Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) Implementation Completion Report (ICR) Review
Naghlu Hydropower Rehabilitation Project (P132944)
Report Number: ICRR0023515
1. Project Data
Project ID Project Name
P132944 Naghlu Hydropower Rehabilitation Project
Country Practice Area(Lead)
Afghanistan Energy & Extractives
L/C/TF Number(s) Closing Date (Original) Total Project Cost (USD)
TF-A1691 30-Sep-2022 21,011,924.83
Bank Approval Date Closing Date (Actual)
14-Dec-2015 31-Mar-2024
IBRD/IDA (USD) Grants (USD)
Original Commitment 83,000,000.00 83,000,000.00
Revised Commitment 22,592,422.68 22,592,422.68
Actual 21,011,924.83 21,011,924.83
Prepared by Reviewed by ICR Review Coordinator Group
Ihsan Kaler Hurcan Kishore Laxmikant Ramachandra Jammi IEGSD (Unit 4)
Nadkarni
2. Project Objectives and Components
DEVOBJ_TBL
a. Objectives
According to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) Grant Agreement (p.4) dated January 19,
2016, the project objective was “to improve dam safety and sustainability of hydropower, and to increase the
supply of domestically generated hydroelectricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.”
According to the Project Appraisal Document (PAD, p.8) dated November 22, 2015, the project objective was
“to improve dam safety and to increase the supply of electricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.” The
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objective in the PAD did not include the sustainability of hydropower, and its formulation was slightly different
without a major material difference.
At the only project restructuring on June 30,2021, the project objective was revised to read similar to the
project objective in the PAD, and the Darunta Hydropower Plant was added: “to improve dam safety, and to
increase the supply of electricity at the Naghlu and Darunta Hydropower Plants.”
As agreed between the Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) and the World Bank’s South Asia Region, this
review will conduct a split assessment of the project performance for the periods before and after the
Taliban’s takeover of power in the country in August 2021. Furthermore, the revision of the project objectives
requires a split assessment of the project performance before and after the revision. Since there was no
disbursement after the revision of the project objectives between the project restructuring in June 2021 and
the Taliban takeover in August 2021, this review will assess the project’s performance based on the parsing of
the project objective as follows:
Before the Taliban takeover in August 2021:
Objective 1: to improve dam safety and sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Objective 2: to increase the supply of domestically generated hydroelectricity at the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant.
After the Taliban takeover in August 2021:
Objective 1: to improve dam safety at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Objective 2: to increase the supply of electricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Objective 3: to improve dam safety at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Objective 4: to increase the supply of electricity at the Darunta Hydropower Plant.
b. Were the project objectives/key associated outcome targets revised during implementation?
Yes
Did the Board approve the revised objectives/key associated outcome targets?
No
c. Will a split evaluation be undertaken?
Yes
d. Components
The project consisted of three components:
A. Mechanical, Electrical, and Electromechanical Works. (Appraisal cost: US$30.00 million including
physical and price contingencies of 25 percent; revised cost at project restructuring: US$35.00 million
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including the addition of the Darunta Hydropower Plant dam rehabilitation to the project scope at the project
restructuring in June 2021 (see Revised Components below); actual cost as of August 15, 2021: US$12.71
million; the cancelled amount was US$22.29 million)
This component consisted of two subcomponents for the rehabilitation of the electrical and
electromechanical parts of the power plant that could not be completed under the Emergency Power
Rehabilitation Project (EPRP, P083908), which closed in March 2013.
A.1. Rehabilitation of Unit 1 and Balance of Plant. The Naghlu Hydropower Plant has four Francis
turbines each with a generation capacity of 23.5 megawatt (MW) totaling 94 MW. The EPRP financed the
rehabilitation of three units but could not complete the rehabilitation of Unit 1. Under this subcomponent, the
project was to finance the rehabilitation of the electrical and electromechanical parts of Unit 1 (such as
repair or replacement of the bent rotor shaft) and the associated supporting and/or auxiliary components
(balance of plant).
A.2. Enhancing Maintenance of the Powerhouse. This subcomponent was to finance the provision of
spare parts and consumables, operations and maintenance equipment, and the construction of related
warehouses to enhance the operation and maintenance of other three units (2, 3, and 4) of the powerplant,
which had not been maintained for an extended period.
B. Dam Safety and Power Generation Improvement. (Appraisal cost: US$33.00 million including physical
and price contingencies of 25 percent; revised cost at project restructuring: US$27.00 million; actual cost as
of August 15, 2021: US$0.57 million, the cancelled amount was US$26.43 million)
This component consisted of two subcomponents:
B.1. Dam Safety Audit and Safety improvement Measures. This subcomponent was to finance activities
to improve the safety of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam, such as the audit of the dam’s structural and
operational safety, reactivation of the bottom outlet, improvement of head gates closing systems, clearance
of unexploded ordnance from the dam structure, studies on hydrological and seismic data, flood routing
including spilling arrangements, implementation of dam safety plans, and identification of sustainable
sediment management.
B.2. Optimization of Power Generation. This subcomponent was to finance the feasibility of various
options to optimize power generation, such as appropriate dam operation and dam management, additional
storage upstream of the dam (the current dam was insufficient; therefore, the power plant was generating
electricity most like a run-of-river powerplant), additional mechanisms for controlled flushing of sediments
that had been preventing some units to generate electricity, raising the dam crest, and catchment area
treatment. This subcomponent, the cost of which was estimated at US$8.00 million, was cancelled at the
project restructuring in June 2021, and a new subcomponent was added to the project scope related to the
optimization of power generation at the Darunta Hydropower Plant (see Revised Components below).
C. Environmental and Social Sustainability, Project Management Support, and Future Project
Preparation. (Appraisal cost: US$20.00 million including physical and price contingencies of 25 percent;
revised cost at project restructuring: US$21.00 million; actual cost as of August 15, 2021: US$7.67 million,
the cancelled amount was US$13.33 million)
This component consisted of two subcomponents:
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C.1. Environmental and Social Sustainability. This subcomponent’s goal was to ensure the
environmental and social sustainability of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam through the provision of
electricity to eight villages and development assistance to the communities around the dam (such as road
development and vocational training including specific skills development for women) and support to the
implementation of environmental and social safeguards.
C.2. Project Management Support and Future Project Preparation. This subcomponent was to support
Da Afghanistan Breshna Sherkat (DABS – public electricity utility and the project implementing entity) in
project implementation, the work of the Environmental and Social Advisory Panel and the Project Technical
Advisory Panel, and the identification of potential future projects for hydropower development by DABS.
Revised Components
At the project restructuring in June 2021 (in the sixth year of project implementation), raising the crest of the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam under subcomponent “B.2. Optimization of Power Generation” was
cancelled because the Project Technical Advisory Panel concluded after their first visit to the dam that it
was not feasible to raise the dam crest as this would have create dam safety, environmental, and social
risks (ICR, p.8). Two new subcomponents were added to the project scope to utilize grant savings from
Component A and the cancellation of subcomponent B.2, and activities under Component C were adjusted.
A.3. Darunta Powerhouse and Switchyard Rehabilitation. (Cost estimated at the time of project
restructuring: US$12.00 million; actual cost as of August 15, 2021: US$1.30 million; the cancelled amount
was US$10.70 million) This new subcomponent was to finance the rehabilitation of three generation units
each with 3.85 MW generation capacity (a total of 11.55 MW), spillway gates and switchyard, and a
geotechnical investigation of the power plant. Darunta Hydropower Plant is located 80 km downstream of
the Naghlu Hydropower Plant close to the Pakistani border and generates electricity for Jalalabad city.
B.2. Dam Safety Measures. (Cost estimated at the time of project restructuring: US$21.50 million; actual
cost as of August 15, 2021: US$0.50 million; the cancelled amount was US$21.00 million) This new
subcomponent, which replaced “B.2. Optimization of Power Generation” at the project restructuring, was to
finance implementation of dam safety measures including instrumentation, rehabilitation of gates and
hoisting mechanism controls of the Darunta Hydropower Plant dam along with seepage control, and
construction of fences and security posts around the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam. The dam safety works
on Darunta Hydropower Plant were transferred from the World Bank-financed Irrigation Restoration and
Development Project (IRDP – P122235) following the identification of safety issues with the dam, which was
considered to have a high risk of dam failure. The IRDP closed in December 2020 in the process of country
portfolio adjustment in response to COVID-19 pandemic (ICR, p.8).
Under Component C, the following adjustments were made at the project restructuring:
C.1. Environmental and Social Sustainability. (Cost estimated at appraisal: US$8.00 million; cost
estimated at the time of project restructuring: US$12.00 million; actual cost as of August 15, 2021: US$5.0
million; the cancelled amount was US$7.00 million) Following the consultation with the local communities, it
was agreed to provide vocational training to the Sorobi region under the ongoing National Horticulture and
Livestock Program (NHLP – P157997), and the vocational training activities under this subcomponent were
cancelled. The subcomponent’s scope was extended to include the electrification of 93 additional villages in
the Sorobi and Tagab districts.
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C.2. Project Management Support and Future Project Preparation. (Cost estimated at appraisal:
US$12.00 million; cost estimated at the time of project restructuring: US$9.00 million; actual cost as of
August 15, 2021: US$2.67 million; the cancelled amount was US$6.33 million) The project management
support for the Darunta Hydropower Plant related works was added to the scope. The scope of the
subcomponent was expanded to support DABS in the collection of baseline geographic, hydrological,
environmental, social, and disaster risk data from Panji River for future hydropower project identification and
preparation. Lastly, two contracts from ARTF-funded DABS Planning and Capacity Support Project
(P131228) that could not be completed before the project closing date of July 31, 2020 because of the
onset of the COVID-19 pandemic were transferred to this subcomponent. The activities covered by these
two contracts were the provision of training aid equipment, supply of furniture for the training center, and
staff capacity building training totaling around US$1.00 million.
e. Comments on Project Cost, Financing, Borrower Contribution, and Dates
Project Cost: The project cost was originally estimated at US$83.00 million. At the project restructuring in
June 2021, the estimated project cost did not change. The project’s actual coast was US$22.60 million,
which was significantly lower than the cost estimated at appraisal because of the incomplete project
activities following the Taliban takeover in August 2021.
Financing: At appraisal, the IDA grant amount was estimated at US$83.00 million that would fully finance
the project cost. At the time of project restructuring in June 2021 (two months before Taliban takeover), the
project had disbursed US$22.60 million (including US$2.66 million eligible expenditures). The undisbursed
amount of US$60.40 million was cancelled on April 8, 2022 as part of the ARTF portfolio-wide cancellation
exercise (ICR, p.1).
Borrower’s contribution: At appraisal, no borrower’s contribution was estimated, and none materialized at
project closing.
Project Restructuring (Level 2 – June 20, 2021): The project was restructured late in project
implementation—five years and five months after project effectiveness. It was restructured to cancel
subcomponent B.2 and add two new subcomponents to the project scope (A.3) for the rehabilitation of the
Darunta Hydropower Plant and extension of the grids in the Sorobi and Tagab districts and (B.2) dam safety
at Naghlu and Darunta Hydropower Plants. Consequently, the project objective was revised to include the
improvement of dam safety and increase in electricity generation at the Darunta Hydropower Plant. The
World Bank’s South Asia Region Vice President approved this project objective revision. Additionally, two
contracts of the ARTF-funded DABS Planning and Capacity Support Project (P131228) that could not be
completed were transferred to the Naghlu Hydropower Rehabilitation Project (see Revised Components
above). Consequently, the project closing date was extended by 18 months from September 30, 2022 to
March 31, 2024 to allow time for the completion of the newly added project activities and the activities
related to the dam safety works at Naghlu Hydropower Plant that could not be implemented because of the
delays in the procurement of the consultant for dam safety and hydromechanical audits due to the limited
availability of experts and contractors in this very specific and technical field and reluctance of consultants
to work in a fragile and conflict environment in Afghanistan. The onset of COVID-19 in March 2020 also
contributed to the delays in project implementation.
Dates: The project was approved on December 14, 2015. The ARTF Grant Agreement was signed on
January 19, 2016, and the project became effective on the same day as there were no conditions defined
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for effectiveness. The Mid-Term Review was conducted in June 2019. The original project closing date was
September 30, 2022. The project closing date was extended by 18 months, and the project will officially
close on March 31, 2024 (The reasons for project closing date extension are given in the restructuring entry
above). Since the undisbursed grant was cancelled on April 8, 2022 and the project could not practically be
implemented, the World Bank project team prepared the Implementation Completion and Results Report of
the project before the revised project closing date of March 31, 2024.
Disbursement Percentages
The following disbursement percentages will be used in deriving the weights to be applied to split Outcome
rating.
Disbursed and Undisbursed Amounts Percentage of
Project Objective before and after Taliban Takeover the Total Grant Amount
($ million) (%)
Before Taliban Takeover 22.60 (disbursed) 27.23
After Taliban Takeover 60.40 (undisbursed) 72.77
Total 83.00 100.00
3. Relevance of Objectives
Rationale
The original project objective was highly aligned with the World Bank’s strategy as defined in the Country
Partnership Framework for FY2017-20 (CPF) for Afghanistan, which was extended through fiscal year
2022. The project sought to address the development problem of unreliable and insufficient electricity
supply to Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, because of neglect and insufficient maintenance of the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant and its dam, which provides more than half of Kabul’s electricity, and inadequate
institutional capacity in the electricity sector. The project also sought to address the underutilization of the
domestically available cheap hydropower potential that would replace the more expensive electricity
imported from the neighboring countries improving the affordability of electricity. As reliable and sufficient
supply of electricity has a direct impact on improved socioeconomic welfare of the people in the medium
and long-terms, the project was expected to contribute to the reduction of poverty, which was one the main
drivers of fragility in Afghanistan. These development problems fit under the second pillar of the CPF, i.e.,
Supporting Inclusive Growth, and contributes to the achievement of “Objective 2.3: Increased power
generation and access to electricity.” The CPF (p.23) defines the intended outcomes at the end of the CPF
period as “increased access to both on-grid and off-grid electricity, reduction in distribution losses as well as
improved regional energy cooperation” to be achieved through increased local power generation and
regional cooperation initiatives, such as CASA 1000 that supported sustainable electricity trade between
Tajikistan, Kyrgyz Republic, Afghanistan, and Pakistan through the construction of a transmission line. The
project was to support the achievement of these outcomes through the rehabilitation and overhauling of the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant, establishment of improved operation and maintenance (O&M) practices
(improved institutional capacity), and improvement of the safety of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam.
These were expected to lead to the improvement of the availability, reliability, affordability, and
sustainability of electricity supplied to Kabul from domestic hydropower resources. The project objective
also corresponded to the first pilar of the CPF, i.e., Building Strong and Accountable Institutions, which aims
to improve service delivery by building the capacity and self-reliance of government institutions, and the
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third pillar, i.e., Social Inclusion, the goal of which is to reduce differences in access to services in the
country and address vulnerability shocks (CPF, pp.17 and 26). The revised project objective, which aimed
also to increase power generation from the Darunta Hydropower Plant and improve its dam safety, was
aligned with the CPF because of the reasons explained above with one difference that Darunta Hydropower
Plant supplies electricity to Jalalabad, the fifth largest city in Afghanistan in terms of population.
The project objective was also highly relevant to the country context. The project objective supported the
implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). The ANDS identified poor and
unreliable access to electricity as a barrier to economic development and poverty alleviation and aimed at
investing in transmission network and power generation to increase the electrification rate and improve the
electricity service quality in the country. Given the fragile and conflict-affected situation (FCS) in
Afghanistan, the project objective was appropriately pitched for the development status in the country as
described in the CPF. As advised in the World Bank’s Systematic Country Diagnostic (SCD, 2016), the
project’s intervention was carefully selected and tailored to the fragile circumstances in the country. The
Naghlu Hydropower Plant was of high strategic importance as the power plant was the main source of
electricity supplied to Kabul. The previous World Bank-financed EPRP (P083908) could only rehabilitate
three out of four units at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and was moderately successful in establishing
sustainable O&M practices. The Naghlu Hydropower Rehabilitation Project was to rehabilitate the
remaining unit and overhaul the previously rehabilitated ones, which deteriorated because of insufficient
O&M. Additionally, the project was to improve the safety of the dam including the clearance of the
sedimentation and unexploded ordnance in the reservoir. The rehabilitation of the Darunta Hydropower
Plant, which was included to the project scope at the project restructuring in June 2021, was also highly
relevant to the country context as its dam needed urgent repairs to ensure sustained electricity supply to
Jalalabad.
Following the reengagement in 2002, the World Bank extensively supported Afghanistan through
interventions in power generation, transmission and distribution, and technical assistance and policy advice.
Some World Bank-financed electricity projects in Afghanistan were as follows: The Emergency
Infrastructure Reconstruction Project (P077779), the Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project (P083908),
the Kabul, Aybak, Mazar-e-Sharif Power Project (P106654), and the Power System Development Project
(P111943). These projects provided support to the rehabilitation of hydropower generation assets,
rehabilitation and construction of transmission and distribution assets with the goal of increasing access to
electricity in the country and improving the availability, reliability, and quality of electricity supply. Therefore,
the objective of the project under this review, excluding its focus on “sustainability of hydropower,” was not
fully pitched at the outcome level given the World Bank’s extensive experience in the country and the
sector. However, given the fragile, conflict, and violence (FCV) status of the country and rapidly challenging
security situation, this review assesses the project objective as sufficiently challenging and relevant to the
FCV status of Afghanistan.
Overall, the relevance of objective is rated High.
Rating Relevance TBL
Rating
High
4. Achievement of Objectives (Efficacy)
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EFFICACY_TBL
OBJECTIVE 1
Objective
To improve dam safety and sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Rationale
Theory of Change
The main causes of Afghanistan’s fragility were defined as weak state institutions, poor governance, and
dysfunctional societal relations that frequently led to violent conflict between groups (ICR, p.1). To address
the drivers of fragility, the World Bank strategy (CPF 2016) was designed to build strong and accountable
institutions, support inclusive growth, and expand and deepen social inclusion. The project was to contribute
to the achievement of the World Bank strategy by improving the availability, reliability, and sustainability of
electricity supply to the capital city of Kabul through the rehabilitation of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and the
improvement of its dam safety. By providing reliable electricity to households, institutions, and businesses,
the project was to contribute to the improvement of economic and social activity and consequently to the
reduction of poverty in the project area and Kabul (ICR, pp.5-6). The project was also to address the fragility
driver of weak state institutions through technical assistance to build DABS capacity in the sustained
operation and maintenance of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
The project was to use the project’s inputs—IDA grants—to finance the rehabilitation and overhauling of the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant, the provision of spare parts for O&M, the inspection of the dam and the
hydromechanical works, sediment assessment and sediment removal including unexploded ordnance,
rehabilitation of the dam instrumentation for safety, rehabilitation of the hydromechanical equipment, and the
reactivation of the flushing system. If decided, the project was to increase the height of the dam to optimize
power generation by the hydropower plant. Additionally, the project was to provide training to the DABS
personnel to increase the entity’s capacity in O&M. The expected outputs of these activities would have been
all four units of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant generating electricity, improved safety of the dam, increased
reservoir area (because of sediment cleaning and increased height of the dam) to optimize power generation,
and increased institutional capacity in O&M. These outputs would have been expected to lead to the project
outcomes of increased availability of electricity supply, reduction in load shedding and unplanned outages
(i.e., increased reliability of electricity supply), and sustainability of electricity supply because of improved
O&M practices and dam safety. The project was also to finance the electrification of villages around the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant by extending the distribution grid, but the project did not finance the cost of the line-
drops required to connect the households to the grids.
The project objective formulation did not cover all the outcomes expected from the project’s intervention
except improved dam safety and sustainability of hydropower and increased power generation. Therefore,
project objective was more output-oriented rather than outcome-oriented, but taking the country’s FCV status
into account, the formulation of the project objective was realistic and appropriate to country conditions. More
electricity supplied to the Kabul grid in a more sustainable way because of improved dam safety and O&M
practices was to be expected to contribute to the improvement of the overall socioeconomic welfare of the
residents in the project area and address drivers of fragility. Overall, the causal pathways in the theory of
change from inputs to outcomes were valid and direct (except the weakness in covering the cost of line-drops
for households’ connection to the distribution grid), and the achievement of the outcomes and project
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objective could be attributed to the project’s intervention. However, the indicators in the results framework
were insufficient to capture the outcomes that were expected from the implementation of dam safety activities
and achievement of related outputs. The M&E system as designed and implemented was insufficient to
assess the performance of the project in achieving the project objectives (see section 9. M&E Design,
Implementation, and Utilization below).
The addition of the rehabilitation of the Darunta Hydropower Plant and the improvement of its dam safety to
the project scope at the project restructuring in June 2021 did not change the theory of change of the project.
The rehabilitation of the three generation units and the installation of a switchyard at the Darunta Hydropower
Plant would have been expected to ensure sustained and reliable power generation at the power plant, which
supplied electricity to Jalalabad. The rehabilitation of the spillway gates and the investigation of the dam
would have been expected to improve the safety of the dam that would contribute to the sustainability of
power generation.
Outputs
Dam Safety Procedures Developed and Maintained. The project could not develop dam safety
procedures. However, by the time of the Taliban takeover, consultants had already started working on
dam safety and hydromechanical audit and the environmental and social impact assessment of the
dam safety measures. According to the project implementation schedule, the project would have
completed the development of dam safety procedures by September 30, 2022, but could not do so
because of the Taliban takeover.
Dam Safety Audit in place. The project could not conduct the dam safety audit because of delays
caused by the experts’ reluctance to visit the project site due to security concerns and the onset of the
COVID-19 pandemic. However, the bidding documents were about to be completed, and the experts
were scheduled to visit the dam in August 2021 when the Taliban took power in the country.
Therefore, the visit did not happen.
Number of staff trained in hydropower operation and maintenance under the project. The
project was to provide training to 130 members of DABS staff in hydropower operation and
maintenance. The actual number of members of staff trained under the project was 25 because of
delays in hiring consultants to give these trainings. However, the remaining members of staff were
expected to be trained by the revised target date in August 2022, but the trainings could not be
delivered because of the Taliban takeover.
The project financed the installation of pumps in the drainage and grouting galleries of the dam. The
Project Technical Advisory Panel recommended the installation of these pumps.
The project financed the rehabilitation of the gates in the flushing system. This work was completed in
mid-2022. After the Taliban takeover, the hydropower plant staff, including a resident engineer,
completed the cleaning of the flushing tunnel, and the repair of the sliding gate on the face of the dam
and the radial gate at the end of the flushing tunnel. These improvements were needed to flush the
sediment in front of the lower outlet.
The project also financed the construction of a security wall around the Naghlu Hydropower Plant’s
periphery to secure the hydropower plant, the dam, and the reservoir.
The project did not finance works to increase the height of the dam as it was found to be not feasible
during project implementation because of risks related to the dam safety.
Outcomes
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As a result of the completion of some project activities, the project was able to partially achieve expected
outcomes in dam safety and sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant. The pumps
installed by the project emptied the water in the galleries that had been putting significant pressure on the
dam safety. The elimination of this pressure improved the stability of the dam (ICR, p.13). As of May 2022,
the hydropower plant staff had been using the pumps daily, and 50 percent of the drainage holes and pipes
had been operational. Spare parts were available and safely stored in the warehouses built under the project
for regular O&M of the power plant. The improvements in the flushing system resulted in the successful
flushing of the sediment in front of the lower outlet, which was required for safe and sustainable operation of
the hydropower plant. The training given to a limited number of member of staff is expected to increase the
O&M quality. The Third-Party Monitoring Agent hired under the project reported that all four turbines had
been inspected and maintained annually, and there had been no efficiency loss in the turbines.
Despite significant delays in the procurement of project activities and hiring of consultants related to dam
safety and sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant, the project activities were on track to
achieve the project outputs and outcomes by the revised target dates in August 2022. Despite the Taliban
takeover in August 2021, the hydropower plant staff continued with the works started under the project to
improve the safety of the dam and improve the sustainability of hydropower with some success. Overall, the
project’s efficacy in achieving the project objective to improve dam safety and sustainability of hydropower at
the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings.
Rating
Substantial
OBJECTIVE 1 REVISION 1
Revised Objective
To improve dam safety at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Revised Rationale
For theory of change and project outputs and outcomes please see Objective 1 above.
The objective was revised in June 2021 only two months prior to the Taliban takeover in August 2021.
However, the project could not disburse any grant during the two-month period. Therefore, the project’s
efficacy in achieving the revised Objective 1 is assessed based on the project’s achievements prior to the
Taliban takeover, and the additional works completed by the hydropower plant as a result of the capacity
created and equipment provided by the project.
According to the report of the Third-Party Monitoring Agent in May 2022, the hydropower plant had continued
to implement regular inspection and maintenance of the hydropower plant. The flushing system that cleans
the sediment in front of the lower outlet is functional. However, the project could not remove the sediment in
front of the intake gates. It is not expected that DABS will continue with the work to remove the sediment in
front of the intake gates, and further accumulation of the sediment will most likely block the intake gates, after
which the hydropower plant could be not operational and cease to generate electricity. The removal of the
sediment in front of the intake gates stands out to be the major barrier to the sustainability of the hydropower
plant. However, as the World Bank project team commented, if the flushing system, which was rehabilitated
under the project and after the Taliban takeover, continued to work properly, it could flush the sediment that
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would otherwise block the intake gates. Yet, without further investigation it cannot be known for sure how
efficient the flushing system would be in clearing the sediment. Therefore, the risk is high that further
accumulation of sediment could adversely affect the operation of the power plant.
Overall, the project’s efficacy in achieving the project objective to improve the dam safety at the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant is rated Modest for the post-Taliban takeover period because the risks to the sustainability
of the outcomes achieved related to the dam safety is significantly high; the hydropower plant could be out of
operation within two to four years unless urgent measures are taken to address the sediment problem and
maintain regular inspection and maintenance practices.
Revised Rating
Modest
OBJECTIVE 2
Objective
To increase supply of domestically generated hydroelectricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Rationale
Outputs
Installed capacity of Unit 1 of the Naghlu hydropower Plant ready for utilization. The project
completed the rehabilitation of the 25 MW Unit 1 of the hydropower plant in March 2018 as targeted.
Overhaul of Unit 3 of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant. The project completed the overhaul of the 25
MW Unit 3 of the hydropower plant in October 2018 as targeted.
The international technical experts hired under the project supported DABS personnel in the
rehabilitation of Unit 4, which was not included in the project scope. The rehabilitation of Unit 4 was
completed within two months between September and November 2019.
The project financed the installation of distribution transformers and expansion of the distribution grid
in the Sorobi district for the electrification of villages. There was no indicator in the results framework
capturing the number of transformers installed and the length of the distribution grid expanded.
The project was to finance the overhauling of Unit 2 because of the operational issues at this unit that
required dismantling of the rotor shaft. The project had signed a contract for the overhauling of this
unit, but the works could not be implemented because of the Taliban takeover.
Outcomes
As a result of the rehabilitation of Unit 1 and the overhauling of Unit 3, the Naghlu Hydropower Plan
was able to generate electricity at its 100 percent capacity for the first time in March 2019. The power
plant generated 436 Gigawatt-hour (GWh) electricity in 2019, and 464 GWh in 2020, which
correspond to 49.77 percent and 52.97 percent capacity factors, respectively. These capacity factors
are assessed to be reasonable given that hydroelectrical components of the power plant were
designed in the 1960s during the Soviet era (PAD, pp.66-67).
Although the results framework did not include any indicator capturing the increase in the electricity
generation at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant following the rehabilitation works, the PAD (Figure 5.2.
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Generation at Naghlu 1968-2010 on p.66) gives the average amount of power generated annually by
the power plant in the first decade of 2000s at 250 GWh, occasionally increasing above 300 GWh, but
with significant deviations from the average. Therefore, the achievement of annual power generation
of 436 GWh and 464 GWh in 2019 and 2020, respectively, are assessed to be significant. The project
team confirmed that there was no generation data for the period between 2011 and 2018, and a
comparison of the project’s achievement before and after the project was not possible.
Total number of unplanned power outages due to deficiency of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
The baseline in 2015 was 100 outages per year attributable to the power plant. The target was to
reduce the number of outages caused by the hydropower plant to 20. The achievement between June
2020 and August 2021, when project activities stopped because of the Taliban takeover, was one
outage.
Number of villages in the immediate vicinity of the dam provided with access to electricity by
the project. Because of the installation of distribution transformers and expansion of the distribution
grid, the project expanded the electricity distribution infrastructure to 15 villages. However, not all 15
villages, nor households in those villages, had access to electricity. According to the Third-Party
Monitoring Agent’s report in May 2022 (ICR, p.13), only in four villages all households had access to
electricity. Additionally, electricity would be accessible to households in three villages if households
could afford the cost of line-drops (the project did not finance the cost of line-drops). Yet, electricity
was not accessible to households in the remaining eight villages—DABS has not electrified the
distribution lines for four villages in the downstream of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant, and households
in the four villages in the upstream of the hydropower plant are yet to purchase meters for line-drops.
The target was to electrify eight villages. The achievement was seven villages where not every
household is not connected to the distribution grid.
The project provided electricity to 534 households, which have electricity between 18 and 24 hours a
day. The grid is accessible for immediate connection of 1,334 households if they pay the cost of drop-
lines. An additional 370 households could have access to the grid if grid extension works were
completed. The results framework did not include an indicator capturing the achievement of access to
electricity at the household of population levels.
The project was successful in increasing the amount of electricity generated by the Naghlu Hydropower Plant
through the rehabilitation works. The amount of electricity generated by the power plant increased from an
average of 250 GWH per year to above 400 GWh depending on the availability of water in its reservoir. Since
the power plant supplies electricity to Kabul, this indicates an increased availability of electricity for the
consumers in the capital. The unplanned power outages caused by deficiency at the hydropower plant
decreased from a high of 100 per year to only one. This is a significant increase in the reliability of electricity
supply, but information is insufficient to assess the impact of this improvement on the customers. If outages
because of the dilapidated transmission and distribution networks are still frequent, the reduction in the
number of unplanned outages caused by the Naghlu Hydropower Plant might not have improved the overall
reliability of electricity supply in the system. Additionally, there is no evidence that increased electricity supply
from the Naghlu Hydropower Plant had an impact on the affordability of electricity or not. Lastly, the project
was successful in extending the electricity distribution grid to the villages in the project area, but the cost of
line-drops (which was not covered by the project) was a barrier to increase households access to electricity.
Overall, the efficacy of the project in achieving the project objective to increase supply of domestically
generated hydroelectricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated Substantial.
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Rating
Substantial
OBJECTIVE 2 REVISION 1
Revised Objective
To increase the supply of electricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant.
Revised Rationale
For project outputs and outcomes please see Objective 2 above.
The formulation of this objective was revised in June 2021 only two months prior to the Taliban takeover in
August 2021. There was no material change in the project objective before and after the revision. Since the
project could not disburse any grant during the two-month period, the project’s efficacy in achieving the
revised Objective 2 is assessed based on the achievements prior to the Taliban takeover.
By the time the project was restructured in June 2021, the project had already achieved the rehabilitation of
Unit 1 and overhauling of Unit 3 totaling 50 MW. At the project restructuring, the target was revised to 86.50
MW including rehabilitation of 11.50 MW of the Darunta Hydropower Plant (see Revised Objective 4 below)
and overhaul of 25 MW Unit 2 of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant. The project could not achieve the revised
target because project activities were halted following the Taliban takeover in August 2021.
At the same project restructuring, the number of villages to be electrified by the project was increased from
eight villages to 111 villages (29 villages in Sorobi, 39 villages in Tagab phase 1, and 43 villages in Tagab
phase 2). Because of the Taliban takeover, the project could not achieve this target except the seven villages
that had already been electrified prior to the project restructuring.
According to the report of the Third-Party Monitoring Agent in May 2022, the project outcomes of increased
power generation at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant has been sustained after the Taliban takeover in August
2021. The personnel at the powerplant have been conducting regular O&M activities. For example, the
powerplant staff identified around 200 issues in the generation units in 240 inspections they carried in 2021,
and they addressed all these O&M issues (ICR, p.13). Currently, the power plant continues to generate
electricity to Kabul.
Overall, the efficacy of the project in achieving the revised project objective to increase the supply of
electricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated Substantial for the post-Taliban takeover period.
Revised Rating
Substantial
OBJECTIVE 3
Objective
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The project did not have a third objective before the Taliban takeover. This entry is inserted here to assess
the new two objectives related to the Darunta Hydropower Plant in the post-Taliban takeover period as
revised objectives.
Rationale
Please see above.
Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable
OBJECTIVE 3 REVISION 1
Revised Objective
To improve the dam safety at the Darunta Hydropower Plant.
Revised Rationale
Outputs
Rehabilitation of spillway gates in Darunta Dam. Because of the Taliban takeover, the project
could not implement this activity.
Geotechnical investigation of Darunta Dam. Similar as above, the project could not implement this
activity because of the Taliban takeover.
Outcomes
Because the project could not implement the project activities related to the safety of the Darunta Hydropower
Plant dam, the expected outcomes did not materialize. Therefore, the project’s efficacy in achieving the
project objective to improve dam safety at the Darunta Hydropower Plant is rated Negligible.
Revised Rating
Negligible
OBJECTIVE 4
Objective
The project did not have a third objective before the Taliban takeover. This entry is inserted here to assess
the new two objectives related to the Darunta Hydropower Plant in the post-Taliban takeover period as
revised objectives.
Rationale
Please see above.
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Rating
Not Rated/Not Applicable
OBJECTIVE 4 REVISION 1
Revised Objective
To increase the supply of electricity at the Darunta Hydropower Plant.
Revised Rationale
Outputs
Hydropower generation capacity rehabilitated under the project. At the time of the project
restructuring in June 2021, the project had already completed the rehabilitation of Unit 1 and the
overhaul of Unit 3 of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant (see Objective 2 and revised Objective 2 above).
This new indicator had a target of 86.5 MW generation capacity to be rehabilitated consisting of Unit 2
of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and all three units of the Darunta Hydropower Plant totaling 11.5 MW.
Because of the Taliban takeover in August 2021, the rehabilitation of the Darunta Hydropower Plant
could not start although the contractor was ready to mobilize. The target was not achieved.
Rehabilitation of Darunta switchyard. The project was to rehabilitate the switchyard at the Darunta
Hydropower Plant but could not complete this activity because of the Taliban takeover.
After the restructuring, the project targeted electrifying 111 villages in the project area (see Revised
Objective 2 above). At the time of the Taliban takeover in August 2021, two bids for the electrification
of 12 additional villages in the Sorobi district and 39 villages in the Tagab district as Phase 1 were in
the final stage of bid evaluation, and the third bidding document for Tagab district phase 2 for the
electrification of 43 villages was about to be finalized. Because of the Taliban takeover, the project
could not implement these activities.
Outcomes
As the project could not implement any project activity related to the rehabilitation of the Darunta Hydropower
Plant and the electrification of the additional villages, the project could not achieve the outputs expected from
these activities, and the expected outcomes did not materialize. Therefore, the efficacy of the project in
achieving the project objective to increase the supply of electricity at the Darunta Hydropower Plant is rated
Negligible.
Revised Rating
Negligible
OVERALL EFF TBL
OBJ_TBL
OVERALL EFFICACY
Rationale
Because of significant delays in the procurement of civil works and hiring of consultants related to the dam
safety and sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant, the project could only partially
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achieve its outputs and outcomes related to dam safety. However, the bidding document preparation and
bidding evaluation for such works and hiring of consultants were on track, and project activities would have
been expected to be completed by the revised target date of August 15, 2022 if the Taliban takeover had not
happened. Therefore, the project’s efficacy in achieving the project objective to improve dam safety and
sustainability of hydropower at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings
for the pre-Taliban takeover period.
The project was successful in completing the project activities to improve the generation capacity at the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant by 2019. This resulted in an increase in the electricity generated at the power plant
and a significant reduction in unplanned power outages caused by deficiency at the hydropower plant from
100 per year to only one by August 2021. However, evidence is insufficient to adequately assess the impact
of increased availability and improved reliability of electricity supplied by the Naghlu Hydropower Plant on the
customers. The evidence is also insufficient regarding the impact of the achievements on the affordability of
electricity supply. The project was also partially successful in expanding the access of the villages in the
project area to electricity. Therefore, the project’s efficacy to increase supply of domestically generated
hydroelectricity at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated Substantial.
Overall, the project’s efficacy to achieve the project activities before the Taliban takeover in August 2021 is
rated Substantial with moderate shortcomings.
Overall Efficacy Rating
Substantial
OBJR1_TBL
OVERALL EFFICACY REVISION 1
Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rationale
After the Taliban takeover in August 2021, DABS did partially continue with activities to improve the safety of
the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam, and major dam safety activities were not implemented. The parts that are
rehabilitated under the project still work as reported by the Third-Party Monitoring Agent in May 2022, and the
hydropower plant personnel continue with regular inspection and maintenance of the power plant and the
dam. However, the sediment in front of the intake gates could not be removed, which poses a serious risk to
operation of the hydropower plant and the security of the dam. It is highly likely that the hydropower plant will
be out of operation within the next two to four years because of the further accumulation of the sediment if the
flushing system that was cleared under the project fails to flush the sediment. Therefore, the project efficacy
in achieving the revised project objective to improve dam safety at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is rated
Modest for the post-Taliban takeover period.
According to the Third-Party Monitoring Agent report, the hydropower plant continues to generate electricity
using its all four units, and the hydropower plant is regularly maintained by the DABS personnel. While the
project could not achieve its revised target of 111 villages electrified under the project, the efficacy of the
project in achieving the revised project objective to increase supply of electricity at the Naghlu Hydropower
Plant is rated Substantial for the post-Taliban takeover period.
The project was restructured in June 2021 to add project activities for the improvement of the dam safety and
the increase in the supply of electricity at the Darunta Hydropower Plant. The project was at the bidding
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documents preparation stage for the contracts related to the works at the Darunta Hydropower Plant when
the Taliban took power in the country; the project could not implement any activity related to the dam safety
and power generation at the Darunta Hydropower Plant. Therefore, the project’s efficacy in achieving these
two objectives is rated Negligible.
Overall, the project’s efficacy in achieving the project objectives in the post-Talban takeover period is rated
Modest.
Overall Efficacy Revision 1 Rating Primary Reason
Modest External shock
5. Efficiency
Economic Analysis
A “with the project” and “without the project” economic analysis was conducted at appraisal. Through Monte
Carlo simulation, it was shown that the Naghlu Hydropower Plant would have been out of operation by 2021 if
rehabilitation and dam safety works had not been implemented (PAD, p.64). The main economic benefit of the
project was assumed to be the displacement of imported electricity and diesel self-generation during peak hours
by the incremental increase in the electricity generated at the Naghlu Power Plant. The increased electricity
supply from the hydropower plant would have avoided the construction of a new diesel-fired power plant to
supply electricity to Kabul or replace the electricity generated by gas-fired power plants and imported from
Uzbekistan to meet the growing demand in Kabul. When the future imports of hydropower through the CASA-
1000 included in the calculations, including an overall three precent differential transmission losses, the avoided
cost of imported electricity because of the incremental electricity supply increase at the Naghlu Hydropower
Plant was estimated to be at US$0.066 per kWh. The avoided cost of diesel self-generation was taken at
US$1.09, the variable cost of diesel fuel in Kabul at the time of appraisal, corresponding to an avoided cost of
US$0.327 per kWh. These were conservative estimates as the cost of imported electricity and diesel-generated
electricity were likely to increase because of increases in the prices of natural gas and diesel, and increased
loss of electricity during transmission of the imported electricity. After the rehabilitation, the hydropower plant
was expected to gradually increase its electricity generation reaching at 438 GWh in 2020 and gradually
declining at the absence of another life-extension rehabilitation and abandonment of the hydropower plant in
2028 (PAD, p.67). The reduction in greenhouse gas emissions was valued at US$30 per ton because of the
displacement of gas and diesel-fired power generation. The costs were taken as the total rehabilitation cost of
US$118 million, including US$32.6 million, the cost of rehabilitation implemented under the ERPR. Overall, the
assumptions used in the economic analysis were realistic and sufficient to assess the economic viability of the
project.
Excluding the benefits from a reduction in the GHG emission, the calculations resulted in an Economic Rate of
Return (ERR) of 42.6 percent with a Net Present Value (NPV) US$103 million at a discount rate of 10 percent
with a project lifetime of 15 years. When benefits from a reduction in GHG emissions are included, the ERR
increases to 52.6 percent with a NPV of US$140 million. These results show that while the benefits from the
project were estimated conservatively—the socio-economic benefits of increased availability and improved
reliability of electricity supply were not included in the economic analysis—the ERRs and NPVs show that the
project was economically viable.
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At project closing, an economic analysis was conducted that was limited with the benefits achieved from the
activities that were substantially completed before the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The analysis included
benefits achieved from the rehabilitation of Unit 1 and overhauling of Unit 3, and different from the analysis
conducted at appraisal, it also included benefits from the electrification of the villages in the project area. It is
estimated that the rehabilitation and overhauling works, including those implanted at Unit 4 that were out of the
scope of the project, extended the economic life of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant by 15 years to 2034. However,
the analysis does not take into consideration the accumulation of sediment in the reservoir basis that is
expected to block the intake gates within two to four years putting the hydropower plant out of operation unless
the flushing system works sufficiently to flush the sediment. The project could not implement the sediment
removal activity because of delays in hiring consultants for the dam and reservoir inspection and the abrupt
ending of project activities after Taliban takeover. The economic analysis valued the incremental power
produced by the power plant at the marginal cost of electricity imports from Uzbekistan. The replacement of
diesel-fired self-generation at peaks hours was not included in the analysis. Regarding the electrification of the
villages, the difference between the consumers’ average willingness to pay for electricity and the incremental
cost of supply as additional imports was taken as the project’s benefits to the consumers based on a household
energy use survey conducted between 2016 and 2019. The costs were taken as the total rehabilitation cost of
the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and expansion of the distribution grid. Additionally, O&M cost was included in the
economic analysis.
The after-project economic analysis resulted in an ERR of 42.9 percent and a NPV of US$59.6 million at a 10
percent discount rate for 15 years. When the reduction in greenhouse gases expected from the replacement of
gas-generated electricity from Uzbekistan by hydropower from the Naghlu Hydropower Plant is included in the
analysis with different carbon prices, the ERR ranges between 58 and 70 percent. Overall, the post-project
economic analysis shows that the project was viable, but the economic analysis is built on the assumption that
the hydropower plant will continue generating electricity for another 15 years. However, the accumulation of
sediment in the reservoir poses a significant risk to the operation of the project. The project could not implement
the sediment removal activity and other dam safety activities. Therefore, despite the significant technical
improvements at the power plant that increased the amount of electricity generation, it is highly unlikely that the
power plant will be able to continue generating electricity in the medium-term because of sediment accumulation
in front of the intake gates; the benefits expected from the rehabilitation of the hydropower plant might not
materialize as expected.
Financial Analysis
At appraisal, the project’s financial benefits to DABS were assumed to come from the cost of avoided electricity
imports and the additional sales revenue from electricity that could be supplied during off-peak hours to the
consumers who had to use diesel self-generation. Since the grant was on-lent to DABS by the Ministry of
Finance under regular IDA terms, DABS’ debt service obligations of the on-lent funds were included in the
financial analysis. The calculations showed that DABS significantly benefits from the project because of
incremental cash flows and achieves a consistent surplus with an NPV of US$83 million. A Financial Rate of
Return was not calculated at appraisal.
A financial analysis was not conducted after project closing.
Administrative and Operational Efficiency
The implementation of the project activities related to the rehabilitation of the units at the Naghlu Hydropower
Plant was efficient. This is reflected in a high ERR because of the benefits achieved as a result of the
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completion of the rehabilitation activities. However, the project could not efficiently implement the project
activities related to the dam safety including the removal of sediment because of significant delays in
procurement caused by lengthy time required to form the bid evaluation committees and prepare the shortlists
and bid evaluation reports. The gaps in the reports also delayed the procurement process along with the delays
in the decisions of the National Procurement Authority. The sediment issue poses a high risk to the sustainability
of electricity generation at the power plant as explained above under the Economic Analysis section. The
worsening security situation in the country adversely affected the project implementation efficiency. This
prevented site visits by experts for dam safety audits and eventually resulted in the cancellation of project
activities related to major dam safety activities at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant. The project could not even start
the implementation of the rehabilitation and dam safety activities at the Darunta Hydropower Plant because of
the Taliban takeover in August 2021, nor the electrification of 111 villages in the project area.
Although the economic analysis resulted in a high post-project ERR and an NPV, the likelihood that the project
benefits will be sustained is low because of dam safety issues (i.e., accumulation of sediment in front of the
intake valves that is expected to put the hydropower plant out of operation within two to four years). The
significant delays in procurement of dam safety contracts under the second component resulted in incomplete
project activities. Lastly, the project’s implementation efficiency was adversely affected by the changing political
situation in the country as a result of the Taliban takeover in August 2021. Overall, the project’s efficiency in
achieving the project objectives is rated Modest.
Efficiency Rating
Modest
a. If available, enter the Economic Rate of Return (ERR) and/or Financial Rate of Return (FRR) at appraisal
and the re-estimated value at evaluation:
Rate Available? Point value (%) *Coverage/Scope (%)
100.00
Appraisal 42.60
Not Applicable
100.00
ICR Estimate 42.90
Not Applicable
* Refers to percent of total project cost for which ERR/FRR was calculated.
6. Outcome
The project objective was highly aligned with the World Bank strategy and relevant to the country context at the
time of project closing. Therefore, the relevance of project objective is rated High. A split assessment was
undertaken to evaluate the project’s efficacy in achieving the project objective before and after the Taliban
takeover in August 2021 and with respect to the revision in the project objective at the project restructuring in
June 2021. Despite some delays related to the implementation of the dam safety activities, the project
substantially completed the rehabilitation and overhauling of Units 1 and 3 of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and
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was on track to achieve the project outputs and outcomes related to dam safety by the revised project closing
date prior to Taliban takeover. Therefore, the project’s overall efficacy in achieving the project objective is rated
Substantial for pre-Taliban period. However, after the abrupt cessation of the project activities following the
Taliban takeover, the project could not complete remaining activities related to the Naghlu Hydropower Plant,
nor start the rehabilitation and dam safety activities at the Darunta Hydropower Plant, which were added to the
project scope at the project restructuring in June 2021. Therefore, the expected outcomes did not fully
materialize for the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and non for the Darunta Hydropower Plant. Hence, the project’s
revised overall efficacy in achieving the project objective is rated Modest for post-Taliban takeover period.
Because of the high risk to the sustainability of the project’s benefits due to the incomplete dam safety activities
at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and the significant delays in procurement of project activities under the second
component, the project’s efficiency in achieving the project objective is rated Modest. These ratings result in an
Outcome rating of Moderately Satisfactory for pre-Taliban period and a Moderately Unsatisfactory rating for
post-Taliban period in accordance with the World Bank guidance (p.37). According to the split rating
methodology adapted specifically for the Afghanistan portfolio, the project’s overall outcome is rated Moderately
Unsatisfactory. The calculation of the split rating is given in Table 1 below.
Table 1: Split Rating Calculation
Before Taliban Takeover After Taliban Takeover
Relevance of Objectives High
Efficacy Substantial Modest
Efficiency Modest
Outcome Rating Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Unsatisfactory
Outcome Rating Value 4 3
Amount Disbursed/Undisbursed
22.60 (disbursed) 60.40 (undisbursed)
(US$ million)
Disbursement (%) 27.23% 72.77%
Weight Value 1.0892 2.1831
Total Weights 3.2723 (rounds down to 3)
Overall Outcome Rating Moderately Unsatisfactory (3)
a. Outcome Rating
Moderately Unsatisfactory
7. Risk to Development Outcome
Technical: The project resulted in a significant increase in the generation capacity of the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant, but the sustainability of hydropower depends on the completion of the overhauling of Unit
2 of the power plant and the removal or sustained flushing of the sediment in the reservoir. If the sediment is
not removed or flushed regularly, it is expected that it will accumulate and block the intake gates within two to
four years, after which the hydropower plant will be out of operation. Furthermore, the hydropower plant dam
has not been fully assessed for safety, and because of its old Soviet design, flood discharge system does not
meet the current international dam safety standards. The collapse of the dam during floods cannot be ruled
out, which would endanger the safety of the people living in the downstream communities. All these technical
issues pose an extremely high risk for the sustainability of dam and the development outcomes.
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Financial: It is not clear whether DABS will have sufficient funds to adequately operate and maintain the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant under the new regime in the country. According to the Third-Party Monitoring
Agent’s report in May 2022, DABS continued to adequately inspect and maintain the hydropower plant. The
hydropower plant continues to supply electricity to Kabul subject to the availability of water. However, the risk
is high that DABS’ financial situation may be insufficient to sustain the operation and maintenance of the
hydropower plant.
Political: The current political situation poses a high risk for the sustainable of electricity generation at the
Naghlu and Darunta Hydropower Plants. A total collapse of authority could result in the total neglect of these
important hydropower plants. Although the power plants survived decades of armed conflict because warring
parties intentionally avoided causing damage to large infrastructure such as the Naghlu Hydropower Plant, a
resumption of armed conflict may cause damage to the power plants or result in improper inspection and
maintenance of the power plants shortening their expected operation lives.
8. Assessment of Bank Performance
a. Quality-at-Entry
At the time of project preparation, the improvement of the energy sector was a high priority for the
Government of Afghanistan and a critical part of its national development program. As the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant supplied more than half of the electricity consumed in Kabul, the rehabilitation of the
power plant was of high strategic importance to ensure the sustainability of electricity supply. The project
design benefited from the extensive experience gained during the rehabilitation of the power plant under
the EPRP. It was to complement the work done under the EPRP, establish sustainable O&M practices,
and improve the safety of the dam. The technical aspects of the project were adequate. The inspections
and assessments conducted during appraisal, such as dam safety assessment and sediment
investigation, provided sufficient information about the general scope of work, which would be further
improved through detailed inspection of the power plant and full safety audit of the dam during
implementation. The design of the project components was sufficient to achieve the project objectives;
however, the exclusion of the financing of the line-drops to the households that were to be electrified
under the project was a moderate shortcoming in the project design. At appraisal, the project was already
at the bid evaluation stage for the rehabilitation of Unit 1 and the overhauling of Unit 3. The economic
analysis was robust; the calculations showed that the project was economically viable although the
benefits and costs were defined conservatively. Implementation arrangements of the project were
adequate. DABS had the overall responsibility for project implementation and appointed a project
manager for day-to-day project management. The project had already started providing training to DABS
personnel to strengthen the utility’s project implementation capacity. The fiduciary aspects of the project
were also adequate. The safeguards policies that were triggered by the project were adequately
identified. The project was designed to ensure that the communities in the project area economically and
socially benefited from the project through the expansion of the electricity distribution grid and vocational
training. The lessons learned during the implementation of previous projects in Afghanistan were
adequately included in the project design such as early start of procurement, allocation for contingencies
to cover cost increases, ensuring the support of the local community, and establishment of panel of
experts for dam safety and environment impact management. The risks were identified in detail, and
mitigation measures were in place such as the hiring of Third-Party Monitoring Agent for project
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implementation supervision, provision of training for capacity development in project implementation,
financial management, procurement, and safeguards policy implementation. The political and governance
risk was rated high, and it was beyond the project’s control to mitigate that risk. The monitoring and
evaluation (M&E) system as designed was broadly sufficient to test the causal links in the project’s theory
of change, but indicators were insufficient to capture the outcomes expected from the project’s
intervention.
Overall, the World Bank’s performance in identifying, facilitating the preparation of, and appraising the
project at entry is rated Substantial.
Quality-at-Entry Rating
Satisfactory
b. Quality of supervision
The World Bank’s project team held in-person missions twice a year until the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic in March 2020, after which the project team held virtual supervision missions. The presence of
some members of the project team in Kabul facilitated frequent contacts with the Ministry of Energy and
DABS; the Kabul-based project team held monthly meetings with DABS to review progress in project
implementation and provide support on technical, fiduciary and safeguards issues. A review of the Aide
Memoirs and Implementation Status and Results Reports (ISRs) showed that the project team closely
monitored the project implementation, which was adequately reflected in these documents. The candor and
quality of performance reporting was high. The project team’s focus on the development impact of the
project was sufficient. The project had successfully completed most of the rehabilitation works at the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant. However, there were some moderate shortcomings in the supervision of the
implementation of project activities related to the dam safety. These activities were delayed because of
procurement issues that were partly beyond the control of the project team (see section 10.b. Fiduciary
Compliance below) and led to an extension of the project closing date. The project team was proactive in
revising the project scope to include the rehabilitation of the Darunta Hydropower Pant and improve the
safety of its dam, but the project was restructured substantially late in the project implementation (in its
sixth year) when disbursement rate was at around 27 percent of the total commitment. Although the project
activities related to the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam safety and those related to the rehabilitation and
dam safety of the Darunta Hydropower Plant were on track for completion by the revised project closing
date, they could not be implemented because of the Taliban takeover in August 2021, only two months
after project restructuring. The project team’s supervision of fiduciary and safeguards aspects of the project
was adequate. However, the project team did not use the only project restructuring as an opportunity to
improve the quality of the results framework to better capture the project outputs and outcomes (see
Section 9.b M&E Implementation).
Overall, the quality of the project team’s supervision of the project is rated Moderately Satisfactory.
Quality of Supervision Rating
Moderately Satisfactory
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Overall Bank Performance Rating
Moderately Satisfactory
9. M&E Design, Implementation, & Utilization
a. M&E Design
While the project objectives were output-oriented, they were clearly specified and sufficiently challenging
for an intervention in a FCV status country. The causal links from project activities to the achievement of
project outputs and outcomes were direct and valid, but the indicators did not sufficiently capture the
project outputs and outcomes. For example, the results framework did not include an indicator measuring
the increase in the amount of electricity generated at the Naghlu Hydropower Plant before and after the
project’s intervention related to the second objective. There was no specific indicator in the results
framework to capture the achievement related to the improvement in dam safety because the scope of
these activities was to be determined during project implementation following a full dam safety inspection.
Some indicators recorded the achievement of the targets as “Yes” or “No,” such as “Overhaul of Unit 3
completed” and “Dam safety procedures developed and maintained.” These indicators were not
measurable. The indicators related to the achievement of project outputs and outcomes for the second
objective were measurable, time-bound, relevant, achievable, and specific, such as “Installed capacity of
Unit 1 ready for utilization” and “Total number of unplanned power outages due to deficiency of the Naghlu
Hydropower Plant.” The indicators were insufficient to capture the project’s impact on the electrification of
the households in the project area. The M&E arrangements were in place. DABS was responsible for
overall M&E implementation. A Third-Party Monitoring Agency (TPMA) to be hired under the project was to
verify project implementation progress and the M&E data.
b. M&E Implementation
DABS collected M&E data and reported them bi-weekly. At the time of project restructuring in June 2021,
the results framework was revised to include new indicators related to the increased project scope (i.e.,
addition of the rehabilitation and dam safety of the Darunta Hydropower Plant), but the weaknesses in
adequately capturing the project outcomes, especially those related to the improvement in dam safety
and the sustainability of O&M practices, were not addressed (Because of these shortcomings, the ICR
introduced two new indicators to assess the achievements of the project: (a) Improved O&M of the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant; and (b) Hydromechanical Rehabilitation and Selective Sediment Removal).
The work of the Third-Party Monitoring Agent was critical in implementing M&E during project
implementation and after the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The Third-Party Monitoring Agent was
able to provide detailed information about the status of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant and the
sustainability of the power generation at the power plant at the time of project implementation in May
2022. Given the partial improvement in the O&M capacity of the hydropower plant personnel, it is
expected that the M&E functions and process will be sustained as long as DABS has sufficient funds to
inspect and maintain the power plant.
c. M&E Utilization
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DABS communicated the M&E findings to the Ministry of Energy and the World Bank project team
regularly. The M&E findings led to the cancellation of project activities, such as the civil works to
increase the height of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam. Following the partial assessment of the dam
safety, the M&E findings led to a project restructuring to add the rehabilitation and dam safety of the
Darunta Hydropower to the project scope. However, the M&E findings were insufficient to provide
evidence of the achievement of project outcomes, as the weaknesses in the results framework were not
addressed during project implementation. As explained in the previous section, the ICR adopted two
new indicators to adequately assess the project achievements.
There were some significant weaknesses in the M&E design and implementation making it difficult to
test the links in the causal chain and assess the achievement of the stated objectives, which were
addressed by the ICR through the introduction of two new indicators and additional evidence. Overall,
the M&E quality is rated Modest.
M&E Quality Rating
Modest
10. Other Issues
a. Safeguards
At appraisal, the project was classified as Category A under Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01) and
triggered Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04), Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11), Involuntary
Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12), Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37), and Project on International Waterways (OP/BP
7.50) safeguard policies. The project did not trigger any additional safeguard policy at the time of project
restructuring in June 2021 when rehabilitation and dam safety works related to the Darunta Hydropower
Plant were added to the project scope.
Environmental Assessment (OP/BP 4.01): The project was classified as Category A because of the
potential severe environmental impact of the dam safety activities to be financed under the second
component of the project, such as removal and disposal of sediment material, handling and disposal of
unexploded ordnance, and the increase in dam height and storage that could result in flooding of more land
requiring enhanced water quality control measures in the reservoir. The environmental impact of the
hydropower plant activities to be financed under the first component were expected to be mostly noise, fust,
storage, and handling and disposal of used oils and removes parts. The impact of the project activities
under the third component was negligible as these activities consisted of extending the electricity grid to the
limited number of villages in the project area. A framework approach was adopted “to ensure that the
environmental and social issues associated with each component are fully analyzed and understood and
that the requisite mitigation and other management measures were agree and put in place” (PAD, p.23).
Consequently, DABS prepared an Environmental and Social Management Framework (ESMF) and
Environmental and Environmental and Social Management Plans (ESMPs) for activities under Components
A and C. A separate ESMP was also prepared for the Darunta Hydropower Power Plant dam safety works.
The ESMF and the ESMPs were disclosed in the Afghanistan in the local language and on the World
Bank’s InfoShop in English. The project could not mobilize consultants to complete the Environmental and
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Social Impact Assessment and the related ESMP for the sediment removal and dam safety works related to
the Naghlu Hydropower Plant because of challenging security environment in the project area.
Natural Habitats (OP/BP 4.04): The project triggered this policy because of the potential impact of the
project activities on natural habitats around the reservoir because of an increase in the dam crest planned
under the second component that would have resulted in flooding of additional land beyond the then
present boundaries of the reservoir. As the project did not finance works to increase the height of the dam,
the surface area of the reservoir did not change. Therefore, this safeguard policy was not triggered during
project implementation.
Physical Cultural Resources (OP/BP 4.11): The project triggered this safeguard policy because of the
presence of graves and shrines in the project area, which would have been required to be displaced if the
project had increased the height of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam. As the project did not finance works
to increase the height of the dam, the surface area of the reservoir did not change. Therefore, this
safeguard policy was not triggered during project implementation.
Involuntary Resettlement (OP/BP 4.12): The project triggered this safeguard policy because of the
possibility of land or other asset acquisition that could have been required to create temporary or permanent
roads for sediment removal and the potential impact of the project on the livelihoods of people living
downstream of the dam. A Resettlement Policy Framework was prepared, which would be applicable to
project activities that required land acquisition, asset loss, or resettlement. The ICR does not report the
implementation of this safeguard policy. The project team confirmed that the project activities did not require
any involuntary resettlement of households or businesses and did not have an impact on the livelihoods of
the people in the project area.
Safety of Dams (OP/BP 4.37): The project triggered this safeguard policy because the safety management
of the Naghlu Hydropower Plant dam was unsatisfactory, and the dam required urgent repairs. An
independent Project Technical Advisory Panel was formed to advise on dam safety risks and revise the
dam safety plan that was prepared during project implementation. However, an Emergency Preparedness
Plan, a requirement under this safeguard policy, could not be completed because of the challenges faced in
hiring experts following the end of the contract of the first group of experts. The adverse security situation in
the country and the restrictions imposed following the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic were the main
challenges in hiring qualified experts to reconstitute the Project Technical Advisory Panel and implement the
safeguard policy at both Naghlu Hydropower Plant and Darunta Hydropower Plant dams. The project was
non-compliant with the requirements of the Safety of Dams safeguard policy.
Projects on International Waterways (OP/BP 7.50): The project triggered this safeguard policy as it was
located on the Kabul River, which flows into Pakistan. In accordance with the requirement of this safeguard
policy, the World Bank, on behalf of the Government of Afghanistan, notified the Government of Pakistan on
April 14, 2015 about the project. The World Bank responded to the additional request of the Government of
Pakistan about the project on September 28, 2105. Since the Government of Pakistan did not request any
additional information nor corresponded with the World Bank regarding the project, the Regional Vice-
President approved the start of the project negotiations. It was confirmed that the rehabilitation of the
Naghlu Hydropower Plant and its dam would not adversely affect the quality or quantity of water flows to
other riparian, and the project would not be adversely affected by the other riparian’s use of water (PAD,
p.24). The project was complaint with the requirements of the Projects on International Waterways
safeguards policy.
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b. Fiduciary Compliance
Financial Management
DABS had the overall responsibility for the project’s financial management. A senior financial management
specialist hired under project headed the financial management department of the Project Implementation
Unit (PIU) under DABS. The World Bank provided training on financial management to the staff of the PIU.
A financial management manual was in place for the project. The PIU submitted interim financial reports on
time and in line with the World Bank requirements. There was no overdue financial statement when project
activities ceased following the Taliban takeover in August 2021. The Supreme Audit Office (SAO) carried
out the annual audit of the project with the support of consultants hired under the project. The project team
confirmed that the audit opinions of the SAO were unqualified, and the reports were acceptable to the
World Bank. There were no known issues of corruption or misuse of funds associated with the project.
Procurement
Procurement was conducted in accordance with the World Bank procurement guidelines. Although the
procurement of some contracts started even during project preparation, the project faced significant
procurement delays related to the contracts under Component B. The causes of delays were as follows
(ICR, p.23): (a) Delays in the formation of bid evaluation committees by DABS; (b) lengthy time required for
the preparation of shortlists and bid evaluation reports; (c) gaps in the reports prepared by bid evaluation
committees; and (d) delays in the decisions of the National Procurement Authority. Because of
procurement delays, consultants and contractors could not start their work. These led to a project closing
date extension, and when project activities abruptly ended because of the Taliban takeover in August
2021, most of the activities under the second component had not even started. Although there were some
complaints received by the World Bank regarding how procurement was conducted, the ICR (p.23) reports
that the investigation of these complaints did not discover non-compliance with the World Bank’s
procurement policies and guidelines.
c. Unintended impacts (Positive or Negative)
None.
d. Other
None.
11. Ratings
Reason for
Ratings ICR IEG
Disagreements/Comment
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Moderately Moderately
Outcome
Unsatisfactory Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Bank Performance Moderately Satisfactory
Satisfactory
The M&E design had
weaknesses in adequately
capturing the project outcomes,
and these weaknesses were not
Quality of M&E Substantial Modest addressed during project
implementation. To provide
evidence, the ICR introduced
two new indicators during project
evaluation.
Quality of ICR --- Substantial
12. Lessons
This review has drawn three lessons based on the information in the ICR.
In an FCV status country, prioritizing the rehabilitation and/or overhauling of large generation
assets can deliver high economic results in a relatively short period. It is observed that despite
decades long armed conflict, major generation assets in Afghanistan were significantly in good
shape without any irreversible damage. Such assets do generally continue generating electricity
even during heightened armed conflict periods. Therefore, Naghlu Hydropower Plant did not have
any major damage to its dam or hydroelectric parts before the start of the project. The project
completed the rehabilitation and overhauling the power plants units within the planned period, and
the hydropower plant was able to use its all four units at the same time. Even after the Taliban
takeover, DABS was able to continue with the rehabilitation of the flushing gates, which partially
contributed to the improvement of dam safety and the sustainability of power generation. Therefore,
in FCV status countries, following an initial adequate assessment, prioritizing large generation
assets that have survived armed conflict can yield high economic results.
In high security risk environments, hiring resident engineers familiar with legacy systems
and equipment of the power plants can be more effective to deliver results in hydropower
plant projects rather than trying to hire consultancy firms that might be reluctant to work in
such environments. One of the main reasons for the delay in the implementation of the dam safety
works was the reluctance of international engineering companies to visit the project site. The hiring
of two resident engineers who were familiar with the legacy Russian systems and equipment at the
Naghlu hydropower Plant was effective in delivering results both in the rehabilitation and overhauling
of the units and the partial improvement of the dam safety through the rehabilitation of the flushing
gates. These resident engineers were embedded in the hydropower plant staff and provided
technical assistance to the DABS’ staff in hydropower plant operation and maintenance. Their
technical expertise was also crucial in scoping the rehabilitation works both at Naghlu and Darunta
Hydropower Plants and the preparation of the tender documents. Hiring of resident engineers was
also significantly less expensive that hiring of engineering firms.
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The cost of line-drops to connect households to the distribution grid can be a major barrier
to increasing access to electricity in rural areas. The project financed the expansion of the
distribution grid to a limited number of villages in the project area, but the cost of the line-drops was
excluded from the project financing. This proved to be a major bottleneck because the households
did not have sufficient financial means to cover the cost of connecting to the grid. Therefore,
although the project brought electricity to the villages, fewer households than expected were
connected to the grid. This was a significant weakness in the project design that restricted the
impact of the project on addressing the drivers of fragility through inclusive growth and social
inclusion.
13. Assessment Recommended?
No
14. Comments on Quality of ICR
The ICR provides a candid, accurate, and substantiated set of observations that are aligned to the project
objective. The narrative is supported by new evidence in addition to those in the results framework. The report
follows most of the Bank Guidance and its Appendix L, Preparation of ICR in FCV Setting for IPF Operations.
The ICR provides a complete critique of the project and is sufficiently evaluative; the interrogation of evidence
was sufficient. The theory of change is well-articulated and informs the reader as how the project achievements
were assessed. There is a logical linking and integration of the various parts of the report, and the results are
mutually reinforcing. The entries in section V. Lessons and Recommendations respond to the specific
experiences of the project, but they are mostly in the form of findings rather than lessons learned. Lastly, the
section IV.B. Environmental, Social, and Fiduciary Compliance could have benefited from a more detailed
discussion in accordance with the Bank guidance.
a. Quality of ICR Rating
Substantial
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