Entrepreneurship Support for Host and Displaced Communities

An Impact Evaluation of the Niger Refugees and Host Communities Support Project

June 2024

Endline Evaluation Report

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[1] Délibération N°076/2021/CNERS

Executive Summary

This report provides initial results from an impact evaluation (IE) of an Entrepreneurship Support Program intended to improve the livelihoods of host communities and displaced households in Niger. The program, inspired by rigorous evidence on the success of multifaceted economic inclusion interventions in other fragile settings, was delivered to households by the Niger Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA, Projet d'Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Communautés d'Accueil).

Conflict and violence create significant challenges to achieving global development objectives like Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Poor people are increasingly concentrated in countries affected by fragility, conflict, and violence (FCV) and, by 2030, it is estimated that nearly half of the global poor will live in in such places. Furthermore, the number of persons that are forcibly displaced from their homes has increased rapidly in recent years, with 117.3 million forcibly displaced people worldwide at the end of 2023 (UNHCR). Up to 75 of forcibly displaced people are hosted in countries that may themselves be poor, fragile, and exposed to conflict and violence (European Commission; 2024).

The Sahel region faces critical levels of displacement due to conflicts, environmental stressors, and protracted humanitarian crises. Niger, located in this region, ranks near the bottom of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, yet it still hosts over 800,000 forcibly displaced persons. Despite these challenges, Niger has committed to supporting and integrating this displaced population with support from international partners such as the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) and the World Bank.

The World Bank–funded Niger Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA) was launched in 2018 to improve access to basic services and economic opportunities for refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and host communities in Niger's most fragile regions. The project's objective was to enhance the livelihoods and economic stability of both displaced and host communities through targeted interventions. It was implemented by the Executive Secretariat of the Strategy for Development and Security in Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger (Secrétariat Exécutif de la Stratégie pour le Développement et la Sécurité des Zones Sahélo-Sahariennes du Niger; SDS-Sahel Niger).

PARCA included an Entrepreneurship Support Program designed to sustainably improve livelihoods and based on multifaceted Economic Inclusion programs. Economic Inclusion, or Graduation programs, are bundled interventions designed to address multiple constraints faced by poor households to improve their incomes, livelihoods, and assets. These programs are usually layered on existing safety net systems and include a combination, or "bundle", of cash or in-kind transfers, skills training, coaching, access to finance, and linkages to market support. Economic inclusion programs have demonstrated effectiveness across settings, including when delivered through government systems in FCV settings. For example, evidence from Afghanistan (Bedoya et al. 2023) and Niger (Bossuroy et al. 2022) show that these programs can achieve high economic returns and induce sustained impacts after the intervention.

PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program provided a reduced set of interventions. The program included a cash grant and business training but, as the program did not explicitly target persons enrolled in an existing safety net, it was not layered on top of regular cash transfers.

To study the program's impacts on livelihoods and other desired outcomes, it was implemented as a randomized control trial. The impact evaluation (IE) study was designed to answer three main questions. First, does PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program improve the livelihoods of vulnerable households in displacement contexts? Second, are there differences in impact across population groups? Third, what are the impacts on the broader community? Program implementation and baseline and endline data collection were conducted in 2022 and 2023.

The PARCA Entrepreneurship Support Program IE contributes to a body of evidence on effective approaches for improving lives and livelihoods for poor and vulnerable populations. Specifically, it extends existing rigorous evidence on multi-faceted economic inclusion programs to areas that are severely affect by forced displacement and assesses the impacts across host community and displaced households. It also considers a program of reduced complexity, which may have been an important element in delivering the program in targeted communities. Finally, the IE captures short term results, just months after the program was delivered. While this does not allow us to speak to the sustainability of outcomes, it adds valuable knowledge on more immediate changes that occur in the aftermath of program delivery.

Baseline survey results highlight the significant vulnerability of individuals and households in PARCA project areas prior to the start of the program. This is consistent across host and displaced households and extends across various socioeconomic dimensions. Households have low human development indicators, with 88% of household heads having no education. Food insecurity is prevalent, with 75 of households running out of food at least once in the past thirty days due to a lack of money. Employment and other economic activities are limited, with most households largely dependent on agriculture. Psychosocial wellbeing is poor, characterized by low levels of trust and high risk of clinical depression. Interactions between host community members and forcibly displaced persons are neutral. An important minority, 10% of households, report at least one dispute between these groups.

The preliminary impact analysis in this report suggests that PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program achieved meaningful short-term results. The program's IE find evidence of improvements in household income and consumption, economic activities, financial well-being, and generalized trust. These benefits extend beyond the households that participated in the program directly, suggesting broader positive impacts in the community. These results were achieved despite the contextual challenges to PARCA's implementation in areas characterized by security threats and high population movements. While still preliminary and subject to further analysis, these meaningful results suggest important promise of programs like this one, which is based on an economic inclusion model, to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable populations in settings affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.

The IE results also showcase some tradeoffs in introducing programs of this type in fragile communities. While generalized trust increased in program communities, we find evidence of an increase in tensions between host communities and forcibly displaced persons. These tensions appear focused on access to natural and other productive resources, like water and electricity. This is perhaps not surprising, given the large injection of resources into poor communities under the program and the fact that some households benefited while others did not. Future programs may therefore consider incorporating additional interventions to mitigate potential areas of tension.

Finally, the analysis shows that the program worked differently for hosts and forcibly displaced households. Both host and displaced households exhibited similar multidimensional vulnerabilities prior to the program: widespread food insecurity, susceptibility to shocks, and a high risk of depression, for example. However, the program appears to have worked differently for these two groups, with host experiencing larger relative positive impacts in some domains (like profits from non-farm income generating activities) and displaced households in others (like overall household income and financial well-being). While further analysis will be conducted to elucidate the mechanisms behind these differences, they suggest that future programs may want to consider some level of tailoring of program design for different population groups. This would need to be balanced with capacity to deliver a more differentiated program in an FCV setting.

The IE provides lessons for future programs and learning. These include optimizing the set of interventions delivered under the program, tailoring for specific population groups, exploring alternative delivery modalities (e.g., group-based vs. individual components; in-person vs. digital delivery), and looking at the sustainability of outcomes and cost-effectiveness. The world's poor are increasingly concentrated in FCV contexts, and building on PARCA's work will be critical to improving economic, social, and community well-being in some of the world's most challenging places.

1. Forced Displacement in Context

Conflict and violence have displaced millions of people worldwide. Forcibly displaced persons often move from one vulnerable area to another, creating significant challenges to achieving the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) by 2030 (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO 2017). Over one-third of all international migration occurs between countries in the Global South, and this trend is increasing (Crawley and Teye 2024). Regions that are already fragile face additional pressures when hosting forcibly displaced people, as both the displaced and host populations are often poor, lack access to basic services, and have limited livelihood opportunities. This scarcity of resources, services, and jobs can heighten socioeconomic tensions.

Forced displacement is a significant issue in the Sahel region. The region faces critical levels of displacement due to conflicts, environmental stressors, and protracted humanitarian crises, leading to a steady increase in the number of forcibly displaced people. Contributing factors include limited livelihood opportunities, competition for scarce resources, weak governance, and the growing threat of extremist groups. Additionally, ethnic and social tensions, exacerbated by structural inequalities and competition for limited resources, have perpetuated instability and displacement in the region[2].

Niger exemplifies the challenges faced by Sahelian countries. The country ranks near the bottom of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) Human Development Index, with nearly half its population living below the national poverty line (UNDP 2024). The economy depends heavily on its agricultural sector, which suffers from recurrent droughts due to climate shocks. Niger is also highly exposed to conflict, primarily due to the Boko Haram crisis and instability in Mali, resulting in an increasing number of attacks on its territory since 2011. To add to this precarious situation, Niger hosts over 800,000 forcibly displaced people, including over 400,000 refugees and over 400,000 internally displaced people (IDPs) as of April 2024 (UNHCR 2024). This influx has put additional pressure on host regions, exacerbating vulnerabilities such as lack of access to education and health care, as well as limited economic opportunities.

Despite these challenges, Niger offers a comparatively favorable context for hosting and integrating displaced populations. It is a signatory to international conventions on refugees and has affirmed the equal rights of refugees under national legislation. Before the coup on July 26, 2023, Niger was also viewed as a model of stability in the region. However, due to limited fiscal resources and administrative capacity in remote border regions, the government of Niger relies heavily on external partners to manage social tensions and provide humanitarian assistance to forcibly displaced people. These partners include the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), the World Food Programme (WFP), and the European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO). The government of Niger aims to transition from

[2] The World Bank's 2016 Risk and Resilience Assessment (RRA) for Niger highlights the security and economic impacts of regional conflicts and forced displacement on Niger. The crises in Libya and Mali as well as the expansion of Boko Haram from Northeast Nigeria into Niger have had an adverse impact on economic activities.

short-term crisis management to a medium-term, socioeconomic approach in response to forced displacement. PARCA is emblematic of this ambition.

2. Niger's Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA)

2.1. Project Objectives

The Refugees and Host Communities Support Project (PARCA, from *Projet d'Appui aux Réfugiés et aux Communautés d'Accueil*) aimed to improve access to basic services and economic opportunities for refugees, IDPs, returnees, and host communities in some of Niger's most fragile regions. The Project was launched in 2018 with support from the World Bank. It was led by the Executive Secretariat of the Strategy for Development and Security in Sahel-Saharan Areas of Niger (Secrétariat Exécutif de la Stratégie pour le Développement et la Sécurité des Zones Sahélo-Sahariennes du Niger) (SDS-Sahel Niger), with technical assistance from UNHCR. PARCA was implemented in the regions of Diffa (which borders Chad and Nigeria), Maradi (which borders Nigeria), Tillabéri (which borders Burkina Faso and Mali), and Tahoua (which borders Nigeria and Mali). Diffa, for example, hosts more than 290,000 refugees and IDPs, primarily displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency (UNHCR 2024).

PARCA was among the first World Bank projects to receive funding under the IDA18 regional sub-window for refugees and host communities. This window was created to help countries hosting refugees address the social and economic dimensions of forced displacement for both forcibly displaced persons and host communities (IDA 2021). As part of this window, PARCA as designed to address forced displacement as a development challenge rather than as a solely humanitarian one. It invested in infrastructure, access to services, and skills and assets for both the forcibly displaced and host populations in targeted regions, with the goal of reducing the shock of an influx of displaced people.

PARCA delivered activities in targeted areas under two main components: a cash-for-work program to improve access to basic services through investments in community infrastructure, and the Entrepreneurship Support Program. The Entrepreneurship Support Program is the focus of the IE presented in this report.

2.2. Project Targeting

PARCA was first implemented in fifteen communes in the regions of Diffa, Tillabéri, and Tahoua. These communes were chosen through UNHCR data due to their high rates of refugees, returnees, and/or IDPs. Ten communes were selected in Diffa, four in Tillabéri, and one in Tahoua[3]. Within these communes, 328

[3] PARCA was restructured in 2021 and 2022 to reflect changing population needs as displacement numbers changed across the country. As such, the project at closing covered a total 1,185 villages across five regions of the country: Agadez, Maradi, Diffa, Tahoua, and Tillaberi. However, only the original PARCA regions and communes were used as the basis for the IE described in this report.

infrastructures[4] were identified for rehabilitation[5] under the cash-for-work program. To identify program participants, any village located within a 16 km radius around these infrastructures was automatically enrolled in the program. This identification was based on data from a georeferencing exercise and Niger's 2011 national census. Due to the census's age, mayors were also asked for lists of communities around the infrastructure, which were then cross-referenced through project identification missions. These surveys collected up-to-date geolocation data, village names, and population distribution across different groups. In total, 565 villages in the regions of Diffa, Tillabéri, and Tahoua were identified to participate in the program.

PARCA used a spatial and "status blind" approach to select individuals and households for participation in its programs. This means that hosts, refugees, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and returnees in each community were all equally eligible for the program. Within each project village, household eligibility was determined through a community-based targeting process. Committees consisting of community leaders (village chief and NGO representatives, religious organizations, schools, etc.) created an exhaustive list of all households in each community. The committee then gathered information on each household's size, its number of livestock, whether the household participated in *habanaye* (a traditional animal trading system), and the type of structure that the household lived in. This information was used to identify eligible households for both components of PARCA.

Households classified as "medium poor" were eligible for PARCA's entrepreneurship support program. "Medium poor was defined as "poor but able to meet basic consumption needs."[6] Two subcommittees separately used the committee's information to classify households into three categories—very poor, medium poor, or wealthy.[7] The final list of eligible households included both forcibly displaced and host households and formed the basis of our sampling frame for the impact evaluation.

2.3. PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program

PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program is based on a growing body of evidence on *economic inclusion* approaches. Such multifaceted interventions are designed to address the many constraints poor households face in improving their incomes, livelihoods, and assets. These programs usually build on existing safety nets and include a combination, or "bundle," of cash or in-kind transfers, skills training, coaching, access to finance, and linkages to market support.

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[4] Typical infrastructure projects included newly built or rehabilitated integrated health centers, classrooms, sanitation facilities, school fence walls, water points with associated hydraulic infrastructure, rural roads, housing units for teachers, administrative/training centers, and market infrastructures.

[5] Originally, SDS-Sahel along with the local communities identified 736 infrastructures for rehabilitation, with 328 identified as higher priority.

[6] Existing experimental research on economic inclusion programs finds that their impacts vary widely by income even among the poor individuals who are targeted by them: households in higher wealth quantiles derive greater economic benefits from participating in these programs. This could be because the very poorest households use the (largely unconditional) grant money for basic needs rather than investing in livelihoods.

7 If the two subcommittees disagreed, they would discuss the household's eligibility until both agreed on its classification. The very poor were eligible for PARCA's cash-for-work community infrastructure component.

Rigorous evidence shows that economic inclusion programs contribute to poverty reduction and overall economic development, with transformational impacts on multiple policy objectives. These include livelihoods, food security, women's economic empowerment, financial inclusion, and resilience to climatic shocks. Moreover, economic inclusion programs can help poor households diversify their livelihoods and reduce income shocks. For example, in Niger, Sahel Adaptive Social Protection (ASP) Program offered various productive inclusion measures—like business training, savings promotion programs, coaching, lump-sum cash grants, and psychosocial activities—alongside regular cash transfers. These measures significantly increased economic outcomes and psychological well-being. Economic measures such as consumption and annual household business revenue showed notable increases ranging from 7 to 15 % for consumption and from 39 to 66 % for revenue, depending on the selection of program components. The program also proved highly cost-effective, especially when psychosocial activities were prioritized. Within 18 months of the intervention, impacts on gross household consumption already exceeded program costs (Bossuroy et al. 2022). Similar findings from Niger's Youth Employment and Productive Inclusion Project (forthcoming), Chad and Burkina Faso's ASP programs (forthcoming), and Afghanistan (Bedoya et al. 2023) show that economic inclusion programs are high-return investments that induce sustained impacts, including when they are delivered through government systems, across rural and urban settings, and in fragile and conflict-affected situations (FCS). More details on existing rigorous evidence on economic inclusion programs can be found in Appendix Literature review00.

PARCA's entrepreneurship support program resembled the Sahel ASP Program but took a reduced approach by delivering a more limited set of activities. The program consisted of a one-time US$200 cash grant (corresponding to more than a third of the yearly GDP per capita in Niger), life skills training[8], and a six-day business training that covered skills for both agricultural and non-agricultural activities (following the GERME level 1 curriculum[9][10]). Topics covered in the business training included financial education, microenterprise management, and technical skills relevant to the local market.

The Entrepreneurship Support Program aimed to enable community members to invest in productive assets or start or expand income-generating activities (IGAs) by removing barriers to productive investment. The objective of the program was to increase households' food security and holistic well-being through promoting individuals' economic activity. Individuals who were selected to receive the project needed to verbally present an idea for an income-generating activity using the cash grant to the implementing partner (a local NGO) that was responsible for carrying out the program in each region. There were no further requirements beyond stating this basic idea. After this, the individual was enrolled in the training program and, conditional on completing the program, received the cash grant.

[8] As implemented in the Sahel ASP program.

9 *Gérez Mieux Votre Entreprise* (GERME) is a training course developed by the International Labour Organization (ILO) that provides a methodology and simplified tools to help (future) business owners develop their income-generating activities.

10 The PARCA program did not include regular cash transfers, psychosocial trainings, and savings group.

3. Evaluating the Impact of PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program

3.1. Background

An impact evaluation was embedded in the design and implementation of the Entrepreneurship Support Program to credibly document the impacts and improve learning from this novel intervention. This was made possible by the commitment to learning of both the government (SDS-Sahel) and the World Bank team responsible for supervising and providing technical assistance to PARCA. The IE was integrated into the project during the project appraisal process through a partnership with the IE research team. This partnership began in September 2018 with the development of an IE Concept Note outlining the research questions, design, and implementation process. Soon after, the research team joined a supervision mission in Niamey and held a workshop with SDS-Sahel to build their capacity on IE methods and finalize the design and research questions. The research team participated in each subsequent supervision mission until the project's completion.

The IE demanded rigorous data collection protocols and implementation methods to accurately measure the causal impacts of the PARCA Entrepreneurship Support Program. The evaluation team helped train the project team through a dedicated workshop and follow-up training sessions during supervision missions. The team also developed clear data-collection and targeting protocols. Finally, a series of training sessions on data systems, complementing the work of the World Bank Geo-enabling team for Monitoring and Supervisions (GEMS), and a full-time impact evaluation field coordinator stationed in Niamey, the capital of Niger, contributed to the project team's ownership over the evaluation. The close integration and capacity-building that helped the IE succeed demonstrate the feasibility of integrating IE into an FCV project.

Both the program and the evaluation faced many challenges. Close monitoring and teamwork were required due to data scarcity and the fragility and volatility of the regions where the intervention took place. Other challenges, including the COVID-19 pandemic, resulted in a compressed timeline for data collection. Although the project and the work on the IE started in September 2018, baseline data collection wasn't finalized until February 2023, and the Entrepreneurship Support Program continued through May 2023, leaving very little time for final data collection in June 2023, just before the project's closing date. Consequently, the results presented in this report are short-run impacts observed in the months following the delivery of the program. Because PARCA was implemented within a highly volatile context marked by forced displacement, PARCA's IE offers insight into whether the positive outcomes of economic inclusion programs extend to new population groups, specifically forcibly displaced people, within such complex environments.

3.2. Impact Evaluation Design

The PARCA IE uses a randomized controlled trial (RCT) study design. This study design was possible because the government of Niger and the research team agreed to roll out the entrepreneurship support program in two phases, anticipating capacity constraints. As described further below, the team selected 260 study villages from the overall set of project villages for the IE. There were two rounds of random assignment.

In the first round of randomization, implemented in May 2022, each eligible village was assigned to either the treatment (phase 1) or the control (phase 2) group. Village-level randomization was conducted electronically using Stata and was stratified at the commune level. As a result, half of the study villages were set to receive the program in mid-2022 (phase 1), and the remaining villages started to receive the program approximately one year later, in mid-2023 (phase 2). Households in villages that did not receive the program until phase 2 serve as a control group to measure the program's impact.

In the second round of randomization, eligible households within each treatment village were selected to receive the program.[11] This was conducted through public lotteries. The research team worked closely with the government of Niger to provide detailed, standardized protocols for implementing the public lotteries and collecting and transmitting the resulting data. On average, 57 % of eligible households were selected to receive the program, representing 40 % of the total village population. Figure 1 shows how both rounds of randomization fit into the overall IE design.

Figure 1 Impact evaluation design



This design allows us to answer three main research questions by comparing different groups of households with one another. The questions are:

1. *Does PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program improve the livelihoods of vulnerable households in displacement contexts?* To study this question, we compare outcomes between eligible households in treatment villages that were randomly selected to receive the entrepreneurship program and eligible households in control villages (that is, eligible households in villages that did not receive the program until phase 2). Comparing these two groups of households (the intervention group and the external comparison group) reveals the direct effect of receiving the

11 As described above, eligible households were "medium poor" households able to meet basic consumption needs, and eligibility was determined using a community-based targeting process.

program on households who are poor but able to meet basic consumption needs, i.e., on the types of households that, by design, are eligible for the program.

2. *Are there differences in impact across population groups?* To answer this question, we use rich baseline survey data (described below) to measure how the impacts of the program differed between the forcibly displaced population and the host population.

   What are the impacts on the broader community? To study this question, we first compare outcomes between eligible households in treatment villages that were *not* randomly selected to receive the program and eligible households in control villages. Comparing these two groups of households reveals the spillover effects that eligible households experience from being part of a treatment village—for instance, potential indirect benefits from having co-villagers who did receive the program. We also compare outcomes between *ineligible* households in treatment and control villages (that is, households classified as either too poor or too wealthy to receive the program). Comparing these two groups of households reveals the spillover effects that ineligible households experience from being part of a treatment village. Finally, we measure the impact of the program on village-level outcomes.

The IE was conducted in 260 of the 565 villages covered by PARCA. To select the 260 villages, the team first excluded all 57 villages from the Tahoua region, so that the project could both respect its delivery timeline, as well as pilot the household listing, enrolment, and lottery exercises. Second, we excluded 8 villages in the communes of Bosso (Diffa) and Inates (Tillabéri), as it was too costly to send data collection teams to these communes for only 8 villages. An additional 93 villages were excluded because they had too few eligible households (fewer than 20 each). Of the remaining 407 villages, the team prioritized those in which a village census (described below) recorded a mix of forcibly displaced and host households, selecting all 189 villages in which the share of displaced households was greater than 2 %.[12] Finally, of the 218 remaining villages whose share of displaced households was less than 2 %, 71 additional villages were randomly selected to reach the target of 260 study villages.

Of the 260 villages, half (130) were assigned to phase 1 of the Entrepreneurship Support Program (treatment) and half were assigned to phase 2 (control). However, due to adverse events (described below), the final IE sample included only 170 of these 260 villages (88 treatment and 82 control). Figure 2 shows the locations of the study villages within the regions of Diffa and Tillabéri, as well as ACLED's conflict-related events map for the study period. This illustrates how PARCA coverage was in the country's most conflict-prone areas.

[12] On average, the share of the forcibly displaced population across these 189 villages was 44 %.

Figure 2: IE Villages (top) and conflict events (2018-2023) ACLED (bottom)




Tillaberi: Village de l'évaluation d'impact de la composante 2 PARCA.
Tillia
Bani Bangou
Sanam
Tébaram
Abala
Inatès
Ayérou
Gorouol
Tondikiwindi
Anzourou
Dessa
Bankilaré
Méhana
Bibiyergou
Sakoira
Sinder
Kokorou
Tillabéri
Ouallam
Dingazi
Filingué
Kourfèye Centre
Soucoucoutane
Téra
Kourtéye
Simiri
Tondikandia
Imanan
Dargol
Diagourou
Karma
Hamdallaye
Tagazar
Gothéye
Namaro
Niamey I
Niamey III
Niamey V
Liboré
Diantchandou
Koygolo
Sokorbé
N'Dounga
Torodi
Bitinkodji
Youri
Kollo
Kouré
Kiota
Légende
Village d'évaluation d'impact
Phase 2 / Control
Phase 1 / Traitement
Insécurité
Contamination


Number of Events
1
10
20
30
37
Event Type
Riots
Explosions/Remote violence
Battles
Violence against civilians
Arlit
Agadez
Ingall
Tchintabaraden
Bankilare
Illela
Belbedji
Niamey
Zinder
Maradi
Torodi
Dosso
Dungass
Diffa
© 2023 Mapbox © OpenStreetMap

3.3. Impact Evaluation Data

3.3.1. Data Sources

The PARCA Entrepreneurship Support Program IE leverages multiple data sources. These are summarized in Figure 3. First, the PARCA project and research teams relied on Niger's 2011 census survey and cross-referenced it with geo-satellite data of the identified infrastructure and neighboring villages to get an initial sense of the existing villages and their population size in the targeted regions. To update this first former database, a community census in 2018 collected basic information from every household in the project villages, which was used to select households for the IE and to respondents (even years later). Third, a rich baseline survey was conducted in 2022 among the households and villages that are part of the IE. In addition, SDS-Sahel set up a comprehensive monitoring system over the course of the program to collect updated information on program participants, including the number of recipients, details on training participation, and the disbursement status of cash grants. Finally, an endline survey was conducted roughly one year after the baseline, before the beginning of phase 2 of the program.

The IE analysis presented in this report primarily uses the household survey data collected before (baseline) and after (endline) the implementation of the program in study villages. Each survey round included two main questionnaires:

1. *Individual and Household Survey:* This survey captured rich data on individuals and households, including consumption, income, food security, social capital, aspirations, mental health, trust, and community integration.

2. *Village Survey:* This shorter survey, conducted with village chiefs, collected data on the community, including ethnic and religious composition, internal and external disputes, external support, and infrastructure.[13]

Figure 3 : Data Sources



[13] The preliminary analysis in this report uses data from the Individual and Household Survey. Subsequent analyses will incorporated data from the Village survey.

3.3.2. Impact Evaluation Survey Samples

The baseline survey was conducted in both treatment and control villages, and households were targeted for the survey based on their eligibility for the Entrepreneurship Support Program. In each of the 130 treatment villages, 34 eligible households were targeted for the baseline survey. Half (17) of the households targeted received the program, and the other half (17) did not receive the program. In the 130 control villages, only 17 eligible households were surveyed.[14] **Figure 4** provides an overview of the baseline and endline timeline in relations to program implementation.

In total, 6,630 households were targeted for the baseline survey, of which 5,833 (89%) were successfully surveyed. This is a high coverage rate despite adverse factors that are characteristic of the study's FCV context:

- As described above, the initial village census was conducted in 2011, 11 years before the implementation of the program. Given the highly mobile target population, the team anticipated that some villages identified earlier might no longer exist due to migration. The baseline survey was crucial in confirming the existence and locations of the villages. *During the implementation of the baseline survey, three villages, totaling 51 households, could not be located and were subsequently removed from the project area in coordination with SDS-Sahel Niger.*

- During the survey, it appeared that some project areas were prone to high insecurity that would prevent survey implementation. SDS-Sahel Niger, the survey firm, and the research team decided to exclude several high-insecurity villages that would expose survey teams to elevated risks**.** *In total, 11 villages, totaling 187 households, were removed from the sample and were not visited during the follow up survey.*

- The research team learned, after the completion of the baseline survey but before the implementation of the program, that the lottery to select program recipients had been conducted in some of the control villages shortly after the baseline data collection ended. The lottery was not meant to happen until phase 2 to ensure that the study had a rigorous control group. As a result, the research team removed these villages from the IE sample. *This issue affected 76 villages, mostly concentrated in the commune of Chetimari in the region of Diffa*.

- The number of villages covered at endline thus dropped by 90 to 170, including 88 treatment villages and 82 control villages.

[14] The baseline survey was conducted in two waves, before and after the lottery that selected households to receive the program, to ensure a balanced sample between both groups in treatment villages. A parallel analysis is being conducted to confirm that there is no systematic difference in baseline responses across households that were in the first and second wave. Preliminary results suggest there is not.

The endline survey targeted baseline households and, additionally, a representative sample of 15 ineligible households in each of the 170 villages where the baseline was successfully conducted. Half of the surveyed ineligible households were classified as very poor, and the other half as wealthy.[15] The total target sample for the follow up was thus 6,936 households. 6,705 (97 %) were successfully surveyed.

Figure 4 provides an overview of the different IE steps and how these fit into PARCA's operational timeline.

Figure 4 : IE Timeline



4. Household Profiles in PARCA project areas

The baseline results highlight the significant vulnerability of individuals and households in PARCA project areas. This vulnerability is consistent across host and displaced households. Heightened vulnerability is characterized by low income, limited education, absence of savings, poor mental health conditions, high exposure to shocks, and potential tensions between forcibly displaced people and host communities.

Approximately half of the IE sample has a forcibly displaced person living in their household. On average, in each baseline targeted village, 36% of households had at least one IDP, and 14.5% had at least one refugee. According to village leaders, these numbers increased by an average of 27 % and 40 %, respectively, in the 12 months preceding the survey, consistent with overall deteriorating security conditions in and around PARCA project areas. Villages in our sample have an average of 206 households.

Household vulnerabilities extend across various socioeconomic dimensions.

[15] In villages with too few households in either category, the other category was oversampled to reach the target of 15 ineligible households.

- **First, households have low human development indicators.** Households tend to be large, with an average of nearly six members, and education levels are very low, with 88 % of household heads having no education. Food insecurity is prevalent, as 77 % of adult household members reported skipping meals at least once in the previous 30 days to feed their children, and 75 % ran out of food at least once due to a lack of money. Health concerns are severe, with nearly 60 % of households having a family member who required medical treatment in the previous 90 days.

- **Second, households' employment and other economic activity are limited.** Only 31 % of household heads were employed (including any paid employment but excluding self-employment) in the 30 days prior to the survey. The average reported income per household member in the same period was CFAF 3,800 (US$6.74), and 80 % of respondents reported being unsatisfied or very unsatisfied with their current income level. Only about 5 % of households received income from remittances. Savings are nearly nonexistent (2 % of households), while about 25 % have outstanding loans. Despite the economic hardships, only about 7 % of households received cash or in-kind transfers, and 18 % received some form of government assistance in the previous 12 months.

- **Third, most households rely on agricultural activities.** 68 % of households own agricultural land, with 31 % of harvest consumed within the household. The average reported value of farming assets is CFAF 16,500 (US$27). Regarding business experience, only 14 % of household heads are self-employed, with an average business age of 7.7 years. The initial investment into these enterprises averages CFAF 59,100 (US$97), and only about a third of these businesses employ paid workers.

- **Fourth, psychosocial wellbeing is low for all population groups.** Data was collected on psychosocial constructs including self-efficacy,[16] general trust, and depression.[17] The results indicate mid-range levels of self-efficacy (22 out of a possible 40), low levels of trust (only 58 % of respondents agreed that most people can be trusted), and a 72 % risk of clinical depression.

The data collected at baseline also highlights the neutral quality of interactions between different groups, although there are signs of minor tensions between hosts and displaced persons. When asked about interactions between forcibly displaced people and host communities on a scale of 1 to 10 (with 10 representing the ideal state), both refugees and hosts reported an average score of about 5.7, indicating significant room for improvement. However, village leaders generally reported good inter-group interactions with a low prevalence of disputes.

The baseline data also highlights minor disputes between hosts and the displaced. 10 % of households have reported at least one dispute concerning hosts and IDPs or hosts and refugees: these mostly relate to theft, discrimination, and minor aggressions.

[16] Measured through the General Self-Efficacy Scale.
[17] Measured through the Center for Epidemiologic Studies Depression Scale.

Finally, the baseline data confirms that the randomization process was successful in creating treatment and control groups that are, on average, equivalent across observable characteristics. This holds even when we account for villages dropped from our sample due to the adverse events described above. Balance tables can be found in Appendix 4: Balance Table.[18]

5. Impacts of PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program

This section presents initial results from PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program IE. As described above, the PARCA IE builds on existing evidence on economic inclusion programs by studying a reduced intervention implemented in forced displacement contexts. As noted, the IE was designed to answer three primary questions: (1) Does PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program improve the livelihoods of vulnerable households in displacement contexts? and (2) What are the impacts on the broader community; and (3) Are there differences in impact across population groups?

The initial analysis covers outcomes in three categories: household income and expenditure, on and off-farm income-generating activities, savings and loans, and social cohesion. The outcomes are further described in Appendix 3: Outcomes description. For each set of outcomes, we discuss the impact of the entrepreneurship support program on program participants, whether these impacts differ between host communities and forcibly displaced people, and the community-level welfare impacts of the program (i.e., spillover effects on other community members). Methods used for the analysis are described in Appendix 2: Methodology.

The results presented here should be interpreted as short term and preliminary. As described above in this report (Section 3.3), these results are based on a survey conducted approximately three months after the Entrepreneurship Support Program was delivered. Therefore, these only reflect the program's impact in the short term.[19] Additionally, the research team will deepen the analysis in the coming months, and the report will subsequently be updated.

5.1. Household Income and Expenditure

Participation in PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program increased household income. Program recipients were 4 percentage points (pp) more likely to report any positive household income, from a reference level in the control group of 94% (+4%), as illustrated in

Figure *5*. Among households reporting a positive income, this increased by 17%[20], as illustrated in **Figure 6**.

[18] We control for baseline indicator values whenever possible in the impact analysis presented later in this repot.
[19] As explained above, delays in implementation and the project's imminent closing date necessitated the collection of follow-up data shortly after program delivery.
[20] This outcome variable measures income from all sources in the previous 30 days.

Figure *5*: Impacts on household's probability to report a positive income



Figure 6: Impacts on household income increase



The effects on household income were stronger for displaced households. On average, the program had a larger impact on the probability of reporting any positive income among displaced households than among host households (the difference in the impact across the two groups is 6pp and is significant at 5%),

as shown in **Figure *7***. Among household reporting any positive income, the estimates suggest a larger increase in income for displaced beneficiaries compared to host beneficiaries, but in this case the difference in program impact across the two groups is not statistically significant at conventional levels.

Figure 7: Impacts by displacement status on household income increase



The benefits of the program extended beyond its direct recipients, with positive impacts also for other households in program villages. First, we find evidence that the program increased the likelihood of reporting any positive income for other "medium-poor" households that were located in program villages and eligible to receive the program but were not selected through the lottery. This group is 4 percentage points more likely to report any positive income. Second, we see evidence of increased reported income for the broader community in program villages, both for eligible but non-selected households and for the group of households that were not considered eligible because they were either too poor or too wealthy. In both cases, the estimated relative increase in income due to the program is similar to the estimate for participating households, though it is only statistically significant for the latter group (i.e., ineligible households). While these results are preliminary and subject to further analysis, they suggest that the Entrepreneurship Support Program had a positive impact that extended to beyond program participants to their wider communities.

Participation in PARCA's entrepreneurship support program also affected short-term household expenditure (Figure *8*). Program participation, on average, resulted in an increase in spending, in the 30 days prior to the follow-up survey, of 14% on food (which represents, on average, the largest high-frequency expenditure item) and of 49% on utilities such as water and electricity (which represent, on

average, the second largest high-frequency expenditure item). These results are significant at the 5% and 1% level, respectively. We also observe a decrease of 29% on spending on tobacco and alcohol (significant at the 10% level). In this case, the program impact is comparable across host community members and displaced households.[21] These results suggest that participating households leveraged the program for increase well-being by increasing spending on essentials like food, water, and electricity. There is however, no change on average induced by the program on medium-term expenditures (recorded over the 3 months preceding the survey), such as school, health, weddings and funerals, and social events.

Figure 8: Impacts on household expenditures



The results suggest that the wider community in program villages also increased their expenditure because of the program. Across the different types of households in target villages, we see evidence of increase in expenditure on utilities and education, and large relative decreases in spending on alcohol and tobacco which are similar to levels observed for participating households. These results corroborate those

[21] We do observe a few differences for host/displaced households in other expenditure categories where there is no average detectable change in expenditure. This is spending on leisure goods such as toys and candy, with displaced households reporting an increase of 114%, and on health, where displaced households report a decrease of 26%.

on household income in suggesting that the Entrepreneurship Support Program had positive impacts that extended beyond program participants to their wider communities.

5.2. Non-Farm Income Generating Activities

Positive impacts on profits from existing non-farm income generating activities (IGAs) are observed, but it is likely still too early to discern impacts on the creation of new activities (Figure 9). In the control group, 19% of households report an off-farm IGA, and we do not find evidence of new activities being created due to participation in the program. However, we find strong evidence of increased profits for existing activities: on average, across all non-farm IGAs, program participants report an increase in profits of 98%. These findings suggest that individuals who already owned businesses effectively utilized the resources and training, resulting in increased revenues from ongoing activities. The high magnitude of these impacts is perhaps not surprising as the cash-grant was specifically targeted towards IGAs.

Figure *9*: Impacts on off-farm IGAs



The positive impact on profits from IGAs are possibly driven by host community households (Figure *10*). The estimated increase for host households across all businesses is 161%, while for displaced households it is 61%. The profit estimates are noisy, and we cannot statistically distinguish the impact across the two groups. However, the magnitudes suggest that, for non-farm IGAs, host community program participants derive greater benefits than do displaced ones. Point estimates are very similar when considering only the main reported IGAs, suggesting that most households with an off-farm IGA have only one such activity.

Figure 10: Impacts by displacement status on off-farm IGAs



The program did not have any effect on profits from IGAs for other households in treatment villages, though it appears to have reduced IGA opportunities for some community members. Specifically, for host community households that would have been eligible for the Entrepreneurship Support Program but who did not gain access to the program through the lottery, the reporting of any IGA falls by a suggestive 6% (significant at the 10% level). As only 19% of all households report any income-generating activity in the control group, this is a large relative decrease. The previous results on household income and expenditure indicated that the program's overall economic benefits extend to non-participating households. However, the results on IGAs suggest that there may still be a shift in the types of opportunities available to non-participating households due to the program's presence in their village.

5.3. Agricultural Activities

PARCA Entrepreneurship Support Program recipients were more likely to own livestock (Figure *11*). The proportion of households reporting ownership of any livestock (chicken or sheep) increased by 7.3pp, or 11.4% relative to the control group mean of 64%. We do not detect a difference in impacts for host and displaced households.

Figure 11: Impacts on households' probability of owning livestock



We also observe an increase in the amount of land rented by displaced households (Figure *12*). While the program did not impact the probability that a displaced household would start renting agricultural land, the size of the rented land area of displaced households increased by 62%. However, it is important to note that only a very small number of households rent land in the comparison group. Among both displaced and host community households, only 1% of households reported renting any agricultural land.

Figure 12: Impacts by displacement status on agriculture activities



There is also some evidence of positive effects on agricultural activities for the wider community. Some community members that did not participate directly in the program also appear to have increased the size of the land they rent (though, again, the proportion of households renting land is very small), and there is suggestive evidence that households in program villages that were themselves not eligible for the program increased livestock ownership by 14pp, a substantial increase relative to the control group average of 57%. While these results require more analysis for a full interpretation, they add evidence to the conclusion that the positive economic impacts of the Entrepreneurship Support Program extended beyond direct program participants.

5.4. Savings and Loans

PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program had positive and significant impacts on household financial well-being (Figure 13). Notably, the proportion of households reporting any outstanding loans decreased by 6pp, which corresponds to a 41% drop from an average of 15% in the control group (significant at the 1% level). We also observe a suggestive increase in the share of households reporting any savings, which is large in relative terms (+183%), but very small (1.1pp, significant at the 10% level) in absolute terms, given the very small fraction of households reporting any savings in our sample (0.6% in the control group). The fact that a large proportion of participating households with loans were able to pay these off suggests that some of the immediate income obtained from participating in the program was used to reduce existing liabilities, which may place households in a stronger position in the future to obtain additional credit for investments or in the case of adverse economic shocks.

Figure 13: Impacts on savings and loans



The impacts on financial health are larger for displaced households (Error! Reference source not found.**).** The impact of the program was significantly larger for displaced beneficiaries, both when considering the

reduction in households with outstanding loans (the differential effect is 11pp and is significant at the 1% level), and when considering the increase in households having any savings (the differential effect is 1.4pp, significant at the 10% level).

Figure 14 Impacts by displacement status on savings and loans



Once again, these effects also impact other members of the community. Specifically, we observe similar effects for other households in program villages who were not themselves selected for the program through the lottery. For these households, outstanding loans decreased by 40% (6pp relative to a control average of 15%).

5.5. Social Cohesion

Social cohesion wasn't an explicit objective of PARCA, but it is considered an important element of building resilience to conflicts and recovering from fragility and is thus often a desired outcome in FCV contexts. There are various channels through which PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program might impact social cohesion, including fostering trust within communities, promoting interactions between different population groups, and addressing resource-based conflicts. At the same time, by providing support to a subset of households in the community, there was the risk that the program could create tensions and increase competition for the scarce resources. It is therefore important to analyze this dimension both for a fuller appreciation of PARCA's impacts and to provide guidance for future policies and programs.

The program had positive and significant impacts on generalized trust expressed by participating households. Trust is measured on a scale of one to four, with higher numbers indicating higher levels of trust overall. **Figure** 15 displays results for reported trust in leaders (including local, regional, and national government leaders, from the village leader to the country's president), "locals" (one's family, neighbors,

tribe, or co-villages), “foreigners” (persons from other villages, other tribes, or other countries), and an index combining values across the three. Across the board, we see relatively high levels of trust: the index average in the control group is 3.31 out of 4. Encouragingly, we also see that, across these three categories and the overall index, the program achieved positive and significant increases in trust. For instance, the overall trust index increased on average by 0.13 points (a 4% increase compared to the average trust level reported in the control group). This suggests that improvements in economic well-being can also translate into social benefits like generalized trust, albeit from a relatively favorable starting point.

Figure *15* **Impacts on reported trust**



Increases in generalized trust are driven by displaced population. The effects on trust towards locals, leaders, and the overall index are driven by displaced populations. Interestingly, the increased trust in foreigners is instead driven by host community households.

Trust also increased throughout the broader community (Error! Reference source not found.**).** Overall, we observe comparable increases in trust levels among other households in the community that did not directly receive the program. These results alleviate the concern that households excluded from the program could develop negative attitudes and sentiments and are instead in line with previous findings showing that the program benefits extended also to them.

Figure 16: Impacts on trust for members of the broader community



However, the program also led to an increase in the number of disagreements reported between different groups in the community (Figure *17*Error! Reference source not found.).[22] The proportion of program recipients who reported any disagreement involving host community members and refugees (IDPs) increased by 7.8pp (7.7pp), which corresponds to a 63% (62%) increase compared to the average disagreement prevalence of 12.4% (12.3%) in the control group. In particular, respondents reported an increase in land disputes (+6pp from a control mean of 4% for disputes involving refugees[23]) and in disputes related to discrimination episodes (+4pp from a control mean of 3%) with refugees as well as with IDPs (with comparable magnitudes).

[22] The specific question in the questionnaire is "Over the past months, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between refugees / IDPs and host communities in this village?"
[23] Results for land disputes involving IPDs are similar: +7pp from a control mean of 3%.

Figure 17: Impacts on households' probability to report conflict between refugees and hosts (left) and IDPs and hosts (right)



These increases in disagreements are mostly reported by displaced households.[24] Displaced households are significantly more likely to report an increase in disputes related to land, water, and theft within the community, compared to host participants. There is, however, no differential impact across displaced and host beneficiaries in term of likelihood of reporting conflicts over discrimination issues. Overall, these results suggest that although the program increased generalized trust among community members, it also led to increased disagreements and tensions among different groups in the community, perhaps particularly in relation to access to economic resources.

The broader community confirmed more disagreements between hosts and displaced populations.[25] Households in program villages that were not directly benefiting from the program also reported higher tensions between groups. Given that the questions referred to overall tensions within the community, not necessarily involving the respondents, their answers corroborate the findings discussed above.

These initial results on PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program's impacts on social cohesion, warrant further investigation, they suggest a concurrent increase in generalized trust and more specific disputes. It is possible, for example, that the program increased interactions and contact across groups in program villages, which may have increase generalized trust. At the same time, increased competition for resources, customers, etc., maybe be responsible for increasing tensions between groups.

[24] The specific question in the questionnaire is "Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between refugees / IDPs and host communities in this village?"
[25] The specific question in the questionnaire is "Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between refugees / IDPs and host communities in this village?"

6. Conclusions

The PARCA Entrepreneurship Support Program IE contributes to a body of evidence on effective approaches for improving lives and livelihoods for poor and vulnerable populations. Specifically, it extends existing rigorous evidence on multi-faceted economic inclusion programs to areas that are severely affect by forced displacement and assesses the impacts across host community and displaced households. It also considers a program of reduced complexity, which may have been an important element in delivering the program in targeted communities. Finally, the IE captures short term results, just months after the program was delivered. While this does not allow us to speak to the sustainability of outcomes, it adds valuable knowledge on more immediate changes that occur in the aftermath of program delivery.

The preliminary analysis in this report suggests that PARCA's Entrepreneurship Support Program achieved meaningful short-term results. The program's IE found evidence of improvements in household income and consumption, economic activities, financial well-being, and generalized trust. These benefits extend beyond the households that participated in the program directly, suggesting broader positive impacts in the community. While still preliminary and subject to further analysis, these meaningful results suggest important promise of programs like this one, which is based on an economic inclusion model, to improve the livelihoods of vulnerable populations in settings affected by fragility, conflict, and violence.

The results also showcase some tradeoffs in introducing programs of this type in fragile communities. While generalized trust increased in program communities, we find evidence of an increase in tensions between host communities and forcibly displaced persons. These tensions appear focused on access to natural and other productive resources, like water and electricity. This is perhaps not surprising, given the large injection of resources into poor communities under the program and the fact that some households benefited while others did not. Future programs may therefore consider incorporating additional interventions to mitigate potential areas of tension.

The analysis also shows that the program worked differently for hosts and forcibly displaced households. Both host and displaced households exhibited similar multidimensional vulnerabilities prior to the program: widespread food insecurity, susceptibility to shocks, and a high risk of depression, for example. However, the program appears to have worked differently for these two groups, with host experiencing larger relative positive impacts in some domains (like profits from non-farm income generating activities) and displaced households in others (like overall household income and financial well-being). While further analysis will be conducted to elucidate the mechanisms behind these differences, they suggest that future programs may want to consider some level of tailoring of program design for different population groups. This would need to be balanced with capacity to deliver a more differentiated program in an FCV setting.

The IE provides lessons for future programs and learning. These include optimizing the set of interventions delivered under the program, tailoring for specific population groups, exploring alternative delivery modalities (e.g., group-based vs. individual components; in-person vs. digital delivery), and looking at the sustainability of outcomes and cost-effectiveness. The world's poor are increasingly concentrated in FCV contexts, and building on PARCA's work will be critical to improving economic, social, and community well-being in some of the world's most challenging places.

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Appendix 1: Literature review

This study contributes to the literature focused on understanding how to support the very poor in building sustainable livelihoods. A solid body of evidence exists supporting the effectiveness of "cash plus" programs, whereby cash transfers are combined with training on how to build resilience and livelihoods, in improving welfare over the short and longer term (Bossuroy et al., 2022; Banerjee et al., 2015). Very little is known, however, about their impact in highly fragile contexts with high shares of forcibly displaced persons. Our study will make five critical contributions to the literature on this topic.

IDPs and refugees are particularly vulnerable populations. They are likely to have lost assets and their source of income generation, may have experienced significant trauma, and are unlikely to have many social supports or networks within the host communities. As such, it is not clear, a priori whether support programs that have been effective elsewhere (and that might be effective for the local population) will be as effective for them. There are few studies that have considered the impact of cash transfer programs on the welfare of forcibly displaced populations. Lehman and Masterson (2014) use a regression discontinuity design and show that providing cash assistance for the purchase of winter items to Syrian refugees and Lebanese returnees in Lebanon significantly increases the consumption of these items (although most of the money was spent on more basic items such as food and water). Hidrobo et al. (2014) rely on a multi-arm randomized controlled trial and study the impact of cash transfers, food transfers, and food vouchers on Colombian refugees in Ecuador. They find that all methods improve both the quantity and the quality of food consumed, with cash transfers being the cheapest modality and the one that beneficiaries are most satisfied with. Both of these studies had a fairly narrow focus (winter items or food) that was targeted exclusively at the displaced population and were implemented in settings where the local host population enjoyed relatively high living standards. Furthermore, in both studies, the intervention was a simple cash (or equivalent) transfer, without accompanying support for the development of livelihoods. The PARCA impact evaluation, instead, focuses on a broader set of outcomes (which include consumption, wellbeing, and social capital), targets both host and displaced individuals, is implemented in a fragile setting among the poorest in the world, and the intervention (which combines cash, training, and coaching) has a broader objective of improving the livelihood and integration of the participants. The current evidence base on the impacts of such programs within highly fragile contexts with a high share of forcibly individuals thus remains critically low.[26]

Psychological wellbeing has become the focus of a small but growing strand in the development economics literature. In particular, the feedback loop between poverty, stress, and negative affective states has been suggested as the potential cause of a "poverty trap", which appears hard to break (Haushofer and Fehr, 2014). The study population includes displaced individuals that have gone through intense physical and psychological stress, we will be able to investigate how our program helps to alleviate some of these negative psychological states. In a recent study, also set in Niger, Bossuroy et al. (2022) evaluate the impact of a program which added a lump-sum cash transfer and/or a psychosocial intervention to a multi-faceted national cash transfer program that included other components such as group savings and

[26] We are also aware of ongoing work in Uganda which studies the impact of a "graduation" program on the livelihoods of refugees in a camp setting and surrounding host communities. See https://www.poverty-action.org/study/impact-graduation-program-livelihoods-refugee-and-host-communities-uganda.

entrepreneurship training. The program was targeted towards poor female beneficiaries (it did not target forcibly displaced individuals) and found that both the lump-sum cash transfer and the psychosocial intervention impacted on outcomes but through different mechanisms. The former was through increased autonomy and control over earnings and productive activities, while the latter was through improved social relationships within the local community and social capital. While our study does not include a psychosocial intervention, by examining outcomes relating to psychological wellbeing, social capital, and integration within the community we can explore whether similar mechanisms are at play in our context.

Verme and Schuettler (2021) provide a review of the evidence on the impact of IDPs and refugees on host communities, concluding that in most cases the effects on host-community household wellbeing, employment, and wages are positive. Where negative effects are found, they disappear over time. Improving integration between forcibly displaced persons and host communities is crucial for the long-term sustainability of resettlement programs. Interventions, such as PARCA, that provide cash transfers and training can help not only the displaced populations but also the host communities to cope and build more sustainable livelihoods in an inclusive way. On the one hand, this could lead to more positive attitudes towards the displaced within the community since they can start contributing to economic activity in the area. Indeed, Jacobsen (2002) suggests that pursuit of livelihoods by refugees can increase human security over the longer term, as economic activities help to create social and economic interdependence within and between communities and can create social networks based on the exchange of labor, assets, and food. On the other hand, the displaced could be seen as taking away economic opportunities from the local host population, and the program could thus decrease community cohesion. Which effect dominates is ultimately an empirical question.

This study also contributes to the recent literature exploring the impact of cash transfers on the decision to migrate. Adhikari and Gantilini (2018) provide an extensive review of the recent literature examining whether and how social assistance programs affect mobility. They conclude that receipt of cash transfer type programs does enter households' decision-making processes in relation to migration, but the impact depends on the type of program. Social assistance programs that relax liquidity constraints or are conditioned on migrating have strong positive effects on mobility while programs that are focused on integrating recipients with the local community deter migration. The cash transfer component of PARCA program will relax liquidity constraints while the entrepreneurship support component will encourage integration into the local community.

The specific features of this program will allow us to analyze In detail the spillover effects on non-recipients. The program hopes to raise the overall living standards of the entire community, by promoting economic activities which might in turn translate in economic growth and employment opportunities for everyone (Egger et al., 2021). Recent evidence, however, indicates that cash transfer programs might also have detrimental effects on non-recipients (Haushofer and Shapiro, 2016, 2018). Higher prices and negative psychological consequences on non-recipients are among the potential explanations for such negative effects. There is, however, still limited evidence on the mechanisms. PARCA impact evaluation will shed some light on these spillovers, by considering non-recipients at different points of the income distribution and comparing them to similar individuals in pure control villages.

Appendix 2: Methodology

The main analysis and the first spillover analysis are based on a sample of households successfully tracked from baseline to endline. The results are largely consistent when the full sample is used (i.e., without the inclusion of baseline controls).

The main comparisons explore differences between treated households in treatment villages and eligible households in control villages (main sample). This specification provides the direct effect of participating in the PARCA entrepreneurship program on eligible households. Comparing eligible households in control villages ensures that the sample is comparable.

The team then compares eligible but untreated households in treatment villages with eligible households in control villages (Spillover sample 1). These are referred to as pure spillovers, comparing eligible households in treated and control villages. For each of these two comparisons, there are two different specifications: (i) including baseline controls for the outcome and the baseline IDP status of the household; (ii) exploring heterogeneity by IDP status at baseline.

Finally, the team compares ineligible households in treatment villages with ineligible households in control villages, referring to these as the ineligible spillovers. For this sample, only endline data are available, so the specification is a simple bivariate analysis of the impact of the treatment variables on the outcome of interest.

In all cases, commune dummies (stratification dummies) are included. Standard errors are clustered at the commune level, and control means at endline are also presented for each specification.

Continuous variables are transformed using an inverse hyperbolic sine transformation to control for outliers in the distribution. Following Bellamare and Wichman (2020), this is appropriate when the untransformed means are roughly greater than 10, which is the case for all variables that we transform using the IHS transformation. While the transformation affects the magnitudes of the effects, the sign and statistical significance will remain the same.

Appendix 3: Outcomes description

N	Title	Survey Question
1	Household total income (last 30 days)	What was the total income (from all sources) of this household over the past 30 days?
2	Food expenditures (last 30 days)	How much did the household spend in the last 30 days on the following items: Food
3	Tobacco and alcohol (last 30 days)	How much did the household spend in the last 30 days on the following items: Tobacco and Alcohol
4	Utilities (last 30 days)	How much did the household spend in the last 30 days on the following items: Utilities
5	Health (last 30 days)	How much did the household spend in the last 30 days on the following items: Health
6	Leisure (last 30 days)	How much did the household spend in the last 30 days on the following items: Leisure
7	Profit from main business (last 30 days)	How much profit did you earn from this activity in the last 30 days?
8	Profit from all business (last 30 days)	How much profit did you earn from this activity in the last 30 days?
9	Rented land (last 3 months)	Has your household rented any agricultural land in the past 3 months?
10	Own livestock	How many units of the following livestock does your household own?
11	Any savings	Do you have any savings ? (For example, money in a saving bank, savings group, cash at home, jewelry at home etc..)
12	Any loans	Do you and/or your spouse have any loans outstanding?
13	Trust index	Mean index: How much do you trust the following people ? The village leader / The mayor / The regional governor / The President / Family / Neighbors / Own tribe / Own village / Other village / Other tribe / Foreigners.
14	Trust index: Leaders	Mean index: How much do you trust the following people ? The village leader / The mayor / The regional governor / The President
15	Trust index: Locals	Mean index: How much do you trust the following people ?Family / Neighbors / Own tribe / Own village.
16	Trust index: Foreigners	Mean index: How much do you trust the following people ?Other village / Other tribe / Foreigners.

17	Conflict between refugees and hosts	Equal to 1 if respondent answered yes to one of the following: "Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between refugees and host communities in this village?"
18	Conflict between IDPs and hosts	Equal to 1 if respondent answered yes to one of the following: "Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between IDPs and host communities in this village?"
19	Conflict between refugees and hosts: over land	Over the past 3 MONTHS, how often were there land disputes between refugee and host communities in this village?
20	Conflict between refugees and hosts: over water	Over the past 3 MONTHS, how often were there water disputes between refugee and host communities in this village?
21	Conflict between refugees and hosts: over discrimination	Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between refugee and host communities in this village? - Discrimination
22	Conflict between IDPs and hosts: over land	Over the past 3 MONTHS, how often were there land disputes between IDPs and host communities in this village?
23	Conflict between IDPs and hosts: over water	Over the past 3 MONTHS, how often were there water disputes between IDPs and host communities in this village?
24	Conflict between IDPs and hosts: over discrimination	Over the past 12 MONTHS, which of the following disputes do you know have occurred between IDPs and host communities in this village? - Discrimination

Appendix 4: Balance Table

Table 1: Summary of Baseline Control (Phase 2) and Treatment (Phase 1) villages

	Control	Treatment	All
HH	1374	1469	2843
Villages	82	88	170

Table 2: Household Balance Checks Treatment versus Control

	Control	n	Treatment	n	Difference	N
Male HHH	0.831	1352	0.838	1462	0.009	2814
	[0.375]		[0.369]		[0.020]	
Age HHH	42.163	1374	42.349	1469	0.125	2843
	[13.939]		[14.016]		[0.634]	
Education (none)	0.852	1374	0.860	1469	0.010	2843
	[0.356]		[0.347]		[0.019]	
# of adults	3.753	1374	3.703	1469	-0.040	2843
	[2.134]		[2.062]		[0.099]	
# Children <5	1.316	1374	1.356	1469	0.060	2843
	[1.169]		[1.204]		[0.056]	
At least one HH member is IDP	0.370	1374	0.367	1469	-0.028	2843
	[0.483]		[0.482]		[0.035]	
At least one HH member is a Refugee	0.114	1374	0.151	1469	0.030	2843
	[0.318]		[0.358]		[0.029]	
HH income per capita last 30 days	3259.159	1374	3412.545	1469	35.623	2843
	[6284.996]		[6181.743]		[298.734]	
Self-Employed/Business Owner	0.091	1374	0.112	1469	0.021	2843
	[0.288]		[0.316]		[0.013]	
Owns agricultural land	0.655	1374	0.643	1469	0.007	2843
	[0.476]		[0.479]		[0.026]	
HFIAS 30 days - Food Insecurity	6.900	1374	7.155	1469	0.244	2843
	[2.860]		[2.707]		[0.145]*	
At risk of clinical depression	0.016	1374	0.028	1469	0.012	2843
	[0.126]		[0.165]		[0.007]*	
Risk Aversion (Scale 1 to 4)	2.932	1374	3.040	1469	0.092	2843
	[1.300]		[1.291]		[0.067]	
Most people can be trusted	0.557	1326	0.562	1434	0.007	2760
	[0.497]		[0.496]		[0.021]	
Any dispute between refugees and hosts	0.110	1374	0.147	1469	0.031	2843
	[0.313]		[0.354]		[0.018]*	
Any dispute between idps and hosts	0.100	1374	0.135	1469	0.030	2843
	[0.301]		[0.342]		[0.017]*	

Natural disaster past 12 months	0.712	1374	0.737	1469	0.033	2843
	[0.453]		[0.440]		[0.023]	
Economic shock past 12 months	0.852	1374	0.862	1469	0.017	2843
	[0.356]		[0.345]		[0.017]	
HH Asset Index	0.029	1374	0.067	1469	0.021	2843
	[0.988]		[1.221]		[0.088]	
Savings	0.009	1374	0.012	1469	0.003	2843
	[0.093]		[0.107]		[0.004]	

Note 1: *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively. The sample includes all households in the 170 villages surveyed in wave 1 of the baseline surveys which made it to the endline. Estimates control for commune fixed effects. Standard errors clustered by village.

Appendix 6: Household income and expenditures

Table 3: Impacts on participants' income

Dep variable:	HH Income		Extensive margins		Intensive margins	
Program Impact	0.598***	0.233	0.0382***	0.00922	0.157**	0.117
	(0.160)	(0.177)	(0.0119)	(0.0118)	(0.0676)	(0.0894)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.802***		0.0638**		0.0903
		(0.302)		(0.0246)		(0.110)
Displaced HH	-0.111	-0.583**	0.00253	-0.0349	-0.149*	-0.203**
	(0.161)	(0.282)	(0.0129)	(0.0237)	(0.0791)	(0.0991)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)	0.795323				0.167698	
Elasticity Program Impact Host		0.242275				0.119266
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH		1.722361				0.225635
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	10.61726	10.61726	0.939353	0.9393531	11.30274	11.30274
Observations	1,681	1,681	1,681	1,681	1,618	1,618
R-squared	0.050	0.057	0.030	0.037	0.068	0.069

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 4: Impacts on non-program participants (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) income.

Dep variable:	HH Income		Extensive margins		Intensive margins	
Program Impact	0.598**	0.0782	0.0386**	0.00117	0.159	0.0589
	(0.237)	(0.285)	(0.0169)	(0.0185)	(0.0998)	(0.138)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.980***		0.0706***		0.190
		(0.337)		(0.0265)		(0.126)
Displaced HH	0.0173	-0.512*	0.00510	-0.0330	-0.0490	-0.153
	(0.205)	(0.294)	(0.0146)	(0.0240)	(0.104)	(0.113)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)	0.768				0.167	
Elasticity Program Impact Host		0.038				0.051
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH		1.76965				0.2767049
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	10.61726	10.61726	0.9393531	0.9393531	11.30274	11.30274
Observations	1,415	1,415	1,415	1,415	1,357	1,357
R-squared	0.062	0.071	0.039	0.046	0.069	0.071

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 5: Impacts on non-program participants (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') income

Dep variable:	HH Income	Extensive	Intensive
Treatment	0.358**	0.0190	0.148**
	(0.176)	(0.0131)	(0.0642)
Elasticity Treatment	0.408		0.157
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	10.661	0.947	11.256
Observations	1,545	1,545	1,485
R-squared	0.036	0.018	0.085

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 6: Impacts on participant's expenditures

Dep variable:	Food		Tobacco and alcohol		Leisure goods		Utilities		Health	
Program Impact	0.129**	0.167**	-0.325*	-0.175	0.215	-0.317	0.404***	0.320**	0.0220	0.278**
	(0.0574)	(0.0768)	(0.182)	(0.238)	(0.281)	(0.313)	(0.118)	(0.156)	(0.102)	(0.116)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		-0.0834		-0.328		1.165**		0.182		-0.560***
		(0.101)		(0.320)		(0.481)		(0.213)		(0.187)
Displaced HH	-0.146**	-0.0999	0.284	0.465	0.250	-0.393	0.00421	-0.0971	-0.0446	0.264
	(0.0565)	(0.0822)	(0.181)	(0.284)	(0.279)	(0.391)	(0.139)	(0.205)	(0.115)	(0.172)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)	0.136		-0.289		0.191		0.487		0.017	
Elasticity Program Impact Host		0.179		-0.184		-0.307		0.361		0.311
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH		0.0846		-0.4129799		1.138062		0.632127		-0.255215
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	10.91257	10.91257	1.30554	1.30554	3.06379	3.06379	7.974573	7.974573	9.235851	9.235851
Observations	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681
R-squared	0.072	0.073	0.081	0.082	0.056	0.061	0.087	0.088	0.021	0.028

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 7: Impacts on non-program participants' (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) expenditures

Dep variable:	Food		Tobacco and alcohol		Leisure goods		Utilities		Health	
Program Impact	0.100	0.0947	-0.603***	-0.635**	-0.162	-0.310	0.272*	0.175	-0.103	0.165
	(0.0866)	(0.117)	(0.197)	(0.252)	(0.323)	(0.409)	(0.163)	(0.226)	(0.140)	(0.180)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.0101		0.0576		0.265		0.174		-0.482**
		(0.117)		(0.321)		(0.525)		(0.250)		(0.221)
Displaced HH	-0.0480	-0.0531	0.136	0.107	-0.471*	-0.604	0.0499	-0.0374	0.0706	0.311*
	(0.0595)	(0.0878)	(0.193)	(0.295)	(0.272)	(0.406)	(0.147)	(0.219)	(0.110)	(0.177)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)	0.101		-0.463		-0.193		0.295		-0.107	
Elasticity Program Impact Host		0.092		-0.486		-0.325		0.161		0.160
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH		0.1056986		-0.456386		-0.123988		0.3942193		-0.2824911
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	10.91257	10.91257	1.30554	1.30554	3.06379	3.06379	7.974573	7.974573	9.235851	9.235851
Observations	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.064	0.064	0.068	0.068	0.066	0.067	0.079	0.080	0.019	0.024

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 8: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') expenditures

Dep variable:	Food	Tobacco and alcohol	Leisure goods	Utilities	Health
Treatment	0.0985	-0.336*	-0.0997	0.318***	-0.133
	(0.0795)	(0.201)	(0.328)	(0.118)	(0.108)
Elasticity Treatment	0.100	-0.300	-0.142	0.365	-0.129
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	10.803	1.325	2.731	7.983	9.237
Observations	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650
R-squared	0.064	0.061	0.094	0.089	0.022

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Appendix 7: Profits

Table 9: Impacts on program participants' off farm IGA

Dep variable:	Any self employment / business		Profit main business		Profit all businesses	
Program Impact	-0.00990	0.000960	0.710***	1.103*	0.718***	1.127*
	(0.0231)	(0.0257)	(0.263)	(0.560)	(0.267)	(0.580)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		-0.0238		-0.605		-0.630
		(0.0432)		(0.556)		(0.578)
Displaced HH	0.0491	0.0622	0.295	0.661	0.277	0.658
	(0.0320)	(0.0395)	(0.202)	(0.435)	(0.204)	(0.457)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)			0.964		0.978	
Elasticity Program Impact Host				1.575		1.608
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				0.6095413		0.60871
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.19375	0.19375	10.11591	10.11591	10.16919	10.16919
Observations	2,681	2,681	552	552	552	552
R-squared	0.083	0.083	0.311	0.314	0.301	0.304

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 10: Impacts on non-program participants' (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) off farm IGA

Dep variable:	Any self employment / business		Profit main business		Profit all businesses	
Program Impact	-0.0230	-0.0562*	0.117	0.628	0.100	0.549
	(0.0265)	(0.0309)	(0.250)	(0.421)	(0.249)	(0.440)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.0597		-0.672		-0.590
		(0.0452)		(0.476)		(0.496)
Displaced HH	0.0803**	0.0505	-0.164	0.210	-0.155	0.174
	(0.0313)	(0.0412)	(0.238)	(0.361)	(0.239)	(0.380)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)			0.0891579		0.072	
Elasticity Program Impact Host				0.7153324		0.573
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				-0.0812856		-0.078
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.194	0.194	10.116	10.116	10.169	10.169
Observations	2,292	2,292	476	476	476	476
R-squared	0.088	0.090	0.409	0.411	0.403	0.405

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 11: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') off farm IGA

Dep variable:	Any self employment / business	Main business	All businesses
Treatment	0.00196	0.274	0.282
	(0.0400)	(0.230)	(0.235)
Elasticity Treatment		0.282	0.290
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	0.219	10.761	10.788
Observations	2,650	589	589
R-squared	0.079	0.075	0.078

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Appendix 8: Agricultural activities

Table 12: Impacts on program participants' agricultural activities

Dep variable:	Rented any agricultural land in last 3 months		Size of land rented		Own any livestock	
Program Impact	0.0208*	0.0171**	0.227*	-0.00685	0.0152	-0.0406
	(0.0110)	(0.00704)	(0.122)	(0.160)	(0.0353)	(0.0367)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		(0.0143)		0.401** (0.192)		(0.0569)
Displaced HH	0.00272	-0.000637	-0.0118	-0.218	-0.0660*	-0.117**
	(0.00750)	(0.00887)	(0.110)	(0.160)	(0.0367)	(0.0466)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)			0.246			
Elasticity Program Impact Host				-0.019		
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				0.467		
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.011	0.011	0.303	0.303	0.641	0.641
Observations	2,291	2,291	1,159	1,159	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.072	0.081	0.110	0.113

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 13: Impacts on non-program participants' (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) agricultural activities

Dep variable:	Rented any agricultural land in last 3 months		Size of land rented		Own any livestock	
Program Impact	0.0208*	0.0171**	0.234*	-0.00906	0.0152	-0.0406
	(0.0110)	(0.00704)	(0.122)	(0.161)	(0.0353)	(0.0367)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		(0.0143)		(0.189)		(0.0569)
Displaced HH	0.00272	-0.000637	-0.00992	-0.224	-0.0660*	-0.117**
	(0.00750)	(0.00887)	(0.111)	(0.160)	(0.0367)	(0.0466)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)			0.2539577			
Elasticity Program Impact Host				-0.0217842		
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				0.4861909		
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.011	0.011	0.322	0.322	0.641	0.641
Observations	2,291	2,291	1,159	1,159	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.027	0.027	0.076	0.085	0.110	0.113

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 14: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') agricultural activities

Dep variable:	Rented any agricultural land in last 3 months	Size of land rented	Own any livestock
Treatment	-0.101*	0.161**	0.136*
	(0.0522)	(0.0789)	(0.0786)
Elasticity Treatment		0.170	
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	0.007	0.328	0.566
Observations	3,031	1.362	1,362
R-squared	0.029	0.071	0.072

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Appendix 9: Financial Health

Table 15: Impacts on program participant's financial health

Dep variable:	Any loans outstanding		Any savings	
Program Impact	-0.0610***	-0.0126	0.0109*	0.00463
	(0.0198)	(0.0255)	(0.00592)	(0.00639)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		-0.106***		0.0137*
		(0.0356)		(0.00737)
Displaced HH	0.0561***	0.115***	-0.00191	-0.00948*
	(0.0185)	(0.0283)	(0.00459)	(0.00484)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)				
Elasticity Program Impact Host				
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.15	0.15	0.00625	0.00625
Observations	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681
R-squared	0.039	0.045	0.014	0.015

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 16: Impacts on non-program participants (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) financial health

Dep variable:	Any loans outstanding		Any savings	
Program Impact	-0.0596**	-0.0223	0.000113	-0.0113**
	(0.0231)	(0.0286)	(0.00398)	(0.00530)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		-0.0672*		0.0205***
		(0.0373)		(0.00695)
Displaced HH	0.0889***	0.122***	0.00417	-0.00605
	(0.0233)	(0.0304)	(0.00431)	(0.00467)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)				
Elasticity Program Impact Host				
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH				
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.150	0.150	0.006	0.006
Observations	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.031	0.033	0.005	0.008

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 17: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') financial health

Dep variable:	Any loans outstanding	Any savings
Treatment	-0.0408	0.00294
	(0.0281)	(0.00269)
Elasticity Treatment		
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No
Control Group Mean	0.181	0.004
Observations	2,650	2,650
R-squared	0.022	0.005

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Appendix 10: Social Cohesion

Table 18: Impacts on program participant's trust

Dep variable:	Trust Index		Trust Index (family/neighbors/own tribe/own village)		Trust Index (other village/other tribe/foreigners)		Trust Index (Leaders)		Trust Index (Displaced)		Trust Index (Locals)	
Program Impact	0.115***	0.0314	0.125***	0.0391	0.177***	0.109*	0.102**	0.0263	0.134**	0.0912	0.107**	0.0993*
	(0.0428)	(0.0413)	(0.0369)	(0.0387)	(0.0585)	(0.0649)	(0.0456)	(0.0480)	(0.0617)	(0.0615)	(0.0532)	(0.0548)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.180**		0.182***		0.146		0.167**		0.0902		0.0171
		(0.0764)		(0.0681)		(0.101)		(0.0824)		(0.106)		(0.0940)
Displaced HH	-0.0723*	-0.170**	-0.0709*	-0.172***	-0.0886*	-0.169**	-0.0645*	-0.155**	-0.0756	-0.126	-0.0781	-0.0874
	(0.0392)	(0.0657)	(0.0362)	(0.0585)	(0.0507)	(0.0822)	(0.0377)	(0.0662)	(0.0538)	(0.0896)	(0.0508)	(0.0822)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)												
Elasticity Program Impact Host												
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH												
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	3.309373	3.309373	3.49852	3.49852	2.97842	2.97842	3.45121	3.45121	3.058177	3.058177	3.248601	3.248601
Observations	2,162	2,162	2,523	2,523	2,390	2,390	2,410	2,410	2,410	2,410	2,533	2,533
R-squared	0.075	0.080	0.085	0.091	0.071	0.073	0.061	0.065	0.059	0.060	0.047	0.047

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 19: Impacts on non-program participants (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) trust

Dep variable:	Trust Index		Trust Index (family/neighbors/own tribe/own village)		Trust Index (other village/other tribe/foreigners)		Trust Index (Leaders)		Trust Index (Displaced)		Trust Index (Locals)	
Treatment	0.104**	0.0264	0.101**	0.0191	0.160**	0.0681	0.0749	0.0179	0.140**	0.0864	0.0502	0.0576
	(0.0482)	(0.0484)	(0.0447)	(0.0432)	(0.0680)	(0.0816)	(0.0560)	(0.0548)	(0.0685)	(0.0658)	(0.0624)	(0.0661)
Treatment X Displaced HH		0.142*		0.147**		0.166		0.105		0.0950		-0.0131
		(0.0796)		(0.0708)		(0.106)		(0.0864)		(0.106)		(0.104)
Displaced HH	-0.0721*	-0.140**	-0.0833**	-0.157***	-0.0538	-0.135	-0.0955**	-0.145**	-0.0260	-0.0734	-0.0771	-0.0706
	(0.0418)	(0.0647)	(0.0356)	(0.0570)	(0.0540)	(0.0827)	(0.0430)	(0.0657)	(0.0538)	(0.0881)	(0.0578)	(0.0839)
Elasticity Treatment (All)												
Elasticity Treatment Host												
Elasticity Treatment Displaced HH												
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	3.309	3.309	3.499	3.499	2.978	2.978	3.451	3.451	3.058	3.058	3.249	3.249
Observations	1,864	1,864	2,180	2,180	2,064	2,064	2,060	2,060	2,096	2,096	2,187	2,187
R-squared	0.072	0.075	0.075	0.078	0.053	0.055	0.057	0.058	0.047	0.048	0.041	0.041

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 20: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') trust

Dep variable:	Trust Index	Trust Index (family/neighbors/own tribe/own village)	Trust Index (other village/other tribe/foreigners)	Trust Index (Leaders)	Trust Index (Displaced)	Trust Index (Locals)
Treatment	0.193***	0.160***	0.221***	0.219***	0.201**	0.232***
	(0.0547)	(0.0511)	(0.0817)	(0.0551)	(0.0808)	(0.0746)
Elasticity Treatment						
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	3.245	3.451	2.947	3.322	2.987	3.113
Observations	2,433	2,562	2,538	2,539	2,541	2,572
R-squared	0.112	0.106	0.082	0.090	0.078	0.054

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 21: Impacts on program participants' reported disputes between refugees and hosts

Dep variable:	Any refugee-host disputes in village?		Refugee dispute: land conflict		Refugee dispute: water conflict		Refugee dispute: discrimination refugees		Refugee dispute: physical agression refugees		Refugee dispute: theft refugees		Refugee dispute: robbery refugees	
Program Impact	0.0776***	0.0242	0.0600***	0.0247	0.0269	0.000425	0.0429***	0.0345***	0.0221	0.00586	0.0142	-0.00385	0.00486	0.00182
	(0.0252)	(0.0255)	(0.0208)	(0.0158)	(0.0184)	(0.0135)	(0.0136)	(0.0120)	(0.0153)	(0.0190)	(0.0113)	(0.0142)	(0.0120)	(0.0181)
Program Impact X Displaced HH		0.117***		0.0772**		0.0580**		0.0185		0.0355		0.0395**		0.00665
		(0.0396)		(0.0299)		(0.0281)		(0.0211)		(0.0247)		(0.0181)		(0.0187)
Displaced HH	0.00577	-0.0588*	0.0287	-0.0140	-0.0150	-0.0469*	-0.00293	-0.0131	0.00205	-0.0175	0.0117	-0.0101	0.00330	-0.000367
	(0.0238)	(0.0341)	(0.0185)	(0.0251)	(0.0183)	(0.0262)	(0.0166)	(0.0193)	(0.0159)	(0.0213)	(0.00991)	(0.0130)	(0.00861)	(0.0131)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)														
Elasticity Program Impact Host														
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced HH														
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.124219	0.124219	0.036719	0.0367188	0.063281	0.063281	0.027344	0.027344	0.036719	0.036719	0.024219	0.024219	0.024219	0.024219
Observations	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681
R-squared	0.096	0.102	0.062	0.068	0.060	0.062	0.048	0.048	0.027	0.029	0.023	0.026	0.026	0.026

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 22: Impacts on non-program participants' (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) reported disputes between refugees and hosts

Dep variable:	Any refugee-host disputes in village?		Refugee dispute: land conflict		Refugee dispute: water conflict		Refugee dispute: discrimination refugees		Refugee dispute: physical agression refugees		Refugee dispute: theft refugees		Refugee dispute: robbery refugees	
Treatment	0.0687**	0.0322	0.0473***	0.0274	0.0348	0.00243	0.0171	0.0122	0.0175	0.0134	0.0252**	0.00594	-0.00233	0.00632
	(0.0294)	(0.0305)	(0.0178)	(0.0183)	(0.0235)	(0.0179)	(0.0133)	(0.0137)	(0.0123)	(0.0161)	(0.0126)	(0.0148)	(0.00908)	(0.0138)
Treatment X Displaced HH		0.0658		0.0359		0.0583*		0.00880		0.00734		0.0346*		-0.0156
		(0.0433)		(0.0279)		(0.0302)		(0.0210)		(0.0205)		(0.0182)		(0.0139)
Displaced HH	0.0217	-0.0111	0.0186	0.000675	0.00746	-0.0216	0.0195	0.0151	0.00385	0.000193	0.0100	-0.00724	-0.00179	0.00597
	(0.0275)	(0.0321)	(0.0216)	(0.0248)	(0.0200)	(0.0242)	(0.0142)	(0.0156)	(0.0140)	(0.0181)	(0.00953)	(0.0121)	(0.00798)	(0.0115)
Elasticity Treatment (All)														
Elasticity Treatment Host														
Elasticity Treatment Displaced HH														
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.124	0.124	0.037	0.037	0.063	0.063	0.027	0.027	0.037	0.037	0.024	0.024	0.024	0.024
Observations	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.080	0.082	0.049	0.050	0.055	0.058	0.039	0.039	0.028	0.028	0.030	0.033	0.034	0.035

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 23: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') reported disputes between refugees and hosts

Dep variable:	Any refugee-host disputes in village?	Refugee dispute: land conflict	Refugee dispute: water conflict	Refugee dispute: discrimination refugees	Refugee dispute: physical agression refugees	Refugee dispute: theft refugees	Refugee dispute: robbery refugees
Treatment	0.189***	0.0579**	-0.00438	0.0259	0.00385	-0.00141	-0.00186
	(0.0327)	(0.0251)	(0.0204)	(0.0218)	(0.0216)	(0.0113)	(0.0112)
Elasticity Treatment							
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	0.162	0.040	0.101	0.049	0.050	0.035	0.030
Observations	3,031	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650
R-squared	0.095	0.070	0.069	0.060	0.009	0.017	0.014

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 24: Impacts on program participants' reported disputes between IDPs and hosts

Dep variable:	Any IDP-host disputes in village?		IDP dispute: land conflict		IDP dispute: water conflict		IDP dispute: discrimination IDPs		IDP dispute: physical agression IDPs		IDP dispute: theft IDPs		IDP dispute: robbery IDPs	
Program Impact	0.0774***	0.0199	0.0650***	0.0348**	0.0284	-0.00348	0.0297**	0.0188*	0.0249	-0.00349	0.0118	-0.00822	0.00845	0.00516
	(0.0259)	(0.0254)	(0.0183)	(0.0140)	(0.0195)	(0.0129)	(0.0145)	(0.0111)	(0.0153)	(0.0191)	(0.0108)	(0.0144)	(0.0121)	(0.0170)
Program Impact X Displaced_HH		0.126***		0.0662**		0.0698**		0.0239		0.0622**		0.0437**		0.00721
		(0.0403)		(0.0274)		(0.0307)		(0.0212)		(0.0253)		(0.0188)		(0.0183)
Displaced HH	0.0148	-0.0547	0.0273*	-0.00926	-0.0204	-0.0589**	0.00853	-0.00461	0.0136	-0.0207	-0.000404	-0.0245*	0.00898	0.00500
	(0.0245)	(0.0357)	(0.0164)	(0.0229)	(0.0192)	(0.0281)	(0.0152)	(0.0191)	(0.0165)	(0.0223)	(0.0102)	(0.0133)	(0.00728)	(0.0122)
Elasticity Program Impact (All)														
Elasticity Program Impact Host														
Elasticity Program Impact Displaced_HH														
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.122656	0.122656	0.026563	0.0265625	0.066406	0.066406	0.030469	0.030469	0.035938	0.035938	0.025	0.025	0.019531	0.019531
Observations	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681	2,681
R-squared	0.103	0.110	0.062	0.067	0.076	0.080	0.042	0.043	0.037	0.042	0.024	0.028	0.032	0.033

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 25: Impacts on non-program participants' (eligible 'medium poor' not selected at lottery) reported disputes between IDPs and hosts

	Any IDP-host disputes in village?		IDP dispute: land conflict		IDP dispute: water conflict		IDP dispute: discrimination IDPs		IDP dispute: physical agression IDPs		IDP dispute: theft IDPs		IDP dispute: robbery IDPs	
Treatment	0.0485*	0.0133	0.0504***	0.0357**	0.0263	-0.00354	-0.00838	-0.00605	0.0253*	0.0105	0.0176*	-0.00241	-0.00180	0.00254
	(0.0278)	(0.0268)	(0.0162)	(0.0154)	(0.0226)	(0.0183)	(0.0135)	(0.0114)	(0.0138)	(0.0150)	(0.00996)	(0.0115)	(0.00860)	(0.00981)
Treatment X Displaced HH		0.0633		0.0266		0.0538*		-0.00419		0.0266		0.0361**		-0.00782
		(0.0414)		(0.0267)		(0.0283)		(0.0207)		(0.0226)		(0.0159)		(0.0109)
Displaced HH	0.0186	-0.0130	0.0187	0.00540	-0.000969	-0.0278	0.0128	0.0149	0.0109	-0.00238	0.00172	-0.0162	0.00111	0.00500
	(0.0266)	(0.0323)	(0.0191)	(0.0222)	(0.0192)	(0.0248)	(0.0137)	(0.0155)	(0.0146)	(0.0196)	(0.00955)	(0.0118)	(0.00692)	(0.00985)
Elasticity Treatment (All)														
Elasticity Treatment Host														
Elasticity Treatment Displaced HH														
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Control Group Mean	0.123	0.123	0.027	0.027	0.066	0.066	0.030	0.030	0.036	0.036	0.025	0.025	0.020	0.020
Observations	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292	2,292
R-squared	0.084	0.086	0.062	0.063	0.059	0.061	0.035	0.035	0.029	0.030	0.030	0.033	0.040	0.041

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.

Table 26: Impacts on non-program participants' (non-eligible 'ultra poor' and 'less poor') reported disputes between IDPs and hosts

Dep variable:	Any IDP-host disputes in village?	IDP dispute: land conflict	IDP dispute: water	IDP dispute: discrimination IDPs	IDP dispute: physical agression IDPs	IDP dispute: theft IDPs	IDP dispute: robbery IDPs
Treatment	0.188***	0.0635***	-0.00460	0.0399**	0.0138	-0.00436	0.00721
	(0.0328)	(0.0242)	(0.0205)	(0.0190)	(0.0200)	(0.00941)	(0.0112)
Elasticity Treatment							
Stratification dummies	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Baseline outcome	No	No	No	No	No	No	No
Control Group Mean	0.159	0.028	0.102	0.041	0.044	0.029	0.022
Observations	3,031	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650	2,650
R-squared	0.094	0.069	0.075	0.055	0.009	0.010	0.016

Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the village level.