressed as improvement in
municipal finance, expressed in turn as the number of cities with an increase in own-source revenues. They
would be the cities that have implemented asset management plans sub-projects with post-project
arrangements such as community engagement or with provisions for operations and maintenance (O&M).
The TOC did not mention how activities directed at central government entities with devolved local functions
would contribute to the implementation of the decentralization law, or assumptions required to ensure that
inputs and outputs would achieve the expected outcomes.
Outputs:
A new National Urban Development Strategy was not developed as targeted. Instead, the
project developed urban planning tools such as Local Development Plans (LDPs), Neighborhood
Development Plans (NDPs), and Urban Master Plans for communes.
Decentralized ministerial services and civil society received various trainings and technical support
related to the implementation of decentralization laws (ICR, paragraph 54) without describing what this
support entailed. The capacity building benefited 778 people, including 160 women (20.57%), bringing
the total number of beneficiaries to 44,604 people, according to information provided to IEG by the
Bank Task Team.
The project did not implement training plans in the municipalities as planned. Instead other capacity
building activities were carried out for municipal staff such as a structural audit of municipal staff,
computer equipment for the Municipal Technical Units, training workshops on the use of NDPs,
trained stakeholders responsible for monitoring, maintenance, and governance of neighborhood
infrastructure assets. 108 participants attended the NDP training sessions, including 24 women
or 22 percent of the participants (ICR, paragraph 41).
No targets were provided for the following outputs (ICR, paragraph 40).
o Municipalities with identified sub-projects in their Local Development Plans to be managed and
maintained by each beneficiary commune. The ICR was unclear if this achievement referred to
the 40 percent of sub-projects (original target 85 percent) or the 12 of 36 sub-projects (or
33 percent) that had post project completion mechanisms (ICR, Table 3). There was no
explanation for the difference between the 40 and the 33 percent achieved.
o 10 NDP reports were prepared for the North zone: Libreville (4), Oyem (2), Makokou (2),
Lambaréné (2)
o 11 NDP reports were prepared for the South zone: Port Gentil (3), Franceville (2), Mouila (2),
Koula-Moutou (2), Tchibanga (2)
6 community facilitators were recruited, including 3 women (original target 48 percent recruited from
female community, target achieved at 50%) (ICR, paragraph 52).
184,050 (target 902,000, target not met) person days of jobs were created (ICR, Annex 4, paragraph
9).
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Outcomes:
None of the target cities (baseline 0, original target 8, revised target 5) increased their own source of
revenues.
All target cities signed city contracts, with objectives that applied to managing infrastructure assets but
only 1 (original target 8, revised target 5, target not achieved) - Port-Gentil - had an asset
management plan but It was not implemented.
Community and civil society organizations were not involved in implementing social safeguards as
envisioned at project appraisal (ICR, paragraph 68). Elsewhere, community-based organizations were
involved in the implementation of activities (ICR, paragraph 55), but then, the lack of involvement of
communities and municipalities hampered ownership of the project (ICR, paragraph 97). Insufficient
attention was paid to women’s participation in neighborhood development committees and other
community development processes as specified in the PAD. No impact assessment or final
satisfaction survey was carried out to assess the impact of the project on women (ICR, paragraph
53). According to an exchange between IEG and the Bank Task Team, the project was unable to
ensure women's participation in all aspects of the program, or disseminate information to women;
use gender sensitive approaches and methods corresponding to local conditions (place, timing,
facilitation techniques, etc.), or support training on gender awareness.
Overall, the efficacy with which the project has achieved Objective 2 is rated Modest. The meager capacity
building efforts introduced some enhancement of municipal management capacity but did not achieve
the targets at closing that reflected strengthened capacity. There was also no assessment in the ICR of the
expected institutional capacity improvements resulting from this project. However, the Bank Task Team
provided IEG with the following additional information. In the Project Identification Document (PID) of the
follow-on project, the Gabon Urban Development Project (P177372) under preparation in January 2022, the
following positive outcomes of the ILDP 2 were cited: "8 provincial capital cities elaborated on their urban
master plans and local development plans in 4 of those cities, as well as 19 neighborhood development plans
in 9 provincial capitals with at least 2 in each city" (PID, p. 6) as evidence of a modest improvement in
capacity. This additional information provided the basis for rating the expected achievement of institutional
capacity building by the project as "Modest."
Rating
Modest
OVERALL EFF TBL
OBJ_TBL
OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
The overall efficacy with which the project achieved its objectives is rated Modest. Two infrastructure
investments achieved their construction targets (Objective 1) but the efficacy with which the
project achieved its objectives is rated Modest because of the lack of indicators on which to provide evidence
for improved infrastructure services in poor neighborhoods. The ICR claimed that project interventions
reduced the gap in service delivery between wealthy and low-income neighborhoods but without evidence.
None of the capacity building outcome targets (Objective 2) were met at closing although one output target
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was met. Nevertheless, the Bank Task Team provided IEG with additional evidence (derived from formal
Bank documents prepared for the follow-on project) that there was clear evidence of institutional capacity
improvements in urban planning, local development planning, and neighborhood planning in all 9 cities. The
efficacy of the project to achieve the second objective is therefore also rated Modest. Since the efficacy with
which the project achieved both objectives is Modest, the overall efficacy of the project is rated Modest due to
measurable but nevertheless low achievement.
Overall Efficacy Rating Primary Reason
Modest Low achievement
5. Efficiency
Economic Efficiency: At appraisal, economic analysis applied only to the initially identified road infrastructure
investments using the World Bank's Road Economic Decision (RED) model which, as the ICR states quantifies
time-savings and reduced vehicle maintenance cost from road upgrading, based on traffic counts, and the
expected evolution in traffic patterns. The PAD noted that for 8.8 km of investments already determined (in
Libreville, Port-Gentil, and Oyem), with an expected investment cost of US$13.3 million, the Net Present Value
(NPV) of these roads was estimated at US$3.1 million using a 12 percent cost of capital as the discount rate.
The economic rate of return (ERR) was estimated at 15.2 percent (PAD, paragraph 47). The team estimated
that other investments under this project could have ERRs of 28 percent similar to those achieved under the
preceding ILDP I project (PAD, paragraph 48) but no evidence was provided.
At closing two approaches were adopted for ex post economic analysis in Annex 4 of the ICR, namely (a) a re-
run of the RED model for some of the roads constructed during the project; and (b) a cost-comparison per km
of road constructed. The ICR states that the results were as follows:
Road Economic Decision Model. The ex post analysis assuming a discount rate of 6% using the RED
model for the roads appraised and built during the project in Libreville and Port Gentil generated an NPV
of US$5.38 million. According to the ICR the ERR for the roads in Libreville was surprisingly high at
greater than 100% and surprisingly low at 7% for Port Gentil (ICR, Annex, Table 5). However, the Bank
Task Team confirmed that they could not replicate the RED analysis used at appraisal and for the ICR,
and no car counting was attempted at completion.
Cost-Comparison of Road Construction. As the ICR noted this analysis was a cost-comparison of the
construction cost estimated at appraisal (US$1.65 million per km) with the actual cost per km of roads
completed at the closing date (US$1.13 million per km). However, if the unit costs at appraisal and at
project completion are compared against the cost of only the additional roads considered as part of this
project they are almost the same (respectively US$1.65 per km and US$1.68 per km) (ICR, Annex 4,
Table 6).
IEG Comments on the Economic Analysis. An ex-ante analysis re-run of the RED analysis based on the
assumptions drawn from the project at appraisal with only the actual cost per km of the investments and a
discount rate of 6 percent was not a reliable basis for assessing the actual efficiency of this project compared
with the appraisal assessment. The ex ante/ex post cost comparisons of a non-random sample of project roads
are unreliable, as measures of efficiency without a validated benchmark for the unit cost and therefore provides
little information on relative efficiency. In an exchange between IEG and the Bank Task Team, it also became
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clear that in replicating the RED analysis for the ICR it was impossible to re-use the model or fine tune it, and in
addition no car counts were attempted at the end of the project.
Administrative and Operational Efficiency: Factors outside the control of the project reduced its operational
efficiency, including overall economic slowdown (since 2016), exchange rate losses (February 2018 to June
2020), as well as political and social unrest. The weak institutional arrangements, poor coordination among line
ministries, and ineffective supervision mechanisms by the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) reduced operational
efficiency and delayed implementation. Nevertheless, actual costs of road rehabilitation were significantly lower
than estimated at appraisal because road work was easier in secondary, less densely populated cities, which
reduced unit costs considerably. However, 60 percent of the loan was cancelled. The stalled reform process and
deficient institutional arrangements and supervision mechanisms hampered the initial project activities,
resulting in serious delays. The
design did not properly account for the administrative resistance to institutional change at the central and local
levels, as described by the ICR (paragraph 46). Initial contracting and disbursements were delayed. Several
deliverables were cancelled, initially due to procurement issues (see Section 10, Procurement below) and later
due to the approaching project closing date. The core problem was that the PIU was not accustomed to
implementing project components beyond infrastructure investments. It was also inexperienced in mobilizing
community participation and in implementing Grievance Redress Mechanisms (see Section 10 of this review).
The capacity of the PIU was further strained because it was simultaneously implementing four Bank-financed
projects. Mitigating measures to address these issues such as hiring of additional staff were delayed. According
to the ICR, high level government support was absent to address these administrative challenges and "there
was insufficient coordination between the PIU and the Ministry of Economy (MoE), and among the different line
ministries; a steering committee was established but did not fulfill its intended role".(ICR, paragraph 62).
Restructuring and proposed corrective measures to address delays encountered administrative resistance to
institutional change at the central and local government levels. In addition, the simultaneous conduct of the MTR
and restructuring proved time consuming (ICR, paragraph 65). Restructuring after the MTR did not improve
project efficiency. To summarize, the key reason for the project's low administrative and operational efficiency
was the lack of adequate capacity in project management, notably the chronic understaffing and
underqualification of the PIU at national and local levels.
Overall, this review rates the project's efficiency as Negligible. The project was complex and the organizational
arrangement did not match its complexity. The participation processes were unrealized. Delays in hiring
qualified dedicated staff were chronic problems. There were also delays in processing disbursements and
prolonged processes associated with approving project documents. Risks were not adequately identified and
mitigating actions were insufficient. Government commitment was not evident in efforts to address
implementation delays.
Efficiency Rating
Negligible
a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal
and the re-estimated value at evaluation:
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Rate Available? Point value (%) *Coverage/Scope (%)
0
Appraisal 0
Not Applicable
0
ICR Estimate 0
Not Applicable
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.
6. Outcome
The relevance of objective is rated Substantial on the basis that the operation remained relevant to the
government’s decentralization efforts and the World Bank’s development strategy in Gabon during
implementation. The efficacy with which the project achieved the first objective is rated Modest because, while
road construction was achieved, the extent to which access to infrastructure services in underserviced
neighborhoods was achieved lacked indicators and no evidence were provided. The efficacy with which the
project achieved the second objective is also rated Modest because the Bank Task Team reported modest
outcomes in institutional capacity after closing and cited in the Project Identification Document (PID) for the
follow-on project. Overall efficacy is rated Modest because of low achievement. The project had major
shortcomings in efficiency and its overall outcome is therefore rated Unsatisfactory.
a. Outcome Rating
Unsatisfactory
7. Risk to Development Outcome
The following pose risks to the limited infrastructure development outcomes achieved under the project:
Sustainability of Investments - Completed infrastructure investments made by the project were
designed to be supported by O&M institutions whose capacity had been enhanced by the capacity
building components of the project. City contracts also contained O&M provisions. Neighborhood
Development Plans would be governed by contracts between cities and neighborhoods to delegate
O&M in infrastructure investments made in these neighborhoods. Community participation in
planning, implementing and monitoring investments were meant to strengthen ownership, use
investments wisely, and cover O&M needs of these investments. Most of these capacity building
targets were not achieved. Corrective measures proposed at MTR to ease the pressure on the
agency implementing four Bank-financed projects simultaneously remained unaddressed and led to
cancelling 60 percent of the remaining funds. Training and capacity building were not fully
implemented. A high risk remains that the infrastructure investments at the municipal and the
neighborhood levels may not be sustained in the long run.
Government commitment to the technical design of the project. The government committed to
restart decentralization by promulgating the law through this project. The project called for
strengthening institutional capacities both at the local and at the central government levels. This
project would help lay the groundworks for political and fiscal decentralization. The commitment of the
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government to this technical design also called for institutionalizing the O&M arrangements and
installing asset management at the local level. Continuing weakness at the local level, economic
constraints from competing needs to address the pandemic, and unclear autonomy of local entities
under the decentralization law pose high risk to the government's commitment to implementing the
technical design of this project.
8. Assessment of Bank Performance
a. Quality-at-Entry
The project was strategically relevant to the country's decentralization efforts and followed Phase 1
(appraised on April 4, 2005; closed on December 31, 2011). At its completion, Phase 1 outcome was
rated Moderately Satisfactory. The performance of the implementing agency Permanent Secretariat of
the National Commission for the Labor Intensive Small-Scale Public Infrastructure Works (Commission
Nationale des Travaux d'Interet Public pour la Promotion de l'Entreprenariat et de l'Emploi, or CN-
TIPPEE) was rated Satisfactory. This same agency would implement this project together with three
other Bank-financed projects (Access to Basic Services in Rural Areas and Capacity Building Project
(P144135), Gabon Statistical Development Project (P157473) and e-Gabon (P132824). The Ministry of
Economy (MOE), led the steering committee that included line technical ministries such as urban
planning and infrastructure. Lessons from Phase 1 were captured in design (PAD, paragraphs 33-37)
including: participatory approach to foster transparency and accountability, use of contracts to delegate
the O&M of completed neighborhood investments; and capacity support for SMEs to create labor
intensive public works in the construction sector started in Phase 1.
Phase 2 originally expanded the geographic coverage from 6 to 9 cities; quadrupled the loan amount;
and introduced municipal contracts between the national and local governments to define terms of
engagement in exchange for the infrastructure investments made such as consultative budget and
planning processes, increasing own-source revenues, and maintaining investments (ICR,
paragraph 58). The substantial implementation risk due to limited capacity (PAD, paragraph 46) was
mitigated by more diverse capacity building activities, hiring additional dedicated staff, introducing city
contracts, and requiring citizen participation. Degree of isolation, access to basic services, housing
density and typology, and health conditions were criteria used to target participating
neighborhoods. However, M&E design lacked baseline data (poverty, access, urban dynamics, trends)
and feasibility studies for some activities. Cities were not selected based on needs or implementation
capacities to determine relevance and realism of scope (ICR, paragraph 59). No additional studies were
launched to assess the choice of cities to inform redesign before implementation. The ICR (paragraph
81) indicated that the CN-TIPPEE did not have experience implementing complex projects beyond basic
service delivery and favored familiar local infrastructure and SME support activities over new,
unfamiliar, capacity building activities. Readiness to implement was poorly assessed. Deficient technical
design inputs were attributed to a lack of ownership by the lead institution and a lack of technical ministry
involvement. Funding needs were miscalculated because costs were overestimated. Implementation was
delayed (ICR, paragraph 80, see below).
Overall, the project's quality at entry was Moderately Unsatisfactory due to significant shortcomings
particularly the serious lack of technical and institutional readiness of the project for implementation, poor
M&E design, and overestimated sub-project costs that, when excessive financing was not cancelled in a
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timely manner, it may have represented an opportunity cost that could not be recouped to the benefit of
the borrower.
Quality-at-Entry Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory
b. Quality of supervision
The World Bank conducted 10 (reported in the Data Sheet but 15 in the text of the ICR, paragraph 83)
supervision missions over the 5-year implementation period. In their email to IEG on February 23, 2022,
the World Bank Task Team confirmed 15 supervision and technical field missions, including safeguards-
dedicated missions. Four Task Team Leaders (TTLs) managed the project over its lifecycle, based in West
Africa or in Washington, DC supported by a core team of procurement, financial management, safeguards,
and communication specialists based in Gabon and Cameroon. The Mid Term Review (MTR) was
conducted, although reportedly leaving insufficient time to carry out corrective measures before the project
closed (ICR, paragraph 65). Dedicated project staff including a project coordinator, a senior procurement
specialist, a social development specialist, and a monitoring and evaluation (M&E) expert were
recommended but were either not hired or were hired but only after the MTR. The Bank team delivered
technical assistance on safeguards compliance. The team also supported the PIU with training workshops
in technical areas, e.g., engineering, procurement, contract management, financial management and
reporting, risk management and audit, monitoring of projects, ethics, and integrity in public procurement
(ICR, paragraph 83). The suggested measures identified at restructuring to improve quality control, and to
avoid project-site accidents were too late (ICR, paragraph 86). There were several factors associated with
the project's implementation that were outside the Bank's control. These included the implementation
arrangement that led to internal disagreements between the National Commission for Labor Intensive
Small-Scale Public Infrastructure Works (CN-TIPPEE) and the Ministry of Economy, according to the Bank
Task Team, which complicated efforts to implement the team's recommendations to address delays.
Overall the ICR exposed moderate shortcomings in the proactive identification of opportunities and
resolution of threats. The arrangements made to train and support PIU staff remained insufficient. The
Bank Task Team provided IEG with additional information on February 23, 2022, that specific capacity
training was delivered in May 2018, March 2019, January 2020, plus an additional South-South exchange
of best practices between the Republic of Congo and the CN-TIPPEE on the use of STEP and contract
management. The project's fiduciary weaknesses (as assessed in Section 5 above) remained
considerable. The Bank team explained that the government was strongly opposed to restructuring, and
that the team was grateful for the support received from the Bank's Country Management Unit in
convincing the government to agree to a belated restructuring and eventual cancellation of funds (ICR,
paragraphs 85 and 87). There was a failure to strengthen the M&E design at restructuring. The quality of
supervision is therefore rated Moderately Satisfactory.
The overall Bank performance is rated Moderately Unsatisfactory.
Quality of Supervision Rating
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Moderately Satisfactory
Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory
9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization
a. M&E Design
The project's objectives were clearly stated but vaguely defined ("improve access") with weak
indicators. The results framework indicated achievements needed to reach the objective of providing basic
services in underserved neighborhoods. Outcomes in infrastructure were attributable to the project
interventions, expressed as the number of beneficiaries. Limiting outcome indicators to the number of
beneficiaries was not, however, sufficient to capture aspects of service delivery such as reliability, quality,
and adequacy of services, time savings, etc.). Such indicators would be useful in the long-term to show
whether the development problem had been addressed by the project. Indicators were specific,
measurable, achievable, and relevant to the problems being addressed by the project. Four sets of
outcome indicators were supposed to match the four sectors being strengthened. The indicators did not
encompass all possible outcomes for the PDO. A baseline survey was to be conducted. Local
Development Committees would collect M&E data. Communities were to submit progress in road
implementation to the PIU. At the MTR, a beneficiary satisfaction survey and an impact assessment would
be carried out and repeated at closing (PAD, paragraph 43). The outcome targets in the Results
Framework were revised at restructuring to reduce geographic coverage and reallocate resources among
the remaining target areas without reducing the project's ambition. CN-TIPPEE would have a field
presence in the various target cities to monitor construction works and safeguards compliance. City
contracts were to be monitored annually. The indicators were relevant and time bound although some
indicators were missed such as those related to building SMEs capacity to participate in the construction
sector and outcomes associated with strengthened capacity of central entities delivering devolved
services.
b. M&E Implementation
The M&E was to be implemented by the CN-TIPPEE (the PIU). The M&E system was not implemented
as designed. The beneficiary surveys and impact assessments were not carried out as planned. Local
Development Committees did not collect field reports. CN-TIPPEE had insufficient quality control
resulting in inconsistencies in fiduciary and technical reports (ICR, paragraph 27). There is also no
indication that M&E functions would be sustained after project closing. Beneficiaries did not participate
as planned in implementation. The Bank Task Team clarified that they used other sources of information
such as field work site reports (ICR, paragraph 71), occasional monitoring reports submitted during
Implementation Support Missions and presentations during monthly follow-up phone calls to the
implementing entity.
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c. M&E Utilization
Data that were available from the M&E system were not used to inform stakeholders of the project's
progress and achievements. Dialogues, and other field reports were used to inform the MTR and project
outcomes. According to the Task Team, M&E was not regularly conducted but occasionally the Task
Team received progress reports that were not in very good condition during Implementation Support
Missions. The Bank Task Team scheduled monthly calls where the implementing entity would present
updates but not many were shared with the Task Team. Even after restructuring, progress reports were
prepared against the original PAD indicators and did not exclude the output indicator dropped at
restructuring (ICR, paragraph 71) The PIU showed limited commitment to implementing Component 2
activities of the results framework. Concerns regarding the quality of monitoring project indicators were
raised with the PIU but remained unaddressed throughout implementation.
Overall, there were severe shortcomings in M&E design, implementation, and consequently little
information that could be utilized to guide or inform the project's implementation. The quality of M&E for
this project is therefore rated Negligible.
M&E Quality Rating
Negligible
10. Other Issues
a. Safeguards
Environmental Safeguards. This project was classified as a Category "B" because most of the project
activities may induce moderate adverse environmental impacts, of limited significance or magnitude, but
manageable and easily mitigated. The project triggered one environmental safeguard: OP/PB 4.01
Environmental Assessment; Exact project locations would be determined during implementation and an
Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) was prepared,
Social Safeguards: The project triggered two social safeguards OP/PB 4.11 Physical Cultural Resources;
and OP/PB 4.12 Involuntary Resettlement. A Resettlement Policy Framework (RPF), and a Grievance
Redress Mechanism (GRM) were prepared. The RPF addressed possible relocation of residents due to
anticipated excavation and demolition works and possible land acquisition and investment specific
Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) for known sites were disclosed. The ESMF, ESIAs, and ESMPs included
guidance and procedures for chance finds of physical cultural resources. The GRM addressed about 90
percent of 83 complaints at closing. Cash compensation for loss of income, crops, or portions of land during
implementation were distributed to 447 Project Affected Persons (PAPs) or around 313 households.
Compliance with Bank safeguards policies was characterized by insufficient site safety measures, the
recurrence of accidents on sites, and the failure to follow accident reporting procedures (ICR, paragraph
68). Over a period of 1 1/2 years (between March 2019 and October 2020), the project reported 26
accidents, with a range of security classification from indicative to serious. The project triggered the filing of
the Environmental and Social Incident Response Toolkit (ESIRT) twice with information shared with senior
Bank management. The incident reports noted that the lack of coordination/communication on accidents,
preliminary risk level analysis, on-site information, and safety equipment caused the accidents (ICR,
paragraph 77). A Safeguards Corrective Action Plan (SCAP) was developed for the project, in collaboration
with the PIU, and updated throughout the project cycle (ICR, paragraph 84). Community and civil society
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organizations were not involved in project implementation as envisioned at project appraisal, and gender
issues were not systematically considered (ICR, paragraph 68). At closing, with safeguards partially
implemented, compliance was rated Moderately Unsatisfactory (ICR, paragraph 73).
b. Fiduciary Compliance
Financial Management. Weaknesses in the internal control system were pervasive in the project's
financial management. These included delays in justifying advances made in the Designated Account,
maintaining previous balances in third parties’ accounts, and shortcomings in the budget planning and
monitoring (ICR, paragraph 76). Supporting documents for the December 2019 review which uncovered
potential irregular expenses worth over US$ 3.5 million (1 865 014 760 XAF) were delayed. Financial
management was rated Unsatisfactory and the residual risk substantial.
Procurement. Procurement performance at closing was rated unsatisfactory (ICR, paragraph 77). The
project lacked procurement planning. The PIU did not monitor or enforce contracts leading
to noncompliance with deadlines, delays in contract execution; budget overruns, and complaints from
contractors. The institutional set up (PIU and MOE) and poor coordination with line ministries led to early
contracting and disbursement processing delays. The PIU capacity to take complex decisions in a timely
fashion, manage high value contracts, resolve disputes, and mitigate project-site accidents was
overestimated. Insufficient contract management due diligence resulted in ineligible expenditures. Payment
of contract amendments were met with issues. Renewal of personnel contracts was delayed. A number of
contracts were cancelled. The PIU resisted the use of the Systematic Tracking of Exchanges in
Procurement (STEP) platform and did not update the platform at closing. The PIU disregarded the MTR
recommendation to hire two contract management firms to support the implementation of infrastructure
activities and compliance with safeguards measures (ICR, paragraph 67). This delayed the completion of
infrastructure investments and led to the cancellation of US$2.5 million for institutional strengthening
studies.
c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
---
d. Other
---
11. Ratings
Reason for
Ratings ICR IEG
Disagreements/Comment
Negligible efficiency resulted in
Moderately
Outcome Unsatisfactory an Unsatisfactory overall
Unsatisfactory
outcome.
Moderately Moderately
Bank Performance
Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
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M&E design was ineffective,
implementation weak,
Quality of M&E Modest Negligible information that was generated
was not used to inform project
management decisions.
Quality of ICR --- Substantial
12. Lessons
The ICR (paragraphs 92-97) provided 6 lessons from the project's experience. The following lessons
are emphasized because they may be of interest for similar projects. The text is based on the
ICR with some adaptation of language.
1. Project design is improved if informed by baseline studies, up-to-date information on
context, in-depth assessments of implementation capacity, and readiness to
implement. This project introduced new institutional arrangements (city and neighborhood
contracts) that were over-ambitious. Targets were uninformed by baseline studies and
assessments of feasibility usually carried out at appraisal were not prepared. Without these
studies and assessments, implementation was hampered because resources were
misallocated due to decisions made without information on issues such as the current status
of local capacity. The project was restructured in an attempt to address design
discrepancies, make targets more realistic, strengthen quality control obligations of the
implementing entity and address recurring project site accidents but there was too little time
left to implement the recommended corrective measures.
2. Adequate assessment of the project's readiness to implement helps to identify
challenges that the project may face during implementation. This project lacked
adequate project management capacity. The PIU was simultaneously implementing four
Bank-financed projects and was chronically understaffed and underqualified at national and
local levels. The institutional arrangements were not ready for implementation at the time of
project effectiveness. Technical design of the infrastructure investments were still subject to
review and construction specifications were not ready for invitations to bid to be issued at the
time of Board approval. Procurement timelines were underestimated. The lack of project
management capacity negatively impacted the operation from safeguards compliance to
procurement efficiency. The PIU disregarded some key MTR recommendations, such as the
hiring of a contract management firm and an independent monitor to address lack of
staff. An independent verification agent would have fostered transparency and strengthened
the M&E system to generate credibly verified outputs and outcomes, The lack of staff led to
further delays in completing infrastructure investments, and in cancelling US$2.5 million for
studies planned for the institutional strengthening component. Finally, the PIU had a limited
commitment to manage the results framework and implement the M&E system as
designed. Identifying factors that signal lack of readiness to implement may in future focus
attention on mitigation measures such as specific technical assistance, the use of third party
monitoring or contract management support.
3. Government leadership that provides high level support to implementation
arrangements and maintaining lines of communication among various government
actors can enhance project implementation efficiency. In this project, delays resulted
from lengthy sub-project approval processes, lack of coordination between the PIU and the
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Ministry of Economy, and among the different line ministries, and a steering committee that
did not fulfill its intended functions. Miscommunication and lack of information sharing
between the PIU and the Ministry of Economy led to internal disagreements, made working
relations difficult, and delayed timely adoption of corrective measures to improve project
performance. In addition, such lines of communication may assist in safeguards
compliance, such as having Grievance Redress Mechanisms at the local level to rapidly
respond to issues on site.
4. Community participation in project planning, implementation, and monitoring is a
useful strategy to enhance stakeholder ownership. Other World Bank-assisted projects
have pointed to the benefits of community involvement and consultative processes from
project design to implementation to M&E. This project did not have an opportunity to optimize
the consultative process that was built into the capacity building component of the project.
The limited implementation of consultative processes in this project highlighted the potential
benefit of involving stakeholders in project design and implementation.
13. Assessment Recommended?
No
14. Comments on Quality of ICR
The ICR provided an overview of the project operations and followed the guidelines although it was not as
concise as it could have been and it exceeded the number of recommended pages (28 versus 15). Ratings and
the performance narrative followed the guidelines except for the rating of Section 9, M&E. The performance
story was direct, and informed by the operation. The report had logical links and integrated the various parts of
the report. The report was candid and highlighted the lack of readiness to implement. The project's inputs were
plausibly linked to the infrastructure investments under the first objective, noting that these outputs represented
the outcomes of this first objective.
The report focused on what occurred and did not occur as a result of the project, and offered the operational
experience as a learning tool. Lessons were based on evidence in the ICR. But, the quality of evidence on
many matters in the ICR could not be readily established because sources were not referenced. However, the
Bank Task Team clarified that other sources such as occasional reports submitted during missions,
presentations made by the PIU during follow-up phone calls to the Bank Task Team supplemented formal
reporting in the project. Lessons were linked to the narrative, and ratings and were based on the analysis of the
evidence provided by the specific experience and findings of the project. However, the efficiency analysis in the
ICR was poorly conducted, particularly with regard to the use of the RED model analysis for the road
investments. The Bank Task Team provided additional information in its February 23, 2022 email to IEG to
highlight their efforts at supervision to improve project implementation.
Given the gaps in evidence, the quality of the ICR is rated "Substantial" but only marginally so.
a. Quality of ICR Rating
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Substantial
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