WORLD BANK SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT 2023 The World Bank’s commitment to fighting corruption is reflected in robust mechanisms across the institutions that enhance the integrity of our oper- ations. We take very seriously any allegation of fraud, corruption, or other sanctionable practices in the programs we finance. How to Report Fraud or Corruption Anyone can visit www.worldbank.org/fraudandcorruption to fill out the online integrity complaint form. The World Bank reviews all complaints it receives, including those submitted anonymously. All information provided will be treated in the strictest confidence. The World Bank will not disclose any information that may reveal your identity without your consent. For further information on the World Bank’s sanctions system and links to useful documents, please visit: • www.worldbank.org/integrity • www.worldbank.org/sanctions • www.ifc.org/anticorruption • www.miga.org/integrity For inquiries, please contact: Daniel Nikolits, External Affairs Officer, at 1-202-473-2475 or dnikolits@worldbankgroup.org. B » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Table of Contents How to Report Fraud or Corruption and Contact Information Inside cover Abbreviations and Acronyms iii Message from the Managing Director and World Bank Chief Administrative Officer iv Fiscal Year 2023 Summary Results 2 The Sanctions System: An Integral Part of the World Bank’s Anticorruption Efforts   4 The Integrity Vice Presidency 7 Introduction by Mouhamadou Diagne, Integrity Vice President 7 Who We Are 9 What We Do 11 Detect: INT’s Investigations 11 Deter: Sanctions, Referrals, and Integrity Compliance 16 Prevent: Prevention, Risk & Knowledge 20 Revitalizing the World Bank’s International Corruption Hunters Alliance 22 The Office of Suspension and Debarment  25 Introduction by Jamieson A. Smith, Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer  25 Who We Are 26 What We Do 29 OSD Case Summary   29 Outreach, Knowledge, and Events 32 Sanctions Imposed by the SDO Pursuant to Notices of Uncontested Sanctions Proceedings  35 The World Bank Sanctions Board 39 Introduction by Jodi T. Glasow, Executive Secretary to the World Bank Sanctions Board 39 Who We Are 40 What We Do 43 Knowledge Sharing and Engagement with Stakeholders 45 Summary of Precedent in FY23 46 Annexes: Fiscal Year 2023 Sanctions System Data 49 Endnotes 59 SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023 « i List of Figures and Tables Figure 1: Offices of the Sanctions System 4 Figure 2: Regional Breakdown of External Investigation Opened in FY23 11 Figure 3: Duration and Regional Breakdown of Active External Investigations at the end of FY23 12 Figure 4: Duration and Regional Breakdown of Completed External Investigations in FY23 12 Figure 5: Subjects of Internal Investigations in FY23 14 Figure 6: Outcomes of INT’s Closed Internal Investigations in FY23 14 Figure 7: Number of cases and settlements reviewed by OSD, FY19–23 30 Figure 8: Number of sanctions cases submitted by INT and reviewed by OSD, FY19–23 30 Figure 9: SDO findings of sufficient/insufficient evidence (by case) 30 Figure 10: Percentage of cases & settlements reviewed by OSD, by type of sanctionable practice   31 Figure 11: Regional Origin of Respondents Sanctioned by the SDO and the Sanctions Board, FY19–23 32 Figure 12: Regional Origin of Respondents Sanctioned by Settlement, FY19–23   32 Figure 13: Location of Misconduct Sanctioned by the SDO and the Sanctions Board, FY19–23 32 Figure 14: Location of Misconduct Sanctioned by Settlement, FY19–FY23 32 Figure 15: Types of Disputes Reviewed 43 Figure 16: Types of Sanctions Imposed on Respondents by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23 44 Figure 17: Decisions Issued by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23 44 Figure B.1: Type of Sanctions Imposed by the SDO, the Sanctions Board, and Pursuant to Settlement, FY19–23 51 Figure B.2: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the SDO*, FY19–23 51 Figure B.3: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23* 52 Figure B.4: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23* 52 Figure E.1: Entities Released from World Bank Sanctions Upon Satisfaction of Compliance Conditions, by Source of Original Sanction, FY19–FY23 57 Table A.1: Sanctionable Practices Identified in Substantiated External Investigation Cases, FY19–FY23 49 Table A.2: Internal Investigation Cases, FY23 49 Table A.3: Overview of Internal Investigation Outcomes, FY19–FY23 50 Table B.2: Settlement Agreements, FY19–23 50 Table B.3: Sanctions Results, FY19–23 50 Table C.1: Firms/Individuals Debarred in FY23 53 Table C.2: Other Sanctions Imposed in FY23 54 Table C.3: Cross-Debarments Recognized by the World Bank in FY23 54 Table C.3, continued 55 Table C.4: Vendors Declared Ineligible in FY23 56 Table D.1: Detailed Referrals Made in FY23 56 Table E.1: Integrity Compliance Data, FY22–FY23 57 Table E.2: Entities Released from Sanction upon Satisfaction of Compliance Conditions, FY23 58 ii » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Abbreviations and Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank LCR Latin America & the Caribbean Region AFE Africa Eastern and Southern Region MDBs Multilateral development banks AFW Africa Western and Central Region MIGA Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency AfDB African Development Bank MNA Middle East & North Africa Region DFL Digital Forensics Lab OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development EAP East Asia & Pacific Region OSD World Bank’s Office of Suspension and EBRD European Bank for Reconstruction and Debarment Development PaCVP People and Culture Vice President ECA Europe & Central Asia Region PIU Project implementation unit EO Evaluation and Suspension Officer PSU Preventive Services Unit FCS Fragile and Conflict-Affected Situations SAO Supreme Audit Office FCV Fragility, Conflict, and Violence SAR South Asia Region IBRD International Bank for Reconstruction and Development SDO World Bank’s Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer ICC International Chamber of Commerce SPADR World Bank’s Director of Strategy, Performance ICHA World Bank’s International Corruption Hunters and Administration Alliance STC Short-term consultant ICO Integrity Compliance Office TTL Task team leader ICP Integrity Compliance Program UNODC United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime IDA International Development Association UNWTO United Nations World Tourism Organization IDB Inter-American Development Bank IFC International Finance Corporation INT World Bank’s Integrity Vice Presidency SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023 « iii Message from the Managing Director and World Bank Chief Administrative Officer The world is facing a pivotal to ensure that the World Bank’s development resources are moment of urgent global chal- used transparently, accountably, and only for their intended lenges such as climate change, purposes. fragility, pandemic preparedness, food security, energy and water It is critical for our institutions to have robust mechanisms to access, addressing learning losses, help ensure that if companies or individuals engage in fraud digitization, and trade integration. or corruption involving World Bank funds, there are ways to These intertwined crises require hold them to account. That is the driving mission behind the that the world come together and offices of the World Bank’s sanctions system, which include act with common purpose to over- the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), the Office of Suspension come them. Today, the World Bank is working to revitalize and Debarment (OSD), and the Sanctions Board and its its mission to meet the urgency this moment calls for. There Secretariat. Together these independent offices provide our are many good lessons from our past to draw from, but we institution and respondent parties with a fair, impartial, and will also need to think creatively to develop new tools for transparent process for investigating and adjudicating alle- bringing more development resources to the table and gations of fraud and corruption in World Bank operations. In expanding our impact. this way, they support the World Bank’s development mis- sion by strengthening the integrity of our operations. Yet, one thing that will not change is the World Bank’s com- mitment and vigilance against corruption in the projects we This year, the offices of the sanctions system continued finance. Corruption is corrosive to development and under- their mission with diligence. INT supported the World Bank’s mines the progress that we aspire to achieve. The victims of operations by working to detect, deter, and prevent fraud corruption are the people whose lives should be improved and corruption. INT’s investigations are the starting point by the projects we invest in. We will not waver in our efforts for accountability, but they are also the basis for how our We will not waver in our efforts to ensure that the World Bank’s development resources are used transparently, accountably, and only for their intended purposes. iv » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  institution gains insights into fraud and corruption risks Corruption Hunters Alliance (ICHA) 2023 Forum, held this and adapts future operations to mitigate such risks. As the year in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire. More than 350 anticorruption first tier of adjudicative review, OSD worked to provide fair actors from over 80 countries gathered to share knowledge assessments and efficient decisions across the World Bank’s and experience, and reinforce the view that only through sanctions cases and settlement agreements, as well as the collective action will we be able to overcome our common cross-debarments received from our partner multilateral challenges. development banks. And the Sanctions Board continued to review contested sanctions cases, issuing their decisions to One can draw some optimism from the dedication to integ- provide a second and final determination through the impar- rity, transparency, and accountability exhibited by the staff tial views of a panel of independent external experts. across the sanctions system offices. Their professionalism and determination reinforce the World Bank’s commitment to Moreover, this year the offices of the sanctions system anticorruption. The work ahead will not be easy, but whether amplified their engagement with partners around the world it be achieving development outcomes at the scale the world to strengthen the global coalition of anticorruption actors. needs, or fighting corruption with vigor and urgency, the I was pleased to speak at the World Bank’s International World Bank stands ready as a partner for development. Shaolin Yang Managing Director and World Bank Chief Administrative Officer SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023 « 1 Fiscal Year 2023 Summary Results This annual report covers fiscal year 2023—from July 1, 2022, to June 30, 2023—and was prepared by the offices of the World Bank’s1 sanctions system, which comprises the Integrity Vice Presidency (INT), the Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD), and the Sanctions Board and its Secretariat. In fiscal year 2023 (FY23): • INT received 4,646 complaint submissions, of which • The Sanctions Board published four fully-reasoned 292 were determined to be actionable. INT opened decisions resolving four contested sanctions cases 64 new and closed 44 existing external investiga- against six respondents. The Sanctions Board con- tions. INT submitted 13 sanctions cases and five vened for hearings in three of those cases. settlements to OSD. One additional settlement was submitted to the IFC Evaluation Officer for review. Beyond the core mandate of the World Bank sanctions sys- tem, in FY23: • OSD reviewed 12 cases and five settlements, tempo- rarily suspended 11 firms and eight individuals, and • INT pursued 28 cases of alleged fraud and corrup- sanctioned 11 respondents via uncontested determi- tion involving World Bank staff and18 cases involving nations. corporate vendors. INT substantiated misconduct alle- gations in three World Bank staff cases and in four • The Integrity Compliance Office (ICO) sent 21 notices corporate vendor cases. to newly sanctioned parties on their conditions for release from sanction and engaged with 91 sanctioned • INT strengthened collaboration among its prevention, parties towards meeting their conditions for release. complaints intake, forensic and digital audits, and data analysis teams to deliver greater impact for the institu- • In addition, the ICO determined that17 entities had tion through prevention, risk analytics, and knowledge. met their conditions for release from sanction, one entity had met the conditions for the conversion of • The sanctions system offices engaged with peer multi- its sanction to conditional non-debarment, and one lateral development banks (MDBs) to further inter- entity had not met its conditions for non-debarment institutional harmonization efforts, including by adopt- and its sanction was converted to a debarment with ing the “MDB General Principles for Business Integrity conditional release. Programmes,” which outline the common approach and guidance for implementing such programs. 12 referrals—eight detailed referrals and • INT issued four summary notification letters—to 11 different • The International Corruption Hunters Alliance (ICHA) recipient countries, when evidence indicated that a 2023 Forum convened more than 350 frontline anticor- member country’s laws may have been violated. ruption actors from over 80 countries in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, to engage in three days of knowledge sharing, 2 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  networking, and strengthening partnerships for collective support of enhancing supranational remedies against anticorruption action to combat global corruption chal- corruption. lenges. Contributions from each of the sanctions system • The Sanctions Board published the Third Edition of its offices added to the Forum’s success. Law Digest, which summarizes the evolving jurispru- • OSD published a Knowledge Report on the Sympo- dence and precedent of the Sanctions Board, hosting a sium on Supranational Responses to Corruption that public event to discuss the importance of transparency convened in 2022, highlighting the lessons learned in its work and the efforts to harmonize sanctions pro- from panels, discussions, and informal exchanges in ceedings among the MDBs. IBRD 47427 • August 2023 The staff across the World Bank’s sanctions system bring diverse experiences, skills, and backgrounds that reflect the shared commitment to principles of diversity, equity, and inclusion by the offices of the sanctions system. Including the Sanctions Board members, staff across the sanctions system come from 46 countries spanning the world (see map above). SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023 « 3 The Sanctions System An Integral Part of the World Bank’s Anticorruption Efforts   • Corruption undermines development objectives, interferes and individuals involved in World Bank operations in three with the World Bank s fiduciary responsibility, and damages ’ stages: (i) investigating whether there is sufficient evi- the reputation of the World Bank and its clients. As such, the dence of the allegations to seek sanctions; (ii) adjudicating World Bank takes seriously all allegations of fraud and cor- whether there is sufficient evidence to sanction the firm or ruption in the projects it finances. The sanctions system is individual and what the proper sanction should be; and (iii) a key component of the World Bank’s anticorruption efforts. engaging with firms and individuals sanctioned with integ- It ensures that fraud and corruption impacting World Bank rity compliance conditions to assist them and ultimately operations are addressed efficiently and fairly for the bene- determine whether they have satisfied the conditions fit of the World Bank’s member countries, and that a strong imposed for their release from sanction. deterrence message is complemented with a focus on pre- vention and integrity compliance programs. Investigation The World Bank’s sanctions system is one aspect of the The Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) monitors integrity risks inter-institutional approach to anticorruption that encom- in World Bank operations and receives allegations about passes its external and internal activities to confront potential misconduct from a variety of sources. All allega- corruption at the project, country, and global levels. These tions are reviewed and assessed by INT. Matters that relate include external activities such as efforts to detect, diag- to a sanctionable practice in a World Bank-financed project nose, and measure fraud and corruption; to support national and fall within INT’s responsibility may warrant a full inves- anticorruption strategies, policies, and practices; and to help tigation. Increasingly, INT is utilizing a risk-based approach design oversight and accountability mechanisms to prevent to the assessment, follow-up, and analysis of complaints, to corruption, as well as internal efforts to prevent and mitigate the selection of cases, and to the proactive identification of integrity risks in operations.2 high-risk projects and cases. When INT completes an inves- tigation and determines it has found credible evidence of How the Sanctions System Works sanctionable conduct, INT can seek sanctions against the firms and individuals involved by either submitting a sanc- The World Bank’s sanctions system addresses allegations tions case to the first tier of review in the sanctions system, of fraud, corruption, collusion, coercion, and obstruction or by negotiating a settlement. (collectively known as “sanctionable practices”) by firms FIGURE 1: Offices of the Sanctions System Investigative Adjudicative Compliance Sanctions Board Chief Suspension & Integrity Vice Debarment Officer Integrity Compliance Presidency / Evaluation & Office Suspension Officers Uncontested sanctions & Settlements Note: Investigations into World Bank staff and corporate vendors are adjudicated outside the sanctions system (see pg. 13). 4 || SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  What are the World Bank’s Sanctionable Practices? › A corrupt practice is the offering, giving, receiving, or soliciting, directly or indirectly, of anything of value to influence improperly the actions of another party. › A fraudulent practice is any act or omission, including a misrepresentation, that knowingly or recklessly mis- leads, or attempts to mislead, a party to obtain a financial or other benefit or to avoid an obligation. › A coercive practice is impairing or harming, or threatening to impair or harm, directly or indirectly, any party or the property of the party to influence improperly the actions of a party. › A collusive practice is an arrangement between two or more parties designed to achieve an improper purpose, including influencing improperly the actions of another party. › An obstructive practice is (a) deliberately destroying, falsifying, altering, or concealing evidence material to an investigation or making false statements to investigators in order to materially impede a World Bank inves- tigation into allegations of a corrupt, fraudulent, coercive or collusive practice; and/or threatening, harassing or intimidating any party to prevent it from disclosing its knowledge of matters relevant to an investigation or from pursuing the investigation, or (b) acts intended to materially impede the exercise of the World Bank’s contractual rights of inspection and audit. Source: Guidelines on Preventing and Combating Fraud and Corruption in Projects Financed by IBRD Loans and IDA Credits and Grants (revised as of July 1, 2016). Adjudication MIGA projects, financing, and guarantees. A case reaches this stage if the respondent chooses to contest liability First Tier of Review. At this stage, a first-tier review officer— and/or the sanction recommended by any of the first-tier the Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer (SDO) for cases review officers. The Sanctions Board reviews cases de that involve public sector IBRD/IDA financing, or the relevant novo, without reexamining decisions made at the first tier. Evaluation and Suspension Officers (EOs) for cases relating The Sanctions Board considers the entire case record and to IFC, MIGA, and IBRD/IDA Guarantees and Carbon Finance affords the parties an opportunity to make any additional Operations—assesses the evidence presented by INT. If the arguments, furnish new evidence, and be heard at a hearing evidence is sufficient, the first-tier officer will issue a formal if one is so convened. Sanctions Board decisions are final notice to the accused respondent, recommend a sanction, and unappealable. and if the recommended sanction includes a minimum period of debarment of at least 6 months, will immediately suspend the respondent from eligibility to engage in World Integrity Compliance Bank operations until the conclusion of sanctions proceed- Most respondents in the sanctions system are sanctioned ings. The first-tier officer also considers INT requests for with integrity compliance conditions that must be met early temporary suspensions, reviews proposed settlement before they can be released from sanction. To demon- agreements, and imposes sanctions on respondents that do strate this, they must engage with the World Bank Integrity not contest their case to the Sanctions Board. In FY23, all Compliance Office (ICO), which works with sanctioned sanctions cases, and five of the six settlements, submitted respondents to help explain the integrity compliance condi- by INT were submitted to the SDO; the remaining settlement tions, recommend enhancements to their internal controls was submitted to the EO for IFC.3 to best satisfy those conditions, and monitor their progress Second Tier of Review. The Sanctions Board is an inde- toward meeting the conditions. This engagement culmi- pendent body comprising seven individual members who nates with the Integrity Compliance Officer determining are entirely external to the World Bank. It is the second tier whether the conditions have been met for the respondents’ of review for all sanctions cases involving IBRD, IDA, IFC, or release from sanction. THE SANCTIONS SYSTEM  || 5  INT’s mission is to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption in the World Bank’s operations, which the staff within INT carry out with dedication and professionalism. 6 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  The Integrity Vice Presidency Supporting the World Bank’s anticorruption agenda through investigations into fraud and corruption, strengthening integrity compliance, and providing insights into integrity risk prevention. Introduction by The Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) is central to the World Mouhamadou Diagne, Bank’s anticorruption efforts to ensure accountability involv- Integrity Vice President ing its financial resources. INT’s mission is to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption in the World Bank’s oper- With its mission to support ations, which the staff within INT carry out with dedication sustainable and inclusive devel- and professionalism. This fiscal year was no exception. INT opment, the World Bank is square opened 64 new and closed 44 existing external investiga- in the middle of today’s defin- tions and submitted 13 sanctions cases and five settlements ing global challenges. Climate for review and adjudication. As a result of some of these and change. Pandemic diseases. War earlier submitted cases and settlements, the World Bank and conflict. Each brings with it real human impacts—on debarred or otherwise sanctioned 23 firms and individuals. livelihoods, on health, on personal security. Unaddressed, In addition, the Integrity Compliance Office within INT deter- poverty will persist, and could worsen. Moreover, in an era mined that 17 entities had met their conditions for release of lackluster global growth, high debt burdens, and tenuous from sanction, making them eligible to again participate in economic outlooks, countries may have limited capacity to projects financed by the World Bank. confront these mounting debts. Anticorruption investigations are the core of INT’s work, In this context, it is critical that the World Bank stand as a providing the evidence for the World Bank’s sanctioning ready partner to help provide and mobilize resources for determinations and forming the basis for insights into integ- countries to address these challenges and invest in their rity risks that can help inform future projects in mitigating development goals. such risks. Yet, INT has also made progress in expanding our anticorruption toolkit to be more agile and deliver greater To ensure that these resources are deployed for their max- impact. Among our efforts this year: imum impact, the World Bank must also be vigilant to the risks of corruption. Indeed, in all sectors of the World Bank’s • INT increasingly approached our preventive work to work, corruption can blunt the desired development results align in lockstep with the strategic priorities of World by draining and diverting much needed resources. Left Bank operational units, in areas such as emergency unchecked, corruption can eat away at trust within society, operations and FCV settings. These efforts include facil- weakening government ties to their citizens and raising ten- itating integrity clinics and targeted trainings for project sions that may cause issues of fragility and conflict to fester. implementation units along with capacity-building ini- Corruption remains a concern for development, one that the tiatives for in-country partners. World Bank takes very seriously in its work. THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 7 • We have further developed our pipeline of knowledge convening of the fifth International Corruption Hunters Alli- products, which we began to roll out with key stake- ance Forum, to our strong contribution at the International holders within the World Bank. For example, packaging Anti-Corruption Conference, to our ongoing work with other recent lessons learned from INT investigations in FCV MDBs to further harmonize our frameworks and coordinate settings to help inform operations staff of risks and our response to fraud and corruption in development, we are options for mitigation. committed to strengthening the global network of frontline anticorruption partners—from across governments, the pri- • INT’s data teams continue to leverage Cloud technology vate sector, and civil society alike. and expand the use of datasets to build out a robust dig- ital infrastructure that can enhance our use of analytics Through our collective action, we can draw on a deeper pool not only in our investigative work, but also to help us bet- of resources and the comparative advantages of diverse ter identify and address integrity risks at earlier stages. stakeholders in combatting corruption. Moreover, we recog- • We have also expanded INT’s global footprint with our nize that fighting corruption is a concern for and a shared first field office in Dakar, Senegal, now fully operational. responsibility of all countries, so we will continue to support This effort brings INT staff closer to World Bank projects, efforts that help us act with urgency and in concert with our with the expectation that it will heighten our ability to partners to advance the global anticorruption agenda. respond to integrity risks on the ground. The challenges facing us today make INT’s mission of detect- These efforts will help INT continue to be effective in carrying ing, deterring, and preventing fraud and corruption for the out its mission. Still, we also recognize that in a world where World Bank more relevant than ever. Our commitment to that corruption concerns are increasingly complex and trans- mission endures. Together with our partners inside the World national in nature, no single institution can confront them Bank and around the globe, we look forward to continuing our alone. This is why INT has actively engaged with our partners work in support of the ambitious development agenda that this year to bolster our ability to act collectively. From INT’s the world needs, expects, and deserves. Mouhamadou Diagne Integrity Vice President 8 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Who We Are The Integrity Vice Presidency (INT) is an independent unit within the World Bank that works to detect, deter, and prevent fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed operations and by World Bank staff and corporate vendors. INT’s staff consists of a global cadre of professionals who are dedicated to the unit’s anticorruption mission. They consist of investigators, lawyers, forensic accountants, economists, risk specialists, data scientists, and information system specialists. As of the end of FY23, INT had 78 full-time staff, along with 21 consultants.4 INT Staff Profiles LORNA JACOBSON, Knowledge Management Analyst Lorna Jacobson is the Knowledge Management Analyst at INT. In this capacity, she coordinates INT participation in various trainings across the World Bank and with the institution’s partners. Her work includes supporting INT staff with their learning, as well as INT’s trainings on integrity risks and risk mitigation to Bank staff and implementation partners. Prior to joining INT, Lorna worked for various international organizations includ- ing the United Nations World Tourism Organization, where she worked with the agency’s Executive Secretary of the UNWTO Knowledge Network. How does INT INT works with diverse World Bank partners across all regions—procurement specialists, support World Bank project implementation teams, country-based colleagues—by delivering training to high- project teams and light integrity risks that have been identified through INT investigations and mitigation implementation measures that can be put in place; and producing knowledge products from lessons learned. partners to improve their knowledge and For example, our Warning Signs of Fraud and Corruption in Procurement brochure, which understanding about was prepared in partnership with World Bank procurement colleagues, provides insights into integrity risk issues? the “red flags” that may indicate corruption in procurement and what our partners need to be mindful of to mitigate these risks. Why is it critical for INT Outreach for INT is essential. It allows us an opportunity to raise awareness of integrity to conduct outreach risks and to convey the critical role that World Bank staff and development partners play to share its knowledge in identifying, managing, and mitigating corruption concerns. Exchanging knowledge and and expertise with World Bank develop- experiences with our partners is critical for our collective success. These exchanges help to ment partners? surface today’s corruption trends and challenges from many perspectives, how they can be overcome, and how to advance our common anticorruption agenda together. THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 9 INT Staff Profiles ANTHONY PAN, Counsel, Integrity Compliance Specialist Anthony Pan is an Integrity Compliance Specialist in INT. He advises on integrity com- pliance programs (ICPs) and facilitates the rehabilitation of entities under sanction for fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed projects. His work includes providing rec- ommendations on sanctioned entities’ ICP policies and procedures and assessing the effectiveness of their implementation. He also contributes to the ongoing outreach efforts of the World Bank’s Integrity Compliance Office (ICO). Prior to joining INT, Anthony worked in investigations and compliance in the United States and in Asia. The ICO team Each engagement with entities subject to World Bank sanction is a unique opportunity focuses on engag- to promote the awareness of integrity compliance and to share our expertise and expe- ing with companies rience in anticorruption. Through collaborating closely with the ICO, sanctioned entities following sanctions have the opportunity to come out of World Bank sanction with more effective and indi- decisions. How do these efforts support vidually tailored tools to detect and prevent fraud and corruption. The knowledge and INT’s anticorruption awareness that entities gain throughout the process also helps to cultivate a culture of mission? integrity in regions and countries where the World Bank operates. Beyond monitoring The ICO works with a diverse array of entities, and to maximize our impact, we make every companies’ progress effort to be innovative in our outreach. We speak at conferences, we hold workshops, and toward meeting their we follow up on questions. These efforts have helped us successfully open dialogues with release conditions, how many sanctioned entities who were otherwise too intimidated or dejected to engage with does the ICO team help strengthen integ- the ICO initially. We have also made meaningful connections with industry associations rity standards more and government actors who are in a position to help improve integrity standards in their broadly? business sectors and regions. In addition, the ICO has created a mentorship program, pairing entities who have successfully completed the conditional release process with cur- rently sanctioned entities similar in size, industry, background, and/or language to share their experience in effectively developing and implementing ICPs and the associated pos- itive outcomes. INT Staff At-A-Glance 78 STAFF FROM 34 SPEAKING 40 56% FEMALE COUNTRIES LANGUAGES 44% MALE 10 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  What We Do To encourage a global and coordinated response to corruption, INT also spearheads initiatives such as the INT’s core anticorruption function is to support the develop- cross-debarment agreement with other MDBs and lever- ment efforts of the World Bank by working to ensure that the ages the World Bank’s convening power to bring together institution’s resources are used only for their intended pur- global anticorruption professionals to strengthen col- poses. INT does this by detecting, deterring, and preventing lective action, including through the World Bank’s ICHA fraud and corruption in World Bank-financed activities. Forum. • DETECT: Through preliminary reviews and investigations, INT ascertains whether firms and individuals doing DETECT: INT’s Investigations business under World Bank-financed operations have engaged in one or more of the World Bank’s sanction- Detecting fraud and corruption is a cornerstone of INT’s able practices in violation of its anticorruption policies. mandate. Investigations are the primary means used by INT’s mandate includes investigating allegations involv- INT to fulfill this mandate and represent a majority of INT’s ing World Bank staff and corporate vendors, which are annual work program. While INT is an independent unit, its addressed via administrative processes outside the investigations are conducted within the broader operational sanctions system. context of the World Bank and in service of the institutions’ development mission. • DETER: When INT obtains evidence it believes demon- strates that firms and individuals have more likely than EXTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS not engaged in sanctionable practices within World In FY23 INT opened 64 investigations, each addressing one Bank operations, INT pursues sanctions via settlement or more sanctionable practices. Sixteen more new cases or proceedings in the sanctions system. Sanctions hold were opened compared to FY22 (48), which constitutes a wrongdoers accountable for their misconduct and help 33% increase. During FY23, INT fully returned to operational deter others from engaging in similar conduct. investigative travel, permitting in-situ forensic audits in new In addition, through the ICO, the World Bank engages investigations and pending investigations that started before with sanctioned firms and individuals to support their or during the COVID-19 restrictions. At the end of FY23, INT efforts towards meeting the conditions for their release had 113 active investigations across all the World Bank’s from sanctions. Through these engagements, the World regions, as well as involving IFC operations. Bank emphasizes rehabilitation through the adoption and effective implementation of appropriate integrity If INT concludes that an investigation has uncovered suffi- compliance measures and promotes higher business cient evidence of one or more sanctionable practices, the integrity standards in the countries where the World Bank relevant allegations are deemed substantiated. INT then operates. produces a Final Investigation Report summarizing the find- ings of the investigation for submission to the appropriate • PREVENT: INT turns the unique knowledge gained from operational staff, and ultimately to the World Bank Presi- its complaints, investigations, diagnostics, and ana- dent. In FY23, INT completed 44 investigations, 31 of which it lytical activities into practical preventive advice and deemed substantiated. targeted advisory interventions and/or training for iden- tifying, managing, and mitigating fraud and corruption Although the nature and complexity of investigations can risks in World Bank operations. vary widely, INT strives to ensure that all its investigations FIGURE 2: Regional Breakdown of External Investigation Opened in FY23 64 18 13 6 13 3 2 6 3 investigations (28.1%) (20.3%) (9.4%) (20.3%) (4.7%) (9.4%) (4.7%) started in FY23 AFE AFW EAP ECA LCR SAR IFC (3.1%) MNA THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 11 FIGURE 3: Duration and Regional Breakdown of Active External Investigations at the end of FY23 63 24 26 (55.8%) (21.2%) (23.0%) 113 open for less than 12 months open for open for more than active 12–18 months 18 months investigations at the end of FY23 31 19 12 25 5 3 15 3 (27.4%) (16.8%) (10.6%) (22.1%) (13.3%) AFE AFW EAP ECA SAR (4.4%) (2.7%) (2.7%) LCR MNA IFC FIGURE 4: Duration and Regional Breakdown of Completed External Investigations in FY23 31 13 (70.5%) were substantiated (29.5%) were not substantiated 44 6 10 28 investigations (13.6%) (22.7%) completed (63.6%) completed in completed in within 12 completed more than 18 months FY23 months 12–18 months 7 8 6 11 3 3 4 2 (15.9%) (18.2%) (13.6%) (25.0%) (6.8%)(6.8%) (9.1%) AFE AFW EAP ECA LCR MNA EAP (4.5%) IFC are impactful. This impact can be seen throughout the life whether INT’s accusations against a respondent are sup- cycle of a World Bank project. For example, information ported by sufficient evidence to sanction that respondent obtained through the investigation process is shared with and, if so, what sanction should be imposed. management and operational counterparts, who are then better equipped to consider risks during project preparation In certain cases, INT may conclude that a negotiated set- and mitigate risks during implementation. Public sanctions tlement is an appropriate way to address sanctionable arising from INT investigations not only remove debarred misconduct. Settlements typically include three parts: actors who have engaged in fraud and corruption from World a sanction, a set of integrity compliance conditions, and Bank-financed activities but also provide a clear and power- ongoing cooperation requirements. The specific terms of ful deterrent to misconduct and help strengthen and enforce the settlement take into account, among other factors, the accountability in public tenders in countries and sectors nature and gravity of the misconduct, and the degree of receiving World Bank financing. cooperation provided by the respondent to INT during the investigation. All settlements must be cleared by the World Once allegations have been substantiated, INT may seek Bank’s General Counsel and then reviewed by the SDO or sanctions against the firm or individual involved in the relevant EO. misconduct. Sanctions can be imposed either through a sanctions proceeding or a negotiated settlement. In sanc- Sanctions that may be imposed through a negotiated set- tions proceedings, INT prepares a Statement of Accusations tlement or sanctions proceeding include debarment with and Evidence that presents in detail the evidence of sanc- conditional release; fixed-term debarment; conditional tionable conduct. The two-tier sanctions system decides non-debarment; letter of reprimand; and restitution. The World Bank’s baseline sanction for firms and individuals is 12 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Illustrative External Investigation in FY23 Uncovering a collusive scheme to influence contract tenders INT completed investigations into allegations of fraud bidders during the procurement process, and draft and collusion under two World Bank-financed projects evaluation reports. INT also found evidence indicating in a country in Central Asia. INT initially began looking that the consortium submitted falsified documents in into allegations that the Project Coordinator for these its bids for the procurement of the contracts. More- projects had submitted falsified credentials in order to over, INT found evidence indicating that the evaluation meet the qualifications for the role. As INT investigated, committee was going to recommend the award of both it not only found evidence supporting these allegations, contracts to the consortium. but also uncovered a larger scheme at play. Through early intervention during the procurement Through records collected during a separate inves- process, INT was able to help prevent the award of the tigation of collusion in the same country, INT found contracts to the consortium. INT also shared its find- evidence that the Project Coordinator along with two ings in a referral report to the country’s government, other public officials colluded with a consortium of leading to the removal of the Project Coordinator from several bidders to influence the procurement of two their position. Through this investigation, INT helped to World Bank-financed contracts with a combined esti- detect and prevent potential misconduct, protecting mated value of approximately $3 million. Specifically, World Bank development resources and identifying les- these individuals leaked confidential information to the sons for strengthening policies and awareness of risks consortium, including draft bidding documents prior to help mitigate similar misconduct from occurring in to their publication, correspondence with competing the future. a debarment with conditional release for three years, though vendor eligibility determinations, leading to possible ineli- there is flexibility to determine the length, sequencing, and gibility and, in some cases, debarment from operational terms of a sanction to suit the specific facts and circum- contracts as well. stances of a case. (Further details on the sanctions case Upon receipt of a complaint, INT internal investigations follow submissions, settlements, and sanctions imposed in FY23 a similar three-stage process as its external investigations: are provided later in this report.) intake and evaluation; preliminary inquiry; and investiga- INTERNAL INVESTIGATIONS tion. An internal investigation entails gathering, weighing, and analyzing facts, assessing the credibility of the parties Ensuring the integrity of the World Bank’s own staff is to a case, and producing a comprehensive report that pro- critical to maintaining institutional credibility in the global vides a complete and balanced account, including all known anticorruption arena. Through its internal investiga- material facts and circumstances, relevant evidence, analy- tions, INT investigates allegations of fraud and corruption sis and evaluation of the evidence, and objective fact-based involving staff and occurring in World Bank operations or conclusions. During the course of a preliminary inquiry or full supported activities (i.e., operational fraud and corruption) investigation, INT may establish sufficient evidence to show or affecting the institution’s administrative budgets (i.e., the allegations are unfounded, thus clearing a staff member corporate fraud and corruption). Examples of allegations or corporate vendor of any wrongdoing. This is an equally against staff within INT’s investigative mandate include important outcome for both the World Bank and the staff abuse of position for personal gain, misuse of World Bank member or corporate vendor. funds or trust funds, embezzlement, fraud, corruption, collusion, coercion, and attendant conflicts of interest or During FY23, INT pursued 28 cases involving World Bank lesser included acts of misconduct. INT also investigates staff and 18 cases involving corporate vendors.5 Forty six allegations against corporate vendors involving the sanc- percent of INT’s investigations involved operations, 41% tionable practices in support of the World Bank’s corporate involved corporate administrative matters, and 13% were THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 13 a combination of both. In addition, INT assessed 174 com- all staff members, including those who are accused, those plaints related to staff and corporate vendors—a record who report allegations, and those who serve as witnesses number of complaints. However, even as pandemic-related in a case. challenges abate, the complaints were often of lower quality both in terms of evidence provided and follow-up responses If the investigation establishes sufficient evidence, INT pre- given by complainants upon INT’s request. pares a final investigative report, inclusive of all evidence, and provides it to the implicated staff member for com- It is critically important that the World Bank meets the high- ment. INT then finalizes the report, incorporating the staff est standards and addresses all material risks when it comes member’s comments and any INT rebuttal to those com- to the integrity of its own staff and entities it directly does ments, and submits the report to the World Bank’s People business with. As a result, INT undertakes preliminary inqui- and Culture Vice President (PaCVP) for decision. If the ries of all credible allegations against World Bank staff and PaCVP finds misconduct, discipline can range from an oral corporate vendors and does not triage cases according to reprimand to termination of the staff member’s employ- risk factors and strategic priorities at the complaint stage ment. A staff member has the right to appeal the PaCVP’s as is done for external investigations. Because of this, pro- disciplinary decision to the Administrative Tribunal, whose portionally more allegations in internal investigations are judgments are binding. unsubstantiated following preliminary inquiries. In FY23, following the preliminary inquiries referenced Investigations of World Bank Staff above, INT conducted five Staff Rule 8.01 investigations INT’s procedures for investigating allegations of staff mis- and substantiated staff misconduct in three cases. In one conduct are governed by the policies set forth in Staff Rule of the substantiated staff cases, the PaCVP decided that 8.01 and are further informed by the judgments issued the staff member should be terminated from employment, by the World Bank’s Administrative Tribunal. These pro- permanently ineligible for future World Bank employment, cedures are designed to protect and respect the rights of provide restitution, and be restricted from access to all FIGURE 5: Subjects of Internal Investigations in FY23 Sta 28 Vendor 18 FIGURE 6: Outcomes of INT’s Closed Internal Investigations in FY23 3 Substantiated 4 5 Unsubstantiated 2 Unfounded 3 Sta Vendor Notes: Substantiated case: A determination that, based on the results of the investigation, the evidence supports a finding of misconduct. Unfounded case: The results of a preliminary inquiry or investigation established sufficient evidence supporting a conclusion that misconduct, as alleged, did not occur. Unsubstantiated case: The preliminary inquiry or investigation, due to a lack of evidence, did not establish a reasonable basis to warrant further investigation or a reasonable belief to substantiate that misconduct was committed. Some credible information may have been present, which if corrob- orated would have established a reasonable belief, but as it stands does not rise above the suspicion level. In other words, there was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation or to prove or disprove that misconduct was committed, and the decision then falls in favor of the staff member or vendor. 14 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  World Bank premises. Two other staff cases are pending In FY23, INT closed six corporate vendor cases, four of PaCVP decisions. which were substantiated. Of the four substantiated vendor cases, one was concluded through the simplified off-ramp INT aims to complete staff cases within nine months (270 procedure.9 All four substantiated cases are pending non-re- days).6 In FY23, the average turnaround time for the 11 staff sponsibility determinations by the SPADR as of the end of cases closed was 475 days or approximately 16 months.7 FY23. The SPADR also temporarily suspended two corporate The increased turnaround time was a direct consequence vendors pending vendor eligibility determinations. of several investigative staff prioritizing substantive and resource-intense complex, multidimensional, high-risk cases. Disclosures Made by World Bank Staff During FY23, 40 World Bank staff (i.e., regular staff, former Investigations of World Bank Corporate Vendors staff, extended- and short-term consultants, and tem- INT’s investigations of allegations against World Bank poraries) made protected disclosures related to internal corporate vendors support the institution’s vendor eligi- investigations by raising misconduct allegations to INT’s bility reviews.8 The Director of Strategy, Performance and attention, including staff qualifying for whistleblower pro- Administration (SPADR) makes determinations of non-re- tection under Staff Rule 8.02.10 In addition, 69 of the 292 sponsibility of corporate vendors to exclude them from external actionable complaints received in FY23 were eligibility to receive contract awards from the World Bank based on information provided to INT by World Bank staff. and/or bid on World Bank corporate solicitations. Implicated INT is grateful to those staff members who have forwarded vendors are provided an opportunity to respond to the alle- to INT concerns of suspected misconduct, including alle- gations before the SPADR makes a determination. Potential gations that may threaten the operations or governance sanctions imposed range from a letter of reprimand to ineli- of the World Bank, and INT appreciates the assistance and gibility for a specified or indefinite period. Determinations by cooperation provided by many staff members in the result- the SPADR cannot be appealed. ing investigations. Impactful Internal Investigations in FY23 Corruption involving abuse of consultant contracts policies are consistently enforced or potentially bol- INT substantiated a multi-year staff investigation stered to mitigate future misconduct of this type. establishing that a now-former World Bank staff Contract steering and undisclosed financial interests threatened retaliation and engaged in fraud, corrup- by staff tion, abuse of position and misuse of World Bank funds INT’s multi-pronged approach to investigations some- for personal gain and the gain of others, and reprisals, times creates hybrid cases, which combine subjects of and failed to meaningfully cooperate with INT’s inves- both internal and external investigations, allowing for tigation. The scope of the misconduct concerned more efficient outcomes. In two such hybrid cases, INT 95 short-term consultant (STC) contracts involv- established that two staff members based at a country ing 35 country office STCs, as well as more than 30 office located in a fragile and conflict-affected situation lending and Reimbursable Advisory Service projects (FCS) repeatedly steered World Bank-financed con- (including at least five trust funds) in three different tracts and other business to a company and its countries. This case demonstrates the potential risks principals, at times in exchange for corrupt payments that can occur when World Bank staff have control or an undisclosed financial stake in the company, and over STCs with limited visibility, oversight, and lack otherwise unfairly benefited the company. Both cases of segregation of duties, along with issues of low STC substantiated misconduct. awareness of World Bank rules and policies. Drawing lessons from this case will help ensure that existing THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 15 DETER: Sanctions, Referrals, and Integrity cooperate further with INT. This cooperation provides INT Compliance with information that can be used to advance additional investigations and cases. Through their efficient resolution of INT’s sanctions cases, and the resulting decisions of OSD cases and detailed compliance and cooperation provisions, and the Sanctions Board, are one way in which the World settlements provide a valuable tool to promote higher integ- Bank gives effect to INT’s investigative findings. Debarments rity standards in World Bank-supported projects. protect World Bank resources by excluding firms and individ- uals that have engaged in sanctionable misconduct from its REFERRALS projects. Referrals to national authorities or other organiza- Referrals are a means for INT to cooperate with other tions can also prompt actions that increase the effectiveness authorities, and a reflection of the fiduciary duty that under- of INT’s investigative work. lies INT’s mandate and work. INT sends referral reports to The World Bank’s standard conditions for release from relevant World Bank member country counterparts when sanction, which typically include the development and evidence indicates that a member country’s laws may have implementation of an integrity compliance program, further been violated, and INT assesses that a referral could be enhance debarment’s deterrent value. Firms and individu- impactful. INT also shares information with counterparts in als debarred with conditional release may only pursue new other MDBs and other international institutions when that World Bank-supported work after they have taken concrete information may be relevant to their operations. steps, satisfactory to the World Bank, to improve their busi- In FY23, INT issued 12 referrals, comprised of eight detailed ness practices. referrals and four summary notification letters, to 11 different SANCTIONS recipient countries. (A list of the detailed referrals is provided in Annex D of this report.) These referrals notably included In FY23, INT submitted 13 sanctions cases, and five set- the findings of a significant INT investigation into allega- tlements to OSD for review. An additional settlement was tions of fraud, collusion, and corruption under two World submitted to the EO for IFC for review. As a result of these Bank-supported power projects in Pakistan; and the findings and earlier INT-submitted cases and settlements, the World of an investigation into allegations of fraud and collusion Bank debarred, or otherwise sanctioned, 23 firms and indi- under two World Bank-supported projects in Tajikistan. viduals. (For more information on the decisions underlying the sanctions cases, please see the OSD and Sanctions INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE Board sections of this report.) In FY23, the ICO continued engaging collaboratively with The World Bank increases awareness of sanctions and bol- sanctioned entities around the world on their efforts to imple- sters their deterrent impact by making its sanctions decision ment effective integrity compliance reforms as a condition of transparent and public. Cross-debarment—under which the release from their World Bank sanction. In that regard, the African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank ICO notified 21 newly sanctioned entities of their conditions (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development for release and actively engaged with 91 sanctioned entities (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank Group (IDB), during FY23.11 The ICO also continued the sanctions of 34 and World Bank recognize each other’s public debarments of entities beyond their initial period of sanction until such time more than one year’s duration—further enhances that deter- as they have met the conditions imposed for their release rent effect. Firms and individuals know that if they engage from sanction. The ICO also sent interim notices to entities in sanctionable misconduct under a World Bank project, sanctioned with release conditions that were not engaging that will carry consequences beyond just the World Bank. In with the ICO, inviting them to engage with the ICO. Fifteen FY23, the World Bank recognized 49 cross-debarments from such notices were sent in FY23, leading to engagement by other MDBs, and 17 World Bank debarments were eligible for three sanctioned entities. In addition, the ICO continued con- recognition. ducting site visits, both virtually and in person, to speak with relevant personnel of sanctioned companies and assess their Settlements provide a complementary way for the World implementation of integrity compliance reforms. In total, 412 Bank to resolve cases of sanctionable misconduct. Under entities were under sanction, with conditional release, at the World Bank settlements, settling parties acknowledge end of FY23, of which 66 were actively engaging with the ICO wrongdoing, agree to a sanction, commit to develop and at that time. implement an integrity compliance program, and agree to 16 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Impactful Sanctions in FY23 Incentivizing Corporate Reform, While Addressing Serious Misconduct If World Bank projects are to achieve their development ment. However, if the firm fails to seize its opportunity, goals, then the firms and individuals who implement and does not fulfill these conditions within two years, those projects must abide by the highest ethical then it will be automatically debarred, with conditional standards. To promote corporate integrity while pro- release, for a further two years. This sanction struc- tecting World Bank-financed projects, the sanctions ture provides the firm with a final chance to improve system imposes case-specific, proportionate sanc- its systems and controls, backed by significant costs tions that balance incentivizing reform with deterring if it does not do so. misconduct. Two significant FY23 sanctions cases demonstrate the impact of this system. In contrast, another INT investigation found evidence that a West African firm and its Managing Director had In the first case, INT investigated the conduct of a engaged in significant fraud and corruption. Evidence major Asian civil engineering firm, and one of its sub- indicated that the firm and its Managing Director had sidiaries, when advising on the procurement of a $200 misrepresented the company’s past experience, the million World Bank-financed contract to design, build, experience of its staff, and/or its finances in bids for 11 and operate a wastewater treatment plant. INT found different World Bank-financed contracts. Based partly that the engineering firm had engaged in fraudulent on these false claims, the firm won nine World Bank-fi- practices by recklessly failing to disclose a potential nanced contracts worth a combined $21.4 million. In reasonably perceived conflict of interest with a bidder, addition to these false claims, evidence further indi- and by recklessly failing to disclose contract-related cated that the firm and its Managing Director had made payments made to third parties. Although the firm had at least 19 corrupt payments, totaling nearly $400,000, shown willingness to improve its practices, evidence related to the procurement and execution of the con- indicated that it lacked internal controls adequate to tracts that it won. identify and disclose potential conflicts of interest. Faced with such extensive misconduct, in FY23 the To encourage the firm’s reform, in FY23 the World World Bank debarred the firm and its Managing Direc- Bank imposed a two-part sanction on the firm and its tor for nine years with conditional release. This sanction entire corporate group. For two years, the firm is con- is among the longest non-permanent debarments ever ditionally non-debarred, during which it must develop imposed by the World Bank, and represents the largest and implement compliance measures designed to sanction that the World Bank has imposed in five years. prevent, detect, investigate, and remediate these types of fraudulent practices. If the firm successfully Viewed together, these two cases demonstrate how the concludes this work in a manner satisfactory to the World Bank encourages reform, while also deterring World Bank, then its sanction will end without debar- severe wrongdoing with significant consequences. The ICO also reviewed the integrity compliance materials of debarment. In addition, one entity failed to meet its condi- several entities in connection with INT’s pre-sanction inter- tions for non-debarment and its sanction was converted actions with respondents, including settlement discussions. from conditional non-debarment to debarment with condi- Relatedly, the ICO participated in several settlement agree- tional release. The released entities include large multi- ment reviews and negotiation processes. national companies, state-owned enterprises, small and medium-sized enterprises, and individuals around the world, Notably, during FY23, the ICO determined that 17 entities including in fragile and conflict-affected situations. had met their conditions for release from sanction and that one entity had met the conditions for the conversion of its In FY23, the ICO was also heavily involved in significant draft- debarment with conditional release to conditional non- ing efforts and collaboration regarding the harmonized “MDB THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 17 Impactful Integrity Compliance Reforms in FY23 Among the 17 entities that met their conditions for from top to bottom, from front line workers to man- release from World Bank sanction in FY23 were two agement, from the company to its business partners, companies, each respectively in France and the and so on. Furthermore, Yooshin further harnessed the Republic of Korea. These companies operate in vastly power of IT systems for better access and consistency. different environments and employ unique compliance As a closing note, I want to give my profound thanks strategies, but they both have derived positive impacts to all for their concerted efforts, including the ICO from their compliance reforms. and the independent expert, our management and employees and our business partners. And to those The Value of Integrity Compliance Guidance: who found this article, I hope you join this greater cir- Yooshin Engineering Corporation cle of collective action. In Korea, a listed multinational company called Yooshin Engineering Corporation (Yooshin) was released from Chung Hwan Kim sanction in December 2022 following the ICO’s determi- Yooshin Chief Compliance Officer nation that it had satisfied the applicable conditions for Sharing the Benefits of Integrity Compliance release under its settlement agreement with the World Reforms: Bouygues Bâtiment International Bank. In this case, the conditions for release required In France, a construction company called Bouygues that Yooshin develop and implement an integrity com- Bâtiment International (BBI) was released from pliance program reflecting the principles of the World sanction in January 2023, following the ICO’s deter- Bank’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines. Throughout mination that it had satisfied the applicable conditions the 30-month period of sanction, Yooshin worked col- for release under its settlement agreement with IFC. laboratively with the ICO and the independent integrity BBI is a subsidiary of Bouygues Construction, one compliance expert engaged by the company pursuant of the largest construction companies in France and to the settlement agreement. Yooshin utilized informa- part of the CAC 40-listed Bouygues Group. As with tion technology-based systems to enhance its integrity Yooshin, the conditions for BBI’s release from sanction compliance controls. Yooshin also collaborated with included the development and implementation of an various external entities to promote integrity compli- integrity compliance program reflecting the principles ance principles. As a Korean multinational company of the World Bank’s Integrity Compliance Guidelines. operating in over 200 locations across 14 countries, During the period of sanction, representatives of BBI Yooshin has a powerful voice in support of integrity and Bouygues Construction engaged regularly with compliance and clean business practices. the ICO and the independent integrity compliance Cicero said: “The function of wisdom is to discrim- expert retained under the settlement agreement on inate between good and evil.” Fortunately, such the development and implementation of the integrity wisdom was available to us from the outset, thanks compliance program. Notably, Bouygues Construction in part to the World Bank’s Integrity Compliance took its engagement with the ICO as an opportunity Guidelines and valuable insights and guidance from to implement wide-reaching integrity compliance the ICO and an independent expert. reforms not only at BBI but also across Bouygues Con- struction’s international operations, with over 53,000 In the face of challenges reforming the company that personnel in more than 60 countries. Like Yooshin, coupled with the pandemic crisis, the wisdom shed members of Bouygues Construction also engaged light on our path to restore trust, ensuring our values with external entities to promote integrity compliance resonate with ethical standards in this transnational in the broader business community. In addition, since world. In essence, it is unwavering commitment and BBI’s release from sanction, Bouygues Construc- effective communication that creates a strong cor- tion has continued to collaborate with the ICO on a porate culture of integrity; the messages should flow continued 18 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  voluntary basis to mentor other entities currently patible with ours. We are convinced that ethics and sanctioned by the World Bank that are undertaking compliance is everyone’s business, at every level, and integrity compliance reform efforts. must be the focus of attention at all times. Ethics and compliance issues have been a prior- Pierre-Eric Saint-André ity for Bouygues Construction for the past decade. Deputy Chief Executive Officer of They contribute to the trust the Group inspires in Bouygues Construction our customers, employees, investors and share- President of Bouygues Bâtiment International holders, and our community of partners. Preventing, detecting, investigating and, if necessary, remedying These cases are further examples of how the ICO’s work any poor practices, is a long, continuous journey with sanctioned entities can lead to meaningful devel- that requires constant attention. The World Bank’s opmental impacts across industries and geographies. Integrity Compliance Guidelines as well as the con- Beyond simply seeking to prevent fraud and corruption structive dialogue with the World Bank’s ICO and an in their own operations, these and other companies independent expert, have been essential sources have become champions of integrity by working to to strengthen Bouygues Bâtiment International’s promote a cleaner business environment in their sup- internal policy. We have therefore improved our pro- ply chains and communities. Indeed, many formerly cesses and compliance documentations, to bring sanctioned companies continue to collaborate with together all our commitments aimed at fostering a the ICO after their release from sanction, whether by responsible business and a fairer world. We adhere participating in integrity-focused outreach activities or to these fundamental values, on all our projects, in serving as mentors to other companies that are seek- all the countries where we operate. We also strongly ing to implement integrity compliance reforms. The ICO encourage any of our business partners to develop, looks forward to further collaboration with its growing if they have not already done so, their own ethics and network of companies to continue promoting integrity compliance programme, based on standards com- compliance globally. General Principles for Business Integrity Programmes” (Gen- CORPORATE INTEGRITY COMPLIANCE OUTREACH eral Principles) that were adopted by the respective MDBs in In FY23, the ICO continued promoting integrity compli- FY23. The General Principles explain the role business integ- ance principles among businesses and other stakeholders. rity programs play in the MDB’s antifraud and anticorruption Beyond its core work with sanctioned entities, the ICO cham- efforts and provide guidance for entities seeking to imple- pions the implementation of tailored integrity compliance ment their own such programs. programs as a good business practice for all companies. Indeed, an effective integrity compliance program is not only In addition, the ICO launched the Integrity Compliance a means of seeking to prevent misconduct, but also can be a Knowledge Sharing Platform, a publicly available platform selling point for companies. that will include integrity compliance-related guidance tools, resources, and learning programs. The platform is As part of the ICO’s outreach efforts, ICO team members funded by a grant awarded under the Korea-World Bank participated as presenters and moderators in various confer- Partnership Facility. ences and events throughout FY23. Some highlights include: • An “Integrity Compliance Programs: Lessons Learned” Learn more about the Integrity Compliance workshop organized by the World Bank and AfDB’s Knowledge Sharing Platform: Office of Integrity and Anti-Corruption, in Abidjan, Côte https://www.integritycomplianceknowledgehub.org/ d’Ivoire. THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 19 • A panel discussion on “Building Linkages with Interna- Enhancing INT’s Risk-based Approach to Complaint tional Organizations and Business Ethics for APEC SMEs Assessment and Analysis Initiative” during the plenary of the 2022 APEC Business INT receives complaints about potential misconduct from a Ethics for SMEs Forum in Bangkok, Thailand (virtually). variety of sources, including from World Bank staff, Project Implementation Units (PIUs), companies, and private citi- • Business Ethics Network of Africa’s Annual Conference, zens. Complaints can be submitted anonymously, and INT’s in Kigali, Rwanda (virtually). processes are strictly confidential. INT performs an initial • The “Anticorruption for Development Global Forum: assessment of every complaint that it receives at intake. This Restoring Trust,” co-hosted by the World Bank and sev- assessment determines whether the complaint relates to eral external partners, in Washington, DC. a sanctionable practice in World Bank-financed projects and falls within INT’s jurisdiction. Complaints outside of • The World Bank Civil Society Policy Forum, in Washing- INT’s mandate are redirected to the responsible unit in the ton, DC. World Bank or to external entities if appropriate. • Anticorruption-focused events organized by the Agence Française Anticorruption, the Organisation for Eco- Building on the new business processes and tools devel- nomic Co-operation and Development, and the United oped last year, INT’s intake function has taken on an ever Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, with support from more pivotal role in driving the risk-based approach to other partners, in Paris, France. complaint assessment and enabling timely preventive sup- port to operations where issues arise. In FY23, INT further By engaging with sanctioned entities working to meet their automated the collection of key data points needed to conditions for release from sanction and collaborating with assess complaints, enabling faster complaint handling and peer organizations, industry groups, and civil society, the ICO deeper discussions of the potential operational risks posed promotes integrity compliance principles for companies of by complaints as well possible investigative avenues. While all sizes and in all sectors and geographies. The ICO’s connec- this data automation effort has focused initially on assess- tions with integrity champions around the world—including ing individual complaints, INT is also leveraging data tools to experienced compliance monitors and released companies enable a global view of complaints across the World Bank’s that voluntarily serve as mentors and speakers at outreach regions and portfolios based on a range of indicators. INT’s events—further broadens the impact of the ICO’s work. case management system was also enhanced to be able to catalogue thematic operational issues raised in complaints submitted to INT. PREVENT: Prevention, Risk & Knowledge The Prevention, Risk and Knowledge Management unit com- Forensic Audits and Digital Forensic Services prises INT’s Complaint Development Unit, Forensic Services The Forensic Audits team plays a critical role in support- Unit, the Data Lab, Risks Analytics, and Preventive Services ing INT’s investigations, in generating insights on integrity Unit. Closer collaboration between these teams is at the risks in operations from its in-depth reviews and in deliver- core of INT’s strategic objectives to deliver greater impacts ing expert training to clients and partners. In FY23, forensic for the institution through prevention support, risk analyt- audit support was provided to 51 investigations and com- ics, and knowledge. INT’s role in preventing and mitigating plaints, involving a total of 134 subjects; was an integral part fraud and corruption risk in World Bank financed opera- of 18 investigative missions across all regions (including tions is supported on several fronts: through our complaint one mission which was supported remotely); and played response and analysis, by developing new insights on risk an important role in the success of a number of sanctions from our forensic reviews, by leveraging data and tools to cases. The Forensic Audits team also partnered with the better understand risk and inform INT’s guidance and knowl- Preventive Services Unit and with World Bank operations on edge products, and through monitoring the institution’s joint in-depth fiduciary reviews, which arise in the context of project pipelines and advising operational teams about how high-risk projects where an understanding and mitigation of to mitigate risks. integrity risk vulnerabilities requires a close look at current practices and potential gaps in operational controls. 20 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  FY23 continued to see an increasing relevance of Digital high-risk projects has supported greater attention to integ- Forensics in INT investigations, made possible by INT’s rity risk into the upstream analysis of risks by the sector or investments in its Digital Forensics Lab (DFL). These invest- country team, the adoption of measures to operationalize ments have included the onboarding of two full-time digital the World Bank’s anticorruption guidelines in the project forensics experts, investments in additional hardware and context, and risk mitigation measures in project implemen- the completion of enhancements to advanced software tation arrangements, working closely with relevant partners tools which now enable investigators to acquire and review in the World Bank. a large variety and volume of digital evidence, and to review and tag digital evidence in real time using an online collab- A special emphasis has been given this year to deepening orative review platform. As of the end of FY23, this platform INT’s support to operations in contexts of Fragility, Conflict, was hosting more than 2.6 terabytes of data related to 33 and Violence (FCV). This has involved extensive coordi- investigations. This year, the DFL team developed Stan- nation with, for example, World Bank teams supporting dard Operating Procedures, a case tracking system, and operations in Ukraine and close collaboration with procure- produced guidance and delivered training to assist all inves- ment teams in Ukraine to support both ongoing operations tigations teams with their digital forensic needs, as well as and new World Bank financing. INT has also delivered participated in four investigative missions. virtual and in-person training events to TTLs, PIUs and in some instances has supported country management units Corporate Integrity Disclosures, Preventive Advisory in dialogue with national oversight authorities in FCS set- Work and Knowledge tings, including Ukraine, Somalia, Mindanao, and the West The Preventive Services Unit (PSU) monitors the World Bank and Gaza. Bank’s portfolio of proposed and active projects for To create sustainable momentum and extend the outreach potential integrity risks associated with INT cases and of its advice in FCS settings, INT has worked closely with the complaints, raises integrity concern flags where appro- World Bank’s FCV group to develop a Knowledge Note on priate, and recommends mitigation measures to project Mitigating Fraud and Corruption Risks in World Bank Opera- teams. The PSU also provides on-demand support to tions in FCV Settings: Lessons from INT Investigations, and project teams in the preparation and implementation of has both enriched and disseminated the findings through high-risk projects, drawing on their experience identifying thematic events and workshops. This note and partnership and mitigating integrity risks in different sectors, types of with the FCV group will serve as a basis for ongoing learn- operations, and operational contexts. ing and training events. Other knowledge products this year An important contribution to risk mitigation is the advice have included short notes for World Bank staff explaining key the PSU provides to teams leading operations that may corporate risk instruments and a survey of TTLs and a knowl- be impacted by a recent or ongoing investigation. This can edge note identifying operational practices that reduce the result in helpful dialogue between PSU and project teams risk of integrity issues. across the lifecycle of project preparation and implemen- tation. The PSU now also plays an integral role in INT’s Modernizing Data Systems and Tools to Support all of complaint assessment processes and works closely with INT’s Strategic Objectives the Complaint Development Unit in providing timely fol- Underpinning much of the innovation in INT’s use of data low-up to project teams in the context of allegations that has been the development of a dedicated cloud infrastruc- may require or benefit from mitigation measures. In doing ture, which was completed this fiscal year. This has been so, the PSU is deepening its role as a bridge between INT’s possible thanks to a close collaboration between INTs’ investigative mandate and the operational teams leading Data Lab and the World Bank’s Information Technology projects. Solutions department. Other systems enhancements have included a dedicated module for the Integrity Compliance In FY23 the PSU has also continued to respond to proac- function in INT’s case management system, resulting in tive requests from project teams to assist in identifying a fully integrated data environment, encompassing all and mitigating integrity risks, particularly in the prepa- sanctions related business areas from complaint intake to ration of selected projects or programs that operational compliance. teams considered particularly high-risk. PSU advice on THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 21 In FY23, INT’s Data Lab also continued to expand its risk of PIUs in Bolivia, Chile, Comoros, Ecuador, Kenya, the analytics work program. This has included the design and Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Madagascar, Peru, testing of Gen2 cloud-based tools to help teams detect Saint Maarten, Somalia, Tajikistan, Türkiye, Uganda, and risks patterns in procurement data, and applications to Ukraine; draw data from a variety of INT and World Bank sources and • trainings organized in collaboration with the Global Gover- databases in real time, creating a data rich environment nance Practice and delivered to members of the Working that will enable the building of machine learning models Group on the Fight Against Corruption and Money Laun- and secure mechanisms to develop, test, and deploy gen- dering of the International Organization of Supreme Audit erative artificial intelligence services. The Data Lab has also Institutions, intended to raise awareness of various types supported piloting the use of satellite and remote imagery of fraud and corruption schemes relevant to project to support evidence gathering for investigations, with a accountants, most common “red flags,” and examples of focus on contexts where supervision and investigations are control weaknesses that could potentially facilitate fraud particularly challenging. and corruption; FY23 was also marked by collaborations and knowledge • the World Bank’s Anticorruption for Development Global sharing with other stakeholders on data analytics and cloud Forum, which brought together more than 220 partners, operations. The Data Lab participated in various sessions in leaders, and practitioners from government, private the recently formed United Nations Working Group on Data enterprise, academia, civil society, foundations, and Analytics, collaborated with the World Bank’s Group Inter- other international development organizations working nal Audit on cloud engineering, and has given presentations in anticorruption and integrity; and on how INT is leveraging advanced technologies to identify and mitigate integrity risks to development and academic • trainings introducing INT and the World Bank’s sanc- partners. tions system, emphasizing the importance of local staff engagement in identifying and reporting integrity risks Training and Outreach and setting out the mechanics of how to report matters Raising World Bank staff awareness of INT’s work helps to INT, sharing integrity and fiduciary risk trends, and strengthen their understanding of the key risks posed by identifying and mitigating integrity risks, in close collab- fraud and corruption to the effectiveness of the World Bank. oration with other parts of the World Bank in countries It also clarifies how INT supports the World Bank’s work, the including Afghanistan, Cabo Verde, Cambodia, Côte role of staff in reporting wrongdoing, and INT’s availability as a d’Ivoire, The Gambia, Georgia, Guinea-Bissau, India, resource for preventive guidance and risk mitigation support. Kenya, Lao PDR, Mauritania, Senegal, Somalia, Uganda, and Vietnam. In FY23, INT delivered and participated in awareness rais- ing sessions, training, and other programs reaching close to 3,500 World Bank staff and staff working for client project Revitalizing the World Bank’s International teams, project implementation units, government counter- Corruption Hunters Alliance parts and officials, and the private sector. These included: Under the theme of “Collective Action in an Era of Crises,” • World Bank corporate onboarding programs for new the fifth meeting of the International Corruption Hunters staff, as well as specialized onboarding sessions orga- Alliance (ICHA) Forum convened in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, on nized for incoming Executive Directors and Board June 14–16, 2023. This meeting of ICHA broke new ground, Officials and staff; recruits to the World Bank’s Young even as it maintained its focus on addressing corruption as Professional Program; government officials participating a development challenge. For the first time since its incep- in the Voice Secondment Program; and staff working in tion in 2010, the ICHA Forum was held in an African country, FCS contexts, to introduce new staff and Board Officials thanks to the partnership of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, to INT’s work, the World Bank’s stance against fraud and who co-hosted the event with the World Bank. corruption, and staff’s duty to report suspected fraud Bringing the ICHA 2023 Forum to Abidjan was an oppor- and corruption; tunity for the World Bank to utilize its convening power to • training on the identification and mitigation of fraud gather more than 350 anticorruption actors from over 80 and corruption in World Bank-financed projects for staff countries around the world, but especially from across 22 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  the African continent. In so doing, the ICHA Forum provides space for the sharing of global knowledge and expertise, while recogniz- ing and drawing on the skills and experience of professionals from countries within the region as well. Ultimately, the ICHA Forum provides the invited participants a chance to strengthen the network of partners engaged in anticorruption around the world. A key theme of discussion across the ICHA 2023 Forum was the critical importance of collective action in the fight against corrup- tion. Participants recognized that corruption manifests in many ways throughout society in all countries, and with advances in technology, these challenges have increasingly become transnational World Bank Integrity Vice President, Mouhamadou Diagne, speaks without respect for borders. It is imperative for all countries, with Cote d’Ivoire’s Minister for the Promotion of Good Governance and the Fight Against Corruption, Epiphane Ballo Zoro, and the State then, to work together with common purpose on the solu- Minister and Minister of Justice and Keeper of the Seals for the tions that help make an impact against corruption. Moreover, Democratic Republic of Congo, Rose Mutombo Kiese, during the the Forum’s program emphasized the need to expand the ICHA 2023 Forum. profiles of partners—including women, youth, and represen- tatives from the private sector and across civil society. The ICHA 2023 Forum reaffirmed the World Bank’s com- Learn more about the ICHA 2023 Forum: mitment to fighting corruption in development and www.worldbank.org/icha strengthening the global network of anticorruption partners engaged in collective action. THE INTEGRITY VICE PRESIDENCY « 23 Over the past fiscal year, OSD provided fair and independent assessments and decisions regarding the World Bank’s sanctions cases and settlement agreements, while ensuring due process for all accused parties. 24 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  The Office of Suspension and Debarment The first tier of the World Bank’s adjudicative sanctions system  Introduction by coalitions in the international anticorruption community. OSD Jamieson A. Smith, staff were involved in key international anticorruption events, Chief Suspension and including the annual meeting of the MDBs’ first-tier sanc- Debarment Officer  tions officers, International Bar Association conferences, and the World Bank’s International Corruption Hunters Alliance I am delighted to present the World (ICHA) Forum. I am particularly pleased that OSD contrib- Bank Sanctions System Annual uted to the ICHA Forum, organizing sessions addressing Report for FY23 and an overview anticorruption in climate change interventions and gender of the activities and accomplish- inclusion in integrity professions. Climate change and gen- ments of the Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD) der inclusion are topics of high priority for the World Bank, during the previous fiscal year. As a critical component of the and OSD will endeavor to reflect this in its knowledge shar- Sanctions System, OSD continued to successfully carry out ing work going forward. Further, OSD published a Knowledge its core mandate of providing the first level of adjudication in Report on the Symposium on “Supranational Responses to cases involving allegations of sanctionable misconduct, and Corruption” that OSD co-organized last year. Such knowl- strengthened the coalition of anticorruption communities in edge sharing and collaboration play a pivotal role in helping support of larger international integrity efforts. the World Bank and the wider development community to Over the past fiscal year, OSD provided fair and indepen- better respond to evolving integrity risks faced in a rapidly dent assessments and decisions regarding the World Bank’s changing world. sanctions cases and settlement agreements, while ensuring As a key component of the Sanctions System, OSD will due process for all accused parties. Further, OSD continued remain committed to contribute to the World Bank’s mission to uphold transparency and accountability by publishing and to fight poverty by ensuring that the World Bank’s devel- maintaining the list of companies and individuals sanctioned opment financing is used solely for its intended purposes, by the World Bank for misconduct. OSD’s sanctions data has and by bolstering collaboration among stakeholders for proved to be a valuable resource used by both internal and enhanced integrity outcomes across the global development external stakeholders for integrity due diligence efforts, and community. And, I would like to express a warm welcome OSD often supports these stakeholders by responding to to the new Executive Secretary of the Sanctions Board related inquiries. Secretariat, Jodi Glasow, and my sincere excitement about In FY23, OSD engaged extensively with counterparts and carrying forward the Sanctions System’s work into another stakeholders around the globe and helped build and maintain successful year. Jamieson A. Smith Chief Suspension and Debarment Officer THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 25 Who We Are The Office of Suspension and Debarment (OSD) is on its merits and in accordance with the World Bank Pro- the first tier of the World Bank’s two-tiered adjudica- cedure: Sanctions Proceedings and Settlements in Bank tive system and functions similar to an administrative Financed Projects (Sanctions Procedures). In deciding judicial office of first instance. It is tasked with impar- a case, the SDO is entirely independent and does not tially reviewing accusations brought by INT against take instructions or recommendations from any other respondent firms and individuals and determining person or unit.  whether there is sufficient evidence that a respondent has engaged in sanctionable misconduct. If there is The SDO is supported by three staff attorneys, one sufficient evidence of misconduct, OSD commences legal consultant, one paralegal, one program assistant, sanctions proceedings against the respondent and rec- and up to two law student interns. During FY23, OSD’s ommends an appropriate sanction.    staff members and consultants had diverse regional backgrounds—hailing from Bolivia, China, Kazakhstan, OSD is an independent unit within the World Bank and the Republic of Korea, the Netherlands, Norway, Roma- is headed by the Chief Suspension and Debarment Offi- nia, Tajikistan, the United States, and Vietnam—and cer (SDO), who is appointed by and reports to the World brought solid expertise in international development, Bank’s Managing Director and Chief Administrative Offi- anticorruption, corporate law, public procurement, and cer on matters related to budget and management. The integrity compliance. All of OSD’s staff are normally SDO is required to evaluate each sanctions case solely based in Washington, DC.  Pictured: World Bank Office of Suspension and Debarment (left to right): Riya Gavaskar, Legal Assistant; Hai Anh Tran, Legal Consultant; Alexandra Manea, Senior Counsel; Adriana Montoya, Program Assistant; Jamieson Smith, Chief Suspension & Debarment Officer; Gaukhar Larson, Counsel; Catherine Hendicott, Legal Intern; Yoonhye Kim, Legal Intern; Chang Liu, Counsel 26 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  OSD Staff & Consultant Profiles RIYA GAVASKAR, Legal Assistant Riya Gavaskar is the Legal Assistant in OSD. Ms. Gavaskar prepares all the logistical tasks for issuing cases, conducts research related to anticorruption, and produces reports and other statistics related to casework. Prior to joining OSD, Ms. Gavaskar interned for the United States Agency for International Development and the Brookings Institution. A United States national, Ms. Gavaskar graduated from George Washington University with a B.A., magna cum laude, in International Affairs and Economics and a minor in Spanish. What attracted you I have always been curious about what drives the success of impactful development pro- to work for OSD and grams and how institutions overcome roadblocks in the implementation process. It has what are some of the been extremely rewarding to start my career in an office where I directly contribute to efforts highlights of working combatting corruption and fraud in development financing. OSD plays an important role in in this office? protecting the integrity of the World Bank by imposing suspensions on firms and individuals involved in misconduct. Equally important, OSD provides a fair and rehabilitative process to ensure that those who want to participate have a chance to do so. The most rewarding part of working at OSD is meeting people from diverse backgrounds and finding more reasons to pursue a career in development. Through my time with the office, I have had the opportunity to write blog posts, share my data reports with different stakeholders, and accompany col- leagues to the many events hosted by the World Bank. Development is ultimately dependent on collaboration, and I admire that OSD exemplifies, through integrity and transparency, how we can work together to support a brighter future for everyone. During the recent pandemic’s peak, OSD worked quickly to ensure that cases were processed How has the case efficiently while prioritizing staff health and safety. For respondents, OSD encouraged virtual issuance process submissions of Explanations and granted requests for retroactive extensions if respondents changed through could not contest cases due to issues related to the pandemic. For staff, OSD moved most virtual and hybrid communications online and adopted paperless submission procedures but continued to work? champion close collaboration on case review and issuance. Now working in a hybrid set- ting, the attorneys, interns, program assistant, and I continue to review cases collaboratively and promote an efficient, effective, and fair sanctions process. Despite the challenges in the past several years, OSD has always been committed to upholding the World Bank’s fiduciary duty, safeguarding development financing, and promoting collective and inclusive knowl- edge-sharing within and beyond the office. OSD Staff & Consultants At-A-Glance 14 STAFF & FROM 10 SPEAKING 17 79% FEMALE CONSULTANTS COUNTRIES LANGUAGES 21% MALE THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 27 OSD Staff & Consultant Profiles HAI ANH TRAN, Legal Consultant Hai Anh Tran is a Legal Consultant at OSD, where she assists the SDO and staff attor- neys with the review and disposition of sanctions cases and other office activities. A native of Vietnam, Ms. Tran earned a Master of Laws degree (LL.M.) in Government Pro- curement and Environmental Law from The George Washington University Law School, an LL.M. in International Law, summa cum laude, from Transnational Law and Business University in the Republic of Korea, and a Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.) with distinction from Hanoi Law University in Vietnam. Prior to joining the World Bank, Ms. Tran served as a law clerk for the Vietnam Supreme People’s Court. What attracted OSD is a unique office that attracts individuals who are passionate about fighting you to work corruption, promoting diversity in the workplace, and sharing knowledge with other for OSD? anticorruption communities. I have always been interested in legal work that promotes the integrity and efficacy of public funds, and I am deeply passionate about ensuring that development programs are implemented properly. Working in OSD provides me the opportunity to contribute to the global fight against corruption, which remains a challenging endeavor in numerous countries worldwide. In addition to its efficient dis- position of sanctions cases, OSD’s emphasis on sharing knowledge and collaborating with other anticorruption organizations creates a platform for continuous learning and professional growth in this field. Overall, working in OSD offers a truly gratifying and rewarding experience for those who are dedicated to promoting integrity and account- ability in public service. What are some My journey began as an intern after a competitive selection process. This opportunity highlights of eventually led to my current legal consultant position, an achievement I deeply cherish. It your experience is extremely valuable to work with and learn from highly experienced attorneys who pos- in OSD? sess the skills and experience needed to analyze and combat fraud and corrupt misconduct through an impartial and efficient sanctions process, while being highly protective of the due process rights of respondents. As a member of OSD, I have had the privilege of participat- ing in world-class conferences on anticorruption, where I meet experts and global leaders from whom I learned enormously. On top of substantive anticorruption work, what sets OSD apart is its organizational culture, which is profoundly dedicated to diversity and inclusion and deeply supportive of employees from various backgrounds and experiences. In partic- ular, I learned how important it is to be intentional about including women and youth in the battle against corruption and, in fact, across all professional fields. I will carry these lessons with me throughout my career. 28 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  What We Do OSD LEGAL INTERNSHIP PROGRAM  The specific functions of the SDO include:  Every year, OSD offers highly-motivated law students • Evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence presented an opportunity to be exposed to the mission and work by INT in each case in a comprehensive, fully-reasoned of OSD and the World Bank through a legal internship. determination that analyzes factual, procedural, and The candidates are selected on a competitive basis, legal matters in detail.  ensuring diversity of backgrounds and nationalities. • Determining if the evidence supports a finding that The objective of the program is to introduce interns the alleged sanctionable misconduct more likely than to practical aspects of the efforts against corruption not occurred and, if so, recommending an appropri- via experience in the day-to-day operations of the ate sanction against the respondent. This sanctioning sanctions system, while working closely with OSD recommendation is based on the public World Bank and other World Bank staff. OSD’s legal interns have Sanctioning Guidelines.  contributed new perspectives, ideas, and knowledge to OSD and are able to improve their legal skills while • Issuing a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to each working in a multicultural environment.  respondent, which includes the allegations and corre- sponding evidence, as well as the SDO’s recommended sanction.  • Organizing outreach and knowledge-sharing activities • Temporarily suspending respondents from eligibility to to inform internal and external stakeholders about the be awarded World Bank-financed contracts pending the mission, processes, and results of the World Bank’s final outcome of the sanctions proceedings.  sanctions system.   • Reviewing any written Explanation submitted by a respondent in response to a Notice of Sanctions Pro- OSD Case Summary   ceedings and deciding if the Explanation warrants a revision or withdrawal of the recommended sanction.  In FY23, OSD received 13 sanctions cases, reviewed 12 cases (including several cases submitted in the previous • Imposing the SDO’s recommended sanction on each fiscal year), and issued a fully-reasoned determination with respondent that does not appeal to the Sanctions Board, respect to whether INT presented sufficient evidence for and publishing a Notice of Uncontested Sanctions Pro- each sanctionable practice accusation in each case. OSD ceedings on the World Bank’s sanctions website.  also reviewed 5 settlements that the World Bank, through • Considering requests from INT for the early temporary INT, entered into with respondents. Any given case may take suspension of respondents that are subject to ongoing a shorter or longer period of time to review depending on the investigations. The SDO will impose an early temporary number of pending cases, the amount of evidence provided, suspension if there is sufficient evidence to support at the number of respondents involved, the complexity of the least one accusation of sanctionable misconduct that, accusations made by INT, and any procedural issues. if presented in a regular sanctions case, would have resulted in a debarment of two or more years.  The SDO referred 3 of the 12 reviewed cases back to INT for revisions after determining that there was insufficient • Reviewing settlement agreements entered into between evidence to support one or more of the accusations made. the World Bank, through INT, and respondents to ensure Once INT has made any necessary revisions to a case, the that they were entered into voluntarily and that their SDO issues a Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to the named terms do not manifestly violate the World Bank Sanc- respondents. In FY23, the SDO issued Notices of Sanctions tioning Guidelines.  Proceedings in 15 cases, which resulted in the temporary • Handling incoming and outgoing cross-debarment noti- suspension of 19 respondents (11 firms and 8 individuals). fications issued pursuant to the Agreement for Mutual Under the Sanctions Procedures, respondents may submit Enforcement of Debarment Decisions.   a written Explanation to the SDO within 30 days—and may • Contributing to the continuous development of the appeal to the World Bank Sanctions Board within 90 days World Bank’s overall sanctions policy.  —after receiving the Notice of Sanctions Proceedings. In THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 29 FY23, OSD reviewed Explanations submitted by 3 respon- dents and reduced the recommended sanctions against Percentage of cases resolved all respondents. Furthermore, 11 out of the 15 respondents at OSD’s level since OSD’s whose appeal deadline fell in FY22 did not appeal to the formation in 2007: Sanctions Board, and the World Bank imposed the SDO’s 68% recommended sanction against those respondents. Since OSD began reviewing and issuing sanctions cases in 2007, about 68% of all cases did not involve an appeal and were resolved at OSD’s level. FIGURE 7: Number of cases and settlements reviewed FIGURE 8: Number of sanctions cases submitted by INT by OSD, FY19–23 and reviewed by OSD, FY19–23 40 40 36 37 36 35 35 30 29 30 29 26 25 25 22 20 20 20 18 20 18 17 16 15 15 15 15 13 12 12 12 10 10 5 5 5 0 0 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 Sanctions cases Settlements Sanctions cases Sanctions cases reviewed by OSD reviewed by INT FIGURE 9: SDO findings of sufficient/insufficient evidence (by case) 40 35 4 30 10 25 11 20 2 15 7 10 22 8 18 3 5 11 7 8 0 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 Insu cient evidence Insu cient evidence for at least Su cient evidence for for all claims one claim all claims 30 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  FIGURE 10: Percentage of cases & settlements reviewed by OSD, by type of sanctionable practice*   140 8% 6% 11% 120 24% 20% 18% 2% 19% 4% 100 18% 13% 20% 21% 12% 30% 80 29% 60 86% 87% 40 77% 70% 59% 20 0 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 Fraud Corruption Collusion Obstruction Coercion Includes all INT submissions reviewed by OSD (sanctions cases and settlements) (185 in total). An individual case may include several * types of sanctionable preactices, each of which counted separately in the number of cases involving a certain type of sanctionable practice. “Collusion” includes cases containing allegations of collusive misconduct governed by the pre-2004 definition of fraudulent practice. SUBMISSION OF RESPONDENT’S EXPLANATION Within 30 calendar days after receipt of an Explana- TO THE SDO   tion, the SDO will consider the arguments and evidence Within 30 calendar days after delivery of a Notice of presented therein and may (i) withdraw the Notice of Sanctions Proceedings to a respondent, the respon- Sanctions Proceedings upon concluding that there is dent may provide a written Explanation as to why the manifest error or other clear basis for supporting a find- SDO should withdraw this Notice of Sanctions Pro- ing of insufficiency of evidence against the respondent, ceedings or revise the recommended sanction. The or (ii) revise the recommended sanction in light of evi- SDO will consider reasonable requests for extensions dence or arguments with respect to mitigating factors of the Explanation submission deadline on a case-by- presented by the respondent.   case basis.  Consistent with historical trends, most of the cases and The respondent’s Explanation must be a single doc- settlements reviewed by OSD this fiscal year (59%) ument in English not exceeding 20 pages, unless the contained at least one fraudulent practice accusation. SDO approves a longer submission. The Explana- Four of the 12 cases reviewed this fiscal year contained tion should present arguments by the respondent accusations of two or more different types of mis- and attach any credible evidence in support thereof, conduct (e.g., fraudulent and corrupt practices). This including with respect to any relevant mitigating fiscal year, 18% of cases and settlements reviewed by factors such as the respondent’s minor role in miscon- OSD alleged at least one collusive practice accusation. duct, voluntary corrective action taken, or cooperation Corrupt practice and obstructive practice accusations with the investigation.  were present in 29% and 18% of cases and settlements reviewed this fiscal year, respectively.   THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 31 REGIONAL BREAKDOWN OF RESPONDENTS SANCTIONED   oped and strengthened partnerships with a broad spectrum The World Bank, as one of the largest sources of funding and of partners to further support the global collective efforts knowledge for developing countries, operates in countries against corruption. In FY23, OSD staff: around the globe, and OSD receives sanctions cases and set- • Lectured at the International Anti-Corruption Academy tlements against respondents from every region of the world.   and the Ukrainian Catholic University about the role of As shown in the graphs above, this breakdown is relatively the World Bank’s sanctions system in the global pursuit consistent in both the 96 cases that resulted in sanctions of integrity in international development. pursuant to the World Bank’s adjudicative process (either • Provided an update on activity in the World Bank’s sanc- by an uncontested determination of the SDO or through a tions system at the International Bar Association’s (IBA) decision of the Sanctions Board), and the 73 cases resolved Annual Conference in Miami, USA in November 2022 through settlement agreements with the World Bank, as and at the IBA Anti-Corruption Committee Conference negotiated by INT and reviewed by the SDO. OSD’s tracking in Paris, France in June 2023. of settlements reviewed by the SDO shows that respondents • Participated in a meeting with fellow first-tier sanctions who settled came from all over the world and were not lim- officers from four other major MDBs in Paris, France in ited to specific regions.   June 2023. Of course, the regional breakdown of sanctions cases and • Spoke to students from the law schools of George- settlements does not necessarily indicate how prevalent mis- town University, the George Washington University, and conduct may be in any given region. INT receives complaints American University about the functions of and careers from all regions and considers many factors when deciding in the World Bank’s sanctions system at the Interna- how to best allocate its resources to investigate potential tional Legal Careers Symposium in February 2023. misconduct. For its part, OSD plays no role in INT’s review of complaints and selection of cases. Nevertheless, the data • Continuously sought feedback regarding the Global Sus- suggests that World Bank sanctions have a truly global reach.  pension and Debarment Directory and made updates with an expanded scope. Outreach, Knowledge, and Events • Conceptualized and organized three sessions at the World Bank’s ICHA 2023 Forum held in Abidjan, Côte This year OSD continued its outreach activities both within d’Ivoire in June 2023 (see session descriptions below). and outside the World Bank to inform colleagues, other organizations, and national governments about the mission, • Published a Knowledge Report on the Symposium on processes, and results of the World Bank’s sanctions system, Supranational Responses to Corruption, which was and to learn from external stakeholders. As the World Bank co-organized by OSD and international partners in continues to evolve and face new challenges, OSD has devel- Vienna, Austria in April 2022. FIGURE 11 FIGURE 12 FIGURE 13 FIGURE 14 Regional Origin of Regional Origin of Location of Misconduct Location of Misconduct Respondents Sanctioned Respondents Sanctioned Sanctioned by the SDO Sanctioned by by the SDO and the by Settlement, and the Sanctions Board, Settlement, FY19– Sanctions Board, FY19–23 (73 Cases)   FY19–23 (96 Cases) FY23 (73 Cases) FY19–23 (96 Cases)    16% 22% 30% 28% 39% 9% 39% 36% 34% 6% 4% 2% 4% 5% 7% 3% 8% 7% 14% 15% 14% 20% 20% 11% 2% 5% East Asia & Paci c Europe & Central Asia Latin America & Caribbean Middle East & North Africa North America South Asia Sub-Saharan Africa 32 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  SESSIONS ORGANIZED AT THE ICHA 2023 FORUM Women in Integrity Adapting Anticorruption Efforts to the Climate This first-of-its-kind gender-focused stream at the ICHA Crisis: A Multi-Stakeholder Approach Forum highlighted the benefits of gender diversity in the This session highlighted the crucial role of the anti- integrity field, raised awareness about the challenges corruption community in addressing the climate crisis faced by women in the integrity profession across coun- and called for more tailored, collaborative, and urgent tries, and identified actions to drive women’s inclusion anticorruption actions to support the achievement of in integrity professions. In the fight against corruption, the global climate agenda. Representatives from the everybody has a role to play—yet gender gaps persist government of Seychelles, Parliament of Ghana, private in key integrity-related professions, at the expense sector, the Green Climate Fund, Transparency Interna- of more effective anticorruption efforts at national, tional, and the World Bank highlighted the many ways regional, and global levels. corruption thwarts effective climate action, particularly The first session—“Trailblazing Women in Integ- by enabling the misuse of key natural resources and rity”—showcased the trailblazing careers of four diverting funds dedicated to climate initiatives. In par- remarkable women in anticorruption: Veronica Drag- ticular, the speakers observed that the massive influx alin, Chief Anti-Corruption Prosecutor in Moldova; of funding tied to climate action—amounting to trillions Martha Chizuma, Head of the Anti-Corruption Bureau of US dollars in the coming decades—coupled with in Malawi; Yvonne Farrugia, European Prosecutor at the accelerated spending due to the urgency of the crisis, European Public Prosecutor’s Office; and Ly Sangare, will undoubtedly heighten integrity risks that we must State Judge in Côte d’Ivoire. The conversation, moder- anticipate and mitigate. As the largest multilateral pro- ated by Anke D’Angelo, World Bank Vice President and vider of climate finance, the World Bank is committed to Auditor General, discussed how to succeed in a field learn, adapt, and advance its own anticorruption work where women continue to be underrepresented in most and to support the global anticorruption community to countries, and shared key actions to create a culture meet the new challenges we will face. that fully leverages the benefits of diversity in which women, and all employees, feel empowered to bring their ideas, perspectives, and experiences for better work outcomes. THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 33 The second session—“Women in Integrity: Driving • Raising awareness of common biases that put Progress Toward Gender Inclusion”—dived deeper women at a disadvantage (e.g., lack of role models for into the topic and engaged over 75 participants in group women, gendered career paths and gendered work, discussions with the goal of identifying good practices women’s reduced access to networks and sponsors, for advancing women’s inclusion in the integrity field cultural constraints, etc.) and identifying ways to at organizational and national levels. The discussions counter such barriers. unpacked the experiences of many participants— • Creating effective regional and global networks for women and men—with facing stereotypes and biases women to share resources, contacts, and knowledge that create a disadvantage for women in the integrity in support of women’s empowerment and more field. With support from facilitators from OSD, the Sanc- effective work. tions Board Secretariat, and INT, the participants shared • Developing allyship across genders in the work- their ideas and experiences on: place and building a coalition of women and men to advance women’s inclusion in the integrity profes- sion and public life. Knowledge Report of the Symposium on Supranational dination in support of enhancing supranational remedies Responses to Corruption against corruption. As we continue to contribute knowledge In FY23, OSD published a Knowledge Report on the Sym- initiatives to international anticorruption efforts, including posium on Supranational Responses to Corruption, which further editions of the Symposium, several actions are rec- was co-organized with the American Society for Interna- ommended based on lessons learned thus far: tional Law’s Anti-Corruption Law Interest Group and the OECD’s Anti-Corruption Division, in Vienna, Austria in April 1. Catalogue prior and existing supranational mechanisms 2022. The Symposium brought together experts from mul- against corruption and other similar crimes, identifying tiple international organizations, governments, the private lessons learned and practices that can guide the devel- sector, non-profit organiza- opment of future supranational initiatives. tions, and academia to reflect 2. Tailor anticorruption efforts to address challenges in on current and prospective priority areas, including those on climate change inter- anticorruption efforts that have ventions. This objective requires research specific to the transcended national boundar- relevant sector based on which anticorruption stake- ies or governments. holders can adapt existing anticorruption remedies—or alternatively devise new mechanisms—to achieve more As highlighted in the Report, the effective results. Symposium’s panels, discus- sions, and informal exchanges 3. Understand state-of-the-art technology tools and solu- emphasized the need to expand tions, devising suitable mechanisms to leverage artificial research, knowledge, and coor- intelligence and machine learning to help make anticor- 34 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  ruption efforts more agile and focused on preventive corrupt conduct; and (iii) the involvement of the individ- action. ual respondent as the firm’s Managing Director and Chief Executive Officer in the misconduct. As mitigating factors, Strengthen the dialogue and collaboration between knowl- the SDO considered (i) INT’s representations regarding the edge-producing actors and decision-makers in the format extent of the respondents’ cooperation during the investi- proposed by the Symposium. Such collaboration is essential gation, noting in particular that the respondents provided to advance the anticorruption agenda based on cutting-edge relevant documents and met with INT; and (ii) the significant research. passage of time since some of the misconduct occurred and since the World Bank was made aware of it. The next Symposium on Supranational Responses to Cor- ruption will focus on climate change action and is planned SANCTIONS CASE NO. 727—The SDO determined that the for spring 2024. Information regarding the call for contribu- respondent, an Uzbek individual, engaged in a fraudulent tions and other details can be found on OSD’s website. practice in connection with a construction contract under a water supply project in Uzbekistan. In particular, the SDO Sanctions Imposed by the SDO Pursuant to found that the respondent, when reviewing bids for the con- Notices of Uncontested Sanctions Proceedings  tract, failed to disclose his affiliation with a company that was a bidder for the contract. The SDO imposed on the respon- During FY23, the SDO issued Notices of Uncontested Sanc- dent a debarment with conditional release for a minimum tions Proceedings in 9 cases, resulting in sanctions against period of two years and five months. In determining this 11 respondents for engaging in fraudulent, corrupt, and col- sanction, the SDO took into account, as mitigating factors: lusive practices in connection with World Bank operations in (i) INT’s representations regarding the respondent’s limited the transportation, environment management, agriculture cooperation during the investigation, noting that the respon- development, urban infrastructure, water management, and dent met with INT and provided some relevant information; sustainable city development sectors of client countries. All and (ii) the significant amount of time that had elapsed since of these Notices of Uncontested Sanctions Proceedings are the fraudulent practice occurred and since the World Bank publicly available on the World Bank’s sanctions website. became aware of it. These cases included: SANCTIONS CASE NO. 728—The SDO determined that the SANCTIONS CASE NO. 678—The SDO determined that respondent, a Chinese company, engaged in fraudulent the respondents, a Nigerian firm and a Nigerian national, practices by misrepresenting its past experience in its bids engaged in fraudulent and corrupt practices in connection for two construction contracts under two environmental with multiple contracts for an agriculture development management projects in China. Specifically, the SDO found project and an erosion and watershed management project that the respondent made misrepresentations regarding its in Nigeria. The SDO found that the respondents engaged past experience and its ongoing litigation in connection with in fraudulent practices by (i) misrepresenting the firm’s its bid for a wastewater treatment plant construction con- past experience in its bids for several contracts; (ii) mis- tract in China. The respondent also misrepresented its past representing the qualifications and past experience of key experience in connection with its bid for a flood control and personnel in its bids for several contracts; and (iii) includ- water treatment works contract in China. The SDO imposed ing audited financial statements and bidder information a debarment with conditional release for a minimum period forms that contained false financial information in the bids of three years on the respondent and its ten affiliates. In for several contracts. The respondents also engaged in cor- determining this sanction, the SDO took into account, as rupt practices by making a series of payments to public an aggravating factor, the respondent’s repeated pattern officials and supervisory consultants to improperly influ- of fraudulent practices. As a mitigating factor, the SDO con- ence their actions regarding nine contracts under both sidered the passage of time since the fraudulent practices projects. The SDO imposed debarments with conditional occurred and the World Bank became aware of them. release on both respondents for a minimum period of nine years. In determining these sanctions, the SDO took into SANCTIONS CASE NO. 750—The SDO determined that the account, as aggravating factors, (i) the fact that the respon- respondent, a Vietnamese national, engaged in collusive dents engaged in both fraudulent and corrupt practices; (ii) practices in connection with two public transport construc- the respondents’ repeated pattern of both fraudulent and tion contracts under two development projects in Vietnam. THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 35 Specifically, the SDO found that the respondent, acting as (i) the respondent’s repeated pattern of collusive practices; a manager of a technology company, entered into collusive (ii) the sophisticated means through which the respondent arrangements with a firm and the design consultants for the engaged in the collusive practices, including the complexi- two contracts in order to obtain confidential information and ties of the schemes and the coordination of multiple involved influence the technical and qualification requirements in the parties; and (iii) the respondent’s interference with the inves- contracts’ bidding documents in favor of the firm and its part- tigative process. As a mitigating factor, the SDO considered ners, which included the respondent’s company. The SDO the significant amount of time that had elapsed since the imposed on the respondent a debarment with conditional sanctionable practice occurred and since the World Bank release for a minimum period of five years and one month. became aware of it. In determining this sanction, the SDO took into account, as SANCTIONS CASE NO. 756—The SDO determined that the aggravating factors, (i) the fact that the respondent engaged in two separate collusive schemes; (ii) the central role that respondent, an Ecuadorian company, engaged in fraudulent the respondent played in each of the collusive schemes; practices in connection with a construction contract under and (iii) the sophistication of the collusive schemes, each a wastewater management project in Ecuador. Specifically, of which involved multiple parties and required significant the SDO found that the respondent misrepresented, in an coordination. As a mitigating factor, the SDO considered the expression of interest and a bid for the contract, that a con- passage of time since the misconduct occurred and since sortium formed by the respondent and two other companies the World Bank became aware of it. did not pay or intend to pay any fees, commissions, or gratu- ities in connection with the contract. The SDO imposed on SANCTIONS CASE NO. 751—The SDO determined that the the respondent a debarment with conditional release for a respondent, an Ecuadorian national, engaged in a collusive minimum period of two years and ten months. In determin- practice in connection with a construction contract under a ing this sanction, the SDO took into account, as aggravating wastewater management project in Ecuador. The SDO found factors, (i) the respondent’s repeated pattern of fraudulent that the respondent entered into an arrangement with two practices involving multiple misrepresentations; and (ii) the companies to improperly influence the drafting of prequal- involvement of the respondent’s manager in the miscon- ification documents in order to favor a consortium formed duct. As mitigating factors, the SDO considered (i) INT’s by those two companies and one other company in the representations regarding the respondent’s limited cooper- bidding process for the contract. The SDO imposed on the ation during the investigation, noting that the respondent’s respondent a debarment with conditional release for a min- representatives participated in interviews with INT; (ii) INT’s imum period of three years and two months. In determining representations regarding the relatively minor role that the this sanction, the SDO took into account, as an aggravating respondent played in the fraudulent scheme; and (iii) the factor, the respondent’s central role in the misconduct. As significant amount of time that had elapsed since the fraud- mitigating factors, the SDO considered (i) INT’s representa- ulent practices occurred and since the World Bank became tions regarding the respondent’s limited cooperation during aware of it. the investigation, noting that the respondent met with INT SANCTIONS CASE NO. 758—The SDO determined that the and provided some relevant information; and (ii) the signifi- cant amount of time that had elapsed since the misconduct respondent, a Japanese company, engaged in corrupt and occurred and since the World Bank became aware of it. fraudulent practices in connection with a consulting ser- vices contract under a water supply and sanitation project SANCTIONS CASE NO. 752—The SDO determined that the in Bangladesh. In particular, the SDO found that the respon- respondent, a Vietnamese national, engaged in collusive dent engaged in a corrupt practice by paying government practices in connection with two transport development officials approximately $8,241 in cash and travel expenses contracts under two urban development projects in Viet- to improperly influence their decisions during the contract’s nam. The SDO found that the respondent entered into implementation. The respondent also engaged in fraudulent an arrangement with multiple parties in order to obtain practices by (i) failing to disclose the replacement of a civil confidential information and improperly influence the engineer under the contract, despite having an obligation requirements for those contracts. The SDO imposed on the to do so; (ii) inflating in certain invoices the cost of rental respondent a debarment with conditional release for a mini- vehicle and maintenance expenses under the contract; and mum period of five years and one month. In determining this (iii) inflating in certain invoices the salary of one individual. sanction, the SDO took into account, as aggravating factors, The SDO imposed on the respondent a debarment with 36 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  conditional release for a minimum period of three years contracts. On the corporate respondent, the SDO imposed a and one month. In determining this sanction, the SDO took debarment with conditional release for a minimum period of into account that the respondent engaged in two different eight years and ten months—consisting of an initial period of types of sanctionable misconduct: corrupt and fraudulent six years commencing November 29, 2021 pursuant to Sanc- practices. The SDO also took into account, as aggravating tions Board Decision No. 134 (Sanctions Case No. 620), plus factors, (i) the respondent’s repeated pattern of misconduct, an additional period of two years and ten months, to run con- noting the multiple corrupt payments made to public officials secutively, in respect of the sanctionable practices addressed during a three-year period and engagement in three fraudu- in this Notice. In determining this sanction, the SDO took into lent schemes to inflate invoices and replace key personnel; account, as aggravating factors, (i) the sophisticated means (ii) the use of sophisticated means, noting the use of a third through which the corporate respondent engaged in the party to circumvent internal controls and generate funds for misconduct, involving significant planning and multiple com- the corrupt practices over a three-year period; and (iii) the panies and individuals; and (ii) the corporate respondent’s participation—or at least awareness—of certain members central role in coordinating the multiple parties involved in of the respondent’s senior management in the corrupt and the misconduct. As mitigating factors, the SDO considered fraudulent practices. As mitigating factors, the SDO took into (i) the corporate respondent’s limited cooperation with INT account (i) the respondent’s substantial cooperation with during the investigation, noting in particular that its represen- INT’s investigation, noting the provision to INT of extensive tatives corresponded with INT and provided INT with certain records of an internal investigation and arrangement for INT documentary evidence, while also noting that the corporate to interview several current and former employees; (ii) the respondent did not accept responsibility for the misconduct; multiple attempts by the respondent to provide restitution to and (ii) the amount of time that had elapsed since the miscon- the project of at least some of the funds that were obtained duct occurred and since the World Bank became aware of it. by the fraudulent misconduct at issue; (iii) the respondent’s On the individual respondent, the SDO imposed a debarment voluntary restraint from bidding for World Bank-funded con- with conditional release for a minimum period of two years tracts since mid-2019; and (iv) the implementation of, and and ten months. As aggravating factors, the SDO considered ongoing improvements to, the respondent’s relevant corpo- (i) the sophisticated means through which the individual rate compliance programs. respondent engaged in the misconduct, involving significant planning and multiple companies and individuals; and (ii) the SANCTIONS CASE NO. 760—The SDO found that the respon- individual respondent’s central role in coordinating the multi- dents, a Vietnamese firm and a Vietnamese national, engaged ple parties involved in the misconduct. As mitigating factors, in a collusive and corrupt scheme in connection with two con- the SDO considered (i) the individual respondent’s limited tracts under a sustainable development project in Vietnam. In cooperation with INT during the investigation, noting in par- particular, the respondents entered into an arrangement with ticular that the individual respondent corresponded with two other firms to improperly influence the drafting of tech- INT, while also noting that the individual respondent did not nical specifications for the contracts, and solicited from one accept responsibility for the misconduct; and (ii) the amount of the two other firms a commission worth 10% of the con- of time that had elapsed since the misconduct occurred and tracts’ value for the respondents’ assistance in winning the since the World Bank became aware of it. THE OFFICE OF SUSPENSION AND DEBARMENT « 37 The Sanctions Board fostered transparency in publishing fully reasoned decisions with comprehensive findings of fact and law and issuing the third edition of the Sanctions Board Law Digest. 38 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  The World Bank Sanctions Board The second and final tier of the World Bank’s adjudicative sanctions system Introduction by core values and the principles of independence, transpar- Jodi T. Glasow, Executive ency, and fairness, we worked hard to ensure timely and fair Secretary to the World consideration of contested sanctions cases. The Sanctions Bank Sanctions Board Board enhanced accountability by sanctioning respondents for engaging in misconduct and focused on rehabilitation It is with great pleasure that I intro- by identifying integrity compliance measures to improve duce the work of the Sanctions respondents’ internal policies and business practices. We Board for FY23. This year marked fostered transparency in publishing fully reasoned decisions a year of celebration, change and with comprehensive findings of fact and law and issuing peri- achievement for the Sanctions Board and its Secretariat. The odic reports. We also saw significant impact of our work by sanctions system noted the occasion of the 25th anniversary issuing the third edition of the Sanctions Board Law Digest of the first formal sanctioning body—the Sanctions Commit- which summarizes the evolving jurisprudence and prece- tee—which evolved over the years into the current two-tiered dent of the Sanctions Board. We remained committed to system that includes the Sanctions Board as the second and sharing our knowledge and learning by fostering communi- final body of review. It was an opportunity to reflect and com- ties of practice, bringing together professional networks in memorate the progress and contributions of the sanctions the international, public, and academic settings. For the first system in achieving the World Bank’s development goals. time ever, all seven Sanctions Board Members participated We said goodbye to retiring Sanctions Board member, John in a panel event to speak about their work to the interna- Murphy, and welcomed a new Sanctions Board member, tional community. We also continued to work with our global Philip Daltrop. John Murphy served the Sanctions Board both partnerships and other similar appellate bodies in MDB as Chairman and Board Member over the years, bringing a sanctions systems to promote excellence and innovation in wealth of judicial and appellate experience. Philip Daltrop our field. joins the Sanctions Board with a distinguished background I wish to congratulate my colleagues at the Secretariat and as an international attorney and MDB professional, having the Sanctions Board members on a productive and inno- served many years at the Asian Development Bank (ADB). vative year. I hope this report makes clear why we are all Finally, the many accomplishments of the Sanctions Board tremendously proud of the work of the sanctions system and and its Secretariat are notable. Guided by the World Bank’s its contribution to the World Bank’s mission. Jodi T. Glasow Executive Secretary to the World Bank Sanctions Board THE SANCTIONS BOARD « 39  Who We Are The Sanctions Board is an independent administrative SANCTIONS BOARD MEMBERS tribunal that serves as the sanctions system’s second The Sanctions Board is composed of seven members, and final tier of review for contested sanctions cases. who are nominated by the President and appointed by The Sanctions Board issues non-appealable decisions the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors. Sanc- in sanctions cases arising from projects financed, co-fi- tions Board members serve single, non-renewable terms nanced, or guaranteed by IBRD, IDA, IFC, or MIGA. In of up to six years. They act as impartial decision-mak- addition, the Sanctions Board reviews other types of ers, are all external to the World Bank, and are subject cases, including disputes regarding the scope of sanc- to disclosure obligations and conflicts of interest rules. tions and compliance with conditions for release from Candidates for membership are identified by IBRD/IDA, sanction (see “Review of other types of cases” later in IFC, or MIGA—with IBRD/IDA selecting three members this section). They consider sanctions cases in dedi- (including the Chair), and IFC and MIGA each selecting cated three-person panels or as a five-person plenary two members. Candidates must satisfy requirements body. The Sanctions Board has issued 141 decisions of professional expertise and independence. In cases to date and, since 2012, has published all final and ful- involving IFC financing or MIGA guarantees, the Sanc- ly-reasoned decisions online. tions Board may also receive input from an internal advisor appointed by the relevant institution. In FY23, the Sanctions Board filled the post vacated by Judge John R. Murphy (South Africa), who had served as both Sanctions Board Chair (Nov 2019–Jan 2022) and regular member (Jan–Oct 2022). We are immensely grateful for Judge Murphy’s invaluable contributions to the World Bank’s sanctions system and for his leadership of the Sanctions Board. As reflected here, the new Maria Vicien Milburn member is Philip Daltrop (UK, Germany). Sanctions Board Chair (IBRD/IDA) Argentina, Spain Rabab Yasseen Philip Daltrop Michael Ostrove Member (IBRD/IDA) Member (IBRD/IDA) Member (MIGA) Switzerland UK, Germany France, United States Cavinder Bull Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour Eduardo Zuleta Member (IFC) Member (IFC) Member (MIGA) Singapore Nigeria Colombia 40 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Sanctions Board Member Profile PHILIP DALTROP, the new member of the Sanctions Board, brings 35 years of experi- ence as an international lawyer, with deep understanding of the procurement and integrity functions at several MDBs. Early in his career, he worked in the London, Brussels, and Tokyo offices of Allen & Overy, the legal department of the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, as a finance lawyer for the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), and as a project lawyer for the World Bank. He spent many years in the legal department of the ADB, and also headed the ADB’s procurement, integrity, and internal audit offices, ultimately taking the role of the ADB’s Deputy General Counsel. As an independent consultant, Philip has undertaken advisory projects for the World Bank, Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and other organizations. Philip’s academic background includes an undergraduate degree in Philosophy, Politics and Economics (First Class), and a master’s in International Human Rights Law (with Distinction), both from Oxford University. He is a qualified English solicitor. What inspired you I spent most of my career working as a lawyer on projects in developing countries. At the to serve on the Asian Development Bank, lawyers were involved at all stages of the project cycle, including Sanctions Board? the nitty-gritty of procurement planning and oversight of bidding processes. I became inter- ested in the difficulties faced by project implementing agencies—often under-resourced and under-staffed—as they dealt with complex international projects. Later, I was fortunate to work for a short time at the World Bank in the 1990s as serious attempts started to be made to systematically address the problem of corruption in development projects. This encour- aged me to specialize in both procurement oversight and anticorruption investigations later in my career. I now have a broad overview of the perspectives of the various parties to World Bank procurement processes, such as project implementation staff in developing countries, contractors, consultants, and World Bank procurement professionals and corruption inves- tigators; I hope this will be helpful as the Sanctions Board considers appeals cases and helps to articulate appropriate standards. How does a Sanctions systems at the World Bank and similar organizations help to ensure that develop- mechanism like the ment finance is spent on the intended purposes, rather than being diverted—many studies Sanctions Board have shown that communities impacted by poverty are also the most affected by fraud, cor- serve the interests ruption, and misallocation of resources. As an independent and external body, the specific of international development? role of the Sanctions Board is to help uphold due process in anticorruption investigations and proceedings in order that the best providers of goods and services are encouraged to participate in World Bank-financed projects, rather than being dissuaded by the threat of public sanctions. The decisions of the Sanctions Board are also watched closely by other organizations, and may be helpful in international standard-setting, as a practical way to promote international cooperation in combating corruption. THE SANCTIONS BOARD « 41  SANCTIONS BOARD SECRETARIAT cussions, and actively engages in strategic outreach and knowledge sharing to ensure that the lessons The Sanctions Board Secretariat provides legal, stra- learned from the Sanctions Board’s work are integrated tegic, and administrative support and advice to the into the World Bank’s operational work. Sanctions Board. The Executive Secretary to the Sanc- tions Board oversees the Secretariat’s work program, The diversity of the Sanctions Board is mirrored in the leading a diverse team of attorneys and support staff. Secretariat. The Secretariat includes seven team mem- Among other functions, the Secretariat assists the bers, the majority of whom are women and include two Sanctions Board in reviewing cases, issuing decisions, members of the LGBTQ+ community. Secretariat staff holding hearings, convening for deliberations, and liais- come from Brazil, Canada, Malaysia, the Philippines, ing with relevant stakeholders within the World Bank Russia, and the United States. Members of the Secretar- and in the international development community. The iat have diverse experiences in World Bank institutional Secretariat also plays a key role in sanctions policy dis- administration and operations, ethics investigations, judicial clerkships, corporate and criminal liti- gation, international dispute resolution, white collar investigations, international law, interna- tional development, and program management. In addition to regular staff, the Secretariat’s FY23 team included an associate from the World Bank-Howard University Law School program. The program places law students in World Bank units addressing issues of integrity and internal justice at the institution and brings in students with backgrounds and interest in alternative dispute resolution. During FY23, the Secretar- iat welcomed Damilola Adebayo (United States, Nigeria). Pictured: Sanctions Board Secretariat (from left to right, top row): Felipe Rocha dos Santos, Counsel; Eugenia Pyntikova, Counsel; Amanda Schneider, Paralegal. (From left to right, bottom row): Sharon Giebel, Legal Analyst; Jodi Glasow, Executive Secretary to the Sanctions Board; Anna Lorem Ramos, Counsel; Ryan Velandria McCarthy, Senior Counsel and Deputy Executive Secretary; (Not pictured: Geise Santos, Program Assistant; Damilola Adebayo, Legal Associate). Sanctions Board Secretariat Staff & Consultants At-A-Glance 9STAFF & FROM 7 SPEAKING 8 78% FEMALE CONSULTANTS COUNTRIES LANGUAGES 22% MALE 42 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  What We Do REVIEW OF CONTESTED SANCTIONS CASES at the first tier in 10% of instances. For 52% of contesting The Sanctions Board provides a respondents, the Sanctions Board applied a sanction that 27% full, fair, and independent review included a lesser period of minimum debarment. For 36% Proportion of of all sanctions cases where the of contesting respondents, the minimum debarment period respondents that respondent contests the allega- imposed by the Sanctions Board was greater.14 For the contested cases tions made by INT and/or the remaining 2% of respondents, as noted above, the Sanctions to the Sanctions sanction recommended by any Board found insufficient evidence of misconduct and there- Board in FY23. of the World Bank’s first-tier offi- fore did not impose any sanction. This variance in decision cers.12 In its review of contested outcomes between the first tier and the Sanctions Board sanctions cases, the Sanctions Board applies a “more likely is reflective of a well-functioning quasi-adjudicative system than not” standard of proof. This standard means that, upon where the second tier reviews an extended case record. consideration of all the relevant evidence, a preponderance Where misconduct is found, the Sanctions Board generally of the evidence supports a finding that the respondent applies a broad range of sanctions, including debarment with engaged in a sanctionable practice. The Sanctions Board conditional release, conditional non-debarment, debarment carries out its analysis under a “burden-shifting” framework for a fixed period of time, and letters of reprimand. The con- in which INT bears the initial burden of proof to present suf- ditions applied by the Sanctions Board are similarly varied ficient evidence of misconduct. Upon such a showing by and tied to the facts of each case and the risk attendant to INT, the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to show the misconduct at issue. that INT’s allegations are not supported by a preponderance of the evidence.13 Between FY19–FY23, the Sanctions Board REVIEW OF OTHER TYPES OF CASES reviewed and decided 29 contested sanctions cases against In addition to resolving contested sanctions cases, the Sanc- 42 respondents. tions Board is responsible for reviewing four other types of disputes. First, the Sanctions Board reviews cases where a The Sanctions Board hears cases de novo, which means sanctioned party contests the Integrity Compliance Office’s that it reviews each case anew without deference to deter- (ICO) determination that the party did not comply with con- minations reached at the first tier of the sanctions process. ditions for release from sanction. Second, the Sanctions In reviewing contested cases, the Sanctions Board considers Board reviews appeals from parties that entered into settle- a more expansive record than at the first tier, including at ment agreements with the World Bank, as negotiated by INT. least one further round of written pleadings containing addi- In such cases, the sanctioned party may contest INT’s subse- tional arguments and/or new evidence, and an oral hearing quent determination of non-compliance with the conditions if requested by either party or called by the Sanctions Board of the settlement, or seek to resolve any controversy as to Chair. In addition, the Sanctions Board makes determinations the interpretation or performance of the settlement’s terms on any jurisdictional, evidentiary, and procedural issues not and conditions. Third, where the World Bank designates an resolved at earlier points in the process. As a result, the Sanc- entity as a respondent’s successor or assign and extends the tions Board may reach different conclusions on liability and respondent’s sanction to that entity,15 that entity may appeal appropriate sanctions as compared to the first-tier officers. the World Bank’s determination to the Sanctions Board. Among all cases contested during the FY19-FY23 period, the Sanctions Board held 98% of those respondents liable for FIGURE 15: Types of Disputes Reviewed alleged misconduct. For 2% of the respondents during the Appeals of ICO determinations same period, the Sanctions Board concluded that the record did not support a finding of liability and terminated the pro- ceedings without any sanction. Appeals of settlement compliance determinations In contested cases where the Sanctions Board reaches a finding of liability, it conducts an analysis of all relevant Appeals by respondent’s successors and assigns aggravating and mitigating factors in selecting the appro- priate sanction. During the FY19–23 period, the Sanctions Requests for reconsideration of Sanctions Board decisions Board applied sanctions equivalent to those recommended THE SANCTIONS BOARD « 43  In reviewing these three types of disputes, the Sanctions tions Board may call witnesses, who may be questioned Board uses an “abuse of discretion” standard and ascer- only by Sanctions Board members. The parties do not have tains whether the World Bank determination at issue (i) the right to directly question or cross-examine witnesses. At lacked an observable basis or was otherwise arbitrary, (ii) the conclusion of a hearing, the parties are invited to make was based on disregard of a material fact or a material closing presentations, with the respondents being given the mistake of fact, or (iii) was taken in material violation of opportunity to have the last word. applicable procedures. ISSUANCE OF SANCTIONS Fourth, the Sanctions Board may review requests for recon- BOARD DECISIONS In FY23, 6 firms sideration of Sanctions Board decisions. The Sanctions and individuals Consistent with the World Bank’s Board has held that such a request would be granted only were sanctioned commitment to transparency, the in narrowly defined and exceptional circumstances. These by the Sanctions Sanctions Board is a leader among circumstances include discovery of newly available and Board MDBs as the first sanctions body decisive facts, fraud in the original proceedings, or clerical to publish its fully-reasoned deci- mistake in the issuing of the original decision. sions in all types of appeals. Sanctions Board decisions set out detailed factual and legal analyses, procedural and sub- CONDUCT OF HEARINGS stantive findings, and citations to relevant precedent. For Sanctions Board hearings are Cases decided every decision imposing a sanction, the Sanctions Board confidential and informal. They with oral hearing also discloses the affected respondent/s and sanction type may be convened at the request (FY23): via the World Bank’s public list of sanctioned entities. The of the respondent or INT, or at 75% holdings in unpublished decisions between 2007 and 2011 the discretion of the Sanctions were presented in the first edition of the Sanctions Board’s Board Chair. Hearings begin with Law Digest, issued in December 2011. The shift to public Cases decided opening presentations, with INT Sanctions Board decisions in 2012 has resulted in the devel- with outside presenting its case first and the counsel (FY23): opment of a body of jurisprudence that offers guidance to respondent afterwards. INT is then international stakeholders involved in anticorruption and 50% permitted to reply to the respon- administrative sanctions. The full body of Sanctions Board dent’s opening presentation. The precedent as of FY23 is presented in the third edition of the Sanctions Board members thereafter pose questions to the Law Digest. parties. In certain exceptional circumstances, the Sanc- FIGURE 16: Types of Sanctions Imposed on Respondents FIGURE 17: Decisions Issued by the Sanctions Board, by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23 FY19–FY23 Debarment 10 without 9 conditions 8 9 Number of Decisions 7 15% 6 Letter of 6 1 Reprimand 5 7% 5 4 Conditional 7% 4 4 3 non-debarment 71% 2 1 Debarment 0 with conditions FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 Fiscal Year of Issuance Decisions in Decisions in requests contested cases for reconsideration The number of decisions issued may account for more than one sanctions case contested to the Sanctions Board and also include decisions in requests for reconsideration. During the period of FY19–FY23, the Sanctions Board has issued a decision every 63 days, on average. 44 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Knowledge Sharing and Engagement with relating to the Sanctions Board’s work. The Sanctions Stakeholders Board and Secretariat hosted a panel event at the World Bank’s offices in Washington, DC, to celebrate the issu- In addition to resolving contested sanctions cases, the Sanc- ance of this publication. During the event, which was tions Board recognizes the value of knowledge sharing and open to the public, the Sanctions Board members high- engagement with the global anticorruption community. lighted and discussed key topics addressed in its To that end, this past year, the Sanctions Board and the jurisprudence and the Sanctions Board’s process. The Secretariat provided internal consultations to World Bank panel shared their experience with hearings, discussed management on the functioning of the sanctions system, the importance of transparency, and reflected on efforts engaged in dialogue with peers at other international devel- among the various MDBs and other IFIs to develop and opment organizations, and participated in public forums harmonize their approaches to sanctions proceedings. focused on the fight against corruption in development. These included: • Graduate Course on Corruption Risk Mitigation • Engagement with MDB Sanctions Appeals Bodies In June 2023, the Secretar- In July 2022, the Secretariat and the World Bank’s ICO iat worked with the American hosted an MDB workshop on integrity compliance issues. University Washington College of Law in coordinating a This virtual session was attended by compliance staff, graduate course on the mitigation of corruption risks in first-tier officers and appellate body secretariats of the public procurement, which enrolled legal and public pol- AfDB, ADB, EBRD, and IDB. The Secretariat and the ICO icy practitioners from Afghanistan, Brazil, Democratic led the group in discussing conditions for release from Republic of Congo, Ecuador, Egypt, Guatemala, Kenya, sanction, integrity compliance challenges for small and Peru, the United States, and Uruguay. This course medium enterprises, and an overview of integrity compli- reviewed the World Bank’s evolving measures against ance in the sanctions systems of MDBs. corruption in public procurement, forms part of a larger program focusing on anticorruption law and practice. The Executive Secretary delivered a module on the World Bank’s sanctions system and the Sanctions Board. This knowledge-building initiative brought together diverse participants from the World Bank’s anticorruption agenda, colleagues from the IDB, and private sector • ICHA 2023 Forum: Collective Action in an Era of stakeholders. Crises The Executive Secretary to the Sanctions Board partic- • Sanctions Board Newsletter ipated in the ICHA 2023 Forum, where she facilitated a In December 2022, the Secre- session titled, “Women in Integrity Professions: Driving tariat circulated the third issue Progress Towards Gender Inclusion.” Sanctions Board of its newsletter, “Sanctions Member Adedoyin Rhodes-Vivour was also present and Board Insights,” providing read- moderated a session titled “Linking Corruption and Tax ers with updates on Sanctions Evasion to Illicit Financial Flows.” The event was hosted Board membership, interim jointly by the Government of Côte d’Ivoire and the case statistics, and changes in Secretariat staffing. In World Bank. addition, the newsletter featured an overview of recently issued Sanctions Board decisions—setting out key find- • Issuance of 2023 Sanctions ings and highlighting particularly interesting aspects of Board Law Digest and Panel the cases. Session with Board Members In May 2023, the Sanctions • C5 Conference on Anti-Corruption Board published the Third Edi- In June 2023, Sanctions Board staff organized and tion of its Law Digest, a moderated a panel on anticorruption enforcement and concise thematic review of adjudication processes at MDBs. The session deliv- recent precedent and data ered an overview of MDB sanctions systems and a THE SANCTIONS BOARD « 45  discussion of the bound- Allegations, evidence, and findings: INT alleged that the aries of sanctionable respondent made two corrupt payments to a public official misconduct, liability of in order to influence the procurement or execution of five corporate groups, and World Bank-financed contracts. The respondent acknowl- MDB approaches to edged that the payments were made, but claimed no integrity compliance. corrupt intent and denied responsibility for this conduct. According to the respondent, the payments constituted • ICC Conference on International Arbitration legitimate personal loans from one of its employees to the In October 2022, the Secretariat joined a panel organized public official. The respondent also argued that its senior by the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) at the management did not authorize, condone, or know of the 20th ICC Miami Conference on International Arbitration. payments prior to INT’s investigation, and that the employ- The panel discussed economic ee’s conduct violated its corporate policies (i.e., he was a and political sanctions, their “rogue employee”). The Sanctions Board found that the implications for international totality of the evidence sufficiently demonstrated corrupt arbitration, and future trends. intent. For example, the respondent’s own financial records provided direct evidence of a connection between the pay- Summary of Precedent in FY23 ments and the respondent’s business interests. Moreover, the record showed that the public official played a key role During FY23, the Sanctions Board issued four decisions in the procurement processes under the projects and was (Sanctions Board Decisions No. 138—No. 141) arising directly involved in the negotiations of at least two of the from contested cases that were reviewed between Summer relevant contracts—indicating a course of dealing between 2022 and Spring 2023. The cases were diverse in scope and the public official and the respondent. The Sanctions Board involved allegations of fraud, corruption, and collusion relat- also found that the respondent was liable for the conduct ing to contracts financed by IBRD, IDA, and the Strategic of the employee in question. Notably, the respondent failed Climate Fund. The projects at issue sought to develop the to prove that it had implemented internal controls reason- urban infrastructure, improve wastewater treatment sys- ably sufficient to prevent or detect the sanctionable practice tems, and support fiscal policy management programs in at issue. In addition, the record showed that the employee several countries, including Brazil, Liberia, and Vietnam. was acting within the course and scope of his employment and that he was serving the respondent’s interests when he The Sanctions Board’s findings and conclusions, as made the corrupt payments. described below, were reached pursuant to the “more likely than not” standard of proof. The Sanctions Board’s findings Sanctioning analysis: In its sanctioning analysis, the Sanc- relied on a diverse array of evidence submitted by the par- tions Board applied aggravation for the respondent’s ties, including copies of contemporaneous correspondence, repeated pattern of conduct and some mitigation for the testimonial evidence from interviews conducted by INT respondent’s cooperation with INT’s investigation. The investigators, and documentation of transactions relevant to Sanctions Board declined to apply aggravation for manage- each case. ment’s role. DECISION NO. 138— Corrupt payments to a public official DECISION NO. 139— Corrupt and collusive practices in order to influence the procurement or execution of using multiple companies in order to influence the multiple World Bank-financed contracts. procurement and award of several contracts financed by Outcome: In this decision, the Sanctions Board imposed a the World Bank. sanction of conditional non-debarment on a respondent Outcome: In this decision, the Sanctions Board imposed a firm. The respondent must comply with the conditions sanction of debarment with conditional release for a mini- of non-debarment within two years from the date of the mum period of two years and ten months on a respondent decision. In case of non-compliance within this prescribed individual. The respondent was a public official acting under period, the respondent shall be automatically placed under the projects pursuant to several World Bank-financed con- debarment with conditional release for a minimum period of sultant agreements. two years and nine months. 46 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Allegations, evidence, and findings: INT alleged that the decision. In case of non-compliance within this prescribed respondent engaged in corrupt and collusive practices period, the respondents shall be automatically debarred for relating to two different companies. According to INT, the a minimum period of two years, with conditional release. respondent received two corrupt payments from the first company in order to influence the procurement or execution Allegations, evidence, and findings: INT alleged that the of five World Bank-financed contracts. INT also argued that respondents engaged in fraudulent practices by failing to the respondent entered into an arrangement with the second disclose a conflict of interest and payments made to third company in order to stifle open competition and influence the parties. First, INT asserted that the respondents failed to procurement and award of a World Bank-financed contract. disclose that one of its major shareholders participated With respect to the alleged corrupt practice, the respondent in the bid that the respondents were tasked to evaluate. In challenged INT’s evidence that the payments were made. their defense, the respondents asserted that the sharehold- The respondent also argued that the first company had er’s 2.13% stake in the respondent parent company did not no reason to bribe him and that he was not in a position to give rise to a conflict of interest subject to disclosure. The exercise the alleged influence. The respondent admitted Sanctions Board held that the disclosure obligations encom- to the alleged collusive practice. The Sanctions Board held passed not only situations of actual or potential conflict of the respondent liable on both counts. First, the record suf- interest, but also those that may be reasonably perceived as ficiently demonstrated that the respondent received the affecting the respondents’ capacity to serve the best inter- payments from the first company with corrupt intent. For ests of the client or borrower. In this case, the respondents example, the first company’s own financial records provided were tasked to assist the borrower in the prequalification direct evidence of a connection between the payments to process, bidding, negotiation, and award of a contract for a the respondent and the first company’s business interests. wastewater treatment plant. The shareholder was engaged Moreover, the record showed that the respondent played a in designing and building wastewater management systems key role in the procurement processes under the projects and and was notably the only entity in the parent company’s list was directly involved in the negotiations of at least two of the of major shareholders that was not a financial institution relevant contracts—indicating a course of dealing between or investment vehicle. The Sanctions Board viewed these the respondent and the first company. Second, the totality circumstances as creating a risk of reasonable perception of the evidence—including correspondence, draft and final that the respondents’ impartiality in carrying out their duties bidding documents, statements from the second company’s might be affected. The Sanctions Board further held that the staff, and the respondent’s own admissions—supported a respondents’ failure to disclose their potential reasonably finding that the respondent engaged in a collusive arrange- perceived conflict of interest was done recklessly. According ment in order to favor the second company improperly in the to the Sanctions Board, the respondents failed to act to mit- procurement of a relevant contract. igate the risk of misrepresentation and there was a lack of evidence showing that the respondents had adequate inter- Sanctioning analysis: The Sanctions Board applied aggra- nal controls—such as a simple conflict check process—or vation for the respondent’s repeated pattern of corrupt had one that was operationalized at the local level. payments. The Sanctions Board granted mitigation for the respondent’s cooperation with INT’s investigation and for the Second, INT argued that the respondents failed to dis- respondent’s minor role in, and admission to, the collusive close fees paid or to be paid to two consultants that were practice. The Sanctions Board declined to grant mitigation engaged to provide services related to the execution of the based on the respondent’s professional certifications. contract. The Respondents argued that the consultants’ payments were neither commissions or gratuities nor fees DECISION NO. 140—Fraudulent conduct involving failure related to the proposal or contingent on contract award and to disclose a potential perceived conflict of interest and execution, which the respondents interpreted as limited to payments made to two consultant companies in relation contract signing. Echoing its broad interpretation of disclo- to a World Bank-financed project. sure obligations in past cases, the Sanctions Board rejected Outcome: In this decision, the Sanctions Board imposed the respondents’ narrow reading of the type of payments conditional non-debarment on a parent company and its subject to disclosure and restrictive understanding of con- wholly-owned subsidiary. In order to avoid debarment, the tract execution. The Sanctions Board further found that respondents must demonstrate compliance with the condi- the respondents acted recklessly when they failed to seek tions of non-debarment within two years from the date of the clarifications on the meaning of ambiguous terms or inter- THE SANCTIONS BOARD « 47  nal contradictions in the bidding documents, as was their or overstating their time or contributions to the project. responsibility under the applicable Consultant Guidelines. The respondents argued that they truthfully and accurately billed for certain services, but admitted that their billing Sanctioning analysis: The Sanctions Board considered that practices were misleading with respect to other services. the respondents engaged in two distinct fraudulent practices The Sanctions Board held both respondents liable for fraud- and applied aggravation for harm caused to the project. The ulent practices. First, the Sanctions Board found that that Sanctions Board applied varying levels of mitigation for the the respondents knowingly used a false billing classification respondents’ compliance program, cooperation, voluntary for certain services, in order to earn additional time-based restraint, and the passage of time since the misconduct. The compensation for activities already covered by a lump-sum Sanctions Board’s choice of sanction and related conditions payment. The Sanctions Board determined that the respon- for non-debarment and release was based on the totality dents’ purported interpretation of the relevant provisions of the circumstances of this case, including the state of the was implausible and inconsistent with the consortium’s respondents’ internal controls and compliance program. rights and obligations under the contract. Second, the Sanc- tions Board found that the respondents systematically and DECISION NO. 141—Fraudulent billing practices seeking knowingly overbilled for a consultant’s time. Third, consid- undue compensation under a World Bank-financed ering the respondents’ admissions and other evidence, the consulting contract. Sanctions Board found that the respondents falsely cred- Outcome: In this decision, the Sanctions Board imposed ited to another consultant at least one deliverable that was sanctions of debarment with conditional release for a min- prepared by others, and that they inaccurately billed for her imum period of nine months on a consulting company and time. The Sanctions Board found that all these patterns of its technical director. The respondent firm was part of a conduct were part of a single fraudulent scheme to obtain consortium hired to supervise the execution of certain con- undue compensation under the contract. struction works and provide technical assistance to the local government pursuant to a World Bank-financed consultant Sanctioning analysis: The Sanctions Board applied aggra- agreement. vation based on the technical director’s central role in the misconduct and involvement of the respondent firm’s man- Allegations, evidence, and findings: INT alleged that the agement in the misconduct. The Sanctions Board granted respondents engaged in fraudulent practices by claiming limited mitigation for the respondents’ cooperation with undue compensation during the execution of the contract. INT’s investigation, voluntary restraint, and admissions, and According to INT, the respondents misrepresented certain considerable mitigation for the significant passage of time services rendered by three consultants by billing some of since the misconduct. their activities under a false contractual classification and/ 48 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Annexes Fiscal Year 2023 Sanctions System Data A. Investigations Overview TABLE A.1: Sanctionable Practices Identified in Substantiated External Investigation Cases, FY19–FY23 FRAUD CORRUPTION COLLUSION COERCION OBSTRUCTION TOTAL FIRS ISSUED FY23 18 8 8 0 6 20 % 90% 40% 40% 0% 30% FY22 17 5 6 0 7 20 % 85% 25% 30% 0% 35% FY21 18 9 5 0 3 21 % 86% 43% 24% 0% 14% FY20 28 6 5 0 7 29 % 97% 21% 17% 0% 24% FY19 36 10 7 0 5 41 % 87% 24% 17% 0% 12% Note: FIR = Final Investigation Report. Because substantiated cases may include more than one type of allegation (e.g., fraud and collusion), the counts by allegation type typically add up to more than the Total FIRs Issued column. TABLE A.2: Internal Investigation Cases, FY23 STAFF VENDOR TOTAL Carried over from FY22 7 12 19 Opened 21 6 27 Total 28 18 46 Closed 11 6 17 Substantiated 3 4 7 Unsubstantiated 5 2 7 Unfounded 3 0 3 Ending caseload 17 12 29 Notes: Substantiated case: A determination that based on the results of the investi- gation, the evidence supports a finding of misconduct. Unfounded case: The results of a preliminary inquiry or investigation established sufficient evidence supporting a conclusion that misconduct, as alleged, did not occur. Unsubstantiated case: The preliminary inquiry or investigation, due to a lack of evidence, did not establish a rea- sonable basis to warrant further investigation or a reasonable belief to substantiate that misconduct was committed. Some credible information may have been present, which if corroborated would have established a reasonable belief, but as it stands does not rise above the suspicion level. In other words, there was insufficient evidence to warrant an investigation or to prove or disprove that misconduct was committed, and the decision then falls in favor of the staff member or corporate vendor. ANNEXES: FISCAL YEAR 2023 SANCTIONS SYSTEM DATA « 49  TABLE A.3: Overview of Internal Investigation Outcomes, FY19–FY23 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 Total New Cases Opened 39 41 25 26 27 Total Cases Completed 29 48 38 28 17 Total Ending Caseload 41 34 21 19 29 CASES Substantiated 10 7 8 4 7 Unsubstantiated 8 17 24 20 7 Unfounded 5 10 3 4 3 Referred 5 14 3 0 0 Other 1 0 0 0 0 Closed 29 48 38 28 17 Complaints Referred/Not investigated 31 27 57 55 44 Notes: Referred case: A determination that the case involved issues more suitably addressed by other venues within the World Bank (e.g., EBC, PaCVP, SPADR). Complaints Referred (Not Investigated): Complaints involving issues not within INT’s investigative mandate were referred to other appropriate venues within the World Bank for intervention. B. Sanctions System and Results TABLE B.1: Sanctions Cases, FY19–23 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 5 YEAR TOTAL Sanctions Cases Submitted to SDO by INT 37 26 17 18 13 111 SDO Initial Review Completed 36 29 20 15 12 112 Sanctions Cases Issued by SDO to Respondents 30 30 17 14 15 106 TABLE B.2: Settlement Agreements, FY19–23 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 5 YEAR TOTAL Settlement Agreements Submitted to SDO/EO by INT 16 22 18 15* 6** 77 SDO/EO Review Completed 16 22 18 15* 6** 77 TABLE B.3: Sanctions Results, FY19–23 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 5 YEAR TOTAL Firms and Individuals Temporarily Suspended 34 38 23 20 19 134 Sanctions Imposed Pursuant to SDO Determinations 19 19 29 11 11 89 Sanctions Imposed Pursuant to Sanctions Board Decisions 14 7 8 6 6 41 Sanctions Imposed Pursuant to Settlement Agreements 20 23 20 18* 6** 87 Notes: *In FY22, the IFC EO reviewed three settlement agreements entered into between the World Bank and three respondents. **In FY23, the IFC EO reviewed one settlement agreement entered into between the World Bank and one respondent. 50 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  FIGURE B.1: Type of Sanctions Imposed by the SDO, the Sanctions Board, and Pursuant to Settlement, FY19–23 (Total of 217 Sanctions Imposed) 100 97.8% 90 80 70.7% 70 60 59.8% Percent 50 40 30 20 14.6% 11.5% 11.5% 10 7.3% 7.3% 9.2% 6.9% 2.2% 1.1% 0 SDO Sanctions Board Settlement* 89 Sanctions total 41 Sanctions total 87 Sanctions total Fixed-Term Debarment Letter of Reprimand Debarment with Conditional Debarment with Conditional Release + Conditional Non-Debarment Release Fixed-Term Debarment + Conditional Non-Debarment Conditional Non-Debarment Note: * Includes three settlement agreements that the World Bank entered into with three respondents in FY22, and one settlement that the World Bank entered into with one respondent in FY23, in connection with IFC operations. FIGURE B.2: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the SDO*, FY19–23 (Total of 89 Debarments) 8+ years 3 7–8 years 1 6–7 years 5 5–6 years 10 4–5 years 12 3–4 years 29 2–3 years 19 1–2 years 7 0–1 year 2 1 0 10 20 30 40 Fixed-term Debarments Debarments with Conditional Release ANNEXES: FISCAL YEAR 2023 SANCTIONS SYSTEM DATA « 51  FIGURE B.3: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23* (Total of 35 Debarments; Excludes 6 Non-Debarment Sanctions) 7+ years 1 2 6–7 years 5 5–6 years 1 4–5 years 1 4 3–4 years 1 7 2–3 years 1 1 1–2 years 5 0–1 year 1 5 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Fixed-term Debarments Debarments with Conditional Release FIGURE B.4: Length and Type of Debarments Imposed by the Sanctions Board, FY19–FY23* (Total of 73 Debarments; Excludes 10 Non-Debarment Sanctions) 7+ years 1 6–7 years 2 5–6 years 4 4–5 years 2 3–4 years 6 2–3 years 1 15 1–2 years 8 23 0–1 year 7 4 0 10 20 30 40 Fixed-term Debarments Debarments with Conditional Release Note: * Debarments for a period of exactly X years are in the higher category (e.g., a 3-year debarment is in the category “3–4 years”). 52 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  C. Lists of Firms/Individuals Sanctioned, Debarred, or Recognized by Cross-Debarment TABLE C.1: Firms/Individuals Debarred in FY23 * This table does not include any affiliates controlled by the firms/individuals debarred. ** All debarments in the table below are imposed with conditional release, unless marked with “**” at the end of the length of debarment. CND = Conditional non-debarment, which means a firm/individual is eligible to participate in World Bank operations. CND converts to debarment ***  with conditional release if the firm/individual does not meet the sanctions conditions. SANCTIONED COUNTRY OF PROJECT GROUNDS FOR   PURSUANT TO FIRM/INDIVIDUAL NAME RESPONDENT COUNTRY DEBARMENT LENGTH OF DEBARMENT 1 SDO Uncontested Henan Geological and China China Fraud 3 years Determination Mining Construction Engineering (Group) Co., Ltd. 2 Settlement Mr. Selcuk Yorgancioglu Türkiye Türkiye Fraud 2 years Agreement 3 SDO Uncontested Getinsa Ingeniería Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Corruption and 2 years, 10 months Determination Co. Ltd. Collusion (added to a previously- imposed 6-year debar- ment, for a total sanction of 8 years, 10 months) 4 SDO Uncontested Ms. Tran Thi Hoan Vietnam Vietnam Corruption and 2 years, 10 months Determination Collusion 5 SDO Uncontested Construcciones y Servicios Ecuador Ecuador Fraud 2 years, 10 months Determination de Minería Consermin S.A. 6 Settlement PCS Limited Vanuatu Vanuatu Fraud 1 year, 3 months Agreement 7 SDO Uncontested Burhani Engineers Ltd. Kenya Uganda Fraud 2 years Determination 8 SDO Uncontested Mr. Carlos Alberto de Otero Ecuador Ecuador Collusion 3 years, 2 months Determination López 9 SDO Uncontested Mr. Pham Hong Ha Vietnam Vietnam Collusion 5 years, 1 month Determination 10 Settlement Mr. Joshua Nari Vanuatu Vanuatu Fraud 1 year, 6 months Agreement 11 Settlement Lotte Data Communications Korea Vietnam Obstruction 3 years Agreement Company Limited 12 Settlement Mr. Carlos Barberán Diez Spain Guyana Corruption 3 years Agreement 13 SDO Uncontested Mr. Yunus Jalalov Uzbekistan Uzbekistan Fraud 2 years, 5 months Determination 14 SDO Uncontested Chez Aviv Nigeria Limited Nigeria Nigeria Fraud, 9 years Determination Corruption 15 SDO Uncontested Mr. Frank John Friday Nnaji Nigeria Nigeria Fraud, 9 years Determination Corruption 16 SDO Uncontested Mr. Cao Xuan Tung Vietnam Vietnam Collusion 5 years, 1 month Determination 17 Sanctions Board Mr. Victor Neeplo Liberia Liberia Corruption, 2 years, 10 months Decision Collusion 18 SDO Uncontested NJS Co., Ltd. Japan Bangladesh Fraud, 3 years, 1 month Determination Corruption 19 Sanctions Board ProjectPlan Consultoria e Brazil Brazil Fraud 9 months Decision Projetos LTDA (formerly MC Consulting LTDA) 20 Sanctions Board Mr. Luis Henrique Werneck Brazil Brazil Fraud 9 months Decision de Oliveira ANNEXES: FISCAL YEAR 2023 SANCTIONS SYSTEM DATA « 53  TABLE C.2: Other Sanctions Imposed in FY23 * This table does not include any affiliates controlled by the firms/individuals debarred. CND = Conditional non-debarment, which means a firm/individual is eligible to participate in World Bank operations. A CND converts to debarment **  with conditional release if the firm/individual does not meet the sanctions conditions. SANCTIONED COUNTRY OF PROJECT GROUNDS PURSUANT TO FIRM/ INDIVIDUAL NAME RESPONDENT COUNTRY FOR SANCTION SANCTION IMPOSED 1 Sanctions Board Union Strong Group, Inc. Liberia Liberia Corruption CND for 2 years Decision 2 Sanctions Board Nippon Koei Co., Ltd. Japan Vietnam Fraud CND for 2 years Decision 3 Sanctions Board Nippon Koei Vietnam Vietnam Vietnam Fraud CND for 2 years Decision International Co. TABLE C.3: Cross-Debarments Recognized by the World Bank in FY23 *Controlled affiliates may be included in the firms/individuals listed below. FIRM/INDIVIDUAL NAME COUNTRY GROUNDS FOR DEBARMENT LENGTH OF DEBARMENT 1 Construcap CCPS Engenharia e Comércio S.A. Brazil Cross Debarment: IDB 1 year, 6 months 2 Sociedad Anónima de Obras y Servicios Copasa Brazil Cross Debarment: IDB 2 years, 6 months do Brasil 3 Ms. Eilyen Nallely Delgado Alfaro Costa Rica Cross Debarment: IDB 11 years 4 GÖKSIN INSAAT GIDA TURIZM BILISIM Türkiye Cross Debarment: EBRD 2 years, 6 months TÜKETIM MALLARI PAZARLAMA MADENCILIK VE PROJE MÜSAVIRLIK HIZMETLERI SANAYI VE TICARET LIMITED SIRKETI 5 GFCC LLC Mongolia Cross Debarment: EBRD 4 years 6 Saruul Och LLC Mongolia Cross Debarment: EBRD 4 years 7 Somsavanh Chaleun Construction Co., Ltd. Lao PDR Cross Debarment: ADB 5 years 8 Mr. Khamky Somchayneuk Lao PDR Cross Debarment: ADB 5 years 9 M/s Pir Azmat Shah & Sons Pakistan Cross Debarment: ADB 6 years 10 Mr. Amir Uddin Shah Pakistan Cross Debarment: ADB 6 years 11 Inversiones Atlantic S.A. de C.V. El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 15 years 12 Héctor Alfonso Velasco Rivas El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 15 years 13 Nelson Alexander Núñez González El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 15 years 14 Proyectos Diversos Integrados S.A. de C.V. El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 15 years 15 Proyectos y Mecanizados Diversos S.A. de C.V. El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 5 years 16 Fernando Bladimir Peña Pineda El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 5 years 17 Gesaworld S.A. or Gesaworld Group S.A. Spain Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 18 Roser Vicente Ruiz Spain Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 19 José Antonio Lázaro Romeu Spain Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 20 Gesaworld do Brasil Limitada Brazil Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 21 Gesaworld Panamá S. A. Panama Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 22 Gesaworld USA Limited Liability United States Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 23 Gesaworld Chile Limitada Chile Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 24 Gesaworld México S.A. de C.V. Mexico Cross Debarment: IDB 10 years 25 Isabel Patricia Carrizo Argentina Cross Debarment: IDB 7 years 26 Marcelo Daniel Romero Argentina Cross Debarment: IDB 7 years 54 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  TABLE C.3, continued 27 Gitto Costruzioni Generali Nigeria Limited Nigeria Cross Debarment: AfDB 4 years 28 U&R Construcciones S.A. de C.V. El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 7 years 29 Leoncio Antonio Urbina Claros El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 7 years 30 Construcciones de Obras Civiles S.A. de C.V. El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 6 years 31 Juan Edgardo Andrade Peñate El Salvador Cross Debarment: IDB 6 years 32 Green Line General Trading and Contracting Kuwait Cross Debarment: EBRD 1 year CO.W.LL 33 Too Talap Strou Service Kazakhstan Cross Debarment: EBRD 3 years 34 Zimo Ltd. Georgia Cross Debarment: ADB 5 years 35 Alberto Esteve Aparisi Spain Cross Debarment: IDB 3 years 36 Genç İnşaat Limited Şirketi Türkiye Cross Debarment: EBRD 4 years 37 Alejandro Bolaños Salazar Costa Rica Cross Debarment: IDB 1 year, 6 months 38 Ogon Asu Limited Nigeria Cross Debarment: AfDB 1 year, 4 months 39 Mr. Wiliam Tuku Ogon Nigeria Cross Debarment: AfDB 1 year, 3 months 40 Shaanxi Herui Technology Development Co., Ltd. China Cross Debarment: ADB 4 years 41 DINAJU S.A. Costa Rica Cross Debarment: IDB 3 years 42 Víctor Julio Arias Herrera Costa Rica Cross Debarment: IDB 3 years 43 Mr. Md. Abdul Awal Bangladesh Cross Debarment: ADB 7 years 44 M/S. A.S. Construction Bangladesh Cross Debarment: ADB 7 years 45 Marcelia for Information Technology (Skytech) Jordan Cross Debarment: EBRD 1 year, 1 month 46 Goldsun Investments Company Limited Kenya Cross Debarment: AfDB 2 years 47 Société Bel Mabrouk Des Travaux et Tunisia Cross Debarment: AfDB 1 year, 1 month Investissement S.A.R.L 48 Todini Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. Italy Cross Debarment: ADB 7 years 49 Mr. Bekhruz Gulruzov Tajikistan Cross Debarment: ADB 5 years ANNEXES: FISCAL YEAR 2023 SANCTIONS SYSTEM DATA « 55  TABLE C.4: Vendors Declared Ineligible in FY23 No World Bank vendors were declared ineligible in FY23. severity of the offense and future risk to the World Bank. In these cases, INT and the Director of SPADR can decide One of the vendor cases that INT substantiated in FY23 that a full investigation is not warranted, based on credible was off-ramped. The non-responsibility determination is and corroborated preliminary inquiry findings by INT. If the non-public, meaning the vendor’s name will not be included vendor is thus excluded for a specific period from receiving on the World Bank’s public list of ineligible vendors. INT and future contract awards from the World Bank, the ineligibil- SPADR, with approval by the Managing Director and Chief ity determination is not made public in SPADR’s listing of Administrative Officer, developed an off-ramped procedure Non-Responsible Vendors. based on a multi-factor analysis, considering, inter alia, D. Referrals Overview TABLE D.1: Detailed Referrals Made in FY23 DATE OF NATURE OF REFERRAL REFERRAL RECIPIENT MISCONDUCT PROJECT 1 Dec. 21, 2022 Germany Fraud AFCC2/RI-Regional and Domestic Power Markets Development Project 2 Dec. 21, 2022 Congo, Dem. Rep. Fraud AFCC2/RI-Regional and Domestic Power Markets Development Project 3 Feb. 7, 2023 Office européen de Collusion Montenegro Second Institutional Development and lutte antifraude (OLAF) Agriculture Strengthening Project 4 Feb. 13, 2023 Tajikistan Fraud, Collusion Early Childhood Development to Build Tajikistan’s Human Capital Project and the Strengthening Critical Infrastructure against Natural Hazards Project 5 Mar. 7, 2023 Pakistan Fraud, Collusion, Tarbela 4th Extension Hydropower Project in Pakistan Corruption and Fraud under the Tarbela 5th Extension Hydropower Project in Pakistan 6 Mar. 15, 2023 Germany Fraud, Collusion, Tarbela 4th Extension Hydropower Project in Pakistan Corruption and Fraud under the Tarbela 5th Extension Hydropower Project in Pakistan 7 May 3, 2023 Kenya Fraud Nairobi Metropolitan Services Improvement Project in Kenya 8 May 3, 2023 Egypt Fraud Nairobi Metropolitan Services Improvement Project in Kenya 56 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  E. Integrity Compliance Overview Note: In instances where different entities within a corporate family have been separately sanctioned, the Integrity Compli- ance Officer treats such entities as a single entity for portfolio counting purposes, including with respect to engagements, notifications, releases (except where different entities within a corporate family are released at different times per their respective sanctions), etc. TABLE E.1: Integrity Compliance Data, FY22–FY23 FY22 FY23 Entities sanctioned with conditional release (as at the end of the fiscal year) 406 41216 Entities actively engaged with the ICO (as at the end of the fiscal year) 59 66 Notifications to newly sanctioned entities 33 21 Interim Notifications to sanctioned entities 17 62 15 Entities whose sanctions were continued 36 34 Entities released from sanction 22 17 Entities whose sanctions were converted 1 2 Debarment with conditional release to conditional non-debarment 1 1 Conditional non-debarment to debarment with conditional release 0 1 FIGURE E.1: Entities Released from World Bank Sanctions Upon Satisfaction of Compliance Conditions, by Source of Original Sanction, FY19–FY23 Sanctioned by OSD 14% 17% Sanctioned via Sanctions Board decision 69% Sanctioned via settlement ANNEXES: FISCAL YEAR 2023 SANCTIONS SYSTEM DATA « 57  TABLE E.2: Entities Released from Sanction upon Satisfaction of Compliance Conditions, FY23 DATE OF SANCTIONED PURSUANT TO NAME COUNTRY RELEASE 1 Settlement China Machinery Industry Construction Group Inc. China 7/18/22 2 SDO Determination Mr. Eugene Sando Caine Liberia 7/29/22 3 Sanctions Board Decision Beijing Huaxu Engineering Project Management Co. China 8/23/22 4 Settlement FCC Construcción, S.A. Spain 9/15/22 5 Sanctions Board Decision Mr. Roland Kolitsch Germany 11/15/22 6 Settlement Egis India Consulting Engineers Private Limited India 12/16/22 7 Settlement Companhia Brasileira de Projetos e Empreendimentos Brazil 12/29/22 8 Settlement Yooshin Engineering Corporation Korea 12/30/22 9 Settlement Bouygues Bâtiment International France 1/4/23 10 Settlement Techno Brain Global FZ-LLC (previously known as United Arab 2/8/23 Techno Brain Global FZE) Emirates 11 Settlement Techno Brain Global (Kenya) Kenya 2/8/23 12 SDO Determination Mr. Frank Rozestraten Netherlands 4/5/23 13 Settlement Al-Zubairi Group for General Trading, Contracting, Yemen, Rep. 4/27/23 Transportation, and Oil Services 14 Settlement Tatva Global Environment Pvt. Ltd. India 5/23/23 * UPL Environmental Engineers Limited affiliate 15 Settlement Tetra Tech International Development B.V. Netherlands 6/1/23 16 Sanctions Board Decision CNOOD Asia Limited China 6/27/23 17 SDO Determination China Jiangsu International Economic and Technical China 6/30/23 Cooperation Group Ltd. 58 » SANCTIONS SYSTEM ANNUAL REPORT • FISCAL YEAR 2023  Endnotes 1. In this report, the term World Bank refers collectively to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- ment (IBRD); the International Development Association (IDA); the International Finance Corporation (IFC); and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA). 2. For further details on the World Bank’s approach to controlling corruption, please see Anticorruption Initiatives— Reaffirming Commitment to a Development Priority (http:/ /documents.worldbank.org/curated/ en/365421591933442799/Anticorruption-Initiatives-Reaffirming-Commitment-to-a-Development-Priority). 3. To date since the two-tier system’s implementation in 2007, the IFC EO has reviewed three sanctions cases and five settlements; all remaining cases have been resolved by the SDO. 4. The total number of consultants consisted of eight extended-term consultants in full-time roles and short-term consultants completing the full-time equivalent work of 13.9 staff. 5. In FY23, 70% of cases are new active cases that are being developed. Seven out of 19 cases carried over from FY22 are in the final investigation stage. Therefore, case closure is lower than in previous fiscal years. However, the substantiation rate is greater. In FY23, INT substantiated seven cases compared to four in FY22. 6. Turnaround time is impacted by a combination of seven variables, including: (i) investigator to case ratio; (ii) complexity of the cases; (iii) single/multiple allegations per case; (iv) whether mission travel is required; (v) whether the subject staff member has requested extensions in which to respond in writing to the allegations notice and/or to the draft final report; (vi) delayed availability of subjects or witnesses beyond INT’s control; and (vii) whether there are parties external to the World Bank whose cooperation cannot be mandated. 7. INT substantiated a multi-year investigation finding sufficient evidence that a now-former staff member engaged in misconduct. Without this particular case, the average turnaround time to complete investigations would have been seven-and-a-half months. 8. For corporate vendor investigations, INT needs sufficient evidence to determine that it is more likely than not that the sanctionable conduct has occurred. 9. INT and SPADR, with approval by the Managing Director and Administrative Officer, developed an off-ramp procedure based on a multi-factor analysis, considering, inter alia, severity of the offense and future risk to the World Bank. In these cases, INT and SPADR can decide that a full investigation is not warranted, based on credible and corroborated preliminary inquiry findings by INT. If the vendor is thus excluded for a specific period from receiving future contract awards, the ineligibility determination is not made public in SPADR’s listing of Non-Responsible Vendors. One of the vendor cases that INT substantiated in FY23 was off-ramped, and the non-responsibility determination is non-public; thus the vendor’s name will not be included on the World Bank’s public list of ineligible vendors. 10. Staff Rule 8.02: Protections and Procedures for Reporting Misconduct (Whistleblowing) “applies to reports [by World Bank staff] of suspected misconduct that may threaten the operations or governance of the Bank . . . [and sets out] protections that apply whether the subject of the allegations is a staff member or any other person or entity inside or outside the Bank.” 11. In instances where different entities within a corporate family have been separately sanctioned, the Integrity Compliance Officer treats such entities as a single entity for portfolio counting purposes, including with respect to engagements, notifications, releases (except where different entities within a corporate family are released at different times per their respective sanctions), etc. 12. The World Bank’s first tier officers are as follows: the IBRD/IDA SDO, IFC’s EO, MIGA’s EO, and the EO for the World Bank’s guarantee and carbon finance activities. 13. The standard and burden of proof in sanctions cases are described in the relevant Sanctions Procedures, all available at: https://www.worldbank.org/en/about/unit/sanctions-system/sanctions-board#3 14. In each contested case, the Sanctions Board considers the respondent’s period of temporary suspension in determining any sanction. 15. As determined by the World Bank. 16. Adjusted from prior year. 17. In FY22, the ICO began to send Interim Notices to non-engaged sanctioned entities approximately half-way through their respective sanction period. ENDNOTES « 59  Corruption is corrosive to development. The World Bank is committed to ensuring that its resources are used transparently, accountably, and only for their intended purposes. If companies or individuals engage in corruption involving World Bank funds, the offices of the World Bank’s sanctions system—the Integrity Vice Presidency, the Office of Suspension and Debarment, and the Sanctions Board—help ensure that they are held to account. Scan the QR code below to learn more about how the World Bank’s sanctions system works and how these offices help fight corruption in development.